Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-
and Long-Term National Needs (07-NOV-01, GAO-02-160T).
According to U.S. intelligence assessments, the United States now
confronts a range of diffuse threats that put increased
destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and
individuals and threaten our values and way of life. These
threats range from incidents of terrorism and attacks on critical
infrastructure to cyber attacks, the potential use of weapons of
mass destruction, and the spread of infectious diseases. A
framework to address these challenges will require leadership
with to develop and implement a homeland security strategy in
coordination with all relevant partners, as well as the ability
to marshal and direct the necessary resources. The recent
establishment of the Office of Homeland Security is a good first
step, but a series of questions must be addressed regarding how
this office will be structured, what authority its Director will
have, and how this effort can be institutionalized and sustained
over time. While homeland security is an urgent and vital
national priority, the U.S. should recognize the range of
challenges facing our government in other areas not as visible or
urgent. As the country responds to these urgent priorities of
today and the enduring long-term requirements related to homeland
security, the nation still must address short-term and long-term
fiscal challenges that were present before September 11, 2001,
and that remain today.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-160T
ACCNO: A02416
TITLE: Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in
Addressing Short- and Long-Term National Needs
DATE: 11/07/2001
SUBJECT: Defense capabilities
Emergency preparedness
Safety
Strategic planning
Terrorism
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GAO-02-160T
Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 1: 00 p. m., EST Wednesday November
7, 2001
HOMELAND SECURITY Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and Long-
Term National Needs
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States
GAO- 02- 160T
Page 1 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: The terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, have profoundly changed the agendas of the Congress, the
White House, federal agencies, state and local governments, and a number of
private sector entities, while simultaneously altering the way of life for
many Americans. The grave events of September 11th not only ended the debate
about whether threats to our homeland are real, but also shattered the false
sense of invulnerability within our nation?s borders. At the same time, the
aftermath of the attacks also clearly demonstrates the spirit of America and
the enormous capacity of this nation to unite; to coordinate efforts among
federal, state and local agencies, as well as among private businesses,
community groups, and individual citizens in response to a crisis; and to
make the sacrifices necessary to respond both to these new threats and the
consequences they entail.
Our challenge is to build upon this renewed purpose in ways that create both
short- and long- term benefits and allow us to sustain our efforts. As the
lesson from history inscribed on the front of the National Archives states,
?Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.? Our fight against terrorism is
not a short- term effort, and homeland security will forevermore be a
priority for our nation. As a result, we must find the best ways to sustain
our efforts over a significant time period and leverage our finite
resources, both human and financial, in ways that will have the greatest
effects.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today a framework for
addressing federal efforts to improve our homeland security and the fiscal
implications that these actions may have for our nation. Specifically, I
will discuss the nature of the threats posed to our nation, key elements of
a framework to address homeland security, and the potential short- and long-
term fiscal implications these efforts may have for the nation.
According to a variety of U. S. intelligence assessments, the United States
now confronts a range of increasingly diffuse threats that put increased
destructive power into the hands of small states, groups, and individuals
and threaten our values and way of life. These threats range from incidents
of terrorism and attacks on critical infrastructure to cyber attacks, the
potential use of various weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of
infectious diseases. Each of these threats has varying degrees of potential
to cause significant casualties and disruption. GAO has reported on many of
these issues over the past several years, and the changing nature of
security threats in the post- Cold War world remains a key theme Summary
Page 2 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
in our strategic plan. Appendix I contains a summary of our work and
products in this area.
An effective framework to address these challenges will require not only
leadership with a clear vision to develop and implement a homeland security
strategy in coordination with all relevant partners but also the ability to
marshal and direct the necessary resources to get the job done. The recent
establishment of the Office of Homeland Security is a good first step, but a
series of questions must be addressed regarding how this office will be
structured, what authority its Director will have, and how this effort can
be institutionalized and sustained over time. The Director will need to
define the scope and objectives of a homeland security strategy. This
strategy should be comprehensive and encompass steps designed to reduce our
vulnerabilities, deter attacks, manage the effects of any successful
attacks, and provide for appropriate response. The strategy will involve all
levels of government, the private sector, individual citizens both here and
abroad, and other nations. Our strategy should also use a risk management
approach to focus finite national resources on areas of greatest need.
While homeland security is an urgent and vital national priority, we should
recognize that the challenges it presents illustrate the range of challenges
facing our government in other areas not as visible or urgent- but
nevertheless important. These include a lack of mission clarity; too much
fragmentation and overlap; the need to improve the federal government?s
human capital strategy; difficulties in coordination and operation across
levels of government and across sectors of the economy; and the need to
better measure performance.
As we respond to these urgent priorities of today and the enduring longterm
requirements related to homeland security, our nation still must address a
number of other short- term and long- term fiscal challenges that were
present before September 11, 2001, and remain today. Our history suggests
that we have incurred sizable deficits when the security or the economy of
the nation was at risk. We are fortunate to face these risks at a time when
we have some near- term budgetary flexibility. It is important to remember,
however, that the long- term pressures on the budget have not lessened. In
fact, they have increased due to the slowing economy and the increased
spending levels expected for fiscal year 2002. As a result, the ultimate
task of addressing today?s urgent needs without unduly exacerbating our
long- range fiscal challenges has become much more difficult.
Page 3 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
The United States and other nations face increasingly diffuse threats in the
post- Cold War era. In the future, potential adversaries are more likely to
strike vulnerable civilian or military targets in nontraditional ways to
avoid direct confrontation with our military forces on the battlefield. The
December 2000 national security strategy states that porous borders, rapid
technological change, greater information flow, and the destructive power of
weapons now within the reach of small states, groups, and individuals make
such threats more viable and endanger our values, way of life, and the
personal security of our citizens.
Figure 1: Threats to National Security
Hostile nations, terrorist groups, transnational criminals, and individuals
may target American people, institutions, and infrastructure with cyber
attacks, weapons of mass destruction, or bioterrorism. International
criminal activities such as money laundering, arms smuggling, and drug
trafficking can undermine the stability of social and financial institutions
and the health of our citizens. Other national emergencies may arise from
naturally occurring or unintentional sources such as outbreaks of The Nature
of the
Threat Facing the United States
Page 4 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
infectious disease. As we witnessed in the tragic events of September 11,
2001, some of the emerging threats can produce mass casualties. They can
lead to mass disruption of critical infrastructure, involve the use of
biological or chemical weapons, and can have serious implications for both
our domestic and the global economy. The integrity of our mail has already
been compromised. Terrorists could also attempt to compromise the integrity
or delivery of water or electricity to our citizens, compromise the safety
of the traveling public, and undermine the soundness of government and
commercial data systems supporting many activities.
A fundamental role of the federal government under our Constitution is to
protect America and its citizens from both foreign and domestic threats. The
government must be able to prevent and deter threats to our homeland as well
as detect impending danger before attacks or incidents occur. We also must
be ready to manage the crises and consequences of an event, to treat
casualties, reconstitute damaged infrastructure, and move the nation
forward. Finally, the government must be prepared to retaliate against the
responsible parties in the event of an attack. To accomplish this role and
address our new priority on homeland security, several critical elements
must be put in place. First, effective leadership is needed to guide our
efforts as well as secure and direct related resources across the many
boundaries within and outside of the federal government. Second, a
comprehensive homeland security strategy is needed to prevent, deter, and
mitigate terrorism and terrorist acts, including the means to measure
effectiveness. Third, managing the risks of terrorism and prioritizing the
application of resources will require a careful assessment of the threats we
face, our vulnerabilities, and the most critical infrastructure within our
borders.
On September 20, 2001, we issued a report that discussed a range of
challenges confronting policymakers in the war on terrorism and offered a
series of recommendations. 1 We recommended that the government needs
clearly defined and effective leadership to develop a comprehensive strategy
for combating terrorism, to oversee development of a new national- threat
and risk assessment, and to coordinate implementation among federal
agencies. In addition, we recommended that the
1 Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations (GAO-
01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001). Key Elements to
Improve Homeland Security
Leadership Provided by the Office of Homeland Security
Page 5 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
government address the broader issue of homeland security. We also noted
that overall leadership and management efforts to combat terrorism are
fragmented because no single focal point manages and oversees the many
functions conducted by more than 40 different federal departments and
agencies. 2
For example, we have reported that many leadership and coordination
functions for combating terrorism were not given to the National Coordinator
for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism within the
Executive Office of the President. Rather, these leadership and coordination
functions are spread among several agencies, including the Department of
Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, we
reported that federal training programs on preparedness against weapons of
mass destruction were not well coordinated among agencies resulting in
inefficiencies and concerns among rescue crews in the first responder
community. The Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency have taken steps to reduce duplication and
improve coordination. Despite these efforts, state and local officials and
organizations representing first responders indicate that there is still
confusion about these programs. We made recommendations to consolidate
certain activities, but have not received full agreement from the respective
agencies on these matters.
In his September 20, 2001, address to the Congress, President Bush announced
that he was appointing Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Ridge to provide a focus
to homeland security. As outlined in the President?s speech and confirmed in
a recent executive order, 3 the new Homeland Security Adviser will be
responsible for coordinating federal, state, and local efforts and for
leading, overseeing, and coordinating a comprehensive national strategy to
safeguard the nation against terrorism and respond to any attacks that may
occur.
Both the focus of the executive order and the appointment of a coordinator
within the Executive Office of the President fit the need to act
2 Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy (GAO- 01- 556T, March 27, 2001). 3 Establishing the Office of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, E. O. 13228, Oct. 8,
2001.
Page 6 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
rapidly in response to the threats that surfaced in the events of September
11 and the anthrax issues we continue to face. Although this was a good
first step, a number of important questions related to institutionalizing
and sustaining the effort over the long term remain, including:
What will be included in the definition of homeland security? What are the
specific homeland security goals and objectives?
How can the coordinator identify and prioritize programs that are spread
across numerous agencies at all levels of government? What criteria will be
established to determine whether an activity does or does not qualify as
related to homeland security?
How can the coordinator have a real impact in the budget and resource
allocation process?
Should the coordinator?s roles and responsibilities be based on specific
statutory authority? And if so, what functions should be under the
coordinator?s control?
Depending on the basis, scope, structure, and organizational location of
this new position and entity, what are the implications for the Congress and
its ability to conduct effective oversight?
A similar approach was pursued to address the potential for computer
failures at the start of the new millennium, an issue that came to be known
as Y2K. A massive mobilization, led by an assistant to the President, was
undertaken. This effort coordinated all federal, state, and local
activities, and established public- private partnerships. In addition, the
Congress provided emergency funding to be allocated by the Office of
Management and Budget after congressional consideration of the proposed
allocations. Many of the lessons learned and practices used in this effort
can be applied to the new homeland security effort. At the same time, the
Y2K effort was finite in nature and not nearly as extensive in scope or as
important and visible to the general public as homeland security. The long-
term, expansive nature of the homeland security issue suggests the need for
a more sustained and institutionalized approach.
I would like to discuss some elements that need to be included in the
development of the national strategy for homeland security and a means to
assign roles to federal, state, and local governments and the private
sector. Our national preparedness related to homeland security starts with
defense of our homeland but does not stop there. Besides involving
Developing a
Comprehensive Homeland Security Strategy
Page 7 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
military, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies, it also entails all
levels of government - federal, state, and local - and private individuals
and businesses to coordinate efforts to protect the personal safety and
financial interests of United States citizens, businesses, and allies, both
at home and throughout the world. To be comprehensive in nature, our
strategy should include steps designed to
reduce our vulnerability to threats;
use intelligence assets and other broad- based information sources to
identify threats and share such information as appropriate;
stop incidents before they occur;
manage the consequences of an incident; and
in the case of terrorist attacks, respond by all means available,
including economic, diplomatic, and military actions that, when appropriate,
are coordinated with other nations.
An effective homeland security strategy must involve all levels of
government and the private sector. While the federal government can assign
roles to federal agencies under the strategy, it will need to reach
consensus with the other levels of government and with the private sector on
their respective roles. In pursuing all elements of the strategy, the
federal government will also need to closely coordinate with the governments
and financial institutions of other nations. As the President has said, we
will need their help. This need is especially true with regard to the multi-
dimensional approach to preventing, deterring, and responding to incidents,
which crosses economic, diplomatic, and military lines and is global in
nature.
The United States does not currently have a comprehensive risk management
approach to help guide federal programs for homeland security and apply our
resources efficiently and to best effect. ?Risk
management? is a systematic, analytical process to determine the likelihood
that a threat will harm physical assets or individuals and then to identify
actions to reduce risk and mitigate the consequences of an attack. The
principles of risk management acknowledge that while risk generally cannot
be eliminated, enhancing protection from known or potential threats can
serve to significantly reduce risk. Managing Risks to
Homeland Security
Page 8 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
We have identified a risk management approach used by the Department of
Defense to defend against terrorism that might have relevance for the entire
federal government to enhance levels of preparedness to respond to national
emergencies whether man- made or unintentional in nature. The approach is
based on assessing threats, vulnerabilities, and the importance of assets
(criticality). The results of the assessments are used to balance threats
and vulnerabilities and to define and prioritize related resource and
operational requirements.
Threat assessments identify and evaluate potential threats on the basis of
such factors as capabilities, intentions, and past activities. These
assessments represent a systematic approach to identifying potential threats
before they materialize. However, even if updated often, threat assessments
might not adequately capture some emerging threats. The risk management
approach therefore uses the vulnerability and criticality assessments
discussed below as additional input to the decision- making process.
Vulnerability assessments identify weaknesses that may be exploited by
identified threats and suggest options that address those weaknesses. For
example, a vulnerability assessment might reveal weaknesses in an
organization?s security systems, financial management processes, computer
networks, or unprotected key infrastructure such as water supplies, bridges,
and tunnels. In general, teams of experts skilled in such areas as
structural engineering, physical security, and other disciplines conduct
these assessments.
Criticality assessments evaluate and prioritize important assets and
functions in terms of such factors as mission and significance as a target.
For example, certain power plants, bridges, computer networks, or population
centers might be identified as important to national security, economic
security, or public health and safety. Criticality assessments provide a
basis for identifying which assets and structures are relatively more
important to protect from attack. In so doing, the assessments help
determine operational requirements and provide information on where to
prioritize and target resources while reducing the potential to target
resources on lower priority assets.
We recognize that a national- level risk management approach that includes
balanced assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality will not
be a panacea for all the problems in providing homeland security. However,
if applied conscientiously and consistently, a balanced approach- consistent
with the elements I have described- could provide
Page 9 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
a framework for action. It would also facilitate multidisciplinary and
multi- organizational participation in planning, developing, and
implementing programs and strategies to enhance the security of our homeland
while applying the resources of the federal government in the most efficient
and effective manner possible. Given the tragic events of Tuesday, September
11, 2001, a comprehensive risk management approach that addresses all
threats has become an imperative.
As this nation implements a strategy for homeland security, we will
encounter many of the long- standing performance and accountability
challenges being faced throughout the federal government. For example, we
will be challenged to look across the federal government itself to bring
more coherence to the operations of many agencies and programs. We must also
address human capital issues to determine if we have the right people with
the right skills and knowledge in the right places. Coordination across all
levels of government will be required as will adequately defining
performance goals and measuring success. In addressing these issues, we will
also need to keep in mind that our homeland security priorities will have to
be accomplished against the backdrop of the long- term fiscal challenges
that loom just over the 10- year budget window.
The challenges of combating terrorism and otherwise addressing homeland
security have come to the fore as urgent claims on the federal budget. As
figure 2 shows, our past history suggests that when our national security or
the state of the nation?s economy was at issue, we have incurred sizable
deficits. Many would argue that today we are facing both these challenges.
We are fortunate to be facing them at a time when we have some near- term
budgetary flexibility. The budgetary surpluses of recent years that were
achieved by fiscal discipline and strong economic growth put us in a
stronger position to respond both to the events of September 11 and to the
economic slowdown than would otherwise have been the case. I ask you to
recall the last recession in the early 1990s where our triple- digit
deficits [in billions of dollars] limited us from considering a major fiscal
stimulus to jump start the economy due to wellfounded fears about the impact
of such measures on interest rates that were already quite high. In
contrast, the fiscal restraint of recent years has given us the flexibility
we need to both respond to the security crisis and consider short- term
stimulus efforts. Short- and Long- Term
Fiscal Implications
Page 10 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Figure 2: Surpluses or Deficits as a Share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
(1800- 2000)
-35 -30
-25 -20
-15 -10
-5 0
5 10
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Note: Data through 1929 are shown as a percent of gross national product
(GNP); data from 1930 to present are shown as a percent of GDP.
Sources: Office of Management and Budget and Department of Commerce.
As we respond to the urgent priorities of today, we need to do so with an
eye to the significant long- term fiscal challenges we face just over the
10year budget horizon. I know that you and your counterparts in the Senate
have given a great deal of thought to how the Congress and the President
might balance today?s immediate needs against our long- term fiscal
challenges. This is an important note to sound- while some short- term
actions are understandable and necessary, long- term fiscal discipline is
still an essential need.
As we seek to meet today?s urgent needs, it is important to be mindful of
the collective impact of our decisions on the overall short- and long- term
fiscal position of the government. For the short term, we should be wary of
building in large permanent structural deficits that may drive up interest
rates, thereby offsetting the potential economic stimulus Congress provides.
For the longer term, known demographic trends (e. g., the aging of our
population) and rising health care costs will place increasing claims on
future federal budgets- reclaiming the fiscal flexibility necessary to
Page 11 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
address these and other emerging challenges is a major task facing this
generation.
None of the changes since September 11 have lessened these long- term
pressures on the budget. In fact, the events of September 11 have served to
increase our long- range challenges. The baby boom generation is aging and
is projected to enjoy greater life expectancy. As the share of the
population over 65 climbs, federal spending on the elderly will absorb
larger and ultimately unsustainable shares of the federal budget. Federal
health and retirement spending are expected to surge as people live longer
and spend more time in retirement. In addition, advances in medical
technology are likely to keep pushing up the cost of providing health care.
Absent substantive change in related entitlement programs, we face the
potential return of large deficits requiring unprecedented spending cuts in
other areas or unprecedented tax increases.
As you know, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
recently suggested the possibility of a federal budget deficit in fiscal
year 2002, and other budget analysts appear to be in agreement. While we do
not know today what the 10- year budget projections will be in the next
updates by CBO and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), we do know the
direction: they will be considerably less optimistic than before September
11, and the long- term outlook will look correspondingly worse. For example,
if we assume that the 10- year surpluses CBO projected in August are
eliminated, by 2030 absent changes in the structure of Social Security and
Medicare, there would be virtually no room for any other federal spending
priorities, including national defense, education, and law enforcement. (See
fig. 3.) The resource demands that come from the events of September 11- and
the need to address the gaps these events surfaced- will demand tough
choices. Part of that response must be to deal with the threats to our long-
term fiscal health. Ultimately, restoring our long- term fiscal flexibility
will involve both promoting higher longterm economic growth and reforming
the federal entitlement programs. When Congress returns for its next
session, these issues should be placed back on the national agenda.
Page 12 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Figure 3: August 2001 Projection - Composition of Federal Spending Under the
?Eliminate Unified Surpluses? Simulation
Note: Revenue as a share of GDP declines from its 2000 level of 20.6 percent
due to unspecified permanent policy actions. In this display, policy changes
are allocated equally between revenue reductions and spending increases.
Source: GAO?s August 2001 analysis.
With this long- term outlook as backdrop, an ideal fiscal response to a
short- term economic downturn would be temporary and targeted, and avoid
worsening the longer- term structural pressures on the budget. However, you
have been called upon not merely to respond to a short- term economic
downturn but also to the homeland security needs so tragically highlighted
on September 11. This response will appropriately consist of both temporary
and longer- term commitments. While we might all hope that the struggle
against terrorism might be brought to a swift conclusion, prudence dictates
that we plan for a longer- term horizon in this complex conflict.
Given the long- term fiscal challenge driven by the coming change in our
demographics, you might think about the options you face in responding to
short- term economic weakness in terms of a range or portfolio of fiscal
0 10
20 30
40 50
2000 2030 2050 Percent of GDP
Net interest Social Security Medicare & Medicaid All other spending
Revenue 60
Page 13 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
actions balancing today?s urgent needs with tomorrow?s fiscal challenges. In
my testimony last February before the Senate Budget Committee, 4 I suggested
that fiscal actions could be described as a continuum by the degree of long-
term fiscal risk they present. At one end, debt reduction and entitlement
reform actually increase future fiscal flexibility by freeing up resources.
One- time actions- either on the tax or spending side of the budget- may
have limited impact on future flexibility. At the other end of the fiscal
risk spectrum, permanent or open- ended fiscal actions on the spending side
or tax side of the budget can reduce future fiscal flexibility- although
they may have salutary effects on longer- term economic growth depending on
their design and implementation. I have suggested before that increasing
entitlement spending arguably presents the highest risk to our long- range
fiscal outlook. Whatever choices the Congress decides to make, approaches
should be explored to mitigate risk to the long term. For example,
provisions with plausible expiration dates- on the spending and/ or the tax
side- may prompt re- examination taking into account any changes in fiscal
circumstances. In addition, a mix of temporary and permanent actions can
also serve to reduce risk.
As we move beyond the immediate threats, it will be important for the
Congress and the President to take a hard look at competing claims on the
federal fisc. I don?t need to remind this Committee that a big contributor
to deficit reduction in the 1990s was the decline in defense spending. Given
recent events, it is pretty clear that the defense budget is not a likely
source for future budget reductions. (See fig. 4.)
4 Long- Term Budget Issues: Moving From Balancing the Budget to Balancing
Fiscal Risk
(GAO- 01- 385T, Feb. 6, 2001).
Page 14 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Figure 4: Composition of Federal Spending
Source: Budget of the United States Government FY 2002, Office of Management
and Budget.
Once the economy rebounds, returning to surpluses will take place against
the backdrop of greater competition of claims within the budget. The new
commitments that we need to undertake to protect this nation against the
threats stemming from terrorism will compete with other priorities.
Subjecting both new proposals and existing programs to scrutiny would
increase the ability to accommodate any new needs.
A fundamental review of existing programs and operations can create much
needed fiscal flexibility to address emerging needs by weeding out programs
that have proven to be outdated, poorly targeted or inefficient in their
design and management. 5 Many programs were designed years ago to respond to
earlier challenges. Obviously many things have changed. It should be the
norm to reconsider the relevance or ?fit? of any federal program or activity
in today?s world and for the future. In fact, we have a stewardship
responsibility to both today?s taxpayers and tomorrow?s to reexamine and
update our priorities, programs, and agency operations. Given the
significant events since the last CBO 10- year budget projections, it is
clear that the time has come to conduct a comprehensive review of existing
agencies and programs- which are often considered to be ?in the
5 See Congressional Oversight: Opportunities to Address Risks, Reduce Costs,
and Improve Performance (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 96, Feb. 17, 2000) and Budget
Issues: Effective Oversight and Budget Discipline Are Essential- Even in a
Time of Surplus (GAO/ TAIMD- 00- 73, Feb. 1, 2000)
FY 1962
31% 6%
13% Defens e Social Security Medicare & Medicaid Net Interes t Other
FY 1980
8% 20%
9% 40%
FY 2000
18% 23%
12% 31%
50% 16%
23%
Page 15 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
base?- while exercising continued prudence and fiscal discipline in
connection with new initiatives.
In particular, agencies will need to reassess their strategic goals and
priorities to enable them to better target available resources to address
urgent national preparedness needs. The terrorist attacks, in fact, may
provide a window of opportunity for certain agencies to rethink approaches
to longstanding problems and concerns. For instance, the threat to air
travel has already prompted attention to chronic problems with airport
security that we and others have been pointing to for years. Moreover, the
crisis might prompt a healthy reassessment of our broader transportation
policy framework with an eye to improving the integration of air, rail, and
highway systems to better move people and goods. Other longstanding problems
also take on increased relevance in today?s world. Take, for example, food
safety. Problems such as overlapping and duplicative inspections, poor
coordination and the inefficient allocation of resources are not new.
However, they take on a new meaning- and could receive increased attention-
given increased awareness of bioterrorism issues.
GAO has identified a number of areas warranting reconsideration based on
program performance, targeting, and costs. Every year, we issue a report
identifying specific options, many scored by CBO, for congressional
consideration stemming from our audit and evaluation work. 6 This report
provides opportunities for (1) reassessing objectives of specific federal
programs, (2) improved targeting of benefits and (3) improving the
efficiency and management of federal initiatives.
This same stewardship responsibility applies to our oversight of the funds
recently provided to respond to the events of September 11. Rapid action in
response to an emergency does not eliminate the need for review of how the
funds are used. As you move ahead in the coming years, there will be
proposals for new or expanded federal activities, but we must seek to
distinguish the infinite variety of ?wants? from those investments that have
greater promise to effectively address more critical ?needs.?
6 Supporting Congressional Oversight: Framework for Considering Budgetary
Implications of Selected GAO Work (GAO- 01- 447, March 9, 2001).
Page 16 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
In sorting through these proposals, we might apply certain investment
criteria in making our choices. Well- chosen enhancements to the nation?s
infrastructure are an important part of our national preparedness strategy.
Investments in human capital for certain areas such as intelligence, public
health and airport security will also be necessary as well to foster and
maintain the skill sets needed to respond to the threats facing us. As we
have seen with the airline industry, we may even be called upon to provide
targeted and temporary assistance to certain vital sectors of our economy
affected by this crisis. A variety of governmental tools will be proposed to
address these challenges- grants, loans, tax expenditures, direct federal
administration. The involvement of a wide range of third parties- state and
local governments, nonprofits, private corporations, and even other nations-
will be a vital part of the national response as well.
In the short term, we have to do what is necessary to get this nation back
on its feet and compassionately deal with the human tragedies left in its
wake. However, as we think about our longer- term preparedness and develop a
comprehensive homeland security strategy, we can and should select those
programs and tools that promise to provide the most costeffective approaches
to achieve our goals. Some of the key questions that should be asked include
the following:
Does the proposed activity address a vital national preparedness mission
and do the benefits of the proposal exceed its costs?
To what extent can the participation of other sectors of the economy,
including state and local governments, be considered; and how can we select
and design tools to best leverage and coordinate the efforts of numerous
governmental and private entities? Is the proposal designed to prevent other
sectors or governments from reducing their investments as a result of
federal involvement?
How can we ensure that the various federal tools and programs addressing
the objective are coherently designed and integrated so that they work in a
synergistic rather than a fragmented fashion?
Do proposals to assist critical sectors in the recovery from terrorist
attacks appropriately distinguish between temporary losses directly
attributable to the crisis and longer- term costs stemming from broader and
more enduring shifts in markets and other forces?
Page 17 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Are the proposal?s time frames, cost projections, and promises realistic
in light of past experience and the capacity of administrators at all levels
to implement?
We will face the challenge of sorting out these many claims on the federal
budget without the fiscal benchmarks and rules that have guided us through
the years of deficit reduction into surplus. Your job therefore has become
much more difficult.
Ultimately, as this Committee recommended on October 4, we should attempt to
return to a position of surplus as the economy returns to a higher growth
path. Although budget balance may have been the desired fiscal position in
past decades, nothing short of surpluses are needed to promote the level of
savings and investment necessary to help future generations better afford
the commitments of an aging society. As you seek to develop new fiscal
benchmarks to guide policy, you may want to look at approaches taken by
other countries. Certain nations in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, such as Sweden and Norway, have gone beyond a
fiscal policy of balance to one of surplus over the business cycle. Norway
has adopted a policy of aiming for budget surpluses to help better prepare
for the fiscal challenges stemming from an aging society. Others have
established a specific ratio of debt to gross domestic product as a fiscal
target.
The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, was a defining moment for our
nation, our government, and, in some respects, the world. The initial
response by the President and the Congress has shown the capacity of our
government to act quickly. However, it will be important to follow up on
these initial steps to institutionalize and sustain our ability to deal with
a threat that is widely recognized as a complex and longer- term challenge.
As the President and the Congress- and the American people- recognize, the
need to improve homeland security is not a short- term emergency. It will
continue even if we are fortunate enough to have the threats moved off the
front page of our daily papers.
As I noted earlier, implementing a successful homeland security strategy
will encounter many of the same performance and accountability challenges
that we have identified throughout the federal government. These include
bringing more coherence to the operations of many agencies and programs,
dealing with human capital issues, and adequately defining performance goals
and measuring success. Conclusion
Page 18 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
The appointment of former Governor Ridge to head an Office of Homeland
Security within the Executive Office of the President is a promising first
step in marshalling the resources necessary to address our homeland security
requirements. It can be argued, however, that statutory underpinnings and
effective congressional oversight are critical to sustaining broad scale
initiatives over the long term. Therefore, as we move beyond the immediate
response to the design of a longer- lasting approach to homeland security, I
urge you to consider the implications of different structures and statutory
frameworks for accountability and your ability to conduct effective
oversight. Needless to say, I am also interested in the impact of various
approaches on GAO?s ability to assist you in this task.
You are faced with a difficult challenge: to respond to legitimate shortterm
needs while remaining mindful of our significant and continuing longterm
fiscal challenges. While the Congress understandably needs to focus on the
current urgent priorities of combating international terrorism, securing our
homeland, and stimulating our economy, it ultimately needs to return to a
variety of other challenges, including our long- range fiscal challenge.
Unfortunately, our long- range challenge has become more difficult, and our
window of opportunity to address our entitlement challenges is narrowing. As
a result it will be important to return to these issues when the Congress
reconvenes next year. We in GAO stand ready to help you address these
important issues both now and in the future.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Page 19 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
GAO has completed several congressionally requested efforts on numerous
topics related to homeland security. Some of the work that we have done
relates to the areas of combating terrorism, aviation security,
transnational crime, protection of critical infrastructure, and public
health. The summaries describe recommendations made before the President
established the Office of Homeland Security.
Given concerns about the preparedness of the federal government and state
and local emergency responders to cope with a large- scale terrorist attack
involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, we reviewed the plans,
policies, and programs for combating domestic terrorism involving weapons of
mass destruction that were in place prior to the tragic events of September
11. Our report, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related
Recommendations, 1 which was issued September 20, 2001, updates our
extensive evaluations in recent years of federal programs to combat domestic
terrorism and protect critical infrastructure.
Progress has been made since we first began looking at these issues in 1995.
Interagency coordination has improved, and interagency and intergovernmental
command and control now is regularly included in exercises. Agencies also
have completed operational guidance and related plans. Federal assistance to
state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted
in training for thousands of first responders, many of whom went into action
at the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
We also recommended that the President designate a single focal point with
responsibility and authority for all critical functions necessary to provide
overall leadership and coordination of federal programs to combat terrorism.
The focal point should oversee a comprehensive national- level threat
assessment on likely weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, that
might be used by terrorists and should lead the development of a national
strategy to combat terrorism and oversee its implementation. With the
President?s appointment of the Homeland Security Adviser, that step has been
taken. Furthermore, we recommended that the Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology complete a strategy to coordinate research and
development to improve federal capabilities and avoid duplication.
1 GAO- 01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001. Appendix I: Prior GAO Work Related to
Homeland Security Combating Terrorism
Page 20 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Since 1996, we have presented numerous reports and testimonies and
identified numerous weaknesses that we found in the commercial aviation
security system. For example, we reported that airport passenger screeners
do not perform well in detecting dangerous objects, and Federal Aviation
Administration tests showed that as testing gets more realistic- that is, as
tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a
checkpoint- screener performance declines significantly. In addition, we
were able to penetrate airport security ourselves by having our
investigators create fake credentials from the Internet and declare
themselves law enforcement officers. They were then permitted to bypass
security screening and go directly to waiting passenger aircraft. In 1996,
we outlined a number of steps that required immediate action, including
identifying vulnerabilities in the system; developing a short- term approach
to correct significant security weaknesses; and developing a long- term,
comprehensive national strategy that combines new technology, procedures,
and better training for security personnel.
Federal critical infrastructure- protection initiatives have focused on
preventing mass disruption that can occur when information systems are
compromised because of computer- based attacks. Such attacks are of growing
concern due to the nation?s increasing reliance on interconnected computer
systems that can be accessed remotely and anonymously from virtually
anywhere in the world. In accordance with Presidential Decision Directive
63, issued in 1998, and other information- security requirements outlined in
laws and federal guidance, an array of efforts has been undertaken to
address these risks. However, progress has been slow. For example, federal
agencies have taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure plans,
but independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant
information security weaknesses that place many major federal agencies?
operations at high risk of tampering and disruption. In addition, while
federal outreach efforts have raised awareness and prompted information
sharing among government and private sector entities, substantive analysis
of infrastructure components to identify interdependencies and related
vulnerabilities has been limited. An underlying deficiency impeding progress
is the lack of a national plan that fully defines the roles and
responsibilities of key participants and establishes interim objectives.
Accordingly, we have recommended that the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs ensure that the government?s critical
infrastructure strategy clearly define specific roles and responsibilities,
develop interim objectives and milestones for achieving adequate protection,
and define performance measures for accountability. The administration has
been reviewing and considering adjustments to the government?s critical
infrastructure- protection strategy Aviation Security
Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructure
Page 21 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
and last week, announced appointment of a Special Advisor to the President
for Cyberspace Security.
On September 20, 2001, we publicly released a report on international crime
control and reported that individual federal entities have developed
strategies to address a variety of international crime issues, and for some
crimes, integrated mechanisms exist to coordinate efforts across agencies.
However, we found that without an up- to- date and integrated strategy and
sustained top- level leadership to implement and monitor the strategy, the
risk is high that scarce resources will be wasted, overall effectiveness
will be limited or not known, and accountability will not be ensured. We
recommended that the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs take appropriate action to ensure sustained executive- level
coordination and assessment of multi- agency federal efforts in connection
with international crime, including efforts to combat money laundering. Some
of the individual actions we recommended were to update the existing
governmentwide international crime threat assessment, to update or develop a
new International Crime Control Strategy to include prioritized goals as
well as implementing objectives, and to designate responsibility for
executing the strategy and resolving any jurisdictional issues.
The spread of infectious diseases is a growing concern. Whether a disease
outbreak is intentional or naturally occurring, the public health response
to determine its causes and contain its spread is largely the same. Because
a bioterrorist event could look like a natural outbreak, bioterrorism
preparedness rests in large part on public health preparedness. We reported
in September 2001 that concerns remain regarding preparedness at state and
local levels and that coordination of federal terrorism research,
preparedness, and response programs is fragmented.
In our review last year of the West Nile virus outbreak in New York, we also
found problems related to communication and coordination among and between
federal, state, and local authorities. Although this outbreak was relatively
small in terms of the number of human cases, it taxed the resources of one
of the nation?s largest local health departments. In 1999, we reported that
surveillance for important emerging infectious diseases is not comprehensive
in all states, leaving gaps in the nation?s surveillance network. Laboratory
capacity could be inadequate in any large outbreak, with insufficient
trained personnel to perform laboratory tests and insufficient computer
systems to rapidly share information. Earlier this year, we reported that
federal agencies have made progress in improving their management of the
stockpiles of pharmaceutical and medical International Crime
Control Public Health
Page 22 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
supplies that would be needed in a bioterrorist event, but that some
problems still remained. There are also widespread concerns that hospital
emergency departments generally are not prepared in an organized fashion to
treat victims of biological terrorism and that hospital emergency capacity
is already strained, with emergency rooms in major metropolitan areas
routinely filled and unable to accept patients in need of urgent care. To
improve the nation?s public health surveillance of infectious diseases and
help ensure adequate public protection, we recommended that the Director of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lead an effort to help
federal, state, and local public health officials achieve consensus on the
core capacities needed at each level of government. We advised that
consensus be reached on such matters as the number and qualifications of
laboratory and epidemiological staff as well as laboratory and information
technology resources.
Related GAO Products Page 23 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide Preparedness Efforts
(GAO- 02- 208T, Oct. 31, 2001).
Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA?s Role in Strengthening Federal
Preparedness (GAO- 02- 145T, Oct. 15, 2001).
Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach
(GAO- 02- 150T, Oct. 12, 2001).
Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation?s Efforts,
(GAO- 01- 1158T, Sept. 21, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in Chemical and
Biological Preparedness (GAO- 02- 162T, Oct. 17, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations (GAO-
01- 822, Sept. 20, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD?s Antiterrorism Program
Implementation and Management (GAO- 01- 909, Sept. 19, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on H. R. 525 to Create a President?s Council
on Domestic Preparedness (GAO- 01- 555T, May 9, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response
(GAO- 01- 660T, Apr. 24, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further
Improvement (GAO- 01- 463, Mar. 30, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National
Strategy (GAO- 01- 556T, Mar. 27, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating
Preparedness and Response (GAO- 01- 15, Mar. 20, 2001).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;
Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO- 0114, Nov. 30, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000). Related GAO Products
Homeland Security Combating Terrorism
Related GAO Products Page 24 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces
Overseas (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 181, July 19, 2000).
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD?s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be
More Integrated and Focused (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 97, May 26, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H. R. 4210 to Manage Selected
Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 172, May 4, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 85, Apr. 7, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 6, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass
Destruction Training (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 64, Mar. 21, 2000).
Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are Poorly
Managed (GAO/ HEHS/ AIMD- 00- 36, Oct. 29, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological
Terrorism (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 50, Oct. 20, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of
Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163, Sept. 7, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 157BR, June 25, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 181, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and
Sustainment Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 151, June 9, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/
NSIAD- 99- 110, May 21, 1999).
Related GAO Products Page 25 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist
Operations (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 135, May 13, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health
Initiatives (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 112, Mar. 16, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism
(GAO/ T- NSIAD/ GGD- 99- 107, Mar. 11, 1999).
Combating Terrorism: FBI's Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism-
Related Activities (FYs 1995- 98) (GAO/ GGD- 99- 7, Nov. 20, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program
Focus and Efficiency (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 3, Nov. 12, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Domestic
Preparedness Program (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 16, Oct. 2, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/ TNSIAD- 98-
164, Apr. 23, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and
Target Program Investments (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74, Apr. 9, 1998).
Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy
and Strategy (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 254, Sept. 26, 1997).
Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas
(GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 207, July 21, 1997).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 95, Apr. 15, 1997).
Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/ GGD- 96- 154, Sept. 30, 1996).
Related GAO Products Page 26 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and
Narcotics (GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 252, Sept. 4, 1996).
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard
Screening Security Operations, (GAO- 01- 1171T, Sept. 25, 2001).
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning
Screening Responsibilities, (GAO- 01- 1165T, Sept. 21, 2001).
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve
Security at the Nation?s Airports (GAO- 01- 1162T, Sept. 20, 2001).
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access Security
Improvements (GAO- 01- 1069R, Aug. 31, 2001).
Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations (GAO/ RCED- 00- 181, Sept. 29, 2000).
Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance (GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000).
Aviation Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/ TOSI- 00-
10, May 25, 2000).
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System (GAO/ T- RCED/ AIMD- 00- 142, Apr. 6, 2000).
Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long- Standing Screener
Performance Problems (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 125, Mar. 16, 2000).
Aviation Security: FAA?s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for
Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (GAO/ RCED99- 53, Feb.
25, 1999).
Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long- term Attention Is Needed
(GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 190, May 14, 1998). Aviation Security
Related GAO Products Page 27 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Aviation Security: FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
(GAO/ RCED- 97- 111R, May 1, 1997).
Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations
of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (GAO/ T- RCED-
97- 90, Mar. 5, 1997).
Aviation Security: Technology?s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities
(GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 262, Sept. 19, 1996).
Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/ TRCED/ NSIAD-
96- 151, Sept. 11, 1996).
Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 237, Aug. 1, 1996).
Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
Expectations (GAO/ RCED- 94- 142, May 19, 1994).
Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/ RCED- 94- 38, Jan. 27, 1994).
Information Sharing: Practices That Can Benefit Critical Infrastructure
Protection (GAO- 02- 24, Oct. 15, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Safeguarding
Government and Privately- Controlled Systems from Computer- Based Attacks,
(GAO- 01- 1168T, Sept. 26, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting
Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities
(GAO- 01- 1132T, Sept. 12, 2001).
Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal
Agencies (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 295, Sept. 6, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO- 01- 769T, May 22, 2001).
Cyber Attacks on
Critical Infrastructure
Related GAO Products Page 28 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing
National Capabilities (GAO- 01- 232, Apr. 25, 2001).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive
Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination
(GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 268, July 26, 2000).
Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of
Executive Branch Officials (GAO/ GGD/ OSI- 00- 139, July 11, 2000 and GAO/
T- GGD/ OSI- 00- 177, July 27, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber Security
Information Act of 2000 (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 229, June 22, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: ?I LOVE YOU? Computer Virus Highlights
Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities
(GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 181, May 18, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information Systems
Protection (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 90R, Feb. 11, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 72, Feb. 1, 2000).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to
Assure Security of Federal Operations (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 7, Oct. 6, 1999).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Status of Computer Security at the
Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 5, Oct. 4, 1999).
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year
2000 Experiences (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 1, Oct. 1, 1999).
Information Security: The Proposed Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1999
(GAO/ T- AIMD- 99- 302, Sept. 30, 1999).
Information Security: NRC?s Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities (GAO/
AIMD- 99- 273R, Aug. 27, 1999).
Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/ RCED- 92- 125, Apr. 20, 1992)
Related GAO Products Page 29 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Anthrax Vaccine: Changes to the Manufacturing Process (GAO- 02- 181T, Oct.
23, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness, (GAO- 02- 141T, Oct.
9, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness, (GAO- 02- 129T, Oct. 5, 2001).
Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities (GAO- 01915,
Sept. 28, 2001).
West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness
(GAO/ HEHS- 00- 180, Sept. 11, 2000).
Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate
Contamination (GAO/ RCED- 00- 3, Oct. 27, 1999).
Emerging Infectious Diseases: Consensus on Needed Laboratory Capacity Could
Strengthen Surveillance (GAO/ HEHS- 99- 26, Feb. 5, 1999).
International Crime Controls: Sustained Executive Level Coordination of
Federal Response Needed (GAO- 01- 629, Sept. 20, 2001).
Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
Growing Problem (GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000).
Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens
Continue to Need Improvement (GAO/ T- GGD- 99- 47, Feb. 25, 1999).
Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need
Improvement (GAO/ GGD- 99- 3, Oct. 16, 1998).
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges (GAO/ T- GGD- 99- 148, July 29, 1999).
Illegal Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
(GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May 19, 1999).
Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
Evaluation Needed (GAO/ GGD- 98- 21, Dec. 11, 1997). Public Health
International Crime Control
Immigration and Naturalization
Related GAO Products Page 30 GAO- 02- 160T Homeland Security
Naturalization of Aliens: INS Internal Controls (GAO/ T- GGD- 97- 98, May 1,
1997).
(350129)
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