    Foreign Relations: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense
    Interest in Two Micronesian Nations (22-JAN-02, GAO-02-119).

    The Compact of Free Association continues a defense arrangement
    that has existed between the United States and two Pacific island
    nations--Micronesia and the Marshall Islands--since the end of
    World War II. The United States has exercised only one of the
    four primary defense provisions contained in the Compact. That
    provision grants the United States the right to use part of the
    Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to test nuclear missiles
    and space tracking operations. The United States has never been
    required to fulfill defense responsibilities under the other
    three defense provisions contained in the Compact. The Defense
    Department considers Kwajalein Atoll an important asset that
    would be costly and difficult to replicate. Ongoing negotiations
    over the Compact are following a course that would preserve the
    existing defense and security relationship between the United
    States and each of these nations.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-119
        ACCNO:   A02681
      TITLE:     Foreign Relations: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S.
    Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations
         DATE:   01/22/2002
      SUBJECT:   Foreign governments
    	     International agreements
    	     International relations
    	     Territories and possessions
    	     Antiballistic Missile Treaty
    	     Compact of Free Association
    	     DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
    	     Kwajalein Atoll (Marshall Islands)
    	     Marshall Islands
    	     Micronesia
    	     North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    	     NATO Status of Forces Agreement
    	     NATO
    	     Military Use and Operating Rights
    	     Agreement

    	     Mutual Security Agreement

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    GAO-02-119

    A

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    January 2002 FOREIGN RELATIONS Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U. S. Defense
    Interest in Two Micronesian Nations

    GAO- 02- 119

    Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 4 The United States Has Maintained a
    Presence at Kwajalein

    Atoll but Has Not Exercised the Compact?s Other Principal Defense Rights 10
    Continued Access to Kwajalein in the RMI Is the Compelling U. S. Defense
    Interest in the Area 14 Current Negotiators Have Expressed Their Intent to
    Preserve the

    Status Quo on Defense and Security Relations 24 Agency Comments 26

    Appendixes

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 28 Whether and How the United
    States Has Exercised Compact Defense Rights and Fulfilled Its Defense
    Responsibilities 28

    Current U. S. Defense and Security Interests in the FSM and the RMI 29
    Defense and Security Issues in the Ongoing Compact

    Negotiations 30

    Appendix II: Expiring Defense- Related Provisions of the Compact 31

    Appendix III: U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall Islands 33 A History of U. S. Operations on
    Kwajalein Atoll 33 Current U. S. Activities and Facilities on Kwajalein
    Atoll Focus on

    Missile Testing and Space Operations 35 U. S. Government Provides Funding
    and Employment Opportunities, but Local Kwajalein Issues Have Posed
    Difficulties 37

    DOD Has Conducted Few Reviews of Possible Alternatives to Kwajalein 39

    Appendix IV: Use of Primary Compact- Related Defense Provisions 41

    Appendix V: Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations 45

    Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense 51 GAO Comments 52

    Appendix VII: Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia 53 GAO Comments 61

    Appendix VIII: Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands 65 GAO Comments 72

    Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 75 GAO Contacts 75
    Acknowledgments 75

    Related GAO Products 76 Tables Table 1: Voting Coincidence of the FSM and
    the RMI with the United States in the U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 24

    Table 2: FSM and RMI Support for U. S. Positions on Important Issues in the
    U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 47 Figures Figure 1: Location of the
    Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands 5

    Figure 2: The Islands of Kwajalein (foreground) and Ebeye in the Kwajalein
    Atoll, RMI 11 Figure 3: Test Launch of Ground- Based Interceptor for the
    Missile Defense Program, Kwajalein Atoll, RMI 12

    Figure 4: TRADEX Radar on the RMI Island of Roi- Namur 15 Figure 5:
    Territorial Extent of Strategic Denial 20 Figure 6: Major Sea Lines of
    Communication in the Asia- Pacific Region 22

    Figure 7: Location of Kwajalein Atoll in the Central Pacific Ocean 34 Figure
    8: ICBM Test and Super RADOT (Recording Automatic

    Digital Optical Tracker) 36 Figure 9: Ebeye Housing of Relocated Mid- Atoll
    Marshallese

    Citizens 39 Figure 10: The Compact?s ?Obligation to Defend? Provision 41
    Figure 11: The Compact?s ?Strategic Denial? Provision 42 Figure 12: The
    Compact?s ?Defense Veto? Provision 43 Figure 13: The Military Use and
    Operating Rights Agreements?

    ?Military Use? Provisions 44 Figure 14: FSM Voting Coincidence with the
    United States in the

    U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 48 Figure 15: RMI Voting Coincidence with
    the United States in the U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 49

    Figure 16: NATO Voting Coincidence with the United States in the U. N.
    General Assembly, 1991- 2000 50

    Abbreviations

    ABM Anti- Ballistic Missile CAT Civic Action Team DOD Department of Defense
    FSM Federated States of Micronesia ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization RMI Republic of the Marshall Islands
    SMDC Space and Missile Defense Command

    Lett er

    January 22, 2002 The Honorable James V. Hansen Chairman Committee on
    Resources House of Representatives

    The Honorable Tom Lantos Ranking Minority Member Committee on International
    Relations House of Representatives

    The Honorable James A. Leach Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia and the
    Pacific Committee on International Relations House of Representatives

    The Honorable Doug Bereuter House of Representatives

    In 1986, the U. S. government entered into separate international
    agreements- known collectively as the Compact of Free Association- with the
    Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands (RMI). The Compact provided for the continuation of a defense
    arrangement that has connected the United States and these Pacific islands
    since the end of World War II. The Compact obligates the United States to
    defend these island nations against attack, while providing the United
    States with continued access to the Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI, which is
    used for missile testing and space tracking activities. Additional rights
    were retained by the United States under the Compact- the ability to

    deny access to the islands by third- party militaries and block actions by
    the island governments that are incompatible with U. S. defense authority
    and responsibilities. These rights reflected Cold War concerns, such as
    Soviet influence in the Pacific, that existed at the time the Compact
    negotiations took place. Certain defense and economic assistance provisions
    of the

    Compact are due to expire in 2001. 1 Ongoing negotiations to renew these
    expiring provisions provide the United States with the opportunity to
    reexamine its defense and security interests in the region in light of the
    end of the Cold War and the current use of Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI as a
    test site for missile defense.

    In June 2001, we briefed your staffs on defense and security issues related
    to the Compact and the ongoing negotiations taking place between the United
    States and the FSM and the RMI. Specifically, we reported on

    (1) whether and how the United States has exercised its defense rights and
    fulfilled its defense responsibilities under the Compact, (2) current U. S.
    defense and security interests in the FSM and the RMI, and (3) the defense
    and security issues that are being addressed in ongoing Compact
    negotiations. This report summarizes the content of our briefing.

    To address these issues, we reviewed the Compact?s defense provisions as
    well as the related defense agreements. 2 We also discussed the use of
    Compact- related defense provisions, as well as U. S. defense and security
    interests in the Pacific, with officials from the Departments of State and
    Defense and U. S. intelligence agencies. Our most recent communication

    with both departments occurred in October 2001 and our discussion of the
    current U. S. defense interests in the FSM and the RMI takes into account
    the Department of Defense?s (DOD) most recent strategy and planning
    document, the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. In addition, we
    reviewed other strategy documents from DOD and public statements made by DOD
    and State officials related to the Compact and Asia Pacific security issues.
    We also reviewed public negotiating documents and

    discussed ongoing negotiations with Department of State officials and
    officials from the FSM and the RMI. Finally, we conducted additional audit
    work in response to questions raised during our June 2001 briefing and
    incorporated this information into the background and other relevant

    1 If renewal negotiations are under way but not completed in 2001, the
    expiring defense and economic assistance provisions can remain in effect
    during a 2- year negotiating window that begins in 2001 and ends in 2003.
    Regarding economic assistance, total U. S. Compact assistance, which
    includes direct economic assistance, program assistance, and federal

    services, to the two countries for fiscal years 1987 through 2001, was
    estimated to be at least $2. 6 billion ($ 1.7 billion for the FSM and $890
    million for the RMI).

    2 The defense- related agreements that accompany the Compact include the
    military use and operating rights agreements, the mutual security
    agreements, and the Status of Forces Agreement.

    sections of this report (see app. I for a detailed discussion of our scope
    and methodology, including a summary of this additional work).

    Results in Brief The United States has exercised only one of the four
    primary defense provisions contained in the Compact of Free Association and
    related

    agreements. This provision grants the United States the right to use
    portions of the Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI, from which the United States
    regularly conducts intercontinental ballistic missile tests, missile defense
    tests, and space tracking operations. In contrast, the United States has
    never exercised its defense rights nor been required to fulfill its defense

    responsibilities under the other three primary Compact- related defense
    provisions. According to U. S. officials, since the Compact was implemented,
    the United States has never (1) had to defend either the FSM

    or the RMI against an attack or the threat of an attack, (2) exercised its
    right to deny access to the islands by foreign militaries or for military
    purposes, or (3) vetoed an action by either government because the action
    was incompatible with the U. S. responsibility and authority for security
    and defense matters.

    Continued access to U. S. facilities on the Kwajalein Atoll is the
    compelling U. S. defense or security interest in the FSM and the RMI that U.
    S. government officials have identified. According to DOD, Kwajalein remains
    an important national asset that would be costly and difficult to replace.
    From a broader defense and security perspective, the FSM and the RMI
    currently play no role in U. S. strategy in the Asia Pacific region, and DOD
    describes these islands as U. S. defense obligations, not U. S. defense
    assets. Statements by policymakers that indicate the United States has a
    right to deny military access to the islands and a vast area of the Pacific
    Ocean- a

    widely cited U. S. interest- overstate the breadth of this right, which only
    covers the individual islands and their 12- mile territorial waters.
    Similarly, frequent references by U. S. officials to the FSM and the RMI and
    their proximity to critical commercial and military transit routes overstate
    the countries? importance to Pacific transit because the most important sea
    lines run north of this area, not through it.

    The ongoing Compact negotiations between the United States, the FSM, and the
    RMI are following a course that would preserve the existing defense and
    security relationship between the United States and each of these countries.
    All parties have agreed in principle to renew the expiring defense
    provisions of the Compact. If the defense provisions of the

    Compact are not renewed by 2003, the one primary Compact- related

    provision that will not continue under a separate agreement is the U. S.
    right to veto an action by the island governments that the United States
    determines to be incompatible with its responsibility and authority for
    security and defense matters. The U. S. obligation to defend the islands and

    the U. S. right to deny military access to other nations, on the other hand,
    continue indefinitely through a related agreement. In addition, access to
    Kwajalein has been secured through 2016, also through a related agreement. 3
    Finally, according to Department of State officials, agreement on continued
    U. S. economic assistance is important for the renewal of the

    Compact?s defense provisions, and would provide a positive context for the
    exercise of U. S. defense rights and facilitate the advancement of U. S.
    interests.

    We provided a draft of this report to DOD, the Department of State, and the
    Department of the Interior, as well as the governments of the FSM and the
    RMI, for comment. The Departments of State and the Interior chose not to
    provide comments on the report. DOD, as well as the FSM and RMI

    governments, responded that defense rights, such as strategic denial,
    granted to the United States under the Compact are important. DOD and the
    FSM government stated that the region has not lost strategic importance for
    U. S. interests. In its comments, the RMI government stressed its strategic
    significance and historic contribution to the United

    States as a site of nuclear tests. The RMI government also expressed the
    view that we had not properly characterized the relationship between the
    United States and the United Nations (U. N.) Trust Territory of the Pacific
    Islands at the time of Compact negotiations. Where we agreed that additional
    information was appropriate, we made minor changes to the report.

    Background Located just north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean are the
    two island nations of the FSM and the RMI. The FSM is a grouping of 607
    small islands in the western Pacific that lie about 2,500 miles southwest of
    Hawaii (see fig. 1). The FSM has a total land area of about 270 square miles
    and is

    comprised of four states- Chuuk, Pohnpei, Yap, and Kosrae- with an estimated
    total 2000 population of 107,000, according to FSM officials. The RMI is
    made up of more than 1, 200 islands, islets, and atolls, with a total land
    area of about 70 square miles. The Marshall Islands are located in the 3 In
    September 1999, the United States exercised its right to unilaterally extend
    the

    agreement that grants access to the atoll until 2016.

    central Pacific about equidistant from Hawaii, Australia, and Japan. The
    Marshall Islands had a 1999 total population of 50, 840, according to the
    RMI census.

    Figure 1: Location of the Federated States of Micronesia and the Republic of
    the Marshall Islands 120�E 135�E 150�E 165�E 180�

    165�W 150�W 135�W 120�W North Korea PACIFIC

    United OCEAN

    States China

    South Korea Japan

    30�N Taiwan

    Commonwealth of the Northern

    Hawaii Mariana Islands

    Philippines 15�N

    Guam Republic of the Marshall Islands

    Palau Federated States

    of Micronesia Kiribati

    0� Papua Indonesia

    New Guinea 15�S Australia

    During the Second World War, the United States engaged in a Pacific campaign
    that liberated the islands of Micronesia from Japanese control. To
    administer these islands, the United Nations created the Trust Territory of
    the Pacific Islands in 1947. The United States entered into the trusteeship
    with the U. N. Security Council and became the administering authority of
    the four current states of the FSM, as well as the Marshall Islands, Palau,
    and the Northern Mariana Islands. The U. N. trusteeship

    agreement made the United States financially and administratively
    responsible for the region. In addition, the agreement, which designated
    this Trust Territory as a strategic trusteeship, granted the United States
    the

    ability to establish military bases, station armed forces, and close off any

    area of the Trust Territory for security reasons. During Senate
    consideration of this agreement, Secretary of State George C. Marshall,
    General Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, among others,
    remarked that the agreement gave the United States the complete and
    exclusive military control over the islands that was necessary to deny other
    militaries access to the islands and prevent their use as a springboard for
    aggression against the United States.

    In 1986, the United States entered into the Compact of Free Association with
    the FSM and the RMI. Through this Compact, the two Pacific Island nations
    became Freely Associated States and were no longer subject to U. S.
    administration under the U. N. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The
    Compact, which consists of separate international agreements with each
    country, was intended to achieve three principal goals: (1) secure
    selfgovernment

    for each country; 4 (2) assist the FSM and the RMI in their efforts to
    advance economic development and self- sufficiency; 5 and (3) ensure certain
    national security rights for the FSM, the RMI, and the United States.

    The defense and security relationships between the United States and the FSM
    and the RMI are governed by Title Three of the Compact of Free Association
    and three Compact- related agreements- the Status of Forces

    Agreement, 6 the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement, and the 4 The
    first goal has been met. The FSM and the RMI are independent nations and
    members of international organizations such as the United Nations. However,
    both countries maintain a special relationship with the United States
    through the Compact, and citizens of both nations are able to live and work
    in the United States with few restrictions. 5 The second objective of the
    Compact, promoting economic development and selfsufficiency (a term that is
    not defined in the Compact), was to be accomplished primarily through direct
    financial payments to the FSM and the RMI. Between 1986 and 1998, the

    United States provided about $1. 6 billion in direct economic assistance to
    the FSM ($ 1.08 billion) and the RMI ($ 510 million) for general government
    operations, capital expenditures, and specific sectors, such as energy,
    communications, maritime surveillance,

    health, and education. In 2000, we reported that both nations had made some
    progress in achieving economic self- sufficiency but remain heavily
    financially dependent on the United States. See Foreign Assistance: U. S.
    Funds to Two Micronesian Nations Had Little Impact

    on Economic Development (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 216, Sept. 22, 2000). By including
    program assistance and federal services in economic assistance totals, total
    Compact assistance for fiscal years 1987 through 2001 is estimated to be at
    least $2. 6 billion-$ 1. 7 billion for the FSM and $890 million for the RMI.

    6 The Status of Forces Agreement provides parameters for the activities of
    U. S. personnel and equipment in the FSM and the RMI.

    Mutual Security Agreement. The provisions of Title Three expire in 2001, but
    they can remain in effect during a 2- year negotiating window that ends in
    2003. 7 If Title Three is not renewed by 2003, the Mutual Security Agreement
    enters into force and preserves key aspects of the defense and

    security relationship between these countries. There are four primary U. S.
    defense rights and responsibilities contained in Title Three of the Compact
    and the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement between the United
    States and the RMI (see app. II for a listing of other defense provisions
    contained in Title Three of the Compact that

    are due to expire in 2001):  Title Three obligates the United States to
    defend the FSM and the RMI against an attack or the threat of attack in the
    same way it would defend

    itself and its own citizens. According to officials at DOD, this defense
    guarantee is stronger than the U. S. commitment to defend its North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) allies from outside aggression. 8 If no agreement
    is reached with the FSM and the RMI on extending Title Three?s defense
    provisions, the United States retains a lesser, albeit

    7 The military use and operating rights agreements with both countries also
    expire in 2001; although as previously noted, in September 1999, the United
    States exercised its option to unilaterally extend its agreement with the
    RMI for an additional 15 years. This same agreement with the FSM must be
    extended by mutual agreement. The Status of Forces Agreement remains in
    effect as long as Title Three or the Military Use and Operating Rights
    Agreement or the Mutual Security Agreement remains in effect, whichever is
    longer. Thereafter the Status of Forces Agreement remains in force until
    terminated by a signatory government. 8 DOD has indicated that defense
    commitment contained in the Compact is unique for two reasons: (1) it
    requires the United States to defend the FSM and the RMI in the event of a
    threat of an attack and (2) it obligates the United States to defend the
    territory and people of the FSM and the RMI ?as the United States and its
    citizens are defended.? In contrast to the Compact?s defense guarantee, the
    Article V defense commitment contained in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty
    (NATO) states that each member of the alliance will take ?such action as its
    deems necessary, including the use of armed force? in the event an armed
    attack on a member state takes place. This represents a lesser obligation.

    significant, obligation to defend the islands through its mutual security
    agreements with each country. 9  Title Three provides the United States
    with the right of ?strategic

    denial,? the ability to prevent access to the islands and their territorial
    waters by the military personnel of other countries or the use of the
    islands for military purposes. This right does not expire with Title Three,
    because the mutual security agreements between the United States and the FSM
    and the RMI contain this right.

     Title Three also grants the United States a ?defense veto? over actions by
    the governments of the FSM or the RMI that the United States determines are
    incompatible with its authority and responsibility for

    security and defense matters in these countries. Unlike the U. S. obligation
    to defend the islands and the right of strategic denial, the U. S. defense
    veto will expire in 2001 unless Title Three of the Compact is extended (or
    2003 if negotiations are ongoing for an additional 2 years).

     Finally, through the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement with the
    RMI, the United States secured continued access to military facilities on
    Kwajalein Atoll. 10 At the time the Compact was negotiated (1969- 1986), the
    United States was concerned about the use of the FSM and the RMI as
    springboards for aggression against the United States, as they were in World
    War II, and the Cold War incarnation of this threat- the Soviet Union.
    Australia, New

    9 DOD also stated that under the mutual security agreements with the FSM and
    the RMI the United States undertakes an obligation that is similar to the
    one it assumes with regard to its other Pacific allies- Australia, Japan,
    the Philippines, and South Korea. In these agreements, the United States
    recognizes that an attack on the other country would constitute a threat and
    danger to the United States and would act to meet this threat. However, once
    again, the U. S. commitment to the FSM and the RMI is stronger because it
    covers threats of attacks as well as actual attacks. The other difference
    between these obligations is that in the case of Australia, Japan, the
    Philippines, and South Korea, the

    commitment to come to one another?s defense is mutual, while in the case of
    the FSM and the RMI this obligation solely rests with the United States.

    10 A similar agreement with the FSM provided the U. S. Coast Guard with
    access to sites on Yap Island until 1992. The Coast Guard, which used these
    sites as part of its LORAN (Long Range Aid to Navigation) network, left Yap
    in 1987. Originally the Coast Guard had planned to use the Yap site until
    1990, but the 1,000- foot- tall radio tower on the island was condemned.
    Instead of rebuilding on Yap, the Coast Guard decided to move the station to
    Guam.

    Zealand, and the United States practiced a coordinated Pacific- wide policy
    of strategic denial. This policy was successful in preventing the Soviet
    Union from establishing a diplomatic mission in the Pacific islands until
    1990, when it did so in Papua New Guinea, and limited Soviet efforts to
    establish economic ties and enter into commercial fishing agreements. 11 The
    United States and its allies blocked these diplomatic and economic efforts
    by the Soviet Union out of concern that closer relations with Pacific

    island governments could eventually lead to Soviet political involvement in
    and military access to the region.

    However, since the Cold War ended, the security environment in the Asia
    Pacific region has changed. The coordinated Pacific- wide policy of
    strategic denial ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and the

    United States does not exhibit the same degree of concern about the
    influence of other foreign governments in the Pacific islands today. For
    example, China has seven embassies in Pacific Island countries, 12 conducted
    $168 million worth of bilateral trade with the South Pacific in 1999,
    reportedly provided millions of dollars in economic assistance, and

    built a civilian space launch tracking facility in Kiribati- an island
    nation southeast of the FSM and the RMI. Taiwan also has a presence in some
    Pacific Island nations through diplomatic and economic ties and annual port
    visits by navy cadets. However, while China and Taiwan may have made greater
    diplomatic and economic inroads into the Pacific than the Soviet Union did,
    they lack the military power projection capabilities that defined the Soviet
    threat. The former Soviet Union was considered an expansionist superpower
    with a large ?blue water,? or ocean- going, navy that was oriented toward
    the Pacific and capable of threatening the United

    States and its allies. In contrast, China, for instance, is currently
    considered to be a regional military power without a developed blue water
    naval capability or power projection capabilities that extend out far beyond
    its coastal waters.

    11 The Soviet Union entered into a commercial fishing agreement with
    Kiribati in 1985. The agreement did not include shore access by either
    Soviet trawlers or aircraft. A 1987 agreement with Vanuatu did provide
    periodic shore access, but the Soviet Union terminated this agreement after
    only 1 year. It was not until the Soviet Union entered into a fishing
    agreement with Papua New Guinea in 1990 that it acquired both shore access
    and the right to station trawlers in a country?s waters.

    12 One of these embassies is located in the FSM. The other six are located
    in Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Kiribati.

    The United States Has While the United States has maintained facilities on
    Kwajalein Atoll for Maintained a Presence

    military use, it has not exercised its other primary defense rights nor has
    it been required to fulfill its responsibilities contained in the Compact:
    (1) it at Kwajalein Atoll but has not had to defend the FSM and the RMI from
    an attack or the threat of Has Not Exercised the

    an attack; (2) it has not invoked its right to deny access to the islands by
    Compact?s Other foreign militaries or for military purposes; and (3) it has
    never had to veto an action by either the FSM or the RMI because the action
    was

    Principal Defense incompatible with the U. S. responsibility and authority
    for defense and

    Rights security matters. As a result, these provisions remain untested.

    Kwajalein Rights Exercised The United States has made extensive use of its
    access rights on Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI, which it secured through the
    Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement with that country (see fig. 2).
    The United States regularly conducts intercontinental ballistic missile
    (ICBM) tests, missile defense tests, and space tracking operations from
    facilities on the atoll that are

    under the authority of the U. S. Army (see fig. 3). Several ICBM tests are
    held annually. Regarding missile defense testing activity, a seventh
    national missile defense test was held in December 2001. Finally, equipment
    on the atoll is used for space- related activities such as observing space
    objects and tracking foreign launches (see app. III for more detailed
    information on U. S. operations and facilities on Kwajalein Atoll).

    Figure 2: The Islands of Kwajalein (foreground) and Ebeye in the Kwajalein
    Atoll, RMI

    Source: U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command Web site.

    Figure 3: Test Launch of Ground- Based Interceptor for the Missile Defense
    Program, Kwajalein Atoll, RMI

    Source: U. S. Army Kwajalein Atoll Command briefing.

    No Other Provisions According to DOD officials, the United States has never
    had to defend the Invoked

    FSM or the RMI. 13 DOD and Department of State officials have also stated
    that the United States has never invoked its right of strategic denial or
    utilized its defense veto. 14 However, a May 2001 port visit by three
    Taiwanese naval vessels in the RMI almost provided a test of these two
    provisions. In January 2001, the government of the RMI sought approval from
    the U. S. government for a 3- day port visit by the Taiwanese ships. The

    United States denied this request in a diplomatic note but did so without
    mentioning the strategic denial or defense veto provisions of the Compact.
    15 Even though the United States did not cite these provisions in its
    written denial, the RMI, in its reply, argued that the strategic denial and

    defense veto provisions were not appropriate in this case and that the
    government?s ability to conduct its own foreign relations must be respected.
    The United States dropped its objection to the proposed visit following this
    appeal and a February 2001 port visit by these same ships in Palau. 16 (See
    app. IV for time lines detailing the history of the four principal

    Compact defense provisions.) 13 The likelihood of an attack on these areas
    is small. According to portions of a 1999 DOD Assessment of U. S. Defense
    and Security Interests in the region provided to us by the FSM and the RMI,
    no outside threat is likely to emerge over the next 10 to 20 years; there
    are no compelling security interests that will manifest themselves in a any
    threat to the FSM or the RMI; and no Asian country will have the military
    reach to pose a credible threat in the foreseeable future. The U. S.
    military presence on these islands is limited to about two dozen people
    stationed at Kwajalein and several Civic Action Teams (CAT). Neither country
    maintains its own military. See app. II for a description of the CAT teams.

    14 According to officials from DOD and the Department of State, the United
    States was considering use of the defense veto to stop a plan proposed by
    the RMI government in the 1990s to store nuclear waste on its territory.
    This plan was later dropped, without U. S. intervention, after a change in
    government in the RMI.

    15 However, press reports from the Marshall Islands and Taiwan, as well as
    Jane?s Defence Weekly, characterized this U. S. denial as an assertion of
    its rights under the Compact of Free Association. 16 The Palau visit
    occurred over repeated U. S. objections that cited the defense veto
    provision of the Palau Compact of Free Association, which is identical to
    the provision in the Compact of Free Association between the United States
    and the RMI. However, Department of State officials told us that the United
    States did not officially invoke the defense veto provision.

    Continued Access to Continued access to the Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI is
    the compelling U. S.

    Kwajalein in the RMI Is defense or security interest in the FSM and the RMI
    that U. S. officials have identified. U. S. facilities located on Kwajalein
    complement the geographic

    the Compelling U. S. characteristics that have helped to make the atoll an
    important part of U. S. Defense Interest in the

    ICBM testing, missile defense testing, and space surveillance operations.
    Area

    From a broader regional security perspective, the FSM and the RMI are not
    currently strategically important to the United States. In addition, other
    defense and security interests cited by U. S. officials, such as the right
    of strategic denial, the proximity of vital transit routes, and support in
    the

    United Nations, have been overstated. Kwajalein Is Important to

    Senior U. S. policymakers agree that continued access to missile testing and
    U. S. Missile Testing and

    space- tracking facilities on the Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI is the most
    Space Operations

    important U. S. defense interest in the FSM and the RMI. DOD has described
    the U. S. Army facility on Kwajalein Atoll, known as the Ronald Reagan
    Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, as an important and unique national
    asset that would be difficult and expensive to replace. In addition, the DOD
    agency responsible for missile defense testing, the Ballistic Missile
    Defense Organization (now the Missile Defense Agency), has determined that
    currently no acceptable alternative site exists for missile defense testing
    against ICBM class threats. The atoll has been the test site for ballistic
    missile systems for decades. The facility, which is one of two

    sites listed in the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the
    United States and the Soviet Union, is used for long- range missile defense
    testing among other missions. 17 According to the U. S. Army Space and
    Missile Defense Command (SMDC), the testing range?s remote ocean location in
    a sparsely populated area provides an acceptable environment for ballistic
    missile testing with minimal environmental impact; and the atoll?s location
    near the equator is beneficial for space object and foreign

    launch observation. To support missile testing activities, Kwajalein Atoll
    17 The ABM Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union was negotiated
    to limit the testing and deployment of antiballistic missile systems. On
    December 13, 2001, the United States gave Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
    and Belarus formal notice of its decision to invoke Article 15 of the ABM
    Treaty and withdraw from the agreement. Article 15 states that notice shall
    be given 6 months in advance of the party?s actual withdrawal. Therefore,
    the terms of the treaty remain in effect until June 2002. In addition, the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has proposed to increase the
    operational realism of missile defense testing by developing new or expanded
    facilities. These facilities will be used in conjunction with Kwajalein
    Atoll as part of an integrated missile defense test bed.

    has become the home to sophisticated radar, optics, and telemetry equipment
    (see fig. 4).

    Figure 4: TRADEX Radar on the RMI Island of Roi- Namur

    Source: GAO.

    FSM and RMI Currently From a more regional or global point of view, the FSM
    and the RMI Lack Broad Strategic

    currently play no role in the execution of U. S. defense and security
    Importance for United strategy. The East Asia Strategy Report, published
    periodically by DOD since 1990, refers to these countries as U. S. defense
    obligations, not as U. S. States

    defense assets. 18 Congressional hearings on U. S. defense and security
    issues in the Asia Pacific region since 1997 have been devoid of references
    to these countries. In addition, the United States has never officially
    responded to an offer the FSM, Guam?s neighbor, made in 1998 to preposition
    military forces in its territorial waters. Portions of a 1999 DOD Assessment
    of U. S. Defense and Security Interests in the region provided to

    us by the FSM and the RMI also concluded the United States has no current
    requirement to preposition equipment in either of these countries. 19
    Finally, the former and current ambassadors to these countries, as well as
    representatives from DOD?s Pacific Command, have told us that the FSM is no
    longer strategically important to the United States, while the RMI only

    remains important because of Kwajalein. 20 In 2001, two reports called for
    increasing the U. S. presence in the Western Pacific, but neither offered
    any definite role for the FSM or the RMI. DOD?s 2001 Quadrennial Defense
    Review, released on September 30, sets out a

    new strategic vision for defense planning purposes. The review noted the U.
    S. overseas presence posture, concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast
    Asia, was inadequate for the new strategic environment in which U. S.
    interests are global and potential threats are emerging in other areas of
    the world. The report called for, among other things, increasing U. S.

    presence in the Western Pacific. As a result, the Navy will increase its air
    craft carrier presence in the Western Pacific and explore basing options for
    18 There is a single reference to the value of Kwajalein as a test facility
    for missile defense in the 1998 report.

    19 These statements and actions are consistent with U. S. views expressed
    during congressional hearings on the Compact in 1984. During those hearings,
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs stated
    that the United States did not plan to seek additional defense sites in the
    islands, and a former State Department official with extensive experience in
    the area concluded the United States did not have any current or projected
    basing requirements in the FSM. Neither the FSM nor the RMI were considered
    as fallback positions for U. S. defense sites in Japan and the Philippines.
    20 While attesting to the fact that the FSM and the RMI were not
    strategically important, officials from the U. S. Pacific Command noted
    their geographic importance. One official also added that U. S. presence in
    the FSM and the RMI promotes stability and that any

    pullback could provide an opportunity for other countries to fill any vacuum
    left by the United States.

    an additional three to four naval combat vessels and guided cruise missile
    submarines in that area, while the Air Force will ensure that sufficient
    refueling and logistics support capabilities are in place. DOD has stated
    that the FSM and the RMI may not ultimately be involved in any of the above
    decisions. A 2001 RAND report on U. S. force posture in Asia 21 reached some
    of the same conclusions as the Quadrennial Defense Review

    when it highlighted Guam as the most suitable location for an increased U.
    S. Air Force presence in the region.

    Other U. S. Interests Are In addition to Kwajalein, U. S. policymakers have
    cited three main U. S.

    Overstated interests in the FSM and the RMI: strategic denial, sea lines of
    communication, and support from the FSM and the RMI for U. S. positions

    in the U. N. General Assembly. However, assessments concerning strategic
    denial and its contribution to U. S. security are mixed. Furthermore, our
    analyses concluded that the effect of strategic denial, the importance of
    sea lines of communication in the region, and the degree of support received
    from the FSM and the RMI for U. S. positions in the United Nations have been
    overstated.

    Strategic Denial: No Consensus First, there is a lack of consensus about the
    value of strategic denial in the

    on Value, Effect Overstated post- Cold War era. Different elements of DOD
    and the Department of State

    have offered a range of opinions on the subject, calling the policy
    everything from ?essential? to ?irrelevant.? In the past 3 years, strategic
    denial has been described as

     ?essential? to counter future uncertainty in the region, by the Office of
    the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs;  ?a
    very real interest,? if not as urgent as during the Cold War, by the

    Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific;  ?a prudent
    insurance policy? for U. S. security in the Pacific, by the Department of
    State?s Office of Compact Negotiations; and

     ?a policy of the past? that is ?irrelevant now with the end of the Cold
    War,? by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command.

    Furthermore, statements that have overstated the scope of strategic denial
    raise questions about the value assigned to this U. S. right and its 21 RAND
    Project Air Force, The United States and Asia: Toward a New U. S. Strategy
    and Force Posture (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

    contribution to U. S. defense and security interests. Strategic denial only
    covers the land and the 12- mile territorial waters around each island of
    the FSM and the RMI (see fig. 5). The geographic limits of strategic denial
    were defined by section 461( c) of the Compact, which states that the FSM
    and

    the RMI include the land and water areas to the outer limits of the
    territorial sea and air space above such areas as recognized by the United
    States. The United States, as a result of its acceptance of most of the
    provisions in the 1982 U. N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as customary
    law, recognized the 12- nautical mile limit for the FSM and the RMI?s
    territorial seas and therefore for strategic denial. However, various
    statements by U. S. and foreign officials have described strategic denial as
    exclusive U. S. military control over a large, contiguous area of the
    Pacific

    Ocean. Specifically,  An official in the Office of Compact Negotiations at
    the Department of State described strategic denial as ?the most significant
    U. S. interest at the time the Compact was negotiated? because of the value
    placed on

    denying military access to ?over half a million miles of the Pacific Ocean
    between Hawaii and Guam? in a paper presented at the 2001 Island State
    Security Conference.

     The Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific testified
    at a 1998 congressional oversight hearing on the Compact that strategic
    denial ?means taking a vast stretch of the Pacific and maintaining U. S.

    military control and ensuring we could deny access to the ships of other
    countries.?  A staff briefing paper submitted for the record during the
    same 1998

    hearing stated that the U. S. right of strategic denial and defense veto
    gave the United States ?exclusive military rights and legal defense veto
    over third party use of any land, ocean, or airspace of the islands.? This
    paper stated that strategic denial included the islands? 200- mile exclusive
    economic zone, ?an area larger than the continental United States? (see fig.
    5).

     The RMI Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade testified in the 1998
    hearing that the RMI ?provides the United States strategic denial rights
    over 1 million square miles of the Central Pacific.?

     Finally, in a paper presented at the 2001 Island State Security
    Conference, the Executive Director of the Joint Committee on Compact
    Economic Negotiations for the FSM stated that ?strategic denial and the
    defense and security concessions in the Compact established an
    internationally recognized U. S. zone of influence covering the 1, 000,000
    square miles of the FSM?s exclusive economic zone in the western Pacific.?

    These statements, if taken literally, not only overstate the scope but also
    the effect of strategic denial. While the right of strategic denial
    prohibits third countries from establishing land- based operations in the
    FSM and the RMI, the United States cannot use this right to prevent ships
    from conducting military activities outside of the 12- mile territorial
    waters of these countries. For example, in the mid- 1980s and early 1990s,
    there were

    numerous reports of Russian trawlers collecting information in the waters
    around Kwajalein. 22 Further, the United States recognizes that under
    international law and custom, military vessels have a right to ?innocent
    passage? through the coastal waters of the islands. According to DOD and the
    Department of State, these rights are identical to those that the United
    States exercises in its own territorial waters. However, Department of
    Defense officials have noted that in denying third- country access to land
    facilities, the right of strategic denial limits the ability of other
    nations to

    undertake long- term naval operations in the area, and makes activities in
    the region, such as surveillance, more costly. 22 A program manager for the
    Ballistic Missile Defense Organization on the Kwajalein Atoll stated in his
    1984 congressional testimony that these ships were observed to be as close
    as 3 miles from the Kwajalein facility.

    Figure 5: Territorial Extent of Strategic Denial

    Note: The land masses that make up the Kwajalein Atoll, as well as the other
    atolls and islands in the FSM, the RMI, and Palau are too small to show on a
    map of this scale.

    Source: GAO. Derived from information provided by the National Imagery and
    Mapping Agency, Department of Defense.

    Key U. S. Sea Routes Do Not Run The importance of sea lines of
    communication, or sea routes, that run near

    through the FSM or the RMI or through the FSM and the RMI is another area in
    which the value of U. S.

    interests has been overstated. While U. S. policymakers have stated that the
    critical commercial and military transit routes run near or through the FSM
    and the RMI, there is evidence to the contrary. Officials from the
    Department of the State and the U. S. Army in the RMI told us that one of
    Kwajalein?s positive qualities was its isolated location, away from
    commercial shipping lines. In addition, a 1992 analysis of U. S. defense
    interests in the Pacific Islands stated that the FSM and the RMI lie well to

    the south of many north Pacific sea and air lines in peacetime; it is only
    when these north Pacific lines are threatened that air and sea movements
    would shift southward to minimize adversary interdiction. 23 Our analysis of
    U. S. trade flows in the Pacific supports these two assessments. Of the less
    than 23 percent of total U. S. trade that crosses the Pacific, more than

    61 percent (or about 14 percent of total U. S. trade) involves Japan, China,
    Taiwan, and Korea, all of which lie north of the FSM and the RMI. 24 Other
    discussions of Pacific sea lines by U. S. officials and policy analysts have
    concentrated on chokepoints in Southeast Asia (see fig. 6). An analysis of
    these chokepoints in a 1996 National Defense University publication, stated
    that in the event all the strategic straits in Southeast Asia are closed or
    blocked, trade flows originating from the Middle East and South Asia could

    be rerouted south of Australia. Depending on the final destination of these
    goods, the rerouted ships could possibly pass near or through the FSM.
    Although the chokepoints analysis does not specifically illustrate how U. S.
    trade flows from this area would be affected, it appears they would transit
    south of the FSM and the RMI in this scenario.

    23 Portions of a 1999 DOD Assessment of U. S. Defense and Security Interests
    in the region provided to us by the FSM and the RMI also concluded that the
    most active sea and air lines of communication linking the west coast of the
    United States with the Pacific and Southwest Asia theaters run north of the
    FSM, the RMI, and the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) into
    the Philippine Sea (see fig. 1 for location of CNMI). Asia- Pacific trade
    flows, specifically those between Yokohama, Japan and Brisbane, Australia
    pass through the FSM.

    24 We approximated the amount of trade crossing the Pacific by examining
    trade flows into and from U. S. ports on the west coast of the United
    States. Trade to and from countries in the Western Hemisphere was excluded
    from these calculations. However, included in the less than 23 percent of U.
    S. trade flows that may have crossed the Pacific Ocean, are shipments from
    Europe that might have arrived in west coast ports via the Panama Canal.
    Consequently, the conclusion that could be reached from the information
    above that up to

    9 percent of all U. S. trade crosses the Pacific through or south of the FSM
    and the RMI, is in all probability an overestimation. For instance, by
    subtracting out U. S. trade with the European Union that may have transited
    the Panama Canal, the percentage of U. S. trade crossing the Pacific through
    or south of these islands falls to under 6 percent.

    Figure 6: Major Sea Lines of Communication in the Asia- Pacific Region

    Japan South Korea

    Pacific China

    Ocean

    Taiwan Hong Kong Myanmar

    Vietnam Laos

    Commonwealth of the Northern Thailand

    Mariana Islands Republic of the Philippines

    Kampuchea Marshall Islands

    Philippine Guam

    South Sea

    China Sea

    Strait of

    Spratly Palau Islands

    Federated States of Micronesia Malacca

    Malaysia Singapore

    Malaysia Borneo

    Indonesia Strait of Sunda

    Coral Sea Lombok Strait

    Australia

    Source: GAO. Derived from information in John H. Noer and David Gregory,
    Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia (Washington, D.
    C.: National Defense University Press, 1996).

    Support in U. N. Overestimated Finally, the level of support from the FSM
    and the RMI for U. S. positions in the U. N. General Assembly has been
    overestimated. Although U. N. voting does not directly relate to U. S.
    defense and security interests, U. S.

    government officials consistently referred to the support of these countries
    in the United Nations as one aspect of the strategic importance of these
    countries to the United States. In fact, an official in the Department of
    State?s Bureau of International Organizations called the FSM ?the number

    one friend of the United States at the United Nations,? while the RMI was
    referred to as ?one of the better members? of the General Assembly. These
    assessments were based on measures of voting coincidence that appeared

    in the 2000 edition of the department?s report to Congress, Voting Practices
    in the United Nations. In 2000, the FSM was said to have voted with the
    United States 100 percent of the time, while the RMI was credited with
    casting an identical vote about 74 percent of the time. However, the

    Department of State?s methodology does not take into consideration those
    occasions when the countries were absent or abstained from voting. 25
    Including these absences and abstentions drops the countries? voting

    coincidence numbers to about 54 percent and 52 percent, respectively (see
    table 1). While these countries have agreed with the United States about as
    often as the average NATO country, support on a few issues identified as
    important by the Department of State, such as votes involving the Middle
    East and other issues where the United States is often isolated, and the
    numbers reported in the Department of State report have led to a perception
    of much stronger support than our analysis indicates (see app. V for more
    discussion of the Department of State report Voting Practices in the United
    Nations).

    25 While the Department of State report excludes absences and abstentions
    from its own voting coincidence methodology, it does caution that
    abstentions and absences can make a mathematical difference, sometimes
    major, in the voting coincidence results.

    Table 1: Voting Coincidence of the FSM and the RMI with the United States in
    the U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
    1998 1999 2000 RMI

    Department of State 39. 5% 60. 5% 55.8% 65. 5% 65. 1% 68. 5% 74.4% 81.6% 74.
    5% 73.9% GAO methodology 24. 3% 35.6% 40.0% 46. 8% 49. 4% 47. 4% 44.4% 48.4%
    53. 2% 52.3%

    FSM

    Department of State 26. 2% 63. 6% 55.0% 69. 2% 66. 7% 64. 4% 100.0% 100.0%
    100.0% 100.0% GAO methodology 15. 7% 28.8% 36.7% 46. 8% 48. 2% 37. 2% 48.6%
    56.3% 42. 9% 53.8%

    Note: GAO methodology includes abstentions and absences. Sources: GAO
    analysis and Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations,
    1991- 2000.

    Current Negotiators The ongoing Compact negotiations 26 have resulted in
    agreements in Have Expressed Their

    principle between the United States and the FSM and the RMI, respectively,
    to continue their existing defense and security relationships. Without a
    Intent to Preserve the

    renewal of the Compact?s defense provisions, one of the four primary U. S.
    Status Quo on Defense

    defense rights and responsibilities will completely expire at the end of the
    and Security Relations

    negotiating period in 2003- the U. S. defense veto. U. S. officials believe
    that continued economic assistance is important to reaching a final
    agreement on renewing the Compact?s defense provisions, providing a
    favorable environment for the United States to exercise its defense rights,
    such as strategic denial and Kwajalein access, and advancing U. S.
    interests.

    Agreement in Principal All parties to the current Compact negotiations have
    expressed their intent Reached on Extending to preserve the status quo on
    defense and security matters. During

    Defense Provisions negotiations with each country, the United States and the
    FSM and the RMI,

    respectively, have issued joint statements calling for the continuation of
    the defense and security relationship set forth in Title Three of the
    Compact. If such an agreement is reached, the U. S. defense veto would be
    extended as well as the U. S. obligation to defend these countries as the
    United States defends itself and its citizens. If an agreement on economic
    assistance is 26 There have been four formal negotiating sessions held
    between the United States and the

    FSM since November 1999. The fourth session was held in December 2001. The
    inaugural negotiating session with the RMI was held in October 1999; but,
    the first substantive round of negotiations did not occur until July 2001
    due to the election of a new President of the RMI in early 2000. The most
    recent round of negotiations was held in December 2001.

    not reached by 2003, the defense veto will expire; and the United States
    will retain a lesser, albeit still significant, obligation to defend the FSM
    and the RMI. According to a representative from DOD?s Pacific Command, U. S.
    defense interests would not be hurt by the loss of the defense veto.
    Finally, the United States has already secured continued access to Kwajalein

    through 2016, by exercising its option to unilaterally extend the Military
    Use and Operating Rights Agreement with the RMI.

    U. S. Rights and Interests Officials from the Department of State?s Office
    of Compact Negotiations Facilitated by Economic have indicated that the
    agreement in principle to extend the defense and

    Assistance security provisions contained in Title Three is part of a package
    (as

    indicated in the joint statements signed by the parties) that would also
    include continued U. S. economic assistance, as well as various other
    measures, such as increased accountability over the use of Compact funds. In
    addition, statements from both DOD and the Department of State have
    described linkages between continued economic assistance and the ability of
    the United States to exercise its defense rights. A June 2001 statement, by
    a representative from the Department of State?s Office of Compact
    Negotiations, argued that continued economic assistance was justified by U.
    S. interests such as strategic denial, political and economic stability,
    support for U. S. positions in international and regional organizations,

    access to Kwajalein, and the need to provide a positive context for the
    United States to exercise its defense rights. Similarly, in a June 2000
    congressional hearing on the Compact, an official from the Office of the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, stated
    that providing continued Compact assistance was in the best interest of the
    United States because it helps preserve access to key defense interests for
    our forces while denying potentially hostile forces access to U. S. economic
    and defense interests in the region. Finally, the Executive Director of the
    Joint Committee on Compact Economic Negotiations for the FSM, has

    stated that the defense rights delegated to the United States under the
    Compact are linked to the economic assistance provided by the United States.
    Furthermore, it is the FSM?s position that the economic, political,

    and security goals of the Compact are closely interrelated; thereby making

    continued economic assistance an important part of the sustained political
    development and economic advancement necessary to attain the mutual security
    goals of the FSM and the United States. 27

    Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to DOD, the Department of
    State, and the Department of the Interior, as well as the governments of the
    FSM and the RMI, for comment. The Departments of State and the Interior
    chose not to provide comments on the draft report. Regarding its decision
    not to submit comments, the Department of State said that it had been
    working with us since June 2001, when we presented this material in
    briefings to congressional staff, and had, during that time, made its views
    on U. S.

    defense interests in the FSM and the RMI known. DOD emphasized in its
    comments that the U. S. right to exclude third- country militaries from the
    territory of the FSM and the RMI remains an important one due to future
    uncertainty about events in the region. It also noted that it would be
    unwise

    to assume that the end of the Cold War has lessened the strategic importance
    of Micronesia to U. S. interests. In our response to DOD?s letter, we cite a
    passage from a DOD assessment that states that the strategic

    importance of the FSM and the RMI has in fact lessened over the past 50
    years. The FSM government also disagreed with our conclusion that the FSM
    currently lacks broad strategic importance for the United States and that
    the importance of certain security interests involving the FSM has been
    overstated. In its comments, the RMI government stressed its strategic
    significance and historic contribution to the United States as a site of
    nuclear test and argued that the rights granted to the United States under
    the Compact have been significant. The RMI government also expressed the
    view that we have not properly characterized the relationship between the
    United States and the U. N. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands at the
    time of Compact negotiations and thus had overemphasized the U. S. desire to
    address Cold War concerns in the Compact, while de- emphasizing the role
    other issues played in the negotiations. We disagree with most points made
    by the FSM and RMI governments; and, in responding to comments

    from these two countries, have made reference to report passages that
    support our views. The RMI government also stated that we should distinguish
    between economic assistance provided to the FSM and the 27 The RMI?s
    negotiating team was formed in August 2001. The RMI presented its official
    negotiating position in December 2001.

    RMI. We agree, and have provided separate assistance figures for each
    country. Comments received from DOD, as well as the FSM and RMI governments,
    and our assessments of them are included in appendixes VI

    through VIII. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of
    Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, the
    President of the FSM, the President of the RMI, and interested congressional
    committees. We will also make copies available to other interested parties
    upon request.

    If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please call
    me at (202) 512- 4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are
    listed in appendix IX.

    Loren Yager Director, International Affairs and Trade

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Objectives, Scope, and Methodology In June 2001, we briefed the staffs of
    the Chairman of the House Committee on Resources, the Ranking Minority
    Member of the House Committee on International Relations, the Chairman of
    the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, House Committee on
    International Relations, and

    Congressman Bereuter on defense and security issues related to the 1986
    Compact of Free Association and the ongoing negotiations taking place
    between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM)

    and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI). Specifically, our briefing
    addressed (1) whether and how the United States has exercised its defense
    rights and fulfilled its defense responsibilities under the Compact, (2) the
    current U. S. defense and security interests in the FSM and the RMI, and

    (3) defense and security issues that are being addressed in the ongoing
    Compact negotiations.

    Since June, we have conducted additional audit work in response to questions
    raised during those briefings. These questions prompted us to address the
    uniqueness of the U. S. obligation to defend these islands, the influence of
    foreign governments in the region, and the utility of some defense
    provisions in the current Asia- Pacific security environment. 28

    Whether and How the To address this objective, we reviewed the Compact?s
    defense provisions

    United States Has (Title Three) as well as the related defense agreements
    (the mutual security agreements, the military use and operating rights
    agreements, and the

    Exercised Compact Status of Forces Agreement) and discussed these documents
    with

    Defense Rights and Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State
    officials to identify Fulfilled Its Defense the principal defense and
    security provisions. We also reviewed the

    congressional hearing record on the Compact, going back to 1984 oversight
    Responsibilities

    hearings, to determine the specific defense and security provisions that
    were focused on in statements and discussions. We then discussed the 28 This
    additional work has involved noting the language contained in other U. S.
    defense treaties; documenting the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department
    of State?s

    interpretation of the U. S. obligation to defend the FSM and the RMI;
    interviewing officials from DOD (Office of International Security Affairs,
    U. S. Commander in Chief Pacific Command); reviewing analyses of the pre-
    and post- Cold War security environment in the Pacific, such as Oceania and
    the United States, The South Pacific: Emerging Security Issues and U. S.
    Policy, and The United States and the Pacific Islands by John Dorrance, and
    statements on defense policy from Australia and New Zealand; and analyzing
    information on the diplomatic, economic, and military presences and
    capabilities of the Soviet Union (mid- 1980s through the early 1990s), China
    (late 1990s through the present), and other foreign nations in the region
    gathered from presentations by regional experts and other sources.

    degree to which the U. S. government has invoked its defense rights or
    discharged its defense responsibilities with these same officials (DOD
    agencies interviewed included the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
    Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Pacific Command, the U. S.
    Army Space and Missile Defense Command, and the Ballistic Missile Defense
    Organization. Department of State offices interviewed included the Bureau of
    East Asia and Pacific Affairs, the Office of the Legal Advisor, and the

    Office of Compact Negotiations). We also interviewed Department of State
    officials and reviewed Department of State documentation pertaining to the
    recent visit of Taiwanese ships to the RMI and Palau. To review U. S.
    operations at Kwajalein Atoll, we visited the atoll islands of Kwajalein and
    Roi- Namur in April 2000 to tour the facilities and discuss DOD activities
    on the islands with U. S. government officials, including the range
    Commander, as well as contractor personnel. We also visited the nearby
    island of Ebeye

    and toured facilities built by the U. S. military, as well as housing used
    by relocated mid- atoll Marshallese citizens. We also discussed Ebeye
    development projects involving schools, hospitals, and infrastructure
    improvements, with local development authority officials and reviewed

    associated documentation. 29 Current U. S. Defense

    To conduct our work in this area, we discussed U. S. defense and security
    and Security Interests interests in the FSM and the RMI with officials from
    DOD, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
    Defense Intelligence in the FSM and the RMI Agency. Furthermore, we obtained
    the views of the former U. S. Ambassador to the FSM and the current and
    former U. S. ambassadors to the RMI. We reviewed DOD reports (2001
    Quadrennial Defense Review, East Asia Strategy Reports 30 and classified
    assessments of U. S. defense and

    security interests in the countries), statements by the Commander in Chief
    of the U. S. Pacific Command, congressional testimony on the Compact (from
    1984 through 2000) and U. S. defense interests in the Asia Pacific region
    (from 1998 through 2000), and the 2001 RAND report entitled The United
    States and Asia: Toward a New U. S. Strategy and Force Posture.

    We also reviewed the legislative history of the Compact. 29 A discussion of
    development projects on Ebeye can be found in Foreign Assistance: U. S.
    Funds to Two Micronesian Nations Had Little Impact on Economic Development
    (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 216, Sept. 22, 2000). 30 The East Asia Strategy Report has
    been issued periodically by DOD since 1990. Editions were published in 1992,
    1995, and 1998; we reviewed these issues.

    For our examination of the scope and effect of strategic denial, we reviewed
    the 1982 United Nations (U. N.) Convention on the Law of the Sea, received a
    legal interpretation of the relevant Compact provision from DOD and the
    Department of State, located and examined statements in the congressional
    record, interviewed officials from DOD and the Department of State, and
    worked with the National Imagery and Mapping Agency to produce a map of the
    territorial boundaries of the FSM and the RMI.

    For our examination of important sea lines of communication, we reviewed
    statements from congressional hearings on the Compact that referred to these
    sea routes; analyzed Department of Commerce data on U. S.- Pacific trade
    flows (2000 data on total trade by U. S. Pacific ports); explored the issue
    of chokepoints in academic papers, government documents, and

    Chokepoints: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast Asia; and studied works
    on U. S. interests in the region written by former U. S. officials, such as
    The United States and the Pacific Islands, by John

    Dorrance. Finally, for our examination of voting in the U. N. General
    Assembly, we analyzed the data on the voting behavior of the FSM and the RMI
    contained in the Department of State?s annual report Voting Practices in the
    United Nations and data from the United Nations on voting margins, and
    interviewed current and former Department of State officials from the Bureau
    of International Organization Affairs, the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific
    Affairs, and the U. S. Mission to the United Nations.

    Defense and Security To address our third objective, we examined the Compact
    and its related

    Issues in the Ongoing agreements to determine the status of certain defense
    provisions after

    2001; interviewed officials from DOD and the Department of State as well
    Compact Negotiations as the FSM and RMI governments; and reviewed joint
    communiqu�s issued in 2001 by the U. S. government and the governments of
    the FSM and the RMI, regarding negotiating principles related to defense
    matters.

    We performed our work at various points from December 1999 through October
    2001, simultaneously with our efforts for other related assignments. Our
    work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
    standards.

    Expiring Defense- Related Provisions of the

    Appendi x II

    Compact As mentioned in this report, the defense veto contained in the
    Compact?s Title Three is due to expire in 2001 (or 2003 if negotiations
    continue for an additional 2 years). In addition to this provision, Title
    Three contains other provisions that are due to expire in 2001 or 2003.
    These include provisions stating that:  The government of the United States
    shall not, in the FSM or the RMI, test by detonation or dispose of any
    nuclear weapon, nor test, dispose of, or discharge any toxic chemical or
    biological weapon.  The government of the United States may invite members
    of the armed

    forces of other countries to use military areas and facilities in the FSM or
    the RMI, in conjunction with and under the control of U. S. armed forces.
    If, in the exercise of its authority and responsibility under Title Three,

    the government of the United States requires the use of areas within the FSM
    or the RMI in addition to those for which specific arrangements are
    concluded, it may request the government concerned to satisfy those
    requirements through leases or other arrangements. The FSM or RMI
    governments shall sympathetically consider any such request and shall
    establish suitable procedures to discuss it with and provide a prompt
    response to the U. S. government.

     The government of the United States shall provide and maintain fixed and
    floating aids to navigation in the FSM and the RMI at least to the extent
    necessary for the exercise of its authority and responsibility under Title
    Three.

     Subject to the terms of the Compact and related agreements, the government
    of the United States, exclusively, shall assume and enjoy, as to the FSM and
    the RMI, all obligations, responsibilities, rights and benefits of  any
    defense treaty or other international security agreement applied

    by the government of the United States as Administering Authority of the
    Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as of the day preceding the effective
    date of the Compact and  any defense treaty or other international security
    agreement to which

    the government of the United States is or may become a party that it
    determines, after appropriate consultation with the FSM or RMI government,
    to be applicable to the FSM or the RMI.  Any citizen of the FSM or the RMI
    shall be eligible to volunteer for

    service in the armed forces of the United States. (Of note, volunteers must
    meet the required mental, physical, and moral qualifications to join the U.
    S. armed forces. For 1998, 42 FSM citizens and 8 RMI citizens

    enlisted in the U. S. Army).

     The government of the United States shall have enrolled, at any one time,
    at least two qualified students, one each from the FSM and the RMI, in each
    of the U. S. Coast Guard Academy and the U. S. Merchant Marine Academy.
    The governments of the United States and the FSM or the RMI shall

    establish two Joint Committees empowered to consider disputes under the
    implementation of Title Three and its related agreements.

    In addition to these Title Three provisions, the Military Use and Operating
    Rights Agreement with the FSM, which authorizes up to four Civic Action
    Teams (CAT) in the FSM, will also expire in 2001. There are currently three
    CATs in the FSM. CATs are to conduct activities that focus on the special
    development needs of the country and are to provide training for the local

    population in general engineering skills. CAT teams work on projects (such
    as roads and school improvements) that the host governments identify. The
    teams are composed of one officer and 12 enlisted men and are shared between
    the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The CAT team budget for fiscal year 2001 was
    close to $2 million, according to a DOD official. This official told us that
    while CAT costs are to be shared between the United States and

    host governments, the United States has not been receiving the required
    funds from the FSM. The U. S. government has raised concerns that CAT teams
    are idle too much of the time and work on projects that quickly fall into
    disrepair.

    U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll, Republic of the
    Marshall

    Appendi x II I Islands The United States has maintained a military presence
    in the Marshall Islands for several decades, and DOD currently conducts
    ballistic missile and missile defense testing on Kwajalein Atoll. U. S.
    equipment on the atoll also allows for space observation, identification,
    and tracking activities. The U. S. government, which provides funding to the
    landowners of the Kwajalein Atoll through the RMI government and is a key
    employer in the RMI, has also experienced some difficulties with the local
    Marshallese

    population. No recent studies have been completed regarding whether there is
    an acceptable alternative site to Kwajalein Atoll for all U. S. defense-
    related activities conducted there.

    A History of U. S. The United States has had a military presence on the
    Marshall Islands in the Operations on central Pacific Ocean since liberating
    the islands from the Japanese in 1944

    in Operation Flintlock. The U. S. government conducted nuclear tests in
    Kwajalein Atoll these remote islands near the equator during the 1940s and
    1950s, 31 and a military base was constructed on Kwajalein Atoll to support
    this testing (see fig. 7). In 1959 Kwajalein was selected as the testing
    site for the NIKEZEUS Anti- Missile System. In 1964, control of this missile
    testing range was transferred from the U. S. Navy to the U. S. Army. During
    the 1960s and

    1970s, the range was used to test rocket systems such as NIKE- ZEUS, Sprint/
    Spartan, and Minuteman. 31 Nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands is
    discussed in our previous report- Foreign Relations: Better Accountability
    Needed Over U. S. Assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall Islands (GAO/
    RCED- 00- 67, May 31, 2000).

    Figure 7: Location of Kwajalein Atoll in the Central Pacific Ocean Canada
    Russia

    United States

    Japan China

    2180 2142 miles miles

    miles Hawaii

    2136 Kwajalein Atoll Marshall Islands miles

    2220 Australia

    Source: GAO. Derived from U. S. Army at Kwajalein Atoll command briefing.

    Kwajalein Atoll is currently home to missile and missile- defense testing
    and space tracking facilities that use land provided to the U. S. government
    under a Compact- related agreement, the Military Use and Operating Rights
    Agreement with the RMI. In September 1999, the U. S. government exercised
    its right to unilaterally extend the agreement, giving the United States
    access to Kwajalein Atoll until 2016. The RMI government pays

    Kwajalein Atoll landowners for U. S. use of the atoll. Most U. S. equipment
    is located on the Kwajalein Atoll islands of Kwajalein and Roi- Namur,
    though

    some equipment is maintained on five other islands in the atoll. 32 The U.
    S. testing range on Kwajalein is under the authority of the U. S. Army Space
    and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and as of June 2001, it became
    officially known as the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site.
    The test site, which is government owned and contractor operated, 33 is home
    to about 75 U. S. government personnel as well as about 1,600

    contractor staff and 1,000 family members. SMDC estimates that the facility
    represents a $4 billion investment. Current U. S. Activities

    The U. S. range on Kwajalein Atoll is used for intercontinental ballistic
    and Facilities on missile (ICBM) testing (see fig. 8). One ICBM system that
    currently uses Kwajalein for testing is the Minuteman III. Three tests per
    year of this Kwajalein Atoll Focus

    system, which was developed in the late 1950s, occur at Kwajalein. Another
    on Missile Testing and ICBM system is the Peacekeeper (one test/ year), the
    newest U. S. ICBM strategic weapon system. 34 Furthermore, this range is
    used for long- range Space Operations

    missile defense testing. Seven national missile defense tests have been
    conducted, with the most recent test in December 2001. 35

    32 These islands are Gagan, Meck, Illeginni, Legan, and Ennylabegan. 33
    Raytheon currently holds two key contracts at the Kwajalein range:
    Integrated Range Engineering and Kwajalein Logistics Support.

    34 In recent congressional testimony regarding DOD?s 2002 budget, the
    Secretary of Defense stated that the Peacekeeper is a missile ?whose time
    has come and gone,? and he proposed deactivating the Peacekeeper system over
    a 5- year period.

    35 Two of these flight tests did not involve intercept attempts. Of the
    remaining five flight tests, three resulted in intercepts.

    Figure 8: ICBM Test and Super RADOT (Recording Automatic Digital Optical
    Tracker)

    Source: U. S. Army at Kwajalein Atoll/ Kwajalein Missile Range mission
    photos.

    Range equipment is also used to conduct space observation, identification,
    and tracking activities. The range has provided more than 32, 000
    observations for updating the catalog of near- earth and deep- space
    objects. It also responds to assignments for the tracking of new foreign
    launches

    (commercial and military, announced and unannounced) and provides radar
    images of high- interest satellites. The facility also supports the

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration?s manned and unmanned space
    operations and experiments.

    To support these activities, the missile range at Kwajalein possesses a
    unique collection of technical equipment. The core of the range?s
    instrumentation is the Keirnan Reentry Measurements Site, a sophisticated
    radar suite. The radar sensors are located on the island of Roi- Namur. Data
    are collected across the radar frequency spectrum with a high degree of
    accuracy and are analyzed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology?s

    Lincoln Laboratory and other facilities. The Kwajalein range also has
    ground- based optics such as tracking instruments, ballistic cameras, and
    documentary photography systems. In addition, twelve antennas are used to
    receive, record, and process flight data. Furthermore, the range has a deep-
    water acoustic sensor array located in the ocean area off the east reef of
    Kwajalein Atoll that can determine the precise location of reentry

    vehicle impacts. A submersible vehicle is also available to locate debris
    within the Kwajalein lagoon. Finally, the range has a launch site on Meck
    Island, with additional launch facilities on other RMI islands as well as
    Wake Island. U. S. Government

    The U. S. military presence on Kwajalein Atoll has led to tension with the
    Provides Funding and

    Marshallese population on the atoll over the years. For example, there were
    four periods of protests by Marshallese landowners of the Kwajalein Atoll
    Employment prior to enactment of the Compact. 36 According to an SMDC
    official, these Opportunities, but

    protests occurred because landowners were concerned that (1) the U. S.
    government was not paying enough for its use of various Kwajalein Atoll
    Local Kwajalein Issues islands 37 and (2) following enactment of the
    Compact, all payments to Have Posed Difficulties landowners and future
    negotiations regarding use of the atoll would be conducted on a government-
    to- government basis, bypassing any direct dealings with landowners. During
    the protests, the landowners occupied

    Kwajalein Atoll islands, including Kwajalein and Roi- Namur. While no 36 The
    four protests covered the following periods: (1) September- November 1978,
    (2) JulyAugust 1979, (3) June- October 1982, and (4) November- May 1986. 37
    A 1982 agreement between the Marshallese government and Kwajalein landowners
    and the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement determine Kwajalein-
    related payments.

    For fiscal year 2000, the RMI government transferred almost $13 million in
    U. S. government funding to Kwajalein landowners and the Kwajalein Atoll
    Development Authority, according to the Department of the Interior (the
    agency responsible for disbursing and monitoring U. S. funding to the RMI).

    major missile tests were delayed or cancelled as a result of the protests,
    two test missions scheduled for August 1979 were cancelled. 38 Protests
    during the 1980s reportedly disrupted the community on Kwajalein and put

    a strain on security forces. Furthermore, the range is a top employer in the
    Marshall Islands, with about 1, 400 Marshallese employed at the facility and
    earning a higher wage than is reportedly available elsewhere in the country.
    These Marshallese

    who are employed at the range are generally not permitted to live on
    Kwajalein Island and so live on the small nearby island of Ebeye. 39 In
    addition, in 1965 the U. S. Army relocated Marshallese citizens living on
    mid- atoll islands to Ebeye so that ballistic missile testing could be
    conducted more safely within the mid- atoll area. Ebeye is severely
    overcrowded, with more than 9,300 people living on about 90 acres of land

    (see fig. 9). Efforts to improve the quality of life on the island, such as
    the provision of electricity and potable water, have experienced failures in
    recent years. Conditions on the island have reportedly deteriorated over the
    last decade, though numerous efforts are now being planned or are

    under way to improve the quality of life on Ebeye. 38 These tests involved
    the High Altitude Density Measurement Program and the Environmental Rocket
    Sounding System. According to an U. S. Army Space and Missile Defense
    Command official, these were not considered major missions, and no
    information was available regarding whether these tests were rescheduled.
    This official also said that the tests were cancelled because a landowner
    refused to allow the Marshallese protestors on the island of Omelek to take
    shelter for the rocket launches. 39 Marshallese who work on the Kwajalein
    Atoll island of Roi- Namur live on the island of Enniburr. This is a much
    smaller number of Marshallese workers (150) compared to the number of
    workers at the Kwajalein Atoll island of Kwajalein (about 1,400).

    Figure 9: Ebeye Housing of Relocated Mid- Atoll Marshallese Citizens

    Source: House Committee on International Relations, staff photo.

    DOD Has Conducted In 1979, DOD conducted an analysis of possible locations
    for relocating

    Few Reviews of U. S. facilities on Kwajalein Atoll. Key criteria used to
    determine the best alternative site were political supportability, land
    availability, and Possible Alternatives population distribution. DOD
    determined that the Northern Mariana to Kwajalein

    Islands were the best alternative to Kwajalein Atoll for establishing a
    major DOD test range, with an estimated investment cost of over $2 billion
    (in 2000 dollars). Other alternative sites were located in the state of
    Chuuk in the FSM and in Kiribati, located southeast of the RMI. DOD
    officials now view this study as outdated. DOD has not conducted a detailed
    study

    examining potential alternative sites for all the activities undertaken at
    that

    U. S. facility on Kwajalein since 1979. However, the DOD agency responsible
    for missile defense testing, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, has
    conducted some analysis of alternatives to Kwajalein and has determined that
    currently no acceptable alternative site exists for

    missile defense testing against ICBM class threats.

    Use of Primary Compact- Related Defense

    Appendi x V I Provisions The United States acquired four primary defense and
    security rights and responsibilities as a result the Compact of Free
    Association and its related agreements: (1) the obligation to defend the FSM
    and the RMI against attack; (2) the right to deny access to foreign
    militaries and foreign military

    activity (strategic denial); (3) the right to prevent the FSM and the RMI
    governments from acting in a way that is incompatible with U. S. authority
    and responsibility for defense and security matters (defense veto); and (4)
    the right to use certain land (i. e., Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI) for
    military purposes. Figures 10 through 13 describe the legal provisions in
    which

    these rights and responsibilities are contained, the extent that each
    provision has been used since the Compact was enacted in 1986, and what
    happens to each provision if agreement is not reached on its renewal

    before the negotiating period ends in 2003.

    Figure 10: The Compact?s ?Obligation to Defend? Provision

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 11: The Compact?s ?Strategic Denial? Provision

    a According to the Department of State, the United States did not specify
    which Compact provision( s) were the basis for its objection. b The three
    ships made a similar visit to Palau in February 2001 despite repeated
    objections from the

    United States. According to the Department of State, in its objections, the
    United States referred to the provisions of Title Three, Article One of the
    Compact of Free Association with Palau (which includes the provisions
    granting strategic denial and a defense veto) and specifically cited the
    defense veto provision.

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 12: The Compact?s ?Defense Veto? Provision

    a According to the Department of State, the United States did not specify
    which Compact provision( s) were the basis for its objection. b The three
    ships made a similar visit to Palau in February 2001 despite repeated
    objections from the

    United States. According to the Department of State, in its objections the
    United States referred to the provisions of Title Three, Article One of the
    Compact of Free Association with Palau (which includes the provisions
    granting strategic denial and a defense veto) and specifically cited the
    defense veto provision.

    Source: GAO.

    Figure 13: The Military Use and Operating Rights Agreements? ?Military Use?
    Provisions

    Source: GAO.

    Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support

    Appendi x V

    for the U. S. Positions in the United Nations While the support of the FSM
    and the RMI for U. S. positions in the United Nations is not directly
    related to U. S. defense and security interests, U. S. officials cite this
    support and support in other international fora 40 as a reason for why these
    islands are strategically important to the United States. The primary source
    that officials refer to in these statements is the Department of State?s
    annual report on Voting Practices in the United Nations. 41 This report,
    which has used a consistent methodology to compare the votes cast by
    countries in the U. N. General Assembly with U. S.

    votes, has been incorrectly interpreted and used to overstate the level of
    support provided by the FSM and the RMI. 42 By excluding instances where
    these countries were absent or abstained in their interpretation of this
    report, 43 officials have overlooked the report?s cautionary message in its
    methodology section. The report indicates that abstentions and absences are
    often difficult to interpret, but they make a mathematical difference,
    sometimes major, in the voting coincidence results. The case of Palau, a
    country near the FSM and the RMI, illustrates this point. An official in the
    Bureau of International Organizations at the Department of State
    characterized Palau as the number- two friend of the United States in the

    40 The FSM cites its support of U. S. positions to refrain from signing on
    to the U. N. Convention on Land Mines and entering into the South Pacific
    Nuclear Free Zone as examples of its support of the U. S. defense and
    security objectives. These officials also stated that the U. S. ability to
    transit nuclear- powered naval vessels through the FSM?s

    territorial waters contributed to the defense of the islands; this activity
    would be prohibited if the FSM were incorporated into the South Pacific
    Nuclear Free Zone.

    41 The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
    Appropriations Act of 1990 required the Department of State to submit this
    report on an annual basis and follow the format used in its 1988 Report to
    Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations.

    42 In 1993, the Department of State began including a second measure of
    voting coincidence that took into account consensus voting in its reports. A
    resolution is adopted by consensus in the U. N. General Assembly if no
    country calls for a vote after the resolution is presented

    by the President for passage. Records of which countries are in attendance
    when consensus is reached are not kept; therefore, including resolutions
    adopted by consensus in voting coincidence requires using a proxy measure to
    estimate attendance. This methodology increases the percentage of the time a
    country agrees with the United States in the U. N. General Assembly.

    43 Abstaining from a vote requires a country to take an affirmative action,
    akin to casting a vote. Department of States officials stated that
    abstentions can be difficult to interpret and the reasons for abstaining
    vary. A country may not want to express an opinion on a contentious issue or
    contradict an ally, or a country may not have an official position on an
    issue or the representative at the United Nations may have not received
    instructions on how to vote. In certain circumstances, the voting practices
    report has favorably interpreted abstentions because, combined with
    dissents, they prevented a resolution from receiving an absolute majority
    despite passing.

    General Assembly because of its 100- percent voting coincidence with the
    United States in 2000. However, this percentage is based on just 11
    identical votes cast out of a possible 65 votes (about 17 percent) because
    Palau?s 2 abstentions and 52 absences are not included in the voting
    coincidence percentage. Table 1 in our letter shows these differences for
    the FSM and

    the RMI. The FSM and the RMI have also gained visibility by supporting the
    United States on important issues in the General Assembly. Each year the
    Department of State report highlights about 13 votes (or 18 percent of total
    General Assembly votes) on issues the United States considers important,
    such as arms control, Middle East issues, and human rights. 44 On some of
    these issues, the United States is one of only a few dissenters, making FSM

    or RMI support highly visible. However, officials from the Department of
    State and the FSM concede that this support has more symbolic significance
    than actual significance given the overwhelming margins on

    these votes. For instance, during the 2000 General Assembly, the FSM joined
    the United States and Israel as the only dissenters on a resolution
    concerning the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East (the RMI was
    one of only 8 countries who abstained), and the RMI joined the United

    States and Israel as the only dissenters on a resolution critical of the U.
    S. embargo of Cuba (the FSM was absent). 45 The vote totals for these
    resolutions were 157- 3- 8 (for- against- abstain) and 167- 3- 4
    respectively. 46 Table 2 contains information on the number of votes the FSM
    and the RMI have cast that are either identical to or the opposite of United
    States votes

    44 The Bureau of International Affairs at the Department of State is
    responsible for identifying these important votes. 45 The FSM points to its
    support of U. S. positions on Cuba as recognition of its special
    relationship with the United States. Officials from the FSM Compact
    negotiating team stated that the FSM comes under extreme pressure from other
    members of the G- 77, a U. N. group made up of developing countries, to
    abandon its support of the United States on Cuban

    issues. However, on Middle East issues, these officials said that FSM
    support for Israel is due more to the fact that Israel was the first country
    to establish diplomatic relations with the FSM than deference to the United
    States. The desk officer for the FSM and the RMI at the Department of State
    also attributed support for Israel in the General Assembly to economic
    assistance provided by Israel in the past to these countries.

    46 Vote margins on General Assembly resolutions typically are large adding
    to the argument that FSM and RMI support is largely symbolic. During the 10-
    year period since the FSM and the RMI became members of the United Nations,
    eight votes was the smallest margin by which a resolution was adopted.

    on important issues, as well the number of times they have abstained or been
    absent, since their induction into the United Nations in 1991.

    Table 2: FSM and RMI Support for U. S. Positions on Important Issues in the
    U. N. General Assembly, 1991- 2000 FSM 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
    1998 1999 2000

    Identical votes 4 8 10 10 8 7 9 6 7 9 Opposite v otes 12 10210 0 00
    Abstentions 322 55 3 3321 Absences 440 00 1 1141

    RMI 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

    Identical votes 8 12 10 10 8 8 9 5 5 8 Opposite v otes 12 11312 0 21
    Abstentions 222 43 3 1222 Absences 100 01 0 1340

    Source: Department of State Voting Practices in the United Nations, 1991-
    2000.

    While the level of support by the FSM and the RMI for U. S. positions in the
    U. N. General Assembly has been overstated, these countries have, in recent
    years, achieved a level of support that resembles the average North Atlantic
    Treaty Organization (NATO) country (see figs. 14 through 16). 47 A closer
    look at the voting profiles of the FSM, the RMI, and NATO also reveals the

    importance of acknowledging abstentions and absences in measures of voting
    coincidence. For example, in 2000, the FSM cast 35 votes (out of 65)
    identical to those cast by the United States, while the RMI and the average

    NATO country each cast 34 identical votes. However, due to the exclusion of
    abstentions and absences from its calculations, the Department of State
    reported voting coincidence percentages for the FSM, the RMI, and the 47
    However, the level of support provided by the FSM and the RMI does not rise
    to the level of the strongest U. S. allies in the United Nations- Israel and
    the United Kingdom. For

    instance, in 2000, Israel voted the same way as the United States on about
    77 percent of all General Assembly votes and the United Kingdom did so over
    58 percent of the time. In contrast, the FSM and the RMI voted with the
    United States about 54 percent and 52 percent, respectively.

    average NATO country that ranged from about 100 percent for the FSM to 74
    percent for the RMI to 63 percent for NATO.

    Figure 14: FSM Voting Coincidence with the United States in the U. N.
    General Assembly, 1991- 2000

    Source: GAO analysis of the Department of State?s Voting Practices in the
    United Nations, 1991- 2000.

    Figure 15: RMI Voting Coincidence with the United States in the U. N.
    General Assembly, 1991- 2000

    Source: GAO Analysis of the Department of State?s Voting Practices in the
    United Nations, 1991- 2000.

    Figure 16: NATO Voting Coincidence with the United States in the U. N.
    General Assembly, 1991- 2000

    Source: GAO Analysis of the Department of State?s Voting Practices in the
    United Nations, 1991- 2000.

    Appendi x VI

    Comments from the Department of Defense Note: GAO comments supplementing
    those in the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1. See comment 2.

    GAO Comments The following are GAO?s comments on the letter from DOD dated
    December 7, 2001.

    1. This report does not determine whether the right of strategic denial is
    essential. However, we did find that (1) strategic denial has never been
    invoked (see p. 13); (2) there is a lack of consensus among U. S.
    policymakers concerning its value in the post- Cold War era (see p. 17); and
    (3) the scope and effect of this right have been overstated in public
    statements by officials from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI

    (see p. 18). 2. The cited DOD study reached a different conclusion on how
    the

    strategic importance of Micronesia has changed over time than the one
    reported in DOD?s letter. According to unclassified portions of this 1999
    assessment, the strategic importance of Micronesia to the defense

    of American national interests has clearly lessened in the 50 years since
    World War II. The study explained that this is the result of a number of
    factors, including the advent of intercontinental, nuclear- armed missiles;
    refuelable, long- range aircraft; and ballistic missile- carrying
    submarines, as well as increases in the operating range and at- sea
    endurance of America?s surface naval forces. Finally, the study stated

    that the end of the Cold War appears to have removed the only current blue-
    water navy and long- range aviation threat to U. S. forces in the Pacific.
    This is consistent with our conclusion about the FSM and the RMI?s current
    lack of broad strategic importance to the United States (see pp. 16- 17).

    Comments from the Government of the

    Appendi x VII

    Federated States of Micronesia Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the
    report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1. See comment 2.

    See comment 3.

    See comment 4. See comment 5.

    See comment 6.

    See comment 7.

    See comment 1. See comment 8. See comment 9.

    See comment 10. See comment 11.

    See comment 12. See comment 13.

    See comment 14.

    See comment 15. See comment 16.

    GAO Comments The following are GAO?s comments on the letter from the
    government of the FSM dated November 19, 2001.

    1. We consulted with DOD on numerous occasions following September 11, 2001,
    to ensure that the conclusions reached in this report still reflected
    current U. S. interests in the Asia Pacific region. In addition,

    on pp. 16- 17 we discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review, which, when it was
    released on September 30, set out a new strategic vision for defense
    planning purposes. Finally, with regard to the future Asia Pacific security
    environment, DOD did not, in response to our request, provide us with
    specific information on how the Compact?s defense provisions might aid the
    United States in its response to potential threats such as conflict on the
    Korean Peninsula, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and Northeast
    Asia, and separatism in Indonesia.

    2. We acknowledge that such statements have and continue to be made by
    senior U. S. policymakers. We examined these statements and gave officials
    at both DOD and the Department of State the opportunity to provide specific
    examples of the FSM?s strategic importance in the current security
    environment. In response, we received some general information, such as the
    views of several DOD officials concerning the utility of strategic denial,
    which are noted on p. 19. However, this information did not change the
    conclusion we reached on pp. 16- 17

    about the FSM currently lacking broad strategic importance for the United
    States. DOD reached a similar conclusion in its 1999 assessment of U. S.
    interests in the Freely Associated States (FAS) - the FSM, the RMI, and
    Palau. See p. 52, comment 2 for additional information on DOD?s conclusion.

    3. We maintain that the effect of strategic denial, the importance of sea
    lines of communication in the region, and the degree of support received
    from the FSM for U. S. positions in the United Nations have been overstated.
    See p. 63, comments 9- 12 and 14, and p. 64, comment 16 for more detailed
    information.

    4. Our report concludes that continued U. S. access to facilities on the
    Kwajalein Atoll in the RMI is both the key and compelling U. S. defense
    interest in the FSM and the RMI. In this context, ?key? means important,
    fundamental. Kwajalein is the most important U. S. defense

    interest in the two countries. In this context, ?compelling? means
    convincing. Among the U. S. interests commonly cited in the FSM and

    the RMI, including Kwajalein, strategic denial, sea lines of communication,
    and U. N. support, we found the evidence supporting Kwajalein?s importance
    most convincing. 5. See comment 2. We repeatedly sought to obtain the
    factual and detailed

    underpinnings that support Dr. Campbell and Mr. Smith?s statements, but DOD
    did not provide this information.

    6. See comment 1. The focus of this report is on current U. S. defense
    interests in the FSM and the RMI. However, we examined the potential role of
    the FSM and the RMI with regard to the Quadrennial Defense Review on pp. 16-
    17 and noted DOD?s views that the FSM and the RMI may not be included in DOD
    plans to increase the U. S. presence in the Western Pacific.

    7. The official U. S. Pacific Command position on the strategic importance
    of the FSM is classified. This information, as well as classified details of
    the 1999 DOD Assessment of U. S. Interests in the FAS, was presented to the
    requesters of this report in June 2001. Further, the views from the U. S.
    Pacific Command officials, which are included in our report, were collected
    from individuals specifically designated by the Command to respond to our
    questions.

    8. The U. S. Pacific Command has told us that the United States has access
    to airfields throughout the FAS. According to the Air Mobility Operations
    Center within the Pacific Command Air Force Operations Center, the U. S. Air
    Force (USAF) does not use Yap and Chuuk for refueling as a matter of routine
    operations. As a rule, when USAF

    fighters transit the Pacific Command?s Area of Responsibility they have
    tanker escort, which means they do not need to refuel on the ground. The Air
    Mobility Operations Center does not keep track of fighter refueling and
    cannot verify whether any USAF fighters have refueled at Yap or Chuuk.
    However, a Pacific Command representative stated that it is quite possible
    that the Marines or Navy could have dropped in for fuel, but there is no way
    to provide an accounting of how many times and for what reasons. He stated
    that there have been literally hundreds

    of flights transiting the Pacific Command?s Area of Responsibility in
    support of Operation Enduring Freedom. U. S. pilots are given a great deal
    of latitude; and, given countless possible scenarios, some could have
    dropped into the FSM to refuel. Finally, he stated that Palau and Guam have
    also been used recently for refueling purposes, with Guam used more often
    than small airfields when it is convenient. However,

    carrier- based aircraft transiting the Pacific Command?s Area of
    Responsibility might find a more direct route by flying through the FSM or
    the RMI rather than Guam. 9. This report does not conclude that the value of
    strategic denial is overrated. However, we did find that (1) strategic
    denial has never been

    invoked (see p. 13); (2) there is a lack of consensus among U. S.
    policymakers concerning its value in the post- Cold War era (see p. 17); and
    (3) the scope and effect of this right have been overstated in public
    statements by officials from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI

    (see p. 18). Finally, with regard to the effective area of strategic denial,
    we acknowledge both the right to deny land access and the potential effect
    of this denial on the ability of other countries to conduct longterm naval
    operations (p. 19).

    10. See p. 21, footnote 24 for a discussion of U. S. trade flows. Our
    analysis illustrates that most U. S. Pacific trade passes well north of the
    FSM and the RMI. 11. Of note, the examples offered here ignore the fact that
    strategic denial would prevent the use of the FSM by a third- party military
    to threaten

    Guam or sea lines. Also, in response to our questions on how U. S. interests
    would be affected if a third- party military had a presence in the FSM or
    the RMI, DOD focused exclusively on potential surveillance

    activities, not threats to Guam or shipping. 12. We have carefully examined
    these route charts and determined that

    they support our finding that the major sea lines of communication between
    the United States and Guam as well as key trading partners in Asia run north
    of the FSM and the RMI. In addition, we have amended

    footnote 23 on p. 21, to note that there are sea lines running between
    Australia and Japan that transit the FSM. Finally, these route charts appear
    to show that major sea lines between the United States and

    Australia lie close to 2000 kilometers away from the nearest point in the
    FSM.

    13. We provided a classified briefing to our requesters in June 2001. This
    briefing included a discussion of contingency war plans and operational
    scenarios, as well as other information gathered from U. S. defense and
    intelligence agencies.

    14. These specific instances of FSM support for U. S. positions were
    included in the draft provided to the FSM for comment (see app. V, p. 45,
    footnote 40, and p. 46, footnote 45). 15. Information on FSM citizens
    serving in the U. S. armed forces was included in the draft provided to the
    FSM for comment (see app. II,

    p. 31). 16. This report recognizes that absences and abstentions are an
    issue for

    all the coincidence numbers reported in the Department of State report in p.
    23, footnote 25. Our methodology, which accounts for these absences and
    abstentions, was described as fair and valid by a former Department of State
    official who prepared the U. N. voting report for the past 12 years. We also
    compare the FSM favorably with U. N. support received from NATO on p. 23
    (see also app. III, pp. 47- 48). Our analysis of NATO voting on pp. 47, 48,
    and 50 applies the same

    methodology that we used to calculate the voting coincidences of the FSM and
    the RMI. Finally, we discuss FSM support on issues identified as important
    by the Department of State on pp 46- 47. However, we note that lopsided vote
    margins in the U. N. General Assembly means this support is largely
    symbolic.

    Comments from the Government of the

    Appendi x VI II

    Republic of the Marshall Islands Note: GAO comments supplementing those in
    the report text appear at the end of this appendix.

    See comment 1. See comment 2.

    See comment 3. See comment 3.

    See comment 4.

    See comment 4. See comment 5.

    See comment 6. See comment 7.

    See comment 8. See comment 9.

    GAO Comments The following are GAO?s comments on the letter from the
    government of the RMI dated November 19, 2001.

    1. This report mentions two incidents where the defense veto, though not
    formally invoked, may have had some relevance. On p. 13 in footnote 14, we
    note that the RMI government once considered a plan to store third country
    nuclear waste in the RMI. The threat of the United States possibly invoking
    the defense veto, along with a change in RMI government leadership, may have
    been responsible for the RMI government?s final decision against providing
    storage. Furthermore, on p. 13 we noted initial U. S. government objections
    to a 2001 RMI port call by Taiwanese ships. While the U. S. government never
    mentioned

    the Compact?s defense veto provision during this incident, the RMI did cite
    the provision as not being appropriate in this particular instance. Finally,
    our objective was to determine which of the key provisions had been formally
    invoked, and both DOD and the Department of State have told us the defense
    veto remains unused. This report also does not attempt to assign value to
    the defense veto provision based on its lack of usage.

    2. This report chose not to speculate on the role strategic denial may have
    played in deterring third country militaries from seeking to use the RMI,
    because data are not available to determine whether there are any third
    countries that would have had an interest in engaging in activities in the
    RMI in the absence of this right. We maintain that the evidence shows

    that the scope and effect of strategic denial have been overstated in public
    statements by officials from the United States, the FSM, and the RMI (see p.
    18). 3. This report does not conclude that hostile actors or foreign powers
    will never again attempt to transit RMI waters or develop a presence in the

    RMI. Rather we note on p. 13 in footnote 13 that portions of a 1999 DOD
    assessment, provided to the RMI, stated that no outside threat to the FSM
    and the RMI is likely to emerge over the next 10 to 20 years, and there are
    no compelling security interests on the part of any Asian countries that
    would manifest themselves in any threat to the FSM and the RMI. This
    assessment also stated that no Asian country will have the military reach to
    pose a credible threat or domineering presence in the foreseeable future.

    4. This report does acknowledge the importance of nuclear and missile
    defense testing in the U. S.- RMI relationship. Appendix III discusses U. S.
    activities in the Marshall Islands over the past 50 years. This report also
    notes that Kwajalein Atoll is cited by DOD as an ?important and unique
    national asset that would be difficult and expensive to replace,? thus
    giving prominence to the RMI location where missile and missile defense
    testing occurs (see pp. 3 and 14). Reviewing U. S. nuclear testing
    activities in the Marshall Islands was outside the scope of our review,
    though the issue is mentioned in appendix III. For a discussion of the
    amount the United States has spent to address nuclear testing- related
    issues in the Marshall Islands, see our report Foreign Relations: Better
    Accountability Needed Over U. S. Assistance to Micronesia and the Marshall
    Islands (GAO/ RCED- 00- 67, May 31, 2000).

    5. This report states that the negotiation of expiring defense and economic
    Compact provisions provides the United States with the opportunity to
    reexamine its defense and security interests in the RMI and the FSM. We
    believe that this is a reasonable and prudent course of action and one that
    in no way suggests that the United States should

    unilaterally choose to end or alter commitments that require mutual
    termination by all parties involved. Of note, in a 1996 testimony, a
    Department of State official stated that while U. S. defense arrangements
    with the Freely Associated States (FAS) - the FSM, the RMI, and Palau - have
    contributed measurably to the security of the

    United States and the FAS, it is necessary to review the entire range of
    Compact security provisions in light of new global conditions and stringent
    fiscal realities as we near the end of the Compact period.

    6. The U. S. obligation to defend the RMI and the FSM is mentioned in this
    report on p. 7 in order to demonstrate the unique relationship between the
    United States and the two Pacific Island nations, and is never referred to
    as a burden. This report also states on p. 8 that strategic denial, the
    defense veto, and access to RMI land are key provisions of the Compact that
    provide rights to the U. S. government. 7. We agree that the factors
    discussed by the RMI government over the

    next three pages- the relationship that developed between the United States
    and the RMI as a result of U. S. administration of the Marshall Islands
    under the U. N. trust, and U. S. nuclear testing during the 1940s and 1950s-
    played a key role in establishing an important framework

    for Compact negotiations. However, we maintain, after carefully reviewing
    the Compact?s legislative history, that the Compact?s specific security and
    defense provisions reflected Cold War concerns that

    existed at the time of the negotiations. We also note that the RMI
    government did not disagree when we cited three goals of the Compact in a
    September 2000 report that are also listed in this report: (1) securing
    self- government for the RMI and the FSM, (2) assuring certain national
    security rights for the RMI, the FSM, and the United States; and (3)
    assisting the RMI and the FSM in their efforts to advance economic self-
    sufficiency. Our earlier report also noted U. S. concerns about an expanded
    Soviet Union military presence in the Pacific at the

    time of Compact negotiations. In addition, a 1999 DOD assessment points out
    that the Compact was negotiated during the Cold War era in a vastly
    different politico- military and security environment, and a State

    Department official testified at a 2000 congressional hearing that the
    Compact was negotiated and enacted during the Cold War, when the Soviet
    Union had a growing presence in the Pacific.

    8. Pages 1 and 6 of this report state that the Compact consists of two
    separate international agreements, one between the United States and the
    RMI, the other between the United States and the FSM.

    9. We have revised footnote 5 on p. 6 of the report to show direct Compact
    funding provided to the RMI and the FSM separately for fiscal years 1986
    through 1998. Further, on p. 2, footnote 1 and p. 6, footnote 5, we have
    separated total estimated Compact assistance (direct funding as well as U.
    S. programs and federal services) for the RMI from the total estimated
    assistance provided to the FSM.

    Appendi x IX

    GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Emil Friberg (202) 512-
    8990 Leslie Holen (415) 904- 2277 Acknowledgments In addition to those named
    above, Ron Schwenn, Mary Moutsos, Mark

    Speight, and Rona H. Mendelsohn made key contributions to this report.

    Related GAO Products

    Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid Effectiveness
    and Accountability and Migrants? Impact on U. S. Areas (GAO- 02- 270T, Dec.
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    Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had Significant
    Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
    (GAO- 02- 40, Oct. 5, 2001).

    Foreign Assistance: Lessons Learned From Donors? Experiences in the Pacific
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    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Funds to Two Micronesian Nations Had Little Impact
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    Foreign Assistance: U. S. Funds to Two Micronesian Nations Had Little Impact
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    Foreign Relations: Better Accountability Needed Over U. S. Assistance to
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    (320069)

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    a

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Page i GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Contents

    Contents

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    Contents

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Expiring Defense- Related Provisions of the Compact

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    Appendix III

    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
    Republic of the Marshall

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    Appendix III U. S. Military Operations and Facilities on Kwajalein Atoll,
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    Appendix IV

    Appendix IV Use of Primary Compact- Related Defense Provisions

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    Appendix IV Use of Primary Compact- Related Defense Provisions

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    Appendix IV Use of Primary Compact- Related Defense Provisions

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    Appendix V

    Appendix V Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations

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    Appendix V Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations

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    Appendix V Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations

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    Appendix V Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations

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    Appendix V Measuring the Level of FSM and RMI Support for the U. S.
    Positions in the United Nations

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    Appendix VI

    Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense

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    Appendix VII

    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia

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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
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    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia

    Page 61 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia

    Page 62 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia

    Page 63 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VII Comments from the Government of the Federated States of
    Micronesia

    Page 64 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Page 65 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 66 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 67 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 68 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 69 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 70 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 71 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 72 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 73 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix VIII Comments from the Government of the Republic of the Marshall
    Islands

    Page 74 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Page 75 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

    Appendix IX

    Page 76 GAO- 02- 119 U. S. Defense Interests in Micronesia

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