Defense Plans: Status of DOD's Efforts to Improve Its Joint	 
Warfighting Requirements Process (09-NOV-01, GAO-02-100R).	 
								 
Because the military services' weapon systems, particularly	 
communication systems, have not been sufficiently interoperable, 
the services have experienced difficulty during operations such  
as the Gulf War and the Kosovo operation. In Joint Vision 2020, a
strategic statement on the transformation efforts of U.S.	 
military forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff	 
recognizes that a joint force is key to operational success and  
envisions an interoperable joint force with technologically	 
advanced warfighting capabilities able to dominate any adversary 
by 2020. This vision also emphasizes the importance of		 
experimenting with new joint warfighting concepts. The Joint	 
Requirements Oversight Council plays a key role in advancing the 
joint warfighting capabilities of U.S. forces in support of Joint
Vision 2020. The Council oversees the joint requirements process 
by, among other things, assessing and approving the services'	 
joint requirements and deficiencies, reviewing and approving	 
plans for correcting those deficiencies while ensuring		 
interoperability, and ensuring that the services have linked	 
their capabilities to Joint Vision 2020. The Chairman of the	 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council and others have identified  
several weaknesses and initiated actions to address them. Because
these initiatives are in the early stages of implementation, it  
is too early to assess their impact in improving the Council's	 
oversight and the joint requirements process.			 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-100R					        
    ACCNO:   A02452						        
  TITLE:     Defense Plans: Status of DOD's Efforts to Improve Its    
Joint Warfighting Requirements Process				 
     DATE:   11/09/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Advanced weapons systems				 
	     Air defense systems				 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Command control communications computer		 
	     systems						                                                                 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Defense economic analysis				 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Management information systems			 
	     Military communication				 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Noncompliance					 
	     Testing						 
	     Waivers						 
	     Warfare						 

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GAO-02-100R
     
GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

November 9, 2001 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John Warner
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Subject: Defense Plans: Status of DOD?s Efforts to Improve Its Joint
Warfighting Requirements Process

Because the military services? weapon systems, particularly communication
systems, have not been sufficiently interoperable, the services have
experienced difficulty during operations such as the Gulf War and the Kosovo
operation. In Joint Vision 2020, a strategic statement on the transformation
efforts of U. S. military forces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recognizes that a joint force is key to operational success and envisions an
interoperable joint force with technologically advanced warfighting
capabilities able to dominate any adversary by 2020. This vision also
emphasizes the importance of experimenting with new joint warfighting
concepts.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council plays a key role in advancing the
joint warfighting capabilities of U. S. forces in support of Joint Vision
2020. The Council oversees the joint requirements process by, among other
things, assessing and approving the services? joint requirements for current
and future military capabilities, assessing warfighting capabilities and
deficiencies, reviewing and approving plans for correcting those
deficiencies while ensuring interoperability, and ensuring that the services
have linked their capabilities to Joint Vision 2020. Assessment teams
comprised of Joint Staff and other defense officials support the Council?s
deliberations by analyzing warfighting needs.

To better ensure that joint requirements will result in interoperable,
future warfighting capabilities, the Chairman and others began to informally
examine the Council?s oversight and the joint requirements process in 1999
and identified several

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 2 weaknesses in both. The Chairman
initiated several actions to address these

weaknesses and, in March 2001, reported on these actions to your respective
committees. 1 We reviewed the March 2001 report and obtained additional
information on the weaknesses and the status of actions taken to address
them. This report summarizes the results of our work. As agreed with your
offices, we are providing this report to you because of your Committees?
oversight of matters related to the Council and the joint requirements
process.

RESULTS IN BRIEF In examining the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and
the joint requirements process, the Chairman and others identified several
weaknesses and initiated actions to address them. Specifically:

ï¿½ The Council had become too focused on validating requirements for
individual systems without sufficient regard to whether or how these systems
would collectively achieve the Chairman?s vision of future joint warfighting
capabilities. To strengthen oversight of the Council, the Chairman directed
the Council?s assessment teams to develop standards for more systematically
evaluating whether proposed requirements for systems and equipment would
advance warfighting capabilities that support the Chairman?s vision.

ï¿½ In preparing requirements documents for information systems, the services
and other Department of Defense (DOD) entities had not given enough
attention to the systems? interoperability. The Chairman issued guidance to
require them to address how proposed information systems and equipment would
operate with existing assets.

ï¿½ The Council?s assessment teams had spent most of their time analyzing
current, rather than future warfighting needs. At the Chairman?s direction,
the Joint Staff realigned these teams and their workloads to focus on the
future warfighting capabilities outlined in Joint Vision 2020.

ï¿½ The Council was focused solely on materiel requirements- systems and
equipment- and did not have oversight of requirements for changes in
doctrine, training, and other nonmateriel elements that may enhance joint
warfighting capabilities. The Chairman revised the Council?s charter to
expand the Council?s responsibilities to include oversight of nonmateriel
requirements.

ï¿½ No mechanism existed to integrate the results of the U. S. Joint Forces
Command?s warfighting experimentation program- a potential source of new
joint requirements-- into the requirements process. To remedy this
situation, the Chairman established procedures to enable the Command to
submit recommendations on joint warfighting requirements stemming from its
joint experimentation program to the Council.

1 The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2001, Sec. 916, requires the Chairman to report on the progress of efforts
to reform the Council in five semiannual reports beginning on March 1, 2001.

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 3 Because these initiatives are in the
early stages of implementation, it is too early to

assess their impact in improving the Council?s oversight and the joint
requirements process. Accordingly, we are not making any recommendations in
this report.

BACKGROUND With the enactment of the Goldwater- Nichols Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was identified as the principal military adviser to the Secretary of
Defense and was tasked with providing the Secretary with advice concerning
requirements, programs, and budgets. To provide additional support
associated with the DOD?s acquisition process, the Secretary of Defense
established the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, and the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 designated the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Chairman of the Council. The Chairman can
delegate his functions only to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who for years has chaired the Council. According to the Council?s
charter, the Council?s key responsibilities and functions are to

ï¿½ identify and assess joint requirements and priorities for current and
future military capabilities, forces, programs, and resources consistent
with the national military strategy and the Secretary of Defense?s annual
defense planning and fiscal guidance;

ï¿½ review and approve military and joint interoperability requirements for
potential acquisition programs;

ï¿½ consider alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified
to meet military requirements by evaluating the cost, acquisition schedule,
and performance of the program;

ï¿½ assess the warfighting capabilities and deficiencies of combatant commands
and defense agencies and review and approve their plans for correcting those
deficiencies while ensuring interoperability, reducing duplicate efforts,
and promoting efficiencies;

ï¿½ determine and oversee processes and methods to be used in identifying,
developing, assessing, validating, and prioritizing joint requirements; 2
and

ï¿½ ensure that capabilities, forces, programs, and budgets proposed by the
military services are linked to the national military strategy, the
Secretary of Defense?s defense planning guidance, Joint Vision 2020, and
combatant command requirements.

To assist the Council in advising the Chairman on joint warfighting
capabilities, the joint warfighting capability assessment (JWCA) process was
established in April

2 Based on Council guidance, the services and other DOD entities submit
requirements, outlined in various documents, for the Council?s approval.
This guidance includes standards to ensure that resulting systems or
equipment are capable of operating effectively together.

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 4 1994. Under this process, assessment
teams representing specific joint warfighting

capabilities, such as precision engagement and dominant maneuver, are
expected to perform assessments to assist the Council in identifying joint
requirements. The intent is for the teams to continuously assess available
information on their respective areas to identify opportunities to improve
warfighting effectiveness. They are composed of the representatives from the
Joint Staff, combatant commands, military services, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, defense agencies, and others as needed.

Joint Vision 2020 also emphasizes the importance of experimentation to
identify innovations in warfighting. Designated as DOD?s executive agent for
joint warfighting experimentation in 1998, the U. S. Joint Forces Command
conducts experiments on new warfighting concepts and operations. The results
of these experiments could generate new joint requirements for major systems
or equipment or changes in doctrine, organization, training, leadership and
education, and facilities.

SEVERAL INITIATIVES ARE UNDERWAY TO ADDRESS IDENTIFED WEAKNESSES

To better ensure that joint requirements will result in joint and
interoperable systems, equipment, and other defense assets, the Chairman and
others began, in 1999, to informally examine whether changes were needed in
the role of the Council and the joint requirements process. They identified
several weaknesses and generally determined that the Council needed to
strengthen its oversight role and more directly influence the development of
joint requirements, focus more on future warfighting capabilities, and
expand its oversight to include nonmateriel areas and the results of joint
experimentation. Prior to and concurrent with the review and its resulting
actions, the Chairman also took specific actions to enhance
interoperability.

Efforts to Develop Standards for Evaluating and Validating Requirements In
reviewing the Council?s role, the Chairman and others recognized the Council
had become too focused on evaluating and validating joint requirements on an
individual basis and had paid insufficient attention to how resulting
systems and equipment would collectively contribute to the future
capabilities outlined in Joint Vision 2020. Specifically, the Council had
little influence on the development of the services? and others?
requirements or any means of ensuring the integration of proposed systems
and equipment.

To address these issues, the Chairman determined that the Council needed
standards to guide the development and evaluation of joint requirements.
Specifically, the Chairman, through the Council, tasked certain assessment
teams to conduct strategic analyses to establish a common view of how U. S.
forces will conduct warfighting in four capability areas-- dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, joint task force command and control, and
counterproliferation. For each capability area, the team will prepare an
operational concept that explains how forces, weapon systems, organizations,
and tactics will be combined to accomplish a military operation. Each team
will also develop an ?operational architecture? that describes the tasks,
activities, and information flows required to accomplish or support a
military operation. Together, the concept and the operational architecture
will provide the

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 5 guidance and standards that the Council
will use to evaluate whether proposed

requirements for systems or equipment meet future warfighting needs. Joint
Staff officials estimate that it will take about 2 to 3 years or longer for
the teams to complete and for the Council to approve the operational
concepts and architectures for the four capability areas. They noted that
they plan to expand this approach to other capability areas such as focused
logistics, full- dimensional protection, information superiority, and
strategic deterrence.

Efforts to Increase Emphasis on Interoperability According to DOD, the
inability of systems and people to talk to one another has been a
significant deficiency in joint operations. Command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems relay critical
information to U. S. forces during joint operations. C4I systems must be
capable of exchanging information and operating effectively together if
joint operations are to be successful. In March 1998, we reported that DOD
did not have an effective process for certifying existing, newly developed,
and modified C4I systems for interoperability. 3 At that time, difficulties
that the services encountered in communicating with one another during the
Kosovo operation highlighted the need for more specific guidance. For
example, DOD?s after action report for Kosovo noted that information
interoperability was sometimes a major problem. For example, networking and
procedures for disseminating information were ad hoc, and it was never
possible to present a common operational picture to joint commanders. 4

Prior to and concurrent with the effort to review the Council and the joint
requirements process, the Chairman began to take steps to emphasize the
importance of addressing the issue of interoperability in the development of
joint requirements documents for information systems. For example, in August
1999, the Chairman strengthened guidelines to require DOD components to
demonstrate the ability of proposed C4I systems to exchange information with
one another. Furthermore, in May 2000, the Chairman established additional
policies and procedures, including a requirement for the Joint Staff to
certify interoperability requirements. 5 The May 2000 guidance also
established a methodology that DOD components must use to develop
performance requirements for exchanging information, such as information on
who exchanges what information with whom, why the information is necessary,
and how the information exchange must occur.

In the past few years, the Joint Staff has also required DOD components to
make more use of a Web- based program known as the Joint C4I Program
Assessment Tool in preparing requirements documents. After requirements
documents are submitted electronically into this Web- based tool, DOD
entities, including JWCA representatives and other Joint Staff officials,
can review and comment on the ability of a proposed system to share
information with other systems. The Joint Staff, on behalf of the

3 Joint Military Operations: Weaknesses in DOD?s Process for Certifying C4I
Systems? Interoperability (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 73, Mar. 13, 1998). 4 Department
of Defense, Report to Congress, Kosovo/ Operation Allied Force After- Action
Report,

Jan. 31, 2000. 5 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 's instructions
are CJCSI 3170.01A, August 10, 1999, and

CJCSI 6212. 01B, May 8, 2000, respectively.

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 6 Council, then reviews the requirements
documents to ensure they address the

mandated interoperability key performance parameter and certifies that
interoperability requirements are being met.

According to Joint Staff and DOD officials, the automated assessment tool is
enhancing cooperation among the components, and the strengthened guidelines
are helping them to give more serious consideration to interoperability for
C4I systems. Some Joint Staff officials believe that applying
interoperability parameters to other types of systems and capabilities would
be beneficial, but there are no specific plans to do so at this time.

Assessment Teams Have Been Realigned to Focus More on Future Warfighting
Needs The Chairman?s review also indicated that JWCA teams, which are
responsible for providing analytical support to the Council, were not
sufficiently focused on future warfighting needs. According to Joint Staff
officials, the teams spent the majority of their resources on addressing the
current needs of warfighting commanders and limited resources on identifying
and assessing joint requirements for future capabilities. As a result, they
believed the Council was not getting the full range of support it needed to
carry out its responsibilities.

To address these issues, the Chairman directed actions to link the teams
more closely with the requirements process and shift the teams? workloads to
tasks geared more to identifying and addressing long- term warfighting
needs. For example, the number of teams was reduced from 14 to 8 to more
closely reflect the warfighting capabilities outlined in Joint Vision 2020
and newly established Joint Mission Areas. 6 Also, in addition to developing
the operational concepts and architectures discussed earlier, JWCA teams
will comment on requirements documents. The teams will continue to conduct
studies of specific joint warfighting topics; however, Joint Staff officials
stated the studies will primarily focus on identifying critical future
warfighting challenges and related requirements.

In the past, we reported on the need for DOD to perform more comprehensive
assessments of future joint warfighting needs. For example, in our work on
combat air power, we found that DOD had not sufficiently assessed joint
requirements and was not well positioned to determine the need for and
priority of its planned investments. 7 Specifically, the Council?s
assessment teams had identified ways to improve the interoperability of
forces in joint operations and their assessments contributed to some
decisions that could help to avoid future levels of redundancy. They had
little impact on weighing alternatives in identifying unneeded overlap and
duplication in existing capabilities or in weighing the relative merits of
alternative ways to recapitalize U. S. air power forces. The focus of the
teams? assessments is

6 Joint Mission Areas are joint tasks and activities that share a common
purpose and facilitate joint force operations and interoperability. The
eight JWCA teams cover Dominant Maneuver; Precision Engagement; Information
Superiority; Focused Logistics; Full Dimensional Protection; Communications
and Computer Environment; Intelligence; Surveillance and Reconnaissance; and
Strategic Deterrence.

7 Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program
and Budget Decisions (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 177, Sept. 20, 1996).

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 7 now in the process of shifting. It is,
therefore, too soon to assess the effect of this

shift on the nature of analytical support provided to the Council, including
whether it will address some of the concerns we raised in the past.

Council Oversight Has Been Expanded Beyond Major Weapons and Equipment In
the past, the Council focused primarily on assessing and validating
requirements for major weapons systems and items of equipment intended to
address identified warfighting deficiencies. It did not have oversight of
joint requirements related to the nonmateriel aspects of warfighting such as
doctrine, training, organization, leadership and education, personnel, and
facilities. According to Joint Staff officials, to respond to the growing
complexity of warfare, take advantage of advances in information technology,
and ultimately achieve the goals of Joint Vision 2020, U. S. forces must
evolve in all materiel and nonmateriel areas. In early 2001, the Chairman
issued guidance to extend the Council?s oversight to the development of
joint requirements for nonmateriel elements of warfighting.

Procedures Were Established to Bring Experimentation Results Before the
Council In 1998, the U. S. Joint Forces Command began to implement a joint
experimentation program to test new warfighting concepts that now support
Joint Vision 2020. However, no mechanism existed to integrate the results of
these experiments- a potential source of new joint requirements-- into the
joint requirements process. The Chairman thus took specific steps to
formalize the relationship between the Command and the Council. For example,
the Chairman, in consultation with the Council and the U. S. Joint Forces
Command, now issues guidance for the Command to use in developing its annual
fiscal year plan for conducting experiments. Also, the Council will now
review the Command?s experimentation plan, which is submitted for the
Chairman?s approval. In developing its annual joint experimentation plan,
the U. S. Joint Forces Command decided to initially conduct experiments that
would primarily focus on nonmateriel solutions to warfighting deficiencies.
By 2004, it expects to more fully address materiel requirements.

Also, the Chairman has provided broad guidance on the coordination of joint
experimentation efforts. For example, in April 2001, the Chairman signed the
Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan that requires the U. S. Joint Forces
Command to coordinate its joint experimentation program initiatives with the
services and other DOD entities. According to U. S. Joint Forces Command and
Joint Staff officials, the U. S. Joint Forces Command and services discuss
and share information on their respective experimentation programs, but the
initiatives are not yet fully coordinated. According to Joint Staff
officials, the Chairman plans to issue additional guidance that will further
clarify specific responsibilities for joint experimentation and coordination
requirements.

In addition, the Council has set up mechanisms for the Command to formally
submit recommendations for Council approval on warfighting requirements
stemming from its experimentation efforts. In July 2001, the U. S. Joint
Forces Command provided its first recommendation to the Council. This
recommendation, called Collaborative Tools, emerged from an experiment
called Millennium Challenge 2000 and was intended to address improvements
needed in the planning, collaboration, and

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 8 operations of future Joint Task Forces.
The recommendation included suggestions

for automated interagency data links for improved joint planning. As of
August 2001, the Council was reviewing the recommendation. Because this is
the Command?s first recommendation, it is too soon to assess the impact of
the Chairman?s efforts to integrate the results of joint experimentation in
the requirements process. We plan to conduct work on the Command?s joint
experimentation program in the future.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION In commenting on a draft of this letter,
DOD concurred with the report and our overall assessment. DOD stated that
our findings accurately reflected both the history and progress that the
Department had made toward improving the joint warfighting requirements
process. Furthermore, DOD stated that our report acknowledged the positive
steps that DOD had taken while also identifying some shortfalls and needed
reforms. DOD added that joint interoperability remains a cornerstone of the
Department?s efforts and that it will continue to refine the joint
warfighting requirements process to expedite the fielding of a truly
interoperable force. DOD also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated as appropriate.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY To obtain additional information on the weaknesses
identified in the Council?s oversight and the joint requirements process and
on the status of actions taken to address them, we reviewed relevant
documents and interviewed officials from the Joint Staff; the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the
U. S. Joint Forces Command; the U. S. Central Command; and the U. S. Special
Operations Command. We also attended a U. S. Joint Forces Command and
National Defense Industrial Association Symposium that discussed the status
and progress of joint experimentation efforts. Our review was conducted from
April 2001 through August 2001 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

- - - We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air
Force, the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and interested
congressional committees. We will also provide copies to others on request.
The letter is also available on GAO?s home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

GAO- 02- 100R Defense Plans Page 9 Please contact me at (202) 512- 3958 if
you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were John R.
Beauchamp, Sharon Pickup, Deborah Colantonio, Joan Slowitsky, and Jason G.
Venner.

Carol R. Schuster Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management (350067)
*** End of document. ***