Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the
Persian Gulf War (30-SEP-02, GAO-02-1003).			 
                                                                 
The utility of land mines on the modern battlefield has come into
question in recent years, largely because of their potential for 
causing unintended casualties and affecting U.S. forces'	 
maneuverability. These concerns were raised during the Persian	 
Gulf War. U.S. land mines of all types--nonself-destructing and  
self-destructing, antipersonnel and antitank--were available for 
use if needed in the Gulf War from U.S. land mine stockpiles,	 
which contained 19 million land mines. U.S. forces sent to the	 
Gulf War theater of operations took with them for potential use  
over 2.2 million land mines. U.S. war plans included plans for	 
the use of land mines if required by the tactical situation.	 
According to Department of Defense (DOD) documents, no		 
nonself-destructing or "dumb," land mines were used; and the	 
reported number of self-destructing, or "smart," land mines used 
by the services totaled approximately 118,000. DOD did not	 
provide information on the effect of U.S. land mine use against  
the enemy. According to U.S. service records, of the 1,364 total 
U.S. casualties in the Gulf War, 81, or 6 percent, were killed or
injured by land mines. Concerns about land mines raised in DOD	 
lessons-learned and other reports included the fear of fratricide
and loss of battlefield mobility. These concerns led to the	 
reluctance of some U.S. commanders to use land mines in areas	 
that U.S. and allied forces might have to traverse.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-02-1003					        
    ACCNO:   A05184						        
  TITLE:     Military Operations: Information on U.S. Use of Land     
Mines in the Persian Gulf War					 
     DATE:   09/30/2002 
  SUBJECT:   Defense operations 				 
	     Mine safety					 
	     Safety regulation					 
	     Ground warfare					 
	     Munitions						 
	     Military forces					 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Gator Mine System					 
	     M-14 Mine						 
	     M-15 Mine						 
	     M-16 Mine						 
	     M-19 Mine						 
	     M-21 Mine						 
	     Persian Gulf War					 

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GAO-02-1003

Report to the Honorable Lane Evans, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

September 2002 MILITARY OPERATIONS

Information on U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

GAO- 02- 1003

Page i GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War
Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 4 Effect of the Use of Self- Destruct U. S.
Land Mines in the Gulf War

Is Unknown 6 Extent of U. S. Casualties from Land Mines and Unexploded

Ordnance 11 DOD Reports Express Fratricide and Mobility Concerns Relating
to

the Safety of, and Lack of Knowledge about, Land Mines and Dudfields 20
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 36

Appendix I Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory 39

Appendix II U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War 44

Appendix III U. S. Gulf War Casualties by Service 51

Appendix IV DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns 52

Developing Antipersonnel Land- Mine Alternatives and More Capable and
Safer Self- Destruct Land Mines 52 Revising Doctrine and Procedures to
Better Address Hazardous

Submunition Dudfields 57 Increasing Ammunition Reliability and Reducing
Dud Rates 60

Appendix V Scope and Methodology 63

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Defense 67 Contents

Page ii GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War
Tables

Table 1: U. S. Land Mines Reportedly Used in the Gulf War 9 Table 2: Total
U. S. Gulf War Casualties 12 Table 3: Descriptions of Casualty Categories
14 Table 4: U. S. Gulf War Casualties from Explosions and All Other

Causes 15 Table 5: U. S. Gulf War Explosion Casualties by Category 16
Table 6: U. S. Scatterable Mines and UXO Reported by CMS, Inc., as

Found on One Kuwaiti Battlefield Sector 27 Table 7: DOD Land Mine
Stockpile Totals as of 2002 39 Table 8: Land Mines in Mixed Dispensers as
of 2002 40 Table 9: Total U. S. Worldwide Inventory of Land Mines as of
2002 41 Table 10: Types and Numbers of Certain U. S. Land Mines

Stockpiled Worldwide in 1990, Available in the Southwest Asian Theater,
and Used during the Gulf War 49

Figures

Figure 1: Causes of U. S. Casualties during the Gulf War 13 Figure 2:
Types of Munitions Causing 177 Explosion Casualties 17 Figure 3:
Circumstances Causing 177 U. S. Casualties from Land

Mines, Cluster Munition UXO, and Other UXO 18 Figure 4: Map of Kuwait
Showing the CMS Explosive Ordnance

Disposal Sector Surrounding Al Jaber Airbase 25 Figure 5: U. S. Land Mines
Available and Used in the Gulf War 44 Figure 6: U. S. Land Mines Available
but Not Used in the Gulf War 46 Figure 7: M- 18 Claymore Nonself- Destruct
Command- Detonated

Antipersonnel Land Mine 48

Page iii GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War
Abbreviations

ADAM Area Denial Artillery Munition AP antipersonnel APL antipersonnel
land mine ASD/ SOLIC Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations
and

Low- Intensity Conflict) AT antitank ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System
CBU cluster bomb unit CINC commander- in- chief CMS Conventional Munitions
Systems, Inc. DAM Demolition Attack Munition DOD Department of Defense
DPICM dual- purpose improved conventional munition FASCAM family of
scatterable mines EOD explosive ordnance disposal GEMSS Ground- Emplaced
Mine Scattering System JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LM land mine MLRS
Multiple Launch Rocket System MOPMS Modular Pack Mine System NSD- A Non-
Self- Destruct Alternative ODS Operation Desert Storm OSD Office of the
Secretary of Defense PDD Presidential Decision Directive PDM Pursuit
Denial Munition RAAM Remote Anti- Armor Mine RADAM Remote Area Denial
Artillery Munition SCATMINE scatterable mine SD self- destruct SLAM
Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition SWA Southwest Asia UXO unexploded
ordnance WAM Wide Area Munition

Page 1 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

September 30, 2002 The Honorable Lane Evans House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Evans: The utility of land mines on the modern battlefield has
come into question in recent years, largely because of their potential for
causing unintended casualties and affecting U. S. forces* maneuverability.
1 These concerns were raised during the Persian Gulf War (August 1990 to
April 1991). In the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) deployed
over 580,000 military personnel and a wide array of conventional weapons
and munitions that it had designed and acquired primarily to fight the
Soviet Union. The munitions used by these forces included several types of
land mines and represented the largest U. S. combat use of its newer
aircraftand artillery- delivered scatterable self- destructing land mines.
Since the United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, DOD has been
reviewing war plans to ensure that the military services are ready to meet
future U. S. national security needs. This effort includes plans for the
use of land mines. U. S. Gulf War experience documented in DOD after-
action and lessons- learned reports provides insights concerning land
mines.

As you requested, this report focuses on U. S. land mine use during the
Gulf War. Our objective was to answer the following questions: (1) To what
extent were U. S. land mines available, planned for use, and used in the
Gulf War; and what enemy losses resulted from U. S. land mine use? (2) To
what extent did land mines cause U. S. casualties? (3) What concerns and
related actions were identified in lessons- learned and other reports
about the use of land mines? In addition, you asked us to provide
information on the quantity of land mines in the current U. S. stockpile
and the planned U. S. use of land mines for the defense of the Republic of
South Korea. We are providing information on the current U. S. land mine
stockpile in appendix I. We will later provide information on the U. S.
use of land mines for the defense of South Korea. Because land mine issues

1 Department of the Army, Field Manual 20- 32, Mine/ Countermine
Operations,

(Washington, D. C.: May 29, 1998 [includes *Change 2,* Aug. 22, 2001])
states, *Mines are explosive devices that are emplaced to kill, destroy,
or incapacitate enemy personnel and/ or equipment. . . . A mine is
detonated by the action of its target, the passage of time, or controlled
means. . . . *

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

are in some ways related to issues regarding unexploded ordnance (UXO) on
the battlefield, we also discuss unexploded ordnance as it relates to U.
S. casualties and troop mobility. This report does not assess the military
utility or effectiveness of land mine warfare, the use of land mines by U.
S. allies or the enemy in the Gulf War, the utility of nonland- mine

*submunition* 2 weapons, the services* casualty- reporting systems,
postconflict humanitarian issues, or DOD*s current actions to address land
mine and unexploded ordnance issues. (See app. IV.)

Because many records on the use of land mines and U. S. casualties during
the Gulf War had been destroyed or lost, were incomplete or contradictory,
or were archived and not easily accessible, we compiled records and
documents from various sources and different DOD locations and interviewed
a wide range of cognizant officials. Military service officials believe
that service- provided data regarding U. S. land- mine, casualty, and
unexploded ordnance issues are as accurate as available DOD records permit
and that our coverage of U. S. casualties is based on the most complete
analysis by service casualty officials to date. (See app. V for a detailed
discussion of this report*s scope and methodology.)

U. S. land mines of all types* nonself- destructing and self- destructing,
antipersonnel and antitank* were available for use if needed in the Gulf
War from U. S. land mine stockpiles, which contained about 19 million land
mines. U. S. forces sent to the Gulf War theater of operations took with
them for potential use over 2.2 million land mines. U. S. war plans
included plans for the use of land mines if required by the tactical
situation. According to DOD documents, no nonself- destructing, or

*dumb,* land mines were used; and the reported number of selfdestructing,
or *smart,* land mines used by the services totaled approximately 118,000.
DOD did not provide us information on the effect of U. S. land mine use
against the enemy. Consequently, we are unable to report this effect.
Although U. S. surface- laid scatterable land mines were employed by
Marine Corps artillery to supplement a defensive position and by Air
Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft to attack suspected Iraqi Scud missile
transporters and other locations, no military service report attributed
enemy losses to the U. S. use of land mines. Similarly, neither DOD, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor the U. S. Central Command provided us

2 A submunition is any munition that separates from the parent munition to
perform its task. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

with any reports or other evidence clearly indicating that U. S. land
mines used during the Gulf War had been the direct or indirect cause of
enemy casualties, equipment losses, or maneuver limitations.

According to U. S. service records, of the 1,364 total U. S. casualties in
the Gulf War, 81, or 6 percent, were killed or injured by land mines. Of
these casualties, none was attributed to U. S. land mines, but rather,
they were attributed to Iraqi or unknown types of land mines. Some portion
of the 142 casualties caused by an unknown type of land mine or unknown or
misidentified type of unexploded ordnance might have been caused by U. S.
or other land mines, but there is no way of knowing. Similarly, it is
possible that some U. S. casualties in the *unknown causes* and *other

causes* categories might have resulted from land mines or unexploded
ordnance. Because of service data limitations, it is not possible to
determine the exact cause of all these casualties.

Concerns about land mines raised in DOD lessons- learned and other reports
included the fear of fratricide and loss of battlefield mobility. These
concerns led to the reluctance of some U. S. commanders to use land mines
in areas that U. S. and allied forces might have to traverse. According to
DOD reports, commanders gave two basic reasons for these concerns: The
first entailed the obsolescence of conventional, nonselfdestructing U. S.
land mines as well as safety issues involving the use of land mines in
general and other scatterable munitions. The safety issues during the Gulf
War were heightened by malfunctioning, or dud, rates for land mines and
other submunitions that were higher than anticipated. Furthermore,
malfunctioning submunitions, when present on the battlefield in large
numbers, can result in de facto minefields, or

*dudfields,* thus creating fratricide hazards and mobility limitations
similar to minefields. The second reason for the concerns was that
reporting, recording, and when appropriate, marking 3 the location of
minefields or hazardous dudfields were not always accomplished when
needed. According to DOD reports, even when self- destructing land mines
are appropriately reported and marked, malfunctioning self- destruct
mechanisms can still cause concerns about potential hazards similar to
nonland- mine dudfields. DOD and service reports resulting from the Gulf

3 Minefield reporting involves an oral, electronic, or written
communication concerning mining activities, friendly or enemy, submitted
in a standard format. Minefield recording involves a complete written
record of all pertinent information concerning a minefield, submitted on a
standard form. Minefield marking involves the visible marking of all
points required in emplacing a minefield and the minefield*s extent.

Page 4 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

War recognized that concerns about land mines and other unexploded
submunitions on the battlefield needed to be addressed. In various
afteraction reports, DOD identified a variety of corrective actions to
address fratricide and mobility concerns and to improve the effectiveness
and utility of land mine and nonland- mine submunitions. These actions
included that DOD (1) replace older model nonself- destruct land mines
with modern, safer ones or alternative systems; (2) emphasize procedures
to reduce fratricide and battlefield mobility concerns associated with
dudfields; and (3) include self- destruct mechanisms in nonland- mine
submunitions. (Appendix IV identifies DOD- reported actions related to
these concerns. However, because it was outside the scope of this report,
we did not evaluate DOD*s progress in these areas.)

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the report is
flawed because it makes assertions that are not based on fact and uses
unreliable data (see app. VI for DOD*s comments in their entirety). Though
we have made some changes to clarify issues DOD raises, we do not agree
that our report is flawed or contains unsupported facts or unreliable
data. Almost all data in this report for U. S. land mine use, U. S.
casualties, and DOD lessons learned were provided to us by service
officials or were taken from DOD documents. The data*s accuracy was not
challenged by DOD, and DOD provided no alternative data. Much of DOD*s
concern about *unreliable data* stems from our use of the report by an
Army contractor on unexploded ordnance cleanup of the battlefield. While
DOD claims that the contractor*s report contained inaccuracies, DOD did
not provide any data to challenge the main message of the contractor*s
report, which was that a very large number of U. S. land mine and cluster
munition duds were found on the Kuwaiti battlefield. See the *Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation* section for our detailed response to DOD*s
comments.

Land mines in the U. S. inventory are of two distinct types: The first
consists of conventional land mines that are hand- emplaced and are termed
nonself- destruct, or sometimes *dumb,* because they remain active for
years unless disarmed or detonated. They can therefore cause unintended
post- conflict and civilian casualties. The second type consists of land
mines that are generally, but not always, surface- laid *scatterable*

land mines that are dropped by aircraft, fired by artillery, or dispersed
by another dispenser system. They are conversely called *smart* because
they remain active for preset periods of time after which they are
designed to self- destruct or deactivate, rendering themselves
nonhazardous. Background

Page 5 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

According to DOD, smart land mines have a 99.99- percent self- destruct
reliability rate. Most self- destruct land mine systems are set at one of
three self- destruct periods: 4 hours, 48 hours, or 15 days. In addition,
should the self- destruct mechanism fail, self- destruct land mines are
designed to selfdeactivate, meaning that they are to be rendered
inoperable by means of the *irreversible exhaustion of their batteries*
within 120 days after employment. This feature, according to DOD, operates
with a reliability rate of 99.999(+) percent. 4 At the time of the Gulf
War, U. S. forces were armed with both nonself- destruct and self-
destruct land mines, and U. S. policy allowed them to use both types.
Today, however, U. S. presidential policy limits the U. S. forces* use of
nonself- destruct M- 14 and M- 16 antipersonnel land mines (see fig. 6 in
app. II) to Korea.

Antitank mines, as the name implies, are designed to immobilize or destroy
tracked and wheeled vehicles and the vehicles* crews and passengers. The
fuzes that activate antitank mines are of various types. For example, they
can be activated by pressure, which requires contact with the wheels or
tracks of a vehicle, or by acoustics, magnetic influence, radio
frequencies, infrared- sensor, command, disturbance, or vibration, which
do not require contact. Antitank mines have three types of warheads. Blast
mines derive their effectiveness from the force generated by high-
explosive detonation. Shaped- charged mines use a directed- energy
warhead. Explosive- formed penetrating mines have an explosive charge with
a metal plate in front, which forms into an inverted disk, a slug, or a
long rod.

Antipersonnel land mines are designed to kill or wound soldiers. Their
fuzes can be activated, for example, by pressure, trip wires, disturbance,
antihandling mechanisms, or command detonation. Antipersonnel land mine
warhead types include blast, directed fragmentation, and bounding
fragmentation. The blast mine is designed to injure the lower extremities
of the individual who steps on it. The directed fragmentation mine propels
fragments in the general direction it is pointed, and the bounding
fragmentation mine throws a canister into the air, which bursts and
scatters shrapnel throughout the immediate area to kill or wound the
enemy.

4 DOD reports that these reliability rates are based on proving ground
tests, conducted over the past 14 years, involving nearly 67, 000 self-
destruct antitank and antipersonnel mines.

Page 6 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Antitank and antipersonnel land mines are often employed together, as

*mixed* systems. In a mixed system, the antipersonnel land mines are
intermingled with antitank land mines to discourage enemy personnel from
attempting to disarm them. Antitank land mines may also be equipped with
explosive antidisturbance devices designed to protect them from being
moved by enemy personnel, thus increasing the difficulty and challenge of
breaching a minefield. 5

According to DOD, all the types of land mines in DOD*s arsenal were
available and included in U. S. war plans for use if needed in the Gulf
War. DOD reported that during the war, U. S. forces used no nonself-
destruct land mines. The services reported using a total of about 118,000
artillerydelivered or aircraft- delivered surface- laid scatterable self-
destruct land mines. DOD provided few records showing why land mines were
used and no evidence of specific military effects on the enemy* such as
enemy killed or equipment destroyed* from the U. S. use of land mines
during the Gulf War. We therefore could not determine the effect of U. S.
land- mine use during the Gulf War. See appendix II for pictures, types,
and numbers of land mines available for use and numbers used in the Gulf
War.

U. S. forces deployed to the Gulf War with over 2.2 million of the
DODestimated 19 million land mines available in U. S. worldwide stockpiles
in 1990. 6 These consisted of both the conventional nonself- destruct land
mines and scatterable surface- laid, self- destruct land mines.
Nonselfdestruct, hand- emplaced land mines available but not used included
the M- 14 (* Toe Popper*) and the M- 16 (* Bouncing Betty*) antipersonnel
land mines and the M- 15, M- 19, and M- 21 antitank land mines. 7 Self-
destruct,

5 Field Manual 20- 32 states, *AHD [antihandling devices] perform the
function of a mine fuse if someone attempts to tamper with the mine. . . .
AHDs are added to a minefield to discourage manual removal and reuse of
mines by the enemy and to demoralize the enemy who is attempting to reduce
the minefield.*

6 Types of U. S. land mines available to U. S. forces during the Gulf War
include those shown in appendix II. According to service records, as of
2002, the DOD land mine stockpile contains about 18 million land mines of
the types and quantities shown in appendix I.

7 The U. S. land mine stockpile in 1990 included over 3.9 million M- 14
and 2.3 million M- 16 nonself- destruct antipersonnel land mines, with
over 200, 000 of these taken by U. S. forces to the Gulf War theater area.
Over 2 million M- 15/ 19/ 21 nonself- destruct antitank land mines were
available in the U. S. stockpile and over 40,000 were taken to the Gulf
War theater. See appendix II, table 10. Effect of the Use of

Self- Destruct U. S. Land Mines in the Gulf War Is Unknown

U. S. Nonself- Destruct and Self- Destruct Land Mines Were Available in
Theater

Page 7 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

scatterable land mines included air- delivered cluster bomb unit (CBU) 78/
89 Gator, which dispensed mixed scatterable antipersonnel and antitank
land mines, and artillery- fired M- 692/ 731 Area Denial Artillery
Munition (ADAM) antipersonnel land mines and M- 718/ 741 Remote Anti-
Armor Mine (RAAM) antitank land mines. 8 (See app. II, figs. 5, 6, and 7
and table 10.)

The services reported that all standard types of U. S. land mines in their
inventories were available from unit and theater supplies or U. S.
stockpiles.

During the Gulf War, U. S. forces were permitted by doctrine, war plans,
and command authority to employ both nonself- destruct and self- destruct
land mines whenever an appropriate commander determined that U. S. use of
land mines would provide a tactical advantage. U. S. land mines of all
types were available and planned for use by U. S. forces.

U. S. land mine warfare 9 doctrine for the services during the Gulf War
indicated that land mines could be used both offensively, for example, to
deny the enemy use of key terrain, and defensively, for instance, to
protect U. S. forces from attack. U. S. doctrine states that the primary
uses of land mines are to provide force protection, shape the battlefield,
and reduce the number of forces needed.

At the time of the Gulf War, U. S. land mine doctrine included the
following four types of minefields:

1. protective minefields, whose purpose is to add temporary strength to
weapons, positions, or other obstacles;

8 The U. S. land mine stockpile in 1990 included over 4.4 million Area
Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) antipersonnel and over 2. 5 million
Remote Anti- Armor Mine (RAAM) antitank artillery- fired self- destruct
land mines. In addition, U. S. forces had a number of other types of land
mines and land mine dispenser systems, including over 2 million land mines
for the M- 128 Ground- Emplaced Mine Scattering System (GEMSS) (see app.
II, fig. 6) and nearly 700,000 land mines contained in Gator CBU89/ 78
aircraft- delivered cluster bombs (see fig. 5). The United States took to
the Gulf War theater for potential use about 2 million of these self-
destruct land mines. See appendix II, table 10.

9 *Mine warfare,* the use of mines and mine countermeasures, is divided
into two basic concepts with regard to land theaters*( 1) the laying of
mines to degrade the enemy*s capabilities to wage land warfare and (2) the
countering of enemy- laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of
selected land areas. Planned Use of U. S. Land

Mines

Page 8 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

2. tactical minefields, which are emplaced as part of an overall obstacle
plan to stop, delay, and disrupt enemy attacks; reduce enemy mobility;
channelize enemy formations; block enemy penetrations; and protect
friendly flanks;

3. point minefields, which are emplaced in friendly or uncontested areas
and are intended to disorganize enemy forces or block an enemy
counterattack; and

4. interdiction minefields, which are emplaced in enemy- held areas to
disrupt lines of communication and separate enemy forces. 10

U. S. plans for the execution of the Gulf War included the use of
handemplaced antipersonnel and antitank land mines (e. g., M- 14/ 16/ 21),
artillery- delivered land mines (ADAM/ RAAM), air- delivered land mines
(Gator), and others for these purposes when U. S. commanders determined
their use was needed. Military units* on- hand ammunition supplies, as
well as ammunition resupply stockpiles located within the combat theater,
included millions of U. S. land mines. Ammunition resupply plans included
planned rates for the daily resupply of land mines consumed in combat.

The services reported that during the Gulf War, they used about 118,000
land mines from the approximately 2.2 million U. S. land mines that were
taken to the Gulf War theater of operations and the millions of land mines
available for use from U. S. worldwide stockpiles, which in total
contained about 19 million land mines. All of the land mines used were the
selfdestructing, scatterable, surface- laid types. However, the services
also indicated that, because Gulf War records related to land mines might
be incomplete, information made available to us may be inexact. For
example, the Army indicated that, while its record searches show that the
Army used no land mines, it is unsure whether archived Gulf War records
include evidence of Army land mine use that it has not uncovered.

10 These are the minefields defined in the Army*s 1985 version of its
Field Manual 20- 32, which applied during the Persian Gulf War. The 1998
version lists the types of minefields as protective, tactical, nuisance,
and phony. Protective minefields are employed to protect soldiers,
equipment, supplies, and facilities from enemy attacks or other threats.
Tactical minefields are employed to directly affect enemy maneuver and to
give the defender a positional advantage over the attacker. Nuisance
minefields impose caution on enemy forces and disrupt, delay, and
sometimes weaken or destroy follow- on forces. Phony minefields are areas
of ground altered to give the same appearance as a real minefield and
thereby deceive the enemy. Services Reported that the

United States Used about 118,000 Land Mines

Page 9 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

The services reported no confirmed use of any nonself- destruct land mines
during the Gulf War. In other words, U. S. forces reported no use of
antipersonnel land mines such as the over 6 million available (over
200,000 in theater) M- 14 *Toe Popper* or M- 16 *Bouncing Betty* and no M-
15, M- 19, or M- 21 antitank land mines, which numbered over 2 million in
U. S. stockpiles (over 40,000 in theater). (See fig. 6 and table 10 in
app. II.) The Army reported no confirmed use of any land mines, with the
qualification that it is unsure whether it had emplaced two minefields of
an unknown type. The other military services reported that they used a
total of 117,634 U. S. self- destruct land mines, whose destruction time-
delay periods were set at 4 hours, 48 hours, or 15 days. The type of land
mine used in the largest quantity was the aircraft- delivered surface-
laid Gator land mines, which were dispersed from cluster bomb units
containing both antitank and antipersonnel mines. Air Force, Navy, and
Marine aircraft employed a total of 116,770 Gator land mines. Table 1 and
appendix II provide additional details on the numbers and types of land
mines available for use and used by the U. S. military services during the
Gulf War.

Table 1: U. S. Land Mines Reportedly Used in the Gulf War Service

Land mine type Army Air Force Navy and

Marine Corps combined a Total land

mines

Gator CBU bombs containing

 antitank mines

 antipersonnel mines 0

0 0

1,105 79,560 24,310

215 9,675 3,225

89,235 27,535

RAAM artillery rounds containing

 antitank mines 0 0

0 0

48 b 432 b 432

ADAM artillery rounds containing

 antipersonnel mines 0 0

0 0

12 b 432 b 432 Total land mines 0 c 103,870 13,764 117,634

a The service- reported data combined Navy and Marine Corps usage of Gator
land mines and are included here in that format. b All ADAM and RAAM
numbers indicate use by only the Marine Corps.

c The Army stated that it is unsure whether it had emplaced two minefields
of unknown type. Note: DOD and the services reported that no U. S. land
mines of any type were employed except those shown in this table. DOD said
that available Gulf War records do not permit estimating the number of
land mines used by calculating the difference between the number brought
to the war and the number returned unused.

Source: DOD and service documents.

Page 10 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

DOD records on the Gulf War provided us include little detail on why land
mines were used. Available records indicate that U. S. forces employed
land mines both offensively and defensively when fighting in
Iraqicontrolled Kuwait. For example, U. S. aircraft offensively employed
concentrations of surface- laid Gator land mines to deny Iraqi use of Al
Jaber airbase in Kuwait and to hamper the movement of Iraqi forces. In
addition, Gator land mines were used extensively with the intent to
inhibit free movement in and around possible staging and launch areas for
enemy Scud missiles. 11 Possible Scud missile transporter *hide sites*
included culverts, overpasses, and bridges in Iraq. In a defensive mode,
Gator land mines were employed along the flanks of U. S. forces. In
addition, U. S. Marines defensively employed concentrations of artillery-
fired ADAM and RAAM land mines to supplement defenses against potential
attacks by enemy forces north of Al Jaber airbase in southern Kuwait.

Procedures for commanders to approve land mine use were established,
disseminated, and included in all major unit war plans. A senior U. S.
force commander who participated in the Gulf War told us that

 U. S. forces had no restrictive theaterwide or forcewide prohibitions on
the employment of land mines,

 U. S. commanders understood their authority to use mines whenever their
use would provide a tactical advantage, and

 U. S. commanders decided to use land mine or nonland- mine munitions
based on their determinations as to which were best suited to accomplish
assigned missions.

The services reported no evidence of enemy casualties, either killed or
injured; enemy equipment losses, either destroyed or damaged; or enemy
maneuver limitations resulting, directly or indirectly, from its
employment of surface- laid scatterable Gator, ADAM, and RAAM land mines
during the Gulf War. (See app. II, fig. 5.) U. S. forces intended to
adversely affect the enemy by using 116,770 Gator land mines, but no
service has provided specific evidence that these land mines or the 864
ADAM and RAAM land mines reported as employed actually caused or
contributed to enemy losses. Because neither DOD nor the services provided
us evidence or

11 During the Gulf War, the Iraqis launched more than 90 Scud missiles,
which are liquidfueled, short- range ballistic missiles. The Iraqi
missiles were developed from the Soviet version. DOD Records Contain

Little Information on Why Land Mines Were Used

Effects of U. S. Land- Mine Use on the Enemy Are Unknown

Page 11 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

estimates of actual effects and losses inflicted on the enemy by these U.
S. land mines, we were unable to determine the actual effect of U. S. land
mine use during the Gulf War.

DOD and service documents detailing when land mines were used did not
provide evidence of the effects of that use. For example, in one case, the
Marine Corps reported that it had fired artillery- delivered ADAM and RAAM
land mines to supplement a defensive position. However, the enemy was not
reported to have been aware of or have actually encountered these land
mines. Similarly, air Gator drops on possible Scud missile sites were not
reported to have destroyed any Scud missiles or transporters. The services
provided no evidence indicating whether the enemy had ever encountered the
Gator land mines dropped on possible enemy maneuver routes or whether
Gator employments had resulted in enemy destruction.

Service reports indicate that 81 of the 1,364 U. S. casualties attributed
to the Gulf War 12 were caused by land mines. None of these were
attributed specifically to U. S. land mines, but rather to an Iraqi or an
*unknown* type of land mine. Because of service data limitations, the
possibility cannot be ruled out that some of the casualties now attributed
to explosions of unknown or ambiguously reported unexploded ordnance were
actually caused by land mines. Service casualty reporting indicates that
at least 142 additional casualties resulted from such unexplained
explosions. However, there is no way to determine whether some portion of
these might have been caused by U. S. or other land mines or by unexploded
ordnance. Of all casualties reported to have been caused by explosions, a
relatively small percentage were reported to have been caused by the
unauthorized handling of unexploded ordnance.

The services reported that there were 1,364 U. S. casualties associated
with the Gulf War. Of these, 385 were killed, and 979 were injured. Army
personnel suffered 1,032 casualties, or 76 percent, of all U. S. deaths
and injuries. Table 2 shows the numbers of U. S. casualties by military
service.

12 Combined reporting totals of Gulf War casualties reported to us by each
service differ from figures previously reported by DOD. DOD- reported
figures provided to us used different and broader categories to report
casualties. Because we believe the services have the most accurate data
available for their casualties, we report service- provided data. Extent
of

U. S. Casualties from Land Mines and Unexploded Ordnance

Numbers of Service Members Reported Killed and Injured during the Gulf War

Page 12 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 2: Total U. S. Gulf War Casualties Service Killed Injured Total
Percentage of

total

Army 226 806 1,032 76

Marines 69 153 222 16

Air Force 35 9 44 3

Navy 55 11 66 5 Total 385 979 1,364 100

Source: Service casualty data.

To determine what number of these casualties could have been caused by U.
S. or other land mines, we obtained information from the services on the
causes of all Gulf War deaths and injuries. Service officials attributed
casualties to causes and categories based on battlefield casualty,
accident, after- action, and other reports. As shown in figure 1, enemy
ground and Scud missile fire caused the largest number of identifiable
casualties to Gulf War service members. The services assigned 287, or 21
percent, of all casualties during the Gulf War to the *enemy ground/ Scud
fire* category. In particular, the Army attributed 128 of the 287 in this
category to an Iraqi Scud missile attack. In addition, enemy fire caused
some *aircraft

incident* casualties. The second and third largest categories of
identifiable causes of casualties were vehicle accidents and aircraft
incidents. Available data indicate that explosions from some type of
ordnance caused 177 casualties: land mines caused 81; cluster munition
unexploded ordnance (UXO) caused 80; and other UXO caused 16. Causes of U.
S. Casualties

Page 13 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figure 1: Causes of U. S. Casualties during the Gulf War

Source: Service casualty data.

The casualty categories depicted in figure 1 are defined in table 3.

Page 14 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 3: Descriptions of Casualty Categories Casualty category Number of

casualties Description of category

Land mines 81 This category includes all deaths and injuries attributed by
the services to Iraqi or unidentified land mines. The services attributed
no U. S. Gulf War casualties to U. S. land mines. a Cluster munition UXO
80 This category includes all deaths and injuries attributed by the
services to a type of U. S.

submunition unexploded ordnance categorized as cluster bomb units and
dual- purpose improved conventional munitions. a Other UXO 16 This
category includes all deaths and injuries attributed by the services to
explosions of

unexploded ordnance of an unidentified type. a Unknown causes 44 This
category includes only Army casualties attributed by the Army to unknown
causes. a Enemy ground/ Scud fire 287 This category includes deaths and
injuries attributed by the services to enemy ground

weapons and Scud missile fire against U. S. forces. This category does not
include aircraft incidents. Aircraft incidents 138 This category includes
all deaths and injuries attributed by the services to airplane and

helicopter incidents due to enemy fire, weather conditions, pilot error,
or mechanical failure. Friendly fire 59 This category includes all deaths
and injuries attributed by the services to friendly fire. Vehicle
accidents 168 This category includes all deaths and injuries attributed by
the services to accidents

involving vehicles other than aircraft. Other accidents 176 This category
includes all deaths and injuries attributed by the services to accidents
other

than vehicle or aircraft accidents. It includes noncombat- related
incidents, such as accidental grenade explosions, drownings, and training
accidents. Other causes 281 This category includes all deaths and injuries
not attributed by the services to the other

categories. a Natural causes 34 This category includes all deaths and
illnesses attributed by the services to natural

physical causes, such as heart attack.

Total casualties 1,364

a Service casualty reporting does not rule out the possibility that this
category may include mine, cluster munition, and other UXO casualties.
Source: Service- reported casualty data.

As would be expected, the various services experienced different types and
numbers of casualties. For the Marine Corps, *enemy ground fire* caused
the largest number of casualties* 84; for the Air Force, *aircraft

incidents* was the largest cause* 39; and for the Navy, *other accidents*
caused the largest number* 33.

For the Army, *other causes* was the largest category* 267. Our comparison
of casualty- related documentation, however, indicates that at least some
of these casualties should have been categorized elsewhere. For example,
documentation shows that one casualty placed in *other

causes* might have been a land mine casualty. In a second case,
documentation indicates that one of these casualties suffered a heart
attack and should have been placed in the *natural causes* category. In

Page 15 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

other documentation, we found indications that five casualties placed in
this *other causes* category suffered what were *other accidents.* For
these reasons, it is unclear whether all 267 of these Army- reported
casualties should have been placed in the *other causes* category.
However, Army officials indicated that available data limited the Army*s
ability to identify more specifically the causes of these casualties. See
appendix III for the reported numbers of casualties by service and cause.

Service data show that 34 persons were killed and 143 were injured during
the Gulf War by the explosion of some type of ordnance other than enemy
fire. These 177 casualties* caused by land mines, cluster munition UXO, or
other UXO* represent 13 percent of all casualties suffered by service
members. (See table 4.)

Table 4: U. S. Gulf War Casualties from Explosions and All Other Causes
Army Marines Air Force Navy DOD Category K I TK I T K I T K I T K I T

Explosion casualties a 32 132 164 2 10 12 0 1 1 0 0 0 34 143 177

All other casualties 194 674 871 67 143 210 35 8 43 55 11 66 351 836 1,187
Total 226 806 1,032 69 153 222 35 9 44 55 11 66 385 979 1,364

Legend K = Killed/ died I = Injured T = Total a Explosion casualty totals
are comprised of three categories - land mines, cluster munition UXO, and
other UXO. Source: Service casualty data.

Of the 177 Gulf War casualties that DOD reported were caused by an
explosion from some type of land mine, cluster munition, or unidentified
type of UXO, the services reported no U. S. casualties were caused by U.
S. land mines. However, as shown in table 5, U. S. cluster munition UXO
(CBU or dual- purpose improved conventional munitions) or other UXO
(unidentified) caused more U. S. casualties* 96* than Iraqi and
unidentified land mines* 81. Explosion Casualties

Caused by Land Mines, Cluster Munition UXO, and Other UXO

Page 16 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 5: U. S. Gulf War Explosion Casualties by Category Army Marines Air
Force Navy DOD Category K I TK I T K I T K I T K I T

Land mines 10 61 71 2 7 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 12 69 81

Cluster munition U XO 225880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0225880 Other U XO 01313 0 3
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 01616

Total 32 132 164 2 10 12 0 1 1 0 0 0 34 143 177

Legend K = Killed I = Injured T = Total

Note: U. S. combat explosion casualties from enemy fire and accidental U.
S. or allied fratricidal fire are not included in the land mine, cluster
munition UXO, and other UXO explosion casualty totals shown in table 5.

Source: Service casualty data.

Of all persons killed or injured by explosions from land mines (either
Iraqi or unidentified), cluster munition UXO (either CBUs or dual- purpose
improved conventional munitions), and other unidentified UXO, Army
personnel represented 164, or 93 percent. In addition, 12 Marine Corps
personnel were killed or injured, and 1 Air Force service member was
injured by these explosions.

Of the 177 explosion casualties attributed by the services to some type of
ordnance explosion, service records specify that 35 were caused by Iraqi
land mines (see fig. 2). Casualty records for some of the 142 other
explosion casualties are inexact or ambiguous. Thus, the other explosion
categories* cluster munition UXO from CBU and dual- purpose improved
conventional munitions, unidentified land mines, and other UXO* could
include some U. S. casualties by U. S. or other land mines because
casualty records did not always permit DOD to identify definitively the
type of UXO causing the casualty. Additional Casualties

Could Have Been Caused by Land Mines

Page 17 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figure 2: Types of Munitions Causing 177 Explosion Casualties

Legend DPICM = dual- purpose improved conventional munition. Source:
Service casualty data.

While the UXO causing a casualty might have been reported as a cluster
munition CBU, it could have been misidentified and actually have been a U.
S. land mine cluster munition from Gator, ADAM, RAAM, or some other
munition. Casualty records show numerous cases in which all these terms
are used interchangeably. For example, in one reported case, a casualty is
first attributed to a mine and next to a dual- purpose improved
conventional munition. In a second case, the service member was said to
have driven over a cluster munition, which was later called a *mine.* In a
third case, the soldier is reported in one document to have *hit a trip
wire causing mine to explode* but in another document to have *stepped on
an Iraqi cluster bomb.* In other words, the terminologies used in these
casualty reports are inconsistent and imprecise, thus preventing a
definitive analysis by the services of the causes of some casualties. DOD
indicated that it is possible also that some of the casualties attributed
to land mines were actually caused by unexploded ordnance.

Page 18 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

DOD data did not always allow it to identify how service members had
triggered the UXO that caused each casualty. Because of the many ways that
ordnance and UXO can be triggered and because some ordnance can be
triggered from a distance, DOD was unable to always determine the
circumstances causing an explosion and the type of ordnance that exploded.
DOD- reported data, however, indicate that relatively few persons who
became casualties of unexploded ordnance were handling it without
authorization.

In attempting to determine what percentage of service members were injured
or killed while handling ordnance in an unauthorized manner, we consulted
all available descriptions of these incidents. We grouped these casualties
into three categories based on service- reported information concerning
how the explosion was triggered: (1) in performance of duty, (2)
unauthorized handling of UXO, and (3) unknown circumstance. As shown by
figure 3, DOD data indicate that more than half of the explosion
casualties resulted from unknown circumstances.

Figure 3: Circumstances Causing 177 U. S. Casualties from Land Mines,
Cluster Munition UXO, and Other UXO

Source: Service casualty data.

Of the 177 explosion casualties, DOD records indicated that 64 casualties
(36 percent) resulted from explosions that were triggered in the
performance of assigned duties. For example, one Army ground unit reported
that when it began its ground attack, its first casualty resulted from a
soldier encountering an artillery submunition dud that exploded.
Percentage of Soldiers

Injured or Killed by Unauthorized Handling of UXO Is Relatively Small

Page 19 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

In another incident, seven Army engineers were killed while clearing
unexploded BLU- 97 (nonland- mine) duds at an Iraqi airfield. DOD
attributed these casualties to *incorrect or incomplete training in mine
neutralization techniques and the handling of UXOs.* An expert in
explosive ordnance demolition who was advising the engineers on how to
clear safely Gator land mine duds and other submunitions reported, *I feel
worse because the guys who died probably died of ignorance. This is a[ n]
EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] related problem which was ill handled by
others who thought they could handle the job.* This situation illustrates
that UXO can be so dangerous that even engineers with some training in
handling UXO were thought by an explosive ordnance disposal expert to be
inadequately prepared to deal with UXO on the battlefield.

Soldiers who represent the 16 casualties (9 percent) attributed by DOD to
unauthorized handling of UXO were generally performing their military
duties but for some unknown reason touched or otherwise triggered UXO.
These soldiers were typically on duty in or traversing U. S. dudfields on
the battlefield while performing such actions as pursuing the enemy. DOD
reported that some soldiers were casualties as a result of disturbing
battlefield objects that they thought were not hazardous, while others
might have known they were handling a piece of some sort of ordnance. For
example, a DOD document cited a case in which soldiers handled UXO that
they thought was harmless. This report stated that two persons were killed
and seven injured when soldiers *collected what they thought were
parachute flares.* Furthermore, soldiers might not have recognized that a
battlefield object was hazardous because UXO comes in many shapes, sizes,
and designs, much of which inexperienced soldiers have never seen before.
Some common U. S. submunitions appear to be harmless while actually being
armed and dangerous. Moreover, many soldiers are not aware that some UXO
can cause injuries at distances of 100 meters.

A small number of DOD casualty reports describing unauthorized handling of
UXO attribute soldier casualties to souvenir hunting. For example, one
incident resulted when a soldier who was examining an object was told by
fellow soldiers to get rid of it. When the soldier threw the object away
from him, it exploded. In other cases, soldiers might have known that
handling UXO was unauthorized and handled it anyway. Gulf War documents
indicate that DOD and the services called for soldiers on a battlefield to
be warned not to handle UXO unless directed to do so.

The remaining 97 (55 percent) of the 177 explosion casualties fell into
the unknown circumstances category. Because battlefield casualty reports
did

Page 20 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

not identify the circumstance or activity of these soldiers, it is unknown
whether or not these soldiers became casualties while performing assigned
duties.

The Army*s Safety Center provided us data on 21 Gulf War U. S. explosion
casualties that occurred in Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (5 deaths and
16 injured). The Center attributed 7 of these casualties to land mines of
unknown type and 14 to U. S. dual- purpose improved conventional munitions
and CBU submunitions. These casualties were associated with unintentional
entry into minefields or dudfields or disturbance of UXO. These casualties
are included in the Gulf War casualty totals presented in this report. 13

Numerous issues included in service and DOD Gulf War lessons- learned,
after- action, and other reports concerned the safety and utility of
conventional and submunition U. S. land mines. Fratricide and battlefield
mobility were cited often as important overall concerns associated with
both available and used U. S. land mines and nonland- mine submunitions.
These concerns led to the reluctance of some U. S. commanders to use land
mines in areas that U. S. and allied forces might have to traverse. 14
Commanders* fears arose because of two basic reasons: The first reason
involved both the obsolescence of conventional U. S. mines and safety
issues with both conventional and scatterable land mines. A higher-
thananticipated dud rate for land mines and other submunitions during the
Gulf War was one safety issue. Reflective of the safety issues, DOD
reports recognized that de facto minefields created by all unexploded
submunitions* land mine and nonland- mine alike* threatened fratricide and
affected maneuvers by U. S. forces. The second reason involved concern
that reporting, recording, and, when appropriate, marking the hazard areas
created by the placement of self- destruct land mines or dudfields were
not always accomplished when needed. On the basis of its

13 In addition, the Army Safety Center provided us data for U. S. land
mine casualties outside the Gulf War theater for 1990 to 2001. It reported
22 U. S. casualties, including 2 killed and 20 injured. These U. S.
casualties include 2 in Egypt, 10 in Germany (these 10 casualties are
described elsewhere in this report), 7 in South Korea, and 3 in the United
States. These 22 casualties are not included in the Gulf War casualty
totals included in this report.

14 Field Manual 20- 32 states, *The modern tendency toward maneuver
warfare and the disappearance of the linear battlefield places
repositioning forces at an increased risk of fratricide by minefields.*
DOD Reports Express

Fratricide and Mobility Concerns Relating to the Safety of, and Lack of
Knowledge about, Land Mines and Dudfields

Page 21 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Gulf War experience, DOD recognized the importance of commanders* taking
into consideration the possible effects of unexploded munitions when
making and executing their plans and identified a variety of corrective
actions. (App. IV cites DOD- reported actions related to landmine and UXO
concerns. Because it was beyond the scope of this report, we did not
evaluate DOD*s progress in these areas.)

In Gulf War lessons- learned and other documents, DOD and the services
reported that U. S. conventional nonself- destructing land mines were
obsolete and dangerous to use and that the newer self- destructing land
mines also posed safety concerns to users. For example, one Army
afteraction report recommended that U. S. conventional antitank and
antipersonnel land mines be replaced because of safety concerns. Army
officials stated that U. S. conventional mines needed better fuzing and
the capability of being remotely turned on or off or destroyed. In a joint
service lessons- learned report, officials stated, *Commanders were afraid
to use conventional and scatterable mines because of their potential for
fratricide.* The report said that this fear could also be attributed to
the lack of training that service members had received in how to employ
land mines. In particular, prior to the Gulf War, the Army restricted
live- mine training with conventional antipersonnel land mines (M- 14s and
M- 16s) because they were considered dangerous. The joint lessons- learned
report argued, *If the system is unreliable or unsafe during training, it
will be unreliable and unsafe to use during war.*

Since before the Gulf War, the Army has known about safety issues with its
conventional nonself- destruct M- 14 and M- 16 antipersonnel land mines.
For example, because of malfunctions that can occur with the M605 fuze of
the *Bouncing Betty* M- 16 antipersonnel land mine, the Army has
restricted the use of the pre- 1957 fuzes that are thought to be
dangerous. However, the concern extends beyond the fuze issue to include
also the land mines themselves. A DOD reliability testing document states
that the M- 16 mines *are subject to duds; the mine ejects but fails to
detonate. [The] mine is then unexploded ordnance and still presents a
danger.* A DOD 2001 report on dud rates for land mines and other munitions
states that the dud rate identified by stockpile reliability testing for
M- 16 land mines is over 6 percent. 15 In a specific case, a currently
serving senior

15 United States Army, Defense Ammunition Center, United States Army
Technical Center for Explosives Safety, Report of Findings for Phase II
Study of Ammunition Dud and Low Order Detonation Rates (McAlester, Okla.:
July 2001). Conventional U. S. Land

Mines Were Considered Obsolete and Unsafe

Page 22 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Army officer told us that he had trained his unit with these antipersonnel
land mines in Germany in 1990 to get ready for the Gulf War. According to
the officer, during the training, his unit suffered 10 casualties from the
M- 16 land mine. This officer said that U. S. *Bouncing Betty* M- 16 and

*Toe Popper* M- 14 antipersonnel land mines should be eliminated from Army
stockpiles because they are too dangerous to use. 16

Due to safety concerns, the Army placed prohibitions on live- fire
training with these land mines before and after the Gulf War, with
restrictions being lifted during the Gulf War. But DOD reporting does not
indicate that any U. S. unit chose to conduct live- mine training in the
theater with any type of mines. According to an Army engineer after-
action report, *Some

troops even reported that they were prohibited from training on live mines
after their arrival in Saudi Arabia.* Moreover, DOD reporting states that
U. S. forces employed no M- 14 or M- 16 mines in combat. Because of
renewed restrictions following the Gulf War, 17 service members still are
prohibited from live- fire training 18 on M- 14 antipersonnel land mines,
and training on live M- 16 mines is restricted to soldiers in units
assigned or attached to the Eighth U. S. Army in Korea. 19

16 The 1992 version of Field Manual 20- 32 states, *Mine training is
inherently dangerous. Between FY [fiscal year] 85 and FY 88, there were
eight accidents in the active Army during mine warfare training. . . .
These accidents resulted in the deaths of three soldiers. In FY 90, there
were two mine accidents, resulting in eleven casualties.*

17 Current U. S. national security policy, established by Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 48, dated June 26, 1996, limits the use of, and
live- mine training on, M- 14 and M- 16 antipersonnel nonself- destruct
land mines to training personnel engaged in demining and countermining
operations and to U. S. forces in Korea. See also Department of the Army
Policy Message 290845Z, July 29, 1997. PDD 48 also directs the Secretary
of Defense to undertake a program of research, procurement, and other
measures needed for the eventual elimination of the M- 14 and M- 16 mines
from U. S.- owned stockpiles of mines intended to be used by U. S.
personnel. Further, by PDD 64, June 23, 1998, the President directed the
Department of Defense to develop antipersonnel land mine alternatives to
end the use of all antipersonnel land mines outside Korea by 2003.

18 Field Manual 20- 32 defines *live- mine training* as *preparing,
laying, arming, neutralizing, and disarming live mines (with live fuses
and components) in a training environment.*

19 See Department of the Army Policy Message 290845Z, July 29, 1997.

Page 23 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Another safety concern expressed in lessons- learned reports was that
higher- than- expected dud, or malfunction, rates occurred for the
approximately 118,000 U. S. self- destruct land mines and the millions of
other U. S. scatterable submunitions employed in the Gulf War. These
included duds found by a U. S. contractor while clearing a portion of the
Kuwaiti battlefield. These duds created concerns about potentially
hazardous areas for U. S. troops.

According to briefing documents provided by DOD*s Office of the Project
Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions, 20 testing over the past
14 years of almost 67,000 self- destructing antitank and antipersonnel
land mines at a proving ground has resulted in no live mines being left
after the tests. The office also reports that all U. S. self- destruct
mines selfdeactivate, that is, their batteries die within 90 to 120 days.
The office stated that the reliability rate for the self- destruct feature
is 99.99 percent and that the reliability rate for the self- deactivation
feature is 99.999(+). According to the program office, these features mean
that self- destruct land mines leave no hazardous mines on the
battlefield.

According to the Army*s 1998 Field Manual 20- 32, all scatterable mines
have similar life cycles, though the times they are set for and the
dispensing systems can vary. The self- destruct mechanism for scatterable
mines operates as follows:

*For safety reasons, SCATMINEs [scatterable mines] must receive two arming
signals at launch. One signal is usually physical (spin, acceleration, or
unstacking), and the other is electronic. This same electronic signal
activates the mine*s SD [self- destruct] time.

*Mines start their safe- separation countdown (arming time) when they
receive arming signals. This allows the mines to come to rest after
dispensing and allows the mine dispenser to exit the area safely . . . .

*Mines are armed after the arming time expires. The first step in arming
is a self- test to ensure proper circuitry. Approximately 0.5 percent of
mines fail the self- test and selfdestruct immediately.

*After the self- test, mines remain active until their SD time expires or
until they are encountered. Mines actually self- destruct at 80 to 100
percent of their SD time. . . .

20 The Office of the Program Manager, Mines, Countermine and Demolitions
is now organizationally assigned to Close Combat Systems, U. S. Army
Program Executive Office for Ammunition. Land Mines and Other

Scatterable Munitions Had Higher- Than- Expected Dud Rates During the Gulf
War

Expected Dud Rates for U. S. Self- Destruct Land Mines

Page 24 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

No mines should remain after the SD time has been reached. Two to five
percent of US SCATMINES fail to self- destruct as intended. Any mines
found after the SD time must be treated as unexploded ordnance. For
example, mines with a 4- hour SD time will actually start self-
destructing at 3 hours and 12 minutes. When the 4- hour SD time is
reached, no unexploded mines should exist.*

Conventional Munitions Systems (CMS), Inc., a U. S. contractor that
specialized in explosive ordnance disposal, was paid by the government of
Kuwait to clear unexploded ordnance from one of seven sectors of the
battlefield in Kuwait, which included Al Jaber Airbase (see fig. 4). CMS
reported finding substantially more U. S. land mine duds than would be
expected if dud rates were as low as DOD documents and briefings stated
they are. DOD indicated that it cannot confirm the accuracy of the CMS-
reported data. Conventional Munitions

Systems, Inc., Found Thousands of Duds on the Kuwaiti Battlefield

Page 25 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figure 4: Map of Kuwait Showing the CMS Explosive Ordnance Disposal Sector
Surrounding Al Jaber Airbase

Source: GAO.

After the Gulf War, CMS employed more than 500 certified, experienced, and
trained personnel to eliminate the unexploded ordnance in its sector of
Kuwait. About 150 CMS employees were retired U. S. military explosive
ordnance disposal experts. In a report for the U. S. Army, CMS recorded
the types and numbers of U. S. submunition duds it found in its explosive

Page 26 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

ordnance disposal sector of the Kuwaiti battlefield. 21 The report
illustrates how the dangers of the battlefield during the Gulf War were
compounded by the large numbers of unexploded U. S. submunitions,
including land mines.

According to the CMS report, it found 1,977 U. S. scatterable land mine
duds and about 118,000 U. S. nonland- mine submunition duds in its
disposal sector. CMS*s report stated that *many tons of modern bombs
called Cluster Bomb Unit[ s] were dropped,* each of which *would deploy as
many as 250 small submunitions.* The report states, *A significant number
of the bombs and more importantly the submunitions, did not detonate upon
striking the ground resulting in hundreds of thousands of

*dud* explosive devices laying [sic] on the ground in Kuwait.* While the
vast majority of these duds were from nonland mine submunitions, they
included the more modern self- destructing RAAM, ADAM, and Gator land
mines. 22 Table 6 lists the types and amounts of U. S. dud submunitions
CMS reported finding in its disposal sector of the Kuwaiti battlefield.

21 U. S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, Contract DAAA21-
92- M- 0300 report by CMS, Inc. (Tampa, Fla.: July 1993). 22 Members of
the CMS explosive ordnance disposal team were interviewed in *The

Battlefield,* a 13- minute segment of the Oct. 25, 1992, televised CBS
news magazine

60 Minutes. *The Battlefield* was about the unexploded ordnance left on
the Kuwaiti battlefield during the Gulf War and the dangers inherent in
the U. S. and other explosive ordnance disposal experts* efforts to clear
battlefield sectors of Kuwait. During the cleanup, 84 operators, including
at least 2 private U. S. contractors, were killed.

Page 27 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 6: U. S. Scatterable Mines and UXO Reported by CMS, Inc., as Found
on One Kuwaiti Battlefield Sector

Type of dud Number of duds Land mines

 RAAM (antitank) 746 a

 ADAM (antipersonnel) 185

 Gator BLU- 91 (antitank) 205

 Gator BLU- 92 (antipersonnel) 841

Total land mine duds 1,977 Nonland- mine submunitions

 BLU 61 2,621

 BLU 63/ 86 6,639

 BLU 97 2,102

 BLU 73 396

 MK 118 95,799

 M 42/ 46/ 77 10,288

Total nonland- mine submunition duds 117,845 Total land mine and nonland-
mine submunition duds 119,822

Note: In addition to the U. S. submunition duds that CMS destroyed, it
disposed of non- U. S. ordnance duds and Iraqi ordnance found on both the
battlefield and in Iraqi ammunition stockpiles. CMS reported destroying a
total of over 1 million pieces of ordnance, including 350,000 land mines,
that it found in its disposal sector of Kuwait. CMS was contracted by the
government of Kuwait to clear battlefield debris and unexploded ordnance
from about 3, 100 square kilometers. CMS personnel stated that its
contract performance was based on Kuwait*s acceptance of UXO- cleared
areas rather than on quantity of UXO cleared. The fact that CMS was paid
by cleared area rather than by piece of ordnance found is described by the
then- DOD Project Manager for Mines, Countermine, and Demolitions in his
trip report of November 9, 1992, to Kuwait to examine the cleanup
operation being performed by CMS. The government of Kuwait also hired
contractors from other countries to clear the rest of the Kuwaiti
battlefield. Similarly, large amounts of UXO were cleared from these
sectors, but information on the types and quantities of UXO destroyed was
not available to us. In addition, the types and quantities of UXO found on
the Iraqi battlefield are unknown. a CMS reported finding 746 M75 RAAM
duds in its disposal sector, though DOD reports firing only 432

RAAM and no M75 mines during the war, a data inconsistency that remains
unresolved. The CMS report includes photographs of ADAM and RAAM land mine
duds found. DOD questioned the reliability of CMS data, indicating it
might include misidentified ordnance and confused nomenclatures of land
mine systems. However, DOD did not provide alternative data.

Source: U. S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, Contract
DAAA21- 92- M- 0300 report by CMS, Inc.

DOD reports that it employed in the Gulf War a total of about 118,000
selfdestruct land mines (see table 1) and that their self- destruct
failure, or dud, rate is 0.01 percent (1 in 10,000). However, if, as DOD
reported, about 118,000 of these self- destruct land mines were employed
and they produced duds at the DOD- claimed rate of 0.01 percent, there
should have been about 12 duds produced, not 1,977 as CMS reported finding
in one of seven Kuwaiti battlefield sectors. Thus, a substantial
inconsistency exists Dud Rates for Self- Destruct

Land Mines Appear to Be Higher Than Expected

Page 28 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

between the DOD- reported reliability rate and the dud rate implied by the
number of mines that CMS reported finding from actual battlefield use. At
the time CMS was completing this UXO disposal work in Kuwait, the DOD
program manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions visited the CMS
cleanup operation. His report of that trip indicates that he thought CMS*s
techniques, training of personnel, and recording of ordnance recovered
were thorough and accurate. The project manager said in his report that he
had personally seen unexploded U. S. ordnance on the battlefield. The mine
database developed by CMS to record the location of land mines, the
project manager believed, was *extremely useful* to the U. S. soldiers
working in that area.

We interviewed several former employees of CMS to obtain their views on
these issues. All of those we interviewed were retired senior U. S.
officers and noncommissioned officers whose rank ranged from major general
to sergeant first class. All but one were experienced in military ordnance
and explosive ordnance disposal. They included the then- CMS president,
the Kuwaiti on- site manager, and leaders of ground UXO disposal teams.
They made two major points: (1) U. S. submunition UXO found in their
sector was tactically employed, unexploded ordnance duds that had failed
to explode as designed and could have been hazardous, meaning that if
disturbed, the ordnance might have exploded, and (2) U. S. Gator, ADAM,
and RAAM land- mine duds had not self- destructed as designed and were
treated as hazardous. CMS explosives disposal personnel stated that they
had personally experienced what they thought were Gator duds exploding on
the battlefield in Kuwait, caused by no apparent triggering event, over a
year after the Gulf War ended. CMS experts speculated that these
detonations might have been caused by the extreme heat in a desert
environment.

DOD has been unable to explain the circumstances that caused the nearly
2,000 U. S. self- destruct land mine duds found in the CMS disposal sector
of the Kuwaiti battlefield not to self- destruct. Several DOD land mine
and explosive ordnance disposal experts speculated that these dud land
mines could have resulted from (1) mines that had malfunctioned or had
been misemployed; (2) greater- than- expected and reported dud rates; or
(3) the use by U. S. forces of many thousands more scatterable land mines
than DOD has reported having used. Some Army land mine- related officials
discounted the accuracy of some data included in the CMS report. However,
these officials did not provide us with any factual evidence supporting
these views.

Page 29 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Other DOD experts in explosive ordnance disposal confirmed in interviews
that scatterable mine duds can exist after their self- destruct times have
elapsed and that these duds may be hazardous. A DOD explosive ordnance
disposal expert said that procedures for eliminating Gator duds specify
that explosive ordnance disposal should be postponed for 22 days, and then
the duds should normally be destroyed remotely by blowing them up in
place. The 22- day period is calculated by adding a 50- percent safety
factor to the maximum possible self- destruct period of 15 days. Explosive
ordnance disposal personnel thus attempt to reduce the possibility of a
munition detonating or self- destructing while they are near it.

DOD did not provide us with records to show the results of reliability
testing for ADAM, RAAM, or Gator land mines done prior to the Gulf War or
any safety- of- use messages that might have been in effect for these or
other U. S. land mines that were in U. S. stockpiles at that time.
However, DOD did provide some post- Gulf War test records that document
reliability problems with eight of its self- destruct land mine systems.
23 Specifically, testing showed that some land mines did not self-
destruct at the selected times. For example, a July 2000 Army study of dud
rates for ammunition reports that the submunition dud rate for RAAM land
mines with short duration fuzes is over 7 percent, and the dud rate for
RAAM land mines with long duration fuzes is over 10 percent. 24 In an
Ammunition Stockpile Reliability Program test for the ADAM, the Army
suspended one lot because it failed. In a test for the Volcano system, 66
out of 564 land mines failed the test. Among the failures were 1 hazardous
dud (meaning that it could explode), 24 nonhazardous duds (meaning that
they had not armed), 6 mines that detonated early, and 1 mine that
detonated late. In another case, DOD testing of the Selectable Lightweight
Attack Munition (SLAM) land mine showed that it also did not destruct at
the selected time. While this problem was investigated, SLAM use was
suspended and a safety- of- use message was put into effect advising
personnel *never to approach an M2 SLAM that has been armed* and, in
training, *to assure that it can be detonated if it fails to go off as
intended.* According to DOD,

23 These eight systems are the RAAM, the Gator, the Ground- Emplaced Mine
Scattering System (GEMSS), the Pursuit Deterrent Munition, the Volcano,
the Modular Pack Mine System, the ADAM, and the Selectable Lightweight
Attack Munition (SLAM). Some of these systems are depicted in figures 5
and 6 in appendix II.

24 United States Army, Defense Ammunition Center, United States Army
Technical Center for Explosives Safety, Report of Findings for Study of
Ammunition Dud and Low Order Detonation Rates (McAlester, Okla.: July
2000).

Page 30 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

the same self- destruct and self- deactivation design has been used in all
U. S. mines since 1970. Because of this design similarity, it is possible
that U. S. self- destruct land mines could be subject to similar failures.

Failures of self- destruct land mines that are induced by extremes in
temperature and other variations in environmental conditions are
welldocumented in service field manuals and after- action reports. Field
manuals state that the reliability of self- destruct land mines degrades
when they are employed on sand, vegetation, hillsides, snow, or hard
surfaces. Also, self- destruct land mines have reportedly *reduced
effectiveness* on hard surfaces such as concrete and asphalt. They break
apart and can easily be seen. Also, the high detectability of scatterable
mines on bare and lightly covered surfaces permits the enemy to seek out
unmined passageways or pick a way through lightly seeded areas. An Army
document states that *FASCAM [family of scatterable mines] must be covered
by either observation or fire, since FASCAM minefields are surface laid
and an undisturbed enemy could breach those obstacles quickly*. FASCAM is
not suitable for use in road interdiction due to its tendency to
malfunction on hard surfaces.* In snow, self- destruct land mines may
settle into the snow at unintended angles, causing their antihandling
devices to prematurely detonate them. In deep snow, selfdestruct land
mines are considered *ineffective,* and at least 40 percent of their blast
is smothered. Soft sand, mud, or surface water can have similar effects.
During the Gulf War in particular, Marines found that in the constantly
blowing and shifting sand, surface mines became buried, and buried mines
came to the surface. Slope or unevenness of the terrain may also have an
adverse impact on self- destruct land mines. Specifically, between 5 and
15 percent of scatterable mines come to rest on their edges when deployed.
RAAM and ADAM land mines must come to rest and stabilize within 30 seconds
of impact, or the submunitions will not arm. Very uneven terrain such as
ground covered by vegetation or rocks also may prevent the ADAM or Gator
trip wires from deploying properly. 25

25 Field Manual 20- 32 identifies the advantages and problems of using
scatterable mine systems in urban terrain [i. e., cities]. For example, it
indicates that ADAMs/ RAAMs *are the most rapidly deployed SCATMINE
systems,* and *these mines can be delivered under enemy fire.* It also
identifies problems: *Using ADAMs/ RAAMs in urban terrain involves five
specific problem areas: Difficulty in precise minefield siting. . . .
Uncertainty of ADAM and RAAM survivability upon impact with a building or
ground surfaces. . . availability of artillery firing units. . . . High
detectability of these mines on bare and lightly covered surfaces. . . .
Difficulty in achieving a good random pattern. Hard- surfaced areas cause
mines to bounce and roll. Some mines (especially AT [antitank] mines) will
land on top of buildings and are ineffective.*

Page 31 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Gator testing indicates that various reliability problems can increase dud
rates. For example, in 58 tests, seven submunition land mine dispenser
failures were observed, reducing the reliability rate of the dispensers to
88 percent. Of the submunition mines delivered, 99 percent survived ground
impact. Of those, 97 percent of the antitank mines armed, and 95 percent
of the antipersonnel mines armed. Various other problems can affect a
mine*s explosion. For example, one antitank mine did not explode when
triggered, but it did activate when it was picked up and shaken.

During the Gulf War, accumulations of thousands of U. S. nonland- mine
submunition duds on the battlefield created unintended de facto
minefields. This problem was exacerbated by dud rates for these
submunitions that appear to have been higher than the 2- to 4- percent
submunition dud rate that DOD had previously reported. In a study of UXO
issues, the Army identified an estimated 8- percent overall dud rate for
submunitions. Another Army document said that an explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) commander estimated that an area occupied by the 24th
Infantry Division during the war experienced at least a 15- to 20- percent
dud rate for some Army submunitions. The document stated that *An unknown
amount was covered by sand suggesting an even higher rate.* EOD personnel
estimated that the dud rate for Air Force submunitions was 40 percent for
one area. They commented that these submunitions *did not function well in
soft sand.* In addition, DOD reported that at the time of the Gulf War,
over half of the 133 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) submunition lots
in inventory exceeded the Army*s 5- percent dud- rate goal. 26 Each
Multiple Launch Rocket System contains 644 M77 submunitions. One DOD
document stated that the dud rate for the M77 for the Gulf War ranged from
10 to 20 percent.

U. S. ammunition stockpile sample testing also indicated that DOD has
experienced past problems with submunition reliability rates. For example,
in 1990, testing of artillery- delivered nonland- mine submunitions
identified two lots that had duds in excess of 40 percent. According to a
testing document, one way to compensate for this high dud rate is to
increase the quantity fired. Instructions contained in the testing
document were to *Notify the user of the increase in submissile defect
rate so that he can make adjustments in the tactical employment plans.*
The July 2000

26 U. S. General Accounting Office, Operation Desert Storm: Casualties
Caused by Improper Handling of Unexploded U. S. Submunitions, GAO/ NSIAD-
93- 212 (Washington, D. C.: Aug. 6, 1993). See table 6 for a list of duds
found by CMS, Inc., on the Kuwaiti battlefield. This list includes M77
duds. Nonland- Mine Submunitions

Also Had Higher Dud Rates Than Expected

Page 32 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Army study of dud rates for ammunition reports that the dud rate for
artillery- fired M42/ 46 submunitions is over 14 percent.

Like land mines, nonland- mine submunitions experience higher failure
rates in various environmental conditions. According to an Army field
manual, about 50 percent of the submunitions that fail to detonate are
armed and hazardous. Firing them into mountainous areas or uneven terrain
further increases the dud rate. The effectiveness of these rounds also
decreases in snow, water, marshy areas, mud, vegetation, and soft sand.

According to one DOD document, the improved conventional munitions used,
including dual- purpose improved conventional munitions, and CBUs,
experienced a high dud rate and caused obstacles for maneuvering forces.
Units perceived the dud rates as *considerably greater than the 2- 4
percent anticipated,* creating a dud minefield. The document continued
that because the dud rates were *too high,* some maneuver commanders
hesitated to use submunition weapons, especially if they believed that
their units would move through the area later. Hazardous dudfields caused
delays in movement on the battlefield, and high winds and shifting sands
often covered many duds. According to this report, *This became especially
dangerous for high hazard missions such as refueling operations.*

According to an Army after- action report written in 1991, *The large
number of dud U. S. submunitions * significantly impeded operations*
during the Gulf War. In one case, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps attempted to
position a combat command post, but because of U. S. dud submunitions, it
had to relocate. According to the XVIIIth Airborne Corps report, *The

assault CP*s [command post*s] position was untenable due to the presence
of numerous USAF CBU duds.* A second Army document cited a case in which
previously dropped U. S. munitions caused maneuver problems and a
significant delay in operations:

*In one case, the 1st Cavalry Division moved into Kuwait along the Wadi al
Batin. Twenty miles of this route was saturated with both USAF
submunitions (BLU97 and Rockeye) and Army M77 submunitions. . . .
Maneuvering through this area was no problem for the tracked vehicles of
the division. However, the 1st Cav selected the same route for its main
supply route (MSR). Because the division*s CSS [combat service support]
consisted of mainly wheeled vehicles, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal]
support was required. It took the 64th EOD and a British unit about five
days to clear a two lane path through the area. In this case, the unit*s
progress was clearly slowed by the duds.*

Page 33 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Because Gulf War records are not always specific, it is not clear how
frequently U. S. forces experienced problems in maneuvering through areas
previously attacked by U. S. ordnance. However, available records indicate
that such problems did occur to some degree and were an operational
concern. In fact, DOD reported that in some instances *ground

movement came to a halt* because units were afraid of encountering
unexploded ordnance. Moreover, Army officials reported that, in the case
of the M77 submunitions, the Army believed that the weapon would most
likely be used against the Soviet threat in Europe, where U. S. troops
would probably be in a defensive position. Therefore, U. S. soldiers were
not expected to occupy submunition- contaminated areas.

During the Gulf War, the placement of self- destruct land mines was not
always reported, recorded, or marked when appropriate. This situation was
exacerbated by the possibility that self- destruct land mines did not
always self- destruct as designed after their preset periods of time.
Consequently, safety issues involving Gulf War self- destruct land mines,
as well as other submunitions, focused on the potential for fratricide
resulting from U. S. forces* unknowingly maneuvering into areas where
scatterable land mines had been employed but had not yet self- destructed.

Shortly after the Gulf War, one DOD fact sheet reported that DOD*s joint
procedures for coordinating the use of air- delivered mines had not been
widely disseminated. Further, according to the fact sheet, the procedures
were outdated with respect to the rapid mobility of the modern Army. Thus,
the warning information* such as the locations and self- destruct timing
durations** was next to impossible to obtain and pass to ground component
commanders.* According to the document, this situation dramatically
increased the probability of friendly fire casualties. The Army*s Field
Manual on Mine/ Countermine Operations states the importance of such
coordination: *Because SCATMINEs [scatterable mines] are a very dynamic
weapon system, great care must be taken to ensure that proper coordination
is made with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. To prevent friendly
casualties, all affected units must be notified of the location and
duration of scatterable minefields.*

Gulf War records include numerous reports indicating that scatterable
minefields were employed in locations that were not reported to maneuver
commanders. For example, one DOD report stated that neither the Air Force
nor the Navy could accurately track the location or duration of Gator
minefields. An Army after- action report stated that the Air Force

*flew over 35 GATOR missions (the exact number is not known) without Land
Mine and Dudfield

Reporting, Recording, and Marking Problems Created Fratricide and Mobility
Concerns

Page 34 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

reporting or recording the missions.* According to this report, the result
was that *[ d] uring the ground offensive, units found themselves
maneuvering in GATOR minefields without any knowledge of their existence.*
Another Army after- action report stated, *Some friendly Gatorscatterable
Air Force- delivered scatterable minefields were encountered in Iraq.* The
report highlighted the lack of a scatterable minefield selfextraction
capability for units to avoid fratricide. A DOD fratricide lessonslearned
document noted that casualties from friendly minefields were a

*major problem* due to the lack of coordination, failure to disseminate
obstacle plans, and failure to report the location of mines throughout the
chain of command.

Another Army after- action report attributed fatalities to the failure to
mark hazardous areas. According to this report, *In many cases GATOR
minefields and large areas which contained DPICM [dual- purpose improved
conventional munitions] and CBU duds were left unmarked due to the lack of
a fast and simple method for marking hazardous areas.* After- action
reports also cited planners* ignorance of *the capabilities, limitations
and reporting, recording, and marking requirements of our scatterable mine
systems,* as well as a lack of training regarding unexploded ordnance, as
the causes of fatalities. 27

Tracking nonland- mine dudfields presented similar concerns. A case in
which one U. S. unit had moved through an area where another U. S. unit
had earlier dropped cluster munitions is presented in an historical
account of the Gulf War written by a retired Army lieutenant general.
According to this account, a U. S. Army 101st Airborne Division aviation
battalion traversed an area that had previously been seized by the U. S.
Army VIIth Corps, which had fired cluster munitions. The battalion*s
commander cited a case in which one of his soldiers was injured when he
stepped on a cluster munition. *Keeping track of DPICM -dudded areas,*
said the

27 Field Manual 20- 32 requires minefield marking: *Minefields must be
marked to prevent fratricide. Marking ensures that friendly soldiers do
not accidentally enter a minefield, and it is a requirement under STANAGs
[Standardization Agreements] and Geneva Convention agreements. . . . For
scatterable minefields, a commander may choose to remove markings once the
self- destruct (SD) time of the mines has expired; but the location of the
minefield must still be recorded and forwarded to higher and adjacent
units in case some of the mines did not self- destruct. . . . To prevent
friendly casualties, all affected units must be notified of the location
and the duration of scatterable minefields. . . . Due to the large
footprint created when the minefield is fired, many mines will scatter
outside the planned minefield area. It is therefore necessary to plot the
safety zone in order to prevent fratricide.*

Page 35 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

commander, *was complicated by the fact that one Corps moved into another
Corps area.*

Senior U. S. Gulf War commanders were aware of the incidence of fratricide
from unexploded CBU, dual- purpose improved conventional munitions, and
other ordnance. For example, one U. S. Army artillery general sent a
safety message that read, *In recent days I have received numerous reports
of soldiers being injured and killed by duds. . . . I am firmly convinced
that each case could have been averted. Every soldier must be warned. . .
.*

According to one DOD official, the main reason hazardous dudfields were
not always reported or marked was that doctrine did not require commanders
to always report or mark nonland- mine hazard areas, as is required for
minefields. However, DOD has noted, *Although UXO is not a mine, UXO
hazards pose problems similar to mines concerning both personnel safety
and the movement and maneuver of forces on the battlefield.*

According to after- action, lessons- learned, and other reports, DOD and
the services recognize the nature, extent, and implications for fratricide
and battlefield maneuver of reported concerns, as well as the need to act
upon their concerns about land mines and other submunition UXO. According
to an Army after- action report, *The large amount of UXO found in Iraq
and Kuwait caught Allied forces by surprise. Lessons learned from past
conflicts were not learned, leading to unacceptable casualties among our
soldiers, allies, and civilians.* These reports suggested that changes to
address these concerns would increase submunition battlefield utility and
effectiveness while simultaneously reducing casualties and increasing
freedom of maneuver. In after- action reports, a number of actions were
identified to improve the safety of troops and their mobility through land
mines and other employed submunitions. These included, among others, that
DOD

 replace the current conventional land mines with modern, safer ones;

 add a feature to scatterable land mines that would allow them to be
turned on and off, giving the land mines a long- term static capability
and providing U. S. commanders with the ability to create cleared lanes
for friendly passage when and where needed;

 develop submunitions with lower dud rates and develop self- destruct
mechanisms for nonland- mine submunitions; DOD Has Recognized the

Need for Action Related to Land Mine and UXO Concerns

Page 36 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

 consider the magnitude and location of UXO likely to be on the
battlefield when deciding the number and mix of submunitions, precision-
guided munitions, or other munitions to use and, when planning maneuver
operations, avoid dudfield hazard areas or breach them with troops inside
armored vehicles;

 develop training aids* such as manuals and working models of U. S.
scatterable mines* to provide service members with the ability to
recognize U. S. scatterable mines and other unexploded ordnance and the
knowledge of the proper actions to take to safely avoid and/ or
deactivate/ detonate explosive submunitions and to safely extract
themselves from minefields or dudfields; and

 establish and standardize procedures for the reporting, recording, and,
when appropriate, marking of concentrations of submunition bomblets as
hazard areas.

DOD has reported a number of actions that relate to these land mine and
UXO concerns. These actions are summarized in appendix IV. Because it was
beyond the scope of this report, we did not evaluate DOD*s progress in
these areas.

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it believes the
report is flawed because it *makes assertions and speculations that are
not based on fact* and because we used *unreliable or unrelated data.* In
particular, DOD made the following main points:

 Our report implies that U. S. casualties caused by land mines were
higher than DOD records show.

 Our report relied heavily on the report by CMS, Inc., even though there
are weaknesses and mistakes in the CMS report. 28

 Our report confuses issues dealing with unexploded ordnance and land
mines.

 By focusing on the Gulf War experience as one *case study,* our report
is not a credible analysis of land- mine utility and employment.

We have made some changes to the report to clarify and elaborate on the
issues DOD has raised, but we do not agree that the report is flawed or

28 U. S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command, Contract DAAA21-
92- M- 0300 report by CMS, Inc. Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 37 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

makes unsubstantiated assertions. In regard to each of DOD*s comments, we
offer the following response:

 Our report states that DOD records show no U. S. casualties attributed
to U. S. land mines and that 81 casualties were attributed to Iraqi or
other land mines. In addition, we point out that it is possible that some
portion of the casualties in the *other* or *unknown* categories reported
by DOD could have been caused by land mines* there is simply no way of
knowing. This is a statement of fact, not an assertion that casualties
were greater than reported. As we gathered data on Gulf War casualties,
our service points of contact worked with us to ensure that we had the
most complete information on this issue that was available. Some records
were ambiguous and/ or incomplete. However, DOD officials who provided us
with this data agreed that our interpretation of the records was accurate.

 Much of DOD*s concern about *unreliable data* stems from our use of the
report by CMS, Inc., on UXO cleanup of the battlefield. Most of our
discussion of the CMS report is in the section addressing DOD*s lessons
learned from the Gulf War. Our use of CMS data in that section
corroborates in most cases the lessons learned contained in DOD
afteraction reports. While DOD claims that the CMS report contained
inaccuracies, DOD did not provide any data to challenge the main message
of the CMS report, which was that a very large number of U. S. land mine
and cluster munition duds were found on the Kuwaiti battlefield. In fact,
a DOD study that discusses the magnitude of the unexploded ordnance
problem and that calculates the relative cost of cleaning up the
battlefield compared to retrofitting or reprocuring U. S. submunitions
with selfdestruct fuzes in order to lower dud rates uses the same CMS data
we cite in our report. 29 In its 2000 report to Congress, DOD uses the
results of these calculations to discuss the cost and feasibility of
retrofitting the Army*s ammunition stockpile. 30

 UXO is discussed in our report from two standpoints. First, casualty
data presenting the causes of casualties cannot always distinguish between
a land mine and other types of UXO, so we believed it was important to
discuss both to provide a proper context. Secondly, DOD*s own afteraction
reports on lessons learned discuss the problems of unexploded

29 U. S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Unexploded Ordnance
(UXO) Study,

Technical Report No. TR- 654, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Apr. 1996).
30 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology &
Logistics)/ Strategic & Tactical Systems/ Office of Munitions, Unexploded
Ordnance Report, Report to Congress (Washington, D. C.: Feb. 29, 2000).

Page 38 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

ordnance in terms of both land mines and cluster munitions, so our
discussion of land mines needs to be in this overall UXO context. We have
tried throughout the report to make clear distinctions between land mines
and other ordnance, and we have made further clarifications as a result of
DOD*s comments.

 Lastly, we recognize that this report focuses exclusively on the Gulf
War; this was the agreed- upon scope of our work as discussed with our
congressional requester, and this is stated in the objectives and scope
and methodology sections of our report. As such, we agree that it is not a
comprehensive analysis of the utility of land mines in modern warfare; it
was never intended to be. As our report makes clear, we do not make any
conclusions or recommendations in this report. Nevertheless, we believe
the report provides important historical context* the Gulf War was the
largest U. S. conflict since Vietnam, and both sides in the battle made
use of land mines.

Unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan
no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date.
At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairmen of the
House and Senate Committees on Armed Services; the Chairmen of the House
and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Subcommittees on Defense; the
Secretaries of Defense, the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy; and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to
other congressional committees and interested parties on request. In
addition, the report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at
http:// www. gao. gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me
at (757) 552- 8100 or e- mail me at CurtinN@ GAO. GOV. Key staff who
contributed to this report were Mike Avenick, William Cawood, Herbert
Dunn, M. Jane Hunt, Jim McGaughey, and Bev Schladt.

Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory Page 39 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S.
Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

According to DOD and service data, the current DOD land- mine stockpile
contains about 18 million land mines* over 2. 9 million nonself- destruct
land mines and over 15 million self- destruct land mines. The Army owns
the vast majority of the nonself- destruct land mines, including over 1.1
million M- 14 and M- 16 mines (see fig. 6 in app. II). The Marine Corps
has a relatively small number of these mines and has no M- 14 land mines.
The Air Force and the Navy stock no nonself- destruct land mines.

Of the over 15 million self- destruct land mines in the U. S. stockpile,
over 8.8 million are antipersonnel, and about 6.2 million are antitank
land mines. Artillery- fired ADAM antipersonnel land mines (over 8
million) and RAAM antitank land mines (over 4 million) are stocked mainly
by the Army but also by the Marine Corps. (See table 7 and fig. 5 in app.
II.)

Table 7: DOD Land Mine Stockpile Totals as of 2002 Category Total Nonself-
destruct land mines

 Antipersonnel 1,565,226 a

 Antitank 1,349,767 b

Subtotal* nonself- destruct 2,914,993 Self- destruct land mines

 Antipersonnel 8,838,922 c

 Antitank 6,177,996 d

Subtotal* self- destruct 15,016,918 Total land mines in stockpile
17,931,911

a This includes about 700,000 M- 14 and about 465,000 M- 16 nonself-
destruct antipersonnel land mines. This total also includes over 400,000
Claymore M- 18 nonself- destruct command- detonated antipersonnel land
mines, which DOD reported are not approved for use with triggering
tripwires or other unattended fuzing devices outside Korea. b The M2
Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition (SLAM), M3 Demolition Attack
Munition (DAM), and M4 SLAM munitions have selectable triggering
mechanisms including sensors and a timer. These munitions are used against
various targets, including vehicles. c Of these, over 8 million are
artillery- fired ADAM antipersonnel land mines, contained in about

232,000 dispenser artillery rounds. d Of these, over 4 million artillery-
fired RAAM antitank land mines are contained in about 462,000

dispenser rounds. Source: The services reported that the stockpile data
were complete and current as of the following dates: Army 5/ 24/ 02,
Marines 1/ 18/ 02, Air Force 3/ 29/ 02, and Navy 3/ 27/ 02.

The DOD land mine stockpile includes over 150, 000 mixed land- mine
dispensers, which contain a mixture of both antipersonnel and antitank
land mines. All together, these mixed land- mine dispensers contain over 2
million land mines, of which over 400,000 are antipersonnel land mines
Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine

Inventory

Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory Page 40 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S.
Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

and over 1.6 million are antitank land mines. (See table 8.) The services
report that land mine types are mixed in three dispenser systems: the
Gator, the Volcano, and the Modular Pack Mine System. 1 For example, the
Air Force and the Navy stockpile the Gator air- delivered CBU, which is
one type of mixed land mine dispenser. The two services together have
almost 14,000 CBU dispensers, which contain nearly 1.2 million land mines.
The Army stocks over 134,000 Volcano mixed dispensers, which contain over
800,000 antipersonnel and antitank land mines.

Table 8: Land Mines in Mixed Dispensers as of 2002 In 150, 401 mixed land-
mine dispensers a Land mines

Antipersonnel land mines in all mixed dispensers 424,846 Antitank land
mines in all mixed dispensers 1,615,594

Total land mines in all mixed dispensers 2,040,440

a Of the 150,401 total mixed land- mine dispensers, 13,995 are Gators;
134, 200 are Volcanoes; and 2,206 are Modular Pack Mine Systems. Source:
The services reported that the stockpile data were complete and current as
of the following dates: Army 5/ 24/ 02, Marines 1/ 18/ 02, Air Force 3/
29/ 02, and Navy 3/ 27/ 02.

Table 9 contains the total current U. S. inventory of land mines by mine
type and common name; self- destruct capability; dispenser type, if any;
service that maintains them; and quantity.

1 The Air Force version of the Gator (CBU- 89) dispenser contains 72
antitank and 22 antipersonnel land mines, and the Navy and Marine version
of the Gator (CBU- 78) dispenser contains 45 antitank and 15 antipersonnel
land mines. (See fig. 5 in app. II.) Mixed Volcano dispensers each contain
5 antitank and 1 antipersonnel land mines. Modular Pack Mine System
dispensers contain 17 antitank and 4 antipersonnel land mines.

Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory Page 41 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S.
Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 9: Total U. S. Worldwide Inventory of Land Mines as of 2002 Service-
managed inventories of unitary land mines & land- mine

dispensers Designation Common

name Selfdestruct

Yes/ No LM type:

unitary (U) or dispenser (D), and number & type of land mines per
dispenser Army Marines Air

Force Navy DOD total

number of unitary land

mines and dispensers

of submunition

land mines DOD total

number of unitary

land mines and

submunition land mines

Mine, antitank: M15, metallic, (M603 fuze) M- 15

(antitank) No (U) 1 AT 1,057,800 28,894 0 0 1,086,694 1,086,694 Mine,
antitank: M19, nonmetallic (M606 fuze)

M- 19 (antitank) No (U) 1 AT 54,100 9, 026 0 0 63,126 63,126

Mine, antitank: M21, metallic (M607 fuze) M- 21

(antitank) No (U) 1 AT 163,000 15,426 0 0 178,426 178,426 Mine,
antipersonnel: M14, nonmetallic a M- 14 (antipersonnel) No (U) 1 AP
696,800 0 0 0 696,800 696,800

Mine, antipersonnel: M16A1 or M16A2, metallic (M605 fuze)

M- 16 (antipersonnel) No (U) 1 AP 441,700 23,630 0 0 465,330 465,330 Mine,
antipersonnel: M18A1, nonmetallic b M- 18 (antipersonnel) Claymore

No (U) 1 AP 368,100 34,996 0 0 403,096 403,096 Projectile, 155 millimeter:
M692 ADAM long

SD (anti personnel)

Yes (D) 36 AP 36,700 23,920 0 0 60,620 2, 182,320 Projectile, 155
millimeter: M731 ADAM

Short SD (anti personnel)

Yes (D) 36 AP 125,000 46,771 0 0 171,771 6, 183,756 Projectile, 155
millimeter: M718, antitank

Basic RAAM Long SD (antitank)

Yes (D) 9 AT 68,200 24,517 0 0 92,717 834,453 Projectile, 155 millimeter:
M718 A1, antitank

Improved RAAM Long SD (antitank)

Yes (D) 9 AT 76,400 0 0 0 76,400 687,600 Projectile, 155 millimeter: M741,
antitank

Basic RAAM Short SD (antitank)

Yes (D) 9 AT 207,700 53,717 0 0 261,417 2, 352,753 Projectile, 155
millimeter: M741A1, antitank

Improved RAAM Short SD (antitank)

Yes (D) 9 AT 31,500 0 0 0 31,500 283,500

Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory Page 42 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S.
Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Service- managed inventories of unitary land mines & land- mine

dispensers Designation Common

name Selfdestruct

Yes/ No LM type:

unitary (U) or dispenser (D), and number & type of land mines per
dispenser Army Marines Air

Force Navy DOD total

number of unitary land

mines and dispensers

of submunition

land mines DOD total

number of unitary

land mines and

submunition land mines

Dispenser and mine, aircraft: CBU- 89/ B Gator (antipersonnel /

antitank) Air Force version

Yes (D) 72 AT 22 AP

544 (User is Air Force)

0 9, 727 0 10,271 965,474 Dispenser and mine, aircraft: CBU 78C/ B Gator

(antipersonnel / antitank) Navy

version Yes (D)

45 AT 15 AP

122 (User is

Navy) 0 0 3,602 3,724 223,440

Mine, antipersonnel: M74, metallic GEMSS

antipersonnel mine

Yes (U) 1 AP 32,900 0 0 0 32,900 32,900 Mine, antitank: M75, metallic
GEMSS

antitank mine

Yes (U) 1 AT 195,800 0 0 0 195,800 195,800 Mine, antipersonnel: M86,
metallic PDM Yes (U) 1 AP 15,100 0 0 0 15,100 15,100 Dispenser and mine,
ground: M131 (with M71 remote control unit)

MOPMS (antitank /

personnel) Yes (D)

17 AT anti4 A P

2,206 0 0 0 2,206 46,326 Canister, mine: M87A1 Volcano

(antitank) Yes (D) 6 AT 34,678 0 0 0 34,678 208,068 Canister, mine: M87
Volcano

(anti tank/ personnel)

Yes (D) 5 AT anti1 AP

134,200 0 0 0 134,200 805,200 Munition, wide area: M93 Hornet/

WAM (antitank)

Yes (U) 1 AT 228 0 0 0 228 228 Selectable Lightweight Attack Munition M2
SLAM c No

(Timer) (U) 12,900 0 0 0 12,900 12,900

Demolition Attack Munition M3 DAM c No

(Timer) (U) 4, 100 0 0 0 4,100 4,100

Munition, Selectable Lightweight Attack: M4 SLAM c

(antitank) No (Timer)

(U) 1 AT 4,521 0 0 0 4,521 4,521

Total 3,764,299 260,897 9, 727 3,602 4,038,525 17,931,911

Appendix I: Current U. S. Land Mine Inventory Page 43 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S.
Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Legend AP = antipersonnel land mine AT = antitank land mine LM = land mine
SD = self- destruct a DOD reports that all M- 14 land mines have been
retrofitted with metal and therefore are no longer nonmetallic. b DOD
reported that the nonself- destruct M- 18 Claymore is authorized to be
detonated only by

command and never by unattended triggering devices, including tripwires,
outside Korea. c The M2 SLAM, M3 DAM, and M4 SLAM munitions have
selectable triggering mechanisms including

sensors and a timer. These munitions are used against various targets,
including vehicles. The M2 SLAM is self- neutralizing, and the M4 SLAM is
self- destructing. They are both multipurpose munitions with an antitamper
feature.

Source: The services reported that the stockpile data shown were complete
and current as of the following dates: Army 5/ 24/ 02, Marines 1/ 18/ 02,
Air Force 3/ 29/ 02, and Navy 3/ 27/ 02.

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 44 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate types of land mines that were in the U. S.
inventory and available for use during the Gulf War.

Figure 5: U. S. Land Mines Available and Used in the Gulf War

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 45 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Source: DOD.

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 46 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figure 6: U. S. Land Mines Available but Not Used in the Gulf War

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 47 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Note: Mine dispensers available for use in the Gulf War in addition to the
GEMSS include the M131 Modular Pack Mine System (MOPMS), which dispenses
17 antitank and 4 antipersonnel land mines, and the M138 Mine Dispenser,
or Flipper. The GEMSS, MOPMS, and Flipper dispenser systems were available
during the Gulf War but not used to actually deploy M74 antipersonnel, M75
antitank, or other scatterable surface- laid land mines, according to DOD.

Source: DOD.

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 48 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Figure 7 shows the M- 18 Claymore antipersonnel land mine. DOD has stated
that it is employed in only the command- detonation mode and therefore is
defined to be a nonland mine. Army Field Manual 20- 32 alternately calls
the M- 18 Claymore a *land mine* and a *munition.* See appendix IV for
DOD*s statements.

Figure 7: M- 18 Claymore Nonself- Destruct Command- Detonated
Antipersonnel Land Mine

Note: Nonself- destruct antipersonnel land mines available for use in the
Gulf War but not used, according to DOD, included the M- 18 Claymore,
which DOD states is not a land mine when employed in the command-
detonation mode. See appendix IV for DOD*s statement. FM 20- 32 indicates
that it is current U. S. policy that the M- 18 Claymore may be used with
trip- wire only in Korea.

Source: DOD.

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 49 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Table 10 cites the U. S. land mines* by mine type and common name and by
service* that were available and used during the Gulf War.

Table 10: Types and Numbers of Certain U. S. Land Mines Stockpiled
Worldwide in 1990, Available in the Southwest Asian Theater, and Used
during the Gulf War

U. S. land mine types U. S. land mines available in 1990 for use in the
Gulf War Designation Common name

Number available in DOD worldwide stockpile in 1990

Number available in SWA theater for potential Gulf War Use

Number of U. S. land mines reported used in

the Gulf War

Mine, antitank: M15, metallic M- 15 (antitank) 1,805,300 41,200 0 Mine,
antitank: M19, nonmetallic M- 19 (antitank) 74,200 100 0 Mine, antitank:
M21, metallic M- 21 (antitank) 219,700 300 0 Mine, antipersonnel: M14,
nonmetallic a M- 14 (antipersonnel)

Toe Popper 3,909,500 55,600 0 Mine, antipersonnel: M16, metallic M- 16
(antipersonnel)

Bouncing Betty 2,332,700 149,000 0 Mine, antipersonnel: M18, nonmetallic b
M- 18 (antipersonnel)

Claymore 771,000 32,500 0 Projectile, 155 millimeter: M692/ 731, high
explosive

ADAM long/ short duration SD (antipersonnel)

(124,600 rounds x 36 AP =)

4,485,600 (37,100 rounds x

36 AP =) 1,335,600

Marine- employed:( 12 rounds x 36AP =)

432 Projectile, 155 millimeter: M718/ 741, antitank

Basic RAAM, long/ short duration SD (anti- tank) (279,200 rounds x

9 AT =) 2,512,800

(23,800 rounds x 9 AT =)

214,200 Marine- employed:

(48 rounds x 9 AT =)

432 Dispenser and mine, aircraft: CBU89 Gator

(antipersonnel/ antitank) Air Force version

(5,673 bombs x 72AT/ 22AP = 408,456/ 124,806 =)

533,262 3,165 bombs x

72AT/ 22AP = 227,880/ 69, 630 =)

297,510 Air Force- employed:

(1,105 Gator CBU bombs x 72AT/ 22AP =

79,560/ 24, 310 =) 103,870

Dispenser and mine, aircraft: CBU78 Gator

(antipersonnel/ antitank) Navy version

(2,682 bombs x 45AT/ 15AP = 120,690/ 40, 230=)

160,920 Navy/ Marine in- theater

quantity unknown, but at least equal to the

number used (215 Gator CBU bombs x 45AT/ 15AP =

9,675/ 3,225 =) 12,900

Navy/ Marine- employed: (215 Gator CBU bombs x 45AT/ 15AP =

9,675/ 3,225 =) 12,900 Mine, antipersonnel: M74, metallic GEMSS
antipersonnel

mine 1,805,300 32,800 0 Mine, antitank: M75, metallic GEMSS antitank mine
297,900 43,900 0

Total 18,908,182 2, 215,610 117,634

Appendix II: U. S. Land Mines Available for Use in the Gulf War

Page 50 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Legend SD = self- destruct GEMSS = Ground- Emplaced Mine Scattering System
AP = antipersonnel AT = antitank SWA = Southwest Asia

Notes: DOD reports that all types of land mines available for U. S. use
from worldwide stockpiles and theater and unit supplies, and all land
mines used by the U. S. in the Gulf War are included in this table. The
services reported that all standard types of U. S. land mines in their
inventories, which DOD estimated to contain about 19 million land mines,
were available for use if needed by U. S. Gulf War units, including over
2. 2 million that were transported to the Gulf War theater of operations.
DOD and service officials reported no U. S. theater command restrictions
on the use of any type or quantity of U. S. land mines, except that actual
land mine use needed to be approved by the appropriate U. S. commander.
DOD reported that U. S. commanders ordered employment of only those land
mine quantities shown as used in this table and that no U. S. land mines
were known by DOD or the services to have been employed except those shown
in this table. The service- provided numbers in this table represent
actual and estimated numbers. DOD indicated that, because of incomplete
Gulf War data, the numbers and types of land mines shown as part of the
1990 U. S. stockpile, available in theater, and used might be inexact. a
DOD reports that all M- 14 land mines have been retrofitted with metal and
therefore are no longer

nonmetallic. b DOD reported that the nonself- destruct M- 18 Claymore is
authorized to be detonated only by

command and never by unattended triggering devices, including tripwires,
outside Korea. Source: Service reports.

Appendix III: U. S. Gulf War Casualties by Service

Page 51 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Army Marines Air Force Navy DOD Category K I TK I T K I T K I TK I T

Land mines 10 61 71 2 7 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 12 69 81

Cluster munition UXO 225880 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00225880 Other UXO 01313 0 3 3 0
0 0 0 0001616 Unknown causes 14344 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0014344 Enemy ground/
Scud fire 39 160 199 14 70 84 0 0 0 0 4 4 53 234 287

Aircraft incidents 39 26 65 18 0 18 31 8 39 13 3 16 101 37 138

Friendly fire 153853 3 2 5 0 0 0 0 11184159 Vehicle accidents 48 77 125 13
24 37 2 0 2 4 0 4 67 101 168

Other accidents 9 85 94 9 40 49 0 0 0 33 0 33 51 125 176

Other causes 22 245 267 4 5 9 2 0 2 0 3 3 28 253 281

Natural causes 21021 6 2 8 0 0 0 5 0532234

Total 226 806 1,032 69 153 222 35 9 44 55 11 66 385 979 1,364

Legend K = Killed/ died I = Injured T = Total

Source: Service casualty data.

Appendix III: U. S. Gulf War Casualties by Service

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 52 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

DOD has reported a number of actions that are related to the land- mine
and unexploded ordnance concerns raised in Gulf War after- action and
lessons- learned reports. These actions fall into three areas: (1)
developing antipersonnel land- mine alternatives and more capable and
safer selfdestruct land mines, (2) revising doctrine and procedures to
better address hazardous submunition dudfields, and (3) increasing
ammunition reliability and reducing dud rates. DOD- reported actions in
these areas are described below. However, because it was beyond the scope
of this report, we did not independently assess DOD*s progress in these
areas.

Presidential directives establish and direct the implementation of U. S.
policy on antipersonnel land mines. 1 Presidential Decision Directive 48
states that the United States will unilaterally undertake not to use and
to place in inactive stockpile status with intent to demilitarize by the
end of 1999, all nonself- destructing antipersonnel land mines not needed
for (a) training personnel engaged in demining and countermining
operations and (b) defending the United States and its allies from armed
aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone. 2 The Directive also
directs the Secretary of Defense to, among other things, undertake a
program of research, procurement, and other measures needed to eliminate
the requirement for nonself- destructing antipersonnel land mines for
training personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations and to
defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression across the
Korean demilitarized zone. It further directs that this program have as an
objective permitting both the United States and its allies to end reliance
on antipersonnel land mines as soon as possible. Presidential Decision
Directive 64 directs the Department of Defense to, among other things, (1)
develop antipersonnel land mine alternatives to end the use of all
antipersonnel land mines outside Korea, including those that self-
destruct, by the year 2003; (2) pursue aggressively the objective of
having

1 Presidential Decision Directive 48, June 26, 1996, and Presidential
Decision Directive 64, June 23, 1998. Because it was beyond the scope of
this report, we did not assess land- mine policy topics.

2 The organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1996 directed the
commanders- inchief (CINC), except for the CINC United Nations Command
(Korea), to undertake actions related to eliminating M- 14 and M- 16
antipersonnel land mines from unit supplies, prepositioned land mine
stockpiles, and land mine warfare plans. See JCS messages UUU 162338Z, May
1996, *Anti- Personnel Landmine Policy Implementation,* and UUU 061520Z,
Aug. 1996, *Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive on Anti-
Personnel Mine Warfare.* Because it was beyond the scope of this report,
we did not assess DOD*s progress in completing these directed actions.
Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That

Relate to Land Mine and UXO Concerns Developing Antipersonnel LandMine
Alternatives and More Capable and Safer Self- Destruct Land Mines

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 53 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

alternatives to antipersonnel land mines ready for Korea by 2006,
including those that self- destruct; (3) search aggressively for
alternatives to our mixed antitank land mine systems; (4) aggressively
seek to develop and field alternatives to replace nonself- destructing
antipersonnel land mines in Korea with the objective of doing so by 2006;
and (5) actively investigate the use of alternatives to existing
antipersonnel land mines, as they are developed, in place of the self-
destructing/ self- deactivating antipersonnel submunitions currently used
in mixed antitank mine systems. 3

In April 2001, DOD reported to the Congress 4 on its progress in meeting
the objectives of Presidential Decision Directives 48 and 64. Although DOD
has pursued programs to develop and field systems to replace land mines
and has plans to spend over $900 million to do so, it reported to us

3 For an overview of land mine issues, including the role of land mines,
international treaties, legislative actions, administrative policy, and
land mine technology, see Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for
Congress, Landmines: Background and Congressional Concerns, 96- 362F
(Washington, D. C.: updated Aug. 28, 1998).

4 U. S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Report to Congress, Progress on
Landmine Alternatives

(Washington, D. C.: Apr. 1, 2001). DOD indicated that this report responds
to section 248 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105- 261, which requires the Secretary of
Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees, not later than
April 1 of 2000 and 2001, a report describing the progress made in
identifying technologies and concepts with regard to antipersonnel land
mine alternatives that

a. would provide a combat capability that is equivalent to the combat
capability provided by nonself- destructing antipersonnel land mines,

b. would provide a combat capability that is equivalent to the combat
capability provided by antipersonnel submunitions used in mixed antitank
mine systems, or

c. would provide a combat capability that is equivalent to the combat
capability provided by current mixed mine systems.

DOD reported it has undertaken a three- tracked approach to identifying,
evaluating, selecting, and developing alternatives. The DOD report
describes numerous programs and activities related to land mines and land
mine alternatives. Because it was beyond the scope of this report, GAO did
not assess DOD*s progress in identifying and developing alternatives or in
achieving objectives and dates established by Presidential Decision
Directives (PDD) 48 and 64.

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 54 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

in May 2002 that it will not be able to meet the dates established in
Presidential Decision Directives 48 and 64. 5

Begun in 1997 and led by the Army, DOD*s *Antipersonnel Landmines
Alternative* program is aimed toward producing what DOD calls a Non Self-
Destruct Alternative (NSD- A). According to the program office, however,
DOD does not now anticipate that it will be able to field this alternative
system by the presidential goal of 2006. The alternative system, which DOD
expects to cost over $507 million, is now on hold pending a decision on
whether to include a mechanism that would allow a commandcontrolled

*man- in- the- loop* feature to be turned off so that unattended mines
could remain armed and detonate on contact. 6

5 U. S. Department of Defense, Project Office for Mines, Countermine and
Demolitions,

*Anti- Personnel Landmine Alternative Program Status Briefing for General
Accounting Office* (Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey: May 6, 2002).

6 U. S. Army, Engineer Systems Handbook (Ft. Leonard Wood, Mo.: May 2001)
characterizes this alternative: *The NSD- A system relies on a man in the
loop to achieve Ottawa [Treaty} compliance. An operator remotely controls
grenades and M16 warheads. Operational war- fighter requirements include a
target- activated option that is not Ottawa compliant. The operational
requirements document (ORD) is approved by the Joint Requirements
Oversight Committee. The USD (ALT) [Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)] decision to enter engineering
manufacturing design is pending NSC [National Security Council] policy
guidance.* Because it was beyond the scope of this report, we did not
assess this policy topic.

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 55 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

In response to the June 1998 Presidential Decision Directive 64, DOD has
also been pursuing alternatives to pure antipersonnel land mine systems 7
to end the use of all antipersonnel land mines outside of Korea by 2003

7 ** Pure* APL [antipersonnel land mines] are used alone and not part of a
mixed [including antitank land mines] system.* See National Academy of
Sciences, Alternative Technologies to Replace Antipersonnel Landmines
(Washington, D. C.: Mar. 21, 2001). On Sept. 3, 2002, a representative of
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and
Low- Intensity Conflict) (ASD/ SOLIC), provided to us the following DOD
statement to include in this report. The statement in part defines *pure*
and *mixed* land mine systems, PDD- 64 requirements, and the Ottawa
Convention and interprets how one DOD land mine program concept* the
Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition* is related: *Among its other
provisions, PDD- 64 directed DoD to develop alternatives to anti-
personnel land mines in order to end the use of anti- personnel land mines
outside Korea by 2003. PDD- 64 also directed development of the Remote
Area Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM) for use outside Korea. RADAM
combines anti- personnel and anti- tank land mines into one *mixed*

system. Since the PDD directed development of a mixed anti- tank system
for use outside Korea, the requirement *to end the use of anti- personnel
land mines outside Korea by 2003* has been interpreted to mean ending the
use of *pure* anti- personnel land mines rather than mixed systems that
include anti- personnel land mines along with anti- tank land mines. (The
Ottawa Convention permits use of mixed systems consisting of anti- tank
land mines that have an anti- personnel device physically attached to the
anti- tank mine. In this case, the use of the anti- personnel device,
called an *anti- handling device, * has the same function as do separate
anti- personnel land mines used as part of mixed systems* the anti-
personnel element protects the anti- tank minefield from easy breaching by
enemy forces.)* By comparison, the U. S. Army*s Engineer Systems Handbook,
May 2001, contains an alternative interpretation: *The RADAM is a mixed
system that combines seven remoteantiarmor- mine (RAAM) AT mines and five
area- denial- artillery- munition (ADAM) AP mines in one 155 shell.
Because of its AP component, this mixed system is not Ottawa compliant.
The directive is to develop alternatives to AP land mines to end the use
of all pure AP land mines outside of Korea, including those that self-
destruct, by 2003 (2006 for Korea). Without RADAM production, tactical
commanders will lose their ability to emplace a mixed system during this
period. Under the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Logistics, and
Technology) (USD [ALT]), the production decision is on hold until new
guidance is received from the National Security Council (NSC). Production
remains on hold pending the OSD decision.* Because it was beyond the scope
of this report, we did not assess these DOD policy- related
determinations.

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 56 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

and in Korea by 2006. 8 These efforts are being led by the Army, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). The program
office indicated that the Army- led project to end the use of all pure
antipersonnel systems outside Korea by 2003 by fielding artilleryfired
mixed land mine ammunition, budgeted at about $145 million, might now be
discontinued. A second effort, budgeted at $24 million and led by the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, is to seek long- term
alternatives for mixed land mine systems. One concept under development is
the self- healing minefield, which does not require antipersonnel land
mines to protect antitank land mines because the antitank mines in the
system are able to independently hop around the battlefield to
intelligently redistribute themselves in response to breaching attempts.
This system is not expected to be fielded before 2015. A third effort,
budgeted at about $230 million and led by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), is aimed at
replacing all U. S. mixed land mine systems by removing the antipersonnel
land mines in them. These mixed systems include the Modular Pack Mine
System, the Volcano, and the Gator. At present, DOD does not expect any of
these alternatives to be fielded by 2006. Although DOD has numerous land-
minerelated program activities underway, it has not reported to us that it
has identified the land mine alternative concepts or systems or the
specific

8 U. S. policy regarding the use and employment of antipersonnel land
mines in Korea is outlined in Field Manual 20- 32. This policy, according
to the field manual, *is subject to the Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons and Executive Orders. Current US policy limits the use of non-
self- destructing APLs [antipersonnel land mines] to (1) defending the US
and its allies from armed aggression across the Korean demilitarized zone
and (2) training personnel engaged in demining and countermine
operations.* The three types of nonself- destruct antipersonnel land mines
that may be used only in Korea include the M- 14 (a low metallic pressure-
detonated blast mine), the M- 16 (a bounding fragmentation mine that can
be detonated by pressure or by trip wires), and the M- 18A1 Claymore (when
employed in the trip- wire detonation mode). The use of the M- 18A1
Claymore in the tripwire mode is permitted only in Korea. According to
Field Manual 20- 32, the M18, when employed in the command- detonation
mode, may be used in Korea or elsewhere: *The use of the M18A1 claymore in
the command- detonation mode is not restricted under international law or
Executive Order.* Field Manual 20- 32 refers to the M18 Claymore
alternately as a *land mine* and a *munition.* A representative from ASD/
SOLIC said that DOD does not consider the M- 18A1 Claymore in the command-
detonated mode as a land mine. This representative provided for inclusion
in this report the following description of the M- 18 Claymore: *The M18
Claymore is not a land mine. Land mines are detonated by the *presence,
proximity or contact of a person or vehicle. * The M18 is detonated by a
human operator*s command.* Regarding the use of the Claymore in Korea, the
field manual states that U. S. forces may use the Claymore in Korea in the
trip- wire mode. Because it was beyond the scope of this report, we did
not assess these DOD policy- related determinations.

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 57 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

land- mine programs that it plans to develop or procure and field as its
next generation of land mines or land mine alternatives, which would
comply with presidential directives and meet DOD*s military requirements.
Because it was beyond the scope of this report, we did not assess DOD*s
progress in these areas.

Since the Gulf War, DOD and the services have updated their manuals and
procedures dealing with unexploded ordnance to increase the attention paid
to reporting and tracking possibly hazardous areas. These revisions are
intended to improve the integration of UXO- related planning into military
operations and provide improved procedures for the services to use when
operating in a UXO environment. However, DOD has provided to us no manuals
that require combat commanders to always report and track all potential
hazardous submunition dudfields. Instead, commanders are allowed to
determine when reporting, tracking, and marking of potentially hazardous
submunition dudfields are required.

DOD*s post- Gulf War UXO manuals 9 increase attention to procedures for
operations in a UXO environment. DOD*s guidance is based on Gulf War
lessons learned: *Experience from Operation Desert Storm revealed that a
battlefield strewn with unexploded ordnance (UXO) poses a twofold
challenge for commanders at all levels: one, to reduce the potential for
fratricide from UXO hazards and two, to minimize the impact that UXO may
have on the conduct of combat operations. Commanders must consider risks
to joint force personnel from all sources of UXO and integrate UXO into
operational planning and execution.* DOD*s manuals conclude that *Although
UXO is not a mine, UXO hazards pose problems similar to mines concerning
both personnel safety and the movement and maneuver of forces on the
battlefield.*

DOD*s manuals describe the UXO problem as having increased in recent
years: *Saturation of unexploded submunitions has become a characteristic
of the modern battlefield. The potential for fratricide from UXO is
increasing.* According to DOD, *The probability of encounter is roughly
equal for a minefield and a UXO hazard area of equal density [though] the
lethality of the UXO hazard area is lower.* DOD lists three

9 See U. S. Department of Defense, Multiservice Procedures for Operations
in an Unexploded Ordnance Environment, FM 100- 38, MCRP 4- 5. 1, NWP TP 3-
02. 4. 1, ACCPAM 10- 752, PACAFPAM 10- 752, USAFEPAM 10- 752 (Air Land Sea
Application Center, Langley Air Force Base, Va.: July 1996). Revising
Doctrine and

Procedures to Better Address Hazardous Submunition Dudfields

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 58 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Army and Marine Corps systems as causes of UXO: the Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS), the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the cannon
artillery- fired dual- purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM). The
manuals warn that, based on the types of ammunition available for these
weapons in 1996, *every MLRS and ATACMS fire mission and over half of the
fire missions executed by cannon artillery produce UXO hazard areas.* With
a 95- percent submunition reliability rate, a typical fire mission of 36
MLRS rockets could produce an average of 1,368 unexploded submunitions.
Air Force and Navy cluster bomb units (CBUs) contain submunitions that
produce UXO hazard areas similar to MLRS, ATACMS, and cannon artillery-
fired DPICM submunitions.

In its post- Gulf War manuals, DOD*s guidance includes *recommended

methodologies for use by the services for planning, reporting, and
tracking to enhance operations in an UXO contaminated environment.* Of
primary concern to DOD is the prevention of fratricide and the retention
of freedom of maneuver. DOD*s manuals state that U. S or allied casualties
produced by friendly unexploded submunitions may be classified as
fratricide. In planning wartime operations, the guidance suggests that
commanders be aware of hazardous areas and assess the risk to their
operations if their troops must transit these areas. Such planning is
necessary for any type of mission, regardless of the unit. Without careful
planning, according to the manuals, commanders* ability to maintain the
required operational tempo could be difficult. Planners should allocate
additional time for the operation if a deliberate breach or a bypass of a
UXO hazard area is required. When encountering locations where unexploded
submunitions have been or may be encountered, commanders should
immediately report these areas. According to the manuals,

*Immediate reporting is essential. UXO hazard areas are lethal and unable
to distinguish between friend and foe.* After reporting hazardous areas,
commanders should carefully coordinate with other units to prevent the UXO
from restricting or impeding maneuver space while at the same time
decreasing fratricide. Such areas should be accurately tracked and marked.

When describing the need for improved procedures, DOD*s UXO manuals state,
*Currently no system exists to accurately track unexploded submunitions to
facilitate surface movement and maneuver.* DOD now highlights staff
responsibilities for joint force planning, reporting, tracking, and
disseminating UXO hazard area information and tactics, techniques, and
procedures for units transiting or operating within a UXO hazard area. For
example, the joint force engineer is responsible for maintaining the
consolidated mine field records and historical files of UXOs, minefields,

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 59 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

and other obstacles. The manuals conclude that *Properly integrated, these
procedures will save lives and reduce the impact of UXO on operations.*
Some of the suggested procedures are as follows:

 Coordination between component commanders and the joint force commander
may be required before the use of submunitions by any delivery means.

 Units should bypass UXO hazard areas if possible. When bypassing is not
feasible, units must try to neutralize the submunitions and scatterable
mines.

 Combat units that have the assets to conduct an in- stride breach can do
so. Extraction procedures resemble in- stride breach or clearing
procedures.

 Dismounted forces face the greatest danger of death or injury from UXO.
Unexploded ordnance is a significant obstacle to dismounted forces.
Dismounted forces require detailed knowledge of the types and locations of
submunitions employed.

 The chance of significant damage to armored, light armored vehicles, and
other wheeled armored vehicles is relatively low. Personnel being
transported by unarmored wheeled vehicles face nearly the same risk to UXO
as dismounted forces. The protection afforded by unarmored wheeled
vehicles is negligible.

 Air assault and aviation forces are also at risk from UXO. Aircraft in
defilade, flying nap- of- the- earth or in ground effect (hovering) are
vulnerable to submunitions. Certain submunitions are sensitive enough to
function as a result of rotor wash.

DOD has issued manuals that alert U. S. forces to the threat of UXO and
identify procedures to mitigate risks. For example, Field Manual 20- 32
states that *Mine awareness should actually be entitled mine/ UXO
awareness. If only mines are emphasized, ordnance (bomblets, submunitions)
may be overlooked, and it has equal if not greater killing potential.*
Despite this recognition, DOD officials have not indicated to us that they
plan to require commanders to report and track all potential hazardous
nonland- mine submunition dudfields and to mark them when appropriate, as
is now required for scatterable submunition minefields. Because it was
beyond the scope of this report, we did not assess DOD*s post- Gulf War
implementation of doctrinal and procedural measures to minimize UXO-
caused fratricide, maneuver limitations, and other effects.

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 60 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

In 1994, the Army formed an Unexploded Ordnance Committee after the
commanding general of the Army*s Training and Doctrine Command expressed
concern about the large number of submunition duds remaining on the
battlefield after the Gulf War. The commanding general sent a message to
the Army*s leadership that stated, *This is a force protection issue.
Based on number of submunitions employed during ODS [Operation Desert
Storm], dud rate of only two percent would leave about 170K- plus
unexploded Army submunitions restricting ground forces maneuver. Add in
other services* submunitions and scope of problem mushrooms*. Need to
reduce hazards for soldiers on future battlefields from own ordnance.* As
one of the Army*s efforts to reduce the dud rates of these submunitions,
the commander stated that all future requirements documents for
submunitions should state that the hazardous dud rate should be less than
1 percent.

The committee*s work also resulted in calculations of the cost of
retrofitting or replacing the Army*s submunition stockpile to lower
hazardous dud rates and the relative costs of cleaning UXO from a
battlefield. The Army estimated in 1994 that the cost would be about $29
billion to increase submunition reliability by retrofitting or replacing
submunitions to add self- destruct fuzing for the nearly 1 billion
submunitions in the Army stockpile. In a different estimate in 1996, the
Army estimated the cost to retrofit the stockpile to be $11- 12 billion.
The Army also estimated lesser costs to retrofit or procure submunitions
with self- destruct fuzing for only those munitions most likely to be
used, including those in unit basic ammunition loads and pre- positioned
ships. These Army cost estimates to equip Army submunitions with self-
destruct fuzing do not indicate that they include costs to similarly equip
Air Force, Marine, and Navy submunitions. Using actual CMS, Inc., costs to
clean up UXO from the CMS sector of the Kuwaiti Gulf War battlefield, the
Army also estimated that the cost to reduce the dud rate by adding self-
destruct fuzes for the submunitions actually used on a battlefield was
comparable to the cost to clean up duds left by unimproved submunitions.
The Army further recognized that, while the costs of reducing and cleaning
up duds may be similar, the detrimental battlefield fratricide and
countermobility effects of duds also need to be considered, as well as
humanitarian concerns. 10

10 U. S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Unexploded Ordnance
(UXO) Study,

Technical Report No. TR- 654 (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Apr. 1996).
Increasing

Ammunition Reliability and Reducing Dud Rates

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 61 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

In 1995, DOD reported that its long- term solution to reduce UXO *is the
ongoing efforts to incorporate self- destruct mechanisms in the DoD*s high
density munitions which would limit further proliferation of unexploded
ordnance on the battlefield.* DOD called the UXO detection and clearance
problem *of enormous magnitude.* 11

DOD has reported that it is taking actions to increase land mine and
submunition reliability rates and reduce dud rates. In a 2000 report to
Congress, 12 DOD summarized its overall approach to addressing UXO
concerns. DOD stated in that report, *An analysis of the UXO problem
concluded that UXO concerns are viable and, using existing weapons, the
potential exists for millions of UXO.* The report further stated that the
majority of battlefield UXO will result from submunitions that *are not
equipped with self- destruct features, [and thus] pose the greatest
potential for UXO hazards.*

Importantly, DOD*s approach to ammunition reliability improvement is to
emphasize adding reliability to future procurements rather than fixing the
existing stockpile. According to DOD*s 2000 report to Congress, *The

Department does not plan to retrofit or accelerate the demilitarization of
its current inventory of weapons containing submunitions that pose UXO
hazards. Notwithstanding, the Department will monitor the Service
submunition development programs to make sure that every effort is taken
to develop a mechanism within the submunition that will increase its
overall reliability, thus reducing the potential for UXO.* The report went
on to state that DOD will also monitor future procurement programs to
ensure that reprocured weapons that contain submunitions were improved to
increase their overall reliability.

In addition to DOD actions aimed at controlling the UXO problem, there are
a number of procurement- related efforts in place by the services to
reduce and/ or eliminate potential UXO from new purchases of ammunition.
For example, in its 2000 report to Congress, DOD states, *The

Army is in the process of producing new weapons that contain selfdestruct
mechanisms. In addition, the Army is considering developing

11 U. S. General Accounting Office, Unexploded Ordnance: A Coordinated
Approach to Detection and Clearance Is Needed (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 197, Sept.
20, 1995). 12 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition,
Technology & Logistics)/ Strategic & Tactical Systems/ Office of
Munitions, Report to Congress, Unexploded Ordnance Report

(Washington, D. C.: Feb. 29, 2000).

Appendix IV: DOD- Reported Actions That Relate to Land Mine and UXO
Concerns

Page 62 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

requirements for new weapons systems aimed at controlling unexploded
submunitions.* The report also states that Air Force and Navy munitions
procurements likewise address reliability concerns. DOD has concluded in
this report that *[ w] hile it has been deemed infeasible to attempt to
retrofit legacy weapons systems with self- destruct features, new and
future submunition- based weapon systems for the Services have or will
incorporate self- destruct features to contain the UXO problem.*

In January 2001, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum 13 directing
the services to adhere to DOD policy on submunition reliability. This
memorandum states, *Submunition weapons employment in Southwest Asia and
Kosovo, and major theater war modeling, have revealed a significant
unexploded ordnance (UXO) concern . . . . It is the policy of the DoD to
reduce overall UXO through a process of improvement in submunition system
reliability* the desire is to field future submunitions with a 99% or
higher functioning rate.* The memorandum did accept lower functioning
rates under operational conditions due to environmental factors such as
terrain and weather. The memorandum allows the continued use of current
lower reliability munitions until superseded by replacement systems.
Because it was beyond the scope of this report, we did not assess DOD*s
actions to increase ammunition reliability and reduce dud rates.

13 See Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, *DOD Policy on Submunition Reliability* (Washington,
D. C.: Jan. 10, 2001).

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology Page 63 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War

At least in part because the Gulf War took place over a decade ago, DOD
reported that many records on the U. S. use of land mines and U. S.
casualties had been destroyed, were lost, were incomplete, conflicted with
each other, or were archived and not easily accessed. Resulting
inconsistencies and gaps in data provided to us by the services and DOD on
U. S. Gulf War land mine use, casualties, and lessons learned required
that we perform extensive cross- checking and comparisons to check facts
and identify associated themes. To create a picture of what happened
during the Gulf War, DOD assisted us in obtaining available records and
documents from various DOD sources in many different locations. We relied
heavily on original service casualty reports as well as service and DOD
after- action and lessons- learned reports written soon after the Gulf
War. Based on our request, the Army conducted a reevaluation of original
Gulf War casualty data and arrived at more exact data on causes and
circumstances of Army- reported casualties. Our resulting compilation of
service data used in calculating U. S. usage of land mines, U. S.
casualties, and lessons learned during the Gulf War is the most complete
assembled to date for the topics in this report. DOD officials believe
that the serviceprovided information on land mine usage and casualties
shown in this report is as accurate as service records permit. DOD, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the services confirmed the accuracy of the
information they provided us on casualties and land- mine use and the
information included in DOD lessons- learned and after- action reports.

To obtain information on land mine issues, we reviewed numerous reports
and analyses of land mines by such organizations as the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics); the
Center for Army Analysis; the National Academy of Sciences; Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory; the Army Training and Doctrine Command; and
the Congressional Research Service.

No one DOD or service office maintained complete records on the Gulf War,
and existing DOD and service records were stored in various locations
around the country. For example, the Headquarters of the U. S. Central
Command, which had directed the war, retained no records of the war, and
the services had no central repositories for the Gulf War documentation we
sought. We therefore visited the following locations to obtain all
available detailed descriptions of land mine systems, the doctrine
governing their use, documents and records on Gulf War land mine usage and
effectiveness, and historical records on the Gulf War: Appendix V: Scope
and Methodology

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology Page 64 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War

 Office of the Project Manager for Mines, Countermine and Demolitions,
and Close Combat Systems, U. S. Army Program Executive Office for
Ammunition, Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey;

 U. S. Army Communications- Electronics Command, Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors Directorate, Fort Belvoir, Virginia;

 Headquarters, U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

 U. S. Army Engineer Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri;

 U. S. Army Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma;

 Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division, Indian Head,
Maryland;

 Marine Corps History and Museums, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.;

 Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Capability Assessment Branch,
Quantico, Virginia;

 Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, Washington, D. C.; and

 Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D. C. To determine the extent to
which land mines and unexploded ordnance caused U. S. casualties, we
gathered data from the services and consulted original casualty reports.
Because DOD data was not sufficiently detailed to allow identification of
land mine or related casualties, we used the services* more detailed data.
In collaboration with service officials, we reconciled inconsistencies in
order to identify the most authoritative data available for casualties. We
visited or received information on Gulf War casualties from the following
locations:

 Army Records Management Declassification Agency, Springfield, Virginia;

 Army Safety Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama;

 U. S. Marine Corps Casualty Section, Quantico, Virginia;

 Army Casualty Office, Washington, D. C.;

 U. S. Air Force Personnel Center, Casualty Branch, Randolph Air Force
Base, San Antonio, Texas;

 U. S. Navy Casualty Division, Millington, Tennessee; and

 Office of the Secretary of Defense*s Directorate for Information
Operations and Reports, Arlington, Virginia.

Lessons learned- and after- action reports and documents on the Gulf War
were similarly not available in a central location but rather were located
in various service organizations and libraries. Therefore, to identify
concerns expressed in these reports about the use of land mines and
related unexploded ordnance issues, we visited and examined documents at
the following locations:

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology Page 65 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War

 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas;

 Army Training and Doctrine Command*s Analysis Center, Ft. Leavenworth,
Kansas;

 U. S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Maryland;

 U. S. Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.;

 U. S. Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama;

 Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas;

 U. S. Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D. C.; and

 Marine Corps Combat Development Center, Quantico, Virginia. To identify
U. S. policy on the U. S. use of land mines during the Gulf War, we
interviewed or obtained documentation from DOD and service officials in
Washington, D. C. These included officials from the Office of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics); Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict); the
Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans,
Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate; Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, Army Headquarters; and service headquarters officials
of the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. To obtain detailed information
on the U. S. policy concerning the use of land mines during the Gulf War,
we interviewed the U. S. commander- in- chief of all forces participating
in the Gulf War.

To obtain details on what ordnance was found on the battlefield after the
Gulf War, we interviewed in person or by telephone seven former employees
or officials of Conventional Munitions Systems (CMS), Inc. These persons
were all retired U. S. military service members, ranking from major
general to sergeant first class, and all but one had extensive experience
in ordnance and explosive ordnance disposal. We confirmed with each CMS
interviewee that they believed that the CMS data reported to the Army were
accurate. We did not examine the evidence CMS used to prepare its report
contracted by the Army.

To discuss U. S. policy and legal issues related to land mines, we
interviewed officials from the Department of State*s Office of the Legal
Adviser, Office of International Security Negotiations, and Office of
Humanitarian Demining Programs. In addition, we discussed the major topics
and themes in this report with an official from the State Department*s
Bureau of Political- Military Affairs.

Appendix V: Scope and Methodology Page 66 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land
Mines in the Persian Gulf War

We conducted our review between June 2001 and September 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 67 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.

Now on p. 16. Now on p. 11.

Now on p. 3.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 68 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

See comment 3. Now on pp. 31- 33.

See comment 2. See comment 1.

Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 69 GAO- 02- 1003 U. S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War

The following are GAO*s comments on the Department of Defense*s (DOD)
letter dated September 12, 2002.

1. We have deleted from the report the example of Gator land mine use
against an aircraft on an airfield.

2. We have changed the report to clarify the fact that Scud transporters
were targeted rather than the Scud missiles they carried.

3. In conducting our review, we consulted these and other reports, as we
state in our objectives and scope and methodology sections. We cite the
National Research Council*s report in appendix IV. However, because it was
beyond the scope of our report to evaluate land mine policy and program
alternatives, which is the general subject of these reports, we do not
discuss them in detail. GAO Comments

(350068)

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