Flood Insurance: Information on the Financial Condition of the	 
National Flood Insurance Program (19-JUL-01, GAO-01-992T).	 
								 
The National Flood Insurance Program, along with low-interest	 
loans provided by the Small Business Administration and 	 
individual and family grants provided by the Federal Emergency	 
Management Agency (FEMA), is a major component of the federal	 
government's efforts to provide flood-related disaster		 
assistance. Floods have been, and continue to be, the most	 
destructive natural hazard in terms of economic loss to the	 
nation, according to FEMA. From fiscal years 1969 through 2000,  
the program paid about $10 billion in insurance claims, primarily
from premiums collected from program policyholders. This	 
testimony discusses (1) the financial results of the program's	 
operations since fiscal year 1993, (2) the actuarial soundness of
the program, and (3) the impact of repetitive losses and FEMA's  
strategies for reducing those losses.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-992T					        
    ACCNO:   A01420						        
  TITLE:     Flood Insurance: Information on the Financial Condition  
             of the National Flood Insurance Program                          
     DATE:   07/19/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Disaster relief aid				 
	     Financial analysis 				 
	     Flood insurance					 
	     Insurance premiums 				 
	     Property losses					 
	     FEMA National Flood Insurance Program		 

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GAO-01-992T
     
Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Committee on
Financial Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. Thursday July 19, 2001
FLOOD INSURANCE

Information on the Financial Condition of the National Flood Insurance
Program

Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO- 01- 992T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: We are here today to
discuss the financial condition of the National Flood Insurance Program
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency?s (FEMA) Federal
Insurance and Mitigation Administration (Administration). The program, along
with low- interest loans provided by the Small Business Administration and
individual and family grants provided by FEMA, is a major component of the
federal government?s efforts to provide flood- related disaster assistance.
Floods have been, and continue to be, the most destructive natural hazard in
terms of economic loss to the nation, according to FEMA. From fiscal years
1969 through 2000, the program paid about $10 billion in insurance claims,
primarily from premiums collected from program policyholders. The recent
floods in the Midwest, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia have again
demonstrated the destructive nature of this hazard to the nation.

Prior to the flood insurance program?s inception in 1968, flood insurance
was generally not available from private insurance companies. The National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (P. L. 90- 448) established the program to
identify flood- prone areas, make flood insurance available to property
owners living in communities that joined the program, encourage floodplain
management efforts to mitigate flood hazards, and reduce federal
expenditures for disaster assistance. As you know Madam Chairwoman, we last
provided testimony to this Subcommittee on this issue on October 27, 1999. 1

Our statement today will provide information on (1) the financial results of
the program?s operations since fiscal year 1993, (2) the actuarial soundness
of the program, and (3) the impact of repetitive losses (multiple loss
properties) and FEMA?s strategies for reducing those losses.

The following summarizes our work:  While the magnitude of flood damage
varies considerably from year to

year, the program has operated ?in the black? during the last 2 fiscal years
following a period of sustained losses to the program from severe flooding.
In March 1994, we reported that, while sufficient to cover flood losses
experienced at that time, overall income from the program?s

1 Flood Insurance: Information on Financial Aspects of the National Flood
Insurance Program (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 23, Oct. 27, 1999).

Page 2 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

premiums was not sufficient to build reserves to meet future expected flood
losses. 2 Therefore, we concluded that it was inevitable that losses from
claims and the program?s expenses would exceed the funds available to the
program in some years. During the 8- year period from fiscal years 1993
through 2000, the program experienced losses from floods that were greater
than the premiums collected from policyholders. Cumulative operating losses
to the program (program income less program costs) totaled about $843
million during this 8- year period. During the first 6 years of that period,
cumulative operating losses totaled about $1.56 billion and required FEMA to
borrow from the U. S. Treasury to help finance these losses. During fiscal
years 1999 and 2000, however, program revenues exceeded program costs by
about $720 million, enabling the Administration to repay the funds it had
borrowed from the U. S. Treasury to finance the program?s earlier losses.

 The program is not actuarially sound because it does not collect
sufficient premium income to build reserves to meet the long- term future
expected flood losses. 3 The program, by design, is not actuarially sound
because the Congress authorized subsidized insurance rates to be made
available for policies covering certain structures to encourage communities
to join the program. Because about 30 percent of the policies were
subsidized as of 2000, overall premium income is not sufficient to build
reserves to meet future expected flood losses. The Administration?s annual
target for the program?s overall premium income is at least the amount of
losses and expenses in an average historical loss year, which approximates
the average annual losses experienced under the program since 1978. Since no
catastrophic loss years have occurred since 1978, 4 collecting premiums that
are based on an average historical loss year does not enable the program to
build sufficient reserves to cover a possible catastrophic loss year in the
future. Because the program does not collect sufficient premium income to
build reserves to meet the long- term future expected flood losses,
including catastrophic losses, it is inevitable that losses from claims and
the program?s expenses will exceed the funds available to the program in
some years and, cumulatively, over time.

2 See Flood Insurance: Financial Resources May Not Be Sufficient to Meet
Future Expected Losses (GAO/ RCED- 94- 80, Mar. 21, 1994). 3 For the program
to be actuarially sound, overall revenues from insurance premiums would need
to be sufficient to cover expected losses from claims and the program?s
expenses. 4 Administration officials told us that a catastrophic year is
defined as a year resulting in $5.5 billion to $6 billion in claims losses,
which has a 1 in 1,000 chance of occurring.

Page 3 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

 Repetitive loss properties have a major disproportionate impact on the
National Flood Insurance Program, according to FEMA. The cost of multiple-
loss properties (two or more losses greater than $1,000 each on the same
property within a 10- year period) to the program is large- about 38 percent
of all claims paid historically, currently about $200 million annually. In a
recent report on the Government Performance and Results Act, we identified
improving the financial condition of the flood insurance program as a major
management challenge and reported on FEMA?s strategy for addressing this
challenge, including reducing losses from multiple loss properties. 5 In its
fiscal year 2002 Performance Plan and budget proposal, FEMA, among other
things, has under way or is planning actions aimed at (1) identifying a
target group of properties suffering multiple losses and transferring them
to a special servicing facility for better oversight and coordination of
insurance and mitigation actions; (2) developing a proposal to reduce the
subsidy provided to older repetitive loss properties; (3) terminating flood
insurance coverage for the worst offending repetitive loss properties; and
(4) eliminating subsidies for vacation homes, rental properties, and other
nonprimary properties that experience repetitive losses.

Before I discuss these issues in greater detail, let me briefly explain the
National Flood Insurance Program and other federal disaster assistance
related to this program.

About 19,600 communities have joined the flood insurance program. Under the
program, flood insurance rate maps (FIRM) were prepared to identify special
flood hazard areas. In order for a community to join the program, any
structures built within a special flood hazard area after the FIRM was
completed were required to be built according to the program?s building
standards that are aimed at minimizing flood losses. Special flood hazard
areas, also known as the 100- year floodplains, are areas subject to a 1-
percent or greater chance of experiencing flooding in a given year. A key
component of the program?s building standards, that must be followed by
communities participating in the program, is a requirement that the lowest
floor of the structure be elevated to or above the base flood level- the
elevation at which there is a 1- percent chance of flooding in a given year.

5 Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO- 01- 832, July 9, 2001). The
National Flood

Insurance Program and Other FloodRelated Assistance

Page 4 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

To encourage communities to join the program, thereby promoting floodplain
management and the widespread purchasing of flood insurance, the Congress
authorized FEMA to make subsidized flood insurance rates available to owners
of structures built before a community?s FIRM was prepared. These pre- FIRM
structures are generally more flood- prone than later built structures
because they were not built according to the program?s building standards.
Owners of post- FIRM structures pay actuarial rates for national flood
insurance. The average annual premium for a subsidized policy is currently
$610, and the average annual premium for an actuarial policy is currently
$310. The higher average premium for a subsidized policy reflects the
significantly greater risk of flood- prone preFIRM properties. The $610
average annual premium for a subsidized policy represents about 38 percent
of the true risk premium for these properties.

From 1968 until the adoption of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973,
the purchase of flood insurance was voluntary. The 1973 act required the
mandatory purchase of flood insurance to cover structures in special flood
hazard areas of communities participating in the program if (1) any federal
loans or grants were used to acquire or build the structures and (2) the
loans were secured by improved properties and were made by lending
institutions regulated by the federal government. The owners of properties
with no mortgages or properties with mortgages held by unregulated lenders
were not, and still are not, required to buy flood insurance, even if the
properties are in special flood hazard areas.

The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 reinforces the objective of
using insurance as the preferred mechanism for disaster assistance by (1)
expanding the role of federal agency lenders and regulators to enforce the
mandatory flood insurance purchase requirements and (2) prohibiting further
flood disaster assistance for any property where flood insurance is not
maintained, even though flood insurance was mandated as a condition for
receiving disaster assistance. Regarding the prohibition on further flood
disaster assistance, the act requires borrowers who have received certain
disaster assistance and then failed to obtain flood coverage to be barred
from receiving future disaster aid.

Other forms of flood disaster assistance include low- interest loans from
the Small Business Administration to flood victims who are creditworthy. In
addition, a flood victim who cannot obtain a Small Business Administration
loan may apply for an individual and family FEMA grant of up to $14,400 or
the amount of the loss, whichever is less.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

Annual operating losses or net revenues from the National Flood Insurance
Program?s operations have varied significantly from year to year. While
revenues exceeded program costs in some years, cumulative program costs
exceeded income by about $843 million during the period October 1, 1992,
through September 30, 2000. As seen in Figure 1, during the 8- year period
from fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the program incurred operating losses
in 5 of these years and experienced net income in the 3 remaining years.

Figure 1: Net Financial Status of the National Flood Insurance Program
(Annual Income Minus Costs)

Source: National Flood Insurance Program Operating Results by Fiscal Year

During fiscal years 1993 through 1998, the first 6 years of the 8- year
period, the flood insurance program generally experienced operating losses.
6 This occurred because losses from flood claims were greater than premium
income collected from the program?s policyholders. The program?s annual

6 Program income primarily consists of premium revenues paid by
policyholders, but also includes investments, fees, and other revenues.
Program costs primarily consist of claims and related expenses, but also
include, among other things, operating and interest costs. Severe Flooding
Has

Sometimes Resulted in Sustained Losses to the Program

270 -536

132 588

-602 -576 -117 -0.6

-800 -600

-400 -200

0 200

400 600

800 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Fiscal year Net dollars in millions

Page 6 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

losses during this period ranged from about $600, 000 in fiscal year 1998 to
$602 million in fiscal year 1993. Cumulative operating losses experienced by
the program totaled about $1.56 billion during the 6- year period. To help
finance these losses, the Administration borrowed from the U. S. Treasury
during the 6- year period. 7 According to FEMA, as of August 31, 1999, the
debt owed by the program to the U. S. Treasury totaled $541 million. 8

Since fiscal year 1995, losses experienced by the program annually have
gradually declined, and in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 program revenues
exceeded program costs by a total of about $720 million. As a result, the
Administration was able to repay its debt owed the U. S. Treasury, and, as
of June 30, 2001, the program owes no debt to the U. S. Treasury. 9

The financial improvement experienced by the program since fiscal year 1995
was primarily due to three reasons. First, claims and related expenses
declined. 10 Second, the number of policyholders covered by the program
increased about 31 percent from 3.3 million policies in force in fiscal year
1995 to 4.3 million policies in force by fiscal year 2000. Accordingly,
earned premium revenue on these policies increased during the period. Third,
according to Administration officials, the proportion of generally more
flood- prone pre- FIRM subsidized policies insured by the program has
declined, resulting in a less risky portfolio of policies in force. The
percentage of program policies that are subsidized has declined over time as
newer properties have joined the program and are charged actuarial rates.
While 41 percent of the 2.7 million policies in force in fiscal

7 The Congress authorized the Administration to borrow up to $1 billion from
the U. S. Treasury, if necessary, to pay claims losses. Legislation enacted
in 1996 provided a 1- year increase in borrowing authority to $1. 5 billion,
later extended through 2001. No appropriations have been made to the program
since fiscal year 1986.

8 According to an Administration official, debt owed by the Administration
to the U. S. Treasury is not equivalent to the program?s cumulative losses
because the amount of borrowing needed depends on (1) the relative timing of
payments on the program?s current obligations and expected monthly premium
receipts and (2) future insurance claims.

9 Administration officials noted that, beginning in fiscal year 1986, the
Congress required all program and administrative costs to be paid for by the
program without a commensurate rate increase. In 1991, the Congress
authorized the Administration to charge policyholders a federal policy fee
to pay for these costs. Administration officials estimate the current value
of the resulting loss of funds and investment income to be about $436
million, making the program more vulnerable to the need for exercising its
borrowing authority.

10 The magnitude of flood damage can vary considerably from year to year.

Page 7 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

year 1993 were subsidized, 30 percent of the 4.3 million policies in force
in fiscal year 2000 were subsidized, according to an Administration
official.

While the program incurred operating losses during the 8- year period, it
should be recognized that the value of the program in reducing federal
expenditures on disaster assistance should not be measured by net federal
expenditures alone. For example, the Administration estimated that the
program?s standards for new construction are now saving about $1 billion
annually in flood damage avoided. Also, from October 1, 1968, through
September 30, 2000, the program paid about $10 billion in insurance claims,
primarily from policyholder premiums that otherwise would, to some extent,
have increased taxpayer- funded disaster relief.

The program is not actuarially sound because about 30 percent of the 4.3
million policies in force are subsidized, according to an Administration
official. For a single- family pre- FIRM property, subsidized rates are
available for the first $35,000 of coverage, although any insurance coverage
above that amount must be purchased at actuarial rates. Administration
officials estimated that total premium income from subsidized policyholders
is currently about $500 million less than it would be if these rates had
been actuarially based and participation had remained the same.

Pre- FIRM structures that are within an identified 100- year floodplain and
are covered by subsidized policies are, on average, not as elevated as the
post- FIRM structures in comparison with the base flood level.
Administration officials told us that, on average, pre- FIRM structures not
built to the program?s standards are three and a half to four times more
likely to suffer a flood loss. When these structures suffer a loss, the
damage sustained is, on average, about 40 percent greater than the damage to
flooded post- FIRM structures. According to the Administration, when these
two factors are combined, pre- FIRM structures suffer, on average, about
five times more damage than post- FIRM structures.

As an alternative to actuarial soundness, the Administration developed a
financial goal for the program to collect sufficient revenues to at least
meet the expected losses and expenses of the average historical loss year,
as well as to cover all non- loss- related program expenses, such as the
program?s administration. However, the average historical loss year is based
only on the program?s experiences since 1978. Since then, no catastrophic
year ($ 5.5 billion to $6 billion in claims losses) has occurred, The
Program Is Not,

by Design, Actuarially Sound

Premium Income Is Not Sufficient to Build Reserves for Potential
Catastrophic Losses

Page 8 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

and many years in the 1980s were characterized by fairly low actual loss
levels as compared to the historical average losses experienced in other
years. Therefore, the historical average loss year involves fewer losses
from claims than the expected annual claims losses in future years. As a
result, collecting premiums to meet the historical average loss year does
not realize the collections necessary to build reserves for potential
catastrophic years in the future.

For the program to be actuarially sound, its rate- setting process would
have to consider the monetary risk exposure of the program or the dollar
value of expected flood losses over the long run. Since the magnitude of
flood damage varies considerably from year to year, income from premiums in
many years would exceed actual losses. This circumstance would enable the
program to build reserves toward a possible catastrophic year in the future.

As we reported in March 1994, increasing the premiums charged to subsidized
policyholders (thereby decreasing the subsidy) to improve the program?s
financial health could have an adverse impact on other federal disaster-
related relief costs. Increasing the rates of subsidized policyholders would
likely cause some policyholders to cancel their flood insurance, and, if
flooded in the future, these people might apply for Small Business
Administration loans or FEMA disaster assistance grants.

Because they were built before the program?s building standards became
applicable, pre- FIRM structures are generally not as elevated as post- FIRM
structures, and, if their owners were to be charged true actuarial rates,
these rates would be much higher than current subsidized rates. 11 For
example, if the subsidy on pre- FIRM structures were eliminated, insurance
rates on currently subsidized policies would need to rise, on average,
approximately a little more than twofold, according to an Administration
official. This increase would result in an annual average premium of about
$1,300 for these pre- FIRM structures. Significant rate increases for

11 Also, Administration officials told us that making all rates actuarially
based would not make the program actuarially sound. They noted that an
initial capitalization would be necessary to establish some reserves in the
event that a catastrophic year were to occur before sufficient reserves had
accumulated from income from premiums. Increasing Premiums for

Subsidized Policies or Expanding Participation in the Program Might Have
Adverse Financial Impacts

Page 9 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

subsidized policies, including charging actuarial rates, would likely cause
some pre- FIRM property owners to cancel their flood insurance. 12

If owners of pre- FIRM structures, which suffer the greatest flood loss,
canceled their insurance policies, the federal government would likely face
increased costs, as the result of future floods, in the form of lowinterest
loans from the Small Business Administration or grants from FEMA. The effect
on total federal disaster assistance costs of phasing out subsidized rates
would depend on the number of the program?s current policyholders who would
cancel their policies. Thus, it is difficult to estimate if the increased
costs of other federal disaster relief programs would be less than, or more
than, the cost of the program?s current subsidy.

On the other hand, expanding participation in the program by increasing the
rate of compliance with the mandatory purchase requirement, or by extending
the mandatory purchase requirement to property owners not now covered, will
likely increase the number of both subsidized and unsubsidized policies.
Although greater participation in the program is likely to reduce the cost
of FEMA grants and Small Business Administration loans, the resulting
increase in subsidized policyholders will put greater financial stress on
the flood insurance program, because the premiums received from subsidized
policyholders are not sufficient to meet the future estimated losses on
these policies.

Repetitive loss properties have a major disproportionate impact on the
National Flood Insurance Program, according to FEMA?s fiscal year 2000
performance report. About 38 percent of all program claims historically
(currently about $200 million annually) represent repetitive losses, even
though repetitive- loss structures make up a small percentage of all program
policies. About 45,000 buildings currently insured under the program have
been flooded on more than one occasion and have received flood insurance
claims payments of $1,000 or more for each loss. Over the years, the total
cost of these multiple- loss properties to the program has been about $3.8
billion.

12 The National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 expanded the mandatory
flood insurance purchase requirement on properties that are located in
special flood hazard areas and financed with any federal loan or grant or
loans made by lending institutions regulated by the federal government. FEMA
Has Developed

Strategies To Reduce The Impact of Repetitive Flood Losses

Page 10 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

A 1998 study by the National Wildlife Federation noted that repetitive loss
properties represent only 2 percent of all properties insured by the
program, but they tend to have damage claims that exceed the value of the
house and most are concentrated in special flood hazard areas. For example,
nearly one out of every ten repetitive loss homes has had cumulative flood
loss claims that exceeded the value of the house. Furthermore, over half of
all nationwide repetitive loss property insurance payments have been made in
Louisiana and Texas. About 15 states account for 90 percent of the total
payments made for repetitive loss properties.

We, as well as FEMA?s Office of Inspector General, have identified improving
the financial condition of the National Flood Insurance Program as one of
FEMA?s major management challenges. In our July report on FEMA?s performance
under the Government Performance and Results Act, we outlined FEMA?s
accomplishments and plans to reduce the losses it sustains from repetitive
loss properties. Among other things, FEMA has under way actions or plans
aimed at (1) identifying target repetitive loss properties and transferring
their servicing to a special servicing facility designed to better oversee
claims and coordinate and facilitate insurance and mitigation actions and
(2) developing and implementing proposals to reduce the subsidy provided to
pre- FIRM repetitive loss properties.

In fiscal year 2000, FEMA implemented a repetitive loss initiative to target
the 10,000 worst repetitive loss properties, those currently insured
properties that had four or more losses, or two to three losses where the
cumulative flood insurance claims payments exceeded the building?s value.
According to FEMA, the initiative is designed to eliminate or shortcircuit
the cycle of flooding and rebuilding for properties suffering multiple
losses due to flooding. The initiative includes identifying repetitive loss
properties and transferring their insurance policies to a central, special
servicing facility designed to better oversee claims. FEMA believes that
this special servicing will help coordinate insurance activities and
mitigation grant programs. FEMA reported that it had identified repetitive
loss properties and would make this information available to state and local
governments to help them target repetitive loss properties for mitigation
actions. FEMA also reported that it planned to mitigate 1,938 target
properties over the next 4 years.

In addition, in its fiscal year 2002 annual performance plan, FEMA outlined
several strategies to reduce the subsidy provided to repetitive loss
properties as well as several business improvement process actions to reduce
the program?s costs. FEMA stated it would use Flood Mitigation

Page 11 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

Assistance funds and Hazard Mitigation Grants Program funds in conjunction
with flood insurance program funds to acquire properties, relocate
residents, or otherwise mitigate future losses. FEMA also plans to provide
incentives to communities to reduce repetitive flood losses.

In its fiscal year 2002 budget proposal, FEMA requested to transfer $20
million in fees from the National Flood Insurance Program to increase the
number of buyouts of properties that suffer repetitive losses. This proposal
also includes a proposal for two major reforms to the flood insurance
program. FEMA proposes to terminate flood insurance coverage for the worst
offending repetitive loss properties. FEMA also proposes to eliminate
subsidized premiums for vacation homes, rental properties, and other
nonprimary properties that experienced repetitive losses. FEMA estimates
these two reforms will generate savings of about $12 million in fiscal year
2002 and additional funds in subsequent years.

- - - - In closing, Madam Chairwoman, the Administration is helping the
nation avoid the costs of flood damage through the premiums it collects
from, and the claim payments it makes to, program policyholders as well as
the building standards it has promoted for new construction that minimize
flood damage. However, at times, heavy flooding has produced annual flood
insurance losses that exceeded the premiums collected from policyholders. As
a result, the program has had to borrow funds from the U. S. Treasury to
cover its operating losses, which it subsequently repaid. Two major factors
underlie these financial difficulties- the program, by design, is not
actuarially sound and it experiences repetitive losses. These factors are
not easy to overcome because they have been an integral part of the program
since its inception, and they are related to the promotion of floodplain
management and widespread purchasing of flood insurance.

Madam Chairwoman, this completes our prepared statement. We would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee might
have.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Mr. Stanley
Czerwinski at (202) 512- 2834. Mark Abraham, Martha Chow, Kerry Hawranek,
Signora May, Lisa Moore, and Robert Procaccini made key contributions to
this testimony. Contact and

Acknowledgments

Page 12 GAO- 01- 992T National Flood Insurance Program

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and
Addressing Major Management Challenges (GAO- 01- 832, July 9, 2001).

Flood Insurance: Emerging Opportunity to Better Measure Certain Results of
the National Flood Insurance Program (GAO- 01- 736T, May 16, 2001).

Disaster Assistance: Issues Related to the Development of FEMA?s Insurance
Requirements (GAO/ GGD/ OGC- 00- 62, Feb. 25, 2000).

Flood Insurance: Information on Financial Aspects of the National Flood
Insurance Program (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 23, Oct. 27, 1999).

Flood Insurance: Information on Financial Aspects of the National Flood
Insurance Program (GAO/ T- RCED- 99- 280, Aug. 25, 1999).

Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Improve Cost- Effectiveness
Determinations for Mitigation Grants (GAO/ RCED- 99- 236, Aug. 4, 1999).

Disaster Assistance: FEMA Can Improve Its Cost- Effectiveness Determinations
for Mitigation Grants (GAO/ T- RCED- 99- 274, Aug. 4, 1999).

Disaster Assistance: Improvements Needed in Determining Eligibility for
Public Assistance (GAO/ RCED- 96- 113, May 23, 1996).

Flood Insurance: Financial Resources May Not Be Sufficient to Meet Future
Expected Losses (GAO/ RCED- 94- 80, Mar. 21, 1994). Related GAO Products

(541004)

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