Military Readiness: Preliminary Observations on the Army's	 
Manning Initiative (26-JUL-01, GAO-01-979R).			 
								 
Congress, the Department of Defense, and GAO have expressed	 
concerns about the readiness of U.S. forces to perform combat	 
missions. To ensure Army units' readiness to fulfill their	 
missions, the Army Chief of Staff created an initiative in	 
October 1999 to staff all active units at 100 percent with	 
personnel at authorized grades and skills over fiscal years	 
2000-2003. The initiative has had a positive impact on the Army's
combat divisions but has created some negative effects, at least 
in the short term, on many nondivisional units. On the positive  
side, some combat divisions that in the past were routinely	 
staffed at less than authorized levels are now staffed in the	 
aggregate at 100 percent. On the negative side, because of the	 
effort to staff the combat divisions and armored regiments at 100
percent, the staffing levels of some nondivisional units,	 
including early deploying combat support units, have decreased.  
According to Army officials, some management decisions have	 
affected and may continue to affect the Army's ability to achieve
the goals for the manning initiative. Whether the Army will fully
achieve and sustain its manning initiative goals will depend on  
its future management decisions on funding, recruiting, and	 
retention.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-979R					        
    ACCNO:   A01471						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Preliminary Observations on the      
             Army's Manning Initiative                                        
     DATE:   07/26/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Army personnel					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Personnel management				 
	     Human resources utilization			 
	     Army Manning Initiative				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-979R
     
Page 1 GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

July 26, 2001 The Honorable Robert Stump Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives

The Honorable John M. McHugh Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Subject: Military Readiness: Preliminary Observations on the Army?s Manning
Initiative In the recent past, Congress, the Department of Defense, and we
have expressed concerns about the readiness of U. S. forces to perform
combat missions. To ensure Army units? readiness to fulfill their missions,
the Army Chief of Staff created an initiative in October 1999 to staff all
active units at 100 percent with personnel at authorized grades and skills
over fiscal years 2000- 2003. In October 2000 you requested that we examine
a number of issues associated with the readiness of Army divisions,
including the manning initiative. After interim briefings with your staff,
you requested that we provide our initial observations on (1) the extent to
which the Army has achieved the manning initiative goals to date for
enlisted personnel, (2) the impact the initiative has had on Army units, and
(3) the effect of management decisions on the Army?s ability to achieve the
initiative?s goals. We will issue a report later this year on the other
readiness- related issues that you requested we review.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

As of May 2001, the Army had achieved its manning initiative goals for
enlisted personnel to varying degrees, as shown in table 1.

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 2 Table 1: Army?s Progress in Meeting
Manning Initiative Goals (as of May 2001)

Fiscal year Goal Progress

2000 Staff 10 combat divisions and 2 combat armored cavalry regiments at 100
percent of the number of enlisted personnel authorized in the aggregate a

Achieved goal 2001 (second quarter)

Staff 10 combat divisions and 2 combat armored cavalry regiments at 100
percent of authorized enlisted personnel by the skills and grades needed

Nearly achieved goal 2001 Staff nondivisional, b early deploying

combat support units at 100 percent of authorized enlisted personnel by
skill and grade levels

Made progress but will not fully achieve goal until the end of fiscal year
2002

a The term ?aggregate? refers to the total number of soldiers at any skill
or grade level. b For this report nondivisional units are all units other
than the 10 combat divisions and 2

combat armored cavalry regiments. The early deploying units include
aviation, engineering, military police, chemical decontamination, and
transportation units that would deploy within the first 30 to 35 days to
support the combat units during a major theater war.

Source: GAO analysis of Army Chief of Staff manning initiative. The
initiative has had a positive impact on the Army?s combat divisions but has
created some negative effects, at least in the short term, on many
nondivisional units. On the positive side, some combat divisions that in the
past were routinely staffed at less than authorized levels are now staffed
in the aggregate at 100 percent. Also, division commanders said that
training has improved and that with more soldiers in their occupational
specialties, the units perform their missions more effectively. Readiness
reports submitted by the divisions from October 1998 to June 2001 confirm
that the initiative has improved ?personnel readiness?; that is, the units
have the required number of soldiers at grade and skill levels to accomplish
their mission. On the negative side, because of the effort to staff the
combat divisions and armored regiments at 100 percent, the staffing levels
of some nondivisional units, including early deploying combat support units,
decreased; Army officials said that over 40 percent of these units have
reported lower states of readiness since the beginning of the initiative.

According to Army officials, some management decisions have affected and may
continue to affect the Army?s ability to achieve the goals for the manning
initiative. First, the Army has chosen to budget for less than its
authorized number of soldiers. Second, in some cases, the Army has allowed
new recruits or soldiers who reenlist to move into occupational specialties
other than those it needed to fill. Finally, the Army has allowed the number
of soldiers unavailable for assignment to units, such as those who are in
training, between assignments, or awaiting discharge, to increase to levels
higher than in the past. According to Army officials, whether the Army will
fully achieve and sustain its manning initiative goals will depend on its
future management decisions on funding, recruiting, and retention.

BACKGROUND

The manning initiative, which the Army Chief of Staff created on October 12,
1999, includes a plan to ensure that all Army units have 100 percent of
their authorized staff, by grade and

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 3 skill levels, 1 by fiscal year 2003
and that those staffing levels are maintained. The manning

initiative has three elements: (1) distributing soldiers by the grades and
skills needed to staff the force, (2) recruiting soldiers to sustain the
force, and (3) ensuring that the force structure matches congressionally
authorized staff levels. Only the distribution element has measurable goals
(see table 2). The intent of the initiative is to ensure that at all units
have the personnel necessary to perform their assigned missions and to
address staffing imbalances that had developed in past years. Such
imbalances developed partly because priority for staffing was given to those
divisions that would be called upon first to deploy to a major theater war,
and divisions that were to deploy later 2 in a war were staffed at less than
authorized levels.

Table 2: Implementation Schedule for the Army Chief of Staff?s Manning
Initiative Goals

Fiscal year Goal Units

2000 100 percent authorized enlisted personnel in the aggregate

10 active divisions 2 armored cavalry regiments

2001 (second quarter)

100 percent authorized enlisted personnel by skill and grade level

10 active divisions 2 armored cavalry regiment

2001 100 percent authorized enlisted personnel by skill and grade level

Nondivisional combat support units- early deploying units

2002 100 percent authorized enlisted personnel by skill and grade level

Nondivisional combat support units- all remaining units

2003 100 percent authorized enlisted personnel by skill and grade level

Institutional units, including support activities such as training, doctrine
development, base operations, supply, and maintenance units

Source: U. S. Army. The Chief of Staff provided additional parameters for
the initiative. For example, to ensure that adequate readiness is
maintained, units are not to have less than 70 percent of their authorized
staff. He also described recruiting as his number one task and emphasized
the importance of retention.

1 Skill is related to a soldier?s occupational specialty such as
infantryman. Skills are grouped by grade levels as follows: skill level 1,
E1- E4 (lowest graded enlisted personnel); skill level 2, E5- E6 (mid- level
noncommissioned officers); and skill level 3, E7- E9 (senior noncommissioned
officers). 2 For purposes of this report, the later deploying combat
divisions are the 1 st Armored, 1 st Infantry, 4 th

Infantry, 10 th Infantry, and 25 th Infantry divisions. Later deploying
combat divisions are those divisions expected to deploy in the event of a
second simultaneous or nearly simultaneous major theater war or as
reinforcements for a theater war that is larger than expected.

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 4

ARMY HAS ACHIEVED MANNING INITIATIVE GOALS TO VARYING DEGREES

In fiscal year 2000, the Army achieved the manning initiative goal for
enlisted personnel 3 as planned. That is, since May 2000, the reported
aggregate staff levels for the 10 active divisions and 2 armored cavalry
regiments have been at or nearly 100 percent and were at 100 percent as of
June 2001. The Army anticipates that it will be able to maintain 100 percent
enlisted staffing for these units. Figure 1 shows the staffing levels for
these units since December 1999 through June 2001.

Figure 1: Aggregate Enlisted Staffing Levels for Army Divisions and Armored
Cavalry Regiments (Dec. 1999 - June 2001)

Source: U. S. Army. For its fiscal year 2001 goals, the Army nearly achieved
one goal and made progress on the other (see figs. 2 and 3). The Army almost
staffed the 10 Army divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments by grade and
skill level. Specifically, the Army achieved 93 percent of its required
staffing, by grade and skill levels, in its divisions and armored regiments.
Army officials projected that they could maintain that level of staffing
until the end of fiscal year 2001 but also said that a 94- percent match
might be the best the Army could achieve because positions such as cooks and
fuel handlers have traditionally been difficult to fill at certain grade and
skill levels. According to Army officials, changes in requirements for
certain occupations, such as those requiring a higher level of technical
skill, prevent the Army from attaining 100 percent of its goals by grade and
skill levels.

For the second fiscal year 2001 goal, the Army will not staff all of its
nondivisional, early deploying combat support units in the aggregate or by
grade and skill levels at 100 percent.

3 The Army dropped a goal initially established for officers shortly after
the initiative was implemented. According to Army officials, the Army
dropped officers from the initiative because it considered the shortages of
officers not as critical as shortages of enlisted personnel and because the
Army measures personnel readiness primarily in terms of its enlisted force.
The Army plans to address officer shortages through other means.

95 95 97

98 99

100 100 99 99

100 92 93

94 95

96 97

98 99

100 Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. Ma JuneJuly Aug. Sept.

Fiscal Year 2000 Percent

100 100 100 99

100 100 100 100 100 Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June

Fiscal Year 2001

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 5 According to Army officials, these
units could not be staffed as intended by the initiative

because doing so would reduce staffing for the remaining combat support and
institutional units and create readiness problems. Thus, the Army plans to
staff 238 of its 386 early deploying units at 100 percent of their
authorized staff by the end of fiscal year 2001 and staff the remaining 148
units in fiscal year 2002. As of May 2001, the Army had achieved 96 percent
of its staffing goal for the 238 units in the aggregate; it also achieved 88
percent of its goal to staff these units by skill and grade levels. The Army
staffed the remaining 148 early deploying units at 97 percent in the
aggregate and 83 percent by skill and grade levels. According to Army
officials, by the end of fiscal year 2002, these units are expected to be
filled at 100 percent. Figure 2 shows the percentage of staffing in the
aggregate and by grade and skill level for nondivisional, early deploying
combat support units for fiscal years 2001 and 2002.

Figure 2: Staffing Levels for Nondivisional, Early Deploying Combat Support
Units for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002 Goals

Note: October 01 are the Army?s projected figures. Source: U. S. Army.

IMPACT OF INITIATIVE ON UNITS HAS BEEN BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

The impact of the manning initiative has been positive for divisions, but
staff levels in nondivisional units were initially reduced. In 1998, we
testified that five divisions had about 93 percent of their authorized
staff, a number of shortages of personnel in the grade and skills required,
and unfilled squads. 4 As of June 2001, however, these units are staffed at
100 percent in the aggregate and have fewer shortages by grade and skill
levels. According to reported data and interviews with Army commanders,
personnel readiness, that is, having the

4 Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying
Army Divisions

(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 126, Mar. 20, 1998).

92 85

96 88

100 93 96

84 97

83 91

84 0 20

40 60

80 100

Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Aggregate

Grade and Skill Level Fiscal Year 2001 Goal

(238 Units) Fiscal Year 2001 Goal (148 Units) Percent

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 6 required mix of soldiers at grade
and skill levels to accomplish their mission, had improved

for these units as a result of the manning initiative. Also, division
commanders believe the initiative has improved their ability to train and
has placed more soldiers in their occupational specialties, allowing the
units to perform their missions more effectively.

As stated earlier, nondivisional combat support units are currently manned
at less than their authorized levels, and according to Army officials over
40 percent of these units have reported lower states of readiness since the
beginning of the initiative. As previously discussed, Army officials decided
to staff some nondivisional, early deploying combat support units in fiscal
year 2001. The goals for the remaining nondivisional combat support units
and institutional units will not be in effect until fiscal years 2002 and
2003. As of May 2001, these units were staffed at 97 percent in the
aggregate and 86 percent by grade and skill levels, and the institutional
units were staffed at 97 percent in the aggregate and 82 percent by grade
and skill levels (see fig. 3). The Army projected that enlisted staffing in
the aggregate and grade and skill levels would decrease from the May 2001
level by October 2001.

Figure 3: Enlisted Staffing Levels for Remaining Nondivisional Units in
Fiscal Year 2001 Note: October 01 are the Army?s projected figures. Source:
U. S. Army.

MANAGEMENT DECISIONS HAVE EFFECTED ARMY?S ABILITY TO ACHIEVE INITIATIVE
GOALS

According to Army officials, some decisions have affected and may continue
to affect the Army?s ability to achieve the goals of the manning initiative.
For example:

Since the late 1990s the Army has chosen not to budget for its authorized
number of soldiers and used the funds to meet other needs. In fiscal year
2001, for instance, the Army budgeted for only 477, 600 soldiers, even
though Congress authorized 480,000 soldiers. The Army has moved funds from
the military personnel account because it

92 85

97 86 91

84 100

81 97

82 91

76 0 20

40 60

80 100

Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Aggregate

Grade and Skill Level Remaining Nondivisional Combat

Support Units Institutional Units Percent

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 7 could not fill its force to the
authorized level through recruitment and could use the

money elsewhere.

To fill its force to the authorized level, the Army has, in some cases,
allowed new recruits or soldiers who reenlist to move into occupational
specialties other than those that it needed to fill. While the Army may
maintain the aggregate level at 100 percent through this practice, it has
left units without the right mix of grades and skills.

The Army has allowed the number of soldiers that are unavailable for
assignment to units, which include new recruits, soldiers attending training
at Army schools, soldiers between assignments, and soldiers awaiting
discharge, to increase to levels higher than in the past. Although the Army
has estimated since the late 1990s that it would have only 63, 000 soldiers
in this category, the number has consistently averaged about 67,000. This
leaves about 4,000 fewer soldiers available for assignment.

According to Army officials, whether the Army will fully achieve and sustain
its manning initiative goals will depend on its future management decisions
on funding, recruiting, and retention practices.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft copy of this report to officials with the Office of the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the Office of the Army
Deputy Chief of Staff (Personnel). We met with Army Personnel officials to
discuss the draft and they provided technical comments which were
incorporated where appropriate.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To assess the extent to which the Army has achieved the manning initiative
goals to date, the impact the initiative has had and will have on units, and
the affect of management decisions on the Army?s ability to achieve the
initiative?s goals, we interviewed Army officials from the Department of
Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Army Personnel Command,
the Army Forces Command, and U. S. Army Forces Europe; and commanders and
staff from the 1 st Armored Division, 1 st Infantry Division, 10 th Mountain
Division, 25 th Infantry Division, 4 th Infantry Division, and 1 st Cavalry
Division; commanders and staff from the 13 th Corps Support Group and the
937 th Engineer Support Group. We also obtained and examined relevant Army
manning initiative policy documents and goals and compared them to the
Army?s reported implementation of the manning initiative. Additionally, we
reviewed reported Army readiness data to identify any changes in readiness
trends since the manning initiative began.

We conducted our review between April and July 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. We are continuing our
review of the readiness of the Army?s later deploying units. This report
represents the preliminary results of our work related only to the manning
initiative.

- - - We

are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees,
the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. We will send copies to other interested parties upon
request.

GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness Page 8 Please contact me on (757) 552- 8111
if you or your staff have any questions about this report.

Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in enclosure I.
Neal P. Curtin, Director Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosure

Enclosure I Page 9 GAO- 01- 979R Military Readiness

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts

William Solis (202) 512- 8365 Claudia Dickey (202) 512- 6399

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above, Donna Rogers, Nancy Ragsdale, Nadine Furr,
Melissa McDowell, Connie Sawyer, Lauren Johnson and James Lewis made key
contributions to this report.

(350101)
*** End of document. ***