Multifamily Housing: Issues Related to Mark-to-Market Program
Reauthorization (19-JUN-01, GAO-01-871T).
This testimony discusses the Mark-to-Market Program, which
provides for low-income rental housing while reducing the federal
government's costs for rental subsidies. The program, which is
administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development's
(HUD) Office of Multifamily Housing Restructuring (OMHAR),
provides the framework to restructure insured Section 8
properties in HUD's multifamily housing portfolio by lowering
their rents to market levels when their current Section 8
contracts expire and reducing their mortgage debt if such action
is necessary for the properties to continue to have a positive
cash flow. Without restructuring, rents for many of the
approximately 8,500 properties in HUD's portfolio would
substantially exceed market levels, resulting in higher federal
subsidies under the Section 8 program. Legislative authorization
for the Mark-to-Market program and OMHAR is scheduled to
terminate on September 30, 2001. If authorization is not
extended, after that date HUD will still be required to renew
Section 8 contract rents at market levels, but the tools
established by the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and
Affordability Act for restructuring mortgages will no longer be
available. This testimony focuses on (1) the status of the
Mark-to-Market program, (2) factors that have affected the pace
of program implementation and the actions HUD has taken to
address these factors, and (3) the advantages and disadvantages
of extending the program past its statutory termination date and
of transferring program responsibilities to HUD or keeping them
with OMHAR.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-871T
ACCNO: A01211
TITLE: Multifamily Housing: Issues Related to Mark-to-Market
Program Reauthorization
DATE: 06/19/2001
SUBJECT: Cost control
Federal aid for housing
Housing programs
Low income housing
Mortgage programs
Rent subsidies
Rental housing
Rental rates
HUD Multifamily Housing Loan Program
HUD Section 8 Housing Assistance Program
HUD Mark to Market Program
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO Testimony. **
** **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced. Tables are included, but **
** may not resemble those in the printed version. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-871T
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING
Issues Related to Markto- Market Program Reauthorization Statement of Peter
Guerrero Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation,
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U. S. Senate
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. Tuesday, June 19, 2001
GAO- 01- 871T
1 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss the preliminary results of our
analysis of various issues relating to the reauthorization of the ?mark- to-
market? program established by the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and
Affordability Act of 1997. We expect to report our final results in early
July 2001. Our work is being carried out in accordance with the provisions
of section 521 of the act, which required us to review the Office of
Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring?s (OMHAR?s) administration of
the mark- to- market program.
As you know, the mark- to- market program is aimed at preserving the
affordability of low- income rental housing while reducing costs to the
federal government of rental assistance subsidies provided to low- income
households. More specifically, the program provides the framework to
restructure insured Section 8 properties in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development?s (HUD?s) multifamily housing portfolio by lowering their
rents to market levels when their current Section 8 contracts expire and
reducing their mortgage debt if such action is necessary for the properties
to continue to have a positive cash flow. Without restructuring, rents for
many of the approximately 8,500 properties in HUD?s portfolio substantially
exceed market levels, resulting in higher federal subsidies under the
Section 8 program.
As provided for in the act, OMHAR has contracted with public and nonpublic
entities (referred to as participating administrative entities or PAEs) to
carry out the mark- tomarket restructurings on behalf of the federal
government. The participating administrative entities are responsible for
developing restructuring plans for the properties assigned to them and
submitting the plans to OMHAR for review and approval. The entities perform
two types of restructurings. The first type of restructuring, referred to as
a full mortgage restructuring, involves resetting a property?s rents to
market levels and reducing its mortgage debt by the amount needed to permit
the property to achieve a positive cash flow. The second type of
restructuring, referred to as a rent restructuring, involves reducing the
property?s rent to market levels, but not reducing its mortgage debt. This
type of restructuring generally occurs when the
2 property is physically and financially sound enough to continue operation
at market- level
rents with its existing mortgage. Legislative authorization for the mark-
to- market program and OMHAR is scheduled to terminate on September 30,
2001. If authorization is not extended, after that date HUD will still be
required to renew Section 8 contract rents at market levels, but the tools
established by the act for restructuring mortgages will no longer be
available. OMHAR?s authority would also terminate and any outstanding mark-
to- market responsibilities will be transferred to HUD?s Secretary.
Our statement today will focus on three of the issues that we are addressing
in our current engagement: (1) the status of the mark- to- market program;
(2) factors that have affected the pace of program implementation and the
actions OMHAR has taken to address these factors; and (3) the advantages and
disadvantages of extending the program past its statutory termination date
and of transferring program responsibilities to HUD or keeping them with
OMHAR. It also presents matters for the Congress? consideration in debating
the reauthorization of the mark- to- market program and OMHAR.
In carrying out the assignment, we analyzed data on the mark- to- market
program?s status and interviewed representatives from a variety of program
stakeholders, including 10 public and 5 nonpublic participating
administrative entities. We also convened an expert panel composed of 10
program stakeholders representing OMHAR, HUD, participating administrative
entities, lending institutions, tenant associations, Section 8 property
owners, and non- profit organizations to discuss the issues that we agreed
to address. (See app. I).
In summary:
As of May 2001, approximately 1,500 properties had entered OMHAR?s mark-
tomarket program. About 60 percent of these properties are expected to
receive full mortgage restructurings and the other 40 percent are expected
to receive rent restructurings only. OMHAR has completed the restructuring
process for 12 percent
3 of the properties requiring a full mortgage restructuring and 84 percent
of the
properties requiring only rent reductions. OMHAR estimates that the federal
government will realize about $499 million in savings over a 20- year period
from the restructurings that it has completed thus far. However, for some
properties that do not successfully complete the restructuring process, the
requirement to reduce rents to market has decreased the properties? cash
flows, thus increasing the likelihood that the properties will develop
physical and financial problems.
Various factors have affected the pace at which the program has been
implemented. It took almost 2 years to establish the program?s
infrastructure and for OMHAR to begin assigning a large volume of properties
to the entities that would carry out restructuring actions. Other factors
may have slowed the restructuring process as well, including OMHAR?s process
for reviewing and approving restructuring transactions, the detailed
requirements contained in the program?s operating procedures guide, and the
unwillingness of many Section 8 property owners to participate in the
program. However, OMHAR has taken actions to address these factors, and many
program stakeholders believe that the pace of the program has improved.
Furthermore, while the program has proceeded more slowly than OMHAR
originally estimated, many program stakeholders we contacted believe that
OMHAR?s progress in implementing the program has been reasonable given the
program?s complexity and the number of tasks that needed to be accomplished.
Extending the mark- to- market program past its scheduled termination date
would be more advantageous to the federal government than ending the
program. If rents must be marked down to market levels without provisions
for mortgage restructuring, many Section 8 properties with above- market
rents are more likely to default on their mortgages, resulting in large
claims against the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance fund. All
of the program stakeholders who participated on our panel support the
continuation of the program beyond September 30, 2001. Furthermore, we agree
with the view expressed by most program stakeholders that administration of
the mark- to- market program should continue to reside in an office
dedicated to the program?s implementation and that the office should have
the resources and
4 expertise needed to administer the program and to oversee restructuring
transactions.
OMHAR Estimates that Completed Restructurings Will Generate $499 Million in
Savings But Risks to Some Properties Have Increased As of May 15, 2001,
OMHAR had assigned over 1,400 of the 1,500 properties entering the
mark- to- market program to the participating administrative entities for
restructuring. As shown in figure 1, about 60 percent of these properties
are to receive full mortgage restructurings, and the remaining 40 percent
are to receive rent restructurings only.
Figure 1: Number and Percentage of Properties Requiring Full Mortgage
Restructurings Compared to Properties Requiring Rent Restructurings
Source: GAO analysis of OMHAR?s database
To date, OMHAR has completed substantially more rent restructurings than
full mortgage restructurings. As of May 2001, OMHAR had completed 486 rent
restructurings or 84 percent of all properties in this category. 1 (See fig.
2.)
1 OMHAR considers the participating administrative entity?s ?plan approval
date? as the completion of the rent restructuring process while the
?closing? date marks the completion for full debt restructurings.
P ro p e rties requiring fu ll m ortgage restructurings P roperties
requiring rent re stru ctu rings 849
(60 p ercent) 566
(40 p ercent)
5
Figure 2: Status of Rent Restructurings in the Mark- to- Market Pipeline as
of May 15, 2001
Source: GAO analysis of OMHAR?s database
As shown in figure 3, as of May 2001, OMHAR had completed 107 full mortgage
restructurings or 12 percent of all assigned and working properties of this
type.
Figure 3: Status of Full Mortgage Restructurings in the Mark- to- Market
Pipeline as of May 15, 2001
Source: GAO analysis of OMHAR?s database
849 461
391 107 0 100
200 300
400 500
600 700
800 900
Restructurings accepted by participating administrative entities
Restructuring plans submitted to OMHAR
Restucturing plans approved by OMHAR
Closed full debt restructurings
Number of Section 8 properties
566 507 486 0 100
200 300
400 500
600 700
800 900
Restructurings accepted by participating administrative entities
Restructuring plans submitted to OMHAR
Completed rent restructurings
Number of Section 8 properties
6 OMHAR estimates that restructurings completed as of May 15, 2001, will
generate
approximately $499 million in savings (net present value) over the next 20
years. Of this total, rent restructurings account for $365 million in
savings and full mortgage restructurings account for the remaining $134
million. 2 (See fig. 4). These savings result primarily from reductions in
the government?s Section 8 rental assistance payments after property rents
have been lowered to market levels. The savings estimate takes into account
costs that the government has incurred as a result of mortgage write- downs,
but it does not include OMHAR?s or participating administrative entities?
administrative costs, which have totaled $53.9 million as of May 2001.
Figure 4: Estimated Mark- to- Market Program Savings by Type of Completed
Restructuring Over 20 years (Net Present Value)
Source: GAO analysis of OMHAR?s database
While the mark- to- market program has resulted in Section 8 savings, the
requirement that rents be reduced to market levels has increased the risk of
physical and financial problems for some properties. For example, the
completed rent restructurings include transactions for 76 properties that
did not meet OMHAR?s underwriting criteria to be
2 The savings calculations for rent restructurings exclude 74 properties
(out of the 486 completed rent restructurings) that did not result in
Section 8 savings. The savings calculations for mortgage restructurings
include savings resulting from the 107 restructurings that OMHAR has closed
and 56 restructurings for which OMHAR reduced property rents but did not
complete a mortgage restructuring.
R ent restructurings Full m ortgage restructurings $365 m illion $134
m illion T otal estim ated
savings of $499 m illion
7 processed as rent restructurings. In other words, these properties
received a rent
restructuring even though OMHAR?s analysis showed that the properties?
income may not be sufficient to cover mortgage payments, operating expenses,
and ongoing repair needs after the properties? rents were reduced to market.
OMHAR said many of these properties should have been processed as full
mortgage restructurings, but the Office lacked the legal authority to compel
property owners to accept such restructurings. Because of the potential for
problems to occur at these properties that could affect the properties?
physical and financial condition, in August 2000, HUD?s Office of Housing
issued guidance establishing additional requirements for its field offices
to follow in monitoring these properties. In addition, for 56 properties
that OMHAR has processed as full mortgage restructurings, OMHAR reduced the
properties? rents to market without completing the restructuring of the
properties' mortgages. OMHAR believes that many of these restructurings are
unlikely to be completed. While these properties also have an increased risk
of problems related to their physical and financial condition that could
affect their future viability and also affect the properties? residents, we
found that they were not specifically covered by HUD?s monitoring guidance.
However, HUD has recently agreed to revise the guidance so that it will
include these properties.
Factors Cited as Slowing Mark- to- Market Implementation and OMHAR?s Actions
to Address Them
Establishing OMHAR and implementing the mark- to- market program has been a
lengthy process. For example, after the passage of the act creating OMHAR
and the program in October 1997, it took a year for the Director of OMHAR to
be appointed. Soliciting, selecting and negotiating contracts with the
participating administrative entity was not completed until January 1999 and
OMHAR did not begin to assign a large volume of properties to the
participating administrative entities for restructuring until July 1999.
Other implementation tasks completed during that time included preparing the
program?s operating procedures guide, issuing regulations, and developing an
Internetbased tracking system to monitor mark- to- market activities. While
these tasks were completed behind OMHAR?s original schedule, OMHAR said the
delays were due to the normal challenges associated with starting a new
organization. Appendix II presents a timeline showing when key mark- to-
market implementation tasks were completed.
8 Some program stakeholders believe that other factors have also slowed the
implementation of the program. These include:
Requirements contained in the program?s operating procedures guide, which
some stakeholders believed were too extensive;
OMHAR?s review of restructuring plans, which some participating
administrative entities regarded as excessive and often not resulting in
improvements to the restructuring plans;
Some Section 8 property owners? unwillingness to cooperate in the
restructuring process; and
Some participating administrative entities not submitting timely and high
quality restructuring plans to OMHAR for approval.
In an effort to increase the program?s production, OMHAR has taken action to
address the factors cited as slowing the program?s implementation. These
actions include:
Streamlining the policies and procedures found in the operating procedures
guide to simplify the process;
Conducting a seminar with the OMHAR staff who review the restructuring plans
submitted by the participating administrative entities to emphasize OMHAR?s
commitment to production, discuss review requirements, and solicit input on
simplifying the process;
Introducing an incentives package to make participation in the program more
attractive for owners; and
Organizing special teams to assist participating administrative entities in
the completion of restructuring transactions.
9 OMHAR and others believed the program has gained momentum and that the
pace for
completing restructurings has improved. Many stakeholders, including over
half of the participating administrative entities we contacted, believed
that the time required to complete the restructurings has decreased.
Furthermore, while implementation of the program has taken considerable
time, program stakeholders noted that the program was more complex than
originally anticipated, involved a considerable number of stakeholders, and
provided few incentives to encourage owner participation. Many stakeholders
we contacted believed OMHAR? s overall progress in implementing the mark-
to- market program has been reasonable.
Expiration of Program Authority and Potential Implications
The statutory authority to restructure properties? mortgages under the
program expires on September 30, 2001. After that time, when their current
Section 8 contracts expire, Section 8 properties with above- market rents
that have not entered into a binding commitment with OMHAR will have their
rents reduced to comparable market levels without the mortgage restructuring
tools available in the program. As shown in figure 5, HUD estimates that
over 1,300 Section 8 properties with above- market rents will expire after
the scheduled termination of the program.
Figure 5: Estimated Number of Section 8 Properties with Above- Market Rents
Expiring Beyond Fiscal Year 2001
Source: HUD?s Office of Housing
0 100
200 300
400 500
600 700
800 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 and
beyond
Number of Section 8 properties
Estimated number of properties with above- market rents totals 1,359
401 570
214 73 101
10 If mark- to- market program authority is not extended, owners will be
placing themselves
and HUD at risk of financial losses if their property?s reduced rents are
insufficient to pay for debt service, reserves, and operating costs. Owners
of properties who are unable to operate efficiently at market rents may be
forced to decrease expenditures for maintenance and other operating costs in
order to remain current with mortgage payments, thereby placing tenants at
risk of residing in substandard housing. In addition, the FHA insurance fund
is likely to be adversely affected if property owners that are unable to
meet their financial obligations eventually fail because proper
restructuring tools were not available.
Our work has found that consensus exists among the program stakeholders we
contacted that the mark- to- market program should be extended. For example,
all expert panelists agreed that allowing the program to expire would
increase the likelihood of Section 8 property defaults and large claims
against the FHA insurance fund. Panelists had different recommendations on
the length of program extension ranging from 3 years to an indefinite
extension. For example, one said that if there is a legal requirement to
reduce the rents to market, there should always be a corresponding authority
to restructure the debt. Several panelists also emphasized that a decision
on extending program authority is needed as soon as possible.
Loss of Dedicated Office to Administer the Program Could Affect Program
Momentum and Reduce Expertise
OMHAR?s legislative authority to administer the program also expires on
September 30, 2001. After that, OMHAR?s authority and responsibilities are
transferred to HUD?s Secretary. A preliminary transition plan, provided to
the Congress in December 2000, sets out three options for the transfer of
OMHAR?s responsibilities to HUD:
HUD could maintain an organization resembling the current structure at
OMHAR;
HUD could create an organization resembling a reduced OMHAR in HUD?s Office
of Multifamily Housing; and
HUD could merge restructuring responsibilities into HUD?s 18 Multifamily
Hubs.
11 Our work has found that significant concern exists among many program
stakeholders
regarding the transfer of program responsibilities to HUD?s Office of
Multifamily Housing. For example, 9 out of 10 expert panel members and 8 of
out 15 participating administrative entities indicated that OMHAR should be
allowed to continue administering the program. These parties cited a number
of problems that could arise if the program were transferred to HUD?s Office
of Multifamily Housing and, particularly, if the responsibility were
assigned to HUD?s Multifamily Hubs. 3
Transferring responsibilities to another location in HUD without dedicated
staff to administer the program could disrupt momentum. In addition, loss of
expertise could occur if OMHAR staff are not retained. According to OMHAR,
57 percent of the 89 staff currently employed with OMHAR have limited terms
and do not have reemployment rights with HUD. OMHAR said most of the staff
with limited terms (about 75 percent) are those with production experience.
According to OMHAR?s Director, if OMHAR is not extended it would be
necessary for HUD to obtain approval from the Office of Personnel Management
to extend their terms. Furthermore, the act allows OMHAR staff to receive
higher pay than comparable HUD employees. Accordingly, OMHAR believes that
unless the provisions allowing higher pay are extended, a substantial number
of the remaining staff may choose to leave. There was also concern that even
if OMHAR staff transferred to HUD?s Office of Housing, unless they were
assigned to a specific office focused on the mark- to- market program, they
could be dispersed to work on other HUD multifamily programs.
There was also concern that HUD?s Office of Multifamily Housing may lack the
capacity to effectively administer the program if OMHAR staff are not
retained and responsibility for the program is shifted to HUD Multifamily
field offices. A survey that we conducted of HUD field office managers in
September and October 2000 supports this view. The survey found that 71
percent of the HUD field office managers believed that their offices do not
have sufficient staff to carry out existing programs and activities. This
lack of capacity could, in our view, affect HUD?s ability to ensure that the
program is being
3 HUD?s 18 Multifamily Hubs and their associated 33 program centers comprise
HUD?s field offices. The field offices report to HUD?s Office of Multifamily
Housing.
12 carried out in accordance with legislative requirements and that the
federal government?s
interests are adequately protected. However, some program stakeholders
favored the transition of program responsibilities to HUD?s Office of
Multifamily Housing. For example, one expert panelist and 7 out of 15
participating administrative entities believed that OMHAR?s authority of the
program should be allowed to expire. Reasons cited by the one panelist and
the participating administrative entities for transferring program
responsibilities included the following: (1) integration of the program into
HUD?s Office of Multifamily Housing could improve program efficiency with
the streamlining of the mark- to- market decision- making process and
execution of policies since one office would be administering all aspects of
Section 8 properties entering the program; (2) integration of the program
into HUD?s Office of Multifamily Housing could improve communication and
coordination between the participating administrative entities and HUD; and
(3) OMHAR?s oversight has been too prescriptive and heavy- handed and HUD
field offices would be better suited to provide program oversight since the
HUD field staff are more knowledgeable about the local rental markets and
are more familiar with the Section 8 properties located in their
jurisdictions.
Conclusions
If the legislative authority to restructure mortgages under the mark- to-
market program is allowed to expire on September 30, 2001, HUD estimates it
will have to reduce the rents to market levels of well over 1,000 properties
without having the tools needed to mitigate the potential effects of such
reductions. If the reduced rents do not provide sufficient revenues for the
properties to cover their operating expenses, mortgage payments, and repair
needs, owners may be forced to reduce expenditures for maintenance or other
operating expenses or may default on their mortgages. Such actions could
result in deteriorating property conditions and substantial claims against
the FHA insurance fund, which, in turn, could adversely affect property
residents and lead to a decrease in the supply of affordable housing.
Extension of the program would permit Section 8 property owners with above-
market rents and unexpired Section 8 contracts to benefit from the
restructuring tools that are currently available and help offset many of the
effects that are likely to occur if the program is not continued.
13 Transferring authority for the mark- to- market program to HUD's Office
of Housing could
potentially help facilitate the handling of some mark- to- market related
functions that have required coordination between OMHAR and the Office of
Housing. However, there are concerns that such a transfer is also likely to
result in the loss of a substantial number of OMHAR staff unless the terms
of existing staff are extended and staff are allowed to continue receiving
higher salaries than other HUD staff. A substantial reduction in the number
of OMHAR employees assigned to the mark- to- market program could result in
additional delays in program implementation and substantially diminish
institutional knowledge of program requirements. Furthermore, concerns about
the adequacy of staffing in HUD's field offices raise questions about
whether HUD would be able to provide comparable program oversight of the
mark- to- market program without straining its field office staffs? ability
to carry out existing responsibilities.
While the mark- to- market program has brought about successful
restructurings resulting in Section 8 savings at a number of properties, at
other properties the requirement that rents be reduced to market has
increased the risk of physical and financial problems. Those at risk include
properties that have not received mortgage restructurings but for which
market rents may not provide sufficient income to cover existing mortgage
payments, operating expenses, and ongoing repair needs. HUD recognized that
these properties may become troubled, and the Office of Housing developed
guidance for its field offices to use in monitoring potentially troubled
mark- to- market properties. However, the guidance did not explicitly cover
all properties that may be at risk. HUD has acknowledged that the guidance
should be more inclusive and has agreed to revise it. We plan to review
HUD?s monitoring of these properties as part of our future work at HUD.
Matters for Congressional Consideration
To permit continued restructuring of Section 8 properties with above- market
rents, the Congress should extend Subtitle A of the Multifamily Assisted
Housing Reform and Affordability Act beyond September 30, 2001. To ensure
that restructurings are completed expeditiously and in accordance with
legislative and regulatory requirements, and that the federal government?s
interests are protected, the Congress should also
14 extend legislative requirements placing the mark- to- market program
under a separate
office headed by a director who is responsible for administering the
program. Regardless of whether program responsibility continues within OMHAR
or is transferred to a separate office elsewhere in HUD, the office should
have a sufficient number of trained staff dedicated to program
administration.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that
you or other members of the Committee might have.
15 Appendix I: Panel Participants
Michael Bodaken, President, National Housing Trust Scott Chamberlain,
Assistant Vice President, GMAC Commercial Mortgage Shaun Donovan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Multifamily Housing Programs U. S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Office of Multifamily Housing Programs
Isha Francis, President, Benchmark Management Corporation Michael Kane,
Executive Director, National Alliance of HUD Tenants Denise Muha, Executive
Director, National Leased Housing Association Ira Peppercorn, Director,
Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring Garth Rieman,
Director for Program Development, National Council of State Housing Agencies
Cathy Vann, President, Ontra, Incorporated Chuck Wehrwein, Vice President of
Acquisitions, Mercy Housing
16 Appendix II: Timeline of Mark- to- Market
Implementation
Source: GAO analysis of HUD data
(545003)
OMHAR issuedan updatedversion of the program?soperatingprocedures guide.
OMHARissued anupdatedversionof the
program?s operating procedures guide. OMHAR established an incentive package
for
owners to encourage participation in the program. OMHAR established an
incentive package for
owners to encourage participation in the program.
OMHAR began to assign a large volume of properties to the participating
administrative entities for restructuring. OMHAR began to assign a large
volume of
properties to the participating administrative entities for restructuring.
OMHAR issued the first version of the program?s operating procedures guide.
OMHAR issued the first version of the
program?s operating procedures guide. OMHAR announced the selection of
public
participating administrative entities (nonpublic entities were selected in
May 1999). OMHAR announced the selection of public
participating administrative entities (nonpublic entities were selected in
May 1999).
OMHAR? s Dir ect or was appoi nt ed. OMHAR? s Dir ect or was appoi nt ed.
HUD publ ished int er im mar k- to- mar ket pr ogr am
regulations (whichbecameeffectiveOctober 13, 1998). HUD publ ished int er im
mar k- to- mar ket pr ogr am
regulations (whichbecameeffectiveOctober 13, 1998).
HUD publ ished a Request for Qual i f icat ions to solicit third parties
(referred to as participating administrative entities) to restructure the
mortgages and rental assistance payments of el igible multif amilypr
operties onHUD?s behalf. HUD publ ished a Request for Qual if i cat ions to
solicit third parties (referred to as participating administrative entities)
to restructure the mortgages and rental assistance payments of el igible
multif amilypr operties onHUD?s behalf. Congress enacted P.L 105-65,
establishing
OMHAR and the mark-to-market program. Congress enacted P.L 105-65,
establishing
OMHAR and the mark-to-market program. Oct 97 Aug98 Sept 98 Oct 98 Jan99
April 99 July 99 Dec99 Mar 00 June00 Sept 00 Jan01
The first rent restructuring was completed. The first rent restructuring was
completed. OMHAR issued final program regulations. OMHAR issued final
program regulations.
The first full mortgage restructuring was completed. The first full mortgage
restructuring was
completed.
Orders by Internet
For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an e-
mail message with ?info? in the body to
info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at http:// www.
gao. gov
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm E- mail: fraudnet@
gao. gov Automated answering system: 1- 800- 424- 5454
*** End of document. ***