Military Readiness: Management of Naval Aviation Training	 
Munitions Can Be Improved (27-JUL-01, GAO-01-840).		 
								 
Over the last several years senior Navy officials have testified 
before Congress about the effects of shortages in training	 
resource on the readiness of aviation units. This report examines
one of these resources--ordnance for air-to-ground training--to  
assess the potential for enhancing Navy and Marine Corps tactical
aviation unit readiness by improving training ordnance		 
management. The availability of Navy and Marine training ordnance
depends on an accurate requirements determination process, a	 
procurement program that supports identified needs, and an	 
allocation process that puts the right amount of ordnance where  
it is needed for training. The Navy program has problems with all
three of these elements. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps	 
provides request data that reflects the training needs identified
in its training instruction. Although both services have linked  
their ordnance requirements to readiness in their training	 
instructions, neither services' request indicates that its	 
instruction serves as the basis for identifying its needs. There 
are many factors that impact each service's ability to fully	 
execute its training plans. However, GAO believes each service	 
has the knowledge and ability to develop more accurate and	 
justifiable training ordnance requirements. Training ordnance	 
shortages limit the amount of training and exercises aircrews can
carry out and reportedly affect their proficiency in certain	 
tasks. The shortages also extend the period of time where units  
are at lower readiness levels and force them to make a		 
last-minute "rush" to achieve readiness just before deployment.  
This increases the risk that units may not be sufficiently	 
prepared if they suddenly are needed for an unexpected		 
deployment.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-840 					        
    ACCNO:   A01489						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Management of Naval Aviation Training
             Munitions Can Be Improved                                        
     DATE:   07/27/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Combat readiness					 
	     Marine Corps training				 
	     Military aviation					 
	     Naval training					 
	     Munitions						 
	     F-14 Aircraft					 
	     F/A-18 Aircraft					 
	     Maverick Missile					 
	     AGM-65 Missile					 
	     Hornet Aircraft					 

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GAO-01-840
     
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and
Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 MILITARY READINESS

Management of Naval Aviation Training Munitions Can Be Improved

GAO- 01- 840

Page i GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness Letter 1

Results in Brief 1 Background 2 Units Do Not Have Enough of Key Types of
Ordnance Needed to

Conduct Required Training and Exercises 6 Causes of Training Ordnance
Shortages 10 Shortages Lower Aircrew Proficiency and Squadron Readiness 15
Conclusions 17 Recommendations for Executive Action 18 Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 20

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense 22

Appendix III Training Ordnance Received by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units 25

Appendix IV Training Ordnance Requested by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units 27

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment 29

Figures

Figure 1. F/ A- 18 Ordnance 5 Figure 2: Percent of Required Training
Ordnance Received by Navy

Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 7 Figure 3: Percent of
Required Training Ordnance Received by

Marine Tactical Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 9 Contents

Page 1 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

July 27, 2001 The Honorable James Inhofe Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

Over the past several years senior Navy officials have testified before
Congress about the effects of shortages in training resource on the
readiness of aviation units. At your request, we examined one of these
resources-- ordnance 1 for air- to- ground training- to assess the potential
for enhancing Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation 2 unit readiness by
improving training ordnance management. This report analyzes (1) shortages
in air- to- ground training ordnance required to meet training readiness
requirements, (2) factors that account for the shortages, and (3) the effect
of shortages on training and tactical aviation readiness. The scope and
methodology of our work are described in appendix I.

Navy and Marine tactical aviation units do not have enough of some key types
of ordnance to meet their stated training and exercise requirements. Navy
units are experiencing shortages in several types of advanced training
ordnance, including inert laser guided training rounds and guided bombs.
Marine units are experiencing extensive shortages of both advanced training
ordnance and common ordnance, such as live bombs.

Factors that contribute to the Navy and Marine Corps? training ordnance
shortages include a poor process for determining annual ordnance needs, the
low funding priority the Navy has assigned to ordnance, and an allocation
process that does not put the ordnance where it is needed for training. More
specifically

 Many Navy and Marine ordnance requests submitted between fiscal year 1998
and 2001- particularly requests for inert laser- guided training

1 The term ordnance, as used in this report, refers to the ammunition and
expendable items used by tactical aviation units in air- to- ground
operations, such as live bombs, inert bombs, cartridges, flares, and chaff
(fibers spread by aircraft and used as decoys for enemy radar).

2 Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation squadrons are those that fly the
F/ A- 18 Hornet, the F- 14 Tomcat, or the AV- 8 Harrier.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Results in Brief

Page 2 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

rounds and guided bombs-- were well below training requirements. This occurs
because Navy ordnance managers are not provided sufficient guidance to
determine training ordnance requirements, including ordnance for Navy
exercises.

 Training ordnance shortages also result from the low funding priority the
Navy gives ordnance, which has resulted in Navy- wide inventory shortages of
live ordnance and inert training ordnance. For some types of live ordnance,
Navy stockpiles are currently at about 40 to 65 percent of the Navy?s
requirement.

 The Navy?s training ordnance allocation process does not make the most
efficient and effective use of available training ordnance. For example,
Marine units normally maintain a higher year- round readiness than
comparable Navy units and, thus, have higher training ordnance requirements.
However, the Marine Corps is not allocated any additional ordnance to
reflect this higher requirement. Additionally, we identified instances where
the Atlantic Naval Air Forces received more ordnance than they needed to
meet their training needs while the Pacific Naval Air Forces received less
than they needed of the same ordnance to meet their training needs. These
disparate allocations occur because fleet ordnance requests are not
validated against training requirements at the Department of Navy level.

Training ordnance shortages limit the amount of training and exercises
aircrews can carry out and reportedly affect their proficiency in certain
tasks. The shortages also extend the period of time where units are at lower
readiness levels and force them to make a last- minute ?rush? to achieve
readiness just before deployment. This increases the risk that units may not
be sufficiently prepared if they suddenly are needed for an unexpected
deployment.

We are making recommendations to help improve the Navy?s process for
determining training requirements and its ordnance procurement and
allocation process. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense agreed with most of our recommendations, but disagreed
that the fleets need guidance and training for determining training ordnance
requirements. As discussed in our evaluation of the Department?s comments on
page 19, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit.

In 1997, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued Instruction 3000. 4, which
sets forth policies, roles and responsibilities, time frames and Background

Page 3 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

procedures to guide the services as they develop their ordnance
requirements. This instruction is titled the Capabilities- Based Munitions
Requirements Process and is the responsibility of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The process is designed
to ensure that the military departments establish ordnance requirements
necessary to address the operational objectives of the commanders in chief
of the combat commands and include those requirements in the planning,
programming, and budgeting process. The Navy process that implements the
Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements Process is the Non- Nuclear
Ordnance Requirements determination process. This process, which includes
the Marine Corps? aviation ordnance requirements, identifies the Navy?s war
reserve ordnance requirements and training, testing, and current operations
requirements. These two requirements, along with the Navy?s ordnance
maintenance requirement, constitute the Navy?s total munitions requirement.
The calculation of the total munitions requirement is not constrained by
anticipated funding limitations. This requirement is input into the Navy?s
planning, programming, and budgeting process as the Navy?s procurement
objective.

The training, testing, and current operations block of the Non- Nuclear
Ordnance Requirements process determines the ordnance requirements for
training. Each year, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments requests training, testing,
and current operations data from 14 major claimants. Input for tactical
aviation training principally comes from three of these claimants: the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Naval Strike and Air
Warfare Center. 3 Marine Force Pacific and Marine Force Atlantic aviation
training requirements are included in the data submitted by their respective
fleets. Even though the Navy refers to this as its training, testing, and
current operations requirement, calculation procedures do not incorporate a
Navy or Marine requirement for current operations.

Training ordnance includes a variety of live and practice non- guided
general purpose bombs, live and practice precision- guided ordnance,
cartridges, missiles, and other training expendable items managed by the
Navy as ordnance, such as chaff and flares. The most common general

3 The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon, NV, provides advanced
training for naval aviators whose missions are to attack enemy targets
ashore, suppress enemy air defenses, or engage enemy aircraft in air- to-
air combat. The Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron provides
comparable training to Marine aviators.

Page 4 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

purpose bombs are the MK- 80 series weapons, which weigh between 500 and
2000 pounds. General- purpose bombs were the type of ordnance most
frequently employed in both the Gulf War in 1991 and Operation Allied Force
in 1999. Precision- guided ordnance includes laser- guided bombs, in which
the operator illuminates a target with a laser designator and then the
munition is guided to a spot of laser energy reflected from the target;
television- guided or infrared- guided systems, in which a data link in the
bomb?s tail section sends guidance updates to a control aircraft that
enables the weapons system operator to guide the bomb by remote control to
the target; and bombs that utilize the Global Positioning System for
guidance to its target. While less than 10 percent of the weapons used in
the Gulf War were precision ordnance, about one- third of the weapons
employed by U. S. forces in Operation Allied Force consisted of this type of
ordnance. Figure 1 shows the range of ordnance an F/ A- 18 aircrew must be
trained to use.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Figure 1. F/ A- 18 Ordnance

Source: F/ A- 18E/ F Super Hornet Ordnance Package.

http:// www. chinfo. navy. mil/ navypalib/ allhands/ ah0197/ fa18ord. html.

Page 6 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

In fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, Navy and Marine Corps tactical
aviation units did not receive sufficient quantities of some key types of
ordnance they needed to conduct required training. The types and quantities
of training ordnance required for aircrew training are defined in service
training and readiness instructions for each aircraft model. We compared the
minimum amount of ordnance that the training instructions said units needed
to reach their readiness goals with the ordnance the units received in each
of the 4 years and found that both services had persistent shortages. The
shortages were actually greater than our analysis indicated because our
analysis did not include the ordnance needed for Navy and Marine exercises,
which are part of their training.

Specifically, Navy tactical aviation units had the severest shortages in
advanced training ordnance such as laser- guided training rounds and guided
bombs. The Marine Corps also had shortages of the same items, as well as the
most common types of ordnance (live and inert bombs). Figure 2 shows that
there was improvement in the allocation of five types of training ordnance
in the Navy in fiscal years 1998- 2001. Throughout the period, however, both
the Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air Forces had shortages of laser- guided
training rounds and guided bombs. While availability of the latter ordnance
increased substantially during the period, availability of the former
increased to only about half of the requirement. Guided bombs have been the
preferred type of ordnance in recent operations, such as Operation Allied
Force, and laser- guided training rounds are used to train for delivery of
these weapons. Additional data on other types of ordnance received by Navy
and Marine Corps units are in appendix III. Units Do Not Have

Enough of Key Types of Ordnance Needed to Conduct Required Training and
Exercises

Page 7 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Navy Tactical
Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Figure 2 only shows that the regional air forces received less ordnance than
required by the Navy?s training instruction. The actual shortages were more
severe because the Navy conducts training exercises that have ordnance
requirements that are not included in the instructions. Several of these
exercises are relatively large, such as training at the Naval Strike and Air
Warfare Center, and the Composite Training Unit Exercise. For example, a
training officer estimated that one carrier air wing needs 126 laser- guided
training rounds for the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center detachment and
another 128 for the Composite Training Unit Exercise. However, the Navy?s
training instruction shows that one carrier air wing needs only about 54 to
56 laser guided training rounds during the period it

0 50

100 150

200 Practice bombs Inert bombs Live bombs Laser- guided training rounds
Guided bomb units Fiscal year

1998 1999 2000 2001 Percent of requirement

Page 8 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

goes to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and about 15 to 19
laserguided training rounds during the period it conducts its Composite
Training Unit Exercise. 4

Figure 3 shows the percentage of required training ordnance received by
Marine tactical aviation units for the same 5 items. The data again show
improvement but also that Marine aircrews still were not receiving the
required amounts of two types of ordnance-- live bombs remained at 14 to 20
percent of requirements, and laser- guided training rounds were at about 75
percent of requirement in fiscal year 2001.

4 The number varies based on the composition of a wing. Some wings have one
F- 14 squadron and three F- 18 squadrons, and some have two F- 14 squadrons
and two F- 18 squadrons.

Page 9 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Marine Tactical
Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Figure 3 shows the shortages we identified using the Marine Corps training
instructions. The actual shortages could be more severe, because like the
Navy, Marine Corps units also participate in exercises, known as Combined
Arms Exercises, requiring ordnance that is not included in the training
instructions. Unlike the Navy, the Marines have identified a standard
Combined Arms Exercise ordnance requirement. Units are aware of the
requirement and are instructed to incorporate this requirement into their
requests. The data in figure 3, however, show that the amounts received do
not support the training instruction requirements alone, without considering
these additional exercise requirements.

0 50

100 150

Practice bombs Inert bombs Live bombs Laser- guided training rounds Guided
bomb units Percent of requirement

Fiscal year 1998 1999 2000 2001

Page 10 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Our calculations do not include the training ordnance made available to
units or pilots through participation in certain training events or the
service weapons schools. Like the fleets, the weapons schools receive
training ordnance allocations. The ordnance used by units or pilots
attending the training events and weapons schools is in addition to the
ordnance available to units from fleet allocations. For example, the Naval
Strike and Air Warfare Center provides some ordnance to support units during
their training there. Therefore, it is possible that portions of the
shortages identified are offset by ordnance received from other claimants.

Factors contributing to shortages include (1) units do not ask for
sufficient amounts of ordnance to support their training and exercise needs;
(2) the Navy has given munitions a low funding priority, which has resulted
in low ordnance stockpile- levels of live munitions and shortages of inert
training munitions; and (3) the Navy has poorly allocated available
ordnance.

We reviewed Navy and Marine aviation training ordnance requests submitted in
fiscal years 1998 through 2001 for 10 types of air- to- ground training
ordnance. We compared the amounts requested to that required by the units as
defined by their training instructions and found that requests were
frequently for less ordnance than needed to support the training identified
in the instruction. Our calculations did not include exercise requirements,
which would make the disparity even greater.

Overall, Naval Air Forces Atlantic requested less ordnance than required to
meet its training instruction requirements for 25 percent of its requests
during the period. Most notably, it requested less than 50 percent of its
required laser- guided training rounds and less than 15 percent of its flare
requirement in fiscal years 1998 to 2000. Data on Naval Air Forces Pacific
requests were not available for fiscal year 2000, but in the other 3 years
its requests were less than its training instruction requirements for about
40 percent of the items reviewed. Its requests for laser- guided rounds were
less than requirements in all 3 years and its request for guided bombs was
less than requirements in 2 of the 3 years.

Marine Force Atlantic training ordnance requests during the period
understated its training requirements for 78 percent of its requests, while
Marine Force Pacific requested less than its requirements for 69 percent of
its requests. Again, Marine Force Atlantic requested less than 50 percent of
its laser- guided training round requirement in 3 of the 4 years, and Marine
Force Pacific requested less than 50 percent of its requirements in all 4
years. For 4 of the 10 items reviewed, Marine Force Atlantic?s request
averaged less than 20 percent of the published requirement. One area Causes
of Training

Ordnance Shortages Units Do Not Ask for Required Ordnance

Page 11 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

where requests tended to exceed requirements was heavy inert bombs. Marine
officials told us that they requested these bombs to offset live bomb
requirements, because there are few ranges where live bombs can be used.
However, the Marine Force Atlantic?s request for live and inert bombs
combined was only between 34 and 43 percent of its total requirement.

Units we visited did not ask for the ordnance they needed to support their
training for a variety of reasons. One explanation was that they did not
know how to use the training instruction to determine their annual needs
because the instruction does not provide sufficient guidance for identifying
needs. As a result, rather than using a standard methodology to determine
their annual training ordnance needs, units used a variety of processes. For
example, some units used historical expenditure or allocation data, while
other units based their requests on the training instructions and planned
exercises. There were also units that understood the instructions but
adjusted their requests based on anticipated aircraft and pilot
availability, and instances where officials said they were instructed not to
request certain ordnance because it would not be available. Other units told
us there were times where they did not request ordnance because they
believed it was either in short supply or because they were not confident
that they could expend it during the year. The result was often the use of
current and previous year?s expenditures- which were usually well below
requirements- as the basis for future year?s requirements. For example, one
carrier air wing requested 150 laserguided training rounds while the
instruction shows a need for 639, and 5,750 practice bombs when the
instruction shows a requirement for 11,300. Another carrier air wing asked
for 784 laser- guided training rounds when the instruction shows a
requirement for 509, and 7,026 practice bombs when the instruction shows a
requirement for 10,075.

The most significant shortcoming in the Navy?s training instruction is that
it does not include ordnance requirements for exercises and, as shown in
appendix IV, requests often did not include the additional amounts needed to
satisfy exercise requirements. Carrier air wings preparing for deployment
participate in a number of exercises that require relatively large amounts
of ordnance. With one exception, 5 the ordnance requirements for these
exercises are not identified in any instruction or

5 The Pacific Fleet?s Carrier Group One has issued an instruction for its
Composite Training Unit Exercise.

Page 12 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

guidance. As a result, units cannot plan for them. Instead, the exercise
sponsors identify shortly before the exercise the ordnance the carrier air
wings should bring. Officials in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
who are responsible for training ordnance agreed that all training ordnance
requirements should be identified in the instructions. They were not aware
that the fleets had imposed additional ordnance requirements for any
exercises.

When we discussed the process for calculating and reviewing ordnance
requests at the squadrons that we visited, Navy ordnance managers expressed
their frustration with the uncertainty of the exercise requirements. They
also said that they had received no training in the computation of ordnance
requirements. Ordnance managers at higher command levels also said that they
did not review the request data they received from subordinate units for
accuracy. They generally did not know what the requirements were and thus
had no basis for questioning requests from subordinate units. They only
totaled the requests they received and passed them on to the next management
level. Ordnance managers also cited a lack of written guidance to help them
through the process of identifying training ordnance requirements. The only
available guidance (OPNAV Instruction 8010.12F/ MCO 8010.12) provides an
overview of the Non- Nuclear Ordnance Requirements process- the Navy?s input
into DOD?s Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements process- but the
instruction states only that naval commanders in chief are responsible for
ensuring training requirements are submitted. The guidance contains no
details on what this entails.

A Marine Corps headquarters official also told us they provided no guidance
for how requests were to be calculated but expected the training and
readiness instruction to be the basis for the requests. However, variances
between requests and training instruction requirements still existed. A
Marine Force Atlantic official, when asked to explain why requests varied
greatly from year to year, stated that he did not know, but believed it may
be due to the use of different methodologies from year to year and among
different units.

While our work shows that weaknesses exist in the guidance, we are not
advocating that ordnance requests be based solely on training instruction
requirements. We recognize that training is sometimes affected by the
availability of other resources including pilots, planes, parts, fuel,
adversarial aircraft, ranges, and targeting systems, which can lower a
unit?s ordnance requirement needs. The units we visited were generally aware
of the factors that impeded their training. Making these factors

Page 13 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

explicit when training ordnance requests are submitted allows officials at
higher levels to immediately recognize when a request is not ?right? and to
see the impact of these factors on the level and quality of training
possible. Such an exception report could also serve to facilitate the
development of alternative training strategies that maximize readiness
within these resource constraints.

The Navy has one ordnance stockpile, which is used for both war reserve and
training purposes. Replenishment of the stockpile has been given low funding
priority, which has resulted in a depletion of the stockpile to the point
that it is below the Navy?s total requirement. In some cases Navy airto-
ground ordnance stockpiles are currently at about 40 to 65 percent of the
Navy?s total ordnance requirement. This condition is expected to continue.
For example, documents provided by the Navy show that in fiscal year 2003
the Navy will have a live practice ordnance requirement of $267.2 million,
but is procuring only $130.7 million of ordnance, a shortage of $136.5
million. This will keep the stockpile below requirements and force the Navy
to either forego some training and accept lower training readiness, develop
alternative training strategies, or accept the readiness risks attendant to
using war reserve assets for training. According to officials in the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, releasing war reserve ordnance for
training is a subjective judgement that balances the value of training
against the risk of not having the ordnance available in the event of war.

The Navy also has shortages of inert training ordnance. Inert training
ordnance includes the laser- guided training round, and inert bombs. These
items are not stockpiled and the Navy generally buys about a year?s worth of
inventory at a time. Navy data shows a total requirement of $72 million for
inert ordnance in fiscal year 2003. However, funding is projected at $41
million, $31 million short of the total inert ordnance requirement.
Additionally the Navy?s $72 million requirement is based on fleet requests,
many of which are understated. For example, in fiscal year 2001 the Pacific
Naval Air Forces asked for only 700 laser- guided training rounds or
approximately 28 percent of its actual requirement of 2,542.

Inventory shortages raise the question of whether accurate fleet ordnance
requests would have resulted in the Atlantic and Pacific Naval Air Forces
receiving sufficient quantities of ordnance to support their training. As
mentioned, stocks of some munitions are short and priority is given to war
reserve stocks, making it unlikely that training requirements for all
munitions would have been met, regardless of what the fleets requested.
However, planned ordnance procurements are based on the requirements The Low
Funding Priority

Given Ordnance Contributes to Shortages

Page 14 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

received from the various claimants. When requirements are understated, it
becomes less likely that future stockpiles will meet future requirements.
The Navy?s understating of its training requirements during each of the 4
years in our review would indicate that this has contributed in part to the
stockpile shortages.

The Navy?s annual ordnance procurement budget request submitted to Congress
includes aggregated war reserve ordnance and training ordnance requirements
making it impossible for Congress to understand how funding decisions affect
training readiness. Identifying the amount of the Navy?s and Marine Corps?
ordnance procurement request that is for war reserve and the amount that is
for training would make the impact on training more readily apparent.

Misallocation of available resources also contributes to the problem.
Appendix III shows examples where the Naval Air Forces Atlantic received
ordnance in excess of the requirements identified while Naval Air Forces
Pacific received less than its requirement for the same type of ordnance.
For example, in fiscal year 2000 Naval Air Force Atlantic received 137
percent of its inert bomb requirement while Naval Air Forces Pacific
received 91 percent. Even in situations where neither fleets? full
requirements were met, there are examples of inequitably distributed assets.
For example, in fiscal year 2001 Naval Air Forces Atlantic received 85
percent of their guided bomb requirement while Naval Air Forces Pacific
received only 61 percent.

According to Navy officials responsible for making ordnance allocation
decisions, the decisions are based on the requests received from the
regional air forces. As mentioned, they do not analyze the requests but try
to satisfy as much of each claimant?s request as possible with the inventory
available for distribution. If a fleet asks for more than it needs, it could
result in that fleet receiving more than its share.

Furthermore, the way ordnance is allocated to Navy and Marine Corps units
shortchanges the Marine Corps, which expects its units to remain at higher
readiness levels and has higher ordnance requirements for live ordnance than
the Navy does. The Marine Corps? requests are combined with the Navy?s
requests for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, allowing no visibility for
Marine- specific requirements. When the fleet receives ordnance, it is
allocated between the Navy and the Marine Corps on the basis of pilot
population, not per pilot requirements. The amount of training ordnance
allocated to a Marine Corps F/ A- 18 pilot is, therefore, the same as for a
Navy pilot, even though certain Marine Corps Allocation Problems Cause

Some Shortages

Page 15 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

requirements exceed Navy requirements. For example, the order shows that a
Marine Corps F/ A- 18 crew requires 80 live MK- 80 series bombs per year,
while a Navy F/ A- 18 crew requires only 12 live MK- 80 series bombs to
maintain the same readiness level. Marine requirements are higher because in
some cases its training instruction calls for more and Marine units are
expected to maintain a higher year- round readiness level than Navy units.
For the years examined, both Atlantic and Pacific Marine Corps forces
typically received less than 20 percent of their live bomb requirement and
10 percent or less of their Maverick missile requirement. Conversely, the
Navy usually received much higher percentages of its requirement than the
Marine Corps received- sometimes in excess of their calculated requirement-
for the same types of munitions.

Both Navy and Marine Corps officials questioned the amounts of live ordnance
required by the Marine Corps? training order. The officials stated that
there are mission differences between the Marine Corps and Navy that may
explain some of the difference, but they believe that these differences are
not significant enough to explain the entire difference. The Marine Corps is
in the process of updating its training and readiness instruction.

Training ordnance shortages impact units in a several ways. Foremost, they
lower the training readiness of tactical aviation units, they extend the
periods where units experience low readiness levels, and they compress a
considerable amount of predeployment training into the weeks immediately
prior to deployment. As a result, should units have to prepare rapidly for
deployment, they may embark at lower readiness levels than prescribed.
Shortages also reduce the amount of practice aircrews receive with weapons
and affect pilot proficiency in attacking ground targets.

Both the Navy and Marine Corps have directly linked the accomplishment of
training tasks to reported training readiness through the DOD?s Global
Status of Readiness and Training System. In this system, training readiness
is reported in one of four categories, T- 1 through T- 4. A T- 1 unit is
trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized and
designed. A T- 4 unit is at the lowest readiness level and needs additional
training to undertake its wartime mission.

Aircrews earn points through the completion of training tasks that allow
them to progress into higher training readiness categories. Without
ordnance, aircrews cannot fully complete many of their training tasks. For
Navy units, this reduces the number of training tasks that can be applied
toward training readiness. The Marine Corps is less stringent. For Shortages
Lower

Aircrew Proficiency and Squadron Readiness

Page 16 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

example, the Navy requires aircrews to have the required ordnance to earn
the points associated with a training task. Since about 64 percent of the
Navy?s F- 14 training tasks and 58 percent of its F/ A- 18 training tasks
require ordnance, ordnance availability directly affects individual aircrew
readiness in Navy tactical aviation units. The Marine Corps permits aircrews
to conduct training events with less than the required ordnance. According
to Marine officials, Marine pilots can use less than the required quantity
of ordnance or substitute ordnance and still earn points. Thus, ordnance
shortages do not affect individual aviator readiness in Marine units as
significantly. Marine officials told us that they do not view a strict by-
the- book calculation of readiness as reflective of the true capabilities of
the squadron.

Ordnance shortages also extend the period in which units report low
readiness. Each training task has a currency period, which is the amount of
days after a training event is completed before the qualification expires.
Squadron and wing representatives told us when sufficient ordnance is not
available to support all training, units conserve their available ordnance
so they can achieve currency near their deployment date. For example, the
currency period for one of the Navy?s precision guided ordnance training
tasks is 90 days. Since the Navy does not have enough laser- guided training
rounds to support all required training, units generally only train with the
round in the months before deployment in order to be ready on their
deployment date rather than year round as envisioned by the training
instruction. Such practices can place aircrews in a degraded state of
readiness for much of the year as the currency periods for tasks expire and
are not renewed. It could be difficult for such units to respond quickly and
effectively to unexpected mission needs.

Several of the units we visited reported that the lack of training affects
pilot proficiency in attacking ground targets. Ordnance shortages also
reduce ground crew training, which impacts aircrew success. For example, one
squadron that had recently returned from Operation Southern Watch in Iraq
reported that during the deployment it dropped 18 precision weapons on
targets in 1 day and all 18 failed to detonate. They attributed the failures
to ground crew inexperience in loading and wiring the weapons. Because both
the risk and cost of errors is great, squadron and air wing officials told
us they spend an inordinate amount of time briefing ground ordnance and
aircrews on the safe handling of live ordnance prior to a training event or
deployment where the use of live ordnance is anticipated.

Page 17 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

A July 2000 report from the Navy Inspector General cited shortages of
training ordnance as a contributing factor to low initial air wing success
in the delivery of precision ordnance at major exercises and in contingency
operations. It found that 98 percent of combat operations since Desert Storm
have involved the employment of laser- guided bombs, but fewer than 30
percent of Navy aviators had employed a live laser- guided bomb in training
or combat. The Navy Inspector General recommended that training ordnance
allocations be reassessed in order to ensure that all aircrew are fully
trained and qualified prior to deployment. We could find no documented
evidence of how severely units are impacted by the shortages. However,
clearly aircrews are not receiving all of the training repetitions
envisioned by the operators, education specialists, and training system
analysts who wrote the Navy and Marine Corps training instructions.

The availability of Navy and Marine training ordnance depends on an accurate
requirements determination process, a procurement program that supports
identified needs, and an allocation process that puts the right amount of
ordnance where it is needed for training. The Navy program has problems with
all three of these elements. Neither the Navy nor Marine Corps provides
request data that reflects the training needs identified in its training
instruction. While both services have linked their ordnance requirements to
readiness in their training instructions, neither services? request
indicates that its instruction serves as the basis for identifying its
needs. Moreover, the Navy?s failure to fully identify its exercise
requirements, justify them in its training instruction, and develop a
process for including these requirements in its training ordnance requests,
makes it near impossible for ordnance officials to effectively plan ordnance
needs. We recognize that there are many other factors that impact each
service?s ability to fully execute its training plans. However, we believe
each service has the knowledge and ability to develop more accurate and
justifiable training ordnance requirements. Guidance that details how units
should go about this process would greatly aid units in developing their
requests. A well- justified training program linked to readiness would also
aid in developing and supporting a procurement program that meets its needs.
Better allocation of available ordnance to units also would improve training
readiness. We recognize that erroneous data from units contributes to this
problem. However, the practice of allocating ordnance to the Marine Corps on
a per- pilot basis rather than a training order requirement basis creates
additional readiness problems for the Marines. If the Navy and Marine Corps
believe that the ordnance requirements identified in the Marine training
order cannot be justified, they have the responsibility to change the order.
Conclusions

Page 18 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Navy and Marine aviation training readiness depends on the completion of
training tasks identified in their respective training instructions. Between
41 and 64 percent of these training tasks require ordnance. Yet, despite
this direct link to training readiness, the Navy?s ordnance procurement
budget request, which combines both its war time requirements and its
training requirements, has been less than its training requirement alone.
This forces the Navy and Marine Corps to forego the training and accept
lower training readiness, to develop alternative training strategies, or to
accept the readiness risks attendant to using war reserve assets for
training. Further, unless the Navy separately identifies its training
ordnance needs in its budget request, the impact of funding decisions on
training readiness will not be apparent.

To improve the availability of training ordnance in tactical aviation units,
we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy
to take the following actions:

 Update the Navy and Marine Corps training and readiness instructions so
that they are comprehensive and identify the ordnance needed for regularly
scheduled pre- deployment exercises.

 Develop guidance for fleet use that provides a standardized methodology
for determining training ordnance requirements and train the appropriate
personnel in the use of that guidance to help ensure that accurate and
reliable data are submitted by units in the ordnance requirements
determination process.

 Require Marine and carrier air wings to include, along with their training
ordnance request, an exception report detailing the reason( s) for requests
that differ substantially from the ordnance requirements identified in the
training instructions.

 Allocate ordnance on the basis of the documented training requirements
identified in the Navy and Marine Corps training instructions.

 Designate the Marine Forces- Atlantic and Marine Forces- Pacific as major
claimants in the ordnance requirements determination process to increase the
visibility of Marine requirements.

 Direct the Navy and Marine Corps to identify the amount of its ordnance
procurement request that is for the war reserve stockpile and the amount
that is for training. If the amount requested for training is less than the
training requirement, the services should explain how training readiness
will be maintained without the required training ordnance. Recommendations
for

Executive Action

Page 19 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with most of our
recommendations. However, it did not agree that the fleets need guidance and
training to help ensure accurate and reliable data are submitted in the
ordnance requirement determination process. DOD stated that additional
guidance would be counterproductive because the Navy?s current training and
readiness instruction is already perhaps the best DOD example of a well-
defined event based training program and provides a basis for establishing
funding requirements. We disagree with DOD and continue to believe that our
recommendation has merit and would not be counterproductive. As discussed in
this report, carrier and Marine air wing officials we met with largely did
not know how to use the training and readiness instruction to determine
their ordnance requirements. The 4- year pattern of understated ordnance
requests submitted by the wings also supports the need for some guidance and
training in determining requirements. Appendix II contains the full text of
DOD?s comments. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated
as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the
Honorable Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy; and the Honorable
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (757) 552- 8100 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix V.

Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 20 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

To assess shortages in Navy and Marine Corps air- to- ground training
ordnance required to meet training readiness requirements, we reviewed the
Navy and Marine Corps? training, testing, and current operations
submissions, and ordnance allocations for the Naval Air Forces in the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. We
reviewed this data for fiscal years 1998 through 2001. We compared the Navy
requests and allocations to a GAO- calculated squadron training and
readiness ordnance requirement based on Commander Naval Air Pacific
Instruction 3500. 67E and Commander Naval Air Atlantic Instruction 3500.63E.
We compared the Marines? requests and allocations to a GAOcalculated
squadron training and readiness requirement based on Marine Order P3500. 15.
Officials within the Offices of the Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, and Headquarters
Marine Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Washington, D. C., validated
the appropriateness of these models. We did not question the validity of the
ordnance requirements identified in either instruction. Our Navy calculation
is based on the minimum ordnance required for squadrons to train to the
readiness level appropriate to their place in their inter- deployment
training cycle. Our Marine calculation is based on the annual requirements
identified in its training order. We also reviewed Department of Defense
Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements Process, to
ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities and to identify required
inputs to the process. We reviewed the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal
years 2000- 2005 and the update for fiscal years 2001- 2005 to find out the
instruction the Department provided to guide the services as they determine
their ordnance requirements. We visited officials responsible for training
and training ordnance at the Naval Air Forces Atlantic and Pacific and
Marine Force Atlantic to discuss the guidance they provided. We obtained
similar information from Marine Force Pacific officials. Afterward, we
visited a sample of Navy carrier air wings and squadrons and Marine Corps
air wings and squadrons to obtain explanations of their training ordnance
determination processes.

To establish the reasons for ordnance shortages in units and their impacts
on units, we met with Department and service officials to obtain their views
on training ordnance problems. We met with senior officials and performed
work at the Office of the Navy Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments, and Headquarters Marine
Corps, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, Washington, D. C.; the U. S. Atlantic
Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Air Forces Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; the
U. S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii; Naval Air Forces Pacific, San Diego,
California; Marine Force Atlantic, Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 21 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Ammunition Logistics Center, Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania; Carrier Air Wing 9, Lemoore Naval Air Station, California;
Strike Fighter Wing Pacific, Lemoore Naval Air Station, California; Carrier
Air Wing 8, Oceana Naval Air Station, Virginia; Marine Corps Training and
Education Command, Quantico Marine Corps Station, Virginia; 2d Marine Air
Wing, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North Carolina; Marine Air
Group 14, Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station, North Carolina; Marine Air
Group 31, Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, South Carolina; and Navy and
Marine fighter squadrons in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

We performed our review from January through April 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 22 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Page 25 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Navy Tactical Aviation
Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 4-
year average

Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 132 129 147 141 137 MK- 76/ BDU- 48 practice
bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 82 93 102 110 97 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic
89 208 137 116 138 MK- 80/ BDU- 45 inert bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 93
141 91 100 106 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 122 130 104 129 121 MK- 80 series
live bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 85 88 58 83 79 Naval Air Forces-
Atlantic 333 364 398 344 360 Cluster bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 235 256
301 374 292 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 25 44 66 45 45 Laser- guided training
rounds Naval Air Forces- Pacific 31 36 44 56 42 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic
57 105 74 90 82 Chaff Naval Air Forces- Pacific 68 70 59 87 71 Naval Air
Forces- Atlantic 37 53 73 49 53 Flares Naval Air Forces- Pacific No data 62
57 40 53 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 5 5 59 85 39 Guided bomb units Naval Air
Forces- Pacific 4 6 35 61 27 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 100 118 64 191 118
Infrared- guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces- Pacific 65 81 71 94 78
Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 86 64 64 145 90 Laser- guided Maverick missile
Naval Air Forces- Pacific No data 50 59 88 66

Source: Navy F- 14 and F/ A- 18 requirements were calculated based on a
unit?s place in the interdeployment cycle using the per squadron
requirements contained in COMNAVAIRPACINST 3500.67E and COMNAVAIRLANTINST
3500.63E.

Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Appendix III: Training Ordnance Received by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Page 26 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Received by Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00
FY01 4- year average

Marine Forces- Atlantic 115 84 72 137 102 MK- 76/ BDU- 48 practice bombs
Marine Forces- Pacific 158 145 128 89 130 Marine Forces- Atlantic 51 101 54
127 83 MK- 80/ BDU- 45 inert bombs Marine Forces- Pacific 74 109 74 79 84
Marine Forces- Atlantic 13 10 14 16 13 MK- 80 series live bombs Marine
Forces- Pacific 16 23 19 10 17 Marine Forces- Atlantic Cluster bombs Marine
Forces- Pacific

No requirement, but this ordnance is requested and allocated annually.
Marine Forces- Atlantic 25 13 28 90 39 Laser- guided training rounds Marine
Forces- Pacific 12 18 34 65 32 Marine Forces- Atlantic 11 11 11 No data 11
Chaff Marine Forces- Pacific 23 25 11 No data 20 Marine Forces- Atlantic 13
9 17 No data 13 Flares Marine Forces- Pacific 25 18 26 No data 23 Marine
Forces- Atlantic 26 6 47 121 50 Guided bomb units Marine Forces- Pacific 16
6 51 75 37 Marine Forces- Atlantic 6 10 19 15 13 Infrared- guided Maverick
missile Marine Forces- Pacific 9 9 7 9 9 Marine Forces- Atlantic 5 10 14 9
10 Laser- guided Maverick missile Marine Forces- Pacific 8 9 8 5 8

Source: Marine Corps AV- 8B and F/ A- 18 requirements were calculated using
the per crew expendable ordnance requirements contained in the applicable T&
R Volume II, MCO 3500.15. In calculating the amounts required by units, we
assumed that units are fully manned. Total requirements were calculated by
multiplying the squadron requirements times the appropriate number of
squadrons.

Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Page 27 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Requested by Navy Tactical Aviation
Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01

Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 158 181 158 166 MK- 76/ BDU- 48 practice bombs
Naval Air Forces- Pacific 91 193 No data 84 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 243
278 243 290 MK- 80/ BDU- 45 inert bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 138 209 No
data 158 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 168 171 168 118 MK- 80 series live bombs
Naval Air Forces- Pacific 108 159 No data 89 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 142
157 142 551 Cluster bombs Naval Air Forces- Pacific 663 435 No data 288
Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 38 47 38 112 Laser- guided training rounds Naval
Air Forces- Pacific 77 65 No data 28 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 94 102 94
171 Chaff Naval Air Forces- Pacific No data No data No data 72 Naval Air
Forces- Atlantic 13 14 13 126 Flares Naval Air Forces- Pacific No data No
data No data 64 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 98 109 98 111 Guided bomb units
Naval Air Forces- Pacific 70 238 No data 0 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 169
200 169 109 Infrared- guided Maverick missile Naval Air Forces- Pacific 141
281 No data 138 Naval Air Forces- Atlantic 129 164 138 109 Laser- guided
Maverick missile Naval Air Forces- Pacific No data 156 No data 150

Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Appendix IV: Training Ordnance Requested by Navy and Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units

Page 28 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Percent of Required Training Ordnance Requested by Marine Corps Tactical
Aviation Units in Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 Description Fleet FY98 FY99 FY00
FY01

Marine Forces- Atlantic 140 138 90 106 MK- 76/ BDU- 48 practice bombs Marine
Forces- Pacific 335 136 131 131 Marine Forces- Atlantic 187 159 128 166 MK-
80/ BDU- 45 inert bombs Marine Forces- Pacific 669 206 197 197 Marine
Forces- Atlantic 23 21 20 21 MK- 80 series live bombs Marine Forces- Pacific
34 58 56 56 Cluster bombs Marine Forces- Atlantic

Marine Forces- Pacific No requirement, but this ordnance is

requested and allocated annually. Marine Forces- Atlantic 29 33 68 24 Laser-
guided training rounds Marine Forces- Pacific 22 39 39 39 Marine Forces-
Atlantic 27 16 15 17 Chaff Marine Forces- Pacific 128 95 92 92 Marine
Forces- Atlantic 18 21 15 15 Flares Marine Forces- Pacific 54 42 42 42
Marine Forces- Atlantic 21 42 38 119 Guided bomb units Marine Forces-
Pacific 258 100 94 94 Marine Forces- Atlantic 14 14 28 11 Infrared- guided
Maverick missile Marine Forces- Pacific 44 23 23 23 Marine Forces- Atlantic
11 21 16 11 Laser- guided Maverick missile Marine Forces- Pacific 28 9 9 9

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment

Page 29 GAO- 01- 840 Military Readiness

Marvin Casterline, Assistant Director, (202) 512- 9076 Anthony DeFrank,
Senior Defense Analyst Glenn D. Furbish, Senior Defense Analyst Appendix V:
GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgment GAO Contact Acknowledgments

(350030)

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