Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective	 
Protection (17-AUG-01, GAO-01-803).				 
								 
Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes	 
because of armed conflict and persecution but who remain within  
their own country--are among the most at-risk, vulnerable	 
populations in the world. Although some protection has been	 
provided to internally displaced persons, international 	 
organizations have been unable to meet the protection needs of	 
internally displaced persons in most locations, partly because of
the danger in operating in conflict zones, the presence of	 
personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in	 
budgetary resources, but also because international organizations
have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also,	 
international relief workers have not received training on how to
incorporate protection considerations and interventions into	 
their assistance activities, and in the three countries GAO	 
visited, international organizations do not coordinate their	 
protection actions within the countries in which they operate.	 
Without such coordination, international organizations are unable
to share basic information about the location of their protection
officers and effective approaches to protection interventions.	 
The U.N. Security Council is one forum where these matters can be
addressed in the context of underlying political and security	 
factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office
to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced  
persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are 
dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some Department  
of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials 
believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in 
this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a locus of		 
accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although 
State is required to provide Congress with an annual report on	 
human rights violations, these reports include only limited	 
information about the treatment of internally displaced persons. 
Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format  
for providing information about the internally displaced and	 
their human right condition that would allow concerned parties to
access the information readily. Increased and more systematic	 
reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced	 
persons would identify a significant problem and would provide	 
U.S. government and international and nongovernmental		 
organizations' officials with country-level data to craft a	 
cohesive program and policy response.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-803 					        
    ACCNO:   A01604						        
  TITLE:     Foreign Affairs: Internally Displaced Persons Lack       
             Effective Protection                                             
     DATE:   08/17/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Civil rights					 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign governments				 
	     Foreign policies					 
	     International cooperation				 
	     International organizations			 
	     Refugees						 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Burundi						 
	     Colombia						 
	     Sudan						 
	     UN World Food Program				 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-803
     
A

Report to the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign
Relations, U. S. Senate

August 2001 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Internally Displaced Persons Lack Effective
Protection

GAO- 01- 803

Letter 1 Results in Brief 3 Background 5 Many Internally Displaced Persons
Lack Protection 10 Immediate Assistance Needs Reported Being Met, But
Longer- Term Needs Remain a Challenge 24

U. S. Government Lacks an Overall Policy and a Lead Office for Internally
Displaced Persons 29 Conclusions 33 Recommendations for Executive Action 34
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 38

Appendix II: Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan 41 Burundi 41
Colombia 43 Sudan 46

Appendix III: Comments From the U. S. Department of State 48

Appendix IV: Comments From the U. S. Agency for International Development 54

Appendix V: Comments From the United Nations 56

Appendix VI: Comments From the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement 58

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 61 GAO Contacts 61
Acknowledgments 61

Tables Table 1: Organizations? Budget Requests, Actual Funds Received,
Percentage of Shortfall, and U. S. Contribution, 2000 15

Table 2: Countries With Internally Displaced Persons Protection Activities,
2001 17 Table 3: Number of Protection Staff Present in Burundi, Colombia,

and Southern Sudan, 2000- 2001 20 Figures Figure 1: Map of Countries With
Internally Displaced Persons,

2001 6

Figure 2: Community of Internally Displaced Persons in Central Burundi, 2000
9 Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001 11 Figure 4:
Extent of Protection Interventions for Internally Displaced Persons in 48
Countries, 2001 13

Figure 5: Rwandan Civilians Fleeing Ethnic Fighting, 1994 19 Figure 6: A
World Food Program Food Delivery Airdrop in Southern Sudan 23

Figure 7: GAO Survey of Assistance Interventions Taking Place for Internally
Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001 25 Figure 8: Reasons Why Internally
Displaced Persons Were Not

Receiving Assistance 26 Figure 9: Perceived Sources of Threat to Internally
Displaced

Persons 27 Figure 10: Members of a Teenage- headed Household That Receives

Food Security and Shelter Assistance from USAID, 2000 43 Figure 11: An
Internally Displaced Persons Community Outside of

Bogota, Colombia, 2001 45

Lett er

August 17, 2001 The Honorable Joseph Biden Chairman The Honorable Jesse
Helms Ranking Minority Member Committee on Foreign Relations United States
Senate

Internally displaced persons-- those forced to flee their homes because of
armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country- are
among the most at- risk, vulnerable populations in the world. They typically
differ from refugees only by the fact that they have not crossed an
international border as refugees have. Governments are responsible for
protecting and aiding their own citizens; however, some cannot do so or

actively persecute groups of their citizens, thus creating a displacement
crisis. When this happens, international organizations, such as the U. N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee for the Red
Cross, acting in response to international humanitarian and human rights law
help protect and assist the estimated 20 million internally displaced
persons in over 50 countries. The charters of these

organizations, and their governing bodies, 1 acknowledge the sovereignty of
each state to deal with internally displaced persons as an internal matter
but also recognize the obligation of international organizations to help

address humanitarian and human rights crises. 2 1 The governing bodies of
these organizations, comprised of representatives of member states of the
organizations, set overall policy and direction. The governing body of the
U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees is its Executive Committee. The
Commissioner also reports to the General Assembly annually through the
Economic and Social Commission, a U. N. body of member states that promotes
humanitarian and social issues and recommends actions. The governing body of
the International Committee for the Red Cross is the Assembly of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, whose president is also the
president of the organization.

2 For example, the Charter of the United Nations states that one of its
purposes is to achieve international cooperation in solving problems of a
humanitarian character and to promote and encourage respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. The U. N. Charter, article 2( 7), also states that
nothing contained in the charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state. The International Committee of the Red Cross is formally
recognized in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which give it the right to take
actions on behalf of civilian populations.

The U. S. government, which spends about $2. 5 billion annually in
humanitarian aid, provides assistance to the internally displaced,
principally through the Department of State (State) and the U. S. Agency for
International Development. State?s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration provides grants to international organizations that work with the
internally displaced, while the Agency for International Development?s
Bureau for Humanitarian Response provides similar grants and also direct
assistance. These bureaus, as well as the U. S. Missions to the United

Nations in New York, Geneva, and Rome, are responsible for working with the
international organizations to ensure U. S. interests are met. Because of
your concerns about human rights violations and other issues related to
displaced persons, you asked us to assess (1) whether international
organizations? efforts have adequately protected internally displaced
persons and what impediments these agencies face, (2) whether

international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of
displaced populations, and (3) whether the U. S. government has a
coordinated and effectively managed program to help protect and assist
internally displaced persons.

To assess the level of protection and assistance international organizations
provided to the internally displaced, we surveyed field- level officials
from the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, and nongovernmental organizations that conduct activities in 48 of
the more than 50 countries with internally displaced populations. Our survey
provided field level views on what international organizations and

the U. S. government are doing to provide physical security for the
internally displaced and supply them with basic necessities-- food, water,
and shelter. The criteria we applied in our assessment of these activities

was based on standards set forth in the 1998 publication, Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement. 3 We supplemented the survey information with (1)
meetings with U. S. government, United Nations, Red

Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organization officials at the
headquarters, regional, and country levels and (2) case study fieldwork in 3
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, based on international
human rights and humanitarian law, have gained international standing and
acceptance. They have been referred to by courts in several countries and
have been recognized and accepted by various

intergovernmental bodies, including the U. N. General Assembly, the U. N.
Commission on Human Rights, and the U. N. Economic and Social Council. We
also consulted the Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution Project on
Internal Displacement, 1999).

Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan. Collectively, these countries have
1.5 million to 2.5 million internally displaced persons. (See app. I for a
complete description of our scope and methodology.)

Results in Brief International organizations have been unable to secure
effective protection for internally displaced persons as set forth in the
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, although they have made some
effort to do so. Field- level officials of such organizations in 48
countries who responded to

our survey indicated that internally displaced persons are subject to direct
physical attack or threat in 90 percent of the countries, forced migration
in 58 percent of the countries, and the sexual assault of women in 46
percent of the countries. A primary reason for this situation was that
ongoing armed conflicts, or governments themselves, citing sovereign rights
of states, prevented the organizations from taking more effective action.
However, even within these circumstances, the organizations had undertaken
only limited protection measures. For example, although a simple visible
presence of international monitors is one of the most effective means to
prevent harm to internally displaced persons,

international organizations did not provide monitors or assign staff to help
provide protection for the internally displaced or the number of staff
assigned for this purpose was small. Insufficient resources provided by the
international donor community was cited as a factor for these shortfalls.
Also, international organizations have been reluctant to challenge
governments about their human rights responsibilities, as called for by the

Guiding Principles, for fear of offending these governments and being asked
to depart. International organizations also have not established country-
level working groups to coordinate protection activities for the internally
displaced among the organizations, nor have they developed practical
training about protection issues for officials providing relief assistance.

When international organizations could obtain access to internally displaced
populations, they generally met their food and shelter needs during the
emergency or flight stage of the displacement. For example, in Burundi,
Colombia, and southern Sudan, we observed that international organizations
usually delivered sufficient food, health care, shelter, and

water to displaced persons to sustain life during the initial stages of
displacement. However, as the emergency phase transitioned into longerterm
displacement situations, international organizations were less effective in
meeting the continuing needs of displaced populations. For

example, in Colombia, farmers internally displaced by fighting in the drug-

producing areas were initially provided adequate food and shelter during the
first 90 days of their displacement, but when they moved to secondary cities
or urban areas, such as Bogota, they received little or no assistance.
Furthermore, nonlife- sustaining help such as supplying clothing, education,
psychosocial activities for traumatized persons, and employment

opportunities generally were not provided or were provided only to a limited
extent.

The Department of State does not have an overall policy for addressing the
issue of internal displacement, as it has for refugees, nor has a lead
office been designated to direct and coordinate overall U. S. action in this
area. Some State and U. S. Agency for International Development officials
said that this has hampered effective management of programs for the
internally displaced because of overlapping mandates and duplication in
areas such

as analysis, planning, and program delivery. Despite this, we found that
officials of each agency were generally aware of each other?s activities. We
also noted that the State Department?s annual Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices contains limited discussion of internal displacement issues
and the human rights abuses that displaced persons suffer. Moreover, the
report does not focus on the problem nor does it have a standard definition
or format for reporting on the internally displaced that would allow for
systematic data gathering and analysis regarding the issues.

This report recommends that the Secretary of State direct the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations to (1) work to
advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist
internally displaced persons and (2) seek the implementation of in- country

protection training programs and the formation of country- level protection
working groups. We also recommend that the Secretary of State include a
focus on internal displacement issues in State?s annual Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices.

The Department of State, the U. S. Agency for International Development, the
United Nations, and the Red Cross Movement commented on a draft of this
report. Each organization generally agreed with our analysis and our
recommendations- and State noted they are actively working to address them.
State and the United Nations both cited a lack of resources as a reason for
some concerns raised in our report, and State also pointed to limited access
to displaced populations and physical danger to relief workers as obstacles
to greater activism on the part of international organizations. We agree
that limited resources and access are significant

impediments to effective protection and assistance programs for internally
displaced persons. These are core issues that international organizations
cannot resolve without member states? support. Nevertheless, we believe that
the steps we suggest in this report to improve the situation for the
internally displaced can be taken by international organizations with
existing resources. The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement also noted
that although the report focuses on those who are displaced due to armed
conflict and persecution, others displaced by natural disasters and

economic hardship have similar needs. Background The U. N. Secretary-
General?s Representative on Internally Displaced

Persons estimates that there are 20 million internally displaced persons in
the world, scattered across more than 50 countries. (Fig. 1 depicts the
countries with internally displaced persons from which we received surveys.)
However, lack of access to some of these populations due to insecure
environments and governments? assertions of sovereignty prevents
international organizations from obtaining accurate accounts of the numbers,
locations, or physical conditions of a large percentage of displaced
persons. Further complicating the issue of internal displacement is the lack
of a universally accepted definition for ?internally displaced

persons,? including criteria for determining when a person no longer should
be considered displaced. 4 4 The most widely used definition for internally
displaced persons is contained in the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, which defines them as ?persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of
armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or humanmade disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized state border.?

Figure 1: Map of Countries With Internally Displaced Persons, 2001

Note: Map shows 48 countries with internally displaced persons from which we
received surveys.

Source: Compiled by GAO from survey responses.

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of internally displaced persons
has grown steadily (and now surpasses the number of refugees), as has the
international community?s awareness of their plight. By all accounts,

internally displaced persons suffer extreme deprivation; are subject to
threats to their physical security during flight and while displaced; and
are unlikely to have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to earn
a livelihood. Mortality rates among internally displaced populations are
much higher than among stable populations, especially among the more
vulnerable segments of the populations- children, the elderly, and

pregnant women. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual assault,
rape, and discrimination in receiving assistance. Psychological and social
distress due to violence and the breakdown of family and community
structures is endemic in internally displaced populations. (Fig. 2 depicts a
community of internally displaced persons in Burundi who are receiving
assistance from the U. S. Agency for International Development.)

Figure 2: Community of Internally Displaced Persons in Central Burundi, 2000

Source: GAO.

The plight of the internally displaced generally did not begin to draw the
attention of the international community until 1992, when the U. N.
Commission for Human Rights requested that the Secretary- General

appoint a special representative to study the problems of the internally
displaced and devise solutions to improve their situation. Despite a
subsequent series of reports, books, briefings, and U. N. resolutions
identifying shortcomings in and recommending solutions for the international
community?s response, little progress was made in addressing the needs of
internally displaced persons throughout most of the 1990s. Prompted into
action after strong criticism from the U. S. Representative to

the United Nations in early 2000, international organizations began a period
of reassessing their policies, programs, and coordinating mechanisms. Many
Internally

Field- level officials of international organizations in 48 countries who
Displaced Persons

responded to our survey reported that some modest success had been achieved
in extending protection interventions to internally displaced Lack
Protection

persons. Nonetheless, international organizations? officials also reported
that they have not been able to secure adequate protection for internally
displaced persons in most countries we surveyed. Several obstacles

prevent international organizations from protecting displaced populations,
including the limitations of working in active war zones, attacks on and
death threats to aid workers, and government assertions of sovereignty that
block the organizations? access to displaced persons. While these

limitations hamper their work, international organizations often have not
taken proactive measures they could have taken to protect internally
displaced persons, such as being more assertive on protection matters,
implementing training programs on protection issues for relief workers, and
establishing country- level coordination mechanisms.

International Organizations International organizations have generally not
been able to secure for

Are Unable to Secure internally displaced persons the fundamental rights set
forth in the Effective Protection for

Guiding Principles. The vulnerability of internally displaced persons is
Internally Displaced reflected by our survey responses, which indicates they
are at risk of direct physical attack in 90 percent of the countries and at
risk of forced

Persons migration, sexual assault, and conscription or forced labor in many
countries. Figure 3 provides data on various types of protection threats

faced by internally displaced persons.

Figure 3: Threats to Internally Displaced Persons, 2001

Source: GAO survey.

According to human rights officials, based on existing international
humanitarian and human rights law, international organizations act to help
ensure the internally displaced have protection and are afforded the

fundamental right to be free from the threats noted in Figure 3. In some
instance (such as in Kosovo), organizations are explicitly mandated by the
United Nations and their governing boards to provide protection and
assistance to internally displaced persons. To accomplish this, the
organizations undertake protection activities in almost all countries we
surveyed. For example, as shown in figure 4, in 63 percent of the countries,
the organizations reported that to a great or very great extent they are
engaging and meeting with both government and opposition forces to try to
get them to respect the rights of internally displaced persons. In 79
percent

of the countries, international organizations indicated they are to some
extent providing the displaced with information about a voluntary return to
their homes. In 90 percent of the countries, international organizations
said they are, to a small extent or greater, establishing systems to
document human rights violations of the displaced.

Overall, however, the extent of protection activities is limited, and in
many countries some protection activities are not being carried out at all.
A senior official of the International Committee of the Red Cross told us
that there is not a single country in the world that can serve as a
successful model for the protection of internally displaced persons. From
providing

core protection actions, such as providing a visible in- country presence of
international staff to help protect the displaced, to replacing lost
personal documentation and preserving the right to asylum, to alerting the
displaced about threats, international organizations have taken limited
action. Figure 4 shows the extent to which protection interventions
identified in the Guiding Principles had taken place in the 48 countries
from which we received survey responses. 5 Only 1 of the 14 protection
interventions-

engaging both government and opposition forces- was being undertaken to a
great or very great extent in at least half the countries. Conversely, 7 of
the 14 interventions were not being undertaken in half the countries. 6 5
The Guiding Principles provide a framework for the protection of internally
displaced

persons and affirm the right of individuals to be protected from arbitrary
displacement and the responsibility of governments and other authorities to
prevent such displacement. While the Guiding Principles are intended for
governments and armed opposition groups, the principles also serve as a
standard by which to deliver protection and assistance and to monitor and
assess the extent to which international human rights and humanitarian law
are being observed. 6 In figures 3 and 8, ?not applicable? answers were
treated as ?not at all? responses. In all but three instances, fewer than 10
percent of survey responses were answered ?not applicable.? However, with
few exceptions, such as for the interventions pertaining to managing camps
and landmine awareness, respondents should not have answered ?not
applicable.? An example of an inappropriate ?not applicable? answer was the
category asking if the Guiding Principles were distributed in the local
language.

Figure 4: Extent of Protection Interventions for Internally Displaced
Persons in 48 Countries, 2001

Source: GAO survey.

External Factors Obstruct Several factors inhibit the international
community?s response on Protection Efforts

protection matters. The danger of operating in conflict zones and the
personal security risks to aid workers are major limitations to involvement
in protection matters. (In 75 percent of countries in our survey,
humanitarian organizations indicated that personal security fears impact
their ability to provide protection or assistance to internally displaced

persons.) 7 State sovereignty is also a significant factor, as many
countries, such as Algeria, Burma, and Turkey, bar international involvement
with their internally displaced populations. In August 2000, the Group of
77, a

group of more than 130 developing countries, blocked the U. N. ?s Economic
and Social Council from endorsing a U. N. approach to dealing with
internally displaced persons for fear that humanitarian intervention and

protection of human rights would infringe upon their countries? sovereignty.
Finally, scarce or declining budgetary resources provided by the
international donor community inhibit agencies from expanding their
protection (and assistance) activities. According to officials of these

organizations, it is difficult to get the funding they request for refugees
and other specifically mandated programs; and there is increasing donor
fatigue because of humanitarian crises that have been ongoing for years

without resolution. Given this environment, officials said it is even more
difficult to get funding for internally displaced persons, who outnumber
refugees by nearly 2 to 1 and where no international organization has an
absolute right to intervene to protect and assist them. Table 1 shows the
amount of funds international organizations? requested from international
donors in 2000 and the shortfall from their budget requests.

7 For example, since 1996, in Burundi, five expatriate relief workers were
murdered, and numerous officials have been attacked or forced to evacuate
due to death threats. Since 1990, 23 World Food Program staff members have
been killed in the line of duty in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Table 1: Organizations? Budget Requests, Actual Funds Received, Percentage
of Shortfall, and U. S. Contribution, 2000

Dollars in millions

Budget Actual

Shortfall U. S. Agency request budget percentage contribution

International $671 $540 19% $122 Committee of the Red Cross

U. N. High 930 693 25 239 Commissioner for Refugees

U. N. High 53 44 17 7 Commissioner for Human Rights

U. N. Development 1, 100 645 41 80

Program a World Food Program 2, 117 1,685 20 796 U. N. Children?s Fund b 254
149 41 110 a Includes core or regular budget only. b Includes emergency
budget only. U. S. contribution includes emergency and regular budget.

Source: Specified agencies.

International Organizations According to numerous relief and human rights
officials we spoke with,

Are Cautious in Challenging their organizations and their representatives at
the country level are often

Governments reluctant to speak out and challenge governments on protection
matters

for fear of jeopardizing relationships and continued access for ongoing
relief or development programs. In Sudan, for example, U. N. officials told
us some of its offices were often reticent about pressing the Khartoum
government on its restrictive flight clearance process in the south
(impeding emergency relief efforts) due to concern of putting at risk U. N.
development activities in the north. Also, in Burundi, the U. N. ?s
Humanitarian Coordinator (the lead U. N. official in country) was criticized

by U. N. agency, nongovernmental organization, and U. S. government
officials for weak leadership: the Coordinator was said to be more
interested in maintaining good relations with the government than in serving
as the main advocate for humanitarian and internally displaced

persons? concerns. Furthermore, U. N. Resident Coordinators 8 from several
countries were unwilling to respond to our survey on internally displaced
persons despite assurances of confidentiality because of their concern about
antagonizing the host government if their participation in the survey became
known.

According to Department of State officials, in some internal displacement
circumstances, international organizations have little leverage to affect
the conduct of governments toward their citizens. In those cases,
international forums, such as the U. N. ?s Security Council or Economic and
Social Council, offer the best opportunity to address issues of internal
displacement within the context of underlying political and security

factors. For example, the U. S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations advocated increased assistance and protection for the internally
displaced in the U. N. Security Council and in other forums. As a result, U.
N. officials said this raised the awareness of the plight of the internally
displaced, prompted other governments to respond, and prompted an assessment
of international organizations? policies, programs, and coordinating
mechanisms on the internally displaced.

8 Within the U. N. system, the Resident Coordinator is the highest- ranking
official in country and is responsible for representing the United Nations
before the host government and for coordinating the various U. N. agencies?
relief and development programs.

Gaps in Field Presence and Organizations with the mandate and staff
expertise to provide protection- Protection Coverage

the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U. N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross- are often
not present to take a proactive role in the protection of internally
displaced populations, according to representatives from these international
organizations and protection experts. Despite a March 2000 policy
pronouncement by the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees to become more
engaged with the internally displaced, we found the number of internally
displaced persons assisted and country programs in place

declined in the last year (from 5 to 4 million and from 13 to 11,
respectively), although the total number of worldwide displacements are
reported to have remained relatively stable. According to State

Department officials and other knowledgeable observers, the U. N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights has few officials working directly in the
field and currently lacks the capability to intervene in human rights
situations. As for the International Committee of the Red Cross, it has a
specific protection mandate during armed conflict, but it generally does not
conduct protection activities for displaced populations caught up in
nonconflict circumstances. Table 2 shows the number of countries where these
organizations said they have a staff presence and engage in protection
activities. 9

Table 2: Countries With Internally Displaced Persons Protection Activities,
2001 Number of countries with internally Organization displaced persons
protection activities

U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees 11 U. N. High Commissioner for Human

7 Rights International Committee of the Red 48

Cross Sources: Specified agencies. 9 The U. N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and the Red Cross Movement in their comments on a draft of this
report provided new statistical data on the number of countries where they
had protection activities and the number of protection personnel posted in a
country, which in some cases exceeded the data we report. We adjusted the
numbers in some instances, but our analysis indicates that the data reported
reflect a more accurate account of protection activities now being carried
out by the organizations. This is because we include only protection-
related persons and activities and excluded assistance activities and
personnel.

During our fieldwork, we observed in two of the three countries we visited,
that despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced
persons, agencies did not have protection officers to monitor conditions or
had assigned only two or three officers for this purpose. Protection experts
acknowledge that a simple visible field presence is sometimes the most
effective means to prevent harm to internally displaced persons. (Fig. 5
shows International Committee of the Red Cross staff accompanying Rwandan
civilians fleeing ethnic fighting in 1994.) In our three case study

countries, only the International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia
provided a robust staffing presence of significant size (54) to help monitor
conditions and provide protection activities. In Burundi and southern Sudan,
the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees did not have a protection presence
even though there were refugees repatriating into internally displaced
communities. In Burundi, none of the agencies were engaged in protection
activities directed toward internally displaced persons, although
geographically nearly half the country is experiencing internal
displacement. According to officials from these organizations, the number of
protection officers working in these countries is not sufficient given the
level of threat against internally displaced persons. Table 3 shows the
number of protection officials assigned in Burundi, Colombia, and southern
Sudan in 2000 to 2001.

Figure 5: Rwandan Civilians Fleeing Ethnic Fighting, 1994

Source: International Committee of the Red Cross.

Table 3: Number of Protection Staff Present in Burundi, Colombia, and
Southern Sudan, 2000- 2001 Organization Burundi Colombia Southern Sudan

International Committee of the Red 2 staff 54 staff 2 staff Cross U. N. High
Commissioner for Refugees 2 11 0

U. N. High Commissioner for Human 3 60 Rights Source: Specified agencies.

No Coordination Activities International organizations do not have
mechanisms at the country level to promote and coordinate actions that could
help protect the internally displaced. Unlike international organizations?
efforts to provide assistance (e. g., food aid and health care) to
internally displaced persons where there are established working groups to
share information and plan and coordinate action, there are no counterpart
coordination mechanisms for protection concerns. For example, in our three
case- study countries, we were told that there was little to no discussion
among international organizations concerning protection issues. There were
no focal points to raise the profile of protection or ensure its place on
the agenda of those

organizations working in the field. Officials engaged in protection
activities in these countries told us that because there are no established
mechanisms to share information, there is a lack of (1) basic information on
where protection officers are posted, (2) common thinking and approaches to
protection, and (3) knowledge about what protection

interventions work or do not work. We noted that in countries where
international organizations have not assigned staff to monitor for
protection concerns, the organizations do provide relief assistance and are
often in direct contact with displaced persons and are knowledgeable about
their conditions. However, according to U. N. and other international
organization officials, they have not established working groups or other
mechanisms in these countries

that could alert the international staff about potential dangers to the
internally displaced or provide advice about how to record and report on
abuses they witness in their routine of providing assistance.

Protection Considerations Not Officials in the field who provide assistance
to internally displaced persons Incorporated Into Assistance

lack knowledge about how to incorporate protection considerations and
Programs

techniques into their assistance activities. As was shown earlier in figure
3,

79 percent of the countries in our survey indicated that no action is taken
to set up and manage camps for internally displaced persons to prevent
attacks, such as ensuring vulnerable female- headed households are not
isolated to remote areas in the camp. Relief officials told us there is
little consideration given to protection concerns when designing programs--
their

focus is on providing assistance as quickly as possible. Forty percent of
the countries in our survey also indicated that no training had been
received on how to undertake protection actions for internally displaced
persons, although officials we spoke with stated they would strongly welcome
such training. During our fieldwork, we found numerous examples of how
relief agencies

both incorporated and failed to incorporate protection measures into the
design and implementation of their programs. These examples include:

 In southern Sudan, protection considerations were taken into account when
water bore holes were drilled in locations that drew internally displaced
populations away from conflict zones into more secure areas.

 In Burundi, when relief workers did not take into consideration the timing
of bulk food deliveries during periods of intense fighting (as opposed to
dispersed deliveries in locations outside the battle zone), the result was
armed attacks and theft of supplies by combatants.  In both Colombia and
southern Sudan, the provision of assistance to

internally displaced persons, while equally vulnerable local populations
were ignored (as opposed to provision of some aid to both communities), led
to conflict between the two groups. Recognizing that the state of training
for internally displaced persons issues has been deficient, in March 1998
the U. N. ?s Inter- Agency Standing Committee ordered the development of a
comprehensive training program

focused on protection issues for the international organizations working
with the displaced. The U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees was tasked with
developing the training module for protection but did not do so until the
end of 2000. To date, no training has occurred. Protection Interventions

Despite the overall poor state of protection for internally displaced Can
Have Positive Impact

persons, we learned that practical actions, as advised by the Handbook for
Applying the Guiding Principles were successful in the countries we visited.
Even in highly insecure environments, reasonable advocacy on the part of
senior officials and the presence of human rights observers and monitors can
have positive effects. For example,

 In Colombia, International Committee for the Red Cross protection officers
negotiated with rebel and paramilitary groups to relocate internally
displaced individuals and families away from areas where death threats were
being issued; they also successfully negotiated with these groups to resolve
kidnappings and prevent executions by death

squads.  In Burundi, the U. S. Ambassador sent demarches (diplomatic
messages) to the highest level of the Burundi government in mid- 2000
challenging

government troops who were intimidating patients in rural health clinics
near the capital Bujumbura. This helped end the troops? harassment and
occupation of the rural health clinics, which were used heavily by displaced
populations.  In southern Sudan, the government and factional commanders

increased the risk to internally displaced persons by requiring that food
drops and the provision of aid be provided in strategic locations at
specific times to coincide with their strategies. The relief organizations
tailored methods to circumvent these requirements and safely

accomplish their relief goals. (Fig. 6 shows a food airdrop in southern
Sudan.)

Figure 6: A World Food Program Food Delivery Airdrop in Southern Sudan

Source: World Food Program.

Immediate Assistance Overall, international organizations believe they have
been generally

Needs Reported Being successful in meeting the emergency food needs for
those internally displaced persons to whom they have access. However, in
numerous Met, But Longer- Term

countries with active emergencies and hostile, insecure environments, Needs
Remain a

such as in Burundi, and southern Sudan, large numbers of internally
Challenge displaced persons were outside the reach of international
organizations? relief efforts, according to relief experts to whom we spoke
and observed

during our case study fieldwork. 10 Other emergency assistance provisions
such as health care, water and sanitation, and shelter were also generally
being provided to displaced populations, although to a lesser extent,
according to relief officials with whom we spoke. According to our survey,

54 percent of countries reported that basic needs, such as food, water, and
health care, are being met to a great or very great extent. Figure 7
provides the results of our survey on the extent to which assistance
interventions

identified in the Guiding Principles have taken place. In Colombia, for
example, largely through the combined efforts of the International Committee
of the Red Cross and the World Food Program, the emergency needs (food,
shelter, and health care) of the internally displaced were reported being
met during the first 90 days of displacement.

10 Access to humanitarian assistance is one of the most pressing problems
affecting internally displaced persons. According to the Guiding Principles,
the primary duty and responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance to
internally displaced persons lies with national authorities. However,
international organizations have the right to offer their services in
support of the internally displaced. Key organizations with the mandate to
provide humanitarian assistance include the U. N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, the Red Cross Movement (National Societies, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies), the U. N. Development Program, the World Food
Program, and the U. N. Children?s Fund.

Figure 7: GAO Survey of Assistance Interventions Taking Place for Internally
Displaced Persons in 48 Countries, 2001

Source: GAO survey.

Gaps in Assistance Although international organizations were generally able
to meet the initial

Programming emergency needs of the internally displaced, we found a number
of

programming gaps in the overall response scheme. First, international
organizations were less effective in meeting the assistance needs of
internally displaced persons after the initial displacement phase. In
southern Sudan, for example, we were told that internally displaced

persons who relocated to nonconflict areas were generally not receiving
assistance from international organizations. Gaps in assistance areas we

identified include providing clothing, education, and income- generation
training and opportunities; psychological and social assistance for
traumatized persons; and nonfood items, such as kitchen utensils, tools, and
personal hygiene items. Figure 8 provides information from our survey of
country- level officials on why internally displaced persons were not
receiving assistance. Foremost among the obstacles were problems in
assistance logistics and distribution.

Figure 8: Reasons Why Internally Displaced Persons Were Not Receiving
Assistance

Source: GAO survey.

Also, internally displaced persons who were congregated in camps or
identifiable communities were more likely to have their assistance needs
met. In contrast, those displaced persons who were dispersed throughout the
countryside, such as in Burundi, or merged into urban communities, such as
in Colombia, were generally not receiving assistance, according to U. N.
officials with whom we spoke. International organizations have difficulty
identifying and obtaining access to these populations, as some

internally displaced persons purposely keep a low profile for fear of

discrimination or retribution at the hands of the government or rebel
groups. Figure 9 provides officials views on whether the source of
protection threat to internally displaced persons comes from the government,
nonstate actors (such as rebel groups), or both.

Figure 9: Perceived Sources of Threat to Internally Displaced Persons

Note 1: Nonstate actors include opposition and rebel groups. Note 2: Numbers
do not add to 100 percent due to rounding. Source: GAO survey.

Internally displaced persons were thought to be generally less likely to
receive assistance the more time had lapsed since their initial
displacement. According to relief and development experts we spoke with,
there is a tendency among donors and aid agencies to provide short- term
relief assistance rather than longer- term development or life- sustaining
assistance. This funding and program trend particularly affects internally
displaced persons, since most internal displacement situations are
longstanding in nature. Similarly, assistance to internally displaced
persons is negatively affected by international organizations? difficulty in
transitioning

or redirecting their programs from the immediate relief phase to the
longerterm rehabilitation/ development phase. Finally, the volatile nature
of complex emergencies often results in sudden

surges of mass displacement. In two of our case study countries- Burundi and
Sudan-- fighting accompanied by drought had resulted in the sudden movement
of thousands to tens of thousands of people within the last few years.
According to relief officials, international organizations do not have
adequate food reserves to respond immediately to these quick surges in
displacement populations. For example, according to World Food Program
officials, the organization only had a 1 month reserve of food for Sudan,
and only 40 percent of its food appeal for Burundi had been met. During our
fieldwork in central Burundi, we were told of rising levels of malnutrition
caused by displacement and drought, and relief officials were fearful that a
failure in the upcoming harvest could lead to significant food shortages.
According to U. N. officials, it takes a lead time of 5 to 6 months before
requested food aid is delivered in- country.

U. S. Government Lacks The U. S. government addresses the needs of the
internally displaced by

an Overall Policy and a providing funds to international organizations and
by directly implementing programs. However, the U. S. government does not
have an Lead Office for

overall policy or agency- specific guidelines for dealing with internally
Internally Displaced displaced persons, nor has the Department of State
designated a lead office Persons

to help coordinate and direct the U. S. government?s response for internally
displaced persons. According to State officials, the lack of a lead office
has been identified as a problem and discussed within the department, but no
policy decisions have been taken to address this issue. Some State and
Agency for International Development (USAID) officials said that as a result
of a lack of policy and a lead office, the U. S. government has difficulty
coordinating and managing its programs to aid the internally displaced. A
study by the State Department?s Office of Policy Planning and an assessment
by the former director of the USAID?s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
concluded that the absence of a U. S. policy for internally displaced
persons has resulted in limited awareness, overlapping bureaucratic
mandates, and fragmented and duplicative efforts. The

reports noted the multifaceted nature of displacement crises and that U. S.
efforts were undermined by the absence of a single, responsible office
managing the interrelated assistance, protection, advocacy, peace processes,
and international cooperation components. Both studies concluded that U. S.
humanitarian interests would be better served with clear policy direction
and senior leadership within the federal bureaucracy on internal
displacement issues. 11 11 See Interagency Review of U. S. Government
Civilian Humanitarian and Transition Programs (Washington, D. C.: Department
of State, Jan. 2000), and The U. S. Government

and Internally Displaced Persons: Present, But Not Accounted For
(Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution Project on Internal
Displacement and the U. S. Committee for Refugees, Nov. 1999).

Difficulty Managing U. S. We identified six offices within State and USAID
that directly assist Government Policy

internally displaced persons, plus several other agencies and offices that
Response are involved in such related functions as intelligence gathering
and representing U. S. interests in international organizations. The
Department of State?s Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees and
USAID?s

Bureau for Humanitarian Response are the two main sources of U. S.
assistance to internally displaced persons. Based upon our discussions with
officials from these agencies and a review of program documents, we found
that there is duplication of effort and little coordination among the
various agencies. For example, in Colombia, we learned that the World Food
Program received funds from four different U. S. funding sources- State?s
Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration; USAID?s Office of Transition
Initiatives; the Department of Agriculture; and Plan Colombia-

to support the same type of food assistance programs. However, the evidence
shows that this funding was provided without coordination and knowledge
about whether this would be complementary or duplicative. Furthermore, these
offices were not able to determine how much of the $2. 5 billion the U. S.
government spends annually on humanitarian assistance goes to internally
displaced persons, because agencies do not track how much money they spend
on internal displacement. 12

According to State and USAID program officials with whom we spoke, there are
numerous drawbacks to not having a lead office or interagency working group
to direct policy and activities related to internally displaced

persons activities. Some of these drawbacks are listed as follows: 
Responding to crises is inefficient. It takes longer and is labor intensive

to launch a response to an internal displacement crisis, as planning
meetings are ad hoc and usually staff generated.  There is no lead office
or person to settle policy disputes among various

agencies. For example, in Sudan, State and USAID had unresolved
disagreements over aid policies and the content of assistance inputs to
refugees and internally displaced persons, resulting in confusion among the
nongovernmental organization implementing partners about which groups should
be provided assistance.  It is unclear whom to consult within the U. S.
government. It is difficult for regional bureaus and other programming
offices to take a proactive

12 USAID?s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is the only U. S. agency to
track funding to internally displaced persons. It estimates expenditures of
$123 million in 20 countries in fiscal year 2000.

role for their countries or areas of responsibility. In the critical area of
providing protection for internally displaced persons, we were told that
good intelligence information exists about protection threats against
internally displaced persons, but without a lead office to receive the

information and direct it, the information does not pass smoothly to the
organization needing it, as was the case in Kosovo and Rwanda.  There is no
senior- level representation or single voice to consider and

address internally displaced persons? issues during political- military
crises deliberations within the highest level of the U. S. government. 
There is no clear locus of accountability for internal displacement issues

within the U. S. government, especially on policy issues. According to the
acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration,
there are pros and cons to designating a lead office, some of which were
pointed out in the interagency review. Primarily, the issue of internally
displaced persons involves human rights, diplomacy, political- military
affairs, humanitarian concerns, and designating a lead office either within
State or USAID could skew the U. S. approach toward one of these concerns.
Without a thorough review of all concerns and the related organizational
structure of several departments, it would be difficult to determine if a
designated lead would improve the

situation. He said that the current administration is addressing the issue
through improved coordination and cooperation among the offices involved.
Furthermore, there is a coordinating committee led by the National Security
Council that could be used to address specific situations. However, he said
that if problems arose in coordinating a U. S. government response to
internally displaced persons, the administration might consider designating
a lead office.

Funding for Internally There is no overall policy on the funding priority
for internally displaced

Displaced Persons persons within the U. S. government. The Department of
State?s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID?s Bureau for
Humanitarian Affairs each has general legislative authority to address the
assistance and protection needs of persons in need, such as provisions
authorizing contributions to international organizations, assistance to
victims of disasters and complex emergencies, help for victims of human
rights abuses, and aid to those needing food assistance. 13 But the
legislation does

not specifically refer to internally displaced persons. Thus, according to
Department of State officials, the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and
Migration does not see itself as the initial source of the U. S. government
response to the internally displaced and has not requested appropriations
for these populations. Similarly, USAID officials told us that internally
displaced persons are not a direct focus of development assistance monies

provided under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Officials from both agencies
told us that they interpret their current statutory authorities as putting a
priority on funding for refugees, development, or emergency programs.
Therefore, they manage their funds to meet these legislative priorities with
no overall direction to coordinate their efforts on internally displaced
persons.

Reporting on Internally The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
requires the State Displaced Persons Is Department to report annually to the
Congress on the status of Insufficient

internationally recognized human rights. Although internally displaced
persons are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations, the
Department of State?s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do
not contain much information on the subject. These reports generally serve
as an authoritative source and a basis for advocacy by U. S. diplomats

both bilaterally and in international forums. 13 The Migration and Refugee
Assistance Act of 1962 (22 U. S. C. 2601 et seq) and the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U. S. C. 2151 et seq) provide the primary
statutory framework for assisting internally displaced persons.

Our examination of several country reports 14 in State?s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2000 and a Brookings Institution analysis of 1996
and 1997 reporting, 15 indicated that State generally provides only a
cursory account of internally displaced persons. In eight country reports

we examined for 2000, three country reports provided some information on
specific incidents of displacement, three reports noted that internal
displacement exists and made estimates of the populations affected; but two
reports made no mention of internal displacement issues, although such
issues existed. The country reports neglected or provided insufficient
information on the protection and assistance problems that internally
displaced persons face or the conduct of the government and opposition
groups toward these populations. For example, the country report for
Afghanistan noted only that drought and conflict were causing an increase

in internal displacement. Furthermore, there is no standard format for
reporting on internal displacement that would allow for systematic data
gathering and analysis. Unlike a standard format for reporting on refugee
issues, discussion of internal displacement issues are dispersed throughout
various sections, for example, freedom of movement, respect for political
rights, and torture, making identification of internally displaced persons
reporting difficult in the lengthy country reports. In addition, the reports

use various terms to refer to internally displaced persons-? IDPs,?
?forcibly displaced,? and ?village re- evacuation?- increasing the
difficulty in identifying internal displacement issues and sometimes
blurring the

distinction between internally displaced persons and refugees. Conclusions
Although some protection has been provided to internally displaced

persons, international organizations have been unable to meet the protection
needs of internally displaced persons in most locations, partly because of
the danger of operating in conflict zones, the presence of

personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary
resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a
proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers
have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations
and interventions into their assistance activities, and in the three
countries

14 The countries reviewed included Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Turkey.
15 IDP Coverage in State Department Human Rights Reports Brookings
Institution Memorandum (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, Aug.
24, 1998).

we visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection
actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such
coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic
information about the location of their protection officers and effective
approaches to protection interventions. The U. N. Security Council is one
forum where these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying
political and security factors.

The U. S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its
efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government
activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and
offices. Some State and USAID officials believe that providing assistance to
the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a

locus of accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although
the Department of State is required to provide the Congress with an annual
report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited
information about the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover,
the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing
information about the internally displaced and their human rights condition

that would allow concerned parties to access the information readily.
Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on
internally displaced persons would identify what we found to be a
significant problem and would provide U. S. government and international and
nongovernmental organizations? officials with country- level data to craft a
cohesive program and policy response.

Recommendations for To strengthen the international response to the plight
of the internally Executive Action

displaced, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent
Representative of the United States to the United Nations (1) work to
advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist
internally displaced persons and (2) seek with other member states to

strengthen international organizations? protection efforts by encouraging
them to implement a training program for international organizations and to
form country- level protection working groups. We also recommend that the
Secretary of State include a focus on internal displacement issues in

State?s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

Agency Comments and State, USAID, the United Nations, and the Red Cross
Movement provided Our Evaluation

written comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III to VI) Both State
and the United Nations emphasized that lack of resources seriously
undermines international efforts to address the protection and assistance

needs of the internally displaced. This report recognizes that shortfalls in
funding for internally displaced persons programs have had a negative impact
on the international response; nevertheless, we believe our recommendations
can be implemented by international organizations within existing resources.
State said this report is useful in drawing attention to the phenomenon of
internal displacement and identifying areas of concern that the State

Department and USAID are working to address. State agreed with our
recommendations to work toward more proactive programs to protect internally
displaced persons and in- country training programs and working

groups for protection. Concerning our recommendation for improved reporting
on internal displacement in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, State said that it recognizes the importance of reporting on
issues related to internally displaced persons and stated that such
information is found throughout the report. State said it strives to use

systematic language when referring to internally displaced persons, and it
will continue its efforts to report on internally displaced persons. USAID
stated that the report identifies issues of concern that it is actively
working to address. USAID agreed with our recommendation to work with other
countries and international organizations to advance programs that protect
and assist internally displaced persons. Regarding the report?s

discussion about the lack of an overall policy and a lead office for
addressing the issue of internal displacement, USAID noted that its efforts
are directed by the Foreign Assistance Manual, which states that ?AID/ OFDA
has responsibility for assisting people displaced within their own country
as a result of natural or man- made disasters.? State said that there are
pros and cons to designating a lead humanitarian office.

The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement noted that steps are being
taken to improve coordination among international agencies at the
headquarter level and that initiatives such as the U. N. ?s Senior Inter-
Agency Network on Internally Displaced Persons are examining the
institutional

arrangements within and between the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement,
and nongovernmental organizations. We recognize that some coordinating
activities have been recently initiated; however, as discussed

in this report, we believe particular focus should be placed on improving
country- level coordination mechanisms, especially in the area of
protection.

The World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the High Commissioner
for Refugees, the Brookings Institution, and the Norwegian Refugee Council
provided technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as
appropriate.

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days
from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on International
Relations, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U. S. Agency for
International Development, the U. N. Secretary General, and the President of
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. We
will also then send copies to others who are interested and make copies
available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 4128 if you or your staff have any questions
about this report. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed
in appendix VII.

Harold J. Johnson, Director International Affairs and Trade

Appendi Appendi xes x I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology At the request of the Chairman and the
Ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we
assessed (1) whether international organizations have adequately protected
internally displaced persons, and if not, what impediments these agencies
face; (2) whether international organizations have met the food and other
assistance needs of displaced populations; and (3) whether the U. S.
government has a

coordinated and effectively managed program to help ensure the protection of
and assistance to internally displaced persons. To assess whether
international agencies have adequately provided protection and assistance to
internally displaced persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy,
program, and budgetary documents from the U. N. Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs, the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U. N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Food Program, the U. N.
Development Program, the U. N. Children?s Fund, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies. We met with officials and reviewed reports pertaining to
humanitarian and

internal displacement issues from numerous think tanks and nongovernmental
organizations, including the Brookings Institution?s Project on Internal
Displacement, the U. S. Committee for Refugees, InterAction, and the
Norwegian Refugee Council.

To assess the extent to which the U. S. government coordinates and manages
its efforts to ensure protection and assistance to internally displaced
persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy and program documents
from the Department of State?s Office of Policy Planning; the Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes
Issues; and the U. S. Missions to the

United Nations in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. We also analyzed a
judgmental sample of country reports from the Department of State?s Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 to determine the extent to which
the issue of internal displacement is addressed. We met with officials and
analyzed program documents for the U. S.

International Agency for Development?s (USAID) Bureau of Humanitarian
Response, including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Office of
Transition Initiatives, and the Office of Food for Peace. We also developed
a field- level survey that was completed by U. N. Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinators and officials from the Red Cross Movement and nongovernmental
organizations. The survey solicited

information on demographics, the effectiveness of international programs,

and program management of aid and protection efforts for internally
displaced persons. The survey asked for information based upon criteria set
forth in the normative framework of protection and assistance principles
outlined in the 1998 U. N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and
included modifications based upon recommendations

from relief and protection experts from the United Nations, the Red Cross
Movement, and think tanks. We sent an electronic copy of the survey
directly, and through points of contact at the headquarters of the United
Nations, the Red Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organizations, to
field- level officials in more than 50 countries. A total of 120 usable
surveys from 48 countries were returned from the various organizations; an
additional 10 surveys were received but could not be used because key
questions were not answered. The number of surveys returned from each
country varied from one to eight. To provide equal weight to the opinions
coming from each country, we computed a countrywide average response for
each item. Thus, the unit of analysis was the 48 countries, rather than the
120 surveys. For questions that asked for a ?yes? or ?no? answer, the
countrywide

answer was coded ?yes? if 50 percent or more of the respondents from the
country responded ?yes.? Countrywide mean ratings were also computed for
questions that asked for the extent to which aid/ protection concerns were
being addressed (rating scale: 1 = Not applicable/ Not at all, 2 = Small
extent, 3 = Moderate extent, 4 = Great extent, 5 = Very great extent). The

countrywide means were rounded (and collapsed to three categories) so that
the percentage of countries at each point on the extent scale could be
ascertained. If the countrywide mean was 1.00 to 1. 49, the aid/ protection
intervention was judged to be not occurring at all. If the mean was 1. 50 to
3.49 or 3.50 to 5.00, the intervention was characterized as occurring to a
small/ moderate extent or a great/ very great extent, respectively. Because
we were unable to determine the total number of countries or officials that
received the survey in each country, we were unable to project the findings

with a specified degree of precision to the population of all countries with
internally displaced persons.

We also performed fieldwork in our case study countries of Burundi,
Colombia, and southern Sudan to determine the effectiveness of international
organizations? responses to the protection and assistance

needs of internally displaced persons. These three countries are
experiencing long- standing internal displacement crises, with large
population movements and programs operated by the U. N. system, the Red

Cross Movement, nongovernmental organizations, and the U. S. government.
During our fieldwork, we met with officials from these organizations
responsible for providing protection and assistance to the internally
displaced. We also met with other donor governments and their aid agencies,
with host government and opposition groups involved in the displacement
crisis, and with internally displaced persons who were recipients of
international assistance. We observed first- hand assistance

programs designed to assist displaced populations and attended coordination
meetings by country teams. Due to security concerns, we were unable to
travel within southern Sudan; however, we met with agency and
nongovernmental organization officials in Nairobi and Lokichoggio,

Kenya, who conduct relief activities in southern Sudan both within and
outside the U. N.- sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan program. We performed
our review from September 2000 through June 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and

Appendi x II

Sudan Burundi Burundi is a poor, densely populated country in East Africa.
More than 90 percent of the country?s 6.6 million population is dependent on
subsistence agriculture for survival. Over 3 million people- half the
population- needed food assistance in 2000 because of drought or war.
Burundi?s majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi populations have
struggled

against each other for economic and political power for 30 years, with a
small number of Tutsi elite having dominated the country?s politics and
military since independence in 1962.

Periodic military crackdowns slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people
during the 1970s and 1980s. The victims were overwhelmingly Hutu. The first
democratic election in 1993 elected a Hutu president. However, elements
within the Tutsi- dominated military assassinated the President in 1993,
triggering a wave of violence. A 1996 coup eliminated the rest of the

democratically elected government, and the Tutsi elites shifted back into
power. An insurgency by Hutu rebels and a counterinsurgency campaign by the
government have claimed tens of thousands of lives and caused mass internal
displacement in an ongoing civil war that continues today. The military has
pursued a regroupment policy starting in 1996, requiring an estimated
350,000 persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment camps, to
prevent those living in the countryside from supporting the

rebels. The camps had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to
water, food, shelter, and medicine, according to the U. S. Committee for
Refugees. International organizations could not reach many of the
government?s forced regroupment camps due to inadequate infrastructure or
because they were prevented from doing so by security forces.

The government?s and the rebels? human rights record are poor, according to
the Department of State?s human rights report. Combatants on both sides
deliberately uprooted civilian populations and targeted displacement camps
for attack. Government forces and rebels committed large- scale atrocities
against civilians. According to Amnesty International, the armed

forces and rebel groups have continued to show complete disregard for human
life, acting with little or no accountability. Scores of civilians were
killed in ambushes. Humanitarian workers were also killed and attacked. On
numerous occasions, rebel groups killed unarmed civilians in reprisal for
alleged collaboration with the government or for failing to support them.

The U. S. government has made humanitarian relief its priority response in
Burundi. Inadequate harvests during the last three seasons due to conflict
and drought have caused severe malnutrition in several provinces.
USAIDfunded programs implemented by nongovernmental organizations and U. N.
agencies primarily focused on life- sustaining activities such as food
security assistance (provision of livestock, seeds, and tools), health care,
and supplementary nutrition programs. In fiscal year 2001, the U. S.
government provided an estimated $5.8 million in food aid and another $3
million to combat HIV/ AIDS and promote human rights and democracy. In
addition, the U. S. government is a significant contributor to the programs

of the World Food Program and the U. N. ?s Children Fund in Burundi. Figure
10 shows a USAID- assisted family.

Figure 10: Members of a Teenage- headed Household That Receives Food
Security and Shelter Assistance from USAID, 2000

Note: The smallest child is age 4 and suffers from stunting due to chronic
malnutrition. Source: GAO.

Colombia The roots of the conflict in Colombia go back to a power struggle
between liberals and conservatives in the late 1940s. Between 1947 and 1957,
the fighting claimed more than 300,000 lives and forced more than 1 million
Colombians to abandon their homes, according to the International Committee
of the Red Cross. In subsequent years, rural defense groups sprung up in
various parts of the country. Some of them turned into guerilla groups with
strong Marxist leanings. In later years, paramilitary

groups appeared. The addition of a flourishing drug trade combined to create
a complex and violent civil conflict that has resulted in the cumulative
displacement of millions of people.

Attempts to end the violence over the years have produced neither
substantive agreements nor a decrease in the levels of violence. In 1999,
the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion, multiyear
strategy designed to support the peace process, an antinarcotics

strategy, democratization, and the provision of humanitarian assistance.
However, the Colombian government faces serious challenges, as armed
paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotic traffickers exert influence
over more than one- third of the country?s municipalities. Furthermore, the
government?s human rights record is poor. According to the Department of
State?s human rights reporting, government forces commit serious abuses,
including extrajudicial killings. Members of security forces collaborate
with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in some instances

allowing them to pass through roadblocks, sharing information, or providing
ammunition and supplies.

Paramilitary groups and guerillas were responsible for the vast majority of
political and other killings, according to the Department of State?s human
rights report. Throughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured,
and threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an
orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby

depriving guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to
challenge the guerrilla groups for control of narcotic cultivations and
strategically important territories. The two main guerrilla groups- the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN)- are reported by the Department of State to regularly attack
civilian populations and commit massacres and summary

executions. They are also reported to have killed religious and medical
personnel. Plan Colombia is being supported by the U. S. government with a
$1.3 billion assistance package that was approved in June 2000. In addition
to drug eradication and interdiction efforts, U. S funding is supporting (1)
democracy programs and the peace process, (2) reduction of opium and cocoa
cultivation through alternative development, and (3) assistance to
internally displaced persons. USAID programs were focused on providing
assistance to internally displaced persons in the reestablishment, or
postflight, stage of displacement. This phase of displacement represents a

major gap in the international community?s response in Colombia. USAIDfunded
activities focused on secondary cities bearing the brunt of internally
displaced populations and included food- for- work community projects,

income generation and long- term economic opportunities, primary education,
and shelter. State- funded activities of the World Food Program and the Pan
American Health Organization focused on areas of capacitybuilding to improve
health care delivery to displaced persons and supplementary feeding programs
for women and children. Figure 11 shows

Colombian women engaged in an income generation project.

Figure 11: An Internally Displaced Persons Community Outside of Bogota,
Colombia, 2001 Note: Women manufacturing low- cost clothing items sold in
retail stores and local markets in

Colombia. Source: GAO.

Sudan Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been at war
nearly its entire independent existence. The conflict started just before
independence in 1955, when the ruling north refused to share power with the
south. This phase of the conflict, which lasted 17 years and claimed several
hundreds of thousands of lives, ended in 1972 with the signing of a peace
agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, fighting resumed in 1983 when
southern black troops in the national army created the Sudanese People?s
Liberation Army and demanded a change of government in the capital,
Khartoum, and a fair share of the resources for all regions in the country.
In addition to the conflict between the regular army and the

Sudanese People?s Liberation Army, fighting has raged between various
militias allied with these two parties. The civil war, which is estimated to
have resulted in the death of 2 million

persons, and the internal displacement of several million more has continued
into its 18 th year. There has been no significant progress toward peace in
years and Department of State officials believe the current situation is
likely to go on indefinitely. Neither side appears to have the ability to
win the war militarily, although oil revenues have allowed the government to
invest increasingly in military hardware. Presently, the government controls
virtually all of the northern two- thirds of the country but is limited to
garrison towns in the south.

The drive for oil and territorial control over newly operational oil fields
is now central to the conflict that has long been rooted in racial,
cultural, religious, and political differences. Government forces have
pursued a scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around a
newly built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities. These forces
have killed and injured civilians, destroyed villages, and driven out
inhabitants in

order to create an unoccupied security zone, according to Department of
State reporting. The government has also blocked or harassed humanitarian
relief operations. The Sudanese People?s Liberation Army has been guilty of
property theft from nongovernmental organizations and U. N. agencies
operating in the south, according to the Department of State. Militia
factions have manipulated humanitarian aid programs to gain food for their
troops and have conscripted new soldiers from camps housing refugees and
internally displaced persons. The militias are also guilty of committing
serious human rights abuses. According to Amnesty International, militia
forces frequently change sides depending on their perceived interests or the

supply of arms. The government pursues a policy of providing support and
weapons to the various militia commanders and encouraging interfactional
fighting. It is estimated that more people have died as a result of
interfactional fighting between militias than in armed encounters with
government forces.

Since 1991, the United States has provided $1.2 billion in humanitarian
assistance to Sudan. Because the government of Sudan is involved in gross
human rights violations and support of international terrorism, the United
States provides only humanitarian assistance in government- controlled areas
but both development and humanitarian assistance in oppositioncontrolled
areas. USAID programs provide emergency food and nonfood aid (blankets,
kitchen items, and plastic sheeting) in areas of displacement and
resettlement. With increased emergency needs related to the many

active conflict zones and large simultaneous displacements, USAID is
providing life- sustaining assistance to extremely vulnerable populations.
Most assistance is provided through Operation Lifeline Sudan, which is a
consortium of U. N. agencies and more than 40 international nongovernmental
organizations. In fiscal year 2001, the U. S. government provided an
estimated $4 million in direct program assistance, in addition to U. S.
contributions to the programs of international organizations, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the U. N. Children?s Fund.

Appendi x II I Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Comments From the U. S. Agency for

Appendi x V I International Development

Appendi x V Comments From the United Nations

Comments From the International Red Cross

Appendi x VI and Red Crescent Movement

Appendi x VII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Harold Johnson (202)
512- 3540 Tetsuo Miyabara (202) 512- 8974 Acknowledgments In addition to
those named above, Patrick Dickriede, Norman Thorpe, Jack

Edwards, Ernie Jackson, Zina Merritt, and Rona Mendelsohn made key
contributions to this report.

(711562) Lett er

Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional
copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are
accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single
address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail: U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington,
DC 20013

Orders by visiting: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U. S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC

Orders by phone: (202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone

phone. A recorded menu will provide information on how to obtain these
lists.

Orders by Internet: For information on how to access GAO reports on the
Internet, send an e- mail message with ?info? in the body to:

info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov

To Report Fraud, Contact one:

Waste, or Abuse in  Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet.
htm

Federal Programs

 e- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov  1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering
system)

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Page i GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Contents

Contents Page ii GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 1 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 1 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

A

Page 2 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 3 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 4 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 5 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 6 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 7 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 8 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 9 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 10 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 11 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 12 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 13 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 14 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 15 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 16 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 17 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 18 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 19 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 20 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 21 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 22 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 23 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 24 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 25 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 26 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 27 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 28 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 29 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 30 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 31 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 32 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 33 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 34 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 35 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 36 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 37 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 38 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix I

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 39 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 40 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 41 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 42 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 43 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 44 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 45 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 46 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix II Country Profiles: Burundi, Colombia, and Sudan

Page 47 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 48 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III

Appendix III Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Page 49 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Page 50 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Page 51 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Page 52 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix III Comments From the U. S. Department of State

Page 53 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 54 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix IV

Page 55 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 56 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix V

Appendix V Comments From the United Nations

Page 57 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 58 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix VI

Appendix VI Comments From the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement

Page 59 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix VI Comments From the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement

Page 60 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Page 61 GAO- 01- 803 Foreign Affairs

Appendix VII

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested Presorted Standard

Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***