Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and	 
Maintenance Effectiveness (31-JUL-01, GAO-01-772).		 
								 
Having spare parts available when needed to perform required	 
maintenance is critical to the Department of Defense's		 
accomplishment of its missions. Shortages of spare parts are a	 
key indicator of supply system problems that can result in the	 
unavailability of weapon systems to meet mission requirements.	 
Despite additional funding by Congress to address this issue, the
Army is still reporting concerns about spare parts shortages.	 
Aviation spare parts shortages for the Apache, Blackhawk, and	 
Chinook helicopters have adversely affected operations and led to
inefficient maintenance practices that have lowered morale of	 
maintenance personnel. Specifically, while the three helicopters 
generally met their mission-capable goals, indicating that spare 
parts shortages have not affected their mission capability,	 
supply availability rates and the cannibalization of parts from  
one aircraft to another indicate that spare parts shortages have 
indeed been a problem. Cannibalization is an inefficient practice
that results in double the work for maintenance personnel, masks 
parts shortages, and lowers morale of maintenance personnel. The 
reasons for the unavailability of parts included actual demands  
for parts that were greater than anticipated, delays in obtaining
parts from a contractor, and problems concerning overhaul and	 
maintenance. Furthermore, according to Army and Defense Logistics
Agency officials, a contributing factor to the shortages was the 
Army's inability to obtain parts for these aging aircraft from	 
the original part manufacturers, which may no longer be in	 
business. The Army and Defense Logistics Agency have initiatives 
underway or planned that are designed to improve the availability
of aviation parts. Some of these initiatives are new or in the	 
planning stages. Once they are more fully developed, GAO will	 
review them to determine whether there are opportunities to	 
enhance them.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-772 					        
    ACCNO:   A01253						        
  TITLE:     Army Inventory: Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations 
             and Maintenance Effectiveness                                    
     DATE:   07/31/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft maintenance				 
	     Helicopters					 
	     Inventory control systems				 
	     Spare parts					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Aircraft components				 
	     Military aircraft					 
	     Army procurement					 
	     Apache Helicopter					 
	     Army Strategic Logistics Plan			 
	     Army Velocity Management Program			 
	     Army Working Capital Fund				 
	     Blackhawk Helicopter				 
	     Chinook Helicopter 				 
	     DOD Logistics Strategic Plan			 
	     CH-47 Helicopter					 
	     UH-60 Helicopter					 
	     AH-64 Helicopter					 

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GAO-01-772
     
Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 ARMY INVENTORY Parts Shortages Are Impacting Operations and
Maintenance Effectiveness

GAO- 01- 772

Page i GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Parts Shortages Adversely Affect Operations,
Maintenance, and

Personnel 7 Key Reasons for Shortages Were Unanticipated Demands and

Delays in Obtaining Parts From Contractors 15 Overall Initiatives May
Address Parts Shortages 22 Agency Comments 27 Scope and Methodology 27

Appendix I Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages
31

Appendix II Reasons for Shortages of Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
Helicopters? Spare Parts 33

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 34

Related GAO Products 35

Table

Table 1: Reasons for Shortages of 90 Spare Parts Reviewed 15

Figures

Figure 1: Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook Helicopters 5 Figure 2: Process for
Providing Spare Parts to Customers 6 Figure 3: Mission- Capable Rates for
the Apache, Blackhawk, and

Chinook Helicopters during Fiscal Years 1996- 2000 8 Figure 4: Gear for the
Chinook Helicopter 9 Figure 5: Supply Availability Rates for the Apache,
Blackhawk, and

Chinook Helicopters during Fiscal Years 1999- 2000 10 Figure 6: Rotary Wing
Heads for Chinook 12 Contents

Page ii GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 7: Repairs Require Two Steps, Cannibalizations Four 14 Figure 8:
Apache Main Rotor Blade Attach Pin 17 Figure 9: Housing Assembly for Apache
18 Figure 10: Rotor Damper for Apache 19 Figure 11: Fuel Boost Pump 20
Figure 12: Blackhawk T- 700 Engine 21

Page 1 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

July 31, 2001 Congressional Committees Having spare parts available when
needed to perform required maintenance is critical to the Department of
Defense?s accomplishment of its missions. Shortages of spare parts are a key
indicator of supply system problems that can result in the unavailability of
weapon systems to meet mission requirements. Despite additional funding
provided by the Congress to address this issue, the Army is still reporting
concerns about spare parts shortages. Since 1990 we have designated the
Department of Defense?s management of its inventory, including spare parts,
as high risk because its inventory is vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse
and its management systems and procedures were ineffective.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P. L. 106- 65,
sec. 364) requires us to evaluate various aspects of the military services?
logistics support capability, including the provision of spare parts. Also,
the Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations, and the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on Appropriations, requested that
we review issues related to the quality and availability of spare parts for
aircraft, ships, vehicles, and weapon systems. In response to the mandate
and requests, we reviewed known spare parts shortages within the services.
For this report, we determined (1) the impact spare parts shortages had on
three selected Army helicopters and (2) the reasons for the shortages.
Additionally, we identified the overall initiatives that the Army and the
Defense Logistics Agency, which are responsible for managing and providing
the spare parts, have in place or planned to address spare parts shortages.
We will be discussing in separate reports our reviews on the availability of
spare parts in the Air Force and the Navy, the quality of spare parts,
funding for spare parts, and war reserves requirements for spare parts. 1

To address our reporting objectives, we selected the Apache, Blackhawk, and
Chinook helicopters. To determine the impact spare parts shortages had on
these helicopters, we reviewed data that measure the effectiveness

1 Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding is
Lacking

(GAO- 01- 472, June 11, 2001) and Defense Inventory: Army War Reserve Spare
Parts Requirements Are Uncertain (GAO- 01- 425, May 10, 2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

of inventory operations in fulfilling units? requests for spare parts. Also,
we reviewed data that measure the aircraft?s highest operational readiness
possible with available resources. To determine the reasons for the known
shortages, we selected and reviewed 90 parts that were in short supply in
fiscal year 2000 for these helicopters. To identify overall initiatives that
address spare parts shortages, we obtained documentation and the Army?s and
the Defense Logistics Agency?s views. However, we did not review the
initiatives.

Aviation spare parts shortages for the three helicopters we reviewed have
adversely affected operations and led to inefficient maintenance practices
that have lowered morale of maintenance personnel. Specifically, while the
Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters generally met their mission-
capable goals, indicating that parts shortages have not affected their
mission capability, supply availability rates and the cannibalization 2 of
parts from one aircraft to another indicate that spare parts shortages have
indeed been a problem. Cannibalization is an inefficient practice that
results in double the work for maintenance personnel, masks parts shortages,
and lowers morale of maintenance personnel. According to the Army?s Deputy
Chief of Staff for Logistics, masking supply shortages through extensive use
of cannibalization is a continuing problem the Army is working to resolve.

The reasons for the unavailability of the 90 parts we reviewed included
actual demands for parts that were greater than anticipated, delays in
obtaining parts from a contractor, and problems concerning overhaul and
maintenance. For example, because a cracked gear in a Chinook transmission
was discovered during an overhaul, the entire fleet was grounded in August
1999. As a result, the demand for the part has been much greater than
anticipated. Also, Defense Logistics Agency records show that as a result of
a contractor?s late deliveries of Apache shear bolts, the Agency did not
have the parts available for Apache users. Additionally, due to a shortage
of parts the Army experienced problems that prevented it from repairing and
overhauling Blackhawk T- 700 engines in a timely

2 The Navy and the Air Force refer to cannibalization as the removal of
usable parts from one aircraft for installation on another. The Army refers
to this practice as controlled exchange. The Army?s definition of
cannibalization is the removal of components from equipment designated for
disposal. Throughout the report, we refer to controlled exchange as
cannibalization. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

manner. Furthermore, according to Army and Defense Logistics Agency
officials, a contributing factor to the shortages was the Army?s inability
to obtain parts for these aging aircraft from the original part
manufacturers, which may no longer be in business. However, we did not find
this factor to be a reason for the shortages of the parts we reviewed.

The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency have initiatives under way or
planned that are designed to improve the availability of aviation parts. The
initiatives generally address the reasons we identified for spare parts
shortages. For example, the Army Materiel Command established a team to
analyze the spare parts programs, and the team identified issues affecting
spare parts shortages, such as unanticipated demands and changes in the
useful life of parts because of safety concerns. To help resolve aircraft
spare parts shortages, the Defense Logistics Agency implemented an
investment strategy that focuses on replenishing aviation repair parts
identified as having availability problems. Additionally, the Army has
developed a Strategic Logistics Plan that is designed to change its current
approach to one that is more effective, efficient, and responsive. The
plan?s initiatives for resolving spare parts shortages are linked to the
asset management process under the Army?s planned change in approach. Some
of these initiatives are new or in the planning stages. Once the initiatives
are more fully developed, we plan to review them to determine whether there
are opportunities to enhance them.

We have previously reported problems with the way the Army has implemented
its logistics initiatives and recommended that it develop a management
framework for its initiatives, to include a comprehensive strategy and
performance plan. 3 The Army has actions under way to address the
recommendation; therefore, we are not making any additional recommendations
at this time. The Department of Defense generally concurred with this
report.

In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense management challenges
and noted that the Department has had serious weaknesses in its management
of logistics functions and, in particular, inventory

3 Defense Inventory: Improved Management Framework Needed to Guide Army Best
Practice Initiatives (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 217, Sept. 14, 1999). Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

management. 4 We have identified inventory management as a high- risk area
since 1990. 5 Despite years of efforts to resolve its inventory problems,
the Department still has spare parts shortages. (See app. I for examples
from our reports on management weaknesses related to the Army?s spare parts
shortages.) We are also reviewing Department of Defense?s practice of
cannibalization of parts on aircraft; this report will be completed at a
later date.

In a separate report issued earlier this year, we indicated that current
financial information did not show the extent to which funds were used for
spare parts. 6 The Department of Defense planned to annually develop
detailed financial management information on spare parts funding uses but
had not planned to provide it to the Congress. When we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense routinely provide this information to the Congress as
an integral part of the Department?s annual budget justification, the
Department agreed to do so.

The Department of Defense submits quarterly reports to the Congress
regarding military readiness. The reports describe readiness problems and
remedial actions, comprehensive readiness indicators for active components,
and unit readiness indicators. The Army?s readiness reports provide
assessments of its major systems, which include aircraft. The readiness goal
for aircraft is to have 70 to 80 percent mission capable. 7

The Apache (AH- 64) is the Army?s main attack helicopter and is equipped to
destroy, disrupt, or delay enemy forces. Originally produced in fiscal year
1982, it is designed to fight and survive during the day and night and in
adverse weather throughout the world. The Blackhawk (UH- 60), first fielded
in 1978, primarily performs air assault, air cavalry, and medical evacuation
missions. The Chinook (CH- 47), first used in Vietnam in 1962, moves
artillery, ammunition, personnel, and supplies on the battlefield. Figure 1
shows the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters.

4 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense

(GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). 5 High Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263, Jan.
2001).

6 Defense Inventory: Information on the Use of Spare Parts Funding is
Lacking

(GAO- 01- 472, June 11, 2001). 7 Mission- capable equipment and systems can
fulfill at least one or more of their missions.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 1: Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook Helicopters

Source: Defense Visual Information Center.

The Army?s spare parts include reparable and consumable parts. Reparable
parts are expensive items, such as hydraulic pumps, navigational computers,
and landing gear, that can be fixed and used again. The Aviation and Missile
Command manages reparable parts. The Corpus Christi Army Depot and
contractors repair helicopters and aviation

Page 6 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

reparable parts. The Defense Logistics Agency provides the Army consumable
parts (e. g., nuts, bearings, and fuses), which are used extensively to fix
reparable parts and aircraft, and manages a large part of the warehousing
and distribution of reparable parts. The Defense Supply Center, Richmond, is
the lead center for managing aviation consumable spare parts. Figure 2 shows
the process for providing spare parts to Army helicopter units and the
repair facilities.

Figure 2: Process for Providing Spare Parts to Customers

Source: GAO.

Page 7 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

While the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters generally met their
mission- capable goals during fiscal years 1999- 2000, indicating that parts
shortages have not affected mission capability, supply availability rates
and the cannibalization of parts indicate that spare parts shortages have
indeed been a problem. These parts shortages created inefficiencies in
maintenance processes and procedures that have lowered morale of maintenance
personnel.

As shown in figure 3, during fiscal years 1996- 2000, the three helicopters
we reviewed generally met their mission- capable goals. In fiscal year 1996,
the Blackhawk?s mission- capable rate was 79.25 percent, which according to
an Aviation and Missile Command official, was just slightly below its
readiness goal of 80 percent. Also, the Command official mentioned the
Blackhawk probably did not exactly meet its mission- capable goal for many
reasons, including several aviation safety action messages that were issued
that year. These messages identified maintenance, technical, or general
problems for which the safety condition of the aircraft had been determined
to be a low to medium risk. The Chinook and the Apache did not meet their
mission- capable goal of 75 percent in August and November 1999,
respectively, when the entire fleet of helicopters was grounded because of
?safety restrictions.? A safety restriction pertains to any defect or
hazardous condition that can cause personal injury, death, or damage to
aircraft, components, or repair parts for which a medium to high safety risk
has been determined. Parts Shortages

Adversely Affect Operations, Maintenance, and Personnel

Mission- Capable Goals for Helicopters Generally Met

Page 8 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 3: Mission- Capable Rates for the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
Helicopters during Fiscal Years 1996- 2000

Source: Our analysis of Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics data.

The Chinook was grounded because of a cracked gear in the transmission,
which was already in short supply before the safety restriction. The gear
changes the direction of power from the engine and reduces the speed that
turns the rotor blades (see fig. 4). The Apache helicopters were grounded
because of transmission clutch failures. According to an Army official, the
clutch engages and disengages the gears in the transmission. Also, Aviation
and Missile Command officials mentioned the grounding of these helicopters
created demands for parts that the wholesale system did not have available.
The safety concerns coupled with the lack of spare parts contributed to
these helicopters? failure to meet their mission- capable goals.

Page 9 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 4: Gear for the Chinook Helicopter

Source: Army.

As shown in figure 5, during fiscal years 1999- 2000, parts for the Apache
and Blackhawk helicopters seldom met the Army?s supply availability goal of
85 percent. 8 The supply availability rate is the percentage of requisitions
filled at the wholesale 9 inventory level. The goal is designed to measure
the overall effectiveness of the wholesale system. While the Blackhawk met
the supply availability goal only twice during the 2- year period, the
Apache never met the goal. We identified several reasons for spare parts
shortages, which will be discussed later.

8 The supply availability goal is not designed as a target for individual
weapon systems. It is a Department of Defense funding goal, and there is no
direct correlation between this goal and the operational readiness goals
established for Army weapon systems.

9 The wholesale system is comprised of subordinate commands that procure
supplies directly from vendors and hold inventories of stock to meet demands
of retail customers. Retail customers are field- operating commands, which
receive support from the wholesale level. Spare Parts Not Available

to Meet Supply Goals

Page 10 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 5: Supply Availability Rates for the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
Helicopters during Fiscal Years 1999- 2000

Note: The Army maintains supply availability rates for individual
helicopters for only 2 years but maintains overall aviation supply rates up
to 9 years. Therefore, we selected supply availability rates for individual
helicopters for the past 2 fiscal years.

Source: Our analysis using Army Materiel Command data.

To compensate for the lack of spare parts, maintenance personnel use
cannibalizations or substitutions of parts from one aircraft to another.
According to the Army Aviation Maintenance Field Manual 3- 04.500,
cannibalization is done when, among other things, (1) the aircraft from
which the exchanged parts will be used is grounded and awaiting repair
parts; (2) needed repair parts are on order before the cannibalization; (3)
the parts will return the other aircraft to a mission- capable status; and
(4) all possible alternatives (local procurement or manufacturers) have been
tried without success. A January 2000 aviation logistics study showed Parts
Shortages Have

Resulted in Cannibalizations That Have Lowered Morale of Maintenance
Personnel

Page 11 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

that cannibalization is an accepted maintenance practice at the unit level
to return aircraft to mission- capable status. 10 According to a Fort
Campbell 101st Airborne Division official, the principal reason for
cannibalizations is the nonavailability of serviceable repair parts. The
results from our spare parts review showed that cannibalizations at Fort
Campbell were done on the Apache and Blackhawk main fuel controls, the
Blackhawk engines, and the Chinook rotary wing head. The rotary wing head is
the main assembly of the rotor system that produces lift, thrust, and
directional control needed for helicopter flight. Figure 6 shows the rotary
wing head. Fort Campbell?s contractor maintenance personnel also used
cannibalizations on the Apache housing assembly and actuator bracket and the
Chinook aircraft access door. The actuator bracket anchors the servocylinder
11 to the aircraft. Although the previous examples show units? reliance on
cannibalization to overcome the unavailability of parts, the practice does
not resolve spare parts shortages. According to the Army?s Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, supply shortages, which are masked through extensive
use of cannibalizations, are a continuing problem the Army is working to
resolve. 12

10 Aviation Logistics Study 99: Controlled Substitution Study, Jan. 7, 2000.
The Army study further states that the three primary reasons for the
practice of controlled substitution are to (1) keep operational rates up,
(2) circumvent long lead times for requisitioned parts, and (3) have parts
available when funds are limited at the end of the fiscal year.

11 The servocylinder is a hydraulically controlled cylinder that is attached
to the main rotors and responds to the pilot?s steering the helicopter
forward, backward, or from side to side.

12 Statement by Lieutenant General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, U. S. Army, to the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, May 22, 2001.

Page 12 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 6: Rotary Wing Heads for Chinook

Note: The arrows point to the rotary wing heads. Source: Army.

As we testified in May 2001, according to Army officials, only a small
portion of Army cannibalizations are reported (only for serial- numbered
parts). 13 The Army does not track cannibalizations servicewide and does not
require subordinate commands to do so. Therefore, the full extent to which
this practice is used is unknown. However, the Floyd D. Spence National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (P. L. 106- 398, sec. 371)
requires the Department of Defense to measure, on a quarterly basis, the
extent to which units remove usable parts, supplies, or equipment from one
vehicle, vessel, or aircraft in order to render a different system
operational. The Department is working to establish definitions, standards,
and a shared framework for the collection and reporting of data on
cannibalization. The first report of these data is

13 Military Aircraft: Cannibalizations Adversely Affect Personnel and
Maintenance

(GAO- 01- 693T, May 22, 2001).

Page 13 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

targeted for the April- June 2001 Quarterly Readiness Report to the
Congress.

Although cannibalization may keep aircraft flying, it is not an efficient
practice. According to the January 2000 aviation logistics study, this
practice doubles the hours dedicated to a single maintenance effort. With
limited hours available to conduct repairs and maintenance, the duplication
of effort is a significant factor in whether or not to use the practice.
Also, as we testified in May 2001, this practice requires at least twice the
maintenance time of normal repairs because it involves removing and
installing components from two aircraft instead of one (see fig. 7).
Additionally, when a mechanic removes a part from an aircraft to place on
another one, the risk of damaging the aircraft and/ or the ?good?

part in the process is magnified.

Page 14 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 7: Repairs Require Two Steps, Cannibalizations Four

Source: GAO.

As we testified in May 2001, evidence suggests that cannibalizations have
negatively affected morale because they are sometimes seen as routinely
making unrealistic demands on maintenance personnel. According to a Fort
Campbell official, the added workload of cannibalization detracts from the
quality of life for aircraft maintenance soldiers. Also, an Army official
said the added workload degrades maintenance soldiers? morale. 14
Cannibalizations may need to be quickly performed at any time, day or

14 Statement by Lieutenant General Charles S. Mahan, Jr., Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, U. S. Army, to the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, May 22, 2001.

Page 15 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

night, to meet operational commitments. In such cases, personnel must
continue working until the job is done, regardless of how much time it
takes. Further, in August 1999 we reported that the majority of factors
cited by military personnel as sources of dissatisfaction and reasons for
leaving the military were work- related circumstances such as the lack of
parts and materials to successfully complete daily job requirements. 15

Our review showed that the primary reasons for shortages of spare parts for
the Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters were demands not anticipated
for parts and delays in obtaining parts from a contractor. Also, problems
concerning overhaul and maintenance of spare parts created shortages. A
contributing factor, which was not identified in our review but which Army
and Defense Logistics Agency officials acknowledged, was the difficulty in
obtaining parts for these aging helicopters because original manufacturers
may no longer be in business.

We selected for review 90 spare parts for the Apache (32 parts), Blackhawk
(34 parts), and Chinook (24 parts) helicopters. Officials at the units and
repair facilities identified shortages of these 90 parts as not being
available to complete repairs. (See app. II for a list of these parts.)
Table 1 shows the reasons for the shortages, by helicopter, for the 90 spare
parts we reviewed.

Table 1: Reasons for Shortages of 90 Spare Parts Reviewed Reason a Apache
Blackhawk Chinook Total Percent

Actual demand was greater than anticipated 21 23 13 57 63 Contractual delays
11 4 6 21 23 Problems concerning overhaul/ maintenance 04 2 67 Other b 03 3
67

Total 32 34 24 90

15 Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention
Critical Specialties (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 197BR, Aug. 16, 1999). Key Reasons for

Shortages Were Unanticipated Demands and Delays in Obtaining Parts From
Contractors

Selected Systems Have Experienced Parts Shortages for Several Reasons

Page 16 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

a There were multiple reasons for parts shortages, but for the purpose of
our analysis, we used the most predominant reason. b Includes unknown
reasons for shortages and incorrect inventory records.

Source: GAO.

The major reason for the shortages of the 90 spare parts we reviewed was
that demands for parts were not anticipated due to unforeseen safety
concerns, the recalculation of parts? useful life, and other sudden
increases in demands. The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency forecast the
demand for parts using past data on the usage of parts, when available. 16
According to an Army document, a demand that was not anticipated results in
the need for parts that the Army had not planned for when determining
requirements for parts. A June 2000 Army Audit Agency report also cited
demands that were not anticipated as a main factor causing parts shortages.
17

Parts identified as causing safety problems resulted in unanticipated
demands for spare parts and created shortages. For example, according to a
safety message, because a cracked gear in a Chinook transmission was
discovered during an overhaul, the entire fleet was grounded in August 1999.
According to an Aviation and Missile Command item manager, units sent
transmissions suspected of having problems to the Corpus Christi Army Depot
for repair. Also, the item manager mentioned the safety issue exacerbated an
already existing condition because the Command never had enough
transmissions on hand to meet the average monthly demand. Causes of this
condition were identified as long lead times to (1) award contracts and (2)
manufacture and repair transmissions. Since the safety concerns, the demands
have increased significantly; and as of March 2001, 75 transmissions were on
back order. 18 Similarly, according to a February 2000 safety message, an
engineering analysis indicated that the retirement life for the Apache main
rotor blade attach pins (see fig. 8) needed to be reduced because specific
pins might not provide the proper fit and would result in significant
degradation of the pins? life due to fatigue. (The pins attach the
helicopter blade to the main rotor.) Units were required to

16 When demand data is not available, the Army uses engineering estimates to
determine the quantities of spare parts to purchase. 17 Army Audit Agency
Report: Survey of Quality of Spare Parts Report (AA 00- 745, June 2000). 18
A back order is the quantity of an item requested by units that is not
immediately available for issuance but is recorded as a stock commitment for
future issuance. Actual Demand Was Greater

Than Anticipated

Page 17 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

inspect all main rotor pins and replace defected pins with new ones that
last longer. In June 2000, demands for the pins increased, and the Command?s
record shows that 81 pins were on back order and 14 pins were on hand to
support the average monthly demands for 30 pins.

Figure 8: Apache Main Rotor Blade Attach Pin

Note: The arrow points to the main rotor blade attach pin. Source: Army.

The recalculated useful life of parts also resulted in unanticipated demands
for parts that the Army had not planned for and created shortages. According
to an Aviation and Missile Command team leader of the Apache Systems
Engineering Office, the useful life of the Apache?s housing assembly 19 (see
fig. 9) and rotor damper 20 (see fig. 10) changed because the Command
conducted test flights that recorded the accurate fatigue factors for parts.
The official said that recalculating the parts?

19 The housing assembly holds the Apache?s rotor blades. 20 The rotor damper
is used on the helicopter?s rotor head assemblies and tail rotor hub
assemblies to control and stabilize movements of rotor blades.

Page 18 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

useful life based on accurate data instead of estimates reduced their useful
life. In August 2000, the Aviation and Missile Command records show that the
Command had only three usable Apache housing assemblies on hand when its
useful life was recalculated and reduced from 1,981 to 1,193 hours, about a
40- percent reduction. As a result, repairs had to be made more frequently,
and there were more demands for the housing assemblies than were available.
Similarly, the Command?s record shows that the Command had only seven usable
Apache rotor dampers on hand when its useful life was reduced from 3,710 to
2,057 hours, about a 45- percent reduction. In September 2000, demands for
the rotor dampers increased, and the Command?s record shows that 53 were on
back order and the average monthly demand was 65.

Figure 9: Housing Assembly for Apache

Source: Army.

Page 19 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Figure 10: Rotor Damper for Apache

Source: Army.

Finally, parts that were ordered more frequently than expected caused
shortages when increases in demand for the items were not anticipated. For
example, field units? demands for bearings used on the Blackhawk helicopters
outpaced the contractor?s production. According to an Aviation and Missile
Command item manager, a new bearing was introduced in 1996. The Command?s
records show that before the new, improved bearing was introduced, units
replaced this bearing every 70 hours. This new bearing lasts 4,000 hours and
the contractor could not produce enough to meet the demand. In March 2000,
Army records show that 976 bearings were on back order. According to a
Command item manager, the increase in demand for the bearings occurred
because (1) units were stockpiling the bearings and (2) the parts were being
replaced worldwide on all Blackhawk helicopters because they lasted longer.
The item manager stated the units were no longer ordering excessive
quantities of bearings and that as of May 2001, there were 300 on hand and
423 on back order.

Likewise, the Command experienced a 25- percent increase in demands for
Apache fuel boost pumps 21 (see fig. 11). A Command team leader for the

21 Fuel enters the engine through the fuel boost (suction- type) pump, which
is mounted on the engine.

Page 20 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Apache airframe was uncertain as to what caused the surge in demand but
commented that it was not unusual for parts to fail because of the
aircraft?s age. The Command?s record shows that unexpected failures of
motors occurred during repairs, which delayed production of fuel boost pumps
to meet increased demands. Also, the Command?s record shows that in October
2000, there were 45 back orders and no usable fuel boost pumps on hand to
meet the average monthly demand for three.

Figure 11: Fuel Boost Pump

Source: Army.

Poor contractor performance and delays in negotiating a contract also
resulted in parts shortages. For example, Defense Logistics Agency records
show that as a result of a contractor?s late deliveries of Apache shear
bolts, the Agency did not have the parts available for Apache users. Agency
records show that the contract was terminated and another one was awarded to
a different contractor. Also, Army records show that the Command had
difficulty negotiating with a sole- source contractor to provide Apache
servocylinders at reasonable prices. Because of the time it took the
Aviation and Missile Command to award the contract, the parts were not
provided to the users when needed.

Due to a shortage of parts, the Corpus Christi Army Depot experienced
problems that prevented it from repairing and overhauling aviation parts
Contract Delays

Problems Concerning Overhaul and Maintenance

Page 21 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

in a timely manner. In May 1999, the Corpus Christi Army Depot received a
requirement to overhaul 20 Blackhawk T- 700 engines (see fig. 12). In July
1999, the depot received the fiscal year 2000 requirement to overhaul 30
engines, which increased to 65 in October 1999 and to 80 in December 1999.
Because of these increases, the depot did not have enough time to determine
the parts needed to support the overhaul requirements and the parts were not
available to complete repairs in a timely manner. Also, the depot did not
have the personnel available to respond quickly to the dramatic increases in
overhaul requirements and thus the Depot could not repair parts in a timely
manner. Further, in June 2000 an Aviation and Missile Command record showed
that the average demand for Blackhawk T- 700 engines was 7 per month, 66
engines were on back order, and 249 engines needed to be repaired. Another
maintenance problem we identified was a shortage of parts used to repair
cold section modules, a compressor section in the T- 700 engine. The repair
of cold section modules was also impacted by the need for personnel to
support the overhauls of Blackhawk T- 700 engines.

Figure 12: Blackhawk T- 700 Engine

Source: Army.

Aircraft age was not a reason for the 90 spare parts shortages we reviewed.
However, Army and Defense Logistics Agency officials informed us the age of
the Apache, the Blackhawk, and the Chinook is a factor Problems With Aging
Aircraft

Page 22 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

contributing to parts shortages for these systems. The aircraft were
originally developed in the 1980s, 1970s, and 1960s, respectively, and they
are expected to be useful for a number of years. The Commander of the Army
Materiel Command said in 1999 that the Army expects to maintain an upgraded
model of the almost 40- year- old Chinook for an additional 30 years. 22 He
added that because of the aircraft?s ages, parts consumption increases,
inventory is depleted, cannibalization is necessary, and procurement costs
of replenishment stocks increase.

According to the Defense Logistics Agency?s November 2000 Aging Aircraft
Program Management Plan, because of the extended age of these systems, the
Army is concerned about the degradation of their structural integrity and
the hard- to- find structural and electrical parts. Also, according to a
report prepared for the Defense Microelectronics Activity, manufacturing
sources for spare parts can be diminished because of uneconomical production
requirements and the limited availability or increasing cost of items and
raw materials used in the manufacturing process. 23 Army and Defense
Logistics Agency officials commented, and the plan states, that this issue
is serious because the original contractors that produced some spare parts
for aging weapon systems may no longer be in business or may have upgraded
their production lines to accommodate technologically advanced parts.
However, we did not find this factor to be a reason for the shortages of the
parts we reviewed.

The Army and the Defense Logistics Agency have initiatives under way or
planned to revolutionize and integrate logistics processes, upgrade aging
aircraft, and improve the supply of aviation parts. The concept for the
initiatives generally addresses the reasons we identified for spare parts
shortages. The Army has developed a Strategic Logistics Plan intended to
integrate the modernization and transformation of logistics processes
throughout many organizations. The Army initiatives we identified are linked
to the plan?s asset management process, which is designed to match available
assets with needs, identify shortages of assets, and interface with
government and industry suppliers to buy additional assets. We have

22 Statement by Commander, U. S. Army Materiel Command, to the Subcommittee
on Military Readiness, House Committee on Armed Services, Oct. 7, 1999. 23
Resolution Cost Factors for Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material
Shortages, February 1999 (revised May 1999). Overall Initiatives

May Address Parts Shortages

Page 23 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

previously reported problems with the way Army has implemented its logistics
initiatives and recommended that it develop a management framework for its
initiatives, to include a comprehensive strategy and performance plan. The
Army has actions under way to address the recommendation; therefore, we are
not making any additional recommendations at this time. The various Army-
wide, Army Materiel Command, and Defense Logistics Agency initiatives are
described in the following sections.

Among the efforts the Army has under way to improve the availability of
spare parts are its Strategic Logistics Plan, Logistics Transformation Plan,
Single Stock Fund, Velocity Management, and National Maintenance Program.

The Army has developed a Strategic Logistics Plan intended to integrate the
modernization and transformation of logistics processes throughout many
organizations. Under its Strategic Logistics Plan, the Army hopes to change
from its current reactive approach to one that is more effective, efficient,
and responsive. The initiatives planned or under way that are designed to
resolve spare parts shortages are linked to the asset management process
under the Army?s planned change in approach. The plan was last updated on
May 11, 2000, to show how the Army will achieve its synchronization goals by
meeting the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (P.
L. 103- 62 (1993)). The next update is planned for the fall 2001 and is to
include a timeline with milestones and metrics to track, measure, and better
manage the transformation process.

In September 1999, we recommended that the Army develop a management
framework to include a comprehensive strategy and a performance plan for
implementing its initiatives. 24 In March 2000, the Department of Defense
issued Defense Reform Initiative 54, which requires each military service to
submit an annual logistics transformation plan. The purpose of this plan is
to document, on an annual basis, the planned actions and related resources
for implementing logistics initiatives, including actions that directly
support the Department?s Logistics Strategic Plan. Initiative 54 requires
that the services? transformation plans include each of the key management
framework elements specified in our prior reports.

24 Defense Inventory (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 217, Sept. 14, 1999). Army- wide
Initiatives

Army Strategic Logistics Plan Army Logistics Transformation Plan

Page 24 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

In response to our previous recommendation, in May 2000 the Army decided to
combine preparation of its Strategic Logistics Plan with its response to
Defense Reform Initiative 54. In July 2000, the Army developed its Logistics
Transformation Plan in response to initiative 54. However, we did not
evaluate this plan to determine whether its management framework included a
comprehensive strategy and performance plan. Since the Army is taking
actions on our previous recommendation to develop a management framework, we
are not making new recommendations at this time. We are now reviewing the
adequacy of the strategic logistics planning process within the Department
of Defense and component commands, and this review will include the
services? logistics transformation plans. This report will be completed
later this year.

The Army?s single stock fund is a business process reengineering initiative
to improve the availability of secondary items 25 logistics and financial
processes in the Army Working Capital Fund, Supply Management business area.
The fund is aimed at improving the availability of spare parts by, among
other things, (1) providing worldwide access to parts down to the
installation levels, (2) consolidating separate national- level and retail
elements into a single fund, and (3) integrating logistics and financial
automated information systems. In 1987 the Army began to study its stock
fund operations. The Army?s single stock fund program campaign plan was
approved by the Vice Chief of Staff in November 1997, and during the first
quarter of fiscal year 2002, the Army plans to transfer all stocks, which
include wholesale and retail inventories, to the single management by Army
Materiel Command.

In September 1995, the Army established its Velocity Management Program to
develop a faster, more flexible, and more efficient logistics pipeline. The
program?s goals, concept, and top management support parallel improvement
efforts in private sector companies. The program?s overall goal is to
eliminate unnecessary steps in the logistics pipeline that delay the flow of
supplies through the system. The program consists of Army- wide process
improvement teams for the following four areas: the ordering and shipping of
supplies, repair cycle, inventory levels and locations (also known as
stockage determination), and financial management.

25 Secondary inventory includes spare parts, clothing, and medical supplies
to support Department of Defense operating forces worldwide. Army Single
Stock Fund

Velocity Management

Page 25 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

This Army- wide initiative, which was announced in July 1999, is designed to
maximize repair capabilities and optimize the use of available resources at
all maintenance levels within the Army. The initiative centralizes the
management of all Army sustainment maintenance programs while decentralizing
the actual repair of components and parts. The workload will be distributed
across depot and installation activities, and repairs will be made based on
national need for an item.

Additionally, the Army plans to upgrade its aging aircraft through its
Recapitalization Program (a part of the National Maintenance Program), which
it will achieve by overhauling components of and upgrading its aircraft. The
purpose of this program is to (1) extend aircraft service life; (2) reduce
operating and support costs; (3) improve reliability, maintainability,
safety, and efficiency; and (4) enhance capability. A limited number of
weapon systems will begin this process in fiscal year 2002, with full- scale
upgrades beginning in fiscal year 2003. The Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
helicopters have been identified as candidates for the program.

The Army Materiel Command has several initiatives under way to help resolve
spare parts shortages, including (1) identifying processes for forecasting
requirements for spare parts, (2) analyzing the spare parts program to
identify issues that affect aviation spare parts shortages, and (3) working
with contractors to provide spare parts. These initiatives are separate from
those in the Army?s Strategic Logistics Plan.

In July 2000, the Army Materiel Command established the Forecasting and
Support Techniques Working Group to identify processes for forecasting
requirements for spare parts and to develop a plan to resolve any identified
problems. The Army uses forecasting to develop quantity and resource
requirements for inventory. Its basic principles are to maintain current
data on customer demand, lead times for obtaining parts, internal process
costs, stock levels, and replenishment of parts in a timely manner. In
January 2001, the working group had prioritized several issues for its
review.

In August 2000, the Army Materiel Command established the Spare Parts
Shortages Integrated Process Team to analyze the spare parts program and to
initially focus on aviation parts managed by the Aviation and Missile
Command. The team identified issues that have affected spare parts
shortages, including (1) an increase in demands that led to reduced
availability of reparable parts; (2) understated times for administration
and National Maintenance Program

Army Materiel Command Initiatives

Plan to Resolve Forecasting Problems

Analysis of Spare Parts Program

Page 26 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

production of spare parts, which resulted in the reduced availability of
consumable and reparable parts; and (3) changes in requirements as the
result of problems with parts that affected aircraft safety and readiness
and minimally affected the availability of spare parts. The team recommended
the issues be used to influence the next budget submission.

The Aviation and Missile Command is attempting to help resolve spare parts
shortages by establishing partnerships with key contractors to reduce the
time it takes to provide spare parts once a need has been identified. The
Aviation and Missile Command focuses on ensuring that the prime contractors?
focus is maintained on readiness, lead times, spare parts reliability, and
rapid response to customer needs.

Among the efforts the Defense Logistics Agency has under way to improve the
availability of spare parts are its Aviation Investment Strategy, Aging
Aircraft Program, and contracts for consumable parts.

The Defense Logistics Agency?s major initiative to resolve aircraft spare
parts shortages is its Aviation Investment Strategy. This fiscal year 2000
initiative focuses on replenishing consumable aviation repair parts that
have been identified as having availability problems that affect readiness.
To achieve this initiative, the Agency plans to invest $17.3 million in
aviation spare parts for the Army from fiscal years 2000 through 2003. As of
fiscal year 2000, about $4.8 million had been obligated for this purpose.

The purpose of the Defense Logistics Agency?s Aging Aircraft Program is to
consistently meet the goals for spare parts availability for the Army, Navy,
and Air Force aviation weapon systems. The program?s focus will be to (1)
provide inventory control point personnel with complete, timely, and
accurate information on current and projected parts requirements; (2) reduce
customers? wait times for parts for which sources or production capability
no longer exist; and (3) create an efficient and effective program
management structure and processes that will achieve the stated program
goals. The Aging Aircraft Program Management Plan was issued in November
2000, and the Agency plans to invest about $20 million on this program
during 2001- 2007.

The Defense Supply Center Richmond has a 2- year contract with an option for
3 years with one contractor and a 5- year contract with another contractor
for consumable Army aircraft spare parts. According to a Contractor and
Partnering

Relationships Defense Logistics Agency Initiatives

Aviation Investment Strategy Aging Aircraft Program

Long- Term Contracts for Consumable Parts

Page 27 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Defense Supply Center Richmond document, the use of best commercial
practices 26 will benefit aircraft users through improved delivery schedules
and reduced inventory storage and administrative costs.

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Principal Assistant
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
indicated that the Department of Defense generally concurred with the
report. The Department?s comments are reprinted in their entirety in
appendix III.

To determine the impact spare parts shortages had on three selected Army
helicopters, we obtained and reviewed (1) Department of Defense Quarterly
Readiness Reports to the Congress for April 1999 through September 2000 and
(2) additional readiness data from the Army?s Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics, Arlington, Virginia. Additionally, we had discussions with
officials at the Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia. We did not
independently verify the readiness data. We selected the three helicopters
for review because the helicopters experienced spare parts shortages during
fiscal year 2000. To determine whether selected helicopters met supply
availability goals, we obtained and reviewed the Army Materiel Command?s
fiscal year 1999- 2000 supply availability rates for the Apache, Blackhawk,
and Chinook helicopters. We did not independently verify the supply
availability data. To determine why the helicopters experienced spare parts
shortages, we interviewed officials at the Army Aviation and Missile
Command, Huntsville, Alabama, and reviewed selected Army safety messages
from August 1999 through February 2000 to identify the parts that caused the
safety concerns. To determine the impact of parts shortages on maintenance
practices and personnel, we reviewed the Army regulation on materiel policy
and retail maintenance operations and an Army study on cannibalizations. We
also reviewed our previous work on how cannibalizations adversely affect
personnel and maintenance and our report that cited the lack of spare parts
as hampering retention of military personnel. Additionally, we interviewed
an official at the 101st Airborne Division, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, on the
impact cannibalizations had on maintenance.

26 Best commercial practices are defined as practices that enable Department
of Defense to reduce inventory levels while making the supply system more
responsive to users? needs. Agency Comments

Scope and Methodology

Page 28 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

To determine the reasons for the shortages of spare parts for the Apache,
Blackhawk, and Chinook helicopters, we obtained computerized lists of spare
parts that caused the helicopters to be not mission capable from the Army
Aviation and Missile Command from October 1999 through July 2000 and from
the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, Virginia, for fiscal year 2000. Also,
we visited and obtained lists of spare parts shortages that caused delays in
repairing helicopters from (1) Fort Campbell?s 101st Airborne Division as of
September 13, 2000; (2) Fort Campbell?s Aviation Logistics Management
Division, DynCorp Aerospace Operations, as of April 18, 2000; and (3) the
Corpus Christi Army Depot, Corpus Christi, Texas, as of August 23, 2000.
From the lists, we selected all 15 parts from the Fort Campbell?s 101st
Airborne Division and randomly selected 75 spare parts from the other
locations for the Apache (32), Blackhawk (34), and Chinook (24) for further
review (a total of 90 parts). Because of the size of our sample, we did not
project the results of the sample to the universe of all helicopters? parts
shortages. Once we identified the 90 spare parts shortages, we provided them
to the inventory control points, the Army Aviation and Missile Command, and
the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, to obtain their reasons for the
shortages along with supporting documentation. To determine whether the
aging of the aircraft contributed to spare parts shortages, we reviewed
congressional Army testimony and documentation from the Defense Logistics
Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and interviewed Army and Defense Logistics
Agency officials. To determine whether management weaknesses contributed to
spare parts shortages, we reviewed our prior reports on Army and Department
of Defense inventory and financial management problems.

To determine what overall actions are planned or under way to address spare
parts shortages for Army aircraft, we visited and obtained documentation and
views from program officials at the Army?s Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Logistics; the Army Materiel Command; the Army Aviation and Missile
Command; the Defense Logistics Agency; and the Defense Supply Center,
Richmond. We also compared the reasons for the spare parts shortages we
found with the overall initiatives under way or planned to determine whether
they were being addressed. We did not review the plans or the specific
initiatives.

Our review was performed from August 2000 to June 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the
Army; the Director, Defense Logistics Agency; and the Director, Office of

Page 29 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other interested
parties upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 8412 if you or your staff have any questions
regarding this report. Key contributors to this report were Lawson Gist,
Jr.; Jose Watkins; Carleen Bennett; and Nancy Ragsdale.

David R. Warren Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Page 30 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

List of Congressional Committees The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The
Honorable John Warner Ranking Minority Member Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Inouye Chairman The Honorable Ted Stevens Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations United
States Senate

The Honorable Bill Young Chairman, Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

The Honorable Bob Stump Chairman The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority
Member Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman The Honorable John Murtha Ranking
Minority Member Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages

Page 31 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

In January 2001, we reported that the Department of Defense had serious
weaknesses in its management of logistics functions and, in particular,
inventory management. 1 Although not specifically identified with the
systems we reviewed, these management weaknesses directly or indirectly
contribute to the shortage of spare parts the Army is facing. For example:

 We reported in April 1997 that the Army needed to improve its logistics
pipeline for aviation parts and reduce logistics costs by incorporating
private sector best practices. 2 We found that the Army?s repair pipeline
was slow, unreliable, and inefficient. One contributing factor was a lack of
consumable parts needed to complete repairs.

 We reported in October 1997 that the Army needed to improve its management
of the weapon system and equipment modification program to eliminate
difficulties in obtaining spare parts. 3 We found that program sponsors had
been inconsistent in providing initial spare parts and ensuring spare parts
were added to the supply system.

 We reported in June 2000 that the Army needed to strengthen and follow
procedures to control shipped items, which include spare parts and other
inventory items. 4 We found that the Army did not know the extent to which
shipped inventory had been lost or stolen because of weaknesses in its
inventory control procedures and financial management practices.

In addition, the Department of Defense?s long- standing financial management
problems may contribute to the Army?s spare parts shortages. As we recently
reported, weaknesses in inventory accountability information can affect
supply responsiveness. 5 Lacking reliable information, the Department of
Defense has little assurance that all items purchased are received and
properly recorded. The weaknesses increase the risk that responsible
inventory item managers may request

1 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense

(GA0- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). 2 Inventory Management: The Army Could Reduce
Logistics Costs for Aviation Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/ NSIAD-
97- 82, Apr. 15, 1997).

3 Army Equipment: Management of Weapon System and Equipment Modification
Program Needs Improvement (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 14, Oct. 10, 1997).

4 Defense Inventory: Army Needs to Strengthen and Follow Procedures to
Control Shipped Items (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 109, June 23, 2000).

5 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks (GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001).
Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have

Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages

Appendix I: Management Weaknesses Have Contributed to Spare Parts Shortages

Page 32 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

funds to obtain additional, unnecessary items that may be on hand but not
reported.

Appendix II: Reasons for Shortages of Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
Helicopters? Spare Parts

Page 33 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Reason for shortage a Apache part Blackhawk part Chinook part

Actual demand was greater than anticipated 1. Cylinder charge

2. Elbow assembly 3. Electric fan cover 4. Fuel booster pump 5. Housing
assembly 6. Main pin blade 7. Nonmetallic seal b 8. Nonmetallic seal b 9.
Plain encased seal 10. Plain hexagon nut 11. Relay assembly 12. Roller-
droop stop 13. Rotor blade damper 14. Rotor pump 15. Shock head 16. Socket
screw cap 17. Straight- headed pin 18. Striker plate 19. Swivel caster 20.
Threaded pin- rivet 21. Transmission main

1. Actuating cylinder 2. Bearing ball 3. Bearing plan 4. Cable assembly 5.
Circuit card assembly 6. Connecting link 7. Digital microcircuit 8. Fuel
tank 9. G axis seal kit 10. Gear box assembly 11. Magnetic compass 12.
Metallic tube 13. Packing with retain 14. Pipe hanger 15. Preformed packing
16. Pressurizing 17. Protective dust cap 18. Repair kit 19. Sas actuator
assembly 20. Shaft assembly 21. Shaft fitting 22. Solid rivet 23. Tubeless
tire

1. Engine gas turbine 2. Machine bolt 3. Machine transmission 4. Nonmetallic
bumper 5. O- ring 6. Plain encased seal 7. Plain seal 8. Preformed packing
9. Quick coupling half b 10. Quick coupling half b 11. Ring spacer 12.
Support structural 13. Time meter

Contractual delays 22. Assembly actuator bracket 23. Left- hand nacelle 24.
Modification kit 25. Mounting bracket 26. Power supply 27. Servocylinder b
28. Servocylinder b 29. Servocylinder b 30. Servocylinder b 31. Shear bolt
32. Shock strut assembly

24. Armored wing assembly 25. Belt aircraft safety 26. Electro actuator 27.
Roller bearing

14. Aircraft access door 15. Annular bearing ball 16. Control swashplate 17.
Hydraulic cylinder 18. Shouldered shaft 19. Time totalizator meter

Problem concerning overhaul/ maintenance 28. Cold section module

29. Engine aircraft 30. Main fuel control 31. T- 700 engine aircraft

20. Aircraft engine 21. Rotary wing head

Other c 32. Cylinder assembly 33. Flutter dampener 34. Multimeter

22. Close tolerance bolt 23. Plastic spir tubing 24. Sleeve bushing a There
were multiple reasons for parts shortages, but for the purposes of our
analysis, we used the

most predominant reason. b The spare parts with the same name have different
stock numbers.

c Includes agency?s lack of knowledge of reason for shortages and incorrect
inventory records

Appendix II: Reasons for Shortages of Apache, Blackhawk, and Chinook
Helicopters? Spare Parts

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 34 GAO- 01- 772
Army Inventory

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Related GAO Products Page 35 GAO- 01- 772 Army Inventory

Defense Logistics: Information on Apache Helicopter Support and Readiness
(GAO- 01- 630, July 17, 2001).

Defense Inventory: Opportunities Exist to Expand the Use of Defense
Logistics Agency Best Practices (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 30, Jan. 26, 2000).

Army Logistics: Status of Proposed Support Plan for Apache Helicopter

(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 140, July 1, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their Relationship
to Current Needs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 60, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative With
Results Act Framework (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 40, Apr. 12, 1999).

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO/
OCG- 99- 4, Jan. 1, 1999).

Defense Depot Maintenance: Use of Public- Private Partnering Arrangements
(GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 91, May 7, 1998).

Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress by Using Best Practices for
Reparable Parts (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 97, Feb. 27, 1998).

Defense Inventory: Management of Surplus Usable Aircraft Parts Can Be
Improved (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 7, Oct. 2, 1997).

Inventory Management: The Army Could Reduce Logistics Costs for Aviation
Parts by Adopting Best Practices (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 82, Apr. 15, 1997).
Related GAO Products

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