Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia (Testimony,
10/12/2000, GAO/GAO-01-76T).

The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help the Colombian National Police and other law
enforcement agencies, the military, and civilian agencies reduce illegal
drug production and trafficking. Recognizing that illegal drug
activities are a serious problem, the Colombian government announced a
counternarcotics plan known as Plan Colombia. This testimony reviews the
U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. Although U.S.-provided
assistance has enhanced Colombian counternarcotics capabilities, its
usefulness has sometimes been limited because of long-standing problems
in planning and implementation. For example, little progress has been
made in launching a plan to have Colombia's National Police assume a
larger role in managing the aerial eradication program, which requires
costly U.S. contractor assistance. The governments of the United States
and Colombia face continuing and new financial and management challenges
in implementing Plan Colombia. The costs and activities needed to
implement the plan are unknown at this time, and it will take years
before any significant reduction in the drug trade is seen. Colombia
must resolve problems with its political and economic stability and
improve its management of counternarcotics funding in order to
successfully implement Plan Colombia. The testimony summarized the
October report, GAO-01-26.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-76T
     TITLE:  Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia
      DATE:  10/12/2000
   SUBJECT:  Law enforcement
	     Narcotics
	     Drug trafficking
	     Helicopters
	     Foreign governments
	     Foreign policies
	     International economic relations
	     Federal aid to foreign countries
	     International cooperation
IDENTIFIER:  Colombia
	     Huey Helicopter
	     212 Bell Helicopter
	     UH-II Helicopter
	     Plan Colombia

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GAO-01-76T

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1: 30 p. m. Thursday, October 12, 2000

GAO- 01- 76T

DRUG CONTROL Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade
Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Page 1 GAO- 01- 76T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today
to discuss the work you requested on the counternarcotics efforts of the
United States and Colombia. Today we will highlight the preliminary findings
from our ongoing review of the U. S. assistance to Colombia. Our draft
report is with the responsible agencies for comment; we expect to issue a
final report at the end of October. I will discuss three broad issues: (1)
how the drug threat has changed in recent years, (2) problems the United
States has had in providing its assistance to Colombia in the past, and (3)
challenges the United States and Colombian face in reducing the illegal drug
activities.

In October 1999, the Colombian government announced a $7.5 billion plan,
known as Plan Colombia, which among other things, proposes reducing the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over 6
years. Colombia has pledged to provide $4 billion to support the plan and
called on the international community, including the United States, to
provide the remaining $3.5 billion. To assist in this effort, in July 2000,
the United States agreed to provide about $860 million to Colombia

for fiscal years 2000- 01, 1 in addition to previously approved U. S.
assistance

of over $330 million for fiscal years 2000- 01. U. S. counternarcotics
assistance to Colombia has almost doubled compared to 1999 levels.

U. S. estimates indicate that the drug threat from Colombia has both
expanded and become more complex over the past several years. During fiscal
years 1996- 2000, the United States provided Colombia more than $765 million
in assistance to help reduce illegal drug activities. Nonetheless, Colombia
remains the world's leading producer of cocaine, doubling its production
during 1995- 99. Over this period, Colombia also became the major source of
heroin consumed in the United States. Furthermore, the number and types of
organizations, including insurgent groups, involved in illegal drug
activities has increased and these groups control more than 40 percent of
Colombia's territory. Both these factors make eradication and interdiction
operations to reduce illegal drug activities more difficult.

The United States has had long- standing problems in providing
counternarcotics assistance to Colombian law enforcement and military

1 The act (Division B of P. L. 106- 246) provides $1.3 billion, but about
$440 million was for other Andean countries and for U. S. agencies involved
in drug interdiction and law enforcement. Summary

Page 2 GAO- 01- 76T

agencies involved in counternarcotics activities. Although U. S.- provided
assistance such as aircraft, boats, and training has enhanced Colombian
counternarcotics capabilities, it has sometimes been of limited utility
because the United States did not provide spare parts or the funding
necessary to operate and maintain them to the extent possible for conducting
counternarcotics operations. Moreover, the U. S. Embassy has made little
progress implementing a plan to have the Colombian National Police assume
more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, which requires the
assistance of costly U. S. contractors. U. S. Embassy officials also
expressed concern that the National Police has not always provided
documentation about its use of some counternarcotics assistance.

The U. S. and Colombian governments face a number of management and
financial challenges in implementing Colombia's strategy to reduce the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent in 6
years. Although both governments are taking certain actions to address the
challenges, at this point however, the total cost and activities required to
meet the plan's goals remain unknown, and significantly reducing drug
activities will likely take years.

U. S. agencies, including the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) and the
U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), are still developing
comprehensive implementation plans for eradication and interdiction
operations and alternative development projects. 2 However, negotiating for
the manufacture and delivery of major equipment, such as helicopters, is
ongoing and staffing new programs in Colombia will take time. As a result,
agencies do not expect to have many of the programs to support Plan Colombia
in place until late 2001.

Officials from State and DOD are now determining how the Blackhawk and Huey
II helicopters mandated by the Congress for Colombia will be equipped and
configured. They do not yet know if the funding planned for fiscal years
2000- 01 to support Plan Colombia will be sufficient. In addition, State
officials have begun planning for funding in fiscal years 2002 and beyond to
continue the Plan Colombia programs initiated in fiscal years 2000- 01.
While estimates have not been completed, these officials stated that
substantial funding would be needed.

2 State and DOD manage most of the U. S.- provided counternarcotics
assistance; USAID oversees related development assistance programs.

Page 3 GAO- 01- 76T

Colombia is relying on international donors in addition to the United States
to help fund Plan Colombia, but much of that support has yet to materialize.
To date, the Colombian government has not shown that it has the detailed
plans and funding necessary to achieve stated goals.

Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its political and
economic instability fostered by its long- standing insurgency and the need
to ensure that the National Police and military comply with human rights
standards in order for U. S. assistance to continue.

As evidenced by past U. S. counternarcotics assistance programs, the United
States has not always provided the necessary support to operate and maintain
the U. S.- provided equipment to the extent possible to help counter the
illegal drug activities in Colombia. If these past problems continue, the
dramatic increase in

U. S. support for Plan Colombia will not be used in the most effective way.
At a minimum, if the United States or Colombia does not follow through on
its portion of Plan Colombia, or other international donors do not support
Colombia's appeals for additional assistance, Plan Colombia cannot succeed
as envisioned.

For more than two decades, the United States has supported Colombia's
efforts to reduce drug- trafficking activities and to stem the flow of
illegal drugs entering the United States. Table 1 shows the U. S. assistance
provided to Colombia during fiscal years 1996- 2000. Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 76T

Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia (Fiscal years
1996– 2000)

(Dollars in millions) Agency 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 a Total

State b $22.6 $44.4 $83.1 $237.7 $76.3 $464.1 DOD c 14.5 53.2 61.4 80.9 72.5
282.5 USAID 0 0 3.3 6.3 9.0 18.6

Total $37.1 $97.6 $147.8 $324.9 $157.8 $765.2

a We did not include the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246) in
fiscal year 2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the
funding between fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

b Includes $173.2 million in Colombia- specific counternarcotics assistance
provided to State in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1999 (Division B of P. L. 105- 277).

c Includes amounts delivered through September 1, 2000, from emergency
drawdowns of DOD inventories authorized in fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998,
and 1999. For fiscal year 1996, DOD could not provide funding data on its
other assistance programs.

The Colombian government's $7.5 billion, 6- year Plan Colombia represents a
significant change from prior efforts. The government recognizes that the
program must address the conditions that foster the growth in illegal drug
activities. Central to the program is the Colombian government's effort to
regain control of the drug- producing regions of the country from insurgent
and paramilitary groups, increase drug interdiction efforts, provide coca
farmers alternative ways to earn a living, and enhance the protection of
human rights. All key Colombian ministries, including the Justice and
Defense ministries, are assigned roles and specific tasks in the plan.

In July 2000, Congress appropriated over $860 million in additional funding
for fiscal years 2000- 01 to directly support activities in Plan Colombia. 3
The activities include providing equipment, such as helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft, and training to support counternarcotics operations of the
Colombian military and National Police; alternative development projects in
drug producing areas; judicial reform and rule of law initiatives;

3 $330 million in counternarcotics assistance for Colombia had already been
approved for fiscal years 2000- 01.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 76T

strengthening Colombian human rights organizations; assisting displaced
persons; and supporting the peace process.

Historically, Colombia has been the world's largest producer of cocaine.
However, starting in 1997, Colombia surpassed Bolivia and Peru as the
world's largest cultivator of coca. Since 1995, the area under coca
cultivation in Colombia expanded by over 140 percent to over 300,000 acres
in 1999. Most of this increased cultivation took place in the areas of
southern Colombia that are controlled by insurgents and paramilitary groups.
Moreover, the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia has increased by 126
percent since 1995, from 230 metric tons to 520 metric tons in 1999.
Finally, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Colombia
has become a major source of the heroin consumed in the United States,
producing about 6 metric tons annually.

Despite U. S. and Colombian efforts to disrupt drug- trafficking activities,
the U. S. Embassy in Colombia has not reported any net reduction in the
processing or export of refined cocaine to the United States. Moreover,
according to DEA, while two major groups (the Medellin and Cali cartels)
dominated drug- trafficking activities during the late 1980s and early
1990s, hundreds of smaller and more decentralized organizations are now
involved in all aspects of the drug trade. According to DEA, several billion
dollars flow into Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone. This vast
amount of drug money has made it possible for these organizations to gain
unprecedented economic, political, and social power and influence.

To further complicate matters, the two largest insurgent groups– the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation
Army– and paramilitary groups have expanded their involvement in
drugtrafficking. The insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40
percent of Colombia's territory east and south of the Andes, an area equal
in size to Texas.

According to DOD, two- thirds of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia's units and one- third of the National Liberation Army units are
involved in some form of drug- trafficking activity. U. S. Embassy officials
stated that information over the past 2 years indicates that units of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia have become more heavily involved in
growing coca, establishing coca prices, and transporting cocaine in
Colombia.

Moreover, in 1998, DEA reported that certain leaders of some paramilitary
groups that emerged as self- defense forces in response to the insurgents'
violence had become major drug traffickers. The Changing Nature

of the Drug Threat in Colombia

Page 6 GAO- 01- 76T

The United States has had long- standing problems in providing
counternarcotics assistance to Colombian law enforcement and military
agencies involved in counternarcotics activities. In 1998, we reported that
planning and management problems hampered U. S. counternarcotics

efforts in Colombia. 4 For example, we reported that limited planning and

coordination between U. S. agencies hampered the delivery of some
counternarcotics equipment, such as fixed- wing aircraft, helicopters, and
boats, to the National Police and the Colombian military. We reported that
this equipment required substantial funding to make it operational.

Between October 1998 and August 1999, State provided the National Police
with six additional Bell 212 helicopters and six UH- II helicopters. Neither
set of helicopters was provided with adequate spare parts or the funds to
ensure adequate logistics support because of budget constraints. Recognizing
that the National Police could not operate and maintain the helicopters, the
Narcotics Affairs Section budgeted $1.25 million in fiscal year 2000 to
replenish the low supply of spare parts. However, according to a U. S.
Embassy official, the funding was not available until March 2000 because of
delays in submitting State's plan for the funds to the Congress. Further
aggravating the situation, the Embassy requested spare parts for some of
these helicopters from DOD stocks. While DOD agreed to provide $3.1 million
worth of helicopter spare parts, only $378,000 worth had been delivered as
of September 1, 2000. Although DOD intends to deliver the remaining parts, a
DOD official did not know when.

Furthermore, in September 1999, State and DOD initiated a plan to provide
the Colombian Army with 33 UH- 1N helicopters State had purchased from
Canada to support Colombia's three counternarcotics battalions. Between
November 1999 and February 2000, 18 of the helicopters were delivered to

Colombia, 5 and a U. S. contractor trained 24 pilots and 28 Colombian Army

copilots to operate them. The original plan called for using these
helicopters beginning in May 2000 to support the first U. S.- trained
counternarcotics battalion, which was ready to begin operations on January
1, 2000. The helicopters were to move troops into insurgent

4 Drug Control: U. S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing
Challenges (GAO/ NSIAD98- 60, Feb. 12, 1998). 5 According to U. S. embassy
officials, the remaining 15 helicopters and the training of 25 additional
pilots and 22 additional copilots would be provided once State received
congressional approval to allocate the funds recently provided as part of
the U. S. support for Plan Colombia. Problems in Managing

U. S. Assistance to Colombia

Spare Parts Unavailable for Helicopters

Inadequate Funding for Helicopter Support

Page 7 GAO- 01- 76T

controlled areas so they could secure the areas and enable the National
Police to conduct eradication or interdiction missions.

At the time State agreed to purchase the helicopters, it had not included
the funds necessary to procure, refurbish, and support them in its fiscal
year 1999 and 2000 budgets. As a result, the helicopters could not be used
for conducting counternarcotics operations and 17 of the 24 contractor
pilots trained to fly the 18 UH- 1Ns were laid off beginning in May 2000.

In August 2000, after the U. S. assistance for Plan Colombia was approved,
State reprogrammed $2.2 million from the U. S. counternarcotics program for
Mexico to rehire and retrain additional personnel. According to State and U.
S. Embassy officials, it will take about 3 months for the counternarcotics
battalion to commence operations with the helicopters- nearly a year after
the original date to begin operations.

During fiscal years 1996 through 1999, the United States agreed to provide
Colombia almost $148 million worth of equipment and services from DOD
inventories to support counternarcotics efforts. As of September 1, 2000, it
had provided only about $58.5 million. According to DOD officials, the
difference between the amount of assistance requested and the amount
delivered is the result of a combination of factors- from overvaluing the
items when the request was initially developed to the unavailability of some
items in DOD inventories and the length of time to obtain and the ship
articles. For example, in 1996, DOD agreed to provide the Colombian military
and National Police with 90 secure radios and supporting communications
equipment from its inventories. However, according to DOD records, this
equipment was not available.

Beginning in 1998, U. S. Embassy officials became concerned over the
increased U. S. presence in Colombia and associated costs with an aerial

eradication program. 6 At the time, the Embassy began developing a plan to

phase out U. S. contractor support of aerial eradication by having the
National Police assume increased operational control over this program. This
would be accomplished by providing the National Police with training,
aircraft, and other support needed to develop an infrastructure to enhance
their overall abilities to eradicate coca leaf and opium poppy. According to
Embassy personnel, the National Police have not formally

6 State estimates show that the direct costs of supporting the contractor
increased from about $6.6 million in fiscal year 1996 to $36.8 million in
fiscal year 1999. DOD Has Not Provided

Some Equipment Requested by the U. S. Embassy

Colombian National Police Have Not Assumed Control Over Aerial Eradication
Operations

Page 8 GAO- 01- 76T

approved the plan, and State has not approved the funding needed to begin
the phaseout. Now, according to State officials, implementing Plan Colombia
is a higher priority, and they do not know when the phaseout program will be
approved.

According to U. S. Embassy officials, despite extensive training and other
efforts to have the National Police develop a management program that would
ensure a more effective aerial eradication program, little progress has been
made. For example, the National Police continue to emphasize training high-
ranking officers, even though the Narcotics Affairs Section has informed the
National Police that training should be given to junior officers in areas
such as logistics, operations, flight instructors, maintenance, and
administration. Moreover, the July 2000 State Inspector General report
stated that the National Police rotate more experienced

mechanics into other areas for developmental purposes. 7 The Police are

therefore constantly training new personnel, making it difficult to maintain
a skilled workforce that is needed to repair the aerial eradication
aircraft. According to the Inspector General report, it will take 3 to 4
years before entry- level mechanics will become productive journeymen.

Department of State policy requires that Narcotics Affairs Sections
adequately oversee U. S. counternarcotics assistance to ensure that it is
being used as intended and that it can be adequately accounted for. However,
U. S. Embassy officials stated that the National Police have not always
provided necessary documents, such as budgetary and planning documents, to
determine if the National Police are using the resources in accordance with
eradication and interdiction plans. In two instances, U. S. Embassy
officials said they observed the National Police using U. S. provided
helicopters for purposes other than counternarcotics, but the Police did not
cooperate in their attempts to clarify how the helicopters were being used.

Also, until recently, neither the U. S. Embassy nor the Colombian National
Police had conducted program reviews, as required in annual bilateral
agreements. Recognizing it may have a problem, the Narcotics Affairs Section
requested in early 2000 that the State Inspector General audit the major
National Police accounts for the first time in 15 years. In May 2000, the
State auditors reported to the Narcotics Affairs Section that the National
Police could not account for 469,000 of the 2.76 million gallons of

7 Report of Audit: Review of INL- Administered Programs in Colombia, 00- CI-
021 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of State, July 2000). U. S. Embassy
Concerns

About Program Oversight Over Some U. S.- Provided Assistance

Page 9 GAO- 01- 76T

fuel provided for counternarcotics missions in 1999. The auditors concluded
that the fuel may have been misused.

The governments of the United States and Colombia face a number of
challenges in implementing Colombia's strategy to reduce the cultivation,
processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years. Although
both governments are taking steps to identify funding and complete
implementation plans, at this point, the total cost of U. S.- supported
activities required to meet the plan's goals remains unknown. In addition,
Colombia must deal with the political and economic instability fostered by
Colombia's long- standing insurgency and human rights problems.

As in the past, State and DOD will have to request additional funding to
support U. S.- provided equipment. Officials from State and DOD recently
testified that they do not know if sufficient funding is available to
procure the number of helicopters mandated by the Congress because they have

not determined how the helicopters will be equipped and configured. 8
According to State, the funding proposed by the administration and approved
by the Congress was not intended to support the equipment scheduled to be
provided through the 6- year life of Plan Colombia. State officials noted
that they are still developing cost estimates for fiscal year 2002 and
beyond but that funding just to sustain the equipment included in the
current assistance for Colombia would be substantial.

During our recent visit to Colombia, government defense and budgeting
officials said that with their already tight defense budget they cannot
afford to operate and sustain the new U. S. helicopters by themselves.
Colombian and U. S. Embassy officials agreed that Colombia will need to
establish a new logistical and support system, including maintenance and
repair, for the Huey IIs that are not currently in the Colombian's inventory
and that this will likely require continuing U. S. support.

Most of the assistance provided under Plan Colombia is targeted for the
Colombian military, but U. S. Southern Command officials said their original
input on Colombia's needs was based on the information they had and
intuitive assessments of the Colombian military's basic requirements. At the
time the administration was developing its assistance package,

8 Before the Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs, House of Representatives, September 21, 2000. Financial,

Management, And Social Challenges Will Complicate Efforts To Meet Goals Of
Plan Colombia

Additional U. S. Funding Will Be Needed to Support Equipment Provided Under
Plan Colombia

U. S. Plans to Implement the Counternarcotics Program Have Not Been
Finalized

Page 10 GAO- 01- 76T

Colombia did not have a military plan on which to base its needs. Moreover,
the Southern Command had not expected large increases in the levels of
assistance for the military, and the daily management of the current
assistance program precluded military officials in the U. S. Embassy from
assessing Colombian overall needs.

To better define the Colombian military's requirements, DOD recently
undertook two studies. The first specifically targeted the deployment of the
helicopters included in the assistance package and addressed issues such as
support for mission requirements and the organization, personnel, and
logistical support needed. The second addressed how the Colombian military
should structure and modernize itself to address the internal threats of
narcotics and insurgents. DOD officials said that these two studies provide
sufficient information to develop the operational doctrine, structure, and
systems necessary to use U. S. assistance and meet counternarcotics goals
effectively.

State is also drafting an implementation plan for U. S. assistance that is
necessary to better synchronize all U. S. programs and activities involved
in supporting Plan Colombia. State officials presented their draft to the
Colombian government to help them develop their strategy for the use of U.
S. funds. State officials stated that they expect the U. S. implementation
plan to be approved by U. S. agencies in October 2000.

State anticipates that it can obligate some funds for Plan Colombia
activities by the end of September 2000. However, DOD and the Colombian Army
have not finalized specifications for the Blackhawk helicopters and State
officials testified in September 2000 that the first Blackhawk may not
arrive in Colombia until October 2002. Similarly, State testified that the
first Huey IIs may not be delivered until mid- 2001. In addition, although
State expects to initiate pilot projects such as alternative and economic
development and judicial reform in September or October 2000, State and the
U. S. Embassy cautioned that it will take years to show measurable results.

U. S. Embassy officials said that the ability to begin implementing and
overseeing programs will hinge on obtaining additional staff to manage
programs. The Narcotics Affairs Section estimated it might need up to 24
additional staff, and USAID estimated it might need 40 more staff to
implement programs envisioned under Plan Colombia. As of September 2000,
State and other agencies involved were still determining the number of
additional personnel needed and ways to address security and other issues,
such as the lack of secure office space in the U. S. Embassy. It Will Take
Time to See

Results of U. S. Assistance

Page 11 GAO- 01- 76T

Although the Colombian government has pledged $4 billion for Plan Colombia,
State and Colombian government officials were pessimistic about Colombia's
ability to obtain much new money without cutting other government programs.
They expect that Colombia will try to raise $1 billion from bonds and loans.
As of August 2000, it had collected $325 million from domestic bonds and
planned to collect an additional $325 million from bonds by the end of 2001.
Colombian government officials indicated that, at best, most of the funds
that will be available are already included in the national budget. However,
according to an official with the Planning Ministry, it is difficult to
document the purposes of funding in Colombian budgets because Colombian
ministries' budget preparation and coordination among ministries vary.

The Colombian government is also seeking donations of more than $2 billion
from donors other than the United States to fund the social, economic, and
good governance development portions of Plan Colombia. As of July 2000,
other donors had pledged about $621 million, and State officials were
optimistic that the remainder could be obtained. They said that many donors
responded favorably to Plan Colombia and made plans for meetings in the fall
2000 to revisit the issue.

The Colombian government has not yet developed the detailed implementation
plans necessary for funding, sequencing, and managing activities included in
Plan Colombia. In early 2000, State officials began asking the Colombian
government for plans showing, step- by- step, how Colombian agencies would
combat illicit crop cultivation in southern Colombia, institute alternative
means of making a livelihood, and strengthen the Colombian government's
presence in the area. In May 2000, State officials provided Colombia
extracts from the U. S. draft implementation plan with the expectation that
the Colombian government would develop a similarly detailed plan. However,
Colombia's product, provided in June 2000, essentially restated Plan
Colombia's broad goals without detailing how Colombia would achieve them. A
U. S. interagency task force went to Colombia in July 2000 to help the
Colombians prepare the required plan. The Government of Colombia provided
their action plan in September 2000 which addressed some of the earlier
concerns.

The Colombian government agrees that ending the civil conflict is central to
solving Colombia's problems. State reports have noted that a peace agreement
would stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery, help ensure the
protection of human rights, and restore the authority and control of the
Colombian government in the coca- growing regions. Colombia Has Not

Determined How It Will Fund Its Share of Plan Colombia

Colombia Still Developing Plans to Address Plan Colombia Goals

Insurgency and Human Rights Conditions Further Complicate Counternarcotics
Efforts

Page 12 GAO- 01- 76T

However, unless such an agreement is reached, the continuing violence would
limit the government's ability to institute its planned economic, social,
and political improvements.

The U. S. Embassy has already reported that initial Plan Colombia activities
have been affected because of security concerns. Specifically, the lack of
security on the roads in southern Colombia prevented the Justice Ministry
from establishing a justice center there. Moreover, indications are that the
insurgents have warned farmers in one area not to participate in alternative
crop development projects unless they are part of an overall peace plan. The
Embassy has reported that these security impediments are probably a small
indication of future security problems if peace is not achieved.

Regarding human rights, the Colombian government has stated that it is
committed to protecting the human rights of its citizens. State and DOD
officials said they will apply the strictest human rights standards before
approving assistance under Plan Colombia. For example, State did not approve
training for the second counternarcotics battalion until an individual
officer suspected of a violation was removed from the unit, even though the
Colombian government had cleared the person of wrongdoing. Nevertheless,
human rights organizations continue to allege that individuals in the
Colombian armed forces have been involved with or condoned human rights
violations and that they do so with impunity. As such, Colombia's failure to
adhere to U. S. to human rights policies could delay or derail planned
counternarcotics activities.

Although the Congress required the President to certify that Colombia had
met certain human rights standards prior to disbursing assistance for Plan

Colombia, 9 the President waived the certification as permitted by the act.
10

According to State officials, the waiver was issued because it was too soon
to determine the extent to which Colombia was complying with the
legislation's requirements.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared
remarks. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.

9 Section 3201( a)( 1) of the Emergency Supplemental Act, FY 2000 (Division
B of P. L. 106- 246). 10 Section 3201( a)( 4) of the Emergency Supplemental
Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246).

Page 13 GAO- 01- 76T

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford
at (202) 512- 4268. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Al Fleener, Ron Hughes, Al Huntington, and Joan Slowitsky.

(711570) Contact and

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