Department of Justice: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and	 
Addressing Major Management Challenges (26-JUL-01, GAO-01-729).  
								 
This report reviews the Department of Justice's fiscal year 2000 
performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required
by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and	 
assesses Justice's progress in achieving selected key outcomes	 
that were identified as important mission areas. Justice's	 
overall progress toward achieving the key outcomes was difficult 
to ascertain because generally the performance report lacked	 
fiscal year 2000 performance targets to measure success and	 
lacked clear linkage between performance measures and outcomes.  
Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for some
measures because the measures were new, and for some measures	 
Justice believes that setting performance targets could cause the
public to perceive law enforcement as engaging in "bounty	 
hunting" or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for the sake of	 
meeting particular goals. Justice's strategies varied in the	 
extent to which they included sufficient information to inform	 
decisionmakers about initiatives to achieve these outcomes. GAO  
noted several areas of opportunity for Justice to improve the	 
usefulness of its reports and plans.				 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-729 					        
    ACCNO:   A01463						        
  TITLE:     Department of Justice: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes  
             and Addressing Major Management Challenges                       
     DATE:   07/26/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Strategic planning 				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Reporting requirements				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     FBI National Instant Criminal Background		 
	     Check System					                                                                 
	     Government Performance and Results Act		 
	     GPRA						 
	     INS Computer Linked Application			 
	     Information Management System 3.0			                                                                
	     INS Computer Linked Application			 
	     Information Management System 4.0			 
								 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-729
     
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.
S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges

GAO- 01- 729

Page i GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes Letter 1

Appendix I Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges 29

Appendix II Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice 43

Tables

Table 1: Extent to Which Justice?s Performance Plan Included Goals,
Measures, and/ or Strategies Related to GAO?s Management Challenges 23 Table
2: Major Management Challenges 30

Abbreviations

BOP Bureau of Prisons CLAIMS Computer Linked Application Information System
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service NICS National Instant Criminal
Background Check System OCDETF Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
OIG Office of the Inspector General OJP Office of Justice Programs OMB
Office of Management and Budget USMS United States Marshals Service Contents

Page 1 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

June 26, 2001 The Honorable Fred Thompson Ranking Minority Member Committee
on Governmental Affairs United States Senate

Dear Senator Thompson: This report responds to your request that we review
the Department of Justice?s (Justice) fiscal year 2000 performance report
and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to assess agencies? progress in achieving
selected key outcomes that you identified as important mission areas for the
agencies. 1 These are the same outcomes we addressed in our June 2000 report
2 on Justice?s fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001
performance plan to provide a baseline by which to measure agencies?
performance from year to year. These selected key outcomes are

 less drug- and gang- related violence;

 reduced availability and/ or use of illegal drugs;

 timely, consistent, fair, and high- quality services provided by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and

 U. S. borders secure from illegal immigration. As agreed, using the
selected key outcomes for Justice as a framework, we (1) assessed the
progress Justice has made in achieving these outcomes and the strategies the
agency has in place to achieve them and (2) compared Justice?s fiscal year
2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan with the
agency?s prior year performance report and plan for these outcomes.
Additionally, we agreed to analyze how Justice addressed the major
management challenges, including the governmentwide high- risk areas of
strategic human capital management and information security, that we and its
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) identified. Appendix I provides
detailed information on how Justice

1 This report is one of a series of reports on the 24 Chief Financial
Officers Act agencies? fiscal year 2000 performance reports and fiscal year
2002 performance plans. 2 Observations on the Department of Justice?s Fiscal
Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (GAO/
GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

addressed these challenges. Appendix II contains Justice?s comments on a
draft of this report.

Justice?s overall progress toward achieving each of the four key outcomes
was difficult to ascertain because generally the performance report lacked
fiscal year 2000 performance targets to measure success and lacked clear
linkage between performance measures and outcomes. Justice did not set
fiscal year 2000 performance targets for some measures because the measures
were new, and for some measures Justice believes that setting performance
targets could cause the public to perceive law enforcement as engaging in
?bounty hunting? or pursuing arbitrary targets merely for the sake of
meeting particular goals. Furthermore, Justice states that measuring law
enforcement performance is difficult, in that it is not always possible to
isolate the effects of Justice?s efforts from other factors that affect
outcomes and over which Justice has little or no control. We agree that
measuring law enforcement performance is difficult given the clandestine and
diffused nature of illegal drug trafficking and its related violence, and
even with rigorous measurement efforts definitive results are illusive. In
general, Justice?s strategies varied in the extent to which they included
sufficient information to inform decisionmakers about initiatives to achieve
these outcomes. We note several areas of opportunity for Justice to improve
the usefulness of its reports and plans.

Planned outcome: Less drug- and gang- related violence. Overall progress
made by Justice toward achieving this outcome is difficult to ascertain
because (1) three of nine performance measures did not have fiscal year 2000
targets to measure success and (2) Justice fell short of achieving its
performance targets for four measures. For example, Justice was close to
meeting its performance targets for three of the four unmet measures, but it
met only about 51 percent of its performance target for preventing persons
with criminal backgrounds from purchasing firearms. Justice?s strategies and
initiatives for meeting its fiscal year 2002 goals generally seem reasonable
and clear. However, Justice could improve its performance strategies by
exploring potential coordination efforts that might be used to mitigate
external factors related to unmet performance targets and by considering the
use of performance evaluations to better assess its progress toward
achieving the planned outcome.

Planned outcome: Reduced availability and/ or use of illegal drugs. Overall
progress made by Justice toward achieving this outcome is difficult to
ascertain because it did not have fiscal year 2000 performance targets for
two of five measures, and the relationship of one other measure to the
Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

outcome was not clear. Specifically, Justice did not indicate how the
measure for positive responses for inquiries to its intelligence center
contributes toward achieving this outcome. Justice?s strategies and
initiatives for meeting its fiscal year 2002 goals generally seem reasonable
and clear. Although Justice generally explained why it did not meet certain
targets and revised those targets downward, its strategies did not
articulate what Justice would do differently to achieve its unmet
performance targets in the future. Furthermore, Justice?s strategies did not
discuss efforts to coordinate crosscutting programs in relation to its
efforts to achieve the planned outcome.

Planned outcome: Timely, consistent, fair, and high- quality services
provided by INS. Overall progress made by INS towards achieving this outcome
is difficult to fully gauge because several measures were not clearly linked
to the planned outcome. For example, the performance measures on the number
of naturalization cases adjudicated, the percent of naturalization and
benefit applications found on line, and the number of these applications
filed online do not indicate whether users of INS? services are receiving
timely, consistent, fair, and high- quality services. Justice?s strategies
and initiatives do not sufficiently discuss achieving this outcome because
the strategies primarily address maintaining or improving application
processing times and generally do not adequately discuss consistent, fair,
and high- quality services.

Planned outcome: U. S. borders secure from illegal immigration. Overall
progress made by INS towards achieving this outcome is difficult to fully
gauge because INS has a new performance measure for which there was no
fiscal year 2000 performance target, and the other two performance measures
were not clearly linked to the outcome. Because it was a new measure,
Justice did not set a performance target for high- priority border corridors
demonstrating optimum deterrence, 3 a critical performance measure to
determine whether it is securing U. S. borders. Justice provided historical
data for the new measure that showed INS? focus has been to reduce illegal
immigration in six corridors along the Southwest border in fiscal years
1998, 1999, and 2000. Justice did not discuss the rationale for the new
measure or how the new measure will better enable INS to assess its progress
toward securing U. S. borders. Justice?s strategy to secure U. S.

3 The performance report states that optimum deterrence is the level at
which applying more border patrol agents and resources would not yield a
significant gain in arrests/ deterrence.

Page 4 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

borders from illegal immigration does not adequately discuss integration of
resources to achieve this outcome.

Justice?s performance reports for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 had a number of
strengths in that both generally included (1) a comparison of actual
performance with the projected level of performance and (2) an explanation
when a performance target was not achieved. In addition, a key improvement
of the fiscal year 2000 report was that, as required under GPRA, it showed
that Justice reassessed fiscal year 2001 performance targets on the basis of
its progress for fiscal year 2000. Furthermore, Justice stated that it has
developed new performance measures for goals where in the past it had not
set targets. However, several weaknesses remain. Like the previous year?s
report, the fiscal year 2000 performance report did not consistently address
reasons for measures being discontinued, added, or revised- information that
could be useful to decisionmakers in assessing progress toward measuring
outcomes.

In both its 2001 and 2002 performance plans, Justice identified strategic
human capital management goals and measures and program evaluations being
conducted, but the plans did not discuss how each of these areas affected
Justice?s ability to achieve its outcomes. In our previous review of
Justice?s performance plans for fiscal year 2001, 4 we identified as a key
weakness the lack of mutually reinforcing goals and measures among Justice
components for crosscutting activities. In its fiscal year 2002 performance
plan, Justice briefly discusses crosscutting program activities, but it does
not explain how program activities mutually reinforce achieving the goals
nor does it explain common or complementary performance indicators.

Regarding the two governmentwide high- risk areas- strategic human capital
management and information security- Justice?s performance plan had goals
and measures, and the performance report explained progress in resolving
these challenges. Although the strategic human capital management goals and
measures were identified in its 2001 and 2002 performance plans, Justice?s
2002 performance plan did not address human capital strategies in relation
to achieving programmatic outcomes for two performance measurements-
dismantling major drug trafficking organizations and providing timely
processing of naturalization applications. In addition, we identified 12
major management challenges

4 GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

facing Justice. Justice?s performance report discussed the agency?s progress
in resolving 8 of the 12 management challenges that we identified. Justice
had performance goals and measures that either directly or indirectly
addressed the management challenges or had strategies for 9 of the 12
challenges.

In its June 19, 2001, letter, Justice commented on a number of aspects of
our draft report. Justice focused on four major areas- our report?s overall
focus, outcome goals that were evaluated, limited consideration of new goals
and measures in Justice?s performance plan, and the presentation of progress
on management challenges. Justice believes that the overall focus of our
report centers mainly on what Justice did not discuss in its performance
report and on targets it failed to establish or failed to meet. Although our
report discusses Justice not achieving some of its performance targets, we
also discuss many of the improvements Justice has made. Justice does not
believe that the outcome of reduced availability and/ or use of illegal
drugs is part of its mission and, thus, its annual goals and measures will
not directly relate to this outcome. In our opinion, reducing the threat and
trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling
drug trafficking organizations is directly related to reducing the
availability and/ or use of drugs. Justice also questioned why five of the
performance measures for the outcome drugand gang- related violence were
selected, indicating that it believed that they were not related to the
outcome. In its performance report, Justice included these five measures
under its strategic goal to reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of
violent crime, especially as it stems from gun crime, organized crime, and
drug and gang- related violence. While Justice?s strategic goal is not an
exact match to the planned outcome, we believe that the performance measures
included in our analysis are appropriate. For example, one disputed
performance measure is the number of persons with criminal backgrounds
prevented from purchasing firearms and we believe that this measure is
related to the outcome because members of gangs may be prevented from
purchasing firearms because of criminal background checks. Justice also said
that our report did not give them sufficient credit for establishing new
performance goals and measures. We added text to reflect the development of
new performance measures in our comparison of the performance report and
plan.

And finally, Justice believes that the format used to report on management
challenges was, although technically correct, misleading. We added text to
the first paragraph in appendix I to explain this point. Justice noted that
it continues to face conflicting pressures to keep its performance report
and

Page 6 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

plan streamlined and yet to include more detailed information. Our point is
not necessarily that Justice needs to include more detailed information, but
rather that it needs to better articulate and explain how performance and
strategies relate to achieving desired goals. Justice?s comments are
discussed in more detail on page 24 and reprinted in appendix II.

GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking,
management, and accountability from activities and processes to the results
and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable information on
the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been provided since
federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA, annual performance
plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the public of (1) the annual
performance goals for agencies? major programs and activities, (2) the
measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3) the strategies and
resources required to achieve the performance goals, and (4) the procedures
that will be used to verify and validate performance information. These
annual plans, issued soon after the transmittal of the president?s budget,
provide a direct linkage between an agency?s longer- term goals and mission
and day- to- day activities. 5 Annual performance reports are to report on
the degree to which performance goals were met. The issuance of the
agencies? performance reports, due by March 31 each year, represents a new
and potentially more substantive phase in the implementation of GPRA- the
opportunity to assess federal agencies? actual performance for the prior
fiscal year and to consider what steps are needed to improve performance and
reduce costs in the future. 6

As the nation?s chief law enforcement agency, Justice is charged with, among
other things, enforcing laws in the public interest and playing a key role
in protecting the public from violence and criminal activity, such as drug
smuggling and acts of terrorism. With a fiscal year 2001 budget of over $24
billion and a staff of about 111,000, including attorneys, investigators,
and agents, Justice is a multifaceted organization whose functions range
from securing the nation?s borders to helping state and local agencies
improve their capacity to prevent and control crime. Justice?s
responsibilities are divided among a number of major components, including
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the

5 The fiscal year 2002 performance plan is the fourth of these annual plans
under GPRA. 6 The fiscal year 2000 performance report is the second of these
annual reports under GPRA. Background

Page 7 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), INS, the Office of Justice Programs
(OJP), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS).

This section discusses our analysis of Justice?s performance in achieving
the selected key outcomes and the strategies it has in place, particularly
strategic human capital management 7 and information technology, when
appropriate, for accomplishing these outcomes. In discussing these outcomes,
we have also provided information drawn from our prior work on the extent to
which the agency provided assurance that the performance information it is
reporting is credible.

Overall progress made by Justice toward achieving less drug- and gangrelated
violence is difficult to ascertain because (1) three of nine performance
measures did not have fiscal year 2000 targets to measure success and (2)
Justice fell short of achieving its performance targets for four measures. 8
Justice did not set fiscal year 2000 performance targets for its performance
related to dismantling Asian criminal enterprises, dismantling Eurasian
criminal enterprises, and cases in Indian Country. 9 Justice did not set
performance targets for these measures because it considered two of the
measures to be new measures, and for the number of cases in Indian Country,
Justice did not want to set performance levels because it believes that
setting performance targets could cause the public to perceive law
enforcement as engaging in ?bounty hunting? or pursuing arbitrary targets
merely for the sake of meeting particular goals. In addition, even though
Justice indicated that the performance measures for

7 Key elements of modern strategic human capital management include
strategic human capital management planning and organizational alignment;
leadership continuity and succession planning; acquiring and developing
staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs; and creating
results- oriented organizational cultures.

8 The nine performance measures in Justice?s fiscal year 2000 performance
report under the strategic objective of ?violent crime? that we used in our
analysis included (1) percent of La Cosa Nostra members incarcerated, (2)
number of dismantled Asian criminal enterprises [new measure], (3) number of
dismantled Eurasian criminal enterprises [new measure], (4) number of gangs
dismantled of the 30 gangs targeted by the FBI as the most dangerous, (5)
number of criminal background checks, (6) number of persons with criminal
records prevented from purchasing firearms, (7) number of cases in Indian
Country, (8) number of new Interpol cases, and (9) number of new treaties
with other countries.

9 The FBI created an Indian Country Unit within its Violence Crime and Major
Offenders Section to work with tribal authorities to combat and reduce the
incidence of violent crime on Indian Reservations. Assessment of

Justice?s Progress and Strategies in Achieving Selected Key Outcomes

Drug- and Gang- Related Violence

Page 8 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

dismantling Asian and Eurasian criminal enterprises were new measures, these
same measures were included in Justice?s fiscal year 1999 performance report
(albeit Eurasian was called Russian then).

Justice fell short of achieving the performance targets for four measures.
For example, although close, Justice did not meet its performance target to
perform 4.81 million criminal background checks. Justice reported that it
had perfomed 4. 49 million criminal background checks. Also, Justice did not
meet its performance target to prevent 140, 244 persons with criminal
backgrounds from purchasing firearms. Justice reported it had prevented
71,890 ineligible persons from purchasing firearms. In its explanation of
why it did not meet these performance targets, Justice noted that the
reported targets for these measures were based on the assumption that all
states and territories would be full participants in the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS) program. 10 Justice reported that
only 27 states have become full participants since NICS began in November
1998. In an April 2000 report, we reported that the states generally are
better positioned than the FBI to conduct background checks and that there
are potential barriers to states participating in NICS. 11 Justice?s
performance report does not articulate the implications of potential
barriers if the intent is for all states to participate.

Although close, Justice also did not meet its performance measure to
initiate 20,000 new Interpol cases or enter into 10 new mutual legal
assistance treaties with other countries. Justice reported that in fiscal
year 2000, it had initiated 19,549 new Interpol cases and entered into 8
treaties. Justice noted that it had not met its performance targets for
these measures because there are a number of outside entities (such as,
state liaison offices, foreign governments, the State Department, the White
House, and the U. S. Senate) that have key roles in these efforts and that
Justice has limited control over actions of these entities. However, Justice
did not discuss any actions that it might take to mitigate the effects of
external factors. Our February 1999 report 12 also suggested that to improve

10 Justice has advised us that the NICS program information may not
accurately reflect the NICS program and its accomplishments. Justice
recognizes that our discussion of the NICS program is based on the
information in its fiscal year 2000 performance report and has further
advised that to the extent that this information is incorrect, it will amend
such information in subsequent performance reports.

11 Gun Control: Options for Improving the National Criminal Background Check
System (GAO/ GGD- 00- 56, Apr. 12, 2000). 12 GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 99- 69, Feb.
26, 1999.

Page 9 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

the usefulness of annual plans, agencies show how strategies will be used to
achieve goals that include describing approaches to leverage or mitigate the
effects of external factors on the accomplishment of performance goals.

For each performance measure, Justice included a brief explanation about
data collection and storage, data validation and verification, and any known
data limitations. There were data limitations associated with four of the
databases used with the performance measures. Two of the data limitations
appear to be more of a clarification rather than a limitation. The other two
data limitation explanations were more significant. One limitation noted
that a significant number of criminal history records were not complete and
that state and local agencies and the courts needed to update and complete
the records in a more timely manner. The performance report did not indicate
actions or steps that might be taken to mitigate the data limitations with
state and local agencies and the courts in order to improve the data?s
reliability. For the other limitation, Justice reported that the current
reporting system for the number of Interpol cases was severely limited.
However, Justice reported that in fiscal year 2001 the database and
procedures were to be validated for accuracy and redesigned for efficiency
and that a comprehensive and flexible reporting system to extract the
statistics from the database was to be developed.

Justice?s strategies and initiatives to achieve less drug- and gang- related
violence generally seem reasonable and clear. However, Justice could improve
its performance strategies by exploring potential coordination efforts that
might be used to mitigate external factors and by considering the use of
performance evaluations to better assess its progress toward achieving the
outcome. For example, on the basis of its fiscal year 2000 performance,
Justice modified its fiscal year 2001 performance target from 5.05 million
to 4.54 million for the number of criminal background checks performed.
Modifying the performance target in the short term is a reasonable step;
however, Justice may want to discuss what it has considered in response to
only 27 states participating in the NICS since it began in November 1998 and
whether other strategies to assist states are needed to achieve the outcome.
As mentioned earlier, Justice did not have performance targets for one
measure because of concerns about pursuing targets merely for the sake of
meeting a goal. We suggest that Justice could compare the relative
effectiveness of programs using a program evaluation approach to provide an
indication of its progress towards achieving its goals. Specifically,
Justice has a goal to provide enforcement assistance and training to tribal
governments to combat and reduce the incidence of violent crime on Indian
Reservations, especially crime related

Page 10 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

to gang activity. This is a performance measure for which Justice did not
provide performance targets and that Justice reported the number of cases in
Indian Country. A program evaluation for this goal could compare the
difference in gang activity on reservations where assistance and training is
provided with reservations where assistance and training have not been
provided. 13 While program evaluations will also be hampered by the lack of
underlying data about the drug- and gang- related violence, they might
provide some indications of the comparative effectiveness of different
interdiction programs.

Overall progress made by Justice toward achieving a reduction in the
availability and/ or use of illegal drugs is difficult to ascertain because
it did not have fiscal year 2000 performance targets for two of five
measures, and the relationship of one measure to the outcome was not clear.
14 Justice did not have a performance target for measures related to drugs
removed and its efforts to seize, dismantle, and dispose of clandestine
laboratories. Justice indicated that the measure of the amount of drugs
removed is to be discontinued because it does not adequately assess
performance and is not results oriented. Justice explained that DEA could
not estimate the amount of drugs to be removed by type because these vary
from case to case. Rather, Justice reported that DEA seeks to investigate
cases that will have the greatest impact on drug trafficking, drug- related
crime, and violence and that drug seizures are merely a by- product of those
investigations. Regarding not setting targets for its efforts to seize,
dismantle, and dispose of clandestine laboratories, as previously noted,
Justice does not want the public to perceive that it is pursuing arbitrary
targets for the sake of meeting particular goals. Also, we noted that
Justice?s fiscal year 2000 actual performance of 1,888 clandestine
laboratories seized, dismantled, and disposed had decreased from its fiscal
year 1999 actual performance of 2,024. According to Justice, it receives

13 This simple example is provided to illustrate what we mean by program
evaluation and is not meant to be definitive or prescriptive regarding what
a program evaluation should take into account.

14 The five performance measures in Justice?s fiscal year 2000 performance
report under the strategic objective of ?drugs? that we used in our analysis
included (1) number of El Paso Intelligence Center inquiries resulting in
positive responses; (2) number of major drug trafficking organizations
identified; (3) number of major drug trafficking organizations dismantled;
(4) amount of drugs removed: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, methamphetamine, and
amphetamine [discontinued measure]; and (5) number of clandestine
laboratories seized, dismantled, or disposed. Availability and/ or Use of

Illegal Drugs

Page 11 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

leads from state and local agencies or concerned citizens regarding the
location of clandestine laboratories. The number of leads vary from year to
year which results in a variance in the number of seizures in a given year.
In addition, the performance report did not explain how positive responses
for inquiries to Justice?s El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) contributes
toward achieving the outcome to reduce the availability of drugs. As
previously noted, we believe the usefulness of annual reports and plans
could be improved by better articulating a results- orientation that would
include explanatory information on goals and measures.

Justice fell short of achieving the performance targets for three measures.
Justice fell somewhat short on its performance target to improve
intelligence gathering. Specifically, Justice reported it had 22,624
inquiries to EPIC resulting in positive responses instead of the performance
target of 24,602 inquiries. 15 Justice reported that it did not meet its
performance measure for the number of EPIC inquiries resulting in positive
responses because EPIC did not receive as many requests for information as
anticipated. Other unmet performance measures were to identify and dismantle
major drug trafficking organizations. Specifically, Justice?s performance
target was to identify 250 and dismantle 50 U. S.- based drug organizations.
Justice reported that the FBI identified 201 major drug trafficking
organizations and dismantled 12. Justice attributed this shortfall to the
FBI overestimating what could be accomplished based on resource constraints.
Justice also indicated that the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF) had a base reduction of agents and support staff at the end of
fiscal year 2000 and that this would affect FBI?s ability to identify and
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations in fiscal year 2001.
Accordingly, the performance targets for fiscal year 2001 were revised.

In a July 1999 report, 16 we stated that DEA did not have performance
targets for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations. In
the absence of such targets, it is difficult to assess DEA?s overall
effectiveness in achieving its strategic goals. In our July 1999 report, we
recommended that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to work
closely

15 If an agency requests only a name check, that counts as one response. If
an agency requests a series of information, such as names, social security
numbers, and vehicle licenses about an organization, EPIC counts each
response separately.

16 Drug Control: DEA?s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (GAO/ GGD- 99-
108, July 21, 1999).

Page 12 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

with Justice and the Office of National Drug Control Policy to develop
measurable DEA performance targets for disrupting and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations consistent with the performance targets in the
National Drug Control Strategy. In response to our recommendation, DEA (1)
developed a new strategic plan, which was approved in May 2000; (2)
participated in a Justice work group to define the terms ?disrupt? and

?dismantle?; and (3) formed an internal GPRA Work Committee to assess and
develop a feasible management approach to identify and establish
quantifiable performance targets. Justice indicated in its fiscal year 2000
performance report that, under DEA?s new strategic plan, DEA developed
another performance measure- percent of major drug trafficking organizations
disrupted or dismantled- and is developing a process to capture information
and data to report on this measure. Justice anticipates, however, that the
system will take between 2 and 3 years to be fully operational.

Similar to the previous outcome, Justice?s performance report included a
brief explanation about data collection and storage, data validation and
verification, and any known data limitations. Except as noted above about
DEA developing a new process for capturing data on the percent of major drug
trafficking organizations disrupted or dismantled, none of the performance
measures noted any data limitations.

Justice?s strategies and initiatives to reduce the availability and/ or use
of drugs generally seem reasonable and clear. Fiscal year 2001 performance
targets were revised based on performance results in fiscal year 2000.
Although Justice generally explained why it did not meet certain targets and
revised those targets downward, its strategies do not articulate what
Justice will do differently to achieve its unmet goals in the future. In
addition, the strategies did not discuss determining the underlying reason
for EPIC not receiving as many requests for information as anticipated- a
piece of knowledge that might improve upon the relevancy, appropriateness,
and usefulness of the performance measure and contribute to determining
whether other measures might be more useful. Furthermore, Justice did not
include specific strategies or goals for mitigating the implications of FBI
and OCDETF resource constraints, including human capital management issues.
Although Justice?s performance plan identifies agencies that have
crosscutting activities related to reducing the availability and/ or use of
drugs, the plan does not discuss efforts in relation to achieving the
outcome. For example, the plan has FBI performance measures and expects
future DEA performance measures on dismantling drug trafficking
organizations, but the plan does not adequately explain how joint planning
and coordination will contribute

Page 13 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

to achieving the overall outcome to reduce illegal drug availability and/ or
use. According to Justice, interagency cooperation is key to successful drug
enforcement, and Justice reported that it has developed a number of programs
through which investigators can coordinate. However, the plan does not
include strategies for enhancing or measuring the contribution of these
programs to the overall achievement of the outcome. In our February 1999
report, 17 we note that the listing of current programs and initiatives that
were often included in agencies plans were useful for providing an
understanding of what agencies do. However, presentations that more directly
explain how programs and initiatives achieve goals would be most helpful to
congressional and other decisionmakers in assessing the degree to which
strategies are appropriate and reasonable.

Overall progress made by INS towards providing timely, consistent, fair, and
high- quality services was difficult to fully gauge because the measures did
not enable us to assess progress toward achieving this planned outcome. 18
For example, the performance measures on the number of naturalization cases
adjudicated, the percent of naturalization and benefit applications found on
line, and the number of these applications filed on line do not indicate
whether users of INS services are receiving timely, consistent, fair, and
high- quality services. Regarding the performance target for achieving a 99-
percent level of compliance with INS? quality standards for naturalization
applications, the performance report did not clearly explain what is covered
in these standards. Therefore, it is unclear whether compliance with these
standards is an indication of timely, consistent, fair, and high- quality
services. Again, we believe that opportunities exist for Justice to improve
the usefulness of its annual report and plan by better articulating a
results- orientation that would include explanatory information on goals and
measures.

17 GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 99- 69, Feb. 26, 1999. 18 The nine performance measures
in Justice?s fiscal year 2000 performance report under the strategic
objectives of ?immigration information services? and ?immigration benefits
services? that we used in our analysis included (1) percent of public use
forms available online; (2) number of applications that can be filed online
[new measure]; (3) response time for status verification for government
customers; (4) response time for status verification for employers; (5)
average case processing time, in months; for naturalization cases; (6)
average case processing time, in months; for adjustment of status cases; (7)
level of compliance with quality standards for processing naturalization and
adjustment of status applications; (8) number of naturalization cases
adjudicated; and (9) number of adjustment- of- status cases adjudicated.
Services Provided by the

INS

Page 14 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Justice reported that it had not met its performance target for an average
case processing time of 6 months for naturalization applications, instead
reporting an average case processing time of 8 months during fiscal year
2000. Justice did not explicitly discuss the reason for missing the
performance target for average case processing time, but implied that it was
a resource issue. Specifically, Justice reported that during peak periods at
the end of the year, INS met the targeted 6- month processing time for
naturalization applications by shifting resources from other services to
increase production. On the basis of its fiscal year 2000 performance, INS
expects to achieve a case processing time of 9 months in fiscal year 2001
for naturalization applications. Furthermore, historical data in Justice?s
performance report shows that improvement has been made to reduce the
average case processing time for naturalization applications from 27 months
in fiscal year 1998 to 8 in fiscal year 2000.

Similar to the previous outcomes, Justice?s performance report included a
brief explanation about data collection and storage, data validation and
verification, and any known data limitations. Justice?s performance report
indicated data limitations and efforts to improve the accuracy and
timeliness of the data. For example, Justice reported that in fiscal year
2001 INS? naturalization case capability will be fully deployed under its
Computer Linked Application Information System (CLAIMS 4) and will allow
data for these cases to be fully automated and case- based, providing for
timely and accurate data. In a May 2001 report, 19 we said that aliens face
long waits for a resolution to their case and have difficulty obtaining
accurate information on how long they can expect to wait. We reported that
INS did not know how long it took to process aliens? applications because
the agency?s automated application data were incomplete and unreliable.
Specifically, we reported that INS? available servicewide automated systems
contained unreliable data and its districts did not have automated systems
for tracking many types of applications. We pointed out that, in the absence
of information on actual processing times, INS had been estimating
processing times, but that the usefulness of the estimation method was
limited. We recommended, and Justice agreed, that INS develop the capability
to begin to calculate and report actual processing times for applications as
soon as reliable automated data are available

19 Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Applications
Processing (GAO- 01- 488, May 4, 2001).

Page 15 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

from its servicewide systems, CLAIMS 3 and CLAIMS 4. 20 Justice?s
performance report states that on the basis of its fiscal year 2000
performance, it expects to meet the corresponding 2001 targets for average
case processing times of 9 months for naturalization applications and 14
months for adjustment of status applications and expects to meet the 2001
performance target of 99 percent compliance with quality standards for
naturalization applications.

Justice strategies and initiatives do not sufficiently discuss achieving the
outcome to provide timely, consistent, fair, and high- quality services. The
strategies primarily address maintaining or improving application process
times and generally do not discuss consistent, fair, and high- quality
services. As previously noted, INS has quality standards that it is using as
a measure, but the performance plan does not articulate the specific quality
standards for achieving the outcome. Justice did not discuss the
implications of using strategic human capital management as a strategy to
help achieve this outcome even though one performance target was not
achieved until resources were realigned. Thus, the deployment of available
staff appears to be critical to achieving the timeliness performance
targets. In addition, the performance plan did not provide as much detail as
it could have to describe INS? strategy to provide electronic filing of
applications and the implications for accomplishing timely, consistent,
fair, and high- quality services. Although Justice identified that it is
deploying CLAIMS 4 software to field offices in fiscal year 2001 and
upgrading CLAIMS 3 automated support, the performance report does not
explain how the information technology improvements will contribute to
achieving better INS services. In our February 1999 report, 21 we note that
the listing of current programs and initiatives that were often included in
agencies? plans were useful for providing an understanding of what agencies
do. However, presentations that more directly explain how programs and
initiatives achieve goals would be most helpful to congressional and other
decisionmakers in assessing the degree to which strategies are appropriate
and reasonable.

20 CLAIMS 4 is INS? newest and most advanced case management and tracking
system that is used to help process incoming naturalization applications.
CLAIMS 3 is used to process applications other than naturalization
applications.

21 GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 99- 69, Feb. 26, 1999.

Page 16 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Overall progress made by INS towards achieving this outcome is difficult to
fully gauge because INS has a new performance measure for which there was no
fiscal year 2000 performance target, and the other two performance measures
did not enable us to assess progress toward achieving this planned outcome.
22 Because it was a new measure, Justice did not set a performance target
for high- priority border corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence, 23 a
critical performance measure to determine whether it is securing U. S.
borders. Justice did not discuss the rationale for the new measure or how
the new measure will better enable INS to assess its progress toward
securing our borders. Justice said that during fiscal year 2000, INS
continued to refine the border control operational effectiveness measure, 24
in particular by using ?corridors?

rather than zones, with each sector identifying the corridors within their
area of operation. Even though this was a new measure, Justice provided
historical data from fiscal years 1994 to 1999, provided actual performance
for fiscal year 2000, and projected performance targets for fiscal years
2001 to 2004 for this performance measure as an indication of its progress.
The historical data showed that INS has maintained optimum deterrence in 6
of 26 corridors along the Southwest border during fiscal years 1998, 1999,
and 2000.

In addition, while Justice met the targets for the other two performance
measures for this outcome, these measures were not directly linked to the
outcome because they omitted some aspects of the performance. For example,
to deter illegal immigration at the source, INS has a performance measure to
intercept undocumented offshore travelers en route to the United States.
Justice reported that these intercepts were accomplished as a result of INS
officers working closely with their host country government agencies,
diplomatic missions, and others to provide advice,

22 The three performance measures in Justice?s fiscal year 2000 performance
report under the strategic objective of ?border enforcement? that we used in
our analysis included (1) number of high- priority border corridors
demonstrating optimum deterrence [new measure], (2) number of interceptions
of mala fide and offshore travelers en route to the United States, and (3)
number of offshore prosecutions assisted by INS aided by fraudulent document
detection.

23 The performance report states that optimum deterrence is the level at
which applying more border patrol agents and resources would not yield a
significant gain in arrests/ deterrence.

24 The level of operational effectiveness within identified corridors (of
the Southwest border) is defined as apprehensions plus turn backs (the
attempt was thwarted), divided by attempts. Securing U. S. Borders

From Illegal Immigration

Page 17 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

training, and assistance. Justice?s performance report does not sufficiently
discuss the working relationship with host countries and others or the
quality of INS officers? training and assistance in relation to deterring
illegal immigration at the source. In a May 2000 report, 25 we said that the
agency does not believe that overseas efforts have produced long- term
impacts because training that INS personnel provided to foreign air carrier
and law enforcement personnel diminished within a few months. In addition,
INS believes that the non- INS personnel they have trained do not receive
continual encouragement and support to perform their jobs professionally
and, therefore, revert to their old practices.

In its performance report Justice stated that it expects to meet the 2001
performance targets for the three performance measures. Specifically,
Justice?s performance report states that on the basis of fiscal year 2000
actual performance for demonstrating optimum deterrence in six corridors,
INS expects to meet the 2001 performance target for this measure of
deterrence in eight corridors. Justice exceeded, by a significant number,
its performance targets for intercepting undocumented offshore travelers en
route to the United States (the performance target was 8,283 interceptions
and the actual was 19, 007) and the offshore prosecutions assisted by INS
(the performance target was 107 prosecutions and the actual was 514).
Justice reported that improved and thorough reporting of these activities by
the INS overseas district offices resulted in a more accurate account of
these activities than had been available in the past, and INS significantly
exceeded its targets. Justice?s performance plan indicates INS expects to
also exceed the fiscal year 2001 performance targets of 9,324 interceptions
and 119 prosecutions.

Although Justice briefly explained its data collection and storage, and data
validation for each performance measure, there is some question about the
credibility of the performance data. Specifically, Justice reported that all
three performance measures related to securing the U. S. borders from
illegal immigration had data limitations. With respect to measuring border
corridors demonstrating optimum deterrence, the report states that
collecting data to measure this goal is currently an intensive manual
process and that INS is implementing a process to standardize recording and
reporting of data to ensure consistency and validity. Justice also reported
that data provided for corridors demonstrating optimum

25 Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to
Address Growing Problem (GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000).

Page 18 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

deterrence prior to fiscal year 1999 were estimated because data was not
available for corridors during that period and that projected corridor
effectiveness for fiscal years 2001 through 2004 is dependent on sufficient
allocation of resources.

Justice?s strategy to secure U. S. borders from illegal immigration does not
adequately discuss integration of resources to achieve the outcome.
Justice?s basic strategy is to apply increased levels of Border Patrol
staff, technology, and other resources in the busiest areas until the risk
of apprehension is high enough to be an effective deterrent, thus creating
acceptable areawide control. Justice?s performance plan does not discuss the
mix of staffing, equipment, and technology needed to achieve the desired
level of deterrence in each area nor does it clearly discuss the basis upon
which a determination is made that a particular corridor has achieved
optimum deterrence. In addition, in December 1999, we reported that INS had
had difficulties attracting and retaining qualified applicants for Border
Patrol positions. 26 Justice?s performance report indicates that INS did not
meet its performance target to have 9,377 Border Patrol agents on board at
the end of fiscal year 2000, falling short by 196 agents. According to
Justice, additional Border Patrol resources (personnel and technology) are
needed in fiscal year 2002 to maintain and extend control along the border.
INS expects to meet its hiring goals for agents in fiscal year 2001,
reaching an on- board strength of 9,807 and projected an onboard strength of
10,377 agents for fiscal year 2002. According to Justice, INS has overcome
difficulties in hiring Border Patrol agents. The Justice report also states
that INS set records in fiscal year 2000 for the number of qualified
applicants and the number passing the required tests. However, Justice did
not discuss actions planned to bringing agents on board nor did it explain
how having more applicants and candidates passing tests will ultimately
result in achieving the targeted level of agents to be on- board in fiscal
year 2001. While hiring more agents is a first step, INS did not discuss
training and deployment of hired agents-- initiatives that also impact on
INS? ability to have agents at the border. Furthermore, the performance plan
did not explain Justice?s plans for obtaining equipment and technology
needed to implement the border control strategy. As previously mentioned,
strategies can be more useful if they describe how they will enable the
agency to achieve its goals.

26 Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring
Goal Was Not Met (GAO/ GGD- 00- 39, Dec. 17, 1999).

Page 19 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Justice stated in its 2002 performance plan that it continuously evaluates
the effectiveness of its border control strategies, particularly for the
Southwest border, and quarterly evaluates progress through the
Commissioner?s Performance Management Reviews. In addition, Justice reported
that several special studies have been initiated and are ongoing to evaluate
border enforcement effectiveness. In a December 1997 report on the Southwest
Border Strategy, 27 we recommended a comprehensive and systematic evaluation
plan of INS? border strategy be developed to obtain information about the
effectiveness of the strategy in reducing and deterring illegal entry.
Justice anticipates conducting additional studies related to the
effectiveness of INS? enforcement activities at the border that includes one
that responds to our recommendation. In a May 1999 report, 28 we concluded
that information on INS studies was too limited for us to assess whether
these studies will provide the information needed to comprehensively and
systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy.

For the selected key outcomes, this section describes strengths or remaining
weaknesses in Justice?s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in
comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report and (2) fiscal year 2002
performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. This section
also discusses the degree to which the agency?s fiscal year 2000 report and
fiscal year 2002 plan addresses concerns and recommendations by us and
Justice?s OIG.

27 Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
Evaluation Needed (GAO/ GGD- 98- 21, Dec. 11, 1997). 28 Illegal Immigration:
Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May
19, 1999). Comparison of

Justice?s Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2002
Performance Plan With the Prior Year Report and Plan for Selected Key
Outcomes

Page 20 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

We identified several strengths in Justice?s performance reports. First,
both fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance reports generally included (1) a
comparison of actual performance with the projected level of performance
(when a goal had a performance projection) as set out in the performance
goals and (2) an explanation for why the goal was not met, where a
performance goal was not achieved. Second, a key improvement of the fiscal
year 2000 report was that, as required under GPRA, the report showed that
Justice generally reassessed fiscal year 2001 performance targets on the
basis of its performance for fiscal year 2000. Third, Justice?s performance
report included historical data to provide perspective on its progress. And
finally, we also noted that this year Justice issued a combined fiscal year
2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan. The
information is now presented in a sequential manner, discussing the results
of the past year, then the anticipated performance for the current year, and
finally the impact of next year?s performance. Presenting the information in
this manner, we believe, provides decisionmakers with a better understanding
of the agency?s progression toward achieving its goals.

The fiscal year 2000 performance report, like the 1999 report, also contains
several weaknesses in that it does not consistently address changes in the
performance report as to why certain measures were discontinued, new ones
added, or revisions made to existing measures. For example, INS changed its
performance goal to measure deterrence in relation to corridors rather than
zones; however, there is no discussion as to the rationale for changing the
areas of operation to be measured or how the new measure will better enable
INS to assess its progress toward securing our borders. We believe an
explanation in the performance report would be useful to better understand
the relationship of revised or new goals and measures toward achieving the
performance goal. Furthermore, although Justice generally explained why it
did not meet certain targets and revised those targets downward, its
strategies do not articulate what Justice will do differently to achieve its
unmet goals in the future.

In addition, eight management challenges identified in our 2000 GPRA report
continue to be management challenges. Progress in resolving two of the eight
management challenges- INS restructuring and internal control weakness at
DEA- was not discussed in either the 1999 or 2000 performance report.
Comparison of

Performance Reports for Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000

Page 21 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Our comparison of Justice?s performance plans for fiscal years 2001 and 2002
found that many of the weaknesses previously identified by us in the 2001
plans were present in the 2002 plan. Although the strategic human capital
management goals and measures were identified in its 2001 and 2002
performance plans, Justice?s 2002 performance plan did not address human
capital strategies in relation to achieving programmatic outcomes for two
goals- dismantling major drug trafficking organizations and providing timely
processing of naturalization applications. In addition, Justice identified
personnel skills that supported each strategic goal, but did not discuss
whether it had the staff with these skills or whether it needed to acquire
or develop staff to meet agency needs. The performance plans also
consistently identified program evaluations related to each of its strategic
goals. However, the plans do not discuss whether these evaluations could be
used in assessing the achievement of goals or as alternative measures for
performance. For example, we noted that Justice reported on a program
evaluation to verify and validate CLAIMS, which supports INS? benefit
processing that may provide information to improve operations, but will not
provide outcome measures. However, we noted that another program evaluation
concerning a multiyear study of the employment verification pilots may
provide some information toward measuring progress. We believe that
providing information on how the program evaluations would help measure
Justice?s achievement of its outcomes could be useful to decision- makers.

Like its fiscal year 2001 performance plan, Justice?s fiscal year 2002
performance plan consistently identified crosscutting activities, but its
discussion of crosscutting activities generally did not discuss how the
activities could be coordinated to improve overall performance within
Justice. For example, to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking
criminal enterprises, the performance plan states that interagency
cooperation is key to successful drug enforcement and provides information
on a number of programs through which investigators from various agencies
can coordinate. The plan cites DEA, FBI, the Criminal Division, and other
federal law enforcement agencies as participants in these programs. However,
the plan does not explain how the strategies of Justice?s components are
mutually reinforcing, nor does it explain common or complementary
performance indicators.

Justice stated that it has developed new performance measures for goals
where in the past it had not set targets. Most of Justice?s performance
measures in its 2002 performance plan had targets against which to measure
progress. However, we do not know the extent to which the new performance
measures will clearly demonstrate results achieved. As Comparison of

Performance Plans for Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002

Page 22 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

mentioned earlier, in our September 2000 report, 29 we provided information
and examples to assist agencies in identifying how they might use
evaluations to improve their performance reporting. We noted that program
evaluations are objective, systematic studies that answer questions about
program performance and results. An evaluation study can explore the
benefits of a program as well as ways to improve program performance by
examining a broader range of information than is feasible to monitor on an
ongoing basis through performance measures. For example, a program
evaluation was conducted of an INS border control initiative in El Paso,
Texas, called Operation Hold the Line. Operation Hold the Line was a new INS
enforcement approach introduced in 1993. Rather than apprehending aliens
after they had illegally crossed the border in El Paso, INS sought to
prevent illegal entry from occurring in the first place by increasing the
number of Border Patrol agents in El Paso and position them in high visible
locations along the border. The evaluation collected data to assess the
effects of Operation Hold the Line on a number of outcomes, including
illegal and legal crossings, business activity, crime, education, births,
and the use of social services in El Paso. By collecting quantitative and
qualitative data on a range of outcome indicators, the researchers were able
to draw conclusions about the representativeness, scope, and magnitude of
the Operation?s effects. 30

The fiscal year 2002 performance plan clearly identified the OIG management
challenges and Justice designated areas of material weaknesses. The plan
does not consistently identify our recommendations or concerns in relation
to achieving goals and performance measures. For example, the Justice plan
provided information on actions taken to address our recommendation to DEA
regarding its performance measures but the performance plan did not address
actions taken in response to our recommendation to INS regarding its
estimation for application processing times.

29 Program Evaluation: Studies Helped Agencies Measure or Explain Program
Performance (GAO/ GGD- 00- 204, Sept. 29, 2000). 30 Illegal Mexican
Migration and the United States/ Mexico Border: The Effects of Operation
Hold the Line on El Paso/ Juarez, University of Texas at Austin, July 1994.

Page 23 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

We identified two governmentwide high- risk areas: strategic human capital
management and information security. Regarding strategic human capital
management, Justice?s performance plan had goals and measures related to
human capital, and the agency?s performance report explained its progress in
resolving human capital challenges. With respect to information security,
Justice?s performance plan had goals and measures related to information
security, and the agency?s performance report explained its progress in
resolving its information security challenges.

In addition, we identified 12 major management challenges facing Justice.
Justice?s performance report discussed the agency?s progress in resolving
many of its challenges, but it did not discuss the agency?s progress in
resolving the following challenges: (1) internal control weaknesses at DEA,
(2) options for restructuring INS, (3) weaknesses in Justice?s asset
forfeiture program, and (4) program management weaknesses in the Weed and
Seed program. As shown in table 1, of the agency?s 12 major management
challenges, its performance plan (1) had goals and measures that were
directly related to five challenges; (2) had a goal but no measures that
were directly related to one challenge; (3) had goals and measures that were
indirectly applicable to one of the challenges; (4) had no goals and
measures related to two of the challenges, but discussed strategies to
address them; or (5) had no goals, measures, or strategies to address three
of the challenges. Appendix I provides detailed information on how Justice
addressed these challenges and high- risk areas as identified by us and its
OIG.

Table 1: Extent to Which Justice?s Performance Plan Included Goals,
Measures, and/ or Strategies Related to GAO?s Management Challenges

Had goals and measures that were directly related to the challenges

Had goals but no measures that were directly related to the challenges

Had goals and measures that were indirectly applicable to the challenges

Had no goals and measures related, but discussed strategies to address the
challenges

Had no goals, measures, or strategies to address the challenges

Information systems planning and implementation

Financial statements and systems Removal of illegal aliens Asset forfeiture
program Internal control

weaknesses at DEA Police Corps program had a slower than expected start, due
to funding and staffing limitations

Program management weaknesses remain in weed and seed program

Efforts to reduce unauthorized employment face impediments

Justice?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management Challenges Identified by
GAO

Page 24 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Had goals and measures that were directly related to the challenges

Had goals but no measures that were directly related to the challenges

Had goals and measures that were indirectly applicable to the challenges

Had no goals and measures related, but discussed strategies to address the
challenges

Had no goals, measures, or strategies to address the challenges

Develop measurable DEA performance targets to determine progress in reducing
the availability of illegal drugs

Shortcomings in programs to control alien smuggling

INS? organizational structure remains undecided INS Southwest border
strategy

Source: GAO analysis.

As agreed, our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of GPRA,
the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, guidance to agencies from the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for developing performance plans and reports
(OMB Circular A- 11, Part 2), previous reports and evaluations by us and
others, our knowledge of Justice?s operations and programs, GAO
identification of best practices concerning performance planning and
reporting, and our observations on Justice?s other GPRArelated efforts. We
also discussed our review with officials in the Department of Justice and
its OIG. The agency outcomes that were used as the basis for our review were
identified by the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs as important mission areas for the agency and do not
reflect the outcomes for all of Justice?s programs or activities. The major
management challenges confronting Justice, including the governmentwide
high- risk areas of strategic human capital management and information
security, were identified in our January 2001 performance and accountability
series and high- risk update and were identified by Justice?s OIG in
December 2000. We did not independently verify the information contained in
the performance report and plan, although we did draw from our other work in
assessing the validity, reliability, and timeliness of Justice?s performance
data. We conducted our review from April through June 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We discussed our draft report with Justice officials on June 13 and 14,
2001, and received written comments on June 19, 2001. The full text of
Justice?s written comments is included in appendix II. In its letter,
Justice discussed four major areas- our report?s overall focus, outcome
goals that Scope and

Methodology Agency Comments

Page 25 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

were evaluated, limited consideration of new goals and measures in its
performance plan, and the presentation of progress on management challenges.

Overall focus. Justice believes that our report focuses heavily on what its
performance report and plan do not discuss, on targets not established, or
on targets not met. In addition, Justice believes that our report does not
focus on improvements the agency has made. For example, in addressing INS?
goal for ensuring that immigration benefit services are timely, fair, and
consistent, Justice said that our report focused on the agency missing the
naturalization case processing time by 2 months. Justice believes that
reaching an 8- month processing time is an incredible achievement, given
that the processing time was 27 months just 2 years earlier.

We addressed many of the improvements that Justice made under the section
comparing the performance report and plan with the previous year?s report
and plan. The sections discussing achieving outcomes are an assessment of
progress toward achieving results on the basis of performance measures and
targets, historical data, and our work related to program areas. We
acknowledge that Justice?s performance report included historical data for
fiscal years 1998 and 1999 for many of its measures. But other than the
example Justice cited in its comments, the historical data for the other
measures did not clearly demonstrate improvements. Furthermore, after
meeting with Justice to discuss the draft report, we revised the text to
include the historical data regarding reported improvement to reduce the
processing time of naturalization cases (the example Justice cited).

Outcome goals. Justice acknowledged that the outcomes we used in our
analysis were prescribed by the requestor, but believes that the outcome of
reduced availability and/ or use of illegal drugs is not part of its
mission. Instead, Justice stated that its strategic goal relative to
enforcing the nation?s antidrug laws is to reduce the threat and trafficking
of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations. Thus, Justice does not believe that any of its
annual goals or measures will relate directly to the achievement of the
outcome to reduce the availability and/ or use of illegal drugs, giving the
false impression that its report and plan are deficient. Justice also
believes that, while reducing drug- and gang- related violence is part of
its mission, only four of its measures under this outcome, not nine, should
have been used in our analysis. Thus, Justice believes that the other five
measures in assessing this outcome should be deleted.

Page 26 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

In our opinion, reducing the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by
identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations is
directly related to reducing the availability and/ or use of drugs. If drug
trafficking organizations are disrupted and dismantled, clearly this will
affect the availability of drugs on the street. Concerning Justice?s
contention that five of the measures under the planned outcome to reduce
drug- and gang- related violence should be deleted, we disagree. The five
measures in question are (1) number of criminal background checks, (2)
number of persons with criminal backgrounds prevented from purchasing
firearms, (3) number of cases in Indian Country, (4) number of new Interpol
cases, and (5) number of new treaties with other countries. In its
performance report, Justice included these five measures under its strategic
goal to reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent crime,
especially as it stems from gun crime, organized crime, and drug and gang-
related violence. While Justice?s strategic goal is not an exact match to
the planned outcome, we believe that the performance measures included in
our analysis are appropriate. Specifically, all of these measures, in our
opinion, have the potential, in part, to be related directly or indirectly
to drug- or gang- related violence. For example, members of gangs may be
prevented from purchasing firearms because of criminal background checks.
Additionally, under the measure for the number of cases in Indian Country,
growing juvenile gangs is one of the major issues discussed in Justice?s
performance report. Likewise, Justice?s performance report indicated that
international law enforcement cooperation is critical to addressing the
dramatic growth of transnational crime such as narcotics trafficking and
terrorism, which may, in part, relate to drug- and gang- related violence on
an international level.

New goals and measures. Justice believes that its performance measures have
matured over time and indicated that it has discontinued old and added new
measures as appropriate. Since some measures are new in fiscal year 2002,
performance targets did not exist for the fiscal year 2000 plan.
Nevertheless, Justice reported on its accomplishments by providing
historical data for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 whenever possible. Justice
believes that this is particularly significant for two outcomes: (1) timely,
consistent, fair, and high- quality services provided by INS and (2) U. S.
borders secure from illegal immigration. Concerning the first outcome,
Justice noted that it has a new performance measure for the level of
compliance with quality standards for processing naturalization cases, and
Justice reports that it has achieved 99 percent compliance with those
standards since fiscal year 1999. Concerning the second outcome, Justice
believes that it is unfair for us to report that its performance was not
considered sufficient to assess progress merely because there was no

Page 27 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

performance target against which to measure. Furthermore, Justice believes
that it is particularly discouraging for the managers and analysts that
worked to develop a measure which Justice believes is an excellent example
of reporting outcomes.

While we used performance measures and targets in our analysis, our
evaluation was also based on other factors, such as previous reports and
evaluations by us and others, our knowledge of Justice?s operations and
programs, and our identification of best practices concerning performance
planning and reporting. Furthermore, we added text to reflect the
development of new measures in our comparison of the performance report and
plan with the previous year?s report and plan. Concerning the quality
standards issue, we did not indicate that INS had not met the 99- percent
standard. We merely indicated that the performance report does not explain
what is covered by these standards. While Justice believes that the
existence of quality standards implicitly explains the relationship to the
outcome, we believe that the report could articulate what aspects of quality
service have been achieved. Moreover, we included information from our
previous work relative to CLAIMS that indicated that data limitations could
affect Justice?s assessment of the quality of services.

Management challenges. Justice believes that the format used in appendix I
of our report did not lend itself to an accurate description of its
performance report and plan. In the column describing how Justice assessed
its progress in resolving the management challenges, we sometimes indicated
that progress relative to a management challenge was not discussed. Justice
believes that, although technically correct, this is misleading because
information about some of the management challenges may be included in the
third column of the table, which discusses applicable goals and measures in
Justice?s performance plan. Justice suggested that, where appropriate, we
should indicate in the report column that information about a particular
challenge is included under the

?plan? column. Further, Justice noted that, in some instances, more complete
discussions of its progress in addressing some issues can be found in other,
more applicable, documents.

We included text in the first paragraph of appendix I to explain that
Justice did not have performance goals and measures for fiscal year 2000 to
assess progress and that, for some of the management challenges, Justice
discussed the challenge in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. We did not
verify whether additional information about Justice?s management challenges
may be found in other documents, but if information in other documents is
relevant to assessing Justice?s progress,

Page 28 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

it would have been useful to decisionmakers if Justice were to identify
these documents in the performance report.

In addition to the four areas discussed above, Justice raised one final
issue. Justice noted that it continues to face conflicting pressures to keep
its performance report and plan streamlined and yet to include more detailed
information. Justice characterized our position as one desiring considerably
more detail in its performance report and plan. Our point is not necessarily
that Justice needs to include more detailed information, but rather that it
needs to better articulate and explain how performance and strategies relate
to achieving desired goals.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to
appropriate congressional committees; the Attorney General; and the
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies of this report will also
be available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512- 8777.
Key contributors to this report were Linda Watson, Tim Outlaw, Mary Hall,
Julia Duquette, David Irvin, and Charles Vrabel.

Sincerely yours, Paul L. Jones Director, Justice Issues

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 29 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

The following table identifies the major management challenges confronting
the Department of Justice (Justice), which includes the governmentwide high-
risk areas of strategic human capital management and information security.
The first column lists the 19 management challenges identified by our office
and/ or Justice?s Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The second column
discusses what progress, as discussed in its fiscal year 2000 performance
report, Justice made in resolving its challenges. The third column discusses
the extent to which Justice?s fiscal year 2002 performance plan includes
performance goals and measures to address the challenges that we and the OIG
identified. We found that Justice?s performance report discussed the
agency?s progress in resolving many of its challenges, but it did not
discuss the agency?s progress in resolving the following challenges: (1)
internal control weaknesses at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
(2) options for restructuring the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), (3) weaknesses in Justice?s asset forfeiture program, (4) program
management weaknesses in the Weed and Seed program, (5) proper management of
grant funds, and (6) enforcement efforts along the northern border. However,
Justice officials pointed out that progress for these management challenges
are not discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report because there
were no goals, measures, or strategies in its fiscal year 2000 performance
plan. Furthermore, Justice noted that some of these management challenges
are included in its fiscal year 2002 performance plan.

Of the agency?s 19 major management challenges identified by us and
Justice?s OIG, Justice?s performance plan (1) had goals and measures that
were directly related to ten challenges; (2) had a goal but no measures that
were directly related to one challenge; (3) had goals and measures that were
indirectly applicable to two of the challenges; (4) had no goals and
measures related to two of the challenges, but discussed strategies to
address them; or (5) had no goals, measures, or strategies to address four
of the challenges. Appendix I: Observations on the Department

of Justice?s Efforts to Address Its Major Management Challenges

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 30 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Table 2: Major Management Challenges Major management challenge

Progress in resolving major management challenge as discussed in the fiscal
year 2000 performance report Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan GAO- designated governmentwide high risk

Strategic Human Capital Management GAO has identified shortcomings at
multiple agencies involving key elements of modern human capital management,
including strategic human capital planning and organizational alignment;
leadership continuity and succession planning; acquiring and developing
staffs whose size, skills, and deployment meet agency needs; and creating
results- oriented organizational cultures.

(The OIG also identified human capital as a management challenge for
Justice.)

Justice?s performance report addressed part of this management challenge.
The report did not discuss progress related to information technology (IT)
and Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff recruitment and retention.

Justice?s 2000 performance report states that current assessment of
recruitment and retention issues indicates that recent efforts to attract
and retain qualified Border Patrol agents have been successful. According to
Justice, INS has overcome difficulties in hiring Border Patrol agents.
However, the performance report indicates that INS did not meet its fiscal
year 2000 performance target. The report also states that INS set records in
fiscal year 2000 for the number of qualified applicants and the number of
applicants passing the required tests. Furthermore, the performance report
indicates that based on program performance in fiscal year 2000, INS expects
to achieve the fiscal year 2001 performance goal. Justice also reports that
its attrition rates for IT positions are predicted to decrease as a result
of special pay rates that went into effect in January 2000.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge. Justice?s 2002 performance plan includes an annual
goal to increase hiring and retention in key positions, increase the quality
of new hires, and increase employee satisfaction. Specific Justice
performance measurements related to hiring resources needed to accomplish
agency missions are for INS to have 10,377 Border Patrol agents on- board
and for BOP to have 2,960 new correction staff on- board in fiscal year
2002.

Justice reported that it did not set a performance target for IT positions
because it was within the normal attrition rates and expected additional
improvements. Justice plans to monitor its performance to ensure that
recruitment and retention remain within acceptable levels. Because Justice
has lost top candidates to other organizations due to a lengthy recruitment
process, Justice has a performance measure to reduce the average cycle time
for filling a job from 200 days to 186 days in fiscal year 2001 and 179 days
in fiscal year 2002.

Lastly, Justice surveyed employees in fiscal year 2000 (baseline) and plans
to survey employees again in fiscal year 2002 to determine if employee
satisfaction in selected areas has increased by a target of 5 percent.
Information Security Our January 2001 high- risk series update noted that
since our last high- risk report in January 1999, a efforts to strengthen
information security have gained momentum and expanded both at individual
agencies and at the governmentwide level. However, recent audits continue to
show that federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that make
them highly vulnerable

Justice has acknowledged that it has information security weaknesses and
reported information system controls as a material weakness in its Federal
Managers Financial Integrity Act (P. L. 97- 255) report for 2000. In
addressing information security, Justice noted in its performance report
that it has revitalized its security certification

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge. Justice?s 2002 plan includes a management performance
goal to ensure adequate information technology security. This goal focuses
on meeting an ongoing requirement to certify department networks and
systems. This goal is

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 31 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

to computer- based attacks and place a broad range of critical operations
and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and disruption.

(Justice?s OIG identified security of department systems and data as a
management challenge. In addition, the OIG reported information system
controls as a material weakness on Justice?s fiscal year 2000 financial
audit report.)

accreditation program to ensure that components carry out comprehensive
security planning, risk assessment, and contingency planning for all
information systems. In addition, a penetration testing program was
initiated 2 years ago to identify weaknesses, reduce unauthorized access to
their systems, and ensure timely corrective action by system owner( s).

Notwithstanding these actions, in its fiscal year 2000 financial audit,
Justice?s OIG reported information security weaknesses in access controls,
segregation of duties, system software controls, change control processes,
service continuity, and entitywide security programs. However, Justice did
not address in its performance report steps it was taking to ensure that all
information security weaknesses reported in connection with Justice?s annual
financial audit were effectively corrected.

measured based on the percentage of information systems that are certified
by department components. In addition, Justice established a management goal
to reduce ?high risk findings? by 10 percent for fiscal year 2002 through a
combination of certifying department systems and an ongoing system
penetration- testing program. While these measurements provide an indication
of progress made in reducing security weaknesses, they do not provide a
measure of the overall effectiveness of Justice?s security.

The Chief Information Officers Council in coordination with the National
Institute of Standards and Technology and the Office of Management and
Budget has developed a framework for agencies to use in determining the
current status of information system controls and, where necessary, to
establish a target for improvement. Justice could use this framework as a
means of measuring progress in improving its information security program.

GAO- designated major management challenge

Asset Forfeiture Program The need to address weaknesses in Justice?s asset
forfeiture program, specifically, its management and accountability of
seized and forfeited property.

GAO has designated Justice?s asset forfeiture program as high- risk since
1990 because (1) over the years, neither Justice nor Treasury adequately
focused on managing and accounting for seized and forfeited items and (2)
Justice and Treasury had not formed a plan to consolidate postseizure
administration of certain properties to eliminate duplication of resources
and reduce administrative costs. In recent years, Justice has taken many
actions to improve the management and disposition of seized and forfeited
property. However, challenges remain to address the programs? inadequate
information systems and financial management weaknesses, including
accountability over seized assets.

Progress in this area was not discussed. The 2002 performance plan had no

goals or measures directly related to this management challenge. As this
area is a

GAO- designated major management challenge, goals or measures addressing the
weaknesses in Justice?s asset forfeiture program should be included in the
performance plan. However, the plan did note that in September 2000 Justice
awarded a contract to a consulting firm to review the operational
effectiveness of Justice?s asset management and disposal practices as they
pertain to assets seized for forfeiture. A final report is expected by the
end of FY 2001.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 32 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

(Justice?s OIG deleted this issue from its list of management challenges
because the Asset Forfeiture Fund received an unqualified opinion on its
most recent financial statement and Justice closed the issue as a material
weakness. d ) Program Management Weaknesses Remain in Weed and Seed Program
While Justice has made some progress toward addressing administrative and
management weaknesses, challenges remain related to developing better
performance measures for the Weed and Seed program. We recommended that
Justice?s Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS) develop additional
performance measures to track program outcomes, noting that indicators would
help EOWS make more informed program decisions, such as whether to continue
existing funding.

EOWS officials told us that they had sought appropriations for fiscal year
2001 to expand evaluation and performance measurement efforts but that the
additional funds requested had not been approved by the Congress as of
November 2000.

Progress in this area was not discussed. The 2002 performance plan had no

goals or measures related to this management challenge. The fiscal year 2002
performance plan states that EOWS will continue to support communities in
the development and implementation of the Weed and Seed strategy including
safe havens and community policing. The performance plan states that the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) impact evaluation final report and GAO
findings have assisted EOWS in improving data collection efforts. EOWS is
establishing a Weed and Seed Data Center that will be showing such things as
each site?s geographic area and Safe Haven locations and selected
demographic data that have been estimated for each site?s service area.

Police Corps Program Had a Slower Than Expected Start, Due to Funding and
Staffing Limitations While Justice has made some progress toward addressing
administrative and management weaknesses, challenges remain related to
increasing states? participation in the Police Corps program. We reported in
February 2000 that the majority of participant slots for the Police Corps
program, under the Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS), remained
unfilled. e

Several states indicated that participation in the program and reasons for
the program?s slow growth was related to the Police Corps statute (42 U. S.
C. 14091- 14119) not providing funding to pay states for program
administration or for recruitment and selection of participants. We also
reported that according to federal and state officials, a factor
contributing to unfilled positions was that COPS dedicated insufficient
staff to the program, which led to delays in providing

The fiscal year 2000 performance report has three performance measures
associated with this management challenge. The Police Corps Program had one
performance measure and the COPS had two performance measures.

The Police Corps Program had a performance measure for the number of Police
Corps graduates serving a 1- year community patrol. Justice fell just short
of its target of 350, with an actual performance level of 345 graduates
serving 1 year. The fiscal year 2000 target was not met because training
classes lost participants as a result of removal or resignation. Justice
also reported that, based on program performance in fiscal year 2000, it did
not expect to achieve the fiscal year 2001 goal.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly applicable to the
management challenge.

Justice reports that, in the future, to reduce the removals and
resignations, it will encourage a careful selection processes to correct the
problem. Justice also stated that it will continue its past strategy of
recruiting and providing technical assistance by telephone, through site
visits, and during national conferences- a process that Justice states has
proved successful.

The COPS office will continue to support community- policing initiatives as
a goal and measure new police officers funded and on the street. The 2002
performance plan states that the COPS office will use a combination of
quantitative and qualitative analyses to measure its impact. These analyses
include

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 33 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

program guidance, processing program applications and payments, and
answering participants? questions about the program.

In December 1998, the Police Corps program was transferred from COPS to the
Office of Justice Programs (OJP). We reported that OJP had made significant
progress in obligating funds and establishing interagency agreements with
participating states and providing program guidance. However, at the time of
our review, it was too soon to tell whether OJP would succeed in filling
empty participant slots in a timely manner.

Regarding COPS, one performance measure is the number of new police officers
funded and the other is the number of police officers on the street. COPS
exceeded the target for officers funded (targeted performance was 109,151
and actual performance was 109,212), but fell short of the target for the
number of officers on the street (targeted performance was 84, 500 and
actual performance was 73, 629).

The projections for future performance measures have been revised to more
accurately reflect the time it takes for an officer to reach the street. In
addition, the report states that if the agency finds that grantees are
encountering difficulties implementing their grant, COPS will provide
training ranging from distance learning to onsite technical assistance.

examining the effect of COPS funding on the outcome measures, using existing
evaluations to compile case studies to examine the effect of COPS funding on
grantee communities, and examining completed NIJ- funded studies for the
relationship between community policing and the outcome measures adopted by
the agency, among other things. Preliminary results are to be available in
fiscal year 2002, to be followed in subsequent years by more complete data.

Justice also states that it plans to streamline component organizations
within the Department that include consideration of alternatives for
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of state and local assistance
programs, which may include merging COPS? program and administrative offices
in OJP and additional streamlining of OJP?s organizational structure. The
performance plan set a target date of September 30, 2002, to develop a plan
to restructure state and local assistance programs and stated that Justice
is awaiting further guidance from OMB. Develop Measurable DEA Performance
Targets to Determine Progress in Reducing the Availability of Illegal Drugs
Consistent with the Office of National Drug Control Policy strategy to
reduce the supply of illegal drugs to our nation, one of Justice?s strategic
objectives is to reduce the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by
identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug trafficking organizations that
are international, multijurisdictional, or have an identified local impact.
Despite progress that DEA made in developing strategic goals and objectives
and in enhancing its programs and initiatives, which are consistent with the
National Drug Control Strategy, limitations in DEA?s performance measures
make it difficult to determine its progress in reducing the availability of
illegal drugs.

Justice?s progress in resolving this management challenge is discussed in
this report under the outcome

?Availability and/ or Use of Illegal Drugs.?

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge.

Internal Control Weaknesses at DEA Although DEA obtained an unqualified
opinion

Progress in this area was not discussed. The 2002 performance plan had no

goals, measures, or strategies to

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 34 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

on its fiscal year 1999 financial statements, the number of reported
internal control weaknesses at DEA increased from fiscal year 1998 to 1999.
These material weaknesses include, among other things, information system
controls, the lack of a system to accurately and completely account for
property and equipment, and a weak financial reporting process.

address this challenge. INS? Organizational Structure Remains Undecided
Proposals to restructure INS have been issued as a result of several
critics? conclusion that

?mission overload? has impeded INS from succeeding at either of its primary
functions. To remedy problems identified, various entities and several
members of Congress have proposed a wide range of reorganization options.

Progress in this area was not discussed. The 2002 performance plan had a
goal

and measure related to this management challenge. Justice has a goal to
streamline selected organizational units by delayering management levels.
Specifically, the Justice report states that INS will be restructured by
splitting it into two components- one for immigration enforcement and the
other for immigration services. The performance plan had a target date to
develop a plan to restructure state and local assistance programs by
September 30, 2002, and stated Justice is awaiting further guidance from
OMB. Efforts to Reduce Unauthorized Employment Face Impediments The
effectiveness of the verification process has been undermined by aliens? use
of fraudulent documents. In addition, employers face little chance of being
investigated by INS, in part because resources for worksite enforcement have
been relatively small. Furthermore, INS issued an interior enforcement
strategy that called for INS to pursue the criminal investigation of
employers who are flagrant or grave violators. However, the strategy left
unclear what was meant by a flagrant or grave violation, what criteria would
be used for opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal
activities, and how INS would measure the effectiveness of its strategy.

The Justice fiscal year 2000 performance report included a performance
measure for the number of criminal cases of employers intentionally
violating employer sanctions (hire illegal workers or violate other criminal
statues relating to the employment of illegal workers). The performance
measure did not have a projected target but reported that 229 criminal cases
were identified in fiscal year 2000. Justice?s reported historical
information showed that this was an increase from the 182 criminal cases
identified in fiscal year 1999.

In an April 1999 report, f we recommended that INS needed to clarify the
criteria for opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal
activities. We believe that having clear criteria is important if INS is to
effectively focus its limited staff to achieve its enforcement goals and
intended results.

The 2002 performance plan had no goals, measures, or strategies to address
this management challenge. Justice?s fiscal year 2002 performance plan
states that the measure related to employer sanctions is a discontinued
measure. The plan states that INS projects it is unlikely to maintain the
levels achieved in fiscal year 2000 in fiscal year 2001. Even though the
measure is to be discontinued, the plan states that INS will continue to
pursue criminal cases against employers who intentionally hire unauthorized
workers or who violate other criminal statutes relating to employment of
unauthorized workers.

In fiscal year 2002, Justice will present principals for prosecution from
complex, international and/ or worksite- related antismuggling cases, large-
scale benefit and document fraud cases, and criminal cases against
employers. Performance measures for investigations are to be aligned with
the emphasis on criminal violators in the Interior Enforcement

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 35 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

strategy. Other measures for sanctions, fines, task force apprehensions, and
asset forfeiture continue to be tracked in INS? internal operational plan.
Shortcomings in Programs to Control Alien Smuggling The country?s ability to
combat the significant and growing problem of alien smuggling is hampered by
management and operational problems at INS, such as fragmented and
uncoordinated investigative efforts and lack of staff to perform
intelligence functions.

The INS National Antismuggling strategy is to disrupt the means and methods
that facilitate alien smuggling utilizing traditional and nontraditional
enforcement efforts. The fiscal year 2000 performance measure focused on the
number of smugglers presented for prosecution to the U. S. Attorneys.
Justice did not project a performance target for this measure; rather it
reported actual numbers for alien smuggling violations (2,520) and benefit
or document fraud cases (785). Reported historical information showed that
this was an increase from the 1,967 alien smuggling violations and 636
benefit or document fraud cases identified in fiscal year 1999.

Limited performance measurement has hampered INS? ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of its antismuggling program. INS does not provide information
to measure the extent to which INS? antismuggling efforts have helped
achieve the strategy?s objective for deterring and disrupting alien
smuggling. We recognized the difficulty in directly measuring outcomes such
as deterrence and disruption of antismuggling. We believe that there are a
variety of measures available- including information on smuggling fees,
usage and tactics, and shifts in the flow of smuggled alien traffic- that
could be used to collect systematic data and develop a composite picture of
progress toward achieving the strategy?s objectives.

In a May 2000 report, g we recommended, among other things, that INS (1)
establish criteria for opening an antismuggling case to help ensure that its
antismuggling resources are focused on the highest The 2002 performance plan
had no

goals, measures, or strategies to address this management challenge.
Justice?s fiscal year 2002 performance plan states that the measures related
to alien smuggling have been discontinued. The plan states that INS projects
it will not maintain the levels achieved in fiscal year 2000 in fiscal year
2001 and may fall below its fiscal years 1998 and 1999 level. Even though
the measures are to be discontinued, the plan states that INS will continue
to pursue criminal cases against employers who intentionally hire
unauthorized workers or who violate other criminal statutes relating to
employment of unauthorized workers.

In support of the INS? antismuggling goals contained in the interior and
border enforcement strategies, INS intelligence will continue to collect and
analyze intelligence related to alien smuggling and endangerment of large,
complex smuggling organizations. On the basis of intelligence from within
the INS intelligence system from domestic and overseas sources as well as
classified information from the intelligence community, INS will identify
and develop operations to disrupt and dismantle major criminal
organizations. For fiscal year 2002, INS plans to target alien smuggling and
trafficking organizations. Specifically, INS projects it will identify five
organizations, disrupt two, and dismantle one.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 36 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

priority cases and (2) establish performance measures for the antismuggling
efforts and intelligence program with which to gauge program effects.

GAO- and OIG- designated major management challenges

Financial Statements and Systems Achieve excellence in financial management,
including, but not limited to, a departmentwide unqualified opinion for
fiscal year 2000 and beyond. (GAO)

Continuing management control issues in financial statement preparation, i.
e., hire contractors to complete financial statements; automated systems not
capable of providing needed information during year (relied on manual
process): significant difficulties implementing commercial off the shelf
software.( OIG)

Justice?s targets were to receive (1) an unqualified opinion on all 6
consolidated statements and (2) all 10 components. Actual FY 2000
performance was (1) an unqualified opinion on two statements (Balance Sheet
and Statement of Custodial Activity) and a qualified opinion on four
statements and (2) 8 out of 10 of its components with an unqualified
opinion.

FY 2000 is the first year Justice achieved an unqualified balance sheet
opinion.

In FY 1999, 9 out of 10 of Justice?s components received an unqualified
opinion, as compared with 8 in FY 2000.

The 2002 performance plan has a goal but does not have measures related to
this management challenge. Justice has set a goal to achieve a
departmentwide, unqualified audit opinion. Additionally, Justice will
continue to focus on addressing the accounting practice, reporting, and
systems weaknesses cited in the audit reports. However, no performance
indicators or milestones for addressing these weaknesses are provided to
allow for measurement of progress. While obtaining an unqualified opinion is
an important goal, it is not an end in and of itself. The key is to take
steps to continuously improve internal control and the underlying financial
and management information systems as a means to ensure accountability and
enhance the effectiveness of government. These systems must generate timely,
accurate, and useful information on an ongoing basis, not just at the end of
the year.

Justice?s OIG reports that most components tend to view the financial
statements as an end- of- year assignment and often must hire a significant
number of contractors. Several components do not have regularly functioning
systems capable of providing needed accounting information to managers
throughout the year.

Systems improvements are critical given that all 10 components have major
accounting system enhancement or replacement projects that are underway,
planned, or in the final phases of implementation. Until system improvements
can be implemented, Justice will continue to expend additional

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 37 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

resources in its accounting operations to compensate for the system
deficiencies. Information Systems Planning and Implementation Justice?s
mission- critical computer systems were poorly planned, experienced long
delays in implementation, or did not provide timely, useful, and reliable
data.

Justice?s OIG also identified this area as a management challenge.

The performance report discusses INS? continued move toward a more strategic
approach to manage IT. The report states that management approaches to IT
planning and implementation are undergoing significant long- term changes.
Specifically, Justice noted that emphasis has been placed on compliance with
IT architectural standards, security requirements, comprehensive investment
review, and procedures for accurate reporting of current status.

However, INS continues to have problems effectively managing its IT
resources that are critical to its operations. In August 2000, b we reported
that INS lacked an enterprise architecture to manage its IT efforts.
Further, in December 2000, c we reported that INS lacked defined and
disciplined processes to manage its IT investments.

While INS has taken some limited steps to develop an enterprise architecture
and has established some important capabilities for managing IT investments,
we have noted in both of our 2000 reports that INS has considerable work
ahead to fully implement them.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge. The 2002 plan contains a management performance goal
to provide an adequate, costeffective, and compliant IT environment. This
goal will be measured by the percentage of IT systems that are determined to
be compliant with (1) security requirements, (2) system development
lifecycle standards, and (3) supported with technologically adequate
workstations. However, the plan does not specifically describe how system
compliance within each of these areas will be determined. For example, in
assessing a system to be compliant with security requirements, the Office of
Management and Budget?s (OMB) Circular A- 130, Management of Federal
Information Resources, provides guidelines on computer security that could
be used as criteria.

INS Southwest Border Strategy Although INS generally allocated newly hired
Border Patrol agents in accordance with its strategy, INS was not able to
meet its goal of increasing its onboard strength of Border Patrol agents by
at least 1,000 in fiscal year 1999. INS saw an increase of only 369 agents
in fiscal year 1999 due to recruitment and retention problems.

INS lacks performance information to determine the overall impact of its
strategy to reduce the illegal alien flow across the border, reduce flow to
the border, and reduce the number of illegal aliens who reside in the United
States. (GAO)

Justice?s progress in resolving this management challenge is discussed under
the strategic human capital management challenge in this table and in this
report under the outcome

?Securing U. S. Borders from Illegal Immigration.?

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 38 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

In 1994, the Border Patrol issued a strategic plan for controlling U. S.
borders. However, the strategic plan does not establish specific goals to be
achieved in each phase of the plan, nor does it establish target dates for
completing one phase or beginning another. (OIG) Removal of Illegal Aliens
We found that for fiscal year 1999, 43 percent of the aliens released from
detention prior to a determination of their asylum status had not appeared
for subsequent removal hearings.

We recommended that INS analyze the characteristics of those aliens who
appeared and those who did not appear for their removal hearing and use the
results to reevaluate its policy for when to release aliens in cases when an
asylum officer determined the aliens to have a credible fear of persecution
or torture. (GAO)

OIG reported that INS was successful in deporting only about 11 percent of
nondetained aliens after final orders had been issued. It noted that
ineligible aliens, including convicted felons, are inappropriately granted
voluntary departure because the INS and the Executive Office of Immigration
Review have not ensured that all eligibility requirements are met. In
addition, INS lacks an effective departure verification system and,
therefore, has no way of knowing whether illegal aliens granted voluntary
departure have left the country. h

Additionally, Justice has classified the monitoring of alien overstays and
removal of criminal aliens as material weaknesses because, among other
reasons, the INS has failed to identify many deportable criminal aliens,
including aggravated felons, or initiate Institutional Hearing Program
proceedings for them before they are released from prison. INS also lacks an
enforcement policy that specifically targets the overstay population. (OIG)

The fiscal year 2000 performance report does not specifically discuss
nondetained aliens. However, the report measures the number of final order
alien removals. The performance target for noncriminal removals was not
projected and the performance target for criminal removals was 55,000.
Justice reported that INS? noncriminal removals were 34,290 and criminal
removals were 64,261. The Justice performance plan notes that current
estimates of 67,000 criminal removals indicate that performance for this
measure will fall short of the original targeted level for fiscal year 2001
of 70,300.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures that were indirectly
applicable to this management challenge.

In fiscal year 2002, INS will continue to use alternative orders of removal,
such as administrative, reinstated, and expedited, as well as partner with
the Executive Office of Immigration Review and the Board of Immigration
Appeals to improve the hearing process. INS will maintain the Institutional
Removal Program in conjunction with state and federal prison systems to
identify and process illegal aliens for removal prior to their release from
custody. INS will continue to improve its relationship with state and local
law enforcement. To this end, INS will improve coverage to law enforcement
activities through the use of Quick Response Teams and the Law Enforcement
Support Center. The projected performance measure for fiscal year 2002 is
31,500 final orders for noncriminal alien removals and 71,700 final orders
for criminal alien removals.

OIG- designated major management challenges

Departmental Response to Terrorism The OIG said that GAO found
governmentwide, antiterrorism resources were not clearly linked to a threat
analysis and a national antiterrorism strategy .i This situation creates the
potential for

Justice had six performance measures related to preventing terrorist acts.
Four of these measures had no performance target. For the two measures that
had a performance

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures that were indirectly
applicable to this management challenge. Justice has set goals to prevent
terrorists? acts, improve

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 39 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

gaps or duplication in U. S. antiterrorism strategy. The OIG also noted that
management of counterterrorism funds is a concern because of discrepancies
found in a previous audit of the fund. The OIG plans to assess the readiness
of selected state and local emergency response agencies that receive Justice
funding and determine whether grant funds are being used for their intended
purpose.

target, Justice met the performance level. Justice?s performance measures do
not address concerns to link resources to threat analysis and a national
antiterrorism threat.

The OJP Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support (OSLDPS) is
to assist state and local emergency response agencies (law enforcement,
fire, hazardous materials, emergency medical services, emergency management,
and public health) to enhance their capabilities to respond to the threat
posed by terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction. Justice has a goal
that the OJP OSLDPS effectively manage counterterrorism efforts. OSLDPS is
to continue to provide targeted assistance to states through on- site
monitoring based on the specific needs identified with each state?s plan.
Justice?s performance report shows that OJP conducted 34 monitoring visits
in fiscal year 2000.

response capabilities to terrorists? acts, and protect critical
infrastructures. In fiscal year 2002, Justice will continue to combat
terrorism by building maximum feasible capability throughout Justice to
attack terrorism by investigating and prosecuting those persons and
countries that finance terrorist acts. Justice?s performance measures for
its goal to prevent terrorist acts are the number of terrorist cases
investigated and the number of terrorist convictions. Justice provides
actual performance but does not provide a performance target level for these
two measures.

To improve response capabilities to terrorists? acts Justice?s strategy is
to build maximum feasible capability in the counterterrorism program,
allowing Justice to identify and address terrorist threats. Justice will
expand partnerships with other federal agencies as well as state and local,
foreign, and international entities to enhance domestic and international
responsiveness to terrorist acts. The performance measure for this goal is
the number of U. S. Attorney Offices with crisis response plans.

To protect critical infrastructure (to enhance U. S. national security by
preventing infrastructure damage through a multifaceted approach to
maximizing its investigative and preventive resources to thwart cyber
attacks on the nation?s infrastructure), the National Infrastructure
Protection Center is working to develop maximum feasible capacity in
detecting, deterring, assessing, investigating, and responding to cyber
attacks on the nation?s infrastructures from both a reactive and
increasingly proactive field, headquarters, and interagency standpoint. The
performance measures for this goal are (1) computer intrusions investigated,
(2) computer intrusions convictions, and (3) key assets identified. Only the
third measure has a performance target level.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 40 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

In fiscal year 2002, OSLDPS will continue to provide targeted assistance to
states through on- site monitoring based on specific needs identified within
each state?s plan. OJP is projected to conduct 52 monitoring visits in
fiscal year 2002. Prison Overcrowding Justice continues to make slow
progress in reducing prison overcrowding, a material weakness for Justice
since 1985. Prison overcrowding will remain a management challenge for
Justice as long as the number of incarcerated inmates outstrips available
BOP housing. Any solution must be cost- effective and provide the
appropriate level of security for staff and inmates. BOP?s management
challenge is to find the optimum mix of new facilities, expansion of
existing facilities, alternatives to incarceration, and privatization
options.

To reduce prison overcrowding is a performance goal for Justice. BOP has set
targets for each of three security levels. For fiscal year 2000, BOP met its
goal for medium (50 percent overcrowding compared with a target of 58
percent) and high (54 percent compared with 69 percent) level prisons, but
not for low (44 percent compared with 36 percent). Justice reported that BOP
revised its classification in fiscal year 2000, which resulted in a short-
term population reduction at the medium- and highsecurity levels and an
increase at the low security level. In addition, Justice commented that
increases of immigration cases had a substantial impact on overcrowding at
the lowsecurity level.

BOP also has a performance measure related to the number of prison beds put
into service and under development or construction. For fiscal year 2000,
BOP?s target was 6,695 new beds; it actually activated 5,346 new prison
beds. Its target for beds under development or construction was 20, 417; it
actually had 23,904 beds under development or construction. Justice noted
that it had activated some beds in fiscal year 1999, ahead of schedule,
which resulted in fewer being activated in fiscal year 2000. Justice
attributed the increase in beds under development or construction to
provision of funding for several new facilities.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge. As a step toward achieving the fiscal year 2007 target
of reducing systemwide overcrowding to 30 percent, Justice is planning to
achieve the following goals in fiscal years 2001 and 2002: Low - 40 percent
and 36 percent; Medium - 57 percent and 61 percent; and High - 56 percent
and 57 percent. Justice expects BOP to meet its targets for fiscal year
2001. We note that, except for the low security level, these goals are
headed in the wrong direction - BOP is predicting more overcrowding, not
less.

With regard to beds put into service and under development or construction,
Justice has targets for activating 3,723 beds in FY 2001 and 5,455 in FY
2002. Justice expects to fall short of the fiscal year 2001 target by only
activating 3,609 beds. It also has targets for the number of beds under
development or construction in each fiscal year. Justice acknowledges that,
in the longer run, the beds under development and construction will address
only some of its overcrowding concerns.

Detention Space and Infrastructure - U. S. Marshals Service and INS This has
been a management challenge for

The USMS administers the federal prisoner detention program. Federal
detainees are people who are detained while awaiting trial or

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures directly related to this
management challenge. USMS and INS each have increasing targets for average

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 41 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

Justice since 1989. Both the USMS and INS are experiencing rapid growth in
their need for detention space. This places increasingly heavy demands on
the agencies? infrastructure, including buildings, transportation,
communications equipment, and staff.

sentencing, a hearing on their immigration status, or deportation. USMS
depends on state and local governments and BOP to house detainees.

Justice uses four performance measures to assess its success in achieving
this goal: both USMS and INS measure the average daily population in custody
and the cost of an average jail day. For fiscal year 2000, both agencies had
less average daily population than they had targeted. INS met its average
jail day cost target; USMS slightly exceeded its target.

daily population for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. USMS expects its average
jail day cost to increase to $62; INS expects its cost to stabilize at $75.

Justice expects to achieve its fiscal year 2001 performance targets. Its
plan states that it will work cooperatively with the private sector and
state and local governments as well as BOP to establish and maintain
adequate capacity for federal detainees.

Grant Management The infusion of funds for the COPS grants has resulted in a
management challenge for Justice to properly dispense and monitor funds
under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcment Act of 1994 (P. L. 103-
322). Justice?s multibillion dollar grant programs are a high risk for fraud
given the amount of money involved and the tens of thousands of grantees.

Progress in this area was not discussed.

The performance report has no quantifiable targets associated with grant
management. Administration of grants could be strengthened through better
monitoring and by obtaining more timely and definitive information about
project funding and the progress of program implementation.

The 2002 performance plan has goals and measures that were directly
applicable to this management challenge. Justice has set a goal to ensure
effective management of grants. Justice plans to achieve this goal by
continued progress toward full implementation of the Grants Management
System (GMS) as a way of standardizing and streamlining the grant process.
However, the system is still in its initial implementation phase; 5 percent
of new grants were processed through GMS in FY 2000. Out- year targets based
on FY 2000 implementation success project only 45 percent of new grants
being processed by GMS by FY 2003. Once implemented, GMS will electronically
track and process grants from initial application to closeout. The plan does
not address how Justice will effectively manage grants in the interim while
GMS is being implemented. INS Enforcement Efforts Along the Northern Border
In a recent Justice OIG report, j concerns were raised regarding enforcement
efforts along the northern border. Specifically, the OIG report indicated
that organized criminal activity along the northern border was encountered
more often than along the Southwest border and that the level of illegal
activity along the northern border is likely much greater than the Border
Patrol can

Progress in this area was not discussed.

Since its inception in 1994, the Border Patrol?s National Strategic Plan has
been the basis for a multiyear, multiphased approach to the deployment of
new resources along the Southwest border, the northern border, and coastal
areas. The

The 2002 performance plan had no goals, measures, or strategies to address
this management challenge.

Appendix I: Observations on the Department of Justice?s Efforts to Address
Its Major Management Challenges

Page 42 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Major management challenge Progress in resolving major

management challenge as discussed in the fiscal year 2000 performance report
Applicable goals and measures in the

fiscal year 2002 performance plan

document because of the lack of intelligence information to the northern
border and the limited number of agents available to patrol the area. In
addition, the OIG report noted that most of the world?s prominent terrorist
organizations have established operational bases in Canada, which help
facilitate the illegal transit of members into the United States.

performance report states that progress toward this management challenge
will not be addressed until phase IV of this strategy. Phase three is not
expected to begin until after fiscal year 2004.

a High Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263, Jan. 2001). b Information
Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the Development of It Enterprise
Architecture (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 212, Aug. 1, 2000). c Information Technology:
INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment Management Capability (GAO- 01-

146, Dec. 29, 2000). d Justice?s OIG report #00- 24.

e Police Corps: Some Problems Resolved, But Most Positions Remain Unfilled
(GAO/ GGD- 00- 69, Feb. 22, 2000). f Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles
to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/ GGD99-

33, Apr. 2, 1999). g Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational
Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem

(GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000). h Justice?s OIG report #I- 99- 09.

i Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO- T-
NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 2000). j Justice?s OIG report, #I- 2000- 004

Source: Prepared by GAO on the basis of Justice and GAO data.

Appendix II: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice

Page 43 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Appendix II: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice

Appendix II: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice

Page 44 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Appendix II: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice

Page 45 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes

Appendix II: Comments from the U. S. Department of Justice

Page 46 GAO- 01- 729 Justice's Status of Achieving Key Outcomes (440044)

The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are
$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also accepted.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013

Orders by phone:

(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

Orders by Internet

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an email
message with ?info? in the body to:

Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov

Contact one:

 Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm

 E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov

 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***