D.C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed Among	 
Participating Agencies (11-MAY-01, GAO-01-708T).		 
								 
Every criminal justice system faces coordination challenges.	 
However, the unique structure and funding of the D.C. criminal	 
justice system, in which federal and D.C. jurisdictional	 
boundaries and dollars are blended, creates additional		 
challenges. The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC) has 
played a useful role in addressing such coordination challenges, 
especially in areas where agencies perceived a common interest.  
However, CJCC's uncertain future could leave D.C. without benefit
of an independent entity for coordinating the activities of its  
unique criminal justice system. Funding CJCC through any	 
participating agency diminishes its stature as an independenet	 
entity in the eyes of several CJCC member agencies, reducing	 
their willingness to participate. Without a requirement to report
successes and areas of continuing discussion and disagreement to 
each agency's funding source, CJCC's activities, achievements,	 
and areas of disagreement have generally been known only to its  
participating agencies. This has created little incentive to	 
coordinate for the common good, and all too often agencies have  
simply ''agreed to disagree'' without taking action. Furthermore,
without a meaningful role in cataloging multiagency initiatives, 
CJCC has been unable to ensure that criminal justice initiatives 
are coordinated among all affected agencies to help eliminate	 
duplicative efforts and maximize their effectiveness. This	 
testimony summarizes the March report, GAO-01-187.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-708T					        
    ACCNO:   A00985						        
  TITLE:     D.C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed 
             Among Participating Agencies                                     
     DATE:   05/11/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Federal aid for criminal justice			 
	     Municipal governments				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     District of Columbia				 

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GAO-01-708T
     
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Friday, May 11, 2001 D.
C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE

SYSTEM Better Coordination Needed Among Participating Agencies

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Justice Issues

GAO- 01- 708T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss our recent report on the District of Columbia (D. C.)
criminal justice system. 1 The D. C. criminal justice system has a unique
structure consisting of D. C., federal, and federally funded D. C. agencies.
In addition, over 30 law enforcement agencies other than the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPDC) have a presence in D. C. To maximize their
effectiveness, these agencies need to coordinate their efforts. However, we
found that because of the different sources of funding, reporting
structures, and organizational perspectives of the various agencies involved
in the D. C. criminal justice system, it has been difficult to take a
coordinated approach to identifying and addressing problem areas that
balances competing institutional interests. One reason for this is that the
costs of coordinating activities and taking corrective actions may fall on
one or more federally funded agencies, while any savings may accrue to one
or more D. C. funded agencies, or vice versa. In the absence of a single
hierarchy and funding structure, agencies have generally acted in their own
interests rather than in the interest of the system as a whole.

The Criminal Justice Coordinating Council for the District of Columbia
(CJCC) is the primary venue in which D. C. criminal justice agencies can
identify and address interagency coordination issues. CJCC was created in
1998 by the agreement of its members 2 and was funded by the D. C. Control

1 D. C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed Among
Participating Agencies (GAO- 01- 187, Mar. 30, 2001). 2 Members include the
D. C. Mayor; Deputy Mayor for Public Safety and Justice; Chairman, D. C.
Council; Chairman, Committee on Judiciary, D. C. Council; Corrections
Trustee; Corporation Counsel; Chief Judge, Superior Court of the District of
Columbia (Superior Court); U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia;
Chief, MPDC; Chairman plus a member of the D. C. Financial Responsibility
and Management Assistance Authority (commonly called the D. C. Control
Board); Director, D. C. Youth Services Administration; Director, District of
Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (Pretrial Services); Director, Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia (Defender Service); Director,
D. C. Department of Corrections (DOC); Director, Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP); Chairman, U. S. Parole Commission; and the Acting Director, Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia (Court
Services).

Page 2 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

Board. The D. C. Control Board 3 did not fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001, and
CJCC?s sole remaining staff member is funded by a grant. CJCC has had some
success in improving agency coordination, mostly in areas such as data
sharing among agency automated data systems where all participants stood to
gain from a coordinated approach to a problem. In problem areas where a
solution would help one agency possibly at the expense of another, CJCC has
been less successful mainly because it lacked the authority to compel
agencies to address the issues. However, on balance CJCC has provided a
valuable independent forum for discussions of issues affecting multiple
agencies.

Our report recommended that Congress fund an independent Criminal Justice
Coordinating Council (CJCC) that, among other things, would assist criminal
justice agencies in coordinating initiatives to improve the system?s
operations. In addition, we recommended that CJCC report annually to
Congress, the Attorney General, and the D. C. Mayor on its activities,
achievements, and issues not yet resolved and why.

The criminal justice process- from arrest through correctional supervision 4
-in any jurisdiction is generally complex and typically involves a number of
participants, including police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, courts, and
corrections agencies. Because of the large number of agencies involved,
coordination among agencies is necessary for the process to function as
efficiently as possible within the requirements of due process. That is, all
involved agencies need to work together to ensure proper and efficient
system operations, identify any problems that emerge, and decide how best to
balance competing interests in resolving these problems. The unique
structure and funding of D. C. ?s criminal justice system, in which federal
and D. C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates
additional coordination challenges. As shown in table 1,

3 Under the statutory terms of its creation, D. C. Control Board activities
are to be suspended after the certification of certain specified
preconditions. For example, one such requirement is that the Authority
certifies that the District has recorded 4 consecutive years of balanced
budgets. In fiscal year 2000, D. C. was expected to record its fourth
consecutive year of balanced budgets or budget surpluses. On the basis of a
projected fourth consecutive year of D. C. budget surpluses, Congress
reduced the Control Board?s fiscal year 2001 budget, anticipating that the
Board would be phasing out its operations in 2001. The Board subsequently
decided not to fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001.

4 Correctional supervision refers to criminal justice system supervision for
convicted defendants, including probation, incarceration, and postprison
parole or supervised release. Background

Page 3 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

the D. C. criminal justice system consists of four D. C. agencies
principally funded through local D. C. funds, six federal agencies, and
three D. C. agencies principally funded through federal appropriations.

Table 1: D. C. Criminal Justice System Agencies and Their Principal Source
of Funding D. C. agencies, D. C. funded Federal agencies, federally funded
D. C. agencies, federally funded

Metropolitan Police Department Office of U. S. Attorney for D. C. Superior
Court Office of Corporation Counsel Bureau of Prisons Public Defender
Service Department of Corrections U. S. Marshals Service Office of the
Corrections Trustee Office of the Chief Medical Examiner U. S. Parole
Commission

Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for D. C. D. C. Pretrial
Services Agency

Source: GAO analysis.

According to most officials we interviewed and our own analyses, an
overarching problem within the D. C. criminal justice system has been the
lack of coordination among all participating agencies. Typically, federal
and nonfederal criminal justice systems include the following stages: (1)
arrest and booking, (2) charging, (3) initial court appearance, (4) release
decision, (5) preliminary hearing, (6) indictment, (7) arraignment, (8)
trial, (9) sentencing, and (10) correctional supervision. Most stages
require the participation of several agencies that need to coordinate their
activities for the system to operate efficiently while also meeting the
requirements of due process. That is, all involved agencies need to work
together to ensure that their roles and operations mesh well with those of
other agencies and to identify any problems that emerge and decide how best
to resolve them.

Table 2 shows the stages in D. C. ?s criminal justice system and the
agencies that participate in each stage. As shown in the table, 7 of the 10
stages typically involve multiple agencies with different sources of
funding, which results in different reporting structures and different
oversight entities. For example, as many as six agencies- one D. C. (MPDC),
three federal (the U. S. Attorney?s Office for the District of Columbia
(USAO), U. S. Marshals Service, and D. C. Pretrial Services Agency), and two
federally funded D. C. agencies (Superior Court and Public Defender Service
(Defender Service)- need to coordinate their activities before the D. C. ?s
Unique

Structure Presents Additional Coordination Challenges

Page 4 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

arrestee?s initial court appearance for a felony offense can occur. 5 At the
latter stages of the system, an offender?s sentencing and correctional
supervision may require the participation of as many as eight agencies- one
D. C.- funded agency (the Department of Corrections (DOC), five federal
agencies (USAO, Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), U. S. Marshals Service, U.
S. Parole Commission, and the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
(Court Services)), and two federally funded D. C. agencies (Superior Court
and Defender Service). At any stage, the participation of other agencies
might also be required. 6 In addition, the reporting and funding structure
for these participating agencies often differs. For example, USAO, the U. S.
Marshals Service, BOP, and the U. S. Parole Commission ultimately report to
the U. S. Attorney General and are funded by the appropriations subcommittee
that funds the Department of Justice; 7 MPDC and the Office of the
Corporation Counsel (Corporation Counsel) ultimately report to the D. C.
Mayor; and Superior Court, Defender Service, Pretrial Services, and Court
Services are independent of both D. C and the U. S. Department of Justice,
submit their budgets to Congress, and are funded by the appropriations
subcommittee for D. C.

5 USAO prosecutes felony and serious misdemeanor violations committed by
adults in D. C. Corporation Counsel would typically not be involved in
prosecutions of adult felony offenses.

6 For example, the D. C. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner may
potentially be used for such purposes as linking a particular suspect to a
crime or court testimony regarding autopsy results or toxicological tests.

7 Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations. The House and
Senate have subcommittees with identical jurisdictions.

Page 5 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

Table 2: D. C. Criminal Justice Agencies Involved In Processing a ?Typical?
Case Through the Stages of the Criminal Justice System

Stages of the criminal justice process (from left to right) Type of agency/
funding Arrest

& booking Charging Initial court appearance Release

decision Prelim. Hearing Indictment Arraignment Trial Sentencing
Correctional

supervision

D. C./ D. C. MPDC MPDC

OCC OCC DOC MPDC

OCC MPDC MPDC

OCC DOC

Federal/ federal USAO USAO

USMS PSA

USMS PSA

USMS USAO PSA

USMS USAO PSA

USMS USAO PSA

USMS USAO PSA

USMS USAO CSOSA

USMS BOP USPC CSOSA D. C/ federal Sup. Ct Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Sup. Ct

PDS Legend: MPDC = Metropolitan Police, D. C.; OCC = Office of Corporation
Counsel; USAO = U. S. Attorney?s Office; USMS = U. S. Marshals Service; Sup.
Ct = D. C. Superior Court; PDS = Public Defender Service; PSA = Pretrial
Services Agency; DOC = Department of Corrections; BOP = Federal Bureau of
Prisons; USPC = U. S. Parole Commission; CSOSA = Court Services and Offender
Supervision Agency.

Note 1: Any specific case is prosecuted by either Corporation Counsel or
USAO, not both. However, in specific circumstances, a case may be referred
at some point in the process from one office to the other for prosecution.

Note 2: Defendants who are eligible for a court- appointed attorney may,
depending upon several factors, be provided a PDS attorney, or a private
attorney. D. C. courts? budget funds private, courtappointed attorneys for
criminal defendants.

Note 3: Information from the D. C. Office of the Chief Medical Examiner may
potentially be used at any stage in the process from arrest through trial.
In addition, forensic evidence and testimony may also be provided by federal
agencies that perform certain forensic analyses for D. C., such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration, or
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Source: GAO analysis of D. C. criminal justice agencies? funding and
responsibilities.

According to most officials we interviewed and our analyses, an overarching
problem within the D. C. criminal justice system has been the lack of
coordination among all participating agencies. Agency officials pointed to
several major problem areas, each the subject of recent studies that have
identified coordination issues. The areas included

 scheduling of court cases, which has resulted in the inefficient use of
officer, attorney, and court personnel time;

 information technology, which uses more than 70 different systems that are
not linked to facilitate the sharing of information; Lack of Coordination

Among Agencies

Page 6 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

 correctional supervision, in which poor communication among agencies has
led to monitoring lapses with tragic consequences; and

 forensics, in which the sharing of responsibilities among agencies
increases the possibility of evidentiary mishaps resulting from lapses in
coordination.

The scheduling of court cases has had adverse affects on several criminal
justice agencies involved in case processing. As shown in table 2, MPDC,
prosecutors, Defender Service, U. S. Marshals Service, Pretrial Services,
Court Services, and Superior Court could be involved in the court- related
processing of a case from the preliminary hearing to the trial and
subsequent sentencing. Representatives from several of these agencies are
typically required to be present at court trials and hearings. Because
specific court times are not established, individuals who are expected to
appear in court are required to be present when the court first convenes in
the morning. These individuals might be required to wait at the courthouse
for some period of time for the case to be called, if (1) more trials or
hearings are scheduled than can be conducted, (2) any one of the involved
individuals is not present or prepared, or (3) the case is continued for any
number of reasons. MPDC recorded that during calendar year 1999 its officers
spent 118 full- time staff years in court- related activities such as
preliminary hearings and trials. While MPDC officials stated that officers
often spent many hours at court waiting for cases to be called, data were
not available on the proportion of the 118 full- time staff years that were
attributable to actual court time compared to the time spent waiting for
cases to be called, including cases that were rescheduled.

CJCC selected the Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management
Institute 8 to conduct a detailed study of criminal justice resource
management issues, with particular emphasis on court case processing and the
utilization of police resources. In its March 2001 report, the Council for
Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute concluded that major
changes were needed in the D. C. criminal justice caseflow system to improve
the system?s efficiency. Among other things, the report found inefficiencies
and counterproductive policies at every stage in case processing. The report
also concluded that little use was

8 The Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute are
not- for- profit research organizations that, among other things, evaluate
court- related programs and functions. Court Case Scheduling

Page 7 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

being made of modern technology in the arrest, booking, papering, 9 and
court process that could improve system operations.

The Council for Court Excellence and the Justice Management Institute
identified priority areas for system improvements, such as redesigning court
procedures in misdemeanor cases, improving the methods used to process cases
from arrest through initial court appearance by automating the involved
processes, and improving the systems used to notify police officers about
court dates. Congress provided $1 million for fiscal year 2001 to implement
some of the recommended case management initiatives, such as a
differentiated case management system for misdemeanors and traffic offenses,
the papering pilot project between MPDC and Corporation Counsel, and a
mental health pilot treatment project for appropriate, nonviolent pretrial
release defendants in coordination with the D. C. Commission on Mental
Health Services.

D. C. ?s criminal justice system is complex, with more than 70 different
information systems in use among the various participating agencies. These
systems are not linked in a manner that permits timely and useful
information sharing among disparate agencies. For example, it is very
difficult to obtain data to determine the annual amount of time MPDC
officers spend meeting with prosecutors about cases in which prosecutors
eventually decide not to file charges against the arrestee. We determined
that such an analysis would require data about: (1) MPDC arrests, (2) MPDC
officer time and attendance, (3) charges filed by USAO or Corporation
Counsel, and (4) Superior Court case dispositions. Such data are currently
maintained in separate systems with no reliable tracking number that could
be used to link the information in each system for a specific case and no
systematic exchange of information. This lack of shared information
diminishes the effectiveness of the entire criminal justice system. For
example, according to a CJCC official, there is no immediate way for an
arresting officer to determine whether an arrestee is on parole or for an
arrestee?s community supervision officer to know that the parolee had been
arrested. Such information could affect both the charging decision and the
decision whether or not to release an arrestee from an MPDC holding cell.

9 Papering refers to the face- to- face meeting between an officer
knowledgeable about an arrest and a Corporation Counsel or USAO attorney to
determine whether or not to prosecute a case. Criminal Justice Information

Systems

Page 8 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

In 1999, CJCC attempted to address problems with D. C. criminal justice
information systems by preparing, among other things, an Information
Technology Interagency Agreement that was adopted by CJCC members. The
agreement recognized the need for immediate improvement of information
technology in the D. C. criminal justice system and established the
Information Technology Advisory Committee (ITAC) to serve as the governing
body for justice information system development. ITAC recognized that it was
difficult for a single agency involved in the criminal justice system to
access information systems maintained by other agencies, and pursued
developing a system that would allow an agency to share information with all
other criminal justice agencies, while maintaining control over its own
system. ITAC devised a District of Columbia Justice Information System
(JUSTIS).

In July 2000, CJCC partnered with the D. C. Office of the Chief Technology
Officer in contracting with a consulting firm to design JUSTIS based on
modern dedicated intranet and Web browser technology. When completed, JUSTIS
is to allow each agency to maintain its current information system, while
allowing the agency to access selected data from other criminal justice
agencies.

Effective correctional supervision, which includes probation, incarceration,
and post- prison parole or supervised released for convicted defendants,
requires effective coordination among participating agencies. In D. C., the
stage of the criminal justice system referred to as correctional supervision
involves several agencies, including: (1) Superior Court, which sentences
convicted defendants and determines whether to revoke a person?s release on
community supervision; (2) Court Services, which monitors offenders on
community supervision; (3) DOC, which primarily supervises misdemeanants
sentenced to D. C. Jail or one of several halfway houses in D. C.; 10 (4)
BOP, which supervises felons incarcerated in federal prisons; (5) the U. S.
Parole Commission, which determines the prison

10 DOC still has control over three prison facilities within the Lorton
Correctional Complex, which is to be closed by December 31, 2001, under the
terms of the D. C. Revitalization Act. Correctional Supervision

Page 9 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

release date and conditions of release for D. C. inmates eligible for
parole; 11 and (6) the U. S. Marshals Service, which transports prisoners.

Gaps in coordination among agencies may lead to tragic consequences, such as
those that occurred in the case of Leo Gonzales Wright, who committed two
violent offenses while under the supervision of D. C. ?s

criminal justice system. Wright, who was paroled in 1993 after serving
nearly 17 years of a 15- to- 60 year sentence for armed robbery and second
degree murder, was arrested in May 1995 for automobile theft charges, which
were later dismissed. In June 1995, Wright was arrested for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. However, he was released pending trial for the
drug arrest, due in part to miscommunication among agencies. Wright
subsequently committed two carjackings, murdering one of his victims. He was
convicted in U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia and is
currently serving a life without parole sentence in federal prison at
Leavenworth, KS.

The outcry over the Wright case resulted in two studies, including a
comprehensive review of the processing of Wright?s case prepared for the U.
S. Attorney General by the Corrections Trustee in October 1999. The report
included 24 recommendations to help ensure that instances similar to the
Wright case do not occur. In July 2000, the Corrections Trustee issued a
progress report on the implementation of recommendations from the October
1999 report. According to the Corrections Trustee, while not all
recommendations in the October 1999 report have been fully implemented,
progress has been made in addressing several of them. For example, with
funds provided by the Corrections Trustee, DOC has purchased a new jail-
management information system for tracking inmates and implemented a new
policy on escorted inmate trips. In addition, in January 2000, the
Corrections Trustee began convening monthly meetings of an Interagency
Detention Work Group, whose membership largely parallels that of CJCC. The
group and its six subcommittees have focused on such issues as the convicted
felon designation and transfer process, and parole and halfway house
processing.

11 Inmates convicted in Superior Court prior to the implementation of the
new D. C. sentencing guidelines were generally sentenced to a range of
years, such as 10 to 20 years. Such inmates could be eligible for parole
after serving a specified minimum number of years. Under the terms of the D.
C. Revitalization Act, the U. S. Parole Commission is now responsible for
determining the parole, or prison release, date for such inmates (Public Law
105- 33, Sec. 11231). Under the new sentencing guidelines, which abolished
parole, inmates will have to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence
before being eligible for release.

Page 10 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

In addition to the studies and the actions of the Corrections Trustee, CJCC
and Court Services are addressing the monitoring and supervision of
offenders. CJCC has begun to address the issues of halfway house management
and programs that monitor offenders. Court Services is developing a system
in which sanctions are imposed whenever individuals violate conditions of
probation or parole.

Forensics is another area where lack of coordination can have adverse
effects. 12 D. C. does not have a comprehensive forensic laboratory to
complete forensic analysis for use by police and prosecutors. Instead, MPDC
currently uses other organizations such as the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and a private
laboratory to conduct much of its forensic work. MPDC performs some forensic
functions such as crime scene response, firearms testing, and latent print
analysis. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, a D. C. agency, performs
autopsies and certain toxicological tests, such as the testing for the
presence of drugs in the body. Coordination among agencies is particularly
important because several organizations may be involved in handling and
analyzing a piece of evidence. For example, if MPDC finds a gun with a
bloody latent fingerprint at a crime scene, the gun would typically need to
be examined by both MPDC and the FBI. In order to complete the analysis,
multiple forensic disciplines (e. g., DNA or firearm examiners) would need
to examine the gun. If the various forensic tests were coordinated in a
multidisciplinary approach, forensic examiners would be able to obtain the
maximum information from the evidence without the possibility of
contaminating it. Such contamination could adversely affect the adjudication
and successful resolution of a criminal investigation.

In April 2000, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) issued a report on
the D. C. criminal justice system?s forensic capabilities. The report
concluded that D. C. had limited forensic capacity and that limitations in
MPDC prevented the effective collection, storage, and processing of crime
scene evidence, which ultimately compromised the potential for successful
resolution of cases. NIJ- identified deficiencies included, among other
things:

12 Forensics involves a number of disciplines, such as latent prints,
firearms/ toolmarks, forensic biology (including DNA), toxicology, drug
analysis, questioned documents, and trace evidence. Forensic Capacity and

Coordination

Page 11 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

 out- of- date technology;

 lengthy delays in processing evidence;

 ineffective communications in the collection, processing, and tracking of
evidence from the crime scene; and

 ineffective communications between forensic case examiners and
prosecutors.

The NIJ report supported the development of a centralized forensic
laboratory that would be shared by MPDC and the D. C. Office of the Chief
Medical Examiner. The report did not examine the costs to build a
comprehensive forensic laboratory. In his fiscal year 2002 proposed budget,
the Mayor has allocated $7.5 million for the development of a forensics
laboratory that is designed to be a state- of- the- art, full- service crime
laboratory, medical examiner/ morgue facility, and public health laboratory
that meets all applicable National Lab Standards. We did not independently
evaluate the costs and benefits of a comprehensive forensic laboratory.
However, such a facility could potentially improve coordination by housing
all forensic functions in one location, eliminating the need to transport
evidence among multiple, dispersed locations.

A principal area where D. C. ?s unique structure has led to coordination
problems is case processing that occurs from the time of arrest through
initial court appearance. As shown in table 2, as many as six agencies need
to coordinate before an arrested person?s initial court appearance for a
felony offense can occur. 13 However, we identified several aspects of the
current process where a lack of coordination posed problems. For example,
unlike many other major metropolitan jurisdictions, prosecutors in D. C.
require an officer who is knowledgeable about the facts of the arrest to
meet personally with them before they determine whether to formally charge
an arrestee with a felony or misdemeanor crime. 14 This process is called
papering. During calendar year 1999, papering required the equivalent of 23
full- time officers devoted solely to these appearances, ultimately reducing
the number of officers available for patrol duty by an

13 The USAO prosecutes felony and serious misdemeanor violations committed
by adults in D. C. Corporation Counsel would typically not be involved in
prosecutions of adult felony offenses.

14 Corporation Counsel and MPDC have agreed to participate in a pilot
project in which officers will not be required to meet face to face with
prosecutors to charge 17 minor offenses. A Coordination Case

Study: The Initial Stages of Case Processing

Page 12 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

equal amount. Efforts in 1998 and 1999 to revise the papering process failed
in part because the costs and benefits of the changes under consideration
were perceived by one or more participating agencies to be unevenly
distributed. We focused our review on offenses prosecuted by the USAO
because during 1999 they accounted for over 85 percent of MPDC officer hours
expended on papering.

USAO?s requirement that MPDC officers personally meet with prosecutors in
order to make a charging decision appears to be unusual, particularly for
misdemeanors. A 1997 Booz- Allen and Hamilton survey found that in 30 of 38
responding jurisdictions (51 were surveyed), police officers were not
required to meet with prosecutors until court (i. e., trial), and in 3
cities officers were not required to appear in person until the preliminary
hearing. In addition, we reviewed the charging processes in Philadelphia and
Boston. Neither of these cities required face- to- face meetings with
prosecutors for processing most cases. According to USAO officials, the
current papering process is critical for USAO to make an initial charging
decision correctly. Both USAO and MPDC officials said that the paperwork
submitted to USAO for charging decisions has been of uneven quality. 15

In the past decade, several attempts have been made to change the initial
stages of case processing in D. C. These efforts- which were made by MPDC,
Corporation Counsel, and USAO, in conjunction with consulting firms-
involved projects in the areas of night papering, night court, and
officerless papering. However, the involved agencies never reached agreement
on all components of the projects, and each of the projects was ultimately
suspended. The Chief of MPDC has publicly advocated the establishment of
some type of arrangement for making charging decisions during the evening
and/ or night police shifts.

Night Papering and Night Court

Currently, both USAO and Corporation Counsel are only open to paper cases
during typical workday hours, that is, generally from about 8: 00 a. m. to
5: 00 p. m., Monday through Saturday. Night papering could permit officers
on evening and night shifts to generally present their paperwork to
prosecutors during their shifts. Night court refers to conducting certain

15 There were no data to determine whether the quality of the paperwork was
generally better for misdemeanors than for felonies. Attempts Have Been Made
to

Change Initial Stages of Case Processing in D. C.

Page 13 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

court proceedings, such as initial court appearance, during a late evening
or night shift. Night papering would require USAO and Corporation Counsel
charging attorneys to work evening hours, and night court would involve a
much broader commitment of D. C. Superior Court resources as well as the
participation of other agencies.

Officerless Papering

Officerless papering would not require an officer to appear in person before
the prosecutor, and provisions could be made for the prosecutor to contact
the officer to clarify issues, as needed. In March 2001, MPDC and
Corporation Counsel began an officerless papering pilot program for 17 minor
offenses prosecuted by Corporation Counsel.

In the absence of an automated system for completing and transmitting the
forms required for documenting arrests and making charging decisions, simple
entry errors resulting from entering the same information multiple times can
hamper the initial stages of case processing. USAO has cited such problems
as one reason that officers should be required to meet face to face with
prosecutors for papering decisions. To the extent that the police do not
have a reliable process for reviewing and ensuring the completeness and
accuracy of the paperwork submitted to prosecutors, USAO is likely to
continue to resist efforts to institute officerless papering.

Even if these issues were to be successfully addressed, the distribution of
costs among the participants in any revised system would still likely pose
an obstacle to change. The costs of the current system of processing cases
from arrest through initial court appearance are borne principally by MPDC-
primarily a locally funded D. C. agency- not USAO or D. C. Superior Court,
both of which are federally funded. On the other hand, instituting night
papering would likely reduce MPDC?s costs, while increasing the costs borne
by USAO, Corporation Counsel, and/ or D. C. Superior Court, depending upon
the approach taken.

CJCC is the primary venue in which D. C. criminal justice agencies can
identify and address interagency coordination issues. Its funding and
staffing have been modest- about $300,000 annually with four staff. CJCC has
functioned as an independent entity whose members represent the major
organizations within the D. C. criminal justice system. According to many
criminal justice officials we spoke with, during its nearly 3- year
existence, CJCC has had some success in improving agency coordination,
Obstacles to Changing Initial

Case Processing Stages CJCC Has Had Some Success as a Coordinating Mechanism

Page 14 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

mostly in areas where all participants stood to gain from a coordinated
approach to a problem. In problem areas where a solution would help one
agency possibly at the expense of another, CJCC has been less successful
mainly because it lacked the authority to compel agencies to address the
issues. However, on balance, CJCC has provided a valuable independent forum
for discussions of issues affecting multiple agencies.

The D. C. Control Board 16 did not fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001, and
CJCC?s sole remaining staff member is funded by a grant. It is not known
whether CJCC will continue to formally exist, and if it exists, how it will
be funded, whether it will have staff, and whether it will remain
independent or under the umbrella of another organization, such as the D. C.
Mayor?s office. Recently, the Mayor included $169,000 in his fiscal year
2002 proposed budget to fund CJCC. While we welcome the Mayor?s support for
CJCC, we believe that for CJCC to be most successful it must be viewed as
independent by participating agencies.

CJCC has not been required to formally report on its activities, including
areas of focus, successes, and areas of continuing discussion and
disagreement. The transparency provided by an annual report would help to
spotlight areas of accomplishment and continuing disagreement and could
assist with oversight by those responsible for funding individual CJCC
members.

As of November 2000, CJCC and other agencies involved in the D. C. criminal
justice system reported 93 initiatives for improving the operation of the
system. Most of these initiatives were ongoing; consequently, their impact
had not yet been evaluated. However, we found numerous instances where
participating agencies did not agree on an initiative?s goals, status,
starting date, participating agencies, or results to date. This lack of
agreement underscores a lack of coordination among the participating
agencies that could reduce the effectiveness of these initiatives.

16 Under the statutory terms of its creation, D. C. Control Board activities
are to be suspended after the certification of certain specified
preconditions. For example, one such requirement is that the D. C. Control
Board certifies that the District has recorded 4 consecutive years of
balanced budgets. In fiscal year 2000, D. C. was expected to record its
fourth consecutive year of balanced budgets or budget surpluses. On the
basis of a projected fourth consecutive year of D. C. budget surpluses,
Congress reduced the Control Board?s fiscal year 2001 budget, anticipating
that the Board would be phasing out its operations in 2001. The Board
subsequently decided not to fund CJCC for fiscal year 2001. Initiatives to
Improve

the D. C. Criminal Justice System

Page 15 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

Every criminal justice system faces coordination challenges. However, the
unique structure and funding of the D. C. criminal justice system, in which
federal and D. C. jurisdictional boundaries and dollars are blended, creates
additional challenges.

CJCC has played a useful role in addressing such coordination challenges,
especially in areas where agencies perceived a common interest. However,
CJCC?s uncertain future could leave D. C. without benefit of an independent
entity for coordinating the activities of its unique criminal justice
system. Funding CJCC through any participating agency diminishes its stature
as an independent entity in the eyes of a number of CJCC?s member agencies,
reducing their willingness to participate. Without a requirement to report
successes and areas of continuing discussion and disagreement to each
agency?s funding source, CJCC?s activities, achievements, and areas of
disagreement have generally been known only to its participating agencies.
This has created little incentive to coordinate for the common good, and all
too often agencies have simply ?agreed to disagree? without taking action.
Furthermore, without a meaningful role in cataloging multiagency
initiatives, CJCC has been unable to ensure that criminal justice
initiatives are coordinated among all affected agencies to help eliminate
duplicative efforts and maximize their effectiveness.

In our March 30, 2001, report, 17 we recommended that Congress consider:

 Funding an independent CJCC- with its own director and staff- to help
coordinate the operations of the D. C. criminal justice system.
Congressional funding ensures that CJCC will retain its identity as an
independent body with no formal organizational or funding link to any of its
participating members.

 Requiring CJCC to report annually to Congress, the Attorney General, and
the D. C. Mayor on its activities, achievements, and issues not yet resolved
and why.

 Requiring that all D. C. criminal justice agencies report multiagency
initiatives to CJCC, which would serve as a clearinghouse for criminal
justice initiatives and highlight for CJCC members those initiatives that
warrant further discussion and coordination. This reporting requirement

17 D. C. Criminal Justice System: Better Coordination Needed Among
Participating Agencies (GAO- 01- 187, Mar. 30, 2001). Conclusions

Matters For Congressional Consideration

Page 16 GAO- 01- 708T D. C. Criminal Justice System

could help improve interagency coordination, promote the adoption of common
goals, and help reduce redundant efforts.

Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have.

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard
Stana or William Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512- 8777. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Mark Tremba and Geoffrey Hamilton.
Contacts and

Acknowledgment
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