Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and	 
Inventory Management Are Needed (28-SEP-01, GAO-01-667).	 
								 
The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is increasingly	 
likely that an adversary will use chemical or biological weapons 
against U.S. forces to degrade superior U.S. conventional warfare
capabilities, placing servicemembers' lives and effective	 
military operations at risk. To reduce the effects of such an	 
attack on military personnel, DOD has determined the quantity of 
chemical and biological protective suits, masks, breathing	 
filters, gloves, boots, and hoods that are needed based on	 
projected wartime requirements. DOD's assessment process is	 
unreliable for determining the risk to military operations. DOD's
2000 report is inaccurate because it includes erroneous inventory
data and wartime requirements. Inadequate inventory management is
an additional risk factor because readiness can be compromised by
DOD's inventory management practices, which prevent an accurate  
accounting of the availability or adequacy of its protective	 
equipment.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-667 					        
    ACCNO:   A01543						        
  TITLE:     Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment
and Inventory Management Are Needed				 
     DATE:   09/28/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Biological warfare 				 
	     Chemical warfare					 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Equipment inventories				 
	     Military inventories				 
	     Military operations				 
	     Military personnel 				 
	     Joint Service Lightweight Integrated		 
	     Suit Technology Program				 
								 

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GAO-01-667
     
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

September 2001 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory Management Are Needed

GAO- 01- 667

Page i GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 4 DOD?s Assessment Process Is Unreliable for
Determining Risk to

Military Operations 5 Erroneous Suit Inventory and Requirements Data
Compromise

DOD?s Risk Analysis 6 Inadequate Inventory Management Is an Additional Risk
Factor 9 Conclusion 13 Recommendations 14 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
14 Scope and Methodology 15

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 16

Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense 18

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 22

Related Products 23

Tables

Table 1: DOD?s Criteria to Assess Risk 6 Table 2: Risk Based on Protective
Items Available in Wartime 7 Table 3: Risk Based on New Requirements and
Protective Items

Available in Wartime 7 Table 4: Servicemembers With Required Protective
Ensembles 8 Contents

Page ii GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense Figures

Figure 1: Components of the Protective Ensemble 4 Figure 2: Boxes of
Defective Suits at the Defense Logistics Agency

Depot in Albany, GA 12

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
Technology

Page 1 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

September 28, 2001 The Honorable Joel Hefley Chairman, Subcommittee on
Military Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Defense (DOD) believes it is
increasingly likely that an adversary will use chemical or biological
weapons against U. S. forces to degrade superior U. S. conventional warfare
capabilities, placing servicemembers? lives and effective military
operations at risk. To reduce the effects of such an attack on military
personnel, DOD has determined the quantity of chemical and biological
protective suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods
(together known as protective ensembles 1 ) that are needed on the basis of
projected wartime requirements.

In response to a request from the former Chairman of your Subcommittee, we
reviewed U. S. forces? readiness in terms of the protective equipment needed
for operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. We
determined (1) whether DOD?s process for assessing the risk to military
operations on the basis of wartime equipment requirements is reliable and
(2) how DOD?s inventory management of chemical and biological protective
gear has affected the risk level. Also, as requested by the former Chairman,
we will soon issue two additional reports on the readiness of military
medical support in Korea and of the Military Sealift Command to operate in a
contaminated environment.

Prior to 1994, each service had its own chemical and biological defense
program and developed and procured individual protection equipment that was
not always interoperable. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994 (Pub. L. 103- 160), 2 however, required the Secretary of Defense
to conduct a DOD- wide program for chemical and biological

1 DOD?s requirements also specify equipment to detect the presence of
chemical or biological agents, to decontaminate equipment, and to provide
protection for servicemembers in groups.

2 50 U. S. C. sect.sect. 1522 and 1523.

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

warfare defense, to exercise program oversight, and to report annually to
the Congress on the program?s status. The Secretary assigned responsibility
for the program to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics. Subsequently, the Joint Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Defense Board, which comprises the services? representatives, was
created to address related policy, joint requirements, funding issues, and
plans for modernization and logistics.

To assist in program oversight, the Joint Board publishes the Joint Service
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Logistics Support Plan: Readiness
and Sustainment Status, which provides an assessment of the overall
logistics readiness of the armed forces to survive and sustain combat
operations in a contaminated environment. Also, DOD?s Chemical and
Biological Defense: Annual Report to Congress, which is partially derived
from information provided by the services and the Defense Logistics Agency,
provides an assessment of the overall readiness of the armed forces to fight
in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment.

DOD?s assessment process is unreliable for determining the risk to military
operations; as a result, in its 2000 report to the Congress, the Department
inaccurately reported the risk in most cases as ?low.? The report is
inaccurate because it includes erroneous inventory data and wartime
requirements. More important, the process for determining risk is
fundamentally flawed because (1) the Department determines requirements by
individual pieces of protective equipment rather than by the number of
complete ensembles that can be provided to deploying servicemembers, and (2)
the risk- determining process combines individual service requirements and
reported inventory data into general categories, masking specific critical
shortages affecting individual service readiness. Had the Department
assessed the risk on the basis of the number of complete ensembles it had
available, by service, the risk would rise to

?high? in all cases. Inadequate management of inventory is an additional
risk factor because readiness can be compromised by DOD?s inventory-
management practices, which prevent an accurate accounting of the
availability or adequacy of its protective equipment. These practices can
also undermine efforts to mitigate the risk. Moreover, these practices
indicate problems in the Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Department?s management of inventory that we have noted in a previous
report. 3 The practices that we identified in the current report regarding
inventories of chemical and biological equipment contribute to the
development of erroneous inventory data that in turn affect the accuracy of
the risk assessment. First, DOD cannot monitor the status of the entire
inventory of protective equipment because the services and the Defense
Logistics Agency use at least nine different systems of inventory management
with differing data fields to manage suit inventories, and the systems?
records contain data that cannot be easily linked. Second, DOD cannot
determine whether all of its older suits would adequately protect
servicemembers because some of the systems? records omit essential data on
suit expiration. Third, DOD cannot easily identify, track, and locate
defective suits because inventory records do not always include contract and
lot numbers. Finally, DOD has miscalculated the requirements for suits and
the number available; for example, the Department counted new suits as on
hand before they had been delivered and consequently overstated the actual
inventory.

We are making recommendations to assist DOD in better assessing risk and
improving oversight of the inventory of chemical protective equipment.

3 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244, Jan. 2001).

Page 4 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

DOD may be unable to prevent an attack using chemical or biological weapons.
Therefore, DOD has determined that servicemembers must be protected to
survive and conduct effective military operations. Consequently, DOD
supplies servicemembers with a protective ensemble consisting of a suit,
mask with breathing filter, rubber boots, butyl gloves, and hoods as
required. Figure 1 displays the components that comprise a protective
ensemble.

Figure 1: Components of the Protective Ensemble

Note: The new JSLIST suit has an attached hood so a separate hood would no
longer be necessary. Source: The Army?s Soldier Biological and Chemical
Command.

Background

Page 5 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

During Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, DOD noted that most of this
equipment (1) could cause unacceptable heat stress to the wearer, (2) could
limit freedom of movement and impair job performance, (3) is bulky, and (4)
is not fully interoperable across the services. Furthermore, most of the
existing suits (1) are no longer manufactured, (2) can be used for up to 14
years from the date of manufacture, and (3) will expire by 2007. To address
these issues, DOD developed new, lightweight individual protective equipment
such as the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST)
trousers and coat to replace the current protective suits. DOD began
procuring the JSLIST suits in 1997. An improved multipurpose overboot is in
procurement and new protective gloves are under development to improve
manual dexterity and/ or reduce heat stress on the wearer. Similarly, since
the existing masks may cause some breathing difficulty, DOD is developing a
new mask but does not expect to begin procurement until fiscal year 2006.

During fiscal years 2002 through 2007, DOD plans to spend about $5.7 billion
on planning for chemical and biological defense, acquisition of defense
equipment, facilities construction, and research and development. In 1999,
we recommended that DOD develop a performance plan guided by outcome-
oriented management principles embodied in the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (Pub. L. 103- 62). 4 DOD created a plan; however,
performance goals and measures were being developed at the time of our
review.

DOD?s assessment process for determining the risk to military operations is
unreliable, and, as a result, the Department?s current determination that
the risk is generally low is inaccurate. Although the Department uses the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress to
indicate its readiness for operations in a chemically and biologically
contaminated environment, the 2000 report contains erroneous inventory data
and understates equipment requirements. More important, the methodology for
assessing the risk is flawed because it is not based on the number of
complete ensembles needed and it obscures military service readiness by
combining service data and reporting the results jointly.

4 Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 159, Aug. 1999). DOD?s
Assessment

Process Is Unreliable for Determining Risk to Military Operations

Page 6 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

DOD?s criteria for assessing the risk of wartime shortages is to determine
the numbers of protective suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots,
and hoods it has on hand, compare them against the requirements for those
individual items, and then assign risk. (See table 1)

Table 1: DOD?s Criteria to Assess Risk Risk level Wartime requirements on
hand (percent)

Low At least 85 Moderate From 70 to 84 High Less than 70

Source: Chemical and Biological Defense Program: Annual Report to Congress,
March 2000.

In the draft fiscal year 2001 annual report to Congress provided to us in
June 2001, DOD reported that it was generally at low risk for suits. 5
However, the risk assessment process was flawed in part because DOD used
erroneous data on protective suits. For example

 DOD made computational errors in comparing the older suits and JSLIST
suits against a combined total suit requirement,

 the Air Force overreported its suit requirement by 801,167 suits,

 DOD reported it had 1,229,935 JSLIST suits on hand as of September 30,
2000, but overcounted its inventory by 782,232 JSLIST suits,

 the Navy included about 117,000 suits that had passed their expiration
dates and were therefore unusable, and

 the Army underreported its suit stocks by an estimated 231,050 suits.
These errors occurred in large part as the result of problems in DOD?s
systems for managing protective suit inventories. 6 We believe that the
services collectively had no more than 4, 348,999 suits of all types on hand
as of September 30, 2000. When we included all the suits for wartime use and
adjusted the numbers to account for the errors and miscounts, the risk
category changed to high for suits, as shown in table 2.

5 DOD has already published the same inventory data in its fiscal year 2001
Logistics Support Plan. 6 Some of these problems and their causes are
discussed later in this report in more detail in the section on inventory
management. DOD?s Process to Assess

Risk Erroneous Suit Inventory and Requirements Data Compromise DOD?s Risk
Analysis

Page 7 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Table 2: Risk Based on Protective Items Available in Wartime Item
Requirement Inventory Inventory as a share of

requirements (percent) Risk level

Suits 6, 346,599 4,348,999 68.5 High Masks 2,120,823 2,278,322 107.4 Low
Filters 3, 479,307 4,762,358 136.9 Low Gloves 7,720,150 7,424,811 96.2 Low
Boots 5, 061,719 3,887,172 76.8 Moderate Hoods 2,481,051 3,559,906 143.5 Low

Source: Our analysis based on data in DOD?s Logistics Support Plan for
fiscal year 2001.

In February 2001, the military services informed the Joint Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Defense Board that equipment requirements were
actually much higher than those reported to Congress and included in the
fiscal year 2001 Logistics Support Plan. The board subsequently accepted the
new requirements. Based on these new requirements, the risk remained high
for suits; changed to high for filters, boots, and hoods; and remained low
for gloves and masks, as shown by comparing the risk level columns in tables
2 and 3.

Table 3: Risk Based on New Requirements and Protective Items Available in
Wartime

Item New requirements Inventory Inventory as a share of requirements
(percent) Risk level

Suits 6, 354,678 4,348,999 68.4 High Masks 1,655,964 2,278,322 137.6 Low
Filters 7, 223,660 4,762,358 65.9 High Gloves 7,082,772 7,424,811 104.8 Low
Boots 5, 844,656 3,887,172 66.5 High Hoods 5,521,232 3,559,906 64.5 High

Source: Our analysis based on guidance provided by the services.

DOD has inaccurately assessed the risk to military operations by determining
the number of individual items of equipment it has on hand and by combining
the services? inventories of individual items. Service guidance specifies
that a total of 1,573,866 active and reserve servicemembers need protection
to meet current operations plan requirements. DOD provides each deploying
servicemember with up to four ensembles either at deployment or held in war
reserve and distributed Assessing Readiness by

Individual Items and by Individual Service Obscures the Risk

Page 8 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

to theater operating forces when needed. The ensembles consist of five
components: (1) four protective suits, (2) between four and eight pairs of
gloves and boots, (3) between four and eight hoods, (4) up to four breathing
filters, and (5) one mask.

Because DOD does not report each service?s readiness based on the equipment
it has on hand, but rather provides a joint assessment, critical service
shortages or opportunities for cross- service assistance tend to be
obscured. In fact, each service reported shortages of one component of the
ensemble. Specifically, the Army reported critical shortages of hoods; the
Air Force reported shortages of gloves; the Navy, shortages of suits; the
Marine Corps, shortages of boots. When we compared the number of ensembles
required by each service?s guidance and applied the DOD risk criteria, the
risk was high for all four services. As a result, DOD cannot provide all the
required ensembles for 682,331 servicemembers scheduled for wartime
deployment, as shown in table 4.

Table 4: Servicemembers With Required Protective Ensembles Servicemembers
Service Require

protection Protected Not protected Percent

protected Risk level

Army 725,000 467,574 257,426 64.5 High Navy 354,182 160,668 193,514 45.4
High Air Force 281,390 168,479 112,911 59.9 High Marine Corps 213,294 94,814
118,480 44.5 High

Total 1,573,866 891,535 682,331 56.6 High

Source: Our analysis based on data from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marine Corps.

The risk posed by suit shortages is likely to worsen through 2007 due to
increasing rates of older suits? expiration and DOD?s plan not to replace
all of them. As of October 1, 2000, DOD reported a shortage of about 1.7
million protective suits; it believes about 3.3 million, or 75 percent, of
the current suit inventory will expire by 2006. JSLIST suits cost about $203
each compared to about $80 each for most of the existing suits, and DOD
plans to buy only about 2.8 million JSLIST suits as replacements. Therefore,
the shortage will increase to about 2.2 million suits by 2006.

DOD?s plan to buy fewer new suits is also influenced by expiration of the
suits and budgetary considerations. By replacing suits at a rate slower than
the expiration rate, DOD plans to spread future suit purchases over more
years to avoid a disproportionately large amount of suits expiring in any
one year. This tactic allows greater dispersion of future suit expirations

Page 9 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

and replacement costs but is likely to also increase the short- term risk of
wartime shortages.

DOD is attempting to mitigate some of the shortages. For example, the Army
plans to procure more than 500, 000 hoods through fiscal year 2002, and the
Defense Logistics Agency was procuring more of the existing generation of
boots at the time of our report. Some opportunities also exist for one
service to assist another. For example, the Army and Marine Corps reported
significantly more gloves on hand than required and could transfer some to
the Air Force to offset Air Force shortfalls since all the services use the
same gloves. However, other available equipment is not interoperable and
cannot be easily shared. For example, the Navy and Marine Corps suits are
hooded, so they do not have separate hoods and therefore cannot help
alleviate the Army?s shortage. If all goes according to plan, such
interoperability problems should ease after fiscal year 2006, as all four
services begin using the JSLIST suit and new joint masks, gloves, and boots.

Shortcomings in DOD?s inventory management of chemical and biological
protective equipment adversely affect the Department?s ability to accurately
assess the readiness of the services to meet requirements for the equipment
and mitigate the risk of shortages. DOD?s current inventory information on
chemical and biological equipment is unreliable for making an accurate risk
assessment because DOD and the services cannot easily link inventory
records; lack data on suit expiration dates; cannot easily identify, track,
and locate defective suits; and have miscalculated the requirements and the
number of suits available. These shortcomings are consistent with long- term
problems in DOD?s inventory management that we have consistently identified
since 1990 as a high- risk area due to a variety of problems, including
ineffective and wasteful management systems and procedures. 7

7 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense

(GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). Inadequate Inventory

Management Is an Additional Risk Factor

Page 10 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

The Defense Logistics Agency and the military services store war reserve
inventories of chemical and biological protective suits and other equipment
at a variety of depots, warehouses, and storage facilities and as noted
earlier, use at least nine different inventory systems to manage the
inventories. However, because these systems are not linked, DOD- wide
oversight of the inventories is restricted, and the systems are not used to
directly support the inventory data in the annual report to Congress and the
Logistics Support Plan. Instead, DOD makes an additional effort to collect
data theoretically already in the systems. The data collection requires
units and depots that store the chemical protective equipment to provide
separate data on the equipment annually and relies heavily on government and
contractor personnel to manually compile the data.

Although DOD has at least nine major inventory management systems, it cannot
accurately determine the expiration rate of most of the older suits used by
the Air Force and Army. These account for about 3.3 million of the current
suit inventory and can be used for up to 14 years from the date of
manufacture after which testing has determined that the suits cannot be used
in a contaminated environment. Therefore, knowing the date the suits were
manufactured is critical to estimating the suits? expiration rate and the
rate at which the suits must be replaced with JSLIST suits. However, neither
DOD nor we can accurately determine the expiration rate of the old suits
because the Defense Logistics Agency, the buyer of the suits, was unable to
locate most of the relevant procurement records. Moreover, many of the
inventory systems cannot be used to locate the actual expired suits in
specific depots because the systems do not record equipment expiration dates
or the manufacturers? contract or lot numbers.

Two examples or illustrations follow:

 The Army does not record suit expiration information in its primary
inventory management system. To compensate, the Army has assumed an annual
20- percent expiration rate of its inventory through fiscal year 2005 and
expects that all suits will expire by 2005. However, the Army?s assumption
may be inaccurate. Records from a depot in Kentucky indicate that almost
80,000 suits would be serviceable after 2005 and some as late as 2008.

 The Navy does not know when its suits will expire because, according to
the Naval Sea Systems Command, the Navy does not require inventory managers
to include the expiration date in inventory records. Nonetheless, in June
2001, the Navy estimated that of 178, 000 suits that it had on hand, only
about 61,000 were actually serviceable because the rest had passed DOD?s
Inventory

Management Systems Are Not Linked and Cannot Be Used to Support Risk
Assessments

DOD Does Not Know the Expiration Rate of Older Suits

Page 11 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

their expiration date. Our review of 19 Military Sealift Command ships,
which help to sustain deployed U. S. forces, showed that most had severe
suit shortages, due mostly to expirations. We found additional problems in
48 ships in the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. These ships currently report
that they are missing one or more components of their ensembles and
consequently cannot provide a complete ensemble for a single crewmember.

The Air Force and Marine Corps use different inventory management systems
that include contract, lot, and expiration information. Consequently, these
two services can estimate suit expiration rates to manage their inventories
effectively. Nonetheless, neither system is compatible with the other DOD
systems.

The majority of DOD?s and the services? inventory systems cannot be used to
identify, track, and locate defective suits that may be in current
inventories because contract and lot numbers needed for the purpose are not
always included in the inventory records. In September 1999, officials from
one manufacturer pleaded guilty to selling 778, 924 defective suits to the
government. Since these defective suits were distributed to DOD war reserve
and various other inventories, it was imperative that the suits be found. In
May 2000, DOD directed units and depots to locate the defective suits and
issue them for training use only. At the conclusion of our review, DOD had
not found about 250,000 of these suits and did not know whether they had
been used, were still in supply, or were sent for disposal.

Finding the suits was difficult even when the storage depot was known. For
example, the Defense Logistics Agency inventory system does not link the
contract and lot number with the box or pallet number to allow ease in
locating specific items. Consequently, during our review, the Agency
resorted to using 19 reservists for up to 34 days to physically inspect all
pallets and boxes containing about 1.3 million protective suits at its depot
in Albany, GA. The reservists found about 347,000 defective suits. Figure 2
displays some of the boxes of these suits. DOD Cannot Locate

Defective Suits That May Be in the Inventory

Page 12 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Figure 2: Boxes of Defective Suits at the Defense Logistics Agency Depot in
Albany, GA

Source: GAO.

Despite the problem in finding defective suits, the Defense Logistics
Agency?s supply system remained unchanged at the time of our review. Agency
officials acknowledged that they would have to physically reinspect depot
stocks if specific lots of other suits need to be removed from the inventory
before the end of their normal 14- year shelf life.

Several questionable inventory management practices and related actions have
further contributed to the generation of the inaccurate inventory data,
which in turn affects the accuracy of DOD?s risk assessment process. These
include miscalculating suit requirements, failing to count parts of the suit
inventory, and counting suits as part of the inventory long before they are
actually delivered from manufacturers. Some specifics regarding these counts
are as follows: Other Questionable

Inventory Management Practices Affect Risk Assessment Accuracy

Page 13 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

 The Air Force double- counted a portion of its suit requirement by
reporting a requirement for both 801,167 of the older suits and the same
number of replacement JSLIST suits.

 The Army asked units that store suits to report the numbers being stored,
but it did not tell them to include desert pattern suits, which are
generally reserved for use in desert climates. As a result, units did not
always include desert pattern suits in their reported inventories, and the
Army believes it consequently underreported its desert pattern suit
inventory by 10 percent of the total, or 231,050 suits.

 In the fiscal year 2001 Logistics Support Plan and draft Annual Report to
Congress, the services reported they had 1,229,935 JSLIST suits on hand on
September 30, 2000, but that included 782, 232 suits not yet delivered. DOD
procedures for compiling inventory data for these reports allow reporting
suits expected to be delivered during the year as on hand. In March 2001,
the Marine Corps Systems Command, which manages JSLIST suit distribution,
acknowledged that DOD did not have 1,229, 935 JSLIST suits on hand on
September 30, 2000 but might reach that quantity a year later on September
30, 2001. Moreover, in the same two reports, DOD projected that it would
reach 1.5 million suits by September 30, 2001, again overestimating JSLIST
production.

DOD?s inventory management practices tend to affect the suit inventory
count. This count in turn can significantly affect the results of the risk
assessment process, which is a comparison of requirements against the
inventory on hand.

Because the Department of Defense?s risk assessment process is flawed and
unreliable, DOD inaccurately assessed the risk to servicemembers? lives and
military operations from potential wartime shortages of protective equipment
as low. The Department underestimated the risk by analyzing requirements
based on individual equipment items and not ensembles. Furthermore, DOD
combined this service data into a consolidated DOD inventory position, which
obscured service- specific shortages. As we discovered, the risk is
currently higher than reported by DOD. Inadequate inventory management has
contributed to increased risk. Because the Department has no integrated
inventory system for managing protective equipment, it has no effective way
to (1) gather the data needed for the annual report to Congress and
Logistics Support plan, (2) determine the expiration dates of protective
equipment, and (3) ensure that its data is correct. To further compound the
problem, the services have counted equipment as on hand before it has been
delivered, adding to the overcounting of equipment that they had in the
inventory. Inaccurate Conclusion

Page 14 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

risk assessment and inadequate inventory management could adversely affect
readiness and prevent informed acquisition decisions that could undermine
risk mitigation.

To improve the Department of Defense?s ability to accurately assess the
level of risk and readiness for operations in a contaminated environment, we
recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to

 issue and implement guidance requiring each service to evaluate its risk
on the basis of current inventory numbers of complete ensembles against
wartime requirements;

 implement a fully integrated inventory management system to manage
chemical and biological defense equipment and use it to prepare (1) the
required annual report to Congress and (2) the annual Logistics Support Plan
on chemical and biological defense;

 establish data fields in the inventory management system to show the
contract, lot number, and expiration date of shelf life items; and

 cease counting equipment as on hand before delivery from the contractor.
DOD provided written comments on a draft of our report and generally
concurred with our recommendations. DOD partially concurred with our
recommendation to conduct risk assessments on the basis of ensembles
required in wartime and not just components of the ensemble and stated that
the department will issue implementing guidance. DOD concurred with comment
with our recommendations to (1) establish an integrated inventory management
system; (2) include item contract, lot number, and expiration date
information in the new inventory system; and (3) cease counting equipment as
on hand before it is delivered and explained its plan to implement the
recommendations. In addition, DOD provided technical comments, which we
incorporated into our report as appropriate.

DOD?s comments are printed in their entirety in appendix II along with our
evaluation of their comments. Recommendations

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 15 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

We discuss our scope and methodology in detail in appendix I. We conducted
our review from August 2000 to April 2001 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.

We will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees;
the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512- 6020. Additional contact and staff acknowledgments are listed
in appendix III.

Sincerely yours, Raymond J. Decker Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management Scope and

Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 16 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and
Biological Defense

We determined (1) whether DOD?s process for assessing the risk to military
operations on the basis of wartime equipment requirements is reliable and
(2) how DOD?s inventory management of chemical and biological protective
gear has affected the risk level. We included in our scope chemical and
biological protective suits, masks and breathing filters, gloves, boots, and
hoods.

To understand the process DOD uses to assess the risk, we determined how DOD
performs risk assessments. We examined DOD?s fiscal years 1999, 2000, and
2001 Chemical and Biological Defense: Annual Report to Congress and Joint
Service Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Logistics Support Plan:
Readiness and Sustainment Status and service input to these reports. To
understand equipment requirements, we interviewed an official from the
Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Chemical and
Biological Defense; the Joint Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense
Board; the Joint Staff; and other organizations and obtained documents
showing how many suits, masks, breathing filters, gloves, boots, and hoods
are needed to support operations. We also obtained the Center for Army
Analysis? Joint Service Chemical Defense Equipment Consumption Rates IV,
Volume II; briefing slides; guidance; directives; memorandums; cables; and
other documents that specify requirements. We also used service guidance to
determine the number of servicemembers scheduled for deployment who need
protection. We did not evaluate the validity of the requirements. To
calculate on- hand stocks, we obtained inventory records from war reserve or
other depots in the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
Netherlands, elsewhere in Europe, and aboard prepositioned ships in Guam to
determine the size of the stockpile. As a result of the national security
reviews under way at the time of our review, requirements for chemical
defense equipment could change. If so, current risk assessments would need
revision.

To determine how DOD?s inventory management practices affected risk, we
tried to verify the accuracy of inventory data reported by the services. We
did this by (1) interviewing officials and obtaining documents showing how
the inventory data were collected and verified, (2) obtaining Navy documents
showing the number of suits still in the inventory that had not expired and
comparing that number to the reported inventory, and (3) obtaining JSLIST
suit production data. We also tried to determine how many of the older
chemical protective suits DOD had bought and when, but the Defense Logistics
Agency could not find most of its records documenting suit procurement. To
determine the compatibility of the nine major supply systems, we interviewed
the responsible DOD officials, Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 17 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and
Biological Defense

compared system inventory procedures, checked records against physical
inventories, and obtained relevant documents. To determine how long shelf
life items can be used and to estimate equipment expiration rates, we
interviewed officials from the Army?s Soldier Biological and Chemical
Command in Maryland; Natick Soldier Center in Massachusetts; and Rock Island
Arsenal in Illinois; the Naval Sea Systems Command in Virginia; the Air
Force Headquarters Directorate of Supply in Washington, D. C.; and the
Marine Corps? Combat Development Command in Virginia and Materiel Command in
Georgia. We also interviewed officials and obtained documents from the
Defense Logistics Agency offices in Pennsylvania showing planned or actual
procurement of JSLIST suits and other equipment. To determine how the
services and depots identify which items will expire and need replacement,
we inspected or inventoried chemical protective suits stored at the
Bluegrass Army Depot in Richmond, KY; the Defense Logistics Agency?s war
reserve depot in Albany, GA; the Air Force?s Mobility Bag Center in Avon
Park and MacDill Air Force Base, FL; and aboard ships at the Norfolk Navy
Base, Norfolk, VA. At these locations, we met with officials and obtained
supply records and suit and other equipment expiration data.

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end
of this appendix.

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

See comment 1.

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

See comment 2. See comment 2.

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

The following is our response to the Department of Defense letter dated
September 18, 2001.

1. While DOD presents the data in the cited Annual Report to Congress and
Logistics Support Plan annexes, the data is presented on an item- byitem
basis and not an ensemble basis. Consequently, the information as presented
does not give a fully reliable risk assessment.

DOD acknowledges that it has scarce resources and must manage risk within
those resource constraints. Consequently, DOD also indicated in its comments
that it will rely on industrial surge capacity to make up any shortfall in
required ensemble components. Nonetheless, the Department?s risk assessment
is based on having 120 days of supply at the units or in war reserve. If the
Department now plans to stock fewer than 120 days of supply and rely on
industrial surge to make up the difference in a crisis, the risk level would
be higher because the continuing shortages would be greater.

2. The Air Force has developed, and the Marine Corps is developing inventory
systems, both of which include contract, lot number, and expiration date of
equipment on hand. Adopting one of these systems DOD- wide could reduce or
eliminate development costs associated with the Business System
Modernization program, assure interoperability across the services, and meet
the intent of our third recommendation. GAO Comments

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

William W. Cawood, Jr. (202) 512- 3959 In addition to the contact named
above, Brian J. Lepore, Raymond G. Bickert, Tracy M. Brown, and Sally L.
Newman made key contributions to this report. Appendix III: GAO Contact and
Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

Related Products Page 23 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244, Jan. 2001).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped but Training and
Readiness Reporting Problems Remain (GAO- 01- 27, Nov. 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 180, May 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R& D Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 130, Mar. 2000).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness
Program for Oregon and Washington (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 13, Oct. 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken to Protect
Military Forces (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 49, Oct. 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should
Follow Results Act Framework (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 159, Aug. 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and
Biological R& D Programs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 160, Aug. 1999).

Chemical and Biological Defense: DOD?s Evaluation of Improved Garment
Materials (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 214, Aug. 1998).

Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD?s Plans to Protect U.
S. Forces (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 83, Mar. 1998).

Assuring Condition and Inventory Accountability of Chemical Protective Suits
(D- 2000- 086, Feb. 25, 2000).

M41 Protection Assessment Test System Capabilities

(99- 061, Dec. 24, 1998).

Unit Chemical and Biological Defense Readiness Training

(98- 174, July 17, 1998). Related Products

GAO Reports Department of Defense Inspector General Reports

Related Products Page 24 GAO- 01- 667 Chemical and Biological Defense

Inventory Accuracy at the Defense Depot, Columbus, Ohio

(97- 102, Feb. 27, 1997).

Army Protective Mask Requirements (95- 224, June 8, 1995).

(702089)

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