International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level		 
Coordination of Federal Response Needed (13-AUG-01, GAO-01-629). 
								 
International crimes such as drugs and arms trafficking,	 
terrorism, money laundering, and public corruption that transcend
national borders, threaten American citizens and communities,	 
businesses and institutions, as well as global security and	 
stability. In April 2001, the National Security Council (NSC)	 
told GAO that the issue of international crime and the framework 
for the U.S. response were under review by the new		 
administration. The extent of International crime is growing, and
measuring the true extent is difficult. Never the less, several  
efforts have attempted to gauge the extent of and the threat	 
posed by international crime to the United States and other	 
countries. The 1999 threat assessment was classified, but a	 
published version of the 2000 assessment provided various	 
indicators or measures with five broad categories--(1) terrorism 
and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of	 
women and children, and environmental crimes; (3) illicit	 
transfer or trafficking of products across international borders;
(4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. Furthermore 
within each category, specific crimes were discussed. NSC	 
identified 34 federal entities that had significant roles in	 
fighting international crime. These included the Department of	 
Justice, Treasury, and State, and the U.S. Agency for		 
International Development. The efforts to combat public 	 
corruption internationally are addressed in two contexts. One	 
involves efforts to eliminate the use of bribes in transnational 
business activities, such as government contracting. The other	 
strategy involves rule of law assistance, which focuses on U.S.  
support for legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts  
by foreign governments.  Much of the technical assistance that	 
the U.S. provides to other nations for fighting international	 
crime involves training, particularly training at law enforcement
academies established abroad. There are no standard measures of  
effectiveness to assess the federal government's overall efforts 
to address international crime.  Justice's, Treasury's, and	 
State's plans describe their efforts to combat specific types of 
crime, along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some
cases, however, these measures do not adequately address	 
effectiveness.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-629 					        
    ACCNO:   A01951						        
    TITLE:   International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level   
             Coordination of Federal Response Needed                          
     DATE:   08/13/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Crime prevention					 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Federal aid for criminal justice			 
	     Federal aid to foreign countries			 
	     Foreign technical aid				 
	     International relations				 
	     Money laundering					 
	     Terrorism						 
	     DOJ International Criminal Investigative		 
	     Training Assistance Program			 								 
	     DOJ Overseas Prosecutorial Development,		 
	     Assistance and Training Program			 								 
	     International Crime Control Strategy		 
	     National Drug Control Strategy			 

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GAO-01-629
     
Report to the Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

August 2001 INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL

Sustained Executive- Level Coordination of Federal Response Needed

GAO- 01- 629

Page i GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime Letter 1

Results 2 Concluding Observations 8 Recommendation for Executive Action 9
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 10

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Appendix II U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime 20

Appendix III Extent of International Crime 28

Appendix IV Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response 38

Appendix V Combating Corruption 65

Appendix VI Technical Assistance Programs 75

Appendix VII Measures of Effectiveness 81

Appendix VIII Comments From the National Security Council 94

Appendix IX Comments From the Department of Justice 96

Appendix X Comments From the Department of State 98 Contents

Page ii GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime Appendix XI
Comments From the U. S. Agency for International

Development 100

Appendix XII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 102

Tables

Table 1: International Crime Control Strategy: Overarching Goals and
Implementing Objectives 22 Table 2: Categories and Extent of Major
International Crimes

Identified As a Threat to U. S. Interests 29 Table 3: Federal Entities With
Significant Roles in Combating

International Crime 38 Table 4: Types of International Crimes or Activities
Handled by

Sections or Offices in Justice?s Criminal Division 40 Table 5: Jurisdiction
for Criminal Activity at U. S. Seaports 57 Table 6: International Crime
Control Strategy Goal and Objectives

That Address Corruption 65 Table 7: U. S. Worldwide Rule of Law Assistance
by Region, Fiscal

Years 1993- 98 72 Table 8: Federal Entities with a Role in Providing Rule of
Law

Assistance Programs 73 Table 9: Similarities Between Justice Objectives and
Strategies and

the International Crime Control Strategy 85 Table 10: Similarities Between
Treasury Objectives and Strategies

and the International Crime Control Strategy 87 Table 11: Similarities
Between State Goals and Strategies and the

International Crime Control Strategy 89

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms COE Council of Europe CSCE
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe DEA Drug Enforcement
Administration DOJ Department of Justice EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center FATF Financial Action Task Force on Money
Laundering

Page iii GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCPA Foreign Corrupt Practices Act FDA
Food and Drug Administration FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center GPRA Government Performance
and Results Act GRECO Group of States Against Corruption ICC International
Chamber of Commerce ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program ILEA International Law Enforcement Academy INL Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service INTERPOL International Criminal
Police Organization IPR Intellectual Property Rights IRS Internal Revenue
Service IRS- CI Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation NCIC
National Crime Information Center NSC National Security Council NSPD
National Security Presidential Directive OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OFAC Office of
Foreign Assets Control OIG Office of Inspector General ONDCP Office of
National Drug Control Policy OPDAT Overseas Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance and Training OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe PCC Policy Coordination Committee PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PME Performance Measures of Effectiveness SCG Special Coordination Group on
International Crime UN United Nations USAID U. S. Agency for International
Development USNCB U. S. National Central Bureau WMD Weapons of Mass
Destruction

Page 1 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

August 13, 2001 The Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell United States Senate

Dear Senator Campbell: This report responds to your August 2000 request that
we review the nature and extent of the federal response to international
crime- including drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism, money laundering,
public corruption, and other criminal activities that transcend national
borders. Such crimes threaten American citizens and communities, businesses
and institutions, as well as global security and stability. International
crime and its impact on the United States- and the importance of having a
coordinated and effective federal response- have been of longstanding
interest to you and other members of the Senate Appropriations? Foreign
Operations Subcommittee.

Specifically, in response to your request, this report provides
overviewlevel information on the following topics:

 The U. S. framework for addressing international crime.

 The extent of international crime.

 Selected federal entities? roles in responding to international crime and
issues related to the coordination of the response.

 U. S. efforts to combat public corruption internationally.

 U. S. programs for providing technical assistance to other nations to
combat international crime.

 Issues related to measures of the effectiveness of U. S. efforts to combat
international crime.

To address these topics, we interviewed responsible officials at and
reviewed relevant documentation obtained from the National Security Council
(NSC); the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State; the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); and their components. As agreed with your
office, we focused our efforts on these five entities and their components
because of the breadth of the international crime topics and the extensive
scope of the response. Accordingly, the information in this report does not
reflect the full extent of the federal response to international crime. Also
as agreed with your office, given the number and the breadth of the topics
covered, our work focused on developing overview information rather than
analyzing each topic in depth. As further agreed, we did not review any
classified documents. We conducted our

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

work from October 2000 to July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more details about the
scope and methodology of our work.

Fueled by global markets, more open borders, and improvements in
telecommunications, international crime has become a growing worldwide
problem. In 1995, the President identified international crime as a threat
to the national interest of the United States. Prior to and since then, the
federal government has been engaged in a crosscutting effort to address
various types of such crime, including money laundering, terrorism, and
public corruption. Despite the multiagency nature of the federal response,
no sustained executive- level coordination- for which NSC has the designated
responsibility- has been apparent. Furthermore, in the past, the government
has neither tracked nor prioritized the billions of dollars in spending on
certain elements of the response, such as combating terrorism. In addition,
because of the absence of governmentwide, outcome- oriented performance
measures, the effectiveness and impact of the response are unclear. Our
prior work on other national issues that involve crosscutting responses-
ranging from employment training to counterterrorism- shows that,
ultimately, achieving any meaningful results requires firm linkages of
strategy, resources, and outcome- oriented performance measures. Otherwise,
scarce resources are likely to be wasted, overall effectiveness will be
limited or not known, and accountability will not be ensured. Accordingly,
we are recommending that the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs take appropriate action to ensure sustained executive-
level coordination and assessment of the multiagency federal efforts in
connection with international crime.

Presented below is summary information about each of the topics that we
studied. More detailed information about each topic is presented in
appendixes II through VII, respectively:

 U. S. framework for addressing international crime. The U. S. government?s
framework for addressing international crime was the result of several
developments. For example, in October 1995, recognizing that international
crime presented a direct and immediate threat to national security,
Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD- 42) directed the development of an
effective U. S. response. As a key part of the response, in May 1998, the
President announced the U. S. government?s International Crime Control
Strategy, which was formulated with input from multiple law enforcement
agencies and was intended to serve as a dynamic, evolving roadmap for a
coordinated, long- term attack on international Results

Page 3 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

crime. The strategy consists of 8 overarching goals (e. g., ?counter

international financial crime?) and 30 implementing objectives (e. g.,
?seize

the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of forfeiture
law?) and was intended to complement and not supplant related strategies,
such as the National Drug Control Strategy. The crime control strategy has
not been updated since its inception to reflect changes in the threat from
international crime. In April 2001, in response to our inquiry, NSC
officials told us that the issue of international crime and the framework
for the U. S. response were under review by the new administration. The NSC
officials had no estimate of when the review would be completed; however,
the officials said that PDD- 42 and the International Crime Control Strategy
were still considered to be in effect during the ongoing review process.
(See app. II.)

 Extent of international crime. While there is general consensus among law
enforcement officials, researchers, and others that international crime is
growing, there is also agreement that measuring the true extent of such
crime is difficult. Nevertheless, several efforts have attempted to gauge
the extent of and the threat posed by international crime to the United
States and other countries. For example, in 1999 and 2000, threat
assessments were prepared to support the International Crime Control
Strategy. While the 1999 threat assessment was classified, a published
version of the 2000 assessment 1 provided various indicators or measures of
international crime within five broad categories-( 1) terrorism and drug
trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children, 2
and environmental crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products
across international borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial
crimes. Furthermore, within each of the five broad categories, specific
types of crimes were discussed. Regarding the financial crime category, for
example, the assessment noted that worldwide money laundering could involve
roughly $1 trillion per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that
representing laundering related to drug trafficking. The assessment
acknowledged, however, that there is little analytical work supporting most
estimates of money laundering. According to NSC, whether the threat
assessment would continue to be updated periodically is being considered as
part of the new administration?s review of international crime and no
decisions had been made in this regard. (See app. III.)

1 The 2000 threat assessment was prepared by an interagency group that
included representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency; the
Departments of Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury; Office of
National Drug Control Policy; and NSC.

2 State has now designated this activity as ?trafficking in persons.?

Page 4 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 Selected federal entities? roles in responding to international crime and
coordination of the response. In response to our inquiry, NSC identified 34
federal entities- including cabinet- level departments and their components,
and independent agencies- that it considered as having significant roles in
fighting international crime. The federal entities included those that are
the focus of this report, namely the departments of Justice, Treasury, and
State, and USAID. 3 Within Justice, for example, relevant components include
the Criminal Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.
S. National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL), U. S. Marshals Service, and U. S. Attorney Offices. Relevant
Treasury components include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(ATF); Customs Service; Internal Revenue Service- Criminal Investigation;
Secret Service; Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center; and the Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Within State, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs has a significant role, which includes coordinating and funding U.
S. training assistance provided to foreign law enforcement entities; also
within State, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism have roles in combating international crime. To illustrate
the broad interagency nature of international crime control, in 1997 we
identified 43 federal entities with terrorism- related programs and
activities. 4 Similarly, 41 federal entities have an interest or are
involved in operations at U. S. seaports; 15 of these entities have some
jurisdiction over criminal activities occurring at these seaports, according
to an interagency commission report. 5

Implementation of the International Crime Control Strategy inherently
involves some jurisdictional overlaps, which necessitate coordination among
agencies. To facilitate executive- level coordination of the strategy, PDD-
42 established the Special Coordination Group on International Crime,
composed of high- level officials from relevant agencies and chaired

3 In addition to those discussed in this report, the federal entities
identified by NSC included the Department of Defense, the Federal Reserve,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission. NSC cautioned that its
compilation of federal entities responding to international crime was not
intended to be exhaustive.

4 Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better
Management and Coordination (GAO- NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997). 5 Report of
the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S. Seaports (Aug.
2000).

Page 5 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

by a senior NSC official. The Special Coordination Group was to meet
periodically to ensure an integrated focus on the federal response to
international crime. According to State and NSC officials, however, while
the Special Coordination Group met 14 times in 1998, it met infrequently
thereafter. At one point the Special Coordination Group did not meet at all
for about 9 months (between September 1999 and June 2000) because some of
its members were involved in other activities, such as preparing for year-
2000 computer compliance and because of staffing shortages. In this regard,
two NSC staff were assigned to coordinate international crime matters.

A Presidential directive issued in February 2001 (National Security
Presidential Directive 1, or NSPD- 1) reorganized NSC and abolished the
existing structure of interagency groups, including the Special Coordination
Group. The directive did not indicate how the overall response to
international crime would be coordinated at the time under NSC?s new
structure. In April 2001, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for
International Organized Crime. 6 The PCC is to be comprised of officials at
the Assistant Secretary level from relevant federal entities and is to be
chaired by the NSC Senior Director for Transnational Threats. The PCC is to
coordinate policy formulation, program oversight, and new initiatives
related to a number of international crime issues, including arms
trafficking, trafficking in persons, and foreign official corruption.
According to NSC, one of the PCC?s priorities is to evaluate the 1998
International Crime Control Strategy.

Various other departmental and agency- level coordination mechanisms- such
as coordination centers, interagency coordinators, and working groups- have
been established over the years to address specific types of international
crimes. For example, Justice and State recently created a center for
combating trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling. (See app. IV.)

 Efforts to combat public corruption internationally. The International
Crime Control Strategy addresses corruption in two contexts. One context
involves efforts to eliminate the use of bribes in transnational business
activities, such as government contracting. In this context, an
international anti- bribery agreement adopted by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

6 In February 2001, NSPD- 1 established 17 other geographic and functional
PCCs.

Page 6 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

represents an effort to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials in
business transactions. This agreement- the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions-
entered into force in 1999. The Convention generally requires signatory
nations to criminalize bribes to foreign public officials made to obtain or
retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of international
business. Essentially, the Convention, according to State, reflects the
long- term U. S. interest in creating a level playing field among the
world?s major trading nations by internationalizing the antibribery
principles of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (P. L. 95- 213), 7 which the
United States enacted in 1977. The Departments of State and Commerce are
required to provide the Congress with annual reports on the implementation
of the OECD Convention. In its third annual report, issued in July 2001,
Commerce noted that progress has been made on the first priority of ensuring
that all signatories deposit an instrument of ratification with OECD. As of
July 2001, 33 of the 34 signatories to the Convention had deposited
instruments of ratification and 30 have legislation in place to implement
the Convention. The report pointed out that the United States continued to
have concerns about the adequacy of countries? legislation to meet all
commitments under the Convention. 8

The strategy?s other context on public corruption involves rule of law
assistance, which focuses on U. S. support for legal, judicial, and law
enforcement reform efforts undertaken by foreign governments. Generally,
proponents view such assistance as being especially important in that
widespread corruption among justice and security officials can potentially
destabilize governments. In a 1999 report to congressional requesters, we
noted that the United States provided at least $970 million in rule of law
assistance to countries throughout the world from fiscal years 1993 through
1998. Four regions- Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central Europe,
and the New Independent States- received about 80 percent of the total. 9
Our 1999 report also noted that at least 35 federal entities- consisting of
7 cabinet- level departments and 28 related agencies, bureaus, and offices-
had a role in providing the assistance. Furthermore, the report recognized
that, due to longstanding congressional concerns about ineffective
coordination, in February 1999,

7 Codified at 15 U. S. C., 78dd- 1, et seq., 78ff. 8 U. S. Department of
Commerce, Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and Fair
Competition: July 2001 (July 2001).

9 Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
98 (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158, June 30, 1999).

Page 7 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

State appointed a rule of law coordinator to work with all the relevant U.
S. governmental entities. 10 More recently, in April 2001, we reported that-
after 10 years and almost $200 million in funding- rule of law assistance to
12 countries of the former Soviet Union had shown limited results. 11 We
recommended that program management be improved by implementing requirements
for projects to include specific strategies for (1) achieving impact and
sustainable results and (2) monitoring and evaluating outcomes. (See app.
V.)

 U. S. programs for providing technical assistance. Much of the technical
assistance that the United States provides to other nations for fighting
international crime involves training, particularly training at law
enforcement academies established abroad. For instance, State Department-
funded academies have been established in Europe, Southeast Asia, and
Southern Africa, and plans are underway to establish an academy to serve
Central America. Also, the Department of Justice strives to strengthen
justice systems abroad through training and assistance in developing
criminal justice institutions provided through two programs- (1) the
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and (2)
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training. In addition to
training, federal agencies- particularly Justice and Treasury- help foreign
nations combat international crime by providing technical assistance through
specialized support services and systems, such as computerized databases and
forensic laboratories. For example, the National Tracing Center- operated by
ATF- traces firearms for foreign law enforcement agencies, as well as for
federal and state agencies. (See app. VI.)

 Measures of the effectiveness of U. S. efforts. There are no standard
measures of effectiveness to assess the federal government?s overall efforts
to address international crime. As one of its objectives, the International
Crime Control Strategy indicated that a governmentwide performance
measurement system for international crime would be established- similar to
the system for measuring the effectiveness of the nation?s drug control
efforts implemented by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. However,
according to NSC officials, no actions were ever taken to establish such as
system. Rather, the task of developing

10 According to State, the rule of law coordinator position lapsed at the
end of the Clinton administration and has not been reestablished. 11 Former
Soviet Union: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and
Sustainability (GAO- 01- 354, Apr. 17, 2001).

Page 8 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

performance measures was deferred to the individual federal entities with
roles in combating international crime.

Under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), federal
agencies are to prepare strategic and performance plans, which describe
their respective program activities and how effectiveness will be measured.
Regarding international crime, Justice?s, Treasury?s, and State?s plans each
have sections describing their efforts to combat specific types of crime,
along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some cases, however,
these measures do not adequately address effectiveness. For example, in June
2000, we reported our observations on key outcomes described in Justice?s
performance report and plan. 12 Among other things, we noted that Justice?s
performance measures focused on outputs rather than outcomes and did not
capture all aspects of performance. Furthermore, in a broader context-
despite the existence of GPRA- related reports and plans- there has been no
effort to consolidate the various federal agencies? results into an overall
performance measurement system, as envisioned by the International Crime
Control Strategy.

Another performance measurement mechanism applicable to international crime
involves focusing on selected types of crimes. That is, for a few types of
international crimes, the government has developed separate strategies that
include measures of results and effectiveness. The most notable such
strategy is the National Drug Control Strategy, which identifies goals,
objectives, and performance indicators to measure the effectiveness of the
nation?s war on drugs. Similar national strategies have been developed for
money laundering and counterterrorism. These national strategies- although
focused on specific types of crimes- are nonetheless similar to the
International Crime Control Strategy in that challenges are presented in
developing goals, objectives, and indicators that adequately measure results
and effectiveness. (See app. VII.)

We believe it is appropriate that the new administration is currently
reviewing the existing framework for addressing international crime and
considering options for top- level coordination mechanisms. But, it is also
important for systems to be in place to ensure that crosscutting goals are
consistent, program efforts are mutually reinforcing- and, where
appropriate, common or complementary performance measures are used as a
basis for results- oriented management. In past reports, we have noted

12 Observations on DOJ?s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance
Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). Concluding

Observations

Page 9 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

instances across a wide range of federal programs where a lack of executive-
level coordination has led to inefficient and/ or ineffective programs,
including those to combat specific types of international crime such as
terrorism. 13 Generally, at the field or operational levels in relation to
specific types or aspects of international crimes, a wide range of interand
intra- agency coordination activities arguably are being carried out
routinely. However, these activities cannot take the place of top- level
leadership in setting and implementing an overall strategy to ensure that
priorities are being established, federal goals and objectives are being
met, and governmentwide performance is being measured.

International crime is a complex and multifaceted issue of great national
importance. Accordingly, the U. S. response to international crime involves
a wide variety of federal entities spending a significant amount of time and
money. We recognize that individual federal entities have developed
strategies to address a variety of international crime issues. We also
recognize that for some crimes, integrated mechanisms exist to coordinate
efforts across agencies, and that, at the operational level, law enforcement
and other personnel are working across agencies. However, we believe that
without an up- to- date and integrated strategy and sustained top- level
leadership to implement and monitor it, the risk is high that scarce
resources will be wasted, overall effectiveness will be limited or not
known, and accountability will not be ensured. Accordingly, we note that the
establishment of the PCC for International Organized Crime in April 2001 is
a step in the right direction and- on the basis of what is known about its
role and priorities- appears to address some of the coordination and related
issues discussed in this report, such as providing oversight of
international crime issues.

Recognizing the establishment of the PCC for International Organized Crime
and its intended responsibilities and priorities, we recommend that the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs take appropriate
action to ensure that this PCC provides sustained and centralized oversight
of the extensive and crosscutting federal effort to combat international
crime. Consistent with the coordination and related issues we have discussed
in this report, we recommend that as the responsibilities of the PCC are
defined, they include systematically

13 For example, see Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency
Coordination (GAO/ GGD- 00- 106, Mar. 29, 2000) and Managing for Results:
Using GPRA to Help Congressional Decisionmaking and Strengthen Oversight
(GAO/ T- GGD- 00- 95, Mar. 22, 2000). Recommendation for

Executive Action

Page 10 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 updating the existing governmentwide international crime threat assessment
to maintain a thorough understanding of credible existing and emerging
threats;

 updating the International Crime Control Strategy, or developing a
successor- to include prioritized goals and implementing objectives- as
appropriate to reflect changes in the threat;

 designating responsibility for executing the strategy and resolving any
jurisdictional issues;

 identifying and aligning the necessary resources with the strategy?s
execution;

 developing outcome- oriented performance measures linked to the strategy?s
goals and objectives to track and assess progress, identify emerging
challenges, and establish overall accountability; and

 periodically reporting the strategy?s results to the President and the
Congress.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, the Attorney General, the
Secretaries of State and the Treasury, and the Administrator of USAID. In
response, we received comments from NSC?s National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection and Counter- Terrorism; Justice?s Acting Assistant
Attorney General for Administration; State?s Acting Chief Financial Officer;
and USAID?s Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Management. The
comments are reprinted in appendixes VIII through XI and discussed briefly
in the next sections. In addition to their comments, NSC, Justice, State,
and USAID provided technical comments that are incorporated in this report
where appropriate. Treasury did not submit written comments but provided
technical comments.

NSC generally concurred with the thrust of the report?s recommendation,
indicating that the coordination of the federal government?s efforts to
combat international crime should be improved further; that NSC is the
logical choice to provide enhanced coordination and policy direction at the
most senior levels of government; and that comprehensive measures should be
developed to assess the effectiveness of international crime control
programs and form an iterative cycle of regular threat, strategy, and
program reviews. NSC also indicated that the PCC for International Organized
Crime would consider our recommendation as it reviews the International
Crime Control Strategy and works to enhance the government?s approach to
fighting international crime. At the same time, NSC expressed concern that
the report did not adequately reflect a number of initiatives it led-
including the establishment of the Special Coordination Group and the
development of the International Crime Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 11 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Control Strategy- that were aimed at a more integrated U. S. government
approach to fighting international crime. Furthermore, NSC indicated that
the report overstated the Council?s proper role in international crime
control efforts. In this regard, NSC said that senior- level interagency
coordination by NSC and its formal committee structure is only part of the
picture and that the overwhelming majority of coordination at that level- as
well as at the operational level- occurs without any involvement by the
Council.

Regarding NSC?s comment about the report not adequately reflecting the
initiatives undertaken to integrate the government?s response to
international crime, we believe that the report- in keeping with its intent
to provide overview- level information on the subject- adequately identifies
and describes, in a framework context, key components of the response. These
include PDD- 42, the International Crime Control Strategy, the International
Crime Threat Assessment, and the now- defunct Special Coordination Group.
Regarding NSC?s comment about its role in international crime control
efforts, the report recognizes that extensive day- to- day coordination does
occur at the operational and executive levels. The report?s discussion of
NSC?s role in coordinating efforts to combat international crime centers on
the delineation of that role in, among other documents, NSPD- 1 and the
memorandum establishing the PCC for International Organized Crime. For
example, NSPD- 1 states that the various PCCs shall be the main day- to- day
mechanisms for senior interagency coordination of national security policy
issues, of which international crime control is one.

Justice agreed with the report?s concluding observations regarding, among
other things, the executive branch?s need to prioritize its response to the
increasing threat from international crime. However, Justice expressed what
it characterized as ?serious reservations? about the report?s discussion and
recommendation concerning interagency coordination of the federal response
to international crime. Specifically, Justice believed that the report
understated the extent of interagency coordination that has occurred in the
past, especially at the lower levels where, according to Justice, law
enforcement coordination has often led to successful international criminal
investigations and prosecutions. Justice also said that the report's
recommendation for high- level coordination overestimated the importance of
the Special Coordination Group and its sub- groups. Justice indicated that
while high- level interagency coordination may be useful for general policy
matters, such coordination is generally not appropriate for particular
criminal investigations. Finally, Justice said that the report did not give
proper recognition to what it

Page 12 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

characterized as the Attorney General?s ?central role? in addressing
international crime, especially in determining whether, and under what
circumstances, to prosecute international criminal conduct. Consequently,
according to Justice, the report?s recommendation appears to be an intrusion
into the ?traditional law enforcement responsibilities of the Attorney
General.?

Regarding Justice?s statement that the extent of interagency coordination is
understated, the report is not intended to be an exhaustive representation
of the federal response to international crime and the coordination of this
response. Rather, the report describes the various means through which
coordination occurs- especially at the operational level- and presents
illustrative examples, provided by a variety of federal law enforcement and
other agencies, without reaching any conclusions about the effectiveness of
coordination at this level. Regarding Justice?s statement that the
importance of the Special Coordination Group and its sub- groups is
overestimated, the report discusses the roles and responsibilities of the
Group as envisioned by and delineated in PDD- 42 and the International Crime
Control Strategy. According to these documents- which form the framework of
the federal response to international crime- the Group was intended as the
high- level mechanism to ensure an integrated and sustained focus on the
federal response to international crime. Regarding Justice?s statement that
the report does not recognize the Attorney General?s central role in
combating international crime and that its recommendation appears to intrude
on his law enforcement responsibilities, we offer two points in response.
First, the report, reflecting a consensus view, describes Justice?s role in
combating international crime as ?significant? and accordingly provides a
detailed description of the relevant responsibilities and programs of its
various components. Second, building upon a mechanism already put in place
by NSC, the recommendation seeks to enhance executive- level coordination
and oversight of the large- scale federal effort to combat international
crime. The recommendation?s specific components- which focus on strategic-
level matters- are not intended to delve into operational- level matters,
such as decisions to prosecute specific instances of international criminal
conduct.

State indicated that it agreed with the basic premise and recommendation of
the report. It further indicated that centrally led coordination- focusing
on general policy rather than particular criminal matters and issues- can be
useful in sorting out and better delineating the many overlapping
responsibilities of federal law enforcement agencies and avoiding
duplications and gaps in anticrime programs that can waste limited

Page 13 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

resources and reduce program effectiveness. State did note that since some
activities discussed in the report, such as nonproliferation and
counterterrorism, involve broader political and national security issues
that extend beyond international crime, they should remain under the
jurisdiction of the appropriate PCC, such as the one for Nonproliferation,
Counter- proliferation, and Homeland Defense. In this regard, we acknowledge
this distinction and, to the extent that they continue to be considered also
as part of the broader context of international crime, defer to the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to determine the
appropriate PCC jurisdiction for activities such as nonproliferation and
counterterrorism.

USAID submitted a letter with technical clarifications, which we included in
the report where appropriate.

As indicated earlier, the Department of the Treasury had no written comments
on a draft of this report. However, Treasury entities provided technical
comments which we incorporated in this report where appropriate.

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Chairmen and
Ranking Minority Members of the Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed
Services, Finance, Foreign Relations, Governmental Affairs, and the
Judiciary; and to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House
Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, Government Reform,
International Relations, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means. In addition, we
will send copies to the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary
of State, and the Administrator of USAID. We will also make copies available
to others on request.

Page 14 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss the matter
further, please contact me at (202) 512- 8777 or Danny R. Burton at (214)
777- 5600. Other key contributors are acknowledged in appendix XII.

Sincerely yours, Laurie E. Ekstrand Director, Justice Issues

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 15 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Our objectives in this review were to develop overview information on the
following topics:

 The U. S. framework for addressing international crime.

 The extent of international crime.

 Selected federal entities? roles in responding to international crime and
issues related to the coordination of the response.

 U. S. efforts to combat public corruption internationally.

 U. S. programs for providing technical assistance to other nations to
combat international crime.

 Issues related to measures of the effectiveness of U. S. efforts to combat
international crime.

As agreed with the requester?s office, given the number and potential
breadth of the topics- and the time frames for conducting our review- we
focused on developing overview information rather than analyzing each topic
in depth. Also, while we tried to identify and contact as many relevant
federal agencies as possible, most of our interactions were with officials
in the National Security Council (NSC); the Departments of Justice,
Treasury, and State; the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID);
and their relevant components. As such, the information contained in this
report does not represent the full extent of the federal government?s
response to international crime. Nor does the information represent the full
response to international crime by NSC, Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID-
in that some of the information is based on examples, rather than an
exhaustive listing of all relevant activities or programs.

To obtain background information and other contextual perspectives, we
relied to a considerable extent on publicly available information- such as
published reports or studies- and we also used the Internet to access
information on the Web sites of various federal and other relevant entities.
To obtain additional information about federal entities? roles and
responsibilities for international crime, we also submitted a data
collection instrument to Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID, and we
submitted written questions to NSC.

As agreed with the requester?s office, our work did not include reviewing
any classified documents. In addition, we did not independently verify or
evaluate the information we obtained, including strategies, threat
assessments, international crime control initiatives, and assistance program
descriptions. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology Objectives

Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 16 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

The following sections present more information about our scope and
methodology for each of the six topics noted earlier.

Regarding the U. S. framework for addressing international crime, we focused
on key documents, such as

 Presidential Decision Directive 42 (PDD- 42), which was issued in October
1995 to authorize development of an effective U. S. response to
international crime and

 the International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998)- an integral part of
the response- that was formulated with input from multiple law enforcement
agencies.

For this report, we have defined ?international crime? consistent with the
International Crime Control Strategy, the ?roadmap? document for federal law
enforcement efforts. The strategy uses the term ?international crime? to
describe criminal conduct that transcends national borders and threatens U.
S. interests in three broad, interrelated categories: threats to Americans
and their communities, threats to American businesses and financial
institutions, and threats to global security and stability. Using this
characterization, the strategy (and the subsequent International Crime
Threat Assessment prepared pursuant to the strategy) designate the following
as the major international crimes from the U. S. perspective: corruption;
terrorism; drug trafficking; illegal immigration and alien smuggling;
trafficking in women and children; environmental crimes (including flora and
fauna trafficking); sanctions violations; illicit technology transfers and
smuggling of materials for weapons of mass destruction; arms trafficking;
trafficking in precious gems; piracy; nondrug contraband smuggling;
intellectual property rights violations; foreign economic espionage; foreign
corrupt business practices; counterfeiting; financial fraud (including
advance fee scams and credit card fraud); hightech crime; and money
laundering.

We discussed the International Crime Control Strategy?s development- and its
continuing significance and use- with officials from various federal
agencies, including NSC; the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State;
USAID; and their components. We also obtained and reviewed other key
documents that address aspects of the federal government?s response to
international crime, including the proposed ?International Crime Control Act
of 1998? (S. 2303), the International Crime Threat Assessment, and the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (and
supplementary protocols). U. S. Framework for

Addressing International Crime

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 17 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

To obtain information concerning the extent of international crime, we
conducted a literature search and interviewed officials of various federal
law enforcement agencies, including the U. S. National Central Bureau of the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).

We also summarized data from the International Crime Threat Assessment (Dec.
2000), which was prepared by a U. S. government interagency working group
with membership from various federal law enforcement agencies, as well as
the Central Intelligence Agency and NSC. Furthermore, we reviewed relevant
documents from other sources- including the National Intelligence Council,
the United States Commission on National Security/ 21st Century, and the
United Nations.

Regarding selected federal entities? roles and coordination, we focused on
identifying and contacting the federal entities responsible for implementing
the basic ?framework? document mentioned previously- that is, the
International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998). However, as also mentioned
previously, most of our interactions were with officials in Justice,
Treasury, State, and USAID- and their relevant components. Also, we
contacted NSC to discuss the role of the Special Coordination Group on
International Crime- a team whose members include high- level officials
from, among others, Justice, Treasury, and State.

To obtain additional information about federal agencies? roles and
responsibilities for international crime, we submitted a data collection
instrument to Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID. Generally, we designed
the instrument to request information about threat assessments, budgets and
staffing, areas of responsibility and authority, interagency and
intergovernmental coordination, performance measures, and foreign technical
assistance. We also met with cognizant officials at these entities to
discuss these issues.

Furthermore, we submitted questions to NSC concerning the agency?s roles and
responsibilities. However, because the issue of international crime and the
framework for the U. S. response were still under review by the new
administration, NSC officials declined to respond to our questions.

In reference to combating corruption, the International Crime Control
Strategy presents two related objectives: Extent of International

Crime Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International Crime
and Coordination of the Response

Combating Public Corruption Internationally

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 18 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat
international crime, including corruption and bribery.

 Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic and free
markets in order to reduce societies? vulnerability to criminal
exploitation.

We contacted officials at Justice, Treasury, State, and USAID to identify
and discuss (1) the major obstacles or challenges in implementing these
objectives and (2) what actions were being taken or planned to address these
obstacles or challenges. Furthermore, we

 reviewed testimony presented at a July 1999 hearing before the Commission
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1 and

 reviewed relevant information from Transparency International, a leading
nongovernmental organization that addresses corruption issues.

We analyzed national and international documents on corruption, bribery, and
the rule of law- including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and documents
associated with (1) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, (2) the First Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption, and (3) the Council of Europe?s Criminal Law Convention Against
Corruption and the attendant Group of States Against Corruption.

Also, from several of our recent reports, we summarized data about U. S.
rule of law worldwide funding and federal entities involved in rule of law
assistance programs.

Regarding U. S. technical assistance to other nations to combat
international crime, we contacted officials at Justice, Treasury, State, and
USAID to identify and discuss relevant training programs and other forms of
assistance, such as access to (1) automated criminal history records, (2)
other computerized information systems, or (3) forensic or other
laboratories. However, we did not visit any field or operational sites to
observe training or other assistance programs. Nor did we contact any
recipient nations to obtain the views of foreign government officials or law
enforcement officers.

1 Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th
Congress, 1st Session, ?Bribery and Corruption in the OSCE Region? (CSCE
106- 1- 10, July 21, 1999), U. S. Government Printing Office (Washington, D.
C.: 2000). U. S Programs for

Providing Technical Assistance to Other Nations to Combat International
Crime

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 19 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

The International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998) called for the
establishment of a performance measurement system for monitoring progress in
meeting the strategy?s goals and objectives. To determine the extent to
which such a system had been established and was being used- and, if
applicable, to identify and discuss other relevant performance measures- we
contacted federal officials at NSC, Justice, Treasury, and State.

Also, to identify alternative approaches used for measuring the results of
international crime control efforts, we reviewed department and agency
strategic and performance plans that were prepared pursuant to the
Government Performance and Results Act. That is, we reviewed these plans to
determine whether and to what extent they contained performance measures for
monitoring international crime control efforts.

Furthermore, we reviewed national strategies and related documents for three
specific international crimes to determine whether and to what extent they
contained performance measures. These crime- specific strategies were the
National Drug Control Strategy, the National Money Laundering Strategy, and
the Five- Year Interagency Counter- Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan.
Measures of Effectiveness

of U. S. Efforts to Combat International Crime

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 20 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

The U. S. government?s framework for addressing international crime is based
on various initiatives involving President- directed federal law enforcement
interagency actions, a proposal for additional statutory authority, and
efforts to increase international cooperation:

 In October 1995, recognizing that international crime presented a direct
and immediate threat to national security, Presidential Decision Directive
42 (PDD- 42) was issued to authorize the development of an effective U. S.
response.

 Also in October 1995, in a speech at the United Nations (UN), the
President called for increased international cooperation to fight various
aspects of international crime.

 In May 1998, the President announced the U. S. government?s International
Crime Control Strategy, which was formulated with input from multiple law
enforcement agencies and was intended to serve as a roadmap for a
coordinated, long- term attack on international crime.

 Also in May 1998, the White House announced proposed legislation that was
intended to help implement the strategy. In July 1998, Senator Patrick J.
Leahy introduced the proposed legislation- the International Crime Control
Act of 1998 (S. 2303) in the 105th Congress.

 In 1999 and in 2000, as part of the International Crime Control Strategy,
a U. S. government interagency working group prepared and issued assessments
of the threat posed by international crime.

 In December 2000, the United States and many other countries signed the
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, along with
supplementary protocols on migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons.

On October 21, 1995, President Clinton issued PDD- 42 to initiate certain
federal efforts to counter international crime. The general purpose of PDD-
42- as stated in the foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, P. L. 106-
120, title VIII, section 802- was to order executive branch agencies to take
the following actions:

 Increase the priority and resources devoted to addressing the threat that
international crime presents to national security.

 Work more closely with other governments to develop a global response to
the threat of international crime.

 Use aggressively and creatively all legal means available to combat
international crime.

Specifically, PDD- 42 required various agencies, including Justice,
Treasury, and State, to integrate their efforts against international crime
syndicates and money laundering. PDD- 42 also established interagency
Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing

International Crime PDD- 42 Issued in October 1995

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 21 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

working groups to address aspects of international crime control- such as
efforts to reduce money laundering by strengthening international
cooperation with critical nations. Subsequently, according to a State
Department official, to help implement PDD- 42, the National Security
Council (NSC) asked the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State to take
the lead in developing a comprehensive national strategy to attack
international crime.

According to a senior Justice official we interviewed during our review, the
President?s 1995 UN speech- which was delivered the day after PDD42 was
issued- can also be considered reflective of the U. S. framework for
addressing international crime. Specifically, on October 22, 1995, in a
speech before the UN General Assembly to mark the organization?s 50th
anniversary, the President called for cooperation in ?fighting the
increasingly interconnected groups that traffic in terror, organized crime,
drug smuggling and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.? 1 The
President indicated, for example, that nations needed to work together to
negotiate and endorse a ?no sanctuary pledge? to ensure that organized
criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers and smugglers have nowhere to
run or hide.

Also, in his UN speech, the President enumerated several steps that the
United States was taking to address international crime. For instance, the
President noted that he had directed applicable U. S. government agencies to

 identify and work (using sanctions, if appropriate) with those nations
that needed to bring their banks and financial systems into conformity with
international antimoney- laundering standards and

 identify the front companies (and freeze their assets) of the Cali Cartel,
the largest drug ring in the world.

Also, the President said that he had instructed Justice to ?prepare

legislation to provide our other agencies with the tools they need to
respond to organized criminal activity.? The resulting proposed legislation-
the International Crime Control Act of 1998 (S. 2303)- is discussed below.

1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ?Remarks by the President
to the UN General Assembly,? (Oct. 22, 1995). The President?s UN

Speech Called for Cooperation in Fighting International Crime

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 22 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Developed with input from multiple federal law enforcement agencies, the U.
S. government?s International Crime Control Strategy was released in May
1998. As summarized in table 1, the strategy consisted of 8 overarching
goals and 30 implementing objectives. It should be noted that according to
the federal officials we interviewed, the strategy- and its goals and
objectives- is intended to supplement and not supplant related strategies,
such as the National Drug Control Strategy.

Table 1: International Crime Control Strategy: Overarching Goals and
Implementing Objectives Overarching goals Implementing objectives

Extend the first line of defense beyond U. S. borders

 Prevent acts of international crime planned abroad, including terrorist
acts, before they occur.

 Use all available laws to prosecute select criminal acts committed abroad.

 Intensify activities of law enforcement, diplomatic, and consular
personnel abroad. Protect U. S. borders by attacking smuggling and
smuggling- related crimes

 Enhance our land border inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities
through a greater resource commitment, further coordination of federal
agency efforts, and increased cooperation with the private sector.

 Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction
efforts in the transit zone.

 Seek new, stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities.

 Target enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against
smuggling crimes and organizations. Deny safe haven to international
criminals  Negotiate new international agreements to create a seamless web
for the prompt

location, arrest, and extradition of international fugitives.

 Implement strengthened immigration laws that prevent international
criminals from entering the United States and provide for their prompt
expulsion when appropriate.

 Promote increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities to
provide rapid, mutual access to witnesses, records, and other evidence.
Counter international financial crime  Combat money laundering by denying
criminals access to financial institutions

and by strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce inbound and outbound
movement of criminal proceeds.

 Seize the assets of international criminals through aggressive use of
forfeiture laws.

 Enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation against all financial crime
by working with foreign governments to establish or update enforcement tools
and implement multilateral anti- money laundering standards.

 Target safe havens of international fraud, counterfeiting, electronic
access device schemes, and other financial crimes. Prevent criminal
exploitation of international trade

 Interdict illegal technology exports through improved detection, increased
cooperation with the private sector, and heightened sanctions.

 Prevent unfair and predatory trade practices in violation of U. S.
criminal law.

 Protect intellectual property rights by enhancing foreign and domestic law
enforcement efforts to curtail the flow of counterfeit and pirated goods and
by educating consumers.

 Counter industrial theft and economic espionage of U. S. trade secrets
through increased prosecution of offenders.

 Enforce import restrictions on certain harmful substances, dangerous
organisms, and protected species. Respond to emerging international crime
threats

 Disrupt new activities of international crime groups.

 Enhance intelligence efforts against criminal enterprises to provide
timely warning

International Crime Control Strategy Announced in May 1998

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 23 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Overarching goals Implementing objectives

of changes in their organizations and methods.

 Reduce trafficking in human beings and crimes against children.

 Increase enforcement efforts against high- tech and computer- related
crime.

 Continue identifying and countering the vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructures and new technologies in telecommunications, financial
transactions, and other high- tech areas. Foster international cooperation
and the rule of law

 Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat
international crime by using bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global
mechanisms, and by actively encouraging compliance.

 Improve bilateral cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement
authorities through increased collaboration, training, and technical
assistance.

 Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation for democratic government and
free markets in order to reduce societies? vulnerability to criminal
exploitation. Optimize the full range of U. S. efforts  Enhance executive
branch policy and operational coordination mechanisms to

assess the risks of criminal threats and to integrate strategies, goals, and
objectives to combat those threats.

 Mobilize and incorporate the private sector into U. S. government efforts.

 Develop measures of effectiveness to assess progress over time. Source:
Information formatted by GAO based on the International Crime Control
Strategy (May 1998).

The International Crime Control Strategy stated that its goals and
objectives were dynamic and would evolve over time as conditions changed,
new crime trends emerged, and improved anticrime techniques were developed.
However, the strategy has not been updated since its inception in 1998, even
though threat assessments (discussed below) were conducted in 1999 and 2000.

The International Crime Control Strategy was intended to build on and
complement existing national security and crime control strategies, such as
the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control Strategy. These
strategies are required to be updated periodically to reflect changes in the
threat posed to the national security and other interests of the United
States (see P. L. 105- 277, Title VII, section 706( b); and P. L. 99- 433,
section 603). Our previous work has shown that the development of a national
strategy to address a specific threat, such as terrorism, first requires a
thorough understanding of the threat. This understanding can be obtained, in
turn, by conducting threat and risk assessments. 2

2 See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and
Resources (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000). Strategy Has Not Been

Updated Since Its Inception

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 24 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

In May 1998, concurrent with the release of the International Crime Control
Strategy, the White House announced a legislative proposal to help implement
objectives in the strategy. In July 1998, Senator Patrick J. Leahy
introduced the proposed legislation- the ?International Crime Control Act of
1998? (S. 2303) in the 105th Congress. According to the White House, S. 2303
contained statutory provisions intended to ?close

gaps in current federal law, criminalize additional types of harmful
activities, and promote a strengthening of both domestic and foreign
criminal justice systems to respond to the new challenges posed by crime
that crosses international boundaries.? Although not enacted by the 105th
Congress, the proposed legislation contained provisions to

 establish jurisdiction in the United States over violent acts committed
abroad against state and local officials while engaged in official federal
business;

 authorize U. S. Customs Service officers to search international, outbound
sealed mail if there is reasonable cause to suspect that the mail contains
monetary instruments, drugs, weapons of mass destruction, or merchandise
mailed in violation of enumerated U. S. statutes, including obscenity and
export control laws;

 strengthen immigration laws to exclude international criminals from the
United States;

 expand the list of money laundering predicate crimes to include certain
serious foreign crimes, such as violent crimes and bribery of public
officials;

 address the problem of alien smuggling by authorizing the forfeiture of
its proceeds;

 provide extraterritorial jurisdiction for fraud involving access devices
such as credit cards;

 expand the authority of the Treasury and Justice departments to transfer
the forfeited assets of international criminals to eligible foreign
countries that participated in the seizure or forfeiture of the assets;

 provide new authority, in cases where there is no applicable mutual legal
assistance treaty provision, to transfer a person in U. S. government
custody to a requesting country temporarily for purposes of testifying in a
criminal proceeding, if both the foreign country and the witness consent;
and

 establish a hearsay exception to admit certain foreign government records
into evidence in U. S. civil proceedings. Proposed Legislation

to Help Implement Objectives of the International Crime Control Strategy

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 25 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

In 1999 and in 2000, as part of the International Crime Control Strategy, a
U. S. government interagency working group prepared assessments of the
threat posed by international crime. According to NSC and State officials,
the first assessment- prepared in 1999- was a classified document and was
not available to the public. An unclassified version of the second
assessment was publicly released- International Crime Threat Assessment,
December 2000. This document consists of the following five

chapters:

 Chapter I addresses the global context of international crime, identifying
the factors that have contributed to the growing problem of international
crime.

 Chapter II gives an overview of specific international crimes affecting U.
S. interests. 3

 Chapter III addresses worldwide areas of international criminal activity,
especially as source areas for specific crimes and bases of operations for
international criminal organizations.

 Chapter IV addresses the consequences of international crime for U. S.
strategic interests, including the ability to work cooperatively with
foreign governments and the problem of criminal safehavens, failed states,
and kleptocracies. 4

 Chapter V gives a perspective on future developments anticipated in
international crime.

3 We summarized this chapter in appendix III. 4 Examples of kleptocracies,
according to the threat assessment, are Nigeria under Sani Abacha, Zaire
under Mobuto Sese Seko, and the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos. In these
cases- characterized by corrosive state- sanctioned criminality and
corruption- top leaders use the resources of the nation solely to enrich
themselves and keep themselves and their cronies in power. Threat
Assessments

Prepared to Support International Crime Control Strategy

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 26 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

In December 2000, the United States and over 120 other countries signed the
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (including two
supplementary protocols 5 ). Before it comes into force, however, the
Convention must be ratified by at least 40 countries. 6

The main purpose of the Convention and its protocols is to enable the
international community to better combat organized crime by harmonizing
nations? criminal laws and promoting increased cooperation. For example,
nations that sign and ratify the Convention would be required to establish
in their domestic laws four criminal offenses- participation in an organized
criminal group, money laundering, corruption, and obstruction of justice.

In December 2000, at a signing conference for the Convention and its
protocols, the Department of State?s Under Secretary for Global Affairs made
the following remarks:

?While globalization has brought progress and expanded economic
opportunities to the world, an unfortunate consequence of globalization is
transnational crime. ? We must match the increasingly sophisticated means
that organized criminal groups have found to exploit globalization if we are
to win this battle. In particular it takes international agreements that are
global to fight crime that is global.

?The Transnational Organized Crime Convention and its supplementary
protocols include several common themes that characterize successful global
agreements. Perhaps most important, they establish global standards that all
countries must meet, and then provide for flexibility in the manner in which
they meet them. For example, the Convention and Protocols define- for the
first time in binding international agreements- organized crime, migrant
smuggling and trafficking in persons; and they require all parties to
criminalize this defined conduct under their domestic law. But they permit
individual countries to tailor the manner in which they implement their
obligations to the particular needs of their system. For example, the
Convention recognizes that different countries have different approaches to
the crime that we in the United States label as conspiracy.

5 The two protocols are (1) Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air and (2) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. A third supplementary
protocol- Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms- was still being drafted at the time that the Convention and the
first two supplementary protocols were adopted by the UN General Assembly in
late 2000.

6 Under terms of the agreement, nations may be a party to the Convention
only, but not to a protocol only. UN Convention

Against Transnational Organized Crime (and Supplementary Protocols)

Appendix II: U. S. Framework for Addressing International Crime

Page 27 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

?The international norms established by this Convention and its protocols
lead to another common theme of successful global treaties- namely, they
facilitate increased cooperation among governments, in this case law
enforcement officials. Having accepted definitions of organized crime,
migrant smuggling, and trafficking in persons makes international
collaboration on these subjects easier. The Convention and Protocols build
on these definitions, by including numerous mechanisms for cooperation. For
example, rather than going through the time- consuming and expensive process
of negotiating bilateral agreements, countries will be able to rely on these
treaties for extradition and mutual legal assistance. ?

?We have taken the first steps together, and now we must bring these
instruments to life as meaningful tools in our fight against transnational
organized crime.? 7

According to an NSC official, the issue of international crime and the
framework of the U. S. response are currently under review by the Bush
administration. The official could not estimate when the review would be
completed. In the meantime, according to this official, the framework for
the response- established primarily by PDD- 42 and the crime control
strategy- is still in effect, pending the outcome of the review. In this
regard, it should be noted that, in February 2001, National Security
Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD- 1) was issued to reorganize the structure of
NSC. NSPD- 1 abolished the then- existing system of interagency groups but
did not indicate which one, if any, of the 17 newly established policy
coordination committees would coordinate the issue of international crime
and the U. S. response.

In April 2001, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
established a multiagency Policy Coordination Committee on International
Organized Crime (PCC) to be chaired by NSC to provide oversight of the
federal response to international crime. According to an NSC official, one
of the PCC?s first priorities- as part of the administration?s ongoing
review- is to evaluate the International Crime Control Strategy to reflect
any changes in the threat from international crime as described in the
December 2000 threat assessment. The official did not provide a time frame
for completion of the evaluation.

7 Speech by Under Secretary Frank E. Loy, U. S. Department of State (Dec.
13, 2000). Framework Being

Reviewed by New Administration

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 28 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

According to law enforcement and intelligence officials, researchers, and
others, the extent of international crime has been growing since the early
1990s -a growth fueled by a number of factors, including the end of the Cold
War and increased globalization of commerce and trade and financial and
communications technology. Criminal organizations have been able to exploit
these developments to their advantage to further illicit activities and
execute financial transactions related to these activities.

While there is general consensus that international crime is growing, there
is also agreement that measuring the true extent of such crime is difficult.
This is mainly because of the clandestine nature of criminal activity and
the fact that criminals are not likely to self- report their activity.
Nevertheless, a number of efforts have attempted to gauge and describe the
threat posed by international crime to the United States and other
countries. These efforts rely primarily on estimates of international crime
activities as developed and reported by, among others, law enforcement
entities, business groups, and researchers.

In December 2000, as called for by the International Crime Control Strategy,
the U. S. government released an International Crime Threat Assessment. The
assessment was developed by an interagency working group and provided
various indicators or measures of international crime within five broad
categories. 1 While the assessment did not address the crimes in any
priority order to indicate severity of the threat to U. S. interests, the
categories were (1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration,
trafficking of women and children, 2 and environmental crimes; (3) illicit
transfer or trafficking of products across international borders; (4)
economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. Furthermore, within each of
the five broad categories, the threats posed by specific types of crimes
were discussed. For example, within the financial crimes category- as shown
in table 2, which summarizes the threat assessment- worldwide money
laundering was estimated to be as much as $1 trillion per year, with $300
billion to $500 billion of that representing laundering related to drug
trafficking. The assessment acknowledged, however, that

1 The group included representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency;
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA); U. S. Customs Service; U. S. Secret Service; Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN); National Drug Intelligence Center; the
Departments of the Treasury, Justice, State, and Transportation; the Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP); and National Security Council
(NSC).

2 State has now designated this activity as ?trafficking in persons.?
Appendix III: Extent of International Crime

International Crime Threat Assessment

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 29 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

there is little analytical work supporting most estimates of money
laundering.

Table 2: Categories and Extent of Major International Crimes Identified As a
Threat to U. S. Interests International crime categories a Excerpts from the
International Crime Threat Assessment regarding the extent

of international crime

Terrorism and drug trafficking Terrorism

 In 1999, there were 169 terrorist attacks against U. S. targets worldwide,
a 52- percent increase from 1998. Drug trafficking

 In 1999, Americans spent $63 billion on illegal drugs, according to a
study sponsored by ONDCP.

 The estimated total costs of drug abuse in the United States- including
health care and lost productivity- were $110 billion in 1995, the latest
year for which data are available, according to the U. S. National Institute
for Drug Abuse (NIDA).

 In 1999, the United States seized some 73 metric tons of cocaine at its
borders, according to the U. S. Customs Service.

 About 875 kilograms of heroin were seized at U. S. ports- of- entry in
1999, according to Customs Service data.

 In 1999, some 536 metric tons of marijuana were seized entering the United
States, most of which came from Mexico. Illegal immigration, trafficking of
women and children, and environmental crimes Alien smuggling

 The U. S. government estimates that 500, 000 illegal migrants are brought
into the United States annually by organized alien smuggling networks;
another estimated 500,000 enter without the assistance of alien smugglers.
Most illegal migrants enter the United States overland from Mexico or
Canada.

 Chinese smugglers, known as snakeheads, often move aliens into the United
States by maritime vessels, including offshore transfers of migrants, but
also transit South and Central America, Mexico, and Canada. The U. S.
government estimates that 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese were smuggled into the
United States in 1999.

 The United Nations (UN) estimates that migrant smuggling worldwide
involves 4 million people and $7 billion annually, according to a report in
December 1997. Trafficking in women and children

 The U. S. government estimated in 1997 that 700, 000 women and children
were moved across international borders by trafficking rings each year. Some
nongovernmental organizations estimate the number to be significantly
higher.

 The worldwide brothel industry earns at least $4 billion from trafficking
victims, according to U. S. government estimates. Environmental crimes

 The tremendous costs for legally disposing of pollutants and dangerous
chemicals have created new illicit business opportunities for criminal
organizations, who earn $10 billion to $12 billion per year for dumping
trash and hazardous waste materials.

 Criminal groups also smuggle environmentally harmful products,
particularly ozone- depleting chlorofluorocarbons whose legal trade is
subject to stringent international restrictions. The illegal trade of these
substances into the United States and other markets is accomplished through
false labeling, counterfeit paperwork, and bogus export corporations. The
size of the global black market for ozone- depleting substances is estimated
by the UN to range from 20, 000 to 30,000 metric tons annually, with more
than half entering the United States.

 The illegal trade in animal parts- in particular elephant, whale, and
hawksbill

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 30 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

International crime categories a Excerpts from the International Crime
Threat Assessment regarding the extent of international crime

turtle parts- and endangered animal species has also become a lucrative
business, particularly for Chinese and other Asian criminal groups. The
illegal trade in exotic birds, ivory and rhino horn, reptiles and insects,
rare tigers, and wild game is estimated to earn criminal groups $6 billion
to $10 billion per year. Illicit transfer or trafficking of products across
international borders Sanctions violations

 Some states of concern use international criminal networks to help in
their efforts to undermine U. S. and multilateral sanctions aimed at
isolating those states from the global community. Illicit technology
transfers and smuggling of materials for weapons of mass destruction

 There is no confirmed reporting that organized criminal groups have
planned or attempted to steal nuclear warheads or weapons- usable nuclear
material. Known thefts of weapons- usable nuclear material have primarily
been committed by opportunists with insider knowledge of the facility
storing nuclear material but without buyers identified before the theft.
Arms trafficking

 The U. S. government estimates that military equipment worth several
hundred million dollars is sold annually on the illegal arms market to
countries under UN arms embargoes.

 Drug traffickers and organized criminal groups have increasingly turned to
the illicit arms market in the 1990s. Trafficking in precious gems

 The lucrative market for diamonds, gold, and other precious gems has
attracted the interest of organized crime groups as well as become the
dominant source of revenue for warlords and insurgent groups in war- torn
diamond- rich areas in Africa. Economic trade crimes Piracy

 Maritime piracy, which is particularly prevalent off the coasts of
Southeast Asia and Africa, threatens the security of some of the world?s
most important sea lanes as well as the safe and orderly flow of
international maritime commerce.

 According to data made available by the U. S. Coast Guard, direct
financial losses incurred as a result of high- seas piracy are estimated at
about $450 million per year.

 Reported incidents of maritime piracy have more than doubled since 1994,
according to data from the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting
Center based in Malaysia, averaging between 200 and 300 per year over the
last 5 years as compared to an average of less than 100 piracy incidents
between 1990 and 1994. These figures, however, understate the extent of the
problem because most piracy attacks go unreported. In particular, incidents
involving coastal fishermen and recreational boaters are heavily under-
reported. Nondrug contraband smuggling

 Nondrug contraband smuggling across international borders- including
illegal import and export of legitimate goods such as alcohol, cigarettes,
textiles, and manufactured products- is a highly profitable criminal
activity that typically carries lighter criminal penalties than narcotics
trafficking.

 Colombian drug traffickers often use illicit drug proceeds to purchase
cigarettes that they smuggle into Colombia for black- market sales, avoiding
high tariffs and taxes on legal tobacco imports, according to the U. S.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

 The United States is most often the destination of illicit trade in
protected wildlife and rare plants.

 Commodities smuggled out of the United States are often items restricted
for export by U. S. law and involve munitions list items, firearms, and
defense- related

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 31 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

International crime categories a Excerpts from the International Crime
Threat Assessment regarding the extent of international crime

technologies tightly controlled for export by the U. S. government. Other
items frequently smuggled out of the United States include stolen
automobiles, dual- use items, and other goods that are difficult to obtain.

 Illegal trafficking in U. S.- origin firearms has become a security issue
of concern for many foreign governments. The U. S. Customs Service seized
nearly $4. 6 million in arms and ammunition at U. S. ports- of- entry and
exit in 1999.

 In 1997, the FBI Uniform Crime Report estimated that 1.4 million to 1.6
million automobiles are stolen annually in the United States, of which
200,000 valued at approximately $20,000 each are illegally transported out
of the country- making the overseas black market for stolen U. S. vehicles
worth about $4 billion. Intellectual property rights (IPR) violations

 Most IPR crimes affecting U. S. businesses involve the theft of trade
secrets and copyright, trademark, and patent violations.

 The American Society for Industrial Security, which conducts a
comprehensive survey of Fortune 500 companies, estimated in 2000 that
potential losses to all American industry resulting from the theft of
proprietary information amounted to $45 billion.

 The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated that, in 1998,
trade losses suffered by U. S.- based industries due to copyright violations
totaled nearly $12.4 billion, with losses to the motion picture industry of
$1.7 billion, the sound recording and music publishing industry at $1.7
billion, the business software industry at nearly $4. 6 billion, the
entertainment software industry at $3. 4 billion, and the book publishing
industry at $685 million.

 According to current estimates by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), counterfeit trademarked products account for approximately 8 percent
of world trade- roughly $200 billion annually. A recent survey of 10 leading
apparel and footwear companies by the International Trademark Association
indicated annual losses of nearly $2 billion. Online counterfeit sales may
exceed $25 billion annually worldwide, according to ICC estimates.

 In 1999, U. S. Customs seized a record $98.5 million in counterfeit
imported merchandise, an increase of $22 million over the previous year.

 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association estimates that
the pharmaceutical industry loses more than $2 billion annually due to
counterfeit medications sold on the open market.

 The International Anti- Counterfeiting Coalition estimated in 1998 that
product and software counterfeiting costs the United States more than $200
billion per year in lost sales, jobs, and tax revenues.

 The World Health Organization estimated in 1997 that at least 7 percent of
the medicines sold worldwide are counterfeit products. Foreign economic
espionage

 The stealing of trade secrets from the U. S. government and from U. S.
businesses through economic espionage, in addition to industrial theft, is a
growing threat to U. S. global economic competitiveness.

 The potential losses to all U. S. industry resulting from economic
espionage were estimated to be about $300 billion, according to a 2000
estimate by the American Society for Industrial Security, which conducts a
comprehensive survey of industrial theft. This figure is three times what it
was a few years ago. Foreign corrupt business practices

 Foreign corrupt business practices cost U. S. firms billions of dollars
each year in lost contracts. Foreign firms often use bribes to win
international contracts. About half of the known bribes in the last 5 years
were for defense contracts, with the other offers directed at major
purchases by governments and parastatal organizations for
telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, and transportation

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 32 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

International crime categories a Excerpts from the International Crime
Threat Assessment regarding the extent of international crime

projects. Financial crimes Counterfeiting

 International counterfeiting schemes include reproducing financial
instruments such as commercial checks, traveler?s checks, and money orders.

 About half of counterfeit U. S. currency is produced abroad, where many of
the illicit financial transactions by terrorist, drug trafficking, and
organized crime groups take place.

 About one- third of U. S. counterfeit currency distributed in the United
States in the past 3 years originated in Colombia, according to U. S. Secret
Service data.

 Counterfeit U. S. currency produced with advanced reprographic
capabilities and distributed in the United States has increased from less
than 1 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 2000.

 While, at present, the production and circulation of counterfeit U. S.
currency present a minimal threat to the U. S. economy, technological
advances in counterfeiting and the extension of counterfeiting knowledge to
more criminal groups may, in some circumstances, undermine U. S. economic
interests. Financial fraud

 Financial fraud crimes have become more prevalent in recent years as
greater amounts of personal and corporate financial information are made
available through computer technology and access devices, such as credit
cards, debit cards, and smart cards.

 In addition, Internet- related financial crime is of growing international
concern.

 Regarding financial fraud against businesses, in 1996, the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners estimated financial losses from fraud perpetrated
by domestic and international criminals in the United States at more than
$200 billion per year.

 According to current industry estimates, fraudulent credit cards cost the
U. S. banking industry at least $2 billion annually; losses worldwide are
estimated to be an additional $1 billion each year. High- tech crime

 According to the joint 2000 FBI- Computer Security Institute survey of
security practitioners in U. S. corporations, financial institutions,
universities, and government agencies, 273 of the respondents cited
financial losses of $265.5 million from computer crime- almost double the
reported losses of $136. 8 million in 1998. The number of U. S. businesses
reporting computer intrusions through Internet connections rose from 37
percent in 1996 to 70 percent in 1998, according to the joint survey.

 The Internet has also become the primary means used by international child
pornography rings to disseminate their material worldwide.

 In December 1999, there were about 100 ongoing U. S. Customs
investigations involving the sale of counterfeit goods over the Internet.

 According to a joint FBI- Computer Security Institute survey in 1998, 241
U. S. business respondents reported $11.2 million in losses caused by
computer financial frauds. Telecommunications fraud from computer attacks
cost these companies an additional $17.2 million in losses.

 IPR violations through the penetration of computer networks are also an
increasing threat to U. S. businesses. In responding to the 1998 survey, U.
S. businesses reported losses of $33.5 million in theft of proprietary
information from computer attacks. Money laundering

 While international law enforcement, intelligence, and financial experts
agree that the amount of illegal proceeds in the world is huge and growing,
there is little analytical work supporting most estimates of money
laundering. A few estimates have been attempted, but no consensus view has
emerged about the magnitude

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 33 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

International crime categories a Excerpts from the International Crime
Threat Assessment regarding the extent of international crime

of money laundering on a global, regional, or national scale.

 According to one recent estimate, worldwide money- laundering activity is
roughly $1 trillion per year, with $300 billion to $500 billion of that
representing laundering related to drug trafficking. A former Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund has estimated worldwide money
laundering at 2 to 5 percent of the world?s gross domestic product- some
$800 billion at the low end of the range and perhaps as high as $2 trillion.
a The crime categories are listed in the order presented in the source
document, which states that the

assessment addressed: ?? the major international crimes identified as a
threat to U. S. interests in the International Crime Control Strategy. This
survey does not address them in any priority order indicating severity of
threat to U. S. interests.?

Source: International Crime Threat Assessment (Dec. 2000).

Based on our interviews with NSC and State officials, it is not clear
whether the threat assessment will continue to be periodically updated- as
part of an iterative process- and used to systematically measure trends and
identify new threats posed by various types of international crime.
According to an NSC official, the matter of updating the threat assessment
is being considered as part of the Bush administration?s ongoing review of
the federal response to international crime. Our prior work shows that
because threats to national security are dynamic and countermeasures may
become outdated, it is generally sound practice to periodically reassess
such threats. 3 Our work has also pointed out that national- level threat
assessments- and accompanying risk assessments that attempt to determine the
likelihood of a threat occurring- are decision- making support tools that
are used to establish requirements, develop strategies, and prioritize
program investments to help focus national efforts on achieving results. As
indicated earlier, the December 2000 threat assessment did not prioritize
the types of international crimes it discussed in terms of the severity of
threat they posed to U. S. interests.

In responding to our survey, a number of federal law enforcement officials
indicated that their agencies do not use the December 2000 threat
assessment. The agencies have, instead, developed their own threat
assessments based on information obtained through their own intelligence.
Examples of agency assessments include the following:

3 See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can
Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 74, Apr. 9,
1998), Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk
Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 163, Sept.
14, 1999), and Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and
Resources (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000). Operational Threat

Assessments

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 34 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

 Annual assessments developed by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service?s (INS) District Offices that focus on activities such as alien
smuggling.

 Country- specific corruption assessments prepared for the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) by a private firm. For instance, a March/
April 2000 assessment on Nigeria concluded that corruption was pervasive in
the private and public sectors and had become woven into the fabric of that
country?s society.

A forthcoming operational assessment represents a joint effort- among the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the U. S. Customs Service,
and the Canadian government- to determine the nature, size, and scope of the
legal and illegal tobacco trade and the involvement of organized crime in
this trade. According to ATF, this initiative is intended to identify
emerging trends, threats to the legal tobacco trade and government revenues,
and obstacles to effective enforcement.

In responding to our inquiries, several federal law enforcement and other
officials identified a number of challenges in accurately and reliably
determining the extent and impact of international crime. These challenges
included (1) the reluctance among agencies to share information; (2)
insufficient human resources deployed in foreign countries to gather
information; (3) the accuracy of information supplied by some countries; (4)
the clandestine and consensual nature of criminal activity (e. g., public
corruption); (5) the use of sophisticated technology by criminals to avoid
detection; and (6) the absence of a single designated entity to act as the
lead or coordination authority on information/ intelligence matters.

A number of other sources have attempted to assess and quantify the threat
posed by international crime. For example, the President?s December 1999
National Security Strategy For a New Century 4 identified international
crime- such as terrorism and drug trafficking- as a threat to U. S.
interests. The strategy outlined a number of actions, including the
deployment of interagency teams to respond to terrorist incidents, designed
to counter such crime.

4 The National Security Strategy is required annually by section 603 of the
GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P. L. 99-
433). Other Sources Assess

Threat Posed by International Crime

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 35 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Also, a December 2000 report by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) 5
-titled Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment
Experts- concluded that between now and 2015, one of the three main
challenges facing countries would be to combat criminal networks and their
growing reach. The report noted that criminal organizations would become
increasingly adept at exploiting the global diffusion of information, as
well as financial and transportation networks. As an example of criminal
activity, the report estimated that corruption costs about $500 billion
annually- the equivalent of about 1 percent of global gross national
product- in slower growth, reduced foreign investment, and lower profits.

The April 2000 Phase II Report on a U. S. National Security Strategy for the
21st Century, issued by the United States Commission on National Security/
21st Century, 6 noted that international criminality- such as terrorism and
drug trafficking- affected the global environment in which the United States
acted. The report concluded that it was in the significant interest of the
United States that international criminality be minimized.

A 1999 UN report- Global Report on Crime and Justice- estimated the extent
of a variety of international crimes, such as the theft of art and
antiquities ($ 4.5 billion to $6 billion annually) and theft of intellectual
property, such as software ($ 7.5 billion annually). In a related matter,
the UN has initiated a 5- year project (Sept. 1999 to Aug. 2004) to assess
the activities of organized crime groups worldwide and the level of danger
that these groups pose to society.

5 NIC is comprised of senior experts from the intelligence community and
outside of government. The experts are to concentrate on the substantive
problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of functional
areas, such as economics and weapons proliferation. NIC provides information
to assist policymakers as they pursue foreign policy priorities.

6 The congressionally mandated Commission was established by the Defense
Department to provide the first comprehensive review of the national
security environment, processes, and organizations since the National
Security Act of 1947. The Commission?s mandate was to identify threats
emerging early in the 21st century and to recommend changes to the national
security structure to meet those threats.

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 36 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Congressional testimony by various intelligence and law enforcement
officials has also highlighted the threat posed by international crime. For
example, in a February 2001 statement on the worldwide threat before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Director of Central
Intelligence stressed that terrorism and drug trafficking, among other
things, posed a real, immediate, and evolving threat to the United States.
The Director also added that these two threats were intertwined since, in
some instances, profits from drug trafficking funded terrorist operations. 7
Testimony in April 1998 by the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations indicated that international crime posed an immediate and
increasing concern for the United States and the worldwide law enforcement
community. 8 Furthermore, at a March 2000 hearing before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 9 on the impact of organized crime
and corruption on democratic and economic

7 See Statement by Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, before
the Senate Select Committee on the ?Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security
in a Changing World,? (Feb. 7, 2001).

8 See Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, on International Crime before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Senate Committee on Appropriations, (Apr. 21, 1998).

9 See Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
106th Congress, 2nd Session, ?The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption
on Democratic and Economic Reform? (CSCE106- 2- 7, Mar. 23, 2000), U. S.
Government Printing Office (Washington, D. C.: 2000). CSCE is a joint House-
Senate independent government agency created in 1976 to encourage and
monitor the implementation of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act (also known as the
?Helsinki Accords?), especially in the areas of human rights and
democratization. Congressional

Testimony on International Crime Threat

Appendix III: Extent of International Crime Page 37 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

reform, several witnesses commented, among other things, that organized
crime and corruption were significant threats to the political, economic,
and social stability of countries in Southeast Europe and Central Asia.

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 38 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

In response to our inquiry, as shown in table 3, the National Security
Council (NSC) identified 34 federal entities- including cabinet- level
departments and their components, and independent agencies- that it
considered as having significant roles in combating international crime. NSC
cautioned that its compilation of federal entities was not intended to be
exhaustive.

Table 3: Federal Entities With Significant Roles in Combating International
Crime Federal entity

 Department of State

 Department of the Treasury

 Department of Defense

 Department of Justice

 Department of Agriculture

 Department of Commerce

 Department of Labor

 Department of Transportation

 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

 Office of Management and Budget

 United States Trade Representative

 Office of National Drug Control Policy

 Central Intelligence Agency

 NSC

 U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

 Federal Reserve

 Joint Chiefs of Staff

 United States Coast Guard

 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

 National Security Agency

 Defense Intelligence Agency

 Customs Service

 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

 Marshals Service

 Secret Service

 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

 Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

 Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

 United States Army

 United States Navy

 United States Marine Corps

 United States Air Force

 Securities and Exchange Commission

 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 39 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Note: Beginning with the Department of State and ending with DEA, entities
are listed in accordance with NSC?s order of protocol. The Marshals Service
through FinCEN are not listed in any particular order.

Source: NSC.

Given the large number of federal entities with a role in international
crime (detailed in table 3), as agreed with the requester, this appendix
presents an overview of the role of selected federal entities in responding
to international crime and the coordination of the response. The specific
federal entities are the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and State; USAID;
and their respective components. NSC- as directed by Presidential Decision
Directive 42 (PDD- 42), discussed in appendix II- is to serve as the overall
coordinator of the federal response to international crime. Because the
focus of our work was limited to these particular entities, the information
in this appendix does not reflect the full extent of the federal response.
However, this appendix presents a number of examples to illustrate the
federal response to specific types of international criminal activity (such
as terrorism) and at particular physical locations (such as ports of entry).

Department of Justice components that have roles in addressing international
crime include the Criminal Division, FBI, DEA, INS, the U. S. National
Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization (USNCB/
INTERPOL), and the U. S. Marshals Service.

Justice?s Criminal Division is responsible for developing, enforcing, and
supervising the application of all federal criminal laws except for those
specifically assigned to other divisions. Fourteen offices or sections
within the Criminal Division have responsibilities for international crime
or other related activities, as table 4 indicates. All sensitive federal
international criminal matters are coordinated through the Criminal
Division. According to a Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, responding to international crime is an increasingly critical
responsibility for the Criminal Division. In this regard, in a 1999 speech,
the then Assistant Attorney General stated that well over half his time was
devoted to issues and cases that have foreign policy and national security
implications. Furthermore, according to the Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, while precise estimates are difficult, over the past few years,
about 40 to 50 percent of the Division?s workload has been associated with
international crime matters. Examples of the Criminal Division?s workload
related to international crime include Department of Justice

and Its Components Criminal Division

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 40 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 prosecuting cases involving international crime- such as organized crime,
drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism- often in
cooperation with U. S. Attorneys? Offices;

 negotiating- in cooperation with State and other departments- and
implementing bilateral and multilateral treaties with other countries, such
as agreements for mutual legal assistance and maritime boarding agreements,
and the recent United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime; and

 providing training and other technical assistance to the law enforcement
and justice sectors of foreign countries.

Table 4: Types of International Crimes or Activities Handled by Sections or
Offices in Justice?s Criminal Division Criminal Division section or office
Type of international crime or activity

Alien Smuggling Task Force  Alien smuggling Asset Forfeiture and Money
Laundering Section  Asset forfeiture

 Money laundering Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section  Child
pornography

 International parental kidnapping

 Sex tourism

 Trafficking of women and children Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section  Computer/ high- tech crime

 International intellectual property rights

 Mutual legal assistance requests in electronic evidence cases

 Treaties in the high- tech area Fraud Section  Bank fraud

 Internet fraud

 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

 Mail fraud

 Securities fraud

 Wire fraud Internal Security Section  Espionage

 National security International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program  International law enforcement training programs

 Law enforcement institutional development Narcotic and Dangerous Drug
Section  Controlled substance offenses

 Drug trafficking organizations Office of International Affairs 
Extraditions (for all federal and state crimes)

 Mutual legal assistance requests/ treaties (for all federal and state
crimes)

 Negotiation of international law enforcement treaties, conventions, and
agreements Office of Overseas Development, Assistance and Training  Justice
sector technical assistance Office of Special Investigations  Crimes
against humanity (jurisdiction over immigration aspects)

 World War II- era war crimes Organized Crime and Racketeering Section 
Organized crime Public Integrity Section  Campaign financing

 Public corruption Terrorism and Violent Crime Section  Crimes against
humanity (criminal jurisdiction)

 Genocide

 International kidnapping

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 41 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal Division section or office Type of international crime or activity

 Terrorism

 Torture

 War crimes Source: Department of Justice, Criminal Division.

The FBI is Justice?s principal investigative arm and is charged with
investigating all violations of federal law, except for those assigned by
statute to another agency. According to the FBI Director, the Bureau?s
response to international crime consists of three key elements- maintaining
an active overseas presence, training foreign law enforcement officers, and
facilitating institution building. Within this context, the FBI identified
five of its components as having roles in responding to international crime.
These components are (1) Criminal Investigative Division, (2) International
Training Assistance Units, (3) National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), (4) International Operations Section, and (5) the International
Terrorism Operations Section.

Examples of the international crime initiatives undertaken by FBI components
include the following:

 Project ?Millennium.? The FBI and law enforcement agencies from 23 other
countries have provided INTERPOL with the names and profiles of thousands of
subjects involved in Eurasian organized crime in order to establish a
worldwide database. The database is intended to allow participating
countries to cross- reference and coordinate leads involving Russian and
Eastern European organized crime members.

 U. S.- Mexico Fugitive Initiative. This initiative- involving the FBI,
Justice, and the government of Mexico- is designed to improve procedures for
obtaining provisional arrest warrants for fugitives who have fled to the
United States from Mexico.

 Plan Colombia. Under the umbrella of this broad- ranging initiative, the
FBI and Justice are assisting Colombia in developing a program to
investigate kidnappings. The program includes establishing a Colombian law
enforcement task force consisting of specially trained investigators. The
task force is intended to work with the FBI when appropriate, such as when
cases involve U. S. nationals.

 Middle Eastern Law Enforcement Training Center. The Center is a joint law
enforcement training initiative between the FBI and the Dubai, United Arab
Emirate police department. The Center- funded entirely by the Emirate?s
government- is being established to address transnational/ cross- border
crimes within the Middle East region; according to FBI, these crimes have an
impact on the United States. Working with police officials in the region,
the FBI identified a number of Federal Bureau of

Investigation

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 42 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

crime issues to be addressed by the Center?s training, including corruption,
counterterrorism, organized crime, money laundering, drugs, cybercrime, and
illegal immigation.

DEA is responsible for enforcing the federal drug control laws and is the
single point of contact for coordinating international drug investigations
for the United States in foreign countries. DEA?s primary responsibilities
include investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and
international levels and working on drug law enforcement programs with its
counterparts in foreign countries. According to DEA, targeting international
drug trafficking organizations and their direct affiliates is one of its
highest priorities. In July 1999, we reported on the major enforcement
strategies, programs, initiatives, and approaches that DEA implemented in
the 1990s to carry out its mission, including efforts to target and
investigate national and international drug traffickers. 1

According to DEA, four of its components have roles in responding to
international crime: (1) the Office of International Operations; (2) the
Office of Domestic Operations; (3) the Financial Operations Section, which
deals with money laundering; and (4) the Office of Training, which trains
drug enforcement officials in other countries. These components are involved
in implementing provisions of the National Drug Control Strategy. These
provisions entail, among other things, the implementation of interdiction
and international programs. For example, DEA participates in the Southwest
Border Initiative- a cooperative law enforcement effort- to combat Mexico-
based drug trafficking along the U. S.- Mexico border. Internationally, DEA
is involved in counternarcotics efforts with the governments of Bolivia,
Colombia, Peru, and Thailand, among others.

INS is charged with the administration and enforcement of U. S. immigration
laws, including facilitating entry of those legally admissible into the
United States and deterring the entry of those seeking to enter illegally.
According to INS, four components within its Office of Field Operations have
roles in responding to international crime. These components are (1) the
Office of International Affairs; (2) the Office of Intelligence; (3) the
Investigations Division, including the Smuggling and Criminal Organizations
Branch, the INS component of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force, the National Security Unit, and the

1 Drug Control: DEA?s Strategies and Operations in the 1990s (GAO/ GGD- 99-
108, July 21, 1999). Drug Enforcement

Administration Immigration and Naturalization Service

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 43 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Fraud Section; and (4) the Border Patrol. Examples of the international
crime initiatives undertaken by these components include the following:

 National Border Patrol Strategic Plan. In effect since 1994, this is the
Border Patrol?s attempt to deter illegal entries into the United States
between ports of entry.

 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative. This is an interagency
initiative to assist Southeastern European countries with, among other
things, combating cross- border crime as it relates to alien smuggling.

 Nigerian Crime Initiative. This interagency initiative is intended to
ensure the sharing of intelligence and providing training on Nigerian
criminal enterprises and removing Nigerian criminal aliens from the United
States.

 Operation ?Crossroads.? This is an interdiction operation being conducted
along the Southwest Border in the Arizona Corridor (the area between Phoenix
and Tucson, Arizona). The operation has branches stretching into Mexico and
Central America.

The U. S. National Central Bureau (USNCB) of the International Criminal
Police Organization- as the U. S. component of the broader INTERPOL network-
is intended as a point of contact for American and foreign police seeking
assistance in criminal investigations that extend beyond their national
boundaries. USNCB?s staff is composed of representatives from various
federal law enforcement entities, including Customs, ATF, Marshals Service,
and DEA. In addition to providing operational coordination and training at
the international, federal, and state level, examples of the services USNCB
provides and the projects it is involved in include the following:

 International Notice Program. USNCB disseminates subject lookouts and
advisories through the circulation of INTERPOL notices. The colorcoded
notices communicate various kinds of criminal information. For example, the
Red Notice (International Wanted Notice) informs member countries that a
warrant has been issued for a person whose arrest is requested with a view
to subsequent extradition.

 Project ?Rockers.? This 28- country INTERPOL project is targeting outlaw
motorcycle organizations involved in criminal activities. The project?s main
objective is to identify the organizations and their membership and to
collect information on their criminality for analysis and dissemination to
affected countries.

The Marshals Service is responsible for, among other things, apprehending
federal fugitives and maintaining custody of and transporting federal U. S.
National Central

Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization

U. S. Marshals Service

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 44 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

prisoners. The International Investigations Unit, within the Investigative
Services Division, has responsibility over international crime matters.
Specifically, according to a Marshals Service official, this unit is
responsible for (1) apprehending fugitives (foreign and international), 2
(2) escorting extradited international fugitives back to the United States,
and (3) training foreign police officers. For example, according to this
official, the Marshals Service trains foreign police officers in
investigating and apprehending fugitives. The training is held in the United
States and is funded by the State Department.

Treasury components that have roles in addressing international crime.
include the Office of Enforcement; the U. S. Customs Service; ATF; the U. S.
Secret Service; IRS Criminal Investigation (IRS- CI); the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC); FinCEN; and the Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC).

Treasury?s Office of Enforcement has responsibility for several functions
that relate to international crime control. These functions include

 coordinating all Treasury law enforcement matters, including formulation
of law enforcement policies;

 providing oversight, monitoring, and/ or guidance to Treasury enforcement
bureaus- Customs, ATF, Secret Service, IRS- CI, and FLETC- and FinCEN;

 ensuring cooperation between Treasury law enforcement and other federal
departments and agencies; and

 negotiating international agreements to engage in joint law enforcement
operations and exchange financial information and records.

Within its dual missions of enforcing laws and regulating commercial
activities, Customs has significant responsibilities for ensuring that goods
and persons enter and exit the United States legally. Within these missions,
Customs? strategic plan 3 identifies specific goals and objectives

-such as disrupting the illegal flow of drugs and money- that are linked to
international crime.

2 According to a Marshals Service official, a foreign fugitive is one who
has committed a crime in another country and has fled to the United States.
An international fugitive is one who has committed a crime in the United
States and has fled to other parts of the world.

3 U. S. Customs Service: Strategic Plan (Fiscal Years 2000- 2005).
Department of the

Treasury and Its Components

Office of Enforcement U. S. Customs Service

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 45 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Three of Customs? principal components have a role in responding to
international crime. These components are (1) the Office of Investigations;
(2) the Office of International Affairs, and (3) the Office of Field
Operations. Within these offices, a number of divisions and other units have
roles in responding to international crime. According to Customs, within the
Office of Investigations, 10 divisions are actively involved in responding
to various types of international crime. The divisions are (1) Investigative
Services, (2) Covert Operations, (3) Special Operations, (4) Financial
Investigations, (5) Fraud Investigations, (6) Strategic Investigations, (7)
CyberSmuggling, (8) Smuggling Investigations, (9) Intelligence, and (10) Air
and Marine.

Within the Office of International Affairs, three units have a role in
responding to international crime. The units are the (1) Operations
Division, (2) the Training and Assistance Division, and (3) the Policy and
Programs Division. Within the Office of Field Operations, three units have
roles in responding to international crime-( 1) Outbound Enforcement Team,
(2) Anti- Smuggling Division, and (3) Trade Programs.

Examples of international crime initiatives undertaken by various Customs
components include the following:

 Industry Partnership Programs. These programs- the Carrier Initiative
Program, the Business Anti- Smuggling Coalition, and the Americas Counter
Smuggling Initiative (training program)- are designed to deter and prevent
narcotics from being smuggled into the United States via commercial cargo
and conveyances. These programs are also designed to enlist industry support
in activities related to narcotics interdiction.

 Border Coordination Initiative. This initiative is a border management
strategy involving Customs, INS, the U. S. Coast Guard, and the U. S.
Department of Agriculture. The initiative is intended to increase
cooperation among federal entities along the Southwest border of the United
States to more efficiently interdict illegal aliens, drugs, and other
contraband. The initiative has six core parts, including developing joint
port management and community partnership plans.

ATF enforces federal laws and regulations relating to firearms, explosives,
arson, alcohol, and tobacco. ATF units that have international crime
responsibilities are (1) the International Programs Branch, (2) the Alcohol
and Tobacco Diversion Branch, and (3) the International Training Branch. ATF
has a number of international crime- related responsibilities and
initiatives. For example, ATF?s Traffic in Arms Program is an enforcement
effort to combat the illegal movement of U. S.- source firearms, explosives,
and ammunition in international traffic. Also, ATF traces U. S. alcohol and
Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 46 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

tobacco products recovered in foreign countries to identify individuals and/
or organized crime groups involved in the purchase and smuggling of these
items. In this regard, ATF assists foreign countries by assessing their tax
systems as they relate to alcohol and tobacco products and educating foreign
officials in how such products are regulated in the United States. ATF?s
National Tracing Center helps foreign law enforcement trace U. S. sourced
crime firearms. According to ATF, this trace information enables it to
identify and target subjects responsible for illegally trafficking firearms
in the United States.

Furthermore, ATF?s International Response Team is the result of an agreement
with the State Department?s Diplomatic Security Service. The agreement
originally provided for ATF investigative assistance at fire and post- blast
scenes on U. S. property abroad, where the Diplomatic Security Service has
investigative responsibility. The agreement has since been expanded to
include responses in which ATF would provide technical/ forensic assistance
and oversight in arson and explosives investigations to foreign governments
on their territory. Such requests for assistance are to be relayed to ATF
through the Department of State, after receiving authorization from the U.
S. ambassador of the affected country.

The Secret Service carries out two distinct missions: protection and
criminal investigations. The investigative mission expanded from enforcement
of U. S. counterfeiting statutes to include other financial crimes, such as
financial institution fraud, computer fraud, financial identity theft,
access device fraud, and computer- based attacks against the national?s
financial, banking, and telecommunications infrastructure. According to the
Secret Service, these types of crimes have become increasingly international
in nature, given the seamless interaction among monetary and economic
systems around the world. Within the Secret Service?s Office of
Investigations, the following branches and divisions have roles in combating
international crime: (1) International Programs Branch, (2) Financial Crimes
Division, (3) Counterfeit Division, (4) Forensic Services Division, and (5)
Investigative Support Division.

In its strategic plan for fiscal years 2000- 2005, 4 the Secret Service
established an investigative strategic goal of reducing crimes against the
nation?s currency and financial system. The goal comprises four strategic
objectives, all of which have a link to international crime: (1) reduce

4 U. S. Secret Service: Strategic Plan (FY 2000- 2005). U. S. Secret Service

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 47 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

losses from financial crime, (2) reduce transnational financial crime, (3)
enhance foreign and domestic partnerships, and (4) support the protective
mission. To meet these objectives, the Secret Service is engaged in a number
of activities. Examples of these activities include implementing the
International Currency Audit Plan. Under this plan, the Secret Service-
along with representatives from the Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York- are to
study the use of foreign currency abroad and develop estimates of
counterfeiting levels outside the United States. Also, through the use of
specialized task forces- such as the West African Task Force and the Asian
Organized Crime Task Force- the Secret Service is targeting international
organized crime groups and the proceeds of their criminal enterprises.

IRS- CI?s mission is to investigate violations of the Internal Revenue Code
and related financial crimes, such as money laundering, in order to enhance
deterrence and compliance with tax laws. According to IRS- CI, tax evasion
and money laundering are closely related and can involve similar activities.
Money laundering can usually be considered as tax evasion in progress
because illicit funds are rarely reported on subsequent tax returns. With
the globalization of the world economy and financial systems, many of the
complex evasion and money laundering schemes are employing international
components, such as offshore banks, trusts, and corporations in ?tax haven?
countries. Although IRS- CI does not have specific jurisdiction over
international crimes, the complex evasion and money laundering schemes
require it to document evidence of the international movement of funds.

According to IRS- CI, its International Strategy complements the overall U.
S. strategy to combat the growing trend of international financial crimes.
In this regard, IRS- CI participates in the Financial Action Task Force for
Money Laundering (FATF). 5 IRS- CI assists FATF in the development and
implementation of strategies and laws that are intended to deter
international financial crimes and enhance compliance with U. S. tax laws.

5 FATF was established in 1989 by the G- 7 summit in Paris in response to
then growing concern over money laundering. FATF?s mission includes
monitoring the implementation of the ?Forty Recommendations,? a set of
countermeasures that the task force designed to be used against money
laundering. The recommendations cover the criminal justice system and law
enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and international
cooperation. FATF has 29 countries- such as Canada, Germany, Hong Kong,
Turkey, and the United States- and 2 regional organizations- the European
Commission and the Gulf Co- operation Council- as members. Internal Revenue
Service

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 48 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

As part of its international strategy, IRS- CI assigns special agents
(attaches) in foreign posts that it considers ?strategic,? such as Canada,
China, Colombia, Germany, and Mexico. The attaches are responsible for,
among other things, assisting IRS- CI special agents in gathering and
developing foreign evidence related to investigations under IRS- CI?s
jurisdiction and training host government personnel on financial
investigative techniques. In this regard, as part of Plan Colombia
(discussed earlier), IRS- CI is providing financial investigation training
to Colombian law enforcement officials and prosecutors.

FLETC serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for
more than 70 federal agencies. FLETC also provides services to state, local,
and international law enforcement agencies. In its strategic plan, 6 FLETC
noted that training must be closely linked to changing law enforcement
challenges, issues, and needs. For one area of change- the nature of crime
itself- FLETC identified three types of internationalrelated crime that law
enforcement training must address: terrorism (both foreign and domestic
groups), internet- related crime (including money laundering), and organized
crime (including foreign organizations).

In an effort to help combat international- related crime, FLETC offers a
range of training programs to foreign law enforcement agencies. Most of
these programs are offered at FLETC?s training campuses. Some are exportable
to user locations or are available at respective International Law
Enforcement Academies (ILEA). Under agreement with the Department of State
and administered by FLETC?s International Programs Division, this training
focuses on the following three areas:

 Law and democracy. Current initiatives under the United States Law and
Democracy Program provide technical assistance and training to law
enforcement personnel in Russia, Ukraine, and other Eastern European and
Central Asian countries. The program funds training to combat whitecollar
crime, financial and computer crimes, and illegal narcotics trafficking. The
program also supports human rights, free market economies, and the building
of democratic systems and institutions.

 Antiterrorism assistance. The antiterrorism training programs conducted by
FLETC and funded by the Department of State?s Office of Antiterrorism
Assistance provide technical assistance and training to foreign law
enforcement in an effort to combat world terrorism.

6 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC): Strategic Plan (2000-
2005). Federal Law Enforcement

Training Center

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 49 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 International academies. The ILEAs in Hungary, Thailand, and Botswana
offer opportunities for foreign prosecutors, police, and criminal
investigators to interact with their U. S. counterparts. U. S. trainers
share operational methods, investigative techniques, criminal trends, and
current law enforcement issues with foreign law enforcement personnel. While
FLETC provides support for the efforts of all of the ILEAs, it has lead
responsibility for the Botswana academy and will also be responsible for a
fourth academy planned for Central America.

FinCEN?s mission is to (1) support law enforcement investigative efforts and
foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and international
financial crimes; and (2) provide U. S. policymakers with strategic analyses
of domestic and worldwide money- laundering developments, trends, and
patterns. Within its overall mission, FinCEN?s strategic plan 7 identifies a
number of strategic objectives, including preventing, detecting, and
prosecuting money laundering and other financial crimes; and establishing
and strengthening mechanisms for the global exchange of information to
combat money laundering and other financial crimes.

Regarding international cooperation, FinCEN is to work closely with other
components of the U. S. government and its global partners to counter the
threat of transnational crime to financial institutions and governments.
FinCEN activities include, for example, the following:

 Developing Financial Intelligence Units. FinCEN supports the development
of Financial Intelligence Units in other nations to help facilitate the
exchange of information in support of anti- money laundering investigations.
These units- of which FinCEN is one model- have been established in various
countries around the world to protect the banking community, detect criminal
abuse of the financial system, and ensure adherence to laws against
financial crime.

 Implementing the National Money Laundering Strategy. FinCEN supports
Treasury?s initiatives highlighted in the 2000 National Money Laundering
Strategy. 8 Among other things, these initiatives include providing training
and assistance to nations implementing counter- money laundering measures.
FinCEN also plans to expand support of Treasury

7 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: 2000- 2005 Strategic Plan. 8 The
National Money Laundering Strategy was developed jointly by Treasury and
Justice (the Criminal Division?s Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering
Section). Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 50 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

initiatives concerning (1) efforts to identify those international
jurisdictions that pose a money laundering threat to the United States and
(2) expertise and analysis related to correspondent banking and offshore
financial services.

 Participating in the Financial Action Task Force. FinCEN supports
Treasury?s efforts to promote the adoption of international anti- money
laundering standards, such as those of the FATF. Formed by the G- 7 Economic
Summit of 1989, 9 the FATF is dedicated to promoting the development of
effective anti- money laundering controls and enhanced cooperation in
counter- money laundering efforts among its membership around the world. 10

Created in 1950, OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions
against targeted foreign countries, terrorism sponsoring organizations, and
international narcotics traffickers in accordance with U. S. foreign policy
and national security goals. In its role, OFAC acts under Presidential
wartime and national emergency powers to impose controls on transactions and
freeze foreign assets under U. S. jurisdiction. Such sanctions are designed
to immobilize assets and deny the targeted country, groups, or individuals
access to the U. S. financial system and the benefits of trade and
transactions involving U. S. businesses and individuals. Examples of OFAC?s
activities include administering prohibitions contained in congressionally
mandated programs involving terrorism and narcotics- these include those
required by the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, P.
L. 104- 132 and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, P. L. 106-
120, Title VIII.

The State Department?s role in addressing international crime is both
diplomatic and programmatic. In carrying out this role, the State
Department?s primary focal point for all international narcotics and
international criminal matters is the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). For drug control
and anticrime issues, the Department?s Bureau of International Organization
Affairs works with INL in coordinating interactions with agencies of the
United Nations system. Furthermore, State?s geographic

9 The Group of Seven (G- 7) originated in 1975 to provide a forum for
discussion of economic issues among the leading industrialized nations-
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. In 1998, the name was changed to G- 8 when Russia was integrated
into the group.

10 In addition to Treasury components, Justice and State components also
participate in the Financial Action Task Force. Office of Foreign Assets

Control Department of State and Its Components

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Page 51 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

bureaus- such as the Bureau of European Affairs, and the Bureau of South
Asian Affairs- have responsibilities in guiding U. S. diplomatic operations
in their respective areas. The Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism- within the Office of the Secretary of State- is
responsible for the overall supervision of international counterterrorism
activities. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security manages multiple anticrime
efforts and, according to State, is the primary point of contact for host
nations? law enforcement entities in their efforts to work collaboratively
with the United States in combating international crime. The Office of the
Legal Adviser, in coordination with Justice?s Office of International
Affairs, is responsible for negotiating and bringing into force bilateral
and multilateral agreements that provide for the extradition of fugitives
and for assistance and cooperation by law enforcement authorities in
criminal cases in U. S. or foreign courts.

INL has broad responsibility for federal law enforcement policy and program
coordination in the international area. INL funds various bilateral and
multilateral international drug and crime control programs to accomplish its
goals and objectives. In this regard, INL administers an annual budget of
over $200 million in assistance- appropriated under annual Foreign
Operations bills- to foreign countries. INL played a central role in
developing the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy. In 1999, INL
organized and coordinated the Vice President?s Global Forum on Fighting
Corruption. This effort included participants from 90 nations and various
multilateral and nongovernmental organizations. Since that time, INL has
continued to coordinate a number of international anticorruption initiatives
and activities.

According to State, INL?s most important initiative in terms of funding is
counternarcotics assistance in support of Plan Colombia, a combination of
interdiction, eradication, and alternative development as well as rule of
law and development assistance. State has sent to the Congress a proposal
entitled the Regional Andean Initiative which expands key parts of Plan
Colombia, primarily the rule of law and economic development portions, to
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

Regarding future initiatives, INL plans to pursue efforts to establish an
ILEA for Central/ South America, in addition to those already established in
Budapest, Bangkok, and Gaborone (Botswana). According to INL, due to endemic
widespread poverty, weak police and judicial infrastructure, and
governmental corruption, Africa is a fertile ground for a growing
international crime threat. A new graduate- level facility is set to open in
Roswell, New Mexico, in September 2001. Bureau for International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

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Page 52 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

A second initiative is to establish a reserve of up to 2,000 civilian police
officers, similar in concept to the National Guard. According to INL, the
United States currently contributes over 700 civilian police officers
worldwide to international law enforcement operations. INL is to respond to
requests by directing a contractor to recruit, select, and train U. S. law
enforcement personnel for missions. In this endeavor, police officers are to
volunteer but remain in their regular jobs until called for active duty. A
third initiative involves the creation of an interagency Migrant Smuggling
and Trafficking in Persons Coordination Center designed to develop
strategies and coordinate intelligence and other information.

The Bureau of International Organization Affairs is charged with developing
and implementing the policies of the U. S. government with respect to the
United Nations and its affiliated agencies, as well as within certain other
international organizations. The Bureau is to engage in what is known as
multilateral diplomacy to promote and defend the various overlapping
interests of the American people. More specifically, with respect to
international crime- related issues, the Bureau is to support efforts in the
areas of

 nonproliferation, nuclear safeguard, arms control, and efforts to combat
terrorism, organized crime, and narcotics trafficking;

 democratic principles and the rule of law in government and politics; and

 human rights, including the advancement of women?s rights. On a less
global scale, State?s geographically defined bureaus- for Africa, East Asia
and the Pacific, Europe, the Near East, South Asia, the Western Hemisphere,
and the New Independent States 11 -are to guide the operation of the U. S.
diplomatic missions within their regional jurisdiction. These bureaus are to
work closely with U. S. embassies and consulates overseas and with foreign
embassies in Washington, D. C. Unlike the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs- which engages in multilateral diplomacy- the
geographic bureaus are to coordinate the conduct of bilateral foreign
relations. For example:

11 Although it functions as a geographic bureau, the New Independent States
is located separately under the authority of the Office of the Special
Advisor for the New Independent States. This office is responsible for
developing, coordinating, and implementing U. S. foreign policy in the 12
countries of Eurasia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Bureau of
International

Organization Affairs Geographic Bureaus

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
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Page 53 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 Europe. The Bureau of European Affairs 12 is responsible for developing,
coordinating, and implementing U. S. foreign policy on a variety of issues
dealing with national security, economic prosperity, democracy, human
rights, protection of the environment, halting the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and combating terrorism and international crime. A key
policy goal is the establishment of an integrated system to enhance regional
stability and security, involving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
cooperation with Russia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union, and the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe.

 Western Hemisphere. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is
responsible for managing and promoting U. S. interests in the region by
supporting democracy, trade, and sustainable economic development, and
fostering cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking and crime, poverty
reduction, and environmental protection. A key initiative supported by the
Bureau is ?Plan Colombia?- an integrated strategy for promoting the peace
process, combating the narcotics industry, reviving the Colombian economy,
and strengthening Colombia?s democratic society.

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has the primary
responsibility for developing, coordinating, and implementing U. S.
international counterterrorism policy. The office chairs the Interagency
Working Group for Counterterrorism- to develop and coordinate policy- and
State?s own task force on counterterrorism to coordinate the response to
international terrorist incidents that are in progress. 13 According to
State, in order to ensure better interagency coordination, officers from the
FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency are detailed to the office. In
addition, the office coordinates U. S. government efforts to improve
counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments, including the policy
and planning of State?s Antiterrorism Assistance Program. This program is
intended to provide assistance, including training and

12 According to State, as of July 2, 2001, the Bureau of European Affairs
was merged with that of the New Independent States to form the Bureau of
European and Eurasian Affairs. 13 The Interagency Working Group for
Counterterrorism is sponsored by NSC. The group oversees a number of
subgroups that coordinate certain terrorism- related research and
development activities, exercises, international consequence management, and
transportation security. In addition to State, members of the group include
the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, Transportation, and the
Treasury; also, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Aviation
Administration, the FBI, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (within Defense).
Office of the Coordinator

for Counterterrorism

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 54 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

equipment, to foreign countries to enhance the ability of their law
enforcement personnel to deter terrorism and terrorist groups from engaging
in international terrorist acts.

In addition to its security and protection roles both domestically and
abroad, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security is responsible for the
investigation of passport and visa fraud, which are often linked to the
movement of international criminals. The Buraeu also coordinates State?s
anti- terrorism and anticrime ?Rewards? efforts; coordinates investigative
leads overseas for State and other U. S. federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies; and provides anti- terrorism training to both U. S.
and foreign government law enforcement agencies.

USAID has a twofold purpose of furthering U. S. foreign policy interests in
expanding democracy and free markets, while improving the lives of the
citizens of the developing world. In doing this, USAID is the principal U.
S. agency to provide assistance to countries recovering from disaster,
trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. Although USAID
is an independent federal government agency, it receives overall foreign
policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

With respect to narcotics and crime control, USAID is responsible for
designing and implementing development assistance programs- for example,
assistance to drug- producing countries to diversify their economies away
from dependency on illegal drugs and towards open market economies. In the
short term, USAID is responsible for alleviating the economic and social
dislocation resulting from successful drug control programs. In the longer
run, USAID?s mandate includes strengthening democratic institutions and the
respect for human rights. USAID sponsors anti- drug education programs
designed to build institutions overseas to address the growing problem of
drug abuse. USAID also funds justice programs to strengthen host nation
capability to prosecute criminal cases in court and to develop and implement
laws to deter criminal elements.

USAID identified four of its bureaus and five of their components- offices
or centers- and its Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as having roles in
combating various types of international crime. The four bureaus (and their
relevant offices or centers) are the (1) Bureau for Policy and Program
Coordination (which includes the Office of Program Coordination and the
Office of Policy Development and Coordination); (2) Bureau for Global
Programs (which includes the Center for Democracy and Governance and the
Center for Economic Growth); (3) Bureau for Europe and Eurasia; and Bureau
of Diplomatic

Security U. S. Agency for International Development

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 55 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

(4) Bureau for Humanitarian Response (which includes the Office of
Transitional Initiatives). The Center for Democracy and Governance is an
example representative of USAID?s efforts against international crime.

To further support and advance USAID?s democracy and governance program, the
Center for Democracy and Governance was founded in May 1994. The Center is
to help USAID field missions design and implement democracy strategies,
provide technical and intellectual leadership in the field of democracy
development, and manage some USAID programs directly. The Center is
organized along the lines of USAID?s strategic framework for democracy and
governance. The framework has four objectives: (1) rule of law
(strengthening legal systems); (2) elections and political processes
(conducting elections and developing political parties and educating
voters); (3) civil society (promoting a politically active civil society);
and (4) governance (promoting accountable and transparent government
institutions).

Under the rule of law objective, the Center?s efforts to strengthen legal
systems- in conjunction with the activities of USAID missions- fall under
three interconnected priority areas, each of which is to integrate human
rights concerns: supporting legal reform, improving the administration of
justice, and increasing citizens? access to justice. For example, the Center
is represented on an advisory committee, which was established to enhance
interagency communication and coordination in the areas of police and
prosecutor training and development.

With respect to the governance objective, the Center is to concentrate on
the following five areas: legislative strengthening, decentralization and
democratic local governance, anticorruption, civil- military relations, and
improving policy implementation. For example, the Center has provided
financial support to Transparency International, a nongovernmental
organization dedicated to generating public support and action for
anticorruption programs and enhancing transparency and accountability in
governments worldwide. Overall, USAID has anticorruption activities in 54
countries; and the Center manages country- specific, anticorruption programs
valued at $19 million.

In addition to its efforts against corruption, USAID has activities that are
designed to address other types of international crime and support the 1998
International Crime Control Strategy. For example, to counter narcotics,
USAID has implemented ?alternative development? programs in several coca-
producing countries, such as Peru and Bolivia. Such Center for Democracy and

Governance USAID Efforts Against Other Types of International Crime

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 56 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

programs are intended to strengthen the coca- producing areas? licit
economies and improve their social and economic infrastructure. According to
USAID, since 1995, the areas used in Peru for coca cultivation have declined
by 70 percent. USAID also supports efforts against trafficking in precious
gems, violations of intellectual property rights, environmental crimes,
trafficking in women and children, and financial fraud. In addition, the
USAID OIG?s Investigations and Audit Divisions have investigated incidents
of financial fraud related to the agency?s developmental, humanitarian, and
reconstructive aid programs around the world. According to USAID, recent
successful OIG investigations of entities involved in financial fraud
related to USAID programs in the United States and overseas have resulted in
the recovery of more that $100 million in fines.

Discussed below are examples that illustrate the federal response to
specific types of international criminal activity- such as corruption and
terrorism- and at particular physical locations- such as ports of entry. The
federal response in these areas includes numerous entities within Justice,
Treasury, and State, as well as various other federal departments and
agencies.

Regarding specific types of international crime, in an earlier report, we
identified at least 35 federal entities- consisting of 7 cabinet- level
departments and 28 related agencies, bureaus, and offices- that had a role
in providing rule- of- law assistance to fight corruption during fiscal
years 1993 to 1998. 14 Appendix V provides a complete listing of the 35
federal entities.

In terms of the response to terrorism, we previously identified 43 federal
agencies, bureaus, and offices that have terrorism- related programs or
activities. 15 These entities included the departments of Justice, Treasury,
and State and their components (as discussed in this appendix), as well as
other federal entities such as NSC and the Central Intelligence Agency.

14 Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
1998 (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158, June 30, 1999). 15 Combating Terrorism: Spending
on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/
NSIAD- 98- 39, Dec. 1, 1997). Examples of the

Federal Response to Specific Types of International Crime and at Specific
Physical Locations Response to Specific Types of Criminal Activity

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 57 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

In August 2000, responding to an April 1999 Executive Memorandum from the
President, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S.
Seaports issued a report detailing, among other things, the missions and
authorities of federal entities handling crime at seaports. 16 Many of the
crimes cited by the Commission- such as terrorism and alien smuggling- fit
our definition of ?international crime.? On the basis of its review of 12 of
the 361 U. S. seaports, the Commission identified 10 federal departments, 25
of their components, and 6 other federal entities that are involved or
interested in seaport operations. Fifteen of these- including the
Departments of Treasury and State, 17 the FBI and Customs, and EPA- were
also identified as having jurisdiction over and a role in combating criminal
activity at the seaports reviewed.

Table 5 presents information about the types of criminal activity
encountered at seaports and the relevant federal (and state and local)
entities with jurisdiction over these activities.

Table 5: Jurisdiction for Criminal Activity at U. S. Seaports Criminal
activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Terrorism FBI, Coast Guard, Customs Service, INS, Treasury, ATF, and state/
local agencies Crime against shipping, piracy FBI, Coast Guard, ATF, and
state/ local agencies Smuggling (importation) strategic/ sensitive: Weapons
of mass destruction and components Controlled substances Arms and munitions
Monetary instruments Child pornography Counterfeit U. S. currency Precursor
and essential chemicals

Customs Service, FBI, DEA, ATF, Coast Guard, Secret Service, and state/
local agencies

Alien smuggling, unlawful entry, stowaways INS, Coast Guard, and FBI General
smuggling (importation): Art and artifacts Endangered species and wildlife
Chlorofluorocarbons Prohibited or restricted merchandise Commercial
merchandise and alcohol

Customs Service, FBI, Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA, Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), ATF, Coast Guard, and state/ local agencies

Cargo theft: Inside seaport

Customs Service, FBI, and state/ local agencies

16 Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S.
Seaports (Aug. 2000). 17 According to State, it has a policy role in a
number of the types of criminal activity, in addition to the one identified
by the Commission, namely ?smuggling (exportation).? Response to Criminal

Activity at Specific Physical Locations

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 58 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Customs custody Outside seaport Outside Customs custody Cargo control: False
manifesting Diversion Substitution

Customs Service, FDA, EPA, DEA, U. S. Department of Agriculture, and
Department of Commerce

Trade crime: Revenue fraud Intellectual property rights Textile
transshipment Antidumping/ countervailing duties Child, forced, or
indentured labor Trade agreements Country of origin marking

Customs Service, Department of Commerce, and FBI Other serious criminal
activity: Extortion Bribery Racketeering Racketeer influenced and corrupt
organizations Money laundering Tax evasion Alcohol and tobacco diversion

FBI, Customs Service, DEA, IRS, ATF, and state/ local agencies Health and
safety: Tainted foodstuffs and alcohol Pharmaceutical drugs Insects
Dangerous organisms

Customs Service, FDA, EPA, U. S. Department of Agriculture, FBI, DEA, Coast
Guard, and Fish and Wildlife Service

Environmental: Hazardous cargo Nonindigenous species Ballast water exchange
Deliberate discharge (pollution)

Coast Guard, EPA, FBI, Customs Service, and U. S. Department of Agriculture
Smuggling (exportation) strategic/ sensitive: Weapons of mass destruction
and components Ballistic delivery systems State- of- the- art critical
technology Military hardware and equipment Dual- use equipment Monetary
instruments Arms and munitions Precursor and essential chemicals

Customs Service, Department of Commerce, Department of State, DEA, ATF, FB
I, Coast Guard, and IRS

Smuggling (exportation): Stolen vehicles Stolen property Stolen securities
U. S. trade secrets Economic espionage

Customs Service, FBI, Coast Guard, and state/ local agencies Economic
sanctions and embargoes: Customs Service, Treasury, and Department of
Commerce

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 59 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Criminal activity Agencies with jurisdiction

Trading with the Enemy Act Other Bribery (government officials) The
official?s agency and the FBI Assault on federal officer The officer?s
agency and the FBI

Source: Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U. S.
Seaports (Aug. 2000).

We identified a group responsible for the executive- level coordination of
international crime. We also identified a number of coordination mechanisms
at the operational level focusing on specific types or aspects of
international crime, as well as particular geographic areas. Various
officials we contacted identified challenges involved in coordinating the
response to international crime. Our prior work has stressed the need for
sustained executive- level coordination of crosscutting efforts that address
national issues.

Regarding coordination of the overall federal response to international
crime, PDD- 42 established the Special Coordination Group on International
Crime (SCG) to ensure sustained and focused attention on international crime
fighting. The SCG was comprised of high- level officials from relevant
federal entities, including Justice, Treasury, and State and was chaired by
a senior NSC official. A number of subgroups- one for each of the types of
international crime enumerated in the crime control strategy- were also
formed. Because the SCG?s and its subgroups? proceedings- and any results
and products- are classified, they are not discussed in this report. 18
Separately within NSC, the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Counter- Terrorism- as Special Assistant to the President-
is intended to be responsible for interagency coordination on issues related
to international organized crime. 19 In addition, the Office of
Transnational Threats is intended to be the NSC point of contact on
international narcotics issues. According to an NSC

18 In commenting on a draft of this report, USAID noted that much of the
information discussed and exchanged by the SCG Sub- group on Diplomatic
Initiatives and Institutional Development was unclassified.

19 In addition to international organized crime, the National Coordinator is
responsible for interagency coordination on issues related to computer
security, protection of critical infrastructure assets, counter- terrorism,
continuity of government operations, national security special events, and
preparedness for and responses to the use of weapons of mass destruction,
including defense against chemical and biological weapons. Coordination of

Response to International Crime

Executive- Level Coordination of Response to International Crime

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 60 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

official, two NSC staff were assigned full- time to international crime
coordination matters.

In response to our review, a number of officials identified some challenges
faced by the SCG in implementing its role. For example, according to State
and NSC officials, the SCG was to meet periodically to discuss matters
related to the response to international crime. After meeting 14 times from
about mid- 1998 through mid- 1999, the SCG did not subsequently meet very
frequently. Specifically, according to an NSC official, the SCG did not meet
at all for almost 9 months- from about September 1999 to June 2000- in part
because some of its members were involved in other activities, such as
working on year 2000 computer compliance matters; and in part, because of
staffing shortages. According to this official, the SCG met four times each
in 1999 and 2000. This official also noted that the coordination of the
federal response to international crime- given its scope and number of
participants- could be further improved. In this regard, he stated that the
SCG had been a step in the right direction toward improving coordination and
had worked reasonably effectively in certain instances. Separately, USAID
officials pointed out that while SCG was an effective way to share
information among agencies, it lacked the authority to broker differences
between agencies or between headquarters and field units.

The SCG was abolished by National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD-
1)- which was issued in February 2001 by the new administration- and the
directive did not designate a specific successor at that time. In addition,
absent naming a successor for the SCG, the directive did not identify which
of the 17 geographic and functional Policy Coordination Committees (PCC) it
established were to handle coordination of federal efforts against
international crime. 20 Subsequently, as discussed briefly in appendix II,
in April 2001, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs-
as part of the Bush administration?s ongoing review of international crime,
terrorism, and critical infrastructure- established a PCC for International
Organized Crime. This PCC is to be comprised of officials at the Assistant
Secretary level from relevant federal entities and is to be chaired by the
NSC Senior

20 According to NSPD- 1, the PCCs are to be the main day- to- day entities
for interagency coordination of national security policy. These committees
would be responsible for managing the development and implementation of
national security policies by multiple agencies of the U. S. government.
Geographic PCCs include those for the Western Hemisphere and the Near East/
North Africa. Functional PCCs include those for international development
and humanitarian assistance and arms control.

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 61 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Director for Transnational Threats. The PCC is intended to coordinate policy
formulation, program oversight, and new initiatives related to a number of
international crime issues not directly related to counterterrorism,
including arms trafficking, trafficking in women and children, and foreign
official corruption. 21 According to an NSC official, as its first task, the
PCC is expected to evaluate the 1998 International Crime Control Strategy to
reflect changes in the threat from international crime as described by the
December 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment. This official did not
provide a time frame for beginning and completing the evaluation of the
strategy.

Regarding the coordination of specific types or aspects of international
crime, a number of coordination centers, interagency coordinators, and
coordination bodies and working groups have been established in recent
years. For example, State and Justice created a Migrant Smuggling and
Trafficking in Persons Coordination Center to achieve greater integration
and overall effectiveness of the U. S. effort to combat trafficking in
persons and smuggling of migrants. In addition, FBI and Customs formed a
center to fight intellectual property rights violations. Among other things,
the center is to coordinate all U. S. government domestic and international
law enforcement activities involving intellectual property rights and to
serve as the collection point for intelligence provided by private industry.
Also, as discussed in appendix V, in 1999, State appointed a coordinator for
rule of law assistance programs. According to State, the position lapsed at
the end of the Clinton administration and has not been reestablished.

In addition, federal entities identified a variety of mechanisms, working
groups, and organizations and law enforcement entities with which they
coordinate their international crime activities. Within Justice, for
example, the FBI coordinates its activities against financial fraud through
the International Securities Working Group. Furthermore, the FBI coordinates
its activities against various types of international crime with foreign
police organizations- such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police- and
domestic law enforcement entities, such as Customs and INS. The FBI
coordinates its training activities through a variety of means, such as the
International Law Enforcement Academy Steering Committee. DEA coordinates
its drug enforcement efforts through interagency coordinating groups or
committees, such as ?Linear? for cocaine and ?Linkage? for

21 Other international crime issues to be coordinated by the PCC for
International Organized Crime are intellectual property theft, international
fraud, drug trafficking, money laundering, alien smuggling, and diamond
smuggling. Operational Level

Coordination of Response to International Crime

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 62 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

heroin. INS? Border Patrol coordinates its alien smuggling efforts through
the Justice Alien Smuggling Task Force and the Interagency Working Group on
Smuggling and Trafficking.

Within Treasury, for example, Customs coordinates its high- tech crime
efforts with the G- 8?s High Tech Crime Sub- Group, 22 as well as with DEA
and FBI. Also, Customs coordinates its terrorism efforts through, among
others, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and efforts
against intellectual property crimes through the National Intellectual Law
Enforcement Coordination Council. ATF coordinates its arms- trafficking
efforts with, among others, Customs and INTERPOL. IRS- CI coordinates many
of its anti- money laundering efforts with components of Justice and
Treasury.

Within State, for example, INL coordinates, among other things, with the
Departments of Justice and Defense and others the designation of major
narcotics transit and trafficking countries, and the decisions on the
certification of countries as cooperating with the United States in
connection with counternarcotics efforts. As discussed earlier, the Office
of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates the response to
international terrorism with, among others, FBI and the Central Intelligence
Agency.

Within USAID, the Global Bureau?s Center for Democracy and Governance
coordinates its public corruption activities through the SCG?s Sub- Group on
Diplomatic Initiatives and Institutional Development. Internationally, USAID
coordinates with multinational entities, such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, and with nongovernmental entities,
such as Transparency International, among others.

In addition to the challenges related to the SCG discussed earlier, various
federal entities identified a number of challenges in coordinating their
efforts against international crime. For example:

 Customs identified an absence of mechanisms to share data in a timely
fashion and restrictions related to the sharing of sensitive information,
especially with the intelligence community.

22 The G- 8 Subgroup on High- tech Crime was formed in January 1997 to help
enhance the abilities of law enforcement to investigate and prosecute high-
tech and computer- related crime. Challenges Involved in

Coordinating International Crime Efforts

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 63 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

 The FBI cited challenges in obtaining evidence from foreign law
enforcement agencies necessary to support U. S. criminal charges, such as
predicate acts for money laundering.

 USAID noted that the large number of actors involved and the diffuse
nature of decisionmaking- between field offices and headquarters and among
the actors- posed particular coordination challenges for anticorruption
efforts.

 State noted the challenge of overlapping responsibilities and competition
of limited resources among federal agencies and the mismatch of institutions
and expertise between U. S. and foreign law enforcement agencies, including
different definitions of crime and the capacity to

?absorb? training. Our previous work has shown that extensive federal
crosscutting responses to national issues- such as international crime-
require a high level of sustained coordination. Our work has also shown that
such highlevel coordination can bring about the required firm linkages of
threat assessments, strategy and prioritization of effort, resource
allocation and tracking, and outcome- oriented performance measures.
Otherwise, our work has concluded, scarce resources are likely to be wasted,
overall effectiveness will be limited or not known, and accountability will
not be ensured. 23 In this regard, we note that the establishment of the PCC
for International Organized Crime is a step in the right direction in
seeking to provide coordination and oversight of the federal response to
international crime. On the basis of the known details about its role and
priorities, the PCC appears to address some of the coordination and related
issues we discuss in this report, such as evaluating the International Crime
Control Strategy in light of any changes in the threat from international
crime.

The federal effort to combat terrorism- one of the activities in our
definition of international crime- illustrates some of the challenges
involved in implementing crosscutting responses to complex public problems
and national issues. Specifically, our work pointed out that the

23 See, for example, Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address
Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap (GAO/ AIMD- 97- 146, Aug. 29,
1997); Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Help Congressional Decisionmaking
and Strengthen Oversight (GAO/ T- GGD- 00- 95, Mar. 22, 2000); and Managing
for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (GAO/ GGD- 00- 106, Mar.
29, 2000). Previous Work Has Shown

That Crosscutting Responses to National Issues Require High- Level
Coordination

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Entities? Roles in Responding to International
Crime and Coordination of the Response

Page 64 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

counterterrorism effort has been prone to problems with interagency
coordination. 24 Our work pointed out, for example, that:

 The federal agencies were not tracking expenditures or developing
priorities for the billions of dollars being invested in an increasing
number of counterterrorism programs.

 These resources and programs, in turn, had not been clearly linked to
sound threat analyses.

 This situation had created the potential for various federal entities
creating their own programs without adequate coordination, with the further
potential for gaps and/ or duplication.

In response, we recommended that, among other things, the federal government
conduct sound threat assessments to define and prioritize requirements and
properly focus programs and investments in combating terrorism.

In commenting on a draft of this report, Justice- as it had done in
commenting on our report that originally raised this issue- disputed the
conclusions that there were major problems with interagency coordination of
terrorism activities and that sound threat assessments were not being
conducted and used to define, prioritize, and address current terrorism
threats. Furthermore, as with the prior report, Justice reiterated its
position that the Attorney General?s Five Year Interagency Plan on
Counterterrorism and Technology Crime included an articulation of goals,
objectives, and time frames and that- together with a number of presidential
directives- the Plan essentially constituted a baseline national strategy to
counter terrorism.

24 See, for example, Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing
Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 145, Apr. 6, 2000) and
Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/ T-
NSIAD- 00- 218, July 26, 2000).

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 65 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

As presented in appendix II, the International Crime Control Strategy,
announced in May 1998, consists of 8 overarching goals and 30 implementing
objectives. Of these totals, one goal and two implementing objectives
address the topic of corruption, as table 6 shows.

Table 6: International Crime Control Strategy Goal and Objectives That
Address Corruption

Overarching goal Implementing objectives

Establish international standards, goals, and objectives to combat
international crime, including corruption and bribery. Foster international

cooperation and the rule of law Strengthen the rule of law as the foundation
for democratic and free markets in order to reduce societies? vulnerability
to criminal exploitation.

Source: Excerpt from International Crime Control Strategy.

In response to our inquiries regarding federal efforts to address
international corruption, a senior Department of State official confirmed
that the International Crime Control Strategy has two implementing
objectives that address corruption. Furthermore, in providing perspectives
on the two objectives, the official commented substantially as follows:

 One objective addresses corruption and bribery in the context of
transnational business practices, particularly regarding government
procurement contracts. This context may involve, in a hypothetical example,
bribes resulting in the purchase of French Mirage versus U. S. F- 16
military aircraft. In sum, this section of the strategy addresses the type
of corruption that is of direct concern to competing transnational
businesses.

 The other objective addresses corruption in a broader context- a rule of
law context- wherein corruption among justice and security officials has a
special significance. 1 These officials are charged with upholding the rule
of law for governments, which establishes the basic framework within which
all elements of society, including business, are to operate. Widespread
corruption among justice and security officials can potentially destabilize
governments.

1 According to the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
rule of law is premised on a government being able to provide a predictable
and transparent legal system. Fair and effective judicial and law
enforcement institutions to protect citizens against the arbitrary use of
state authority and lawless acts are also a basic part of such a system.
Appendix V: Combating Corruption

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 66 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

According to Commerce and State Department reports, the bribery of foreign
public officials is a deeply embedded practice in many countries. For
example, in the period from May 1994 through April 2001, Commerce received
reports that the outcome of 414 contracts valued at $202 billion may have
been affected by bribery involving foreign firms. During this period, U. S.
firms are alleged to have lost 101 of these contracts worth approximately
$30 billion because of this corrupt practice.

In recent years, a variety of anticorruption and transparency initiatives
have been considered by various international governmental entities.
Furthermore, a number of legal and business associations and nongovernmental
organizations have had key advisory roles in developing the various
anticorruption initiatives. Of the various initiatives, an international
agreement adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has been described as the

?centerpiece of a comprehensive U. S. government strategy to combat bribery
and corruption? in international business transactions. This agreement is
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.

In 1977, the United States enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
15 U. S. C. 78dd- 1, et seq., 78ff, which makes it unlawful to bribe foreign
government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.
Subsequently, partly as a result of U. S. leadership efforts to create a
level playing field among the world?s major trading nations, an
international anti- bribery agreement was created and entered into force in
1999. This agreement- the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions- obligates its
parties to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in order to
obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the conduct of
international business. 2 In effect, the OECD Convention internationalizes
the principles in the FCPA. The State Department?s Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs has described the OECD Convention as

2 As enacted in 1977, FCPA?s antibribery provisions covered only issuers
with securities registered under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and all
other U. S. nationals and companies (defined as ?domestic concerns?). In
1998, the Congress amended FCPA to conform to the requirements of the OECD
Convention. Because the OECD Convention requires state parties to
criminalize bribery by ?any person,? the Congress expanded FCPA?s coverage
to include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign
bribe while in the United States. See S. Rep. No. 105- 277 and Signing
Statement for the International Anti- Bribery and Fair Competition Act of
1998, P. L. 105- 366, reprinted in 1998 U. S. C. C. A. N. 771- 772.
Corruption:

Transnational Business Context

Development of the OECD Convention

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 67 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

?our principal weapon for combating a particularly damaging form of
corruption, the payment of bribes to foreign officials in international
business transactions, sometimes referred to as the ?supply side? of
bribery.?

The OECD Convention provides a mechanism for monitoring- through a peer
review process following the model used by the FATF- the quality of the
implementing legislation enacted by each participating nation and the
effectiveness of efforts to enforce relevant national laws. Also, under U.
S. law, the Departments of State and Commerce are required to provide the
Congress with annual reports on the implementation of the OECD Convention. 3
State and Commerce submitted their most recent annual reports in June 2001 4
and July 2001, 5 respectively. The State and Commerce reports presented
similar key points and findings. For instance, in its July 2001 report,
Commerce noted that:

 Further progress has been made on the first priority of ensuring that all
signatories ratify the OECD Convention and enact implementing criminal
legislation prohibiting the bribery of foreign government officials.
Thirtythree of the 34 signatories had deposited instruments of ratification
and 30 had legislation in place to implement the Convention. As of June 4,
2001, Brazil, Chile, Ireland, and Turkey had not ratified and/ or enacted
implementing legislation.

 Countries that have ratified the Convention had generally taken a serious
approach to fulfilling their obligations on criminalizing the bribery of
foreign government officials. During the Phase I monitoring procedure in the
OECD?s Working Group on Bribery, all 28 signatories with implementing
legislation have had such legislation reviewed. On the basis of its own
review of implementing legislation, the U. S. government is concerned that
some countries? legislation- particularly, that of France, Japan, and the
Untied Kingdom- may be inadequate to meet all of their commitments under the
Convention.

3 The State Department?s reports are required by Paragraph (c)( 1) of the
Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent (dated July 31, 1998) to
ratification of the Convention. Commerce?s reports are required by the
International Anti- Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-
366, section 6.

4 U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs,
Battling International Bribery 2001 (June 2001). 5 U. S. Department of
Commerce, Addressing the Challenges of International Bribery and Fair
Competition: July 2001 (July 2001).

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 68 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

 Since the Convention had been in force for only a short time, it was still
too early to make judgments regarding the effectiveness of enforcement
measures. According to Justice?s Criminal Division, the OECD?s Working Group
on Bribery will embark later this year upon Phase II of the monitoring
procedure. Phase II reviews will focus on the quality of enforcement under
each signatory?s implementing criminal legislation.

As mentioned previously, in addition to the OECD Convention, a variety of
other anticorruption and transparency initiatives have been started by
various international governmental entities, including the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American
States (OAS), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Global
Coalition for Africa, and the United Nations. An example of these
initiatives is OSCE?s Charter for European Security, Rule of Law, and Fight
Against Corruption.

Furthermore, key advisory roles in developing the various anticorruption
initiatives have involved a number of legal and business associations and
nongovernmental organizations- such as the American Bar Association, the U.
S. Chamber of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), and
Transparency International. 6 An example of these initiatives is ICC?s Rules
of Conduct and Bribery, which are to apply to business conducted across
borders.

More information about these various initiatives is presented in a May 2000
brochure prepared by the State Department, in consultation and cooperation
with other federal entities. 7 The brochure was developed as an outreach
effort to provide U. S. companies and business associations with information
about the benefits of corporate anti- bribery policies, as well as give
guidance on the requirements of U. S. law and the OECD Convention.

6 Transparency International is a global nongovernmental organization. Its
stated principal goal is to increase government accountability and curb
international and national corruption.

7 Department of State (in consultation and cooperation with the Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and the Treasury; the U. S. Office of Government
Ethics; and USAID), Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management
(Department of State Publication 10731)

(May 2000). This publication was revised and updated in May 2001. Other
Anticorruption

Initiatives

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 69 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

In recent years, in addition to the OECD Convention focusing on
transnational bribery, a number of broad- based multilateral regional
initiatives against corruption have been developed. According to Justice?s
Criminal Division, efforts in this area in Europe and the Western Hemisphere
are currently the most developed. In this regard, the United States has
provided assistance worldwide to support the development of democratic
principles and institutions, although the effectiveness of some of this
assistance has been recently questioned.

In 1999, the Council of Europe?s (COE) Criminal Law Convention Against
Corruption was opened for signature. In general, the COE Convention
obligates state parties to criminalize a wide variety of domestic and
international bribery offenses and related money laundering offenses, as
well as to adopt asset forfeiture and international legal assistance
measures. The COE Convention also provides that the Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO) shall monitor parties? implementation of the Convention.
GRECO is a peer review mechanism through which members evaluate each other?s
implementation of the COE Convention as well as a variety of preventative
measures against corruption. The United States signed the Convention and
joined GRECO in fall 2000. A number of Eastern and Central European
countries- such as Romania, Croatia, Georgia, and Latvia- have also joined
GRECO.

Several U. S. government agencies are providing corruption experts to
participate in GRECO evaluations of other countries. The Departments of
Justice and State expect that over time, the GRECO evaluations will not only
encourage internal reforms but also help the United States and other donor
countries better target anticorruption technical assistance.

In 1996, negotiation of the Inter- American Convention Against Corruption
was completed. The Convention obligates state parties to criminalize
domestic bribery, including the fraudulent use or concealment of property
derived from such acts of bribery, and to criminalize transnational bribery,
if consistent with the state?s constitution and legal system. It also
encourages state parties to the Convention to adopt a broad range of
preventive measures, including open and equitable systems for government
hiring and procurement, standards of conduct for public servants, financial
disclosure registration systems for certain public servants, and
anticorruption oversight bodies.

Twenty- two OAS countries, including the United States, have ratified the
Convention. In May 2001, the state parties to the Convention concluded
Corruption: Rule of

Law Context Council of Europe

Inter- American Convention Against Corruption

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 70 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

negotiation of a follow- up mechanism whereby international teams of experts
are to review the level of implementation by each party. The mechanism was
established by the state parties to the Inter- American Convention by means
of a declaration signed on the margins of the June 2001 meeting of the OAS
General Assembly.

Additional anticorruption efforts, outside the framework of a formal
instrument, are reflected in the First Global Forum on Fighting Corruption,
which was hosted by the Vice President and held in Washington, D. C., in
February 1999. Forum participants- from 90 governments- agreed to a final
conference declaration that called on governments to (1) adopt principles
and effective practices to fight corruption, (2) promote transparency and
good governance, and (3) establish ways to assist each other through mutual
evaluation.

During May 28- 31, 2001, 143 countries attended the Second Global Forum on
Fighting Corruption at The Hague in the Netherlands. The Forum was hosted by
the Dutch government and co- sponsored by the United States. The U. S.
Attorney General led the U. S. delegation.

These global efforts have been characterized as important for securing
public integrity and controlling corruption among government officials,
especially those responsible for maintaining the rule of law.

In the early 1980s, as a way to support democratic principles and
institutions, the United States began helping Latin American countries
improve their judicial and law enforcement organizations. Until 1990, such
assistance was provided primarily to Latin American and Caribbean countries.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, the United States has also
provided rule of law and related assistance to Central and Eastern Europe
and other regions of the world. 8

Generally, the phrase ?rule of law assistance? refers to U. S. efforts to
support legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts undertaken by
foreign governments. The term encompasses assistance to help reform legal
systems (criminal, civil, administrative, and commercial laws and
regulations) as well as judicial and law enforcement institutions

8 The Freedom Support Act of 1992 (P. L. 102- 511) and the Support for
Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989 (P. L. 101- 179) provided for U. S.
assistance to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Global Forum
Against

Corruption U. S. Rule of Law Funding Worldwide

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 71 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

(ministries of justice, courts, and police, including their organizations,
procedures, and personnel). Also, the term includes assistance ranging from
long- term reform efforts, with countries receiving funding over a period of
years, to one- time training courses provided to the police or other law
enforcement organizations.

In a 1999 report to congressional requesters, who asked us to identify the
amount of U. S. rule of law funding provided worldwide (by region and
country) in fiscal years 1993- 98, we noted that such data were not readily
available for various reasons, including the following:

 The departments and agencies involved did not have an agreed- upon
definition of what constitutes rule of law activities.

 Some entities could not provide funding data for all the years of interest
nor had other problems in compiling the information we requested. 9

Nonetheless, based on data that cognizant departments and agencies made
available, our 1999 report presented a funding summary (see table 7) and
made the following observations:

 The United States provided at least $970 million in rule of law assistance
to countries throughout the world during fiscal years 1993- 98. Some
assistance- ranging from $138 million for Haiti to $2,000 for Burkina Faso-
was provided to 184 countries.

 Over the 1993- 98 period, the largest recipient of U. S. rule of law
assistance was the Latin America and Caribbean region, which accounted for
$349 million, or more than one- third of the total assistance.

 However, in the more recent years of the period, Central European
countries received an increasing share. In 1998, for instance, the largest
regional recipient was Central Europe, which accounted for about onethird of
all rule of law assistance.

9 Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
98 (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158, June 30, 1999). In another report, Foreign
Assistance: U. S. Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries
(GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 195, Aug. 4, 1999), we discussed assistance provided to
Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama.

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 72 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

Table 7: U. S. Worldwide Rule of Law Assistance by Region, Fiscal Years
1993- 98 Dollars in millions Region a

Countries receiving rule of law assistance

Rule of law funding amount

Percentage total funding

Latin American and the Caribbean 40 $349.1 36.0 Africa 45 145.8 15.0 Central
Europe 15 144.9 14.9 Newly independent states of the former Soviet Union 12
142.4 14.7 Near East 17 65.1 6. 7 East Asia and the Pacific 28 41.0 4. 2
South Asia 6 16.9 1. 7 Western Europe 21 15.4 1. 6 Mulitregional b
activities Not applicable 49.8 5. 1

Total 184 $970.5 c 100.0 c

a Based on information provided by the Department of State, we grouped
countries receiving rule of law assistance into eight geographical regions.
b The term ?multiregional? denotes rule of law assistance provided to
several countries in two or more

regions or when such assistance was not broken out by recipient countries. c
Details do not add to total due to rounding.

Source: Summary of U. S. agencies? rule of law funding data, as we reported
in Foreign Assistance: Rule of Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993-
98 (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158, June 30, 1999).

In our 1999 report, we also noted that at least 35 federal entities-
consisting of 7 cabinet- level departments and 28 related agencies, bureaus,
and offices- had a role in providing rule of law assistance programs. These
entities are listed in table 8. 10

10 State indicated that in addition to its components listed in table 8, the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs are involved in rule of law assistance. The latter became
effective on July 2, 2001, when the Bureau of European Affairs and the
Secretary?s Office of Newly Independent States were merged. U. S.
Departments and

Agencies Involved in Rule of Law Assistance

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 73 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

Table 8: Federal Entities with a Role in Providing Rule of Law Assistance
Programs Departments and independent agencies Component agencies, bureaus,
and offices

Department of State  Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs

 Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance

 Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs USAID U. S. Information Agency a
Department of Justice  Criminal Division b

 International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

 Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training

 DEA

 FBI

 INS Department of the Treasury

 ATF

 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

 IRS

 U. S. Customs Service - Office of International Affairs - Office of
Investigations

 U. S. Secret Service Department of Commerce

 International Trade Administration

 National Telecommunications and Information Administration

 Office of General Counsel, Commercial Law Development Program

 U. S. Patent and Trademark Office Department of Transportation

 U. S. Coast Guard Department of Defense  U. S. Air Force

 U. S. Army

 U. S. Marine Corps

 U. S. Navy Department of Energy a In October 1999, the U. S. Information
Agency was merged with the Department of State?s Office of International
Information Programs. b The Criminal Division?s training programs are
discussed in appendix VI.

Source: Summary of information we presented in Foreign Assistance: Rule of
Law Funding Worldwide for Fiscal Years 1993- 98 (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 158, June
30, 1999).

Regarding overall responsibility for coordinating rule of law programs and
activities, our 1999 report noted that:

Appendix V: Combating Corruption Page 74 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to
International Crime

 There have been longstanding congressional concerns that rule of law
coordination efforts among the numerous departments and agencies in
Washington, D. C., were ineffective.

 Thus, in February 1999, State appointed a rule of law coordinator, whose
principal mandate is to work with all the relevant U. S. governmental
entities to develop a framework for future U. S. international rule of law
assistance efforts. 11

 In addition, the coordinator is to be the principal U. S. liaison to other
donors and private sector organizations involved in rule of law activities.

In April 2001, we reported on rule of law assistance to 12 countries of the
former Soviet Union. 12 We concluded that- after 10 years and almost $200
million in funding- such assistance had produced limited results. Also, the
report

 questioned the sustainability- the extent to which the benefits of a
program extend beyond its life span- of the rather limited results that had
been achieved; and

 attributed the lack of impact and sustainability to a number of factors,
such as limited political consensus on reforms in recipient countries, a
shortage of domestic resources for many of the more expensive innovations,
and weaknesses in the design and management of assistance programs by U. S.
agencies.

The report recommended that program management be improved by implementing
requirements for projects to include specific strategies for (1) achieving
impact and sustainable results and (2) monitoring and evaluating outcomes.

11 According to State, the position lapsed at the end of the Clinton
administration and has not been reestablished. 12 Former Soviet Union: U. S.
Rule of Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Sustainability (GAO- 01-
354, Apr. 17, 2001). Our Report on Assistance

to Former Soviet Union Countries

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 75 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Much of the technical assistance that the United States provides to other
nations for fighting international crime involves training, particularly
training at law enforcement academies established abroad. The Department of
Justice?s technical assistance efforts include two units within the Criminal
Division-( 1) the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP) and (2) the Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance
and Training (OPDAT)- which attempt to strengthen police and legal systems
in foreign countries. Justice, Treasury, State, and the U. S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) provide a number of other training
programs. In addition to training, U. S. technical assistance includes
providing foreign nations with information from computerized law enforcement
databases and investigative and forensic services. An example of such
assistance is the U. S. National Central Bureau of the International
Criminal Police Organization?s (USNCB/ INTERPOL) Notice Program.

The International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) are a cooperative effort
among the Departments of State (which provides funding), Justice, and
Treasury. To accomplish overall coordination of the ILEAs domestically, a
Policy Board was established that is comprised of members from each
Department and appointed by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General,
and the Secretary of the Treasury. The mission of these academies has been
to support emerging democracies; help protect U. S. interests through
international cooperation; and promote social, political, and economic
stability by combating crime. ILEAs also are to encourage strong
partnerships among regional countries to address common problems associated
with criminal activities. ILEAs have been established in Europe, Southeast
Asia, and Southern Africa, and plans are underway to establish an ILEA in
the western hemisphere to serve Central America and the Dominican Republic.
State plans to open a graduate- level ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico, in
September 2001.

In 1995, the United States and the government of Hungary cooperated to
create the first ILEA in Budapest, Hungary, under FBI leadership. This
ILEA?s purpose is to train law enforcement officers from Central Europe and
the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The academy offers
two categories of courses:

 Core course. An 8- week core course- a personal and professional
development program- focuses on leadership, personnel and financial
management issues, ethics, the rule of law, and management of the
investigative process. Annually, according to the State Department, Appendix
VI: Technical Assistance Programs

International Law Enforcement Academies

ILEA Europe

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 76 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

approximately 250 to 300 mid- level police officers and managers receive
this training, which is provided by various U. S. agencies and Hungarian and
Western European law enforcement agencies.

 Specialized short- term courses. These courses provide law enforcement
officers with training on combating various types of crime- for example,
organized crime, financial crime, corruption, nuclear smuggling, illegal
migration, and terrorism- including training on prosecuting criminal cases.
Annually, according to the State Department, about 500 police, prosecutors,
immigration specialists, and others participate in these courses.

ILEA Southeast Asia- located in Bangkok, Thailand- opened in March 1999,
under DEA leadership. Like the ILEA Budapest program, the purpose of the
Bangkok ILEA is to strengthen regional law enforcement cooperation and
improve performance. According to the State Department:

 This academy?s curriculum and structure are similar to those of ILEA
Budapest, with the exception of a shorter core course (6 weeks).

 In 1999, over 700 law enforcement personnel representing 10 countries
participated in courses at the academy.

In July 2000, the State Department announced an agreement with the
Government of Botswana to establish the ILEA for Southern Africa in
Gaborone, under the leadership of FLETC. Similar in overall format to the
other academies, ILEA Southern Africa is to follow the model developed for
ILEAs in Budapest and Bangkok by providing

 courses on a wide range of law enforcement skills, including police
survival, forensics, basic case management, fighting organized crime,
supervisory police training, police strategy, narcotics identification and
evidence handling, customs interdiction, illegal migration, and public
corruption; and

 a permanent location from which to address special topics, such as stolen
vehicles, money laundering, crimes against women, domestic violence,
terrorism, and other critical topics such as human rights and policing.

In September 2001, State will open a new ILEA in Roswell, New Mexico. This
new facility, which will be open to graduates of the regional ILEAs, will
offer shorter- term (4 weeks versus 8 weeks) advanced training with a
greater focus on an academic versus practical or operational curriculum.
ILEA Southeast Asia

ILEA Southern Africa ILEA Roswell, New Mexico

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 77 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Tailored to the regional needs of officials from Central/ South America,
pilot courses of ILEA Western Hemisphere have already been conducted at a
temporary site in Panama. However, activities have been suspended until a
permanent location can be selected.

Two Justice units- ICITAP and OPDAT- are to work in tandem to strengthen
justice systems abroad.

The purpose of ICITAP- functionally located in Justice?s Criminal Division-
is to provide training and development assistance to police organizations
worldwide. That is, the mission of ICITAP is to support U. S. foreign policy
and criminal justice goals by helping foreign governments develop the
capacity to provide modern professional law enforcement services based on
democratic principles and respect for human rights.

The program was first created in 1986 to train police forces in Latin
America on how to conduct criminal investigations. ICITAP?s activities have
expanded worldwide since then and now consist of two principal types of
assistance projects:

 developing police forces in the context of international peacekeeping
operations and

 enhancing the capabilities of existing police organizations in emerging
democracies.

Specific ICITAP activities or projects are to be initiated at the request of
the National Security Council and the Department of State, in agreement with
the foreign governments requesting the assistance. Priority is to be given
to countries in transition to democracy, where unique opportunities exist
for major restructuring and refocusing of police and investigative resources
toward establishment of the rule of law.

Regarding funding, according to Justice, ICITAP is unique among federal law
enforcement assistance programs in that ICITAP is not listed as a ?line

item? in Justice?s budget. Rather, most of ICITAP?s budget consists of
project- specific funding, which is provided to Justice by the Department of
State and USAID. For fiscal year 2000, according to Justice?s Criminal
Division, ICITAP received $6.6 million for the Latin American Regional
Program and $23.6 million for training and development projects in Africa,
the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Far East. According to State, it
ILEA Western Hemisphere

Training: Strengthening Legal Systems Abroad

ICITAP: Development Assistance to Law Enforcement Organizations

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 78 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

has proposed to Justice that ICITAP be transferred to State. State believes
that such a transfer would improve the linkage between policy and
implementation, provide better financial and administrative support, and
strengthen ICITAP?s ability to respond to fast developing situations abroad.

Created in 1991, the Office of OPDAT (also in Justice?s Criminal Division)
provides justice- sector institution- building assistance, including
training of foreign judges and prosecutors, in coordination with various
government agencies and U. S. embassies. Although part of the Criminal
Division, OPDAT programs are funded principally by the Department of State
and USAID.

OPDAT programs take place in South and Central America, the Caribbean,
Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, the new independent states of the former
Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific Region. In
many of these countries, OPDAT has placed ?Resident Legal Advisors.? The
advisors are experienced prosecutors who are intended to interact with local
justice- sector officials and direct OPDAT assistance projects. These
projects seek to strengthen the legislative and regulatory criminal justice
infrastructure within the host country, and enhance the capacity of that
country to investigate and prosecute crime more effectively, consistent with
the rule of law.

Furthermore, USAID- through its Center for Democracy and Governance- has an
agreement with Justice regarding OPDAT. The agreement allows USAID missions
around the world to access the Office of OPDAT for help in activities such
as

 conducting justice sector assessments,

 reviewing laws and legislation,

 designing rule of law programs, and

 providing other technical assistance. OPDAT: Strengthening

Criminal Justice Systems Abroad

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 79 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Federal agencies- particularly Justice and Treasury- help foreign nations
combat international crime by providing technical assistance in the form of
access to and use of specialized support services and systems, such as
computerized databases and forensic laboratories. 1 The following
descriptions are examples- and not a complete or exhaustive listing- of this
type of assistance.

Examples of Justice support services and systems that foreign law
enforcement entities may access or use for combating international crime
include the following:

 Federal Bureau of Investigation?s (FBI) National Crime Information Center
(NCIC). NCIC, the nation?s most extensive computerized criminal justice
information system, consists of a central computer at FBI headquarters,
dedicated telecommunications lines, and a coordinated network of federal and
state criminal justice information systems. The center provides users with
access to files on wanted persons, stolen vehicles, and missing persons, as
well as millions of criminal history information records contained in state
systems. Data in NCIC files are exchanged with and for the official use of
authorized officials of the federal government, the states, cities, and
penal and other institutions, as well as certain foreign governments.

 Drug Enforcement Administration?s (DEA) El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC). Established in 1974, EPIC is a multiagency tactical drug
intelligence center managed by DEA. EPIC?s mission is to support counterdrug
efforts through the exchange of time- sensitive, tactical intelligence
dealing principally with drug movement. Today, EPIC?s focus has broadened to
include all of the United States and the Western Hemisphere where drug and
alien movements are directed toward the United States. Through information
sharing agreements with federal law enforcement agencies, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, and the 50 states, EPIC can provide requesters with real-
time information from different federal databases and EPIC?s internal
database.

 INTERPOL?s Notice Program. Through the circulation of international
notices, INTERPOL disseminates subject lookouts and advisories to member
country police forces. These notices, color- coded to designate their
specific purposes, are published at the request of a member country.
INTERPOL members (such as USNCB) then receive and distribute the

1 For a variety of purposes, Justice and Treasury also provide technical
assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies. See appendices III
and IV in Crime Technology: Federal Assistance to State and Local Law
Enforcement (GAO/ GGD- 99- 101, June 7, 1999). Access To and Use of

Specialized Support Services and Systems

Department of Justice Support Services and Systems

Appendix VI: Technical Assistance Programs Page 80 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

notices among appropriate law enforcement authorities within their
respective countries. Ten different types of notices exist to communicate
various kinds of criminal information. For example, a ?red notice? indicates
a wanted fugitive- that is, a subject for whom an arrest warrant has been
issued and where extradition will be requested.

Examples of Treasury support services and systems that foreign law
enforcement entities may access or use for combating international crime
include the following:

 Customs? National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center.
Located at Customs Service headquarters in Washington, D. C., the center?s
core staffing consists of Customs Service and FBI personnel. The center?s
responsibilities include (1) coordinating all U. S. government domestic and
international law enforcement activities involving intellectual property
rights (IPR) issues and (2) integrating domestic and international law
enforcement intelligence with private industry information relating to IPR
crime. According to Customs, particular emphasis is given to investigating
major criminal organizations and those using the Internet to facilitate IPR
crime.

 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms? (ATF) National Tracing Center.
Through its National Tracing Center, ATF traces firearms for federal, state,
and foreign law enforcement agencies. The firearms are traced from the
manufacturer to the retail purchaser for the purpose of aiding law
enforcement officials in identifying suspects involved in criminal activity.
By examining patterns in aggregates of traces, gun tracing can help identify
opportunities for intervention on the supply side of illegal firearm
markets. Such intervention can then reduce further trafficking and
associated violent crime. For example, ATF?s Project LEAD- an automated data
system that tracks illegal firearms- is designed to help identify recurring
patterns of illegal firearm suppliers, both in the United States and across
international borders, and provide evidence for prosecution.

 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network?s (FinCEN) support of financial
intelligence units. FinCEN supports the development of financial
intelligence units in other nations to help facilitate the exchange of
information to assist anti- money laundering investigations, detect criminal
abuse of the financial system, and ensure adherence to laws against
financial crime. Working together, these financial intelligence units have
created a secure communication network- developed by FinCEN- which permits
the units and FinCEN to post and access information about money laundering
trends, financial analysis tools, and technological developments. Department
of the

Treasury Support Services and Systems

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 81 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Existing frameworks for measuring the effectiveness of federal efforts to
address international crime include (1) the International Crime Control
Strategy, (2) Government Performance and Results Act 1 (GPRA) strategic and
performance plans prepared by federal departments and agencies, and (3)
crime- specific national strategies. As we have previously reported, for any
given program area, virtually all the results that the federal government
strives to achieve require the concerted efforts of two or more agencies. 2

The International Crime Control Strategy represents a national strategic
plan for combating international crime and reducing its adverse impacts on
the American people. The strategy articulates 8 overarching goals and 30
related objectives as a blueprint for a coordinated, long- term attack on
international crime. Each of the eight general goals is associated with a
number of specific implementing objectives- with the expectation that
achieving the objectives will result in reaching the overall goal. To
further describe how the objectives will be achieved, the strategy outlines
specific programs and initiatives that will be carried out to address each
identified objective.

To illustrate, goal 2 of the stragegy is ?Protect U. S. borders by attacking
smuggling and smuggling- related crimes.? Four implementing objectives are
associated with achieving this goal:

 Enhance our land border inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities
through a greater resource commitment, further coordination of federal
agency efforts, and increased cooperation with the private sector.

 Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction
efforts in the transit zone.

 Seek new and stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities.

 Target enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against
smuggling crimes and organizations. Furthermore, for each of the four
objectives, the strategy identifies programs and initiatives that are to
take place to carry out the objective.

1 Under GPRA (P. L. 103- 62, Aug. 3, 1993), federal agencies are to develop
(1) long- term strategic plans describing their general program goals for
major functions and operations and (2) annual performance plans describing
how the agencies will meet their program goals and establishing performance
targets for program activities.

2 Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (GAO/ GGD- 00-
106, Mar. 29, 2000). Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness

International Crime Control Strategy

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 82 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Regarding the first objective, for example-? Enhance our land border
inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities?- these programs and
initiatives include the following: (1) implementing the Southwest border
strategy, 3 (2) deploying new detection and identification technology, and
(3) cooperating with the private sector.

Under goal 8 of the International Crime Control Strategy (? Optimize the
full range of U. S. efforts?), one of the objectives is to develop measures
of effectiveness to assess progress over time. Specifically, the purpose of
this objective is to establish a system to measure progress on the major
goals of the strategy, provide feedback for the strategy refinement and
system management, and assist the administration in resource allocation.
Moreover, as stated in the strategy, the goals and objectives are dynamic
and are expected to evolve over time as conditions change, new crime trends
emerge, and improved anticrime techniques are developed.

As described in the strategy, the performance measurement system is to be
designed to quantify the measurement of results in the following areas:

 Disrupting major criminal organizations.

 Reducing criminal activity at our borders.

 Improving coordination among U. S. agencies.

 Improving coordination with other nations against criminal targets.

 Increasing adoption of international standards and norms to combat crime.

 Securing passage and implementation of major anticrime conventions
internationally.

 Reducing incidence and costs to the United States of intellectual property
theft and economic crime.

 Improving the coordination of international investigations into and
prosecutions of high- tech crime.

 Strengthening international capabilities against smuggling and raising the
cost of smuggling activities to smugglers.

 Strengthening international cooperation against alien smuggling and
reducing the flow of illegal migrants to the United States.

 Fighting money laundering and financial crime. 3 In 1994, the Attorney
General announced a five- part strategy to strengthen enforcement of
immigration laws. The strategy?s first priority was to strengthen
enforcement along the Southwest border. See, Illegal Immigration: Status of
Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May 19, 1999).
Performance Measurement

System Required by Strategy

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 83 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

 Increasing the number of nations that extradite nationals and that provide
mutual legal assistance.

 Combating illicit smuggling in firearms.

 Combating illicit trafficking in women and children.

 Decreasing the production and distribution of child pornography.

 Combating corruption and improving the administration of justice in
foreign criminal justice systems.

 Achieving the other goals and objectives of the strategy. In describing
the prescribed measurement system, the International Crime Control Strategy
compared it to a similar performance measurement system being created and
implemented by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to measure
the effectiveness of the nation?s war on drugs. That system- ONDCP?s
Performance Measures of Effectiveness (PME)- was established in February
1998 and is designed to implement the National Drug Control Strategy and
measure the effectiveness of the nations? drug control efforts through a
framework of measurable goals, objectives, and targets. 4 Additional details
on these performance measures appear later in this appendix.

During our review, we found that no progress has been made towards
establishing the performance measurement system described in the
International Crime Control Strategy. According to a National Security
Council (NSC) official, the set of performance measures envisioned under the
strategy was never implemented. Rather, the decision to devise and implement
performance measures was left up to the individual departments and their
components. In response to our inquiries, the NSC official indicated that he
was unaware of any specific measures used by departments or their components
to gauge the success of their efforts to combat international crime,
especially in the context of the strategy. Generally speaking, however, the
official noted that the concept of measuring performance is farther along in
the area of counterdrug efforts than for any other types of international
crime.

4 For more information about ONDCP?s performance measurement system, see
Drug Control: ONDCP Efforts to Manage the National Drug Control Budget (GAO/
GGD- 99- 80, May 14, 1999). No Progress Towards

Measuring Effectiveness of Federal Efforts to Address International Crime

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 84 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

In lieu of the performance measurement system envisioned in the
International Crime Control Strategy, strategic and performance plans
required by GPRA present an alternative approach for measuring the
effectiveness of the federal government?s international crime control
efforts. For example, we have previously reported that GPRA offers a
framework for addressing crosscutting federal programs (such as
international crime control) and could be used by the Congress, the Office
of Management and Budget, and the agencies to ensure that such programs are
being effectively coordinated. 5 Furthermore, we noted that agencies could
use the GPRA planning processes to consider whether agency goals are
complementary and common performance measures are needed.

Our recent reports on agencies? GPRA reports and plans indicate that
agencies are still challenged to develop meaningful goals, objectives, and
indicators that adequately measure their own program results and
effectiveness. Furthermore, despite the potential benefits, there has been
no governmentwide effort by NSC or others to consolidate information from
agencies? GPRA plans into a single plan measuring the government?s overall
results on international crime control. The following sections discuss in
more detail how the strategic and performance plans of Justice, Treasury,
and State address international crime and the extent to which these plans
measure program performance.

The Department of Justice?s 2000- 2005 strategic plan identified 7 strategic
goals and 34 related strategic objectives. For each of the strategic
objectives, the plan further outlined various strategies for achieving the
objectives. Among the goals most directly linked to international crime are
goal 1 (? Enforcing federal criminal laws?) and goal 4 (? Administering
immigration laws?). Although the plan does not discuss the International
Crime Control Strategy or identify linkages between the two strategies,
Justice highlighted several international crimes- including terrorism,
worldwide drug trafficking, and immigration/ border control- as key global
challenges that it expected to focus its work on over the next 5 years.
Table 9 illustrates how selected objectives and strategies in Justice?s
strategic plan address similar overarching goals and implementing objectives
in the International Crime Control Strategy.

5 Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination (GAO/ GGD- 00-
106, Mar. 29, 2000). Federal Agencies?

GPRA Plans Department of Justice

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 85 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Table 9: Similarities Between Justice Objectives and Strategies and the
International Crime Control Strategy Justice objective Justice strategy
International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal International Crime Control

Strategy implementing objective

Deter and detect terrorist incidents by developing maximum intelligence and
investigative capability

 Identify, investigate, and prosecute suspected terrorists around the world

 Prevent and deter debilitating damage to U. S. infrastructure

Extend the first line of defense beyond U. S. borders

Respond to emerging international crime threats

 Prevent international crime planned abroad, including terrorist acts

 Continue identifying and countering vulnerabilities of critical
infrastructure Reduce white collar crime in order to minimize negative
social and economic impacts

 Investigate and prosecute hightechnology crimes

 Investigate and prosecute international price- fixing cartels

Respond to emerging international crime threats

Prevent criminal exploitation of international trade

 Increase enforcement efforts against high- tech and computer crime

 Prevent unfair and predatory trade practices in violation of U. S. law
Secure the ports of entry, land borders, and sea coast of the United States
against illegal entry

 Prevent and deter illegal entry by implementing a comprehensive border
enforcement strategy

Protect U. S. borders by attacking smuggling and smuggling- related crime

 Enhance land border inspection, detection, and monitoring capabilities
through enhanced resources, coordination of federal efforts, and cooperation
with the private sector Deter illegal immigration and immigration- related
crimes and remove individuals unlawfully in the United States

 Disrupt and dismantle alien smuggling and trafficking organizations

Respond to emerging international crime threats

 Reduce trafficking in human beings and crimes against children

Note: Justice?s objectives and strategies were judgmentally selected to
illustrate areas where Justice?s strategic plan addressed similar goals and
objectives outlined in the International Crime Control Strategy.

Source: Fiscal Years 2000- 2005 Strategic Plan, U. S. Department of Justice
(Sept. 2000); and

International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

While Justice?s strategic plan provides overall direction and framework, its
annual performance plan links the broadly stated goals and objectives with
specific annual performance goals or targets. For example, for the strategic
goal ?Secure the land border, ports of entry, and coasts of the United
States against illegal immigration,? Justice?s 2001 summary performance plan
identified an annual goal to effectively control the border and thwart
international alien and drug smuggling. This annual goal is to be measured
by three performance indicators: (1) increased operational effectiveness
within identified Southwest border zones, (2) interception of mala fide
travelers and migrants (i. e., persons attempting illegal entry) en route to
the United States, and (3) offshore prosecutions assisted by INS aided by
fraudulent document detection.

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our
observations on key outcomes described in Justice?s GPRA performance

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 86 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

report and plan. 6 Two of these key outcomes were most directly related to
international crime: (1) less drug- and gang- related violence and (2) U. S.
borders secure from illegal immigration. Overall, we found that Justice?s
performance plan did not contain sufficient performance goals and measures
to objectively capture and describe performance results or measure progress
towards desired outcomes. We reported that Justice?s performance measures
were more output- oriented than outcome- oriented and did not capture all
aspects of performance. Also, we noted that Justice had not stated
performance goals in some instances. For the international crime- related
outcomes, we reported mixed results. For example, the performance measures
for drug- and gang- related violence did not cover the full range of issues
that the goal covers, and the performance measures also tended to be more
output- oriented than outcome- oriented.

The Department of the Treasury?s 2000- 2005 strategic plan identified 14
strategic goals and 40 related strategic objectives, grouped into 4 broad
departmental missions. The goals most directly linked to international crime
control- money laundering and financial crime, border control, and violent
crime and terrorism- are associated with Treasury?s law enforcement mission.
Although the plan does not discuss the International Crime Control Strategy
or identify linkages between the two strategies, Treasury highlighted
linkages between its own strategic plan and other national crime control
strategies, such as the National Money Laundering Strategy and the National
Drug Control Strategy. Table 10 illustrates how selected objectives and
strategies in Treasury?s strategic plan address similar overarching goals
and implementing objectives in the International Crime Control Strategy.

6 Observations on DOJ?s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance
Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). Department of the

Treasury

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Response to International Crime

Table 10: Similarities Between Treasury Objectives and Strategies and the
International Crime Control Strategy Treasury objective

Treasury strategy International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal International Crime Control

Strategy implementing objective

Dismantle domestic and international money laundering networks

 Work with federal, state, and local agencies to implement the National
Money Laundering Strategy

 Pursue bilateral and multilateral measures to strengthen anti- money
laundering regimes in the international arena

Counter international financial crime

 Combat money laundering by strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce
inbound and outbound movement of criminal proceeds

 Enhance bilateral and multilateral cooperation against financial crime by
working with foreign governments Deny the smuggling of illicit drugs at land
borders, airports, and seaports

 Identify, disrupt, and dismantle drug smuggling organizations by enhancing
high- impact investigations and strengthening interdiction

 Shield U. S. borders from foreign drug sources by utilizing air and marine
resources to interdict drugs in the source, transit, and arrival zones

Protect U. S. borders by attacking smuggling and smuggling- related crime

 Enhance land border inspection, detection, and monitoring through greater
resources, coordination of federal efforts, and cooperation with the private
sector

 Improve the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction in
the transit zone

Strengthen the capability to fight terrorist threats to the United States

 Prevent the entry of weapons of mass destruction into the United States

 Foster increased interagency cooperation and information sharing to
prevent and respond to terrorist activities

Extend the first line of defense beyond U. S. borders

 Prevent international crime planned abroad, including terrorist acts

 Intensify activities of law enforcement, diplomatic, and consular
personnel abroad

Note: Treasury?s objectives and strategies were judgmentally selected to
illustrate areas where Treasury?s strategic plan addressed similar goals and
objectives outlined in the International Crime Control Strategy.

Source: Department of the Treasury Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2000-
2005 (Sept. 2000); and

International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

Treasury?s strategic plan generally describes the department?s overall
goals, objectives, and strategies. The plan also forms the baseline for the
development of the Treasury components? strategic and performance plans-
which contain additional details on the specific performance goals and
measures. For example, for the strategic objective ?Deny the smuggling of
illicit drugs,? there are two related bureau strategic goals: (1) reduce the
amount of illegal drugs entering the United States and (2) effectively use
asset forfeiture as a high- impact law enforcement sanction to punish and
deter criminal activity. Progress towards these goals is to be measured via
two performance goals- one to be reported by the Customs

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 88 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

Service (seized drugs) and one by the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (seized
property).

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our
observations on key outcomes described in Treasury?s GPRA performance report
and plan. 7 Among these key outcomes, two- for Customs and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)- were most directly related to
international crime: (1) reduced availability and/ or use of illegal drugs
and (2) criminals are denied access to firearms, and firearms- related crime
is reduced. Overall, we reported that it was difficult to determine
Treasury?s progress towards these two outcomes because performance measures
were generally output measures. At the agency level, for example, we noted
that Customs? performance measures for illegal drugs had historically been
output- related- such as, pounds of narcotics seized and number of drug
seizures. Customs recognized that measures for some of its goals did not
fully measure achievement of the goals and also indicated that it was
working to develop outcome measures to better demonstrate the impact of its
activities.

Regarding firearms, we noted that ATF?s performance measures had also been
primarily output- related (e. g., number of firearm traces, average trace
response time, and number of persons trained). However, ATF?s performance
plan contained a refined measure of ?future crimes avoided,? as a way to
measure progress towards reducing the risk of violent crime by estimating
the number of crimes prevented through the incarceration of criminals and
the elimination of crime gun sources.

The Department of State?s 2000 strategic plan identified 16 strategic goals,
which were grouped into 7 areas of national interest. For each strategic
goal, the plan further outlined strategies for achieving the goal, as well
as State?s specific responsibilities for each of the strategies. For those
strategies that involved the cooperation of multiple agencies, the plan also
identified the ?lead? U. S. government agencies involved. Although the plan
does not discuss the International Crime Control Strategy or identify
linkages between the two strategies, it does identify how State?s strategic
planning process has considered other national and agency strategic plans-
such as the National Security Strategy and the National Drug Control
Strategy. Table 11 illustrates how selected goals and strategies in

7 Observations on Treasury?s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001
Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD/ AIMD- 00- 231R, June 30, 2000). Department of
State

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 89 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

State?s strategic plan address similar overarching goals and implementing
objectives in the International Crime Control Strategy.

Table 11: Similarities Between State Goals and Strategies and the
International Crime Control Strategy State goal

State strategy International Crime Control

Strategy overarching goal International Crime Control

Strategy implementing objective

Reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)

Reduce incidence and severity of international terrorist attacks

 Combat nuclear smuggling, especially in the Newly Independent States

 Defend against threats or use of WMD and cyberwarfare by terrorists

Extend the first line of defense beyond U. S. borders

Respond to emerging international crime threats

 Prevent international crime and terrorism planned abroad, before they
occur

 Increase enforcement against high- tech and computer- related crime

Facilitate travel to the United States, while deterring entry by those who
abuse or threaten system

 Coordinate among federal agencies to increase border security, identify
and prevent the entry of criminals and terrorists, inhibit illegal
immigration, and counter alien smuggling

Protect U. S. borders by attacking smuggling and smuggling- related crime

 Enhance land border inspection, detection, and monitoring through greater
resource commitment, further coordination of federal agency efforts, and
increased cooperation with the private sector Minimize the impact of
international crime on the United States and its citizens

 Preclude criminals engaged in illegal, transnational activities from
fraudulently obtaining or using U. S. passports of visas to facilitate their
criminal activities in the United States

Deny safe haven to international criminals

 Implement strengthened immigration laws that prevent international
criminals from entering the United States and provide for their prompt
expulsion when appropriate Open political systems to democracy, rule of law,
good governance, and respect for human rights

 Through assistance, exchanges, and international broadcasting, encourage
the development of democratic systems and the rule of law

Foster international cooperation and the rule of law

 Improve cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement through
collaboration, training, and technical assistance

 Strengthen the rule of law in order to reduce societies? vulnerability to
criminal exploitation

Note: State?s goals and strategies were judgmentally selected to illustrate
areas where State?s strategic plan addressed similar goals and objectives
outlined in the International Crime Control Strategy.

Source: U. S. Department of State Strategic Plan (Sept. 2000); and
International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998).

In its strategic plan, State identified various indicators to measure
performance towards each goal. For example, regarding the national security
goal ?Reduce the threat to the United States from weapons of mass
destruction,? State identified 12 performance indicators. However, these
indicators were not associated with any particular strategy, such as
combating nuclear smuggling. Rather, the 12 indicators- taken as a

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 90 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

whole- measure progress towards the overall goal of reducing the threat from
weapons of mass destruction.

Regarding performance measurement, in June 2000, we reported our
observations on key outcomes described in State?s GPRA performance report
and plan. 8 Among these key outcomes, three were most directly related to
international crime: (1) eliminate threats from weapons of mass destruction,
(2) reduce international crime and availability and/ or use of illegal
drugs, and (3) reduce international terrorism. Overall, we found that
State?s performance plan provided more detail on goals and measures than in
previous years, but there were still some limitations. We reported that:

 Goals and measures were presented by individual bureau, making it
difficult to obtain an agencywide perspective or sense of priority.

 Assessing performance against the many targets listed would be
timeconsuming and likely inconclusive about whether tangible results were
achieved.

 There was no discussion about whether State coordinated with the numerous
partner agencies listed in the plan.

For the international crime- related outcomes noted above, we reported mixed
results. For example, regarding one of the expected outcomes-

?Eliminated threats from [WMD]?- State?s performance plan covered a more
complete range of activities than it planned to undertake to achieve the
goal, as compared to prior years. However, some of the goals and measures
did not provide valid indicators of progress. For example, one of the
performance goals was to ?be authoritative, relevant, and timely,? and
measures were to ?use technology and report on specific activities such as
producing and maintaining [Internet] web pages.? Regarding the response to
international terrorism, the performance plan referred to using diplomatic
pressure, enlisting cooperation, and developing new technologies as general
ways to address this goal. However, training was the only performance goal
reported for this desired outcome. Furthermore, while the plan more clearly
identified goals and measures for this outcome compared to prior years, some
goals and measures would be difficult to quantify, such as the status of U.
S. policies in various international forums.

8 Observations on State?s FY 1999 Performance Report and FY 2001 Performance
Plan (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 189R, June 30, 2000).

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 91 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

In addition to the International Crime Control Strategy, the federal
government has developed national crime control strategies that focus on
specific types of international crimes. Like the International Crime Control
Strategy, these strategies are interagency in nature and identify national
goals or objectives. However, they are specifically focused on a particular
type of crime or related set of crimes. This approach can also provide a
framework- not unlike GPRA- for developing performance indicators for
measuring the effectiveness and results of efforts to combat specific types
of international crime. Even with this targeted approach, however, the
government is still challenged to develop crime- specific strategies
containing meaningful goals, objectives, and indicators that adequately
measure program results and effectiveness.

Probably the most well- known of the national crime control strategies is
ONDCP?s National Drug Control Strategy, which identifies long- range
national goals and measurable objectives for reducing drug use, drug
availability, and the consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. The
development of this strategy was mandated by the Congress in 1988, when it
created ONDCP in order to set priorities, implement a national strategy, and
certify federal drug control budgets for the nation?s war on drugs. The
Congress later expanded ONDCP?s mandate to require the establishment of a
drug control performance measurement system.

In 1998, ONDCP established the PME system- to provide performance goals,
objectives, and targets designed to implement the strategy and measure the
effectiveness of the nation?s drug control efforts. The PME system also
identified intermediate and long- term impact targets- for example, ?Reduce
the Availability of Illicit Drugs by 25 Percent in 2002?- as a way to
measure the strategy?s overall impact on drug demand and supply, as well as
the consequences of drug abuse and trafficking. ONDCP is required to report
to the Congress annually on the implementation of the PME system. As noted
above, the performance measurement system envisioned by the International
Crime Control Strategy was compared with the PME system.

Jointly developed by Treasury and Justice in 1999, the National Money
Laundering Strategy outlined a comprehensive, integrated approach to
combating money laundering in the United States and abroad, through both law
enforcement and banking supervision. This strategy defined a framework of
objectives and ?action items? (performance goals) designed to advance four
broad goals: strengthen domestic enforcement, enhance the engagement of
banks and other financial institutions, provide more Crime- Specific

National Strategies Drug Control

Money Laundering

Appendix VII: Measures of Effectiveness Page 92 GAO- 01- 629 Federal
Response to International Crime

effective assistance to state and local governments, and bolster
international cooperation.

In 2000, an updated version of the strategy was released, setting forth a
broad array of action items organized in a consolidated, governmentwide
plan. Each action item included a designation of the government office/
official accountable for implementation and for meeting specified goals and
milestones. For example, under goal 1 of the strategy-

?Strengthen domestic enforcement to disrupt the flow of illicit money?- one
of the action items is to promote cooperation with the governments of
Colombia, Aruba, Panama, and Venezuela to address black market currency
exchanges. Treasury?s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Policy is
identified as the lead official responsible for establishing a multilateral
task force to examine the issue and recommend policy options to the
appropriate government officials.

To address the national and international problem of terrorism, Justice
developed the Five- Year Interagency Counter- Terrorism and Technology Crime
Plan in 1998, with funds appropriated by the Congress for this purpose. The
resulting document was intended to serve as a blueprint for coordinating
national policy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism in the
United States and against U. S. interests abroad. The plan involved the
implementation of three strategies: (1) identify, investigate, and prosecute
suspected terrorists; (2) ensure domestic preparedness; and (3) prevent and
deter damage to the U. S. information infrastructure. As discussed in
appendix IV, Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD- 62) had previously
created within NSC the Office of the National Coordinator for Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Counter- Terrorism to oversee and report on
the federal government?s efforts in such areas as counterterrorism,
protection of critical infrastructures, and preparedness and consequence
management for weapons of mass destruction. 9

Despite this effort, questions remain about whether the counterterrorism
plan functions as a true national strategy. A federally funded advisory
panel, supported by research from the RAND Corporation, recently concluded
that the plan could not be considered a national strategy because it did not
synchronize existing government programs or identify future program
priorities needed to achieve national objectives for

9 PDD- 62 and PDD- 63, issued simultaneously in May 1998, elaborated the
federal government?s response to combating terrorism and protecting critical
U. S. infrastructures, respectively. Counterterrorism

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Response to International Crime

domestic preparedness for terrorism. 10 Among other things, the panel
recommended creating a comprehensive strategy that was truly national in
scope, appropriately resourced, and based on measurable performance
objectives. We reached a similar conclusion in our recent report on the
federal response to terrorism. 11 We concluded that the counterterrorism
plan, either taken alone or with other documents, did not constitute a fully
developed national strategy. We further reiterated the need for a federal or
national strategy that clearly identifies a desired outcome, provides a
goal, and allows measurement of progress toward that goal. As discussed in
appendix IV, in commenting on a draft of this report, Justice still
considers the counterterrorism plan to be a baseline national strategy to
combat terrorism.

10 Second Annual Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Toward a
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Dec. 15, 2000), better known as
the Gilmore Panel. 11 Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide
Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO- 01-
14, Nov. 30, 2000).

Appendix VIII: Comments From the National Security Council

Page 94 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix VIII: Comments From the National Security Council

Appendix VIII: Comments From the National Security Council

Page 95 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice Page 96 GAO- 01- 629
Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice

Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 97 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix X: Comments From the Department of State Page 98 GAO- 01- 629
Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix X: Comments From the Department of State

Appendix X: Comments From the Department of State Page 99 GAO- 01- 629
Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix XI: Comments From the U. S. Agency for International Development

Page 100 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix XI: Comments From the U. S. Agency for International Development

Appendix XI: Comments From the U. S. Agency for International Development

Page 101 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 102 GAO- 01- 629 Federal Response to International Crime

Laurie E. Ekstrand, (202) 512- 8777 Danny R. Burton, (214) 777- 5600

David P. Alexander, Seto J. Bagdoyan, Nancy A. Briggs, Philip D. Caramia,
Christine F. Davis, James M. Fields, Anthony L. Hill, and Bethany L. Letiecq
also made key contributions to this report. Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and
Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(440003)

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