Worker Protection: Better Coordination Can Improve Safety at Hazardous
Material Facilities (Letter Report, 10/26/2000, GAO/GAO-01-62).

Work places that produce, use, store, or dispose of hazardous materials
are often considered to be among the nation's most dangerous. Workers at
such facilities face the potential for injury, chronic illness, or
death, which can be caused simply by exposure to certain materials.
Several agencies, each with its own mission, method of operation,
regulatory requirements, and organizational structure, play a role in
protecting workplace safety and health. This may help ensure that all
workers are adequately protected. This report summarizes GAO's findings
on the coordination among the federal agencies trying to make the work
place a safer environment. GAO found that the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Treasury's Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Chemical Safety and Hazard
Investigation Board (CSB) play distinct roles in federal efforts to
protect the safety and health of workers at hazardous materials work
places. However, these agencies' functions partially overlap in a number
of areas. These overlaps cause them to place make duplicate requirements
on employers. Although there is a good effort on the part of the
agencies, more coordination is needed to eliminate the overlaps.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-62
     TITLE:  Worker Protection: Better Coordination Can Improve Safety
	     at Hazardous Material Facilities
      DATE:  10/26/2000
   SUBJECT:  Occupational safety
	     Interagency relations
	     Redundancy
	     Occupational health standards
	     Hazardous substances
	     Accident prevention
	     Safety regulation
	     Agency missions
IDENTIFIER:  OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
	     EPA Risk Management Program

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GAO-01-62

A Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on
Education and the Workforce, House of Representatives

October 2000 WORKER PROTECTION

Better Coordination Can Improve Safety at Hazardous Material Facilities

GAO-01-62

Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Relevant Statutes and Regulations 38

Appendix II: Incident Investigation Procedures and Regulatory Requirements
42

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Labor 45 Appendix IV: Comments
From the Environmental Protection

Agency 47 Appendix V: Comments From the Department of the Treasury 51
Appendix VI: Comments From the Chemical Safety and Hazard

Investigation Board 56 Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
60

Tables Table 1: Agencies' Roles and Activities 8 Table 2: Examples of CERCLA
Hazardous Materials Regulated

by or Otherwise Under the Auspices of Other Agencies 12 Table 3: Examples of
Requirements Placed on Facilities for Limiting

Exposure to Selected Hazardous Materials 15 Table 4: Hazardous Material MOUs
26 Table 5: Statutes and Regulations Affecting Work Place Safety and

Health at Hazardous Material Facilities 38 Table 6: Comparison of Incident
Investigation Procedures 42 Table 7: Requirements Placed on Hazardous
Material Facilities

by Statute and Regulation 43

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms CERCLA Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation,

and Liability Act CSB Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board EPA
Environmental Protection Agency GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response MOU Memorandum of
Understanding NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NRC National Response Center NRT National Response Team OSHA Occupational
Safety and Health Administration RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 TSCA Toxic
Substances Control Act USCG United States Coast Guard

Lett er

October 26, 2000 The Honorable Cass Ballenger Chairman, Subcommittee on
Workforce

Protections Committee on Education and the

Workforce House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: Work places that produce, use, store, or dispose of
hazardous materials are often considered to be among the nation's most
dangerous. 1 Workers at such facilities face the potential for injury,
chronic illness, or death, which can be caused not only by the machinery and
processes used to handle these materials, but also by exposure to the
materials themselves. According to one recent study, between 1994 and 1999,
hazardous material facilities in the United States experienced almost 2,000
major chemical release accidents, causing 33 worker deaths and more than 1,
800 worker injuries. 2 Several agencies, each with its own mission, method
of operation, regulatory requirements, and organizational structure, play a
role in protecting workplace safety and health. Having multiple agencies
play some role for protecting workers who are exposed to hazardous materials
may help to ensure that all workers are adequately protected. However, if
not coordinated properly, the need to comply with multiple authorities may
also cause employers an unnecessary burden and result in confusion that
might actually endanger worker safety. Concerns have also been raised that
there still may be regulatory gaps that leave some workers inadequately
protected.

1 According to EPA, hazardous materials include chemicals, oil and
petroleum- based products, and radioactive materials. Hazardous waste is any
waste material with properties that make it dangerous or capable of having a
harmful effect on human health or the environment, especially if it is
improperly stored, treated, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed.
For ease of understanding, we refer to all such substances in this report as
“hazardous materials,” even though agencies may refer to them by
other terms, such as “hazardous substance” or “hazardous
chemical,” in relevant regulations and guidance.

2 P. Kleindorfer, H. Feldman, and R. Lowe, Accident Epidemiology and the U.
S. Chemical Industry: Preliminary Results from RMP Information, Center for
Risk Management and Decision Processes, The Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, Pa.: 1999).

At your request, we reviewed coordination among the federal agencies engaged
in protecting safety and health at hazardous material work places.
Specifically, we assessed (1) the extent to which agencies have overlapping
statutory authority or procedures, 3 (2) employers' and workers' experiences
with multiagency efforts to protect work place safety and health at
hazardous material facilities, and (3) the extent to which agencies
coordinate their enforcement efforts and communicate to employers the nature
and extent of their coordinated activities.

We identified eight statutes affecting work place safety and health for
workers at facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of hazardous
materials (see table 5 in app. I). 4 These eight statutes give four
agencies- and their state partners, when appropriate- various
responsibilities affecting work place safety and health at hazardous
material facilities. These agencies are the Department of Labor's
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA); the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA); the Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB). 5 We interviewed headquarters and regional office officials;
reviewed statutory requirements, inspection procedures, databases, and
coordination mechanisms; and reviewed prior GAO reports and other documents
that dealt with multiagency coordination of regulatory authorities. To
determine the impact of multiagency safety and health regulations at
selected hazardous material facilities, we contacted 40 such facilities in
nine states. Of these facilities, 31 had been subject to (1) inspections by
both EPA and OSHA during fiscal years 1998 and 1999, or (2) an investigation
by CSB and at least one other agency in our review in response to an
incident involving the accidental leak of hazardous materials. We contacted
the remaining nine because trade associations identified employers' health,
safety, and environmental managers as being knowledgeable regarding the
issues addressed in this review. We also

3 For purposes of this review, overlap exists when agencies regulate the
same materials, place similar requirements on employers, or use similar
procedures to ensure employer compliance.

4 Our review does not include hazardous materials that are in transport, nor
did we include facilities in the mining or nuclear industries. 5 OSHA, EPA,
and ATF are regulatory agencies. CSB determines the root causes of serious
chemical- related accidents and recommends ways to reduce their occurrence
and severity. EPA and CSB are both independent agencies. OSHA and ATF are
component agencies in larger Cabinet departments.

contacted trade associations and labor unions representing a number of
industries that use hazardous materials. Where possible, we corroborated
information obtained at the facilities with agency officials. We performed
our work from February to August 2000 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Results in Brief OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB play distinct roles in federal
efforts to protect the safety and health of workers at hazardous materials
work places, which

can range from chemical and oil processing plants to food distribution
facilities. However, these agencies' functions partially overlap in a number
of areas. We found that this overlap causes them to place duplicative
requirements on employers. The three regulatory agencies- OSHA, EPA, and
ATF- regulate many of the same materials. For example, we found that
approximately 29 percent of the hazardous materials covered by one EPA
statute are also covered by OSHA and/ or ATF under other statutes. All four
agencies use similar procedures for investigating accidents involving these
materials. OSHA and EPA also place similar requirements on employers for
training workers and developing plans for responding to emergencies. Because
these agencies can address worker protection from different perspectives,
their overlapping requirements may help to ensure coverage of most types of
dangers posed by hazardous materials, thereby extending worker protection
broadly. On the other hand, the presence of overlapping requirements can
also lead to confusion and an additional compliance burden.

Consistent with the findings on overlap from our review of the four
agencies' regulations, a number of managers at facilities with hazardous
materials said that overlapping agency requirements caused them duplication
of effort in several areas. For example, when incidents at their facilities
necessitated investigations by more than one agency, facility managers we
interviewed said that they were subject to simultaneous, independent
investigations during which agencies often made separate requests for the
same information or separately interviewed the same employees. Also, to
address OSHA and EPA training requirements, employers and employee
representatives said that facilities provided the same type of training to
the same employees. In addition, they may have created training curriculums
that attempt to consolidate both agencies' training requirements without
being certain as to whether the consolidated curriculums provided all
necessary training to workers. In addition, facility managers believed they
had to develop multiple emergency plans to address overlapping OSHA and EPA
emergency response requirements,

and were generally not aware that they had the option to use a single,
consolidated emergency plan. They also believed that the existence of
multiple emergency plans could lead to confusion about which plan to use and
whom to notify in emergencies, raising the question of whether the
appropriate actions would be taken in response to a hazardous material
accident. On the other hand, even though there are overlaps, gaps in
coverage of workers may exist. Employers and labor union officials told us
that hazardous material workers in certain situations are inadequately
covered by statutes and regulations; these include workers who handle
reactive chemical mixtures and certain state and local government workers
who respond to hazardous material accidents.

OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB have had mixed results using a variety of mechanisms
to coordinate overlapping functions that affect worker safety and health at
hazardous material facilities and, more specifically, in addressing the
issues we identified. Officials of all four agencies told us that their
primary vehicles for interagency coordination are Memorandums of
Understanding (MOU). We found several MOUs that address coordination of
incident investigations, but little evidence that agency staff followed
these MOUs. In addition, these agencies have established interagency groups
to foster coordination. First, OSHA and EPA established a standing committee
to coordinate implementation of regulations under their statutory
authorities for ensuring the safety of hazardous material processes. This
standing committee has several accomplishments, such as its effort to
further harmonize the agencies' covered materials. However, the standing
committee lacks the procedures, including the development of a long- term
strategy and a mechanism for obtaining the views of employees and labor
unions, that may be needed to address future coordination issues. Second,
both agencies are members of a public- private task force that was
established to address the safety of workers who clean up hazardous waste.
This task force has successfully addressed various technical issues to help
facilitate compliance with regulations, but lacks the authority to address
compliance issues resulting from regulatory overlap. Finally, a federal
multiagency committee, known as the National Response Team (NRT), which is
responsible for directing the federal response to hazardous material
emergencies, has addressed the emergency response plan issue by developing a
protocol that permits employers to consolidate multiple emergency response
plans into a OnePlan. Employers we contacted reacted positively to the One-
Plan but we found that the committee could do more to inform employers of
this option. We are making recommendations to OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB to

improve the coordination of their overlapping functions in ways that enhance
worker protection and reduce employer regulatory burden.

OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB provided us with written comments on a draft of this
report. OSHA, EPA, and CSB made specific reference to our recommendations,
agreeing or not objecting to them. All four agencies, however, raised
concerns about or provided further clarification for portions of the draft
report that characterized their jurisdictions and missions, and the extent
to which they are currently coordinating. We incorporated these comments
into the report as appropriate.

Background OSHA is the federal agency with primary responsibility for
protecting work place safety and health. Three other agencies- EPA, ATF, and
CSB- are

responsible for or perform functions that have an impact on work place
safety at stationary facilities that produce, use, store, or dispose of
hazardous materials. As shown in table 1, the three regulatory agencies-
OSHA, EPA, and ATF- perform a number of the same functions, including
promulgating regulations, conducting routine inspections to assess employer
compliance, and conducting investigations in response to an incident. All
three agencies can cite an employer for noncompliance. They can also conduct
other activities to help employers comply, such as providing consultation.
In contrast, CSB focuses on investigating incidents to determine their root
causes.

Table 1: Agencies' Roles and Activities Key activities Number of Conduct

Type of incident investigation conducted inspections

routine and

Promulgate regulatory

investigations Agency Role

regulations inspections

Regulatory Criminal Root cause a in FY 1999 b OSHA Regulate

X X X X 101, 058 general work place safety and health

EPA Regulate safety X X X X X 74, 228

of environment and general public

ATF Regulate use X X X 6, 780

and storage of explosives c

CSB Determine and X 6 report on root cause of accidents

a Although OSHA and EPA have authority to perform root cause investigations
of incidents involving hazardous materials, they have not exercised this
authority since CSB was funded in 1998. b Includes state partners. EPA's
data are for the period April 1999 to March 2000.

c ATF can also investigate incidents involving accelerants, which can
include any material, ranging from cut- up paper to gasoline, that can
augment the impact of an explosion. Source: GAO analysis of agencies'
authorities.

OSHA and its 10 regional offices have general responsibility for ensuring
that all workers in the United States have safe and healthful work places.
OSHA has promulgated a number of regulations that establish safety
requirements for workers exposed to hazardous materials. These include the
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) regulation,
which establishes safety requirements and requires training for workers
involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste; and the
Process Safety Management regulation, which requires facilities to establish
procedures for eliminating or minimizing the results of catastrophic
releases of highly hazardous materials. (See table 5 in app. I for a full
list of OSHA's statutory and regulatory authorities in this area.)

OSHA has delegated this authority to state agencies in 23 states. 6 In
fiscal year 1999, OSHA issued about 45, 000 citations for violations of
safety and health standards related to hazardous materials exposure. 7

EPA has broad authority under a variety of statutes to protect the
environment and general public from pollutants. In addition, in carrying out
its programs, EPA has issued regulations addressing worker protection and
work place safety. For example, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), EPA has promulgated regulations establishing worker training and
emergency response requirements at hazardous waste facilities. EPA's Risk
Management Program regulation, under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
requires facilities having large amounts of extremely hazardous substances
to develop and implement risk management programs for the prevention and
mitigation of accidental releases. EPA's Risk Management Program regulation
is broader in scope than OSHA's Process Safety Management regulation and
both regulations have a number of requirements in common. EPA's safety and
health requirements aim to protect the environment and the general public
but also afford some level of protection to workers. In addition, EPA was
directed by statute to promulgate regulations that aim to specifically
protect workers, such as its HAZWOPER regulation that supplements the OSHA
regulation of the same name. 8 (See table 5 in app. I for a full list of
EPA's statutory and regulatory authorities in this area.) When carrying out
EPA's responsibilities, its 10 regional offices have some flexibility to
focus on the specific environmental needs of their regions. 9 Moreover, EPA
has delegated the authority for many of its programs to state environmental
agencies.

The role of ATF and its 23 field offices in protecting work place safety and
health stems from its responsibility to regulate the storage of explosives

6 The Occupational Safety and Health Act (29 U. S. C. 651 et seq.) allows
states to operate their own safety and health programs as long as they are
determined by OSHA to be at least as effective as the federal OSHA program;
OSHA provides up to 50 percent federal funding of state program costs (29 U.
S. C. 667, 672( g)). Two of the state programs cover only state and local
government employees.

7 States with delegated authority are excluded from this total. 8 EPA's
HAZWOPER regulation applies to a subset of workers not reached by the OSHA
regulation. 9 Both OSHA and EPA maintain regional offices in the same 10
cities.

intended for civilian use. As a result, ATF's enforcement activities affect
the safety of workers who handle, store, or are otherwise exposed to
explosives. ATF's regulatory role is primarily for the issuance of licenses
and permits, which organizations seeking to import, manufacture, distribute,
store, or use explosives must obtain. ATF also has a role in addressing
potentially criminal behavior, as it is responsible for conducting
investigations at incident sites to determine whether violations of federal
criminal law, such as arson, were involved. In addition, ATF has- but only
infrequently exercises- statutory authority to determine whether an
explosion or fire was brought about by accidental means and to recommend
precautions to guard against a reoccurrence.

CSB, which was authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, first
received funding in fiscal year 1998. Its role to protect work place safety
and health rests with its responsibility to investigate and determine the
root causes of chemical- related accidents that result in fatalities,
serious injuries, or substantial property damage. CSB may issue
recommendations to regulatory agencies, the company involved in the
incident, and others that they take actions to reduce the likelihood of
similar accidents. As of August 2000, the CSB had conducted only 11
investigations and issued reports on four of those investigations. 10

Altogether, the four federal agencies in our review derive their authority
in this area primarily from eight statutes. OSHA, EPA, and ATF implement
their authority through regulations that affect the safety and health of
workers at stationary hazardous material facilities. CSB does so primarily
through its investigations and reports on chemical- related incidents. (See
table 5 in app. I for a complete list of statutes and regulations.) The
statutes range from worker- related legislation- such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U. S. C. 651 et seq.), which led to the
creation of OSHA- to statutes that have a primary purpose other than work
place issues, such as the Organized Crime Control Act of 1990 (18 U. S. C.
841- 848), which regulates the storage of explosives.

10 GAO has reported on several occasions on the challenges CSB has faced
since it was funded in 1998. See, for example, Chemical Safety Board:
Improved Policies and Additional Oversight Are Needed( GAO/ RCED- 00- 192,
July 11, 2000).

Agencies Have Some OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB have distinct roles in protecting
safety and

Overlapping Authority, health at hazardous material facilities but, as a
result of similar statutory

responsibilities, can have overlapping authority, procedures, or employer
Procedures, or

requirements. In the past, we found that shared responsibility among
Requirements

federal agencies is widespread and an outgrowth of several different
factors. Shared responsibility is often a reasonable response to a specific
need and can be beneficial if the overlap fosters competition among
agencies, permits better service delivery, or provides emergency backup.
However, unless it is properly managed, overlap can lead to duplicative
requirements that waste funds, confuse and frustrate the regulated
community, and limit overall effectiveness. 11 Specifically in the area of
work place safety and health, we found that more than one agency can have
authority for the same hazardous material and have similar procedures for
investigating incidents involving these substances. We also found that OSHA
and EPA have overlapping employer requirements for training workers and
developing emergency response procedures, while OSHA, EPA, and ATF have
employer requirements for keeping records and reporting information to
government authorities.

Multiple Agencies Cover Recognizing the level of danger posed by hazardous
materials that are often

Similar Materials and Use found in the work place, the Congress has given
several agencies

Similar Procedures to responsibility for regulating workers exposed to
hazardous materials. The

Investigate Incidents eight statutes we reviewed contained references to
over 3,200 hazardous

materials and many of these substances were covered by more than one of the
eight statutes. This overlap largely results from the legislative and agency
processes that lead to the development of regulations. In many cases, when
developing a statute regarding hazardous materials, the Congress has
included some of the hazardous materials that are already covered by other
statutes. For example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U. S. C. 9601 et seq.), which
authorizes EPA to regulate the cleanup of uncontrolled or abandoned
hazardous waste sites and respond to accidental releases of hazardous
substances, contains a list of covered materials that was compiled from
lists associated with other statutes. The Congress may also

11 See our reports, Managing for Results: Barriers to Interagency
Coordination( GAO/ GGD00- 106, Mar. 29, 2000), and Managing for Results:
Using the Results Act to Address Mission Fragmentation and Program Overlap(
GAO/ AIMD- 97- 146, Aug. 29, 1997).

direct agencies to promulgate regulations covering some of the same
materials.

We found that 29 percent (or 214) of the hazardous materials associated with
EPA's CERCLA were also covered by other agencies. Table 2 provides examples
of several materials covered under CERCLA that are also covered by statutes
and regulations enforced by OSHA or ATF. 12

Table 2: Examples of CERCLA Hazardous Materials Regulated by or Otherwise
Under the Auspices of Other Agencies

Agency Hazardous

EPA material

(CERCLA) OSHA ATF CSB

Ammonia X X a b Asbestos X X a b Formaldehyde X X a b Hydrochloric acid X X
a b Nitric acid X X X b Dinitrophenol X X b Sulfuric acid X X a b Vinyl
chloride X X a b a ATF can conduct a criminal investigation for any type of
material that may be involved in causing a fire or explosion. b CSB can
conduct a root- cause investigation for any type of hazardous material that
may be involved in

causing an accident. Source: Comparison of CERCLA materials to other
statutes.

In order to prevent accidental releases of hazardous materials, the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 authorized OSHA to issue a chemical process
safety standard designed to protect employees from accidental releases of
hazardous materials in the work place. The legislation also required EPA, in

12 Our analysis underestimates the incidence of hazardous materials that are
regulated or otherwise under the auspices of multiple agencies because we
did not compare all the materials governed by each statute. No agency has
compiled such a list. Because the agencies' database systems are not
compatible, such an undertaking would involve manually comparing seven lists
of hazardous materials containing a total of over 3,200 substances.
Furthermore, these lists use different terminology when referring to
chemicals and their effects.

coordination with OSHA, to issue regulations governing the prevention,
detection, and correction of hazardous material releases, which include
monitoring, recordkeeping, reporting, and training requirements. OSHA's
regulation- the Process Safety Management standard- regulates about 130
hazardous materials. EPA's regulation- the Risk Management Program-
regulates 140 hazardous materials. These two regulations have 59 hazardous
materials in common.

Although hazardous materials may fall under the auspices of more than one of
these agencies, the materials are not necessarily regulated or covered at
the same level or for the same use. In most cases, the level at which a
material is subject to regulation (often called the “compliance
threshold”) is set at the minimum amount at which it may pose a
hazard. 13 Using OSHA's Process Safety Management standard and EPA's Risk
Management Program as an example, even though 59 materials are common to
both regulations, only 6 are regulated at the same threshold. 14 For
instance, whereas OSHA regulates nitric acid at any facility that uses at
least 500 pounds of the substance in a process, EPA does not become involved
unless the process involves at least 15,000 pounds. Generally, OSHA's
compliance thresholds are much lower, as its focus is on the hazards these
materials pose to workers, while EPA's focus is on larger releases that
might pose a hazard to the environment and general public.

Because they cover similar materials, two or more agencies often conduct
investigations of incidents involving the accidental release of hazardous
materials at the same facilities. Of the facilities we contacted that had
experienced serious incidents, all were investigated by more than one of the
agencies in our review. These agencies tend to use similar procedures when
conducting incident investigations. For example, all four agencies conduct
interviews, gather physical evidence, collect documentation, and hold
closeout meetings with management (see table 6 in app. II). Agencies
recognize this situation, and several of their procedures call for working
with other agencies on the scene. OSHA's and ATF's procedures require
investigators to participate in joint meetings at about the same time as the

13 The compliance threshold differs from the “discharge
quantity,” which represents the smallest discharge of hazardous
material that must be reported to federal and/ or state and local
authorities; and the “exposure limit,” which represents the
maximum level of exposure to a hazardous material that is considered to be
safe for individuals.

14 By threshold, we mean the minimum amount of a hazardous material, either
on premises or used in a process, that would initiate federal regulation.

opening conference with facility management. CSB's procedures also require
investigators to participate in coordination meetings throughout the
investigation.

Despite these coordination requirements, agency officials told us of
barriers that prevent effective coordination of incident investigations. 15
Of greatest importance, investigators may pursue separate investigations out
of concern that attempting to coordinate the information- gathering
activities with agencies that have differing missions would jeopardize their
ability to obtain all the information they need in a timely manner. For
example, CSB instructs its investigators to conduct separate interviews
because the agency fears that having regulatory investigators participate in
the interviews would cause the witness to hold back information. 16 ATF
generally does not permit regulatory investigators to participate in its
investigations because, as a criminal- investigation agency, ATF is
concerned that they might inadvertently tamper with evidence or undermine
the interrogation of a witness. OSHA investigators sometimes move forward
with their investigations, rather than waiting to make joint requests for
information, because they only have 6 months to complete their investigation
and issue citations for violations- the shortest mandatory time frame of the
four agencies in our review. In addition, OSHA, EPA, and CSB officials
stated that they might be unable to share documents that facilities have
identified as confidential business information with other agencies.

Agencies Place Overlapping Our review of the eight statutes and relevant
regulations identified

Requirements on Employers overlapping requirements for employers dealing
with hazardous materials

in four areas: (1) training workers to handle or dispose of hazardous
materials; (2) developing emergency response plans, which detail the
procedures for responding to and notifying authorities when accidental
discharges of hazardous materials occur; (3) keeping records on various
worker- related activities, including training provided to workers and the

15 The National Response Team- a federal multiagency organization that
coordinates federal response to hazardous material incidents-- is seeking to
identify ways to strengthen coordination among agencies conducting emergency
response to an incident and those that, at the same time, are conducting
criminal investigations at an incident site.

16 CSB is in the process of developing investigation protocols that require
its staff to conduct separate interviews during incident investigations to
ensure they receive the most complete information.

amount of hazardous materials used, stored, or emitted; and (4) reporting
information, such as the amount of hazardous materials used or stored and
procedures used to protect workers. Overlap occurs when facilities must
comply with multiple requirements for the same materials. Table 3 provides
examples of materials regulated by different agencies for which these
requirements apply. OSHA and EPA have the greatest number of overlapping
requirements.

Table 3: Examples of Requirements Placed on Facilities for Limiting Exposure
to Selected Hazardous Materials Agency/ requirement

EPA OSHA a (CERCLA) ATF b

Hazardous Emer.

Emer. Emer.

material Trng. Rcdkpg. Rpt. response Trng. Rcdkpg. Rpt. response Trng.
Rcdkpg. Rpt. response

Ammonia X X X X X X Ammonium

X X X X X perchlorate Asbestos X X X X X

Formaldehyde X X X X X X Hydrochloric acid X X X X X X Nitric acid X X X X X
X X X Dinitrophenol X X X X X Sulfuric acid X X X X X X Vinyl chloride X X X
X X X X

Note: The abbreviations refer to training, recordkeeping, reporting, and
emergency response. a Includes requirements promulgated under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. b Includes requirements promulgated under
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1990.

Source: GAO analysis of agencies' regulatory authorities.

(Table 7 in app. II highlights the statutes and pertinent regulations that
contain these kinds of requirements.)

Training We found that OSHA and EPA have several regulations for training
that have numerous overlapping requirements. As shown in table 7 in appendix
II, training requirements are a key aspect of regulatory efforts to protect
workers, the general public, and the environment from the harmful effects of
hazardous materials. Virtually all of OSHA's hazardous material regulations
promulgated under any of the statutes included in this review require
workers to be trained to minimize their exposure. All but two of EPA's
regulations promulgated under these statutes also require training

that generally aims to ensure that workers handle substances appropriately
to avoid an accidental release.

We identified significant overlapping training requirements for workers
handling hazardous materials and disposing of hazardous waste. During normal
processing of a hazardous material, a worker would be covered by OSHA's
Hazard Communication regulation, EPA's Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),
or EPA's Federal Water Pollution Control Act. If some of that material
should be accidentally discharged and become hazardous waste, the worker
could be covered by OSHA's or EPA's HAZWOPER regulations and by EPA's RCRA
regulations. Both require overlapping training in safety plans and
potentially in other aspects of hazardous material management, such as
emergency response, spill containment, and engineering controls inspection
and maintenance. However, HAZWOPER requires training in five additional
areas, including personal protective equipment and medical surveillance,
while RCRA requires training in three additional subjects, including
shutdowns.

One area in which EPA and OSHA have coordinated their training requirements
is between OSHA's Process Safety Management and EPA's Risk Management
Program regulations. OSHA's regulation requires employers to provide workers
with initial training as well as refresher training in process overview and
operating procedures with emphasis on (1) safety and health hazards, (2)
emergency operations (including shutdown), and (3) safe work practices.
EPA's regulation adopts OSHA's regulatory requirements for certain classes
of facilities and places a lesser degree of regulation on others. According
to EPA, if a firm covered by both regulations implements OSHA's Process
Safety Management training requirements, it will be in compliance with the
training requirements of EPA's Risk Management Program. OSHA and EPA have
both issued guidance for companies seeking to comply with the regulations.
While OSHA has conducted inspections to assess compliance with its
regulation for several years, EPA is just beginning to conduct such
inspections.

Emergency Response Planning Emergency response plans are required by OSHA's
HAZWOPER, Process

and Notification Safety Management, and Emergency Action Plan regulations;
by EPA's Risk

Management Program regulation; and by regulations promulgated under RCRA and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 17 A number of these

17 We did not review other federal, state, or local agencies that may have
additional emergency response requirements.

regulations' requirements are similar in that they call for facilities to,
where appropriate, prepare to notify community, state, and federal
authorities; establish the facility chain of command for use during an
incident; develop a process for ensuring the safety of responders; arrange
for interaction between internal and external emergency response teams; and
prepare for waste management.

Despite these similarities, the emergency plans under each regulation differ
in some aspects. The detailed requirements for the execution of each plan
vary, depending on the potential severity of the release, the type of
hazardous material, the nature of the discharge (that is, into the air,
water, or ground), the layout of the facility, and the extent to which the
facility depends on outside assistance. In addition, EPA's regulations
require plans that detail how a facility would respond to an accidental
discharge that would affect the environment or the surrounding community. In
contrast, OSHA's emergency response regulations focus on protecting workers.
As discussed later, in 1996 facilities were permitted through the Integrated
Contingency Plan Guidance to consolidate their federal emergency response
plans into a One- Plan.

As part of these emergency plans, facilities are required to notify the
appropriate federal authorities regarding the incident. 18 However, the
appropriate federal officials vary according to the type of hazardous
material involved and the nature of the release. For example, after any oil
spill from a covered vessel or facility, or a hazardous material discharge
of a certain magnitude, facilities are required to contact the National
Response Center (NRC), which is the central point of contact for
coordinating the federal response to such events. In addition, each plan
must take into consideration the unique reporting requirements of individual
agencies that must be notified if certain factors are present. For example,
OSHA requires facilities to report within 8 hours any accidental discharge
in which a worker is killed or three workers are injured seriously enough to
require hospitalization.

Recordkeeping and Reporting We found a lesser degree of overlap among
recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Virtually all of the OSHA and EPA
hazardous material statutes and regulations we reviewed contained
requirements that facilities

18 In addition, CSB has the authority to promulgate a regulation governing
when it should be notified of incidents involving hazardous chemicals. CSB
has been hesitant to promulgate such a regulation in light of existing
requirements by other agencies.

keep records. OSHA's recordkeeping requirements tended to focus on worker-
related information, such as on- the- job training, injuries or illnesses,
and safety procedures. EPA's requirements in this area focused more on the
results of environmental testing, such as air sampling and emissions
monitoring. However, both require facilities to maintain records on the
results of periodic medical examinations of workers at hazardous waste
sites. ATF requires facilities to keep records of explosives transactions
and inventories.

There are relatively few overlapping requirements for reporting related to
work place safety and health at hazardous material facilities. OSHA requires
little routine reporting. EPA generally requires reporting of information
kept in facility records and the submission of facility emergency response
plans for approval. As with recordkeeping, ATF requires facilities to report
to the agency whenever explosives may have been misplaced in a transaction
or may be missing from inventories. (See table 7 in app. II.)

Employers Report That Trade association and labor union officials we
contacted agreed that

Overlapping regulatory overlap can benefit workers but also has the
potential for

placing a compliance burden on employers that, in the long term, could
Regulations Cause

limit work place safety and health. Our review found overlapping Burden, yet
Some

requirements in three areas: incident investigation, worker training, and
Workers Are

development of emergency response plans. Representatives of nearly all of
the facilities we contacted agreed that these overlapping agency

Inadequately Protected procedures and requirements resulted in duplication
of effort and

unnecessary burden. Labor union officials expressed concern that facilities
facing such compliance burdens may not be able to fully implement regulatory
requirements and comply with investigations, potentially placing workers at
risk. At the same time, employer and employee representatives also
emphasized that some workers- such as certain emergency response personnel-
are inadequately protected due to regulatory gaps.

Multiagency Incident Twelve of the 40 facilities we contacted had
experienced multiagency

Investigations Have Created incident investigations. According to facility
and regional office officials, in

Confusion and Burden a few instances the agencies coordinated their
investigations to the extent

possible with good results. For example, in one investigation, the agencies
developed a protocol that identified the lead agency and contact points, and
agreed on the extent to which the agencies would coordinate daily

meetings and the control of gathered evidence. In another investigation, the
agencies worked together primarily because the employer threatened to not
cooperate with any of them unless the agencies coordinated with each other.
According to the employer, after the federal investigators consulted
together, they were able to develop a procedure for coordinating the
investigation.

However, many facility managers, as well as regional office officials,
confirmed that the agencies' simultaneous, separate investigations placed a
burden on facility personnel at a time when they were already coping with a
catastrophe that might have involved fatalities or serious injuries. 19
These facilities' experiences are not unexpected given the results of our
review of the relevant regulations, which found the potential for
investigating agencies to make duplicative requests for information and
evidence. For example, ATF agents pursued their criminal investigations
independently. During one incident, ATF cordoned off the scene and permitted
only law enforcement personnel to enter the site, thus excluding OSHA, EPA,
and CSB investigators. Similarly, CSB investigators often insisted on
conducting their interviews separately, even when other investigating
agencies would have the same questions for the same witnesses. Finally,
facilities would need to respond to separate requests for documents because,
as stated earlier, the agencies are sometimes unable to share documents that
have been designated as confidential business information.

Officials at some facilities expressed frustration over the resources they
expended to comply with uncoordinated federal investigations. During some
investigations, facility staff needed to accompany federal officials on
separate tours of the scene of the incident to examine evidence. Facilities
needed to make workers available for separate interviews, which often took
hours. In addition, the employers said that agencies made separate requests
for documents and facility staff spent days copying, compiling, and boxing
such documents. 20 Two facility managers emphasized that, although agencies
were within their rights to seek information during their

19 Facility managers also indicated that they were subject to uncoordinated
routine inspections, sometimes within a few weeks of one another, but stated
that this did not present a problem.

20 Facility managers added that, at the same time, state and local
government agencies were often conducting their own investigations and
lawyers representing the injured or survivors of those killed were also
contacting the facility.

investigations, the agencies could ease the administrative burden if they
would do so in a coordinated manner.

Multiagency Training Representatives of 16 of the 40 facilities we contacted
stated that the need

Requirements Place to comply with OSHA's and EPA's training requirements has
led to

Additional Burden on duplication and created a compliance burden for them.
This occurs

Employers because several of their regulations address exposure to the same

hazardous materials (or group of materials) and for similar groups of
workers, but may have different requirements for the content of the
training, depending on the type of exposure. In addition, although EPA and
OSHA regulations may require the same training content, other aspects of
their requirements differ, such as the required number of hours of training.
As a result, facilities seeking to comply with training requirements may
need to provide workers with multiple rounds of training that provide
duplicative information. The experiences of these facilities are consistent
with the findings of our review of training regulations for hazardous
material facilities, which found overlap for the training requirements for
workers handling hazardous materials.

According to facility managers and union representatives we contacted, the
overlapping training requirements have led a few facilities to develop
specific curriculums that attempt to consolidate the training requirements
from key regulations. Managers at these facilities said additional resources
were devoted to developing these curriculums. Despite best efforts, they
were still concerned that they might have left out crucial training elements
and, as a result, workers may not be adequately trained to handle hazardous
materials. Managers also expressed concern that agency inspectors might not
accept these consolidated curriculums as meeting the requirements of the
various regulations involved.

Multiple Emergency Despite the availability of the One- Plan guidance,
several facility managers

Response Requirements stated that the overlapping emergency planning
requirements caused them

Result in Additional Work to develop multiple emergency response plans that
created not only an

and Confusion additional burden, but also confusion as to what procedures
should be

used in the event of an emergency and whom should be contacted. OSHA and EPA
alone maintain six emergency response plan requirements. These plans have
some overlapping requirements although, according to managers at two
facilities, not enough to permit facilities to use one of the plans for all
emergencies. The plans differed in focus (for example, an oil spill into a
local waterway versus a runaway chemical reaction that could

lead to an explosion) and had different emergency response requirements.
Using the plan with the most stringent requirements would likely be
inappropriate for smaller emergencies warranting a less vigorous response.

Only two of the facilities in our review stated that they were aware of the
One- Plan guidance that would permit them to consolidate their emergency
response plans. As a result, many of the facilities we contacted maintained
at least two of the six emergency response plans required by OSHA and EPA,
and some maintained as many as five. Facility managers said the requirements
to develop multiple emergency response plans pose an administrative burden,
not just for developing the plans initially but also for maintaining and
updating the plans as required. The existence of multiple plans could also
delay emergency response as personnel try to determine which plan to use
while the accidental release is in progress. Some facility managers told us
that they believed that such a delay could jeopardize the safety of workers
and others injured by or attempting to contain the hazardous material leak.
As a consequence, several facilities indicated to us that, in addition to
the numerous federally required plans, they maintain yet another emergency
response plan- one developed by the facility itself- that they would
actually use in the event of an accidental release of hazardous materials.
Managers at several of the facilities we contacted reacted positively to the
concept of a One- Plan and some stated they would consider developing one
the next time they reviewed and updated their emergency response plans.

According to managers at two of the 40 facilities, the existence of multiple
plans and associated requirements also leads to confusion regarding which
federal authorities should be contacted in the event of an emergency. By not
contacting all appropriate authorities, facilities may conceivably delay
response to a hazardous material leak. Such delay may threaten workers or
the surrounding community. Out of concern that they may not be contacting
all the appropriate authorities, managers at these facilities said that they
contacted any federal agency they believe may have some jurisdiction, even
though this practice may create additional burdens. Facility managers were
generally familiar with the NRC- a federal point of contact that receives
notification of many serious hazardous material incidents and notifies the
appropriate federal agencies. However, officials at one facility pointed out
that one call to the NRC does not obviate their need to contact other
agencies directly. For example, as discussed earlier, OSHA has a separate
reporting requirement when worker fatalities or injuries occur.

Some Workers Remain Facility officials and labor union officials said that
regulatory gaps leave

Inadequately Protected some workers inadequately protected. For example,
federal regulations

often do not extend to workers who handle certain types of materials that
become hazardous or explosive when mixed. The three regulatory agencies in
our review noted the difficulty involved with extending regulatory coverage
to the dangers posed by all chemical combinations. Given the approximately
650,000 chemicals currently in use and those being developed every day,
developing a regulation that provides meaningful coverage for all mixtures
would present a potentially insurmountable challenge. While OSHA and ATF
regulations extend to explosives, which are often a composite of several
materials, EPA and OSHA generally regulate work place hazards for single
materials. CSB officials have said that each year, workers are injured-
sometimes fatally- when explosions or other reactions occur because
chemicals that should not be combined are mixed, or are mixed without the
requisite safety procedures or equipment. In August 2000, a CSB
investigation report found that an explosion that injured nine people- two
seriously- largely resulted because unprotected workers lacked the proper
equipment or training to safely mix materials and recognize when the mixture
had become unstable. The report noted that existing federal safety standards
do not provide sufficient protection for workers using this kind of reactive
chemical process and recommended that OSHA and EPA issue joint guidelines
governing reactive chemical process hazards that result from mixing such
materials.

Labor union officials and the managers of one facility we contacted stated
that federal regulations also do not adequately cover all state and local
government emergency personnel that respond to accidental hazardous material
releases. This view is consistent with our review of the relevant
regulations and information we obtained from OSHA and EPA officials. OSHA's
HAZWOPER regulation requires training, protective equipment, and other
protections for personnel who respond to hazardous material incidents.
However, OSHA's protections do not extend to state and local government
workers, except in the 23 states that received delegated authority from
OSHA. These states are required to provide work place safety and health
coverage at least as effective as provided by OSHA to workers, including
state and local government workers.

As required by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (P.
L. 99- 499), EPA adopted OSHA's HAZWOPER regulation for state and local
government employees in the 27 states that do not have delegated authority
from OSHA. However, EPA has not taken any enforcement actions under this
regulation. In responding to this report, EPA's Assistant Administrator for
Solid Waste and Emergency Response stated that while the agency has taken no
enforcement action under the HAZWOPER regulation, this lack of enforcement
is not because the agency believes it lacks the legal authority to do so.
However, numerous EPA program officials we contacted in the field and
headquarters said that EPA does not have legal authority to enforce this
regulation. The internal confusion about EPA's authority, plus the lack of
enforcement action, raises questions about how well EPA's regulation
protects responders to hazardous material incidents. 21

According to one OSHA official, the agency has addressed this issue to some
extent by requiring facilities to ensure that any outside organization
identified in the facilities' emergency response plans as playing a major
role in containing any hazardous material accident is appropriately trained
and equipped. If the external personnel do not have the required training or
other protection, the facilities must pursue other options such as training
the emergency personnel at their own expense, developing an in- house
response capability, or contracting with a private hazardous materials
response organization. With this requirement, OSHA has been able to extend
HAZWOPER protection to additional emergency response organizations. However,
OSHA recognizes that it could not reach all potential first responders to
hazardous material emergencies in this way. First, not all hazardous
material facilities are required by OSHA to have a facility response plan
because they are below the threshold for regulatory coverage. Second, first
responders who are untrained and not part of a facility's emergency response
plan may, nonetheless, respond to an emergency at that facility. As a
result, state and local government first responders may not receive the
training or protective equipment needed to safely respond to emergencies
involving hazardous materials.

21 Similarly, federal work place safety and health regulations do not
adequately protect volunteers who respond to hazardous material incidents.
Generally speaking, OSHA protections do not extend to volunteers, leaving
EPA as the only federal agency that provides such protection. However, EPA
can extend protection to volunteer first responders only in states that do
not have OSHA- delegated authority. State governments are under no
obligation to provide regulatory protections to such volunteers but some may
do so under certain circumstances.

Consequently, though they are working side- by- side with private- sector
workers performing essentially the same work, they may have less training
and protective equipment.

The gap in overall protection for state and local government workers in
states without delegated authority from OSHA has not gone unnoticed. Members
of the Congress, the Department of Labor's Office of the Inspector General,
and the American Industrial Hygiene Association have all recommended that
the law be amended so that OSHA can extend work place safety and health
protection to state and local government employees. For example, on February
23, 1999, Congressman Robert E. Andrews introduced the Fairness for State
and Local Workers Act, which seeks to extend OSHA work place safety and
health protections to all state and local government workers. Also, on
February 9, 2000, the Labor Department's Office of Inspector General issued
its report, Evaluating the Status of Occupational Safety and Health Coverage
of State and Local Government Workers in Federal OSHA States, Report No. 05-
00- 001- 10- 001, which found that many states under the jurisdiction of
federal OSHA (that is, those without delegated authority) lack important
occupational safety and health protections for public- sector employees in
general. It recommended that the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
be amended to extend federal work place safety and health coverage to all
public- sector employees.

Agencies' Efforts to OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB have taken steps to coordinate
their overlapping

Coordinate requirements and activities; however, these efforts do not
adequately

address the duplication or gaps we identified. We found little evidence that
Overlapping Activities

existing MOUs among the agencies are generally followed or address the Are
Incomplete

duplicative requirements claimed by the facilities in our review. Although
interagency groups developed to facilitate coordination have had some
success, their effect appears to be limited. The NRT- a federal multiagency
organization with responsibility for coordinating federal response to
hazardous material incidents- has made a good effort to reduce the
compliance burden associated with the development of emergency response
plans, but its effect has been limited because employers may not be aware of
the new consolidated plan option.

Agreements Address Some According to agency officials, coordination is
necessary and important in

Coordination Issues but the work place safety regulatory environment.
Although some coordination

Their Effectiveness Is mechanisms in this area date back to the 1970s and
1980s, the importance

Unknown of coordination was emphasized in 1993, when the Government

Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was signed into law. Among other things,
this law required federal agencies to coordinate implementation of shared
responsibilities. 22 In GPRA planning documents, OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB all
recognized the importance of working closely with other agencies. In
addition, some statutes require these agencies to coordinate specific
activities with other regulatory agencies. For example, TSCA requires the
EPA Administrator to coordinate implementation of the statute with other
federal agencies to maximize enforcement and minimize the regulatory burden.

Also in 1993, EPA, working in conjunction with the NRT, issued a report that
discussed how regulatory overlap could lead to confusion. This report,
entitled A Review of Federal Authorities for Hazardous Materials Accident
Safety, describes the hazardous material safety system and defines it as a
composite of laws, regulations, and programs pieced together and
administered by numerous agencies at all levels of government. The report
concludes that this system, as developed, resulted in overlaps,
inefficiencies, and some gaps in the statutory and regulatory framework, and
in the federal government's management structure, causing it to be
unnecessarily burdensome and confusing for government, industry, and the
public. Although this report does not contain recommendations, EPA officials
stated that it has led to several efforts to strengthen interagency
coordination on hazardous materials issues.

According to agency officials, MOUs represent the agencies' efforts to
implement these and other coordination requirements. Ten MOUs among OSHA,
EPA, ATF, and CSB currently seek to coordinate overlapping authority or
activities concerning hazardous materials. These MOUs do little to lessen
the compliance burden placed on employers because they do not address the
key duplicative requirements identified by facilities we contacted and the
requirements in the MOUs are rarely followed.

22 GPRA calls for agencies to establish program objectives and strategies
for meeting those objectives. It also provides federal agencies with a
framework for addressing overlapping program objectives.

As shown in table 4, two of the MOUs delineate jurisdictional
responsibilities between the signatory agencies for regulating worker
exposure to certain hazardous materials (namely, explosives and wood
preservatives). The remaining eight are cooperative; that is, they call for
interagency cooperation with regard to various activities, ranging from
assessing the hazards for chemical substances (1986 EPA- OSHA MOU) to
conducting incident investigations (1998 OSHA- CSB and 1998 EPA- CSB MOUs).
23

Table 4: Hazardous Material MOUs Inspection- related coordination elements
Signatory

Incident Information

Joint Year agencies Subject

notification exchange Referrals inspections Reports Other a Jurisdictional
MOUs

1974 OSHA, Storage of explosives b X ATF 1986 OSHA,

Regulation of wood X

EPA preservative pesticides b Cooperative MOUs

1981 OSHA, General coordination for

X X X EPA regulating pesticides and

other toxic materials 1986 OSHA,

Protective clothing and X X EPA,

equipment for handling NIOSH, c

hazardous waste USCG d

1986 OSHA, Designation of materials

X EPA as toxic 1988 OSHA,

Assessment and X X

EPA, regulation of toxic

NIOSH materials

1990 OSHA, General coordination of

X X X X X EPA enforcement procedures 1991 OSHA,

Regulation of EPA X X X X EPA assisted municipal

wastewater projects

23 OSHA and EPA entered into an MOU in November 1996 that called for joint
investigations of the causes of serious chemical accidents. Although it was
never officially rescinded, according to OSHA officials, the MOU lost its
effect in 1998 when the CSB took responsibility for investigating the root
causes of such incidents.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Inspection- related coordination elements Signatory

Incident Information

Joint Year agencies Subject

notification exchange Referrals inspections Reports Other a

1998 OSHA, Hazardous material

X X X X CSB incident investigations 1999 EPA,

Hazardous material X X X CSB incident investigations a This category
includes conducting research, coordinating the development of new
regulations, and

making efforts to encourage state OSHAs to participate in MOUs. b OSHA
considers these interagency agreements to function as MOUs.

c National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. d U. S. Coast
Guard.

Source: MOUs provided by OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB.

The eight cooperative MOUs include a number of elements that may facilitate
the coordination of incident investigations, including incident
notification, information exchange, referrals, and joint inspections.
However, we found little evidence that these elements were carried out by
agency staff. While some EPA headquarters officials stated that agency
regional staff complied with the elements of EPA- OSHA MOUs during incident
investigations, other headquarters and regional agency officials were
uncertain whether and to what extent their staff adhered to the elements of
MOUs. Further, both OSHA and EPA officials said that states with delegated
authority are not bound to comply with these MOUs. Managers at the agencies'
regional offices stated that agency investigators speak informally with
other agencies' staffs, but that formal notification or referral happens
very infrequently and is generally not entered in the agencies' databases.
In fact, EPA's inspection database does not track referrals, and OSHA's
inspection database identified only 37 referrals to OSHA from EPA and three
to EPA from OSHA from April 1998 to March 2000. Officials said joint
inspections were rare, and neither EPA's nor OSHA's inspection databases
identify those inspections that may occur jointly. Moreover, all but four of
these MOUs are about 10 years old or older, and an OSHA official said that
the usefulness of MOUs tends to diminish over time to the point where they
are rarely, if ever, used. Finally, none of the MOUs address those
duplicative requirements we identified as creating compliance burdens for
facilities (that is, training and emergency notification requirements).

OSHA, EPA, and ATF are currently negotiating additional MOUs to further
coordinate incident investigations. OSHA is currently negotiating an MOU
with ATF to better define each agency's role during incident investigations

and the extent to which information or evidence can be jointly gathered.
OSHA is also developing an MOU with EPA to update the 1990 MOU to
incorporate the new regulations governing the safety of industrial processes
(OSHA's Process Safety Management standard and EPA's Risk Management
Program). According to OSHA officials, the revised MOU will enhance the
agencies' efforts to share information relevant to each agency's
regulations, conduct joint inspections, and coordinate investigations. The
agencies have no time frames for the completion of these MOUs and no plans
for ensuring that the elements of these new MOUs are implemented.

Interagency Groups Address OSHA, EPA, other federal agencies and, in one
case, labor unions have

Coordination Issues but formed three interagency groups, explained below, to
coordinate agency

Impact Is Limited activities with regard to various aspects of work place
safety and health at

hazardous material facilities. These interagency groups have had mixed
results in coordinating agencies' regulatory activities.

Standing Committee on Process The OSHA/ EPA Process Safety Management- Risk
Management Program

Safety Regulations Standing Committee has made progress but appears to
operate in an

informal manner, which may hamper its ability to address the coordination
issues that will likely arise from these agencies' joint regulation of
process safety management. The standing committee which, according to EPA
officials, resulted in part from the EPA- NRT 1993 report, seeks to enhance
interagency coordination for enforcement of OSHA's Process Safety Management
standard and EPA's Risk Management Plan regulation. As discussed earlier,
both regulations were mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, in
which OSHA and EPA were instructed to coordinate implementation of their
regulations governing the safety of hazardous material processes. The
standing committee, which convened formally for the first time in fall 1999,
24 consists of staff from both agencies and meets monthly to identify areas
in which either OSHA or EPA should harmonize their respective process safety
regulations.

The standing committee has objectives, but no strategy for reaching those
objectives or criteria for measuring success. Recognizing the potential for
overlap with regard to their responsibilities for ensuring process safety,

24 Prior to creation of the standing committee, OSHA and EPA officials met
informally beginning in 1991 to address coordination issues resulting from
their promulgation of process safety regulations.

OSHA and EPA in an August 1996 letter committed to coordinate enforcement of
their respective regulations. This half- page letter contains background
information on the need for coordination and lists four objectives, which
the standing committee has adopted. These are to (1) assist the regulated
community's efforts to comply with the regulations, (2) interpret the
regulations and provide guidance to facilities, (3) share information, and
(4) develop enforcement and compliance strategies and actions. The letter
devotes a few sentences to a strategy to achieve these objectives, which
standing committee officials contend is the strategy the committee is using.
Thus, the standing committee, which has been in formal operation for about 1
year, has yet to develop additional outcomeor results- oriented goals to
define the general process goals listed in the joint letter, a long- term
strategy to help identify which issues should be addressed first, or
procedures for identifying the progress made toward achieving its goals.

Moreover, as currently organized, the standing committee depends largely
upon informal procedures for its operations, which may hinder its usefulness
as a mechanism for coordinating OSHA's and EPA's implementation of process
safety management regulations. According to agency officials on the
committee, its members use ad hoc means to identify issues to address and
take only general minutes of the meetings. Their communication is frequent
but informal. They also have not established structured mechanisms to ensure
that they identify the pertinent issues of concern to employees and labor
unions, who can provide valuable input on the results of these regulations.
They also can help to identify where confusion or the compliance burden may
be limiting full implementation and thus, undermining the impact of the
regulations on protecting work place safety and health. Agency officials
stated that the two agencies could strengthen the standing committee by
introducing some rigor into its operations.

Despite the informal nature of the committee's operations, according to
agency officials on the committee, the committee has sought to address
employers' priorities. The primary effort to date has been to recommend that
OSHA expand its current list of covered hazardous materials by adding seven
to nine substances that are currently covered only by EPA's regulation.
Agency officials anticipate that this effort, that would increase to at
least 66 the number of materials common to both lists, would further
harmonize the two regulations and, ultimately, help employers comply. No
decision has been reached, however, with regard to the threshold at which
these materials will be regulated and OSHA has just recently initiated the

regulatory process needed to make this change. The standing committee has
also been instrumental in (1) making sure that all process safety guidelines
issued by either agency are reviewed to ensure that they do not conflict
with agreed- upon policies or prior guidelines, (2) arranging for OSHA
investigators to receive EPA's Risk Management Program training, and (3)
arranging for EPA investigators to observe OSHA's Process Safety Management
inspections. Agency officials acknowledged, however, that the standing
committee's role in these efforts might not be evident because they have not
documented the results of their efforts.

Hazardous Waste Task Force The hazardous waste task force, known as the EPA/
Labor Superfund Health and Safety Task Force, includes, in addition to EPA
and OSHA, other agencies and labor unions. It has accomplished a great deal
to improve the technical implementation of pertinent regulations, but lacks
the authority to address employer concerns that may require changes in
regulations. The task force was formed in 1991, and attempts to enhance
coordination among those public and private- sector agencies involved in
cleaning up and remediating emergencies at hazardous waste sites. 25 The
task force, which is made up of health and safety experts from several
federal agencies and labor organizations, does not have a statutory or
regulatory charter. 26 The task force meets bimonthly and addresses
primarily technical issues arising from overlapping authorities for workers
at Superfund sites and those carrying out emergency response. The task force
seeks to (1) identify issues that endanger the safety and health of workers
in hazardous waste operations, including emergency response; (2) develop
nonregulatory, coordinated interagency resolutions to those issues; and (3)
communicate this information broadly within the industry sector. The task
force also serves as a knowledgeable resource to aid agencies and
organizations in addressing emerging hazardous waste operations and
emergency response issues. The task force makes recommendations to EPA once
or twice each year.

The task force has a number of accomplishments. For example, working through
the task force, OSHA and EPA are updating HAZWOPER- related fact sheets,
published originally in the early 1990s, to reflect changes or

25 Superfund sites are abandoned or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. 26
Other agencies that send representatives to this task force are the U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Energy, Department of the Navy,
NIOSH, and the National Institute of Environmental Health Services.

interpretations in related standards or identified best practices. The task
force has also supported OSHA in the development of Protocols and Compliance
Directories, which help employers to comply with its regulations. Member
agencies have also contacted the task force to obtain other agencies' views
on policy/ guidance documents. However, because of its technical focus and
lack of an official agency charter, the task force lacks the authority to
address compliance issues resulting from regulatory overlap, such as
duplicative training and emergency response requirements.

The NRT's Efforts Have Had In accordance with CERCLA, President Reagan
created the NRT in 1987 in

Limited Results an order that also designated EPA to serve as chair. The NRT
is responsible

for national preparedness and coordination of response actions to incidents
involving hazardous materials. As part of this responsibility, the NRT is
authorized to recommend regulatory changes to facilitate coordination among
federal agencies that respond to hazardous material emergencies. 27

The NRT has taken a number of steps to address the concerns identified by
the hazardous material facilities we contacted. For example, recognizing the
duplication and other problems resulting from the overlapping requirements
to develop emergency response plans, the NRT in 1996 developed the One-
Plan. This guidance, the need for which was highlighted in the EPA- NRT 1993
report, allows hazardous material facilities to consolidate all of their
pertinent federal emergency response plans into one plan that will meet
federal regulatory requirements. With its minimal resources, the NRT was
limited in what it could do to inform employers about the One- Plan, but it
did post the guidance and a fact sheet on its website. EPA played a major
role in publicizing the One- Plan, including publishing the guidance in the
Federal Register, working with various trade associations to provide their
members with this information, and referencing the One- Plan in its Risk
Management Program regulation. OSHA has also made efforts to publicize the
One- Plan. The agency included a description of the One- Plan in a relevant
Compliance Directive and agency officials made a presentation at an
industrial hygiene trade

27 The USCG is the vice chair of the NRT, and OSHA is one of its 16 members.
Other member agencies include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce
(National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration), Defense, Energy,
Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, State, Transportation, and the
Treasury; the Federal Emergency Management Agency; the General Services
Administration; and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

association conference. NRT officials do not know how many employers have
implemented the One- Plan but, as discussed earlier, we found that only two
of the facilities we contacted were aware of this option.

Currently, the NRT is making efforts to address the burden employers face
regarding notification of federal agencies of unauthorized leaks of
hazardous materials. There are many different requirements for notifying
federal officials of leaks and the resulting confusion has often prompted
facilities to contact any agency that might have interest or jurisdiction.
The NRT is in the process of developing what it calls a One- Number- a
single telephone number that facilities can use to contact all federal
agencies regardless of the type of release or emergency. These efforts are
in the early stages and NRT does not have a timetable for completing them.
Until it is finalized and implemented, we will not know if this One- Number
will in fact eliminate the need for facilities to undertake duplicative
notification procedures.

Conclusions In recognition of the importance placed on protection against
exposure to hazardous materials that are often found in the work place, the
Congress

has given OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB related and sometimes overlapping roles
for ensuring worker protection from exposure to hazardous materials. If
properly coordinated, this overlap could help ensure that workers are
protected. However, we found that, in many cases, agencies either did not
have or did not make use of existing mechanisms to properly coordinate their
activities- especially in the areas of incident investigation, training, and
emergency response procedures. Managers at hazardous material facilities
told us that this situation not only leads to unnecessary burden and
duplication for employers, but also potentially weakens the protections
afforded to workers. The agencies need mechanisms to coordinate overlapping
activities to address the concerns raised by employers.

Regarding incident investigations, agencies need a protocol to use when more
than one agency will be investigating to determine (1) which agency
representative will coordinate the investigation, (2) the extent to which
investigators can jointly obtain and share information, and (3) how
confidentiality and other issues will be handled. The protocol should be
flexible enough to accommodate various agency missions and requirements. In
the absence of such a protocol, coordination at incident investigations will
continue to be ad hoc.

To make compliance with training requirements easier for employers, EPA and
OSHA could jointly develop a unified curriculum that consolidates both
agencies' training requirements for workers who handle hazardous materials.
Such an effort has precedent. The NRT's One- Plan, which establishes a
mechanism for a single emergency response plan, serves as a model for this
type of interagency effort. Finally, although the NRT's efforts to establish
the One- Plan are useful, the NRT needs to expand beyond working with trade
associations to help publicize the One- Plan option. The NRT's effort to
establish the One- Number is too new to evaluate.

Given that there is little or no evidence that existing MOUs are being used
or are efficient, the agencies need to determine whether they still believe
MOUs serve a purpose and, if so, identify ways to measure achievement of the
activities laid out in the MOUs. The agencies may identify other ways that
better ensure coordination, such as developing investigation policies and
procedures that require coordination, or developing other performance
measures.

OSHA and EPA's standing committee on process safety regulations has made
some progress. However, given its lack of a long- term strategy and
mechanism to obtain the views of employees and labor unions, it may not be
able to rise to the long- term challenge of coordinating the two
regulations' overlapping requirements.

Recommendations for To enhance worker protection and reduce the compliance
burden

Executive Action associated with the hazardous material statutes and
associated regulations

addressed in this report, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the EPA

Administrator, and the CSB Chairman work to establish a general protocol
that sets forth the framework under which multiagency incident
investigations shall be conducted; the Secretary of Labor and the EPA
Administrator establish guidance

that consolidates common training requirements into a unified training
curriculum for hazardous material workers; and the NRT Chairman consult with
member agencies to identify and

implement additional outreach mechanisms to alert employers to the option of
preparing a consolidated emergency response plan, or OnePlan.

To ensure that agencies adequately coordinate overlapping authority,
procedures, or requirements for hazardous material facilities over the long
term, we recommend that

the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of the Treasury, the EPA
Administrator, and the CSB Chairman work to determine whether and to what
extent MOUs are achieving their stated objectives and, where necessary, to
establish other mechanisms that more effectively address employer burden and
enhance worker protection, such as enforcement procedures that require
coordination; and the Secretary of Labor and the EPA Administrator enhance
the

accountability and effectiveness of the OSHA/ EPA standing committee on the
agencies' process safety management regulations by establishing a long- term
strategy needed to address future coordination issues and a mechanism to
obtain the views of employees and labor unions.

Agency Comments OSHA, EPA, ATF, and CSB provided us with written comments on
a draft of this report. These comments are reproduced in appendices III, IV,
V, and VI,

respectively. Three agencies made specific reference to our recommendations.
EPA agreed with most of our recommendations without elaborating. CSB
endorsed the two recommendations that applied to it. Finally, OSHA agreed
with our recommendation regarding publicizing the One- Plan and did not
object to any of the others. All four agencies raised concerns or provided
further clarifications for the portions of our draft report that
characterized their jurisdictions and missions, and the extent to which they
are coordinating their overlapping requirements.

EPA, CSB and ATF raised issues concerning the report's discussion of their
relative missions. EPA said that employers, and not government agencies,
have the primary responsibility to protect work place safety and health. It
also said that its primary mission is to protect the environment, and that
worker safety and health may not be a major component of all its guiding
statutes. ATF stated that its mission in the work place is to protect
against the hazards arising from misuse and unsafe storage of explosive
material in commerce. We made changes in the report to further clarify these
agencies' primary missions. We also reflect in the report that OSHA has the
primary role to enforce work place safety and health while continuing to
discuss the other agencies' roles in this area. CSB and ATF also commented
that there are instances in which, because of their unique missions, they
need to function independently to attain their objectives at incident
investigations.

OSHA acknowledged the overlap between its and EPA's training requirements,
but stated our report did not consider the progress these two agencies had
made to minimize the resulting burden on facilities. It cited several
examples of such coordination, including OSHA's and EPA's HAZWOPER and
process safety management regulations. These regulations and interagency
coordination mechanisms are discussed in the report, which we believe
provides a comprehensive discussion of the relevant coordination mechanisms
brought to our attention by agency headquarters and field office officials,
facility managers, and labor union officials. We acknowledge that some EPA
regulations refer to OSHA's requirements or incorporate requirements by
reference. According to employers and labor union officials, however, while
such efforts are beneficial, they do not eliminate confusion or additional
burden and fall short of the unified training guidance that we recommend.
Such guidance would consolidate all relevant training requirements into a
unified set of instructions similar in intent to the One- Plan guidance.

OSHA also said that, in its estimation, very few employers could be affected
by combined overlapping jurisdiction of the four agencies in our review. The
intent of our review was not to establish the number of employers that could
be affected by overlapping jurisdictions, but to demonstrate the experiences
of affected employers in their efforts to comply with these requirements.
Moreover, as far back as 1993, EPA, working in conjunction with the NRT,
concluded that the federal hazardous material safety system caused
complexities, inefficiencies, and confusion for both regulators and the
regulated community.

EPA raised other issues, including the association we draw between the
compliance burden and resulting confusion, and the endangerment of worker
safety. The agency said that, while it agrees that lack of coordination
could lead to a compliance burden, it does not agree that inefficiencies in
coordination could jeopardize worker safety. As stated in our report, we
believe that compliance burden could, under certain circumstances, affect
the level of work place safety and health afforded to workers. This view is
corroborated by employers and union officials we contacted as part of this
review. EPA also commented on our characterization of the operating
structure of the OSHA/ EPA standing committee and stated that it does have
objectives, a long- term strategy and a mechanism to obtain the views of the
regulated community. In response to EPA's comments, we revised and further
clarified our description of certain aspects of the standing committee's
operations. Nonetheless, we maintain our concerns that the standing
committee relies on informal

procedures and has not established mechanisms to ensure that it identifies
the issues of concern pertinent to employees and labor unions, a long- term
strategy to help identify which issues should be addressed first, or
procedures for identifying when the standing committee has achieved its
goals.

The agencies also made technical comments, which we incorporated as
appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees; the Honorable Alexis M. Herman, Secretary of Labor; the
Honorable Lawrence H. Summers, Secretary of the Treasury; the Honorable
Carol M. Browner, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency;
Gerald Poje, Irv Rosenthal, and Andrea Kidd Taylor, members of the Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director
of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request.

Please contact me on (202) 512- 7215 if you or your staff have any questions
about this report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VII.

Sincerely yours, Marnie S. Shaul Director, Education, Workforce,

and Income Security Issues

Appendi Appendi xes xI

Relevant Statutes and Regulations Table 5 lists the principal agencies with
statutory responsibilities affecting safety and health at stationary work
places where there is exposure to hazardous materials, the statutes that
grant them this authority, and the regulations they have promulgated to
exercise such authority. Given its sole focus on work place safety and
health, the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's (OSHA) regulations address numerous specific work place
hazards. In contrast, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and
Department of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms' (ATF)
regulations tend to address broader environmental and public safety issues,
respectively, but are implemented in such a way as to protect workers.

Table 5: Statutes and Regulations Affecting Work Place Safety and Health at
Hazardous Material Facilities Agency Regulation Description Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U. S. C. 651 et seq.)

OSHA Log and summary of occupational injuries and Employers must maintain a
log and summary of all recordable illnesses (29 C. F. R. 1904.2)
occupational injuries and illnesses for that establishment and

record each one within 6 working days. Reporting of fatality or multiple
hospitalization

An employer must report to OSHA, within 8 hours, any fatality or incidents
(29 C. F. R. 1904. 8) catastrophic event (defined as three or more workers

hospitalized).

Means of egress (29 C. F. R. 1910 subpart E)

Employee emergency plans (29 C. F. R. 1910.38) Employers must have, in
writing, an emergency action plan to ensure employee safety from fire and
other emergencies.

Hazardous materials (29 C. F. R. 1910 subpart H)

Compressed gases (29 C. F. R. 1910.101) Establishes a standard for the in-
plant handling, storage, and utilization of compressed gas in cylinders.
Employers must conduct visual and other inspections to ensure compressed
gases are in safe condition.

Acetylene (29 C. F. R. 1910.102) Establishes a standard for the in- plant
transfer, handling, storage, and utilization of acetylene in cylinders.

Hydrogen (29 C. F. R. 1910. 103) Establishes a standard for the safe use of
gaseous hydrogen systems.

Oxygen (29 C. F. R. 1910.104) Establishes a standard for the installation
and storage of bulk oxygen systems on industrial and institutional consumer
premises.

Nitrous oxide (29 C. F. R. 1910. 105) Establishes a standard for the in-
plant transfer and distribution of nitrous oxide.

Flammable and combustible liquids (29 C. F. R. Establishes a standard for
the storage, location, piping, and 1910. 106) protection of systems using
flammable and combustible liquids.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Regulation Description

Spray finishing using flammable or combustible Establishes a standard for
specific requirements concerning materials (29 C. F. R. 1910.107) equipment
and materials used to spray aerated solid powders

for coating purposes. Dip tanks containing flammable or combustible

Not applicable liquids (29 C. F. R. 1910.108) Explosives and blasting agents
(29 C. F. R.

Establishes a standard for the handling and storage of 1910. 109) explosives
and blasting agents.

Storage and handling of liquefied petroleum gases Establishes a standard for
the use of liquefied petroleum gases, (29 C. F. R. 1910.110) their
equipment, above and below ground containers, and

piping. Storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia (29

Establishes a standard for the design, location, construction, C. F. R.
1910.111) installation, and operation of anhydrous ammonia systems.

General requirements for dipping and coating Establishes requirements for
construction and ventilation for operations (29 C. F. R. 1910.124) dipping
and coating operations.

Additional requirements for dipping and coating Establishes requirements for
construction materials and piping operations that use flammable or
combustible

systems for dipping and coating operations. liquids (29 C. F. R. 1910.125)

Additional requirements for special dipping and Establishes procedures for
hardening or tempering tanks. coating operations (29 C. F. R. 1910.126)
Personal protective equipment (29 C. F. R. 1910

Subpart I)

Eye and face protection (29 C. F. R. 1910. 133) Requires the use of proper
eye or face equipment to protect employees from hazardous materials.

Respiratory protection (29 C. F. R. 1910.134) Requires the use of
respirators to protect employees from breathing contaminated air.

Occupational foot protection (29 C. F. R. 1910.136) Requires the use of
protective footwear in areas where there is danger of foot injury.

Hand protection (29 C. F. R. 1910. 138) Requires the use of appropriate hand
protection to protect employees' hands from exposure to hazards.

Respiratory protection for M. tuberculosis (29 C. F. R. Requires the use of
respirators to protect employees from 1910. 139) breathing contaminated air.

Toxic and hazardous substances (29 C. F. R. 1910 Subpart Z)

Air contaminants (29 C. F. R. 1910.1000) Limits employees' exposure to
particular substances. Asbestos (29 C. F. R. 1910.1001) Establishes
requirements for occupational exposure to asbestos. Coal tar pitch volatiles
(29 C. F. R 1002) Limits employee exposure to coal tar pitch volatiles. 13
Carcinogens (4- nitrobiphenyl, etc.) (29 C. F. R.

Establishes occupational exposure limits to particular 1910. 1003)
substances, medical surveillance, and air sampling.

Alpha- naphthylamine (29 C. F. R. 1910.1004) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003.
Methyl chloromethyl ether (29 C. F. R. 1910.1006) See 29 C. F. R. 1910.
1003. 3. 3'- Dichlorobenzidine (29 C. F. R. 1910.1007) See 29 C. F. R. 1910.
1003. bis- Chloromethyl ether (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1008) See 29 C. F. R. 1910.
1003. beta- Naphthylamine (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1009) See 29 C. F. R. 1910.
1003.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Regulation Description

Benzidine (29 C. F. R. 1910.1010) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003. 4-
Aminodiphenyl (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1011) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003.
Ethyleneimine (29 C. F. R. 1910.1012) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003. beta-
Propiolactone (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1013) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003. 2-
Acetylaminofluorene (29 C. F. R. 1910.1014) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003. 4-
Dimethylaminoazobenzene (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1015) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003.
N- Nitrosodimethylamine (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1016) See 29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003.
Vinyl chloride (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1017) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures

for vinyl chloride. Inorganic arsenic (29 C. F. R. 1910.1018) Establishes
exposure limits and medical surveillance measures

for inorganic arsenic. Lead (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1025) Establishes exposure
limits and medical surveillance measures

for lead. Cadmium (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1027) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures

for cadmium. Benzene (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1028) Establishes exposure limits
and medical surveillance measures

for benzene. Coke oven emissions (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1029) Establishes
exposure limits and medical surveillance measures

for coke oven emissions. Bloodborne pathogens (29 C. F. R. 1910.1030)
Establishes exposure limits and safety measures for bloodborne

pathogens. Cotton dust (29 C. F. R. 1910.1043) Establishes exposure limits
and medical surveillance measures

for cotton dust. 1, 2- Dibromo- 3- chloropropane (29 C. F. R.

Establishes exposure limits and medical surveillance measures 1910. 1044)
for 1, 2- dibromo- 3- chloropropane.

Acrylonitrile (29 C. F. R. 1910.1045) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for acrylonitrile.

Ethylene oxide (29 C. F. R. 1910.1047) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for ethylene oxide.

Formaldehyde (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1048) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for formaldehyde.

Methylenedianiline (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1050) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for methylenedianiline.

1,3- Butadiene (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1051) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for 1, 3- butadiene.

Methylene chloride (29 C. F. R. 1910.1052) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for methylene chloride.

Ionizing radiation (29 C. F. R. 1910.1096) Establishes exposure limits and
medical surveillance measures for ionizing radiation.

Hazard communication (29 C. F. R. 1910.1200) Chemical manufacturers and
importers must assess and communicate the hazards associated with particular
chemicals to employers. Employers must provide this information to employees
through labels, training, and other means.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Agency Regulation Description Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (P. L. 101-
549)

OSHA Process safety management of highly hazardous

Requires the development and implementation of a plan to chemicals (29 C. F.
R. 1910.119) prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases

of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals that may result in
toxic, fire, or explosion hazards. EPA

Risk management program (40 C. F. R. 68) Requires the development and
implementation of plans to prevent the accidental release of highly
hazardous materials.

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) (P. L. 99- 499)

OSHA Hazardous waste operations and emergency

Establishes safety requirements and requires training for response (29 C. F.
R. 1910.120) workers involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of

hazardous waste EPA

Hazardous waste operations and emergency Establishes safety requirements and
requires training for response (40 C. F. R. 300. 150 and 311) workers
involved in the treatment, storage, or disposal of

hazardous waste.

Emergency Planning & Community Right- to- Know Act (Title III SARA/ EPCRA)
(42 U. S. C. 11001 et seq.)

Inventory reporting (40 C. F. R. 370.25; 370. 40 and Requires facilities
that use, store, or otherwise have custody of 370.41) hazardous chemicals to
submit a hazardous materials inventory

form to the proper authorities

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) (42 U. S. C. 9601 et seq.)

EPA Emergency response plans (40 C. F. R. 300) Establishes emergency
response procedures for oil and hazardous substances, including notifying
the National Response Center of chemical spills.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U. S. C. 6901 et seq.)

EPA Personnel training (40 C. F. R. 264. 16 and 265.16) Establishes training
requirements for employees at hazardous waste facilities.

Emergency response plans (40 C. F. R. 264.50 et Requires the development and
implementation of a plan to

seq. and 265.50 et seq.) address emergency procedures at hazardous waste
facilities.

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (15 U. S. C. 2601 et seq.)

EPA Asbestos (40 C. F. R. 763) Establishes safety standards for handling
asbestos in renovation of schools

Significant new uses of chemical substances (40 Establishes research and
other requirements to assess the C. F. R. 721) health risks of materials

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) (33 U. S. C. 1251 et
seq.)

EPA Spill prevention, control and countermeasures plan Requires the
development and implementation of procedures (40 C. F. R. 112. 3) and
methods to prevent oil discharges

Facility response plan (40 C. F. R. 112. 20) Requires the development and
implementation of procedures and methods to address potential oil
discharges, including storage requirements and training requirements for
employees to be able to respond to emergencies.

Organized Crime Control Act of 1990 (18 U. S. C. 841 et seq.)

ATF Commerce in explosives (27 C. F. R. 55) Establishes requirements for the
licensing and storage of explosives in sale and commerce.

Source: Agency records.

Incident Investigation Procedures and

Appendi xII

Regulatory Requirements Table 6 shows the similarities among the incident
investigation procedures of the four agencies in our review.

Table 6: Comparison of Incident Investigation Procedures Investigation
procedure OSHA EPA a ATF CSB a, b

Assess scene of incident X X Make initial contact with facility X X X
Participate in opening conference and first joint coordination

X X X meeting Establish field operations center X X

Tour facility X X Conduct joint coordination meetings during investigation X
Conduct interviews X X X X Gather physical evidence X X X X Gather
documentation X X X X Conduct testing X X Evaluate site safety plan c X X X
Make referrals to other agencies X X Conduct closeout meeting X X X X
Provide abatement assistance X Conduct followup inspections X

a Procedures include references to interagency MOUs. b Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board. c Includes training, recordkeeping, and
reporting requirements.

Source: Agency records.

Table 7 shows the statutes included in our review and the pertinent
regulations that contain any requirements highlighted in our review.

Table 7: Requirements Placed on Hazardous Material Facilities by Statute and
Regulation Emergency Statute, pertinent regulation, and citation Training
Recordkeeping Reporting response a

OSHA

Occupational Safety And Health Act of 1970 b Log and summary of occupational
injuries and illnesses

X (29 C. F. R. 1904.2) Reporting of fatality or multiple hospitalization
incidents

X (29 C. F. R. 1904.8) Employee emergency plans and fire- prevention plans
(29

X X X C. F. R. 1910.38) Explosives and blasting agents (29 C. F. R. 1910.
109) X X X X

Respiratory protection (29 C. F. R. 1910.134) X X X Respiratory protection
for tuberculosis (29 C. F. R.

X X 1910. 139) Asbestos (29 C. F. R. 1910.1001) X X

13 Carcinogens (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1003) X X Vinyl chloride (29 C. F. R.
1910. 1017) X X X X Inorganic arsenic (29 C. F. R. 1910.1018) X X X Lead (29
C. F. R. 1910. 1025) X X Cadmium (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1027) X X X Benzene (29
C. F. R. 1910. 1028) X X Coke oven emissions (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1029) X X
Bloodborne pathogens (29 C. F. R. 1910.1030) X X Cotton dust (29 C. F. R.
1910.1043) X X 1, 2- Dibromo- 3- chloropropane (29 C. F. R. 1910.1044) X X X
X Acrylonitrile (29 C. F. R. 1910.1045) X X X X Ethylene oxide (29 C. F. R.
1910.1047) X X X Formaldehyde (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1048) X X X
Methylenedianiline (29 C. F. R. 1910. 1050) X X X 1, 3- Butadiene (29 C. F.
R. 1910.1051) X X X Methylene chloride (29 C. F. R. 1910.1052) X X Ionizing
radiation (29 C. F. R. 1910.1096) X X X Hazard communication (29 C. F. R.
1910.1200) X X Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990

(Continued From Previous Page)

Emergency Statute, pertinent regulation, and citation Training Recordkeeping
Reporting response a

Process safety management of highly hazardous X X X X chemicals (29 C. F. R.
1910.119) SARA of 1986

Hazardous waste operations and emergency response X X X (29 C. F. R.
1910.120) EPA

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 Risk management program (40 C. F. R. 68) X
X X X SARA of 1986 Hazardous waste operations and emergency response

X X X (40 C. F. R. 300. 150 and 311) Inventory reporting (40 C. F. R.
370.25; 370. 40 and 370.41) X X

CERCLA Emergency response plans (40 C. F. R. 300) X X X RCRA Personnel
training (40 C. F. R. 264. 16 and 265.16) X X Emergency response plans (40
C. F. R. 264.50 et seq. and

X 265.50 et seq.) TSCA

Asbestos (40 C. F. R. 763. 80 et seq.) X X Significant new uses of chemical
substances (40 C. F. R.

X X 721.40, 721. 72, and 721.125) Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Oil pollution prevention (40 C. F. R. 112. 1 et seq.) X X X X

ATF

Organized Crime Control Act of 1990 Commerce in explosives (27 C. F. R. 55.
121 - 55. 129) X X

a For purposes of this table, we placed routine or recurring reporting
requirements in the “Reporting” column and reporting
requirements related to emergency response in the “Emergency
response” column. Also, we included in the “Emergency
response” column only those requirements that called for the facility
to inform government authorities of the incident causing the emergency. b In
some cases, statutes identify the materials that will be regulated under
those statutes. In other

cases, such as with the Occupational Safety and Health Act, no materials are
specifically identified. Instead, the act authorizes the Secretary of Labor
to extend regulatory coverage to any material that poses a threat to safety
and health in the work place. OSHA has used this authority since 1970 to
develop specific regulations for specific materials.

Source: GAO analysis of statues and regulations.

Appendi xI II Comments From the Department of Labor

Comments From the Environmental

Appendi xI V Protection Agency

Comments From the Department of the

Appendi xV Treasury

Comments From the Chemical Safety and

Appendi xVI Hazard Investigation Board

Appendi xVII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Lori Rectanus, (202)
512- 9847 Joseph Natalicchio, (202) 512- 5897 Staff Acknowledgments In
addition to those above, Monika Gomez, Julian Klazkin, and Suzanne

Sterling made key contributions to this report.

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Appendix I

Appendix I Relevant Statutes and Regulations

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Appendix I Relevant Statutes and Regulations

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Appendix I Relevant Statutes and Regulations

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Appendix II

Appendix II Incident Investigation Procedures and Regulatory Requirements

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Appendix II Incident Investigation Procedures and Regulatory Requirements

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Appendix III

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Labor

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Appendix IV

Appendix IV Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency

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Appendix IV Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency

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Appendix IV Comments From the Environmental Protection Agency

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Appendix V

Appendix V Comments From the Department of the Treasury

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Appendix V Comments From the Department of the Treasury

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Appendix V Comments From the Department of the Treasury

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Appendix V Comments From the Department of the Treasury

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Appendix VI

Appendix VI Comments From the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

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Appendix VI Comments From the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

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Appendix VI Comments From the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

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Appendix VII

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
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