Status Update of the New 155mm Lightweight Howitzer (10-APR-01,  
GAO-01-603R).							 
								 
GAO reviewed the progress of the new 155mm Lightweight Howitzer  
program. GAO found that since July 2000, all key program	 
milestones have continued to slip. Only the initial fielding date
for the howitzer remains unchanged. Since July 2000, the total	 
program cost estimates have increased from $1,129.9 million to	 
$1,250.2 million, an increase of $120.3 million. In addition, GAO
found four technical problems yet to be addressed in the program:
(1) cracking of the spades used to anchor the howitzer, (2) loose
spade latches that create difficulties in removing the spades	 
from the ground, (3) the spade damper--a device intended to help 
the spade dig into the soil to stabilize the gun--does not work  
properly in all soil types, and (4) the durability of the optical
sight being developed for the gun. Design solutions have been	 
identified for each of these problems, according to the 	 
Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office.	 
These design changes have not been fully incorporated and field  
tested to date. 						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-603R					        
    ACCNO:   A00825						        
  TITLE:     Status Update of the New 155mm Lightweight Howitzer      
     DATE:   04/10/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Army procurement					 
	     Military research and development			 
	     Weapons systems					 
	     Schedule slippages 				 
	     Cost overruns					 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     155mm Howitzer					 
	     M198 Towed Howitzer				 

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GAO-01-603R
     
GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer United States General Accounting
Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 10, 2001 The Honorable Lane Evans House of Representatives

Subject: Status Update of the New 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer Dear Mr.
Evans: In July 2000, we issued a report to you and several other members of
Congress describing problems with the new 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer
program. 1 The new 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer is expected to replace the M-
198 towed howitzer. The Army- Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint
Program Office is directing this program?s development, with BAE SYSTEMS
(BAE), a British company, as the prime contractor.

This correspondence responds to your request of December 2000 that we
continue to monitor and report on this program due to your continued
concerns about its schedule, cost, and technical difficulties.

RESULTS IN BRIEF Since our July 2000 report, all key milestones except one
have continued to slip. For example, acceptance of the first developmental
howitzer slipped an additional 5 months from June to November 2000, and
delivery of the remaining 7 developmental howitzers was delayed an
additional 5 to 10 months. The production decision has slipped from March
2002 to September 2002 and the initial fielding of the new howitzer by the
Marine Corps has slipped another 8 months to July 2004 or 28 months from the
date set at the original contract award. The initial fielding of the
howitzer to the Army remains unchanged at March 2005.

Since July 2000, total program cost estimates have increased from $1,129.9
million to $1,250.2 million, an increase of $120.3 million. 2 This increase
is principally the result of restructuring the developmental contract which
added $20.2 million and an approximately $100 million increase for an
electronic aiming system.

1 See Defense Acquisitions: Howitzer Program Experiencing Cost Increases and
Schedule Delays

(GAO/NSIAD-00-182, July 28, 2000). 2 All fiscal year 2002 cost estimates are
predecisional, as the President's fiscal year 2002 budget has not yet been
submitted to the Congress.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 2 In our July report, we
focused on three technical problems- insufficient spade size

(devices that anchor the howitzer in the ground to stabilize the gun during
firing), instability of the saddle (the part of the howitzer in which the
cannon barrel rests), and faulty titanium welds. The Program Office reports
that the contractor has enlarged the spade and tests at Yuma on the first
developmental gun have verified it is now properly sized; the new saddle
design was recently successfully field tested in the United Kingdom; and one
weld was repaired on site and a second faulty crack continues to be
monitored. We also focused on four additional technical problems during our
current review. The first is a problem with the cracking of the spades. The
second is a problem with loose spade latches that create difficulties in
removing the spades from the ground. The third is with a device- the spade
damper- intended to help the spade dig into the soil to stabilize the gun,
but which does not work properly in all soil types. The fourth problem
involves the durability of the optical sight being developed for the gun.
According to Program Office officials, design solutions have been identified
for each of these new problems. These design changes have not been fully
incorporated and field tested to date.

Program officials provided oral comments that were generally technical in
nature to a draft of this correspondence.

BACKGROUND The new 155 mm Lightweight Howitzer is intended to be a lighter,
more transportable, and mobile weapon for strategic and tactical movements.
Weapon performance requirements include a maximum weight of 9,000 pounds
(7,000 pounds less than M- 198 towed howitzer it is to replace), reduced
time to place the weapon in a firing position, and an increased rate of fire
compared with current weapons.

The Army- Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office directs and
funds the Lightweight Howitzer development program. The Army will assume
program management responsibilities for the Lightweight Howitzer program
upon completion of deliveries to the Marine Corps. The Army plans to buy 273
guns and the Marines plan to buy 413.

BAE is the Lightweight Howitzer prime contractor. Cannon barrels are being
produced at the U. S. Army?s Watervliet Arsenal under a separate contract
and are to be provided as government- furnished equipment. The howitzer will
eventually incorporate the towed artillery digitization upgrade, a precise
location and targeting system being developed by General Dynamics for the
Army under a separate contract as government- furnished equipment.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 3 BAE is currently planning to
subcontract 70 percent of the howitzer?s production to

subcontractors in the United States listed in table 1.

Table 1: Major United States Subcontractors for the New 155 mm Lightweight
Howitzer Subcontractor/ location Subcontracted component/ activity

United Defense LP, Pascagoula, Mississippi Final Assembly, Test, and
Delivery HydroMill, Inc., Chatsworth, California Body Assembly Major Tool
and Machining, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana Stabilizers, Spades, Trails Rock
Island Arsenal, Rock Island, Illinois Breach Operating Load Tray System RTI
International Metals, Inc., Niles, Ohio Titanium Source: Lightweight 155 mm
Howitzer Joint Program Office

PROGRAM SCHEDULE CONTINUES TO SLIP Since the program inception and since we
last reported on this program in July 2000, the program schedule for all key
milestones dates have slipped for the howitzer, except one. The schedule for
the towed artillery digitization upgrade will also slip.

In December 2000, the Joint Program Office restructured the development
program consistent with the new contract with BAE. 3 The restructuring
slipped the schedule even further beyond the already delayed schedule
estimates from December 1998, as reflected in table 2. For example,
acceptance of the first developmental howitzer was delayed by an additional
six months, the production decision (Milestone III) and contract award were
delayed by an additional 12 months, and initial fielding of this system by
the Marine Corps was delayed an additional 8 months. Initial fielding of the
howitzer by the Army remained unchanged at March 2005.

3 The restructuring was retroactive to June 2000.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 4

Table 2: Comparison of Key Program Milestones Since the Original Schedule
Key Milestones Original

February 1996 schedule

December 1998 schedule

December 2000 schedule

Months delayed since original 1996 schedule

Months delayed since December 1998 schedule

First Test Article Acceptance( first developmental howitzer)

June 1998 May 2000 November 2000 24 6

Production Decision (Milestone III)

December 1999

September 2001 4 September

2002 33 12

Production Contract Award

December 1999

October 2001 October 2002 34 12 First Production Article Qualification
Testing March 2001 January 2003 December

2003 33 11

Marine Corps Initial Fielding 5 March 2002 November

2003 July 2004 28 8

Army Initial Fielding 6 March 2005 March 2005 March 2005 No change 7 No
change 7 Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office

Delivery of all developmental howitzers has also slipped since our last
report in July 2000. Table 3 below shows that all eight developmental
howitzers were to be delivered by February 2001 but only one of the eight
developmental howitzers has been delivered. In addition, delivery of the
remaining seven has been delayed from an additional 5 to 10 months. Program
Officials told us that it was a conscious decision to delay delivery of the
last four howitzers for operational testing in order to implement changes
resulting from developmental testing.

4 In July 2000, the program office had slipped this date to March 2002. 5
Marine Corps initial fielding is defined to be about 38 guns for a battalion
from both I & II Marine Expeditionary Force. 6 Army initial fielding is
defined to be about 6 guns to support a troop battery in a light-division.

7 While the overall program has been significantly delayed, program
officials believe the original Army initial fielding date of March 2005 is
achievable, in part, due to the likelihood that a small number of guns can
be delivered to support a troop battery.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 5

Table 3: Comparison of Original and Revised Delivery Dates for Developmental
Howitzers Developmental Howitzer (unit number)

Original delivery date

Revised delivery date (as of May 2000)

Current delivery date

Months delayed from original delivery date

Months delayed since May 2000

1 May 2000 June 2000 Acceptance November 2000 8

6 5 2 May 2000 October 2000 April 2001 11 6 3 June 2000 November 2000 June
2001 12 7 4 June 2000 January 2001 June 2001 12 5 5 - 8 October

2000 February 2001 December

2001 14 10

Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office The schedule delays
have been caused by the need for engineering changes and corrective action
to address problems found during manufacturing and initial contractor and
government testing at Yuma Proving Grounds on the first developmental gun.
These problems included difficulties with the design of the spades, which
dig into the ground to stabilize the weapon during firing; the stiffness of
the saddle assembly which holds and supports the cannon barrel; and
difficulties with the titanium welding process.

The initially designed spades were too small to firmly anchor the howitzer
into the ground, causing excessive movement during firing. The original
saddle assembly design created pointing accuracy problems when the howitzer
was fired from sloping ground. As for the titanium welding problems, the
first developmental gun experienced two instances of faulty welds, one of
which required repair. Details on BAE?s efforts to address these problems
will be discussed in a later section.

According to Program Office officials, the Army?s towed artillery
digitization upgrade, a precise location and targeting system, is also
experiencing significant schedule delays primarily due to software
development. According to these officials, the winning contractor for the
digitization program assumed in its bid that about 90 percent of the
software written for another cannon program could be re- used for the
digitization program. The contractor just recently performed a detailed
analysis of the software for the other program and determined that only 70
percent to 80 percent of this software could be re- used for the
digitization program. According to Program Office officials, more new code
will have to be written than originally estimated resulting in the need to
restructure the digitization program. The Program Office is currently
developing alternative courses of action for consideration by the users and
the program executive officer. Because no course of action has yet been
adopted, cost and schedule projections have not been made. However, a
Program Office official stated that since the howitzer is designed to
initially operate with an optical

8 The first developmental howitzer was delivered in June 2000. However,
according to Program Office officials the gun required additional testing
and modifications by the contractor before it was accepted in November 2000.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 6 sighting system, rather than
a digitized system, any schedule slippage in the towed

artillery digitization upgrade will not affect the howitzer?s schedule.
PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES CONTINUE TO INCREASE The most recent Program Office
cost estimates, as of February 2001, show the total costs for the
development and production of the howitzer and the digitization program to
be $1,250.2 million- an increase of $120.3 million from the Program Office?s
July 2000 estimates. All fiscal year 2002 cost estimates are predecisional-
that is they are not yet final nor approved-- because the President has not
submitted his fiscal year 2002 budget request to the Congress. Details of
these cost increases are shown in table 4.

Table 4: Increases in Estimated Development and Production Costs of the New
Howitzer and Towed Artillery Digitization

Then- year dollars in millions Program July 2000 February

2001 Total program cost increase

from July 2000 to February 2001

US Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer RDT& E

$142.6 $162.8 $20.2 US Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer and Towed Artillery
Digitization Upgrade Production

492.6 543.0 50.4 Army Towed Artillery Digitization Upgrade RDT& E 43.8 52.3
8. 5 Army Lightweight Howitzer and Towed Artillery Digitization Upgrade
Production

450.9 492.1 41.2

Total Budget $1,129.9 $1,250.2 $120.3

Source: Lightweight 155mm Howitzer Joint Program Office The howitzer
developmental program funded by the Marine Corps increased by $20.2 million.
This increase primarily represents the restructuring of the BAE development
contract for the howitzer. The estimated contract cost increased $22.4
million, from $43.4 million to $65.8 million, when the contract was
restructured from a cost- plusincentive fee contract into a cost- sharing
contract. 9 According to Program Office officials, the increase of $22.4
million includes $5.0 million required for the addition of two pilot
production guns; $8.5 million for risk reduction efforts; integration of the
cannon barrels and towed artillery digitization upgrade (government-
furnished equipment) and long- lead costs; and $8.9 million for extending
the program by one year.

9 The cost increase of $22.4 million includes $2.2 million contributed by
Italy for the development of the howitzer. Therefore, the total increase in
U.S. cost of the howitzer development program is $20.2 million.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 7 According to Program Office
officials, while the Marine Corps has always had the

same requirements for its towed artillery digitization upgrade production
program, it had not included all funding necessary to meet its full
requirements in previous cost estimates. By including all necessary funding
for full requirements for the first time in its February 2001 estimates, an
additional $50.4 million for the Marines? towed artillery digitization
program is reflected in estimated program costs. The $8.5 million increase
in the Army?s digitization development program resulted from the additional
costs that will be required to refurbish, after their use for operational
testing, four of the developmental guns needed by the digitization program
for testing purposes.

Program Office officials also reported that the Army increased its cost
estimate by $41.2 million for the production of the howitzer and
digitization program. During our discussions with Program Office officials,
they said that they did not know why this increase occurred. According to
Program Office officials, the estimated cost of the cannon barrel is

included in the howitzer production costs. These officials said that the
cost of cannon barrels has fluctuated from $106,000 to $334,000, depending
on the workload at Watervliet Arsenal. The most recent estimate for the
cannon barrels is between $200,000 and $224,000.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO BE IDENTIFIED In our July 2000 report, we
focused on three major problems: (1) insufficient spade size, (2) flexure of
the saddle assembly, and (3) faulty titanium welding processes. BAE has made
efforts to address these problems. We have identified four additional
technical problems during our current review that had not been identified in
July 2000- spade cracking, spade latch, spade damper, and optical sighting
difficulties.

Initial Technical Problems Based on the results of tests made on the
prototypes of the lightweight howitzer prior to July 2000, BAE determined
that the spades were not large enough to securely anchor the weapon into the
ground during firing in all soil conditions. The spades are critical to the
operation of the howitzer because they are designed to dig about six inches
into the ground to stabilize the gun during firing. To solve the spade size
problem, BAE enlarged the spades and installed them on the first
developmental weapon. A Program Office official told us that live- fire
testing of the first developmental weapon at Yuma has confirmed that the
spades are now large enough to anchor the weapon as required.

BAE has stiffened the saddle assembly- now termed ?fat boy?- and the cradle
to address problems with the howitzer?s accuracy and stability. The saddle
assembly, along with the cradle, holds and supports the cannon barrel.
Program Office officials told us before the saddle assembly and cradle were
stiffened, the fire control system

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 8 (optical sights) would not
remain aligned with the barrel of the howitzer (boresight

retention) at high elevation or severe side- leaning conditions because the
gun was too flexible. BAE also reports adding two shims that are intended to
reduce offset errors and a new thermally insulated linkage rod to counter
different thermal expansion effects between adjacent aluminum and titanium
components. The stiffened saddle and cradle have been installed on the
second developmental howitzer (scheduled for delivery in April 2001) and
tested in the factory on level and sloping surfaces. Program Officials
report that this redesigned howitzer met accuracy requirements during the
recent preliminary field testing in the United Kingdom.

A February 2000 inspection of the first developmental howitzer being
manufactured by BAE revealed quality problems with the welding process of
some titanium parts. As a result, BAE revised its manufacturing processes
related to titanium welding. Nonetheless, initial field testing of the first
developmental howitzer resulted in two indications of titanium weld
cracking. Program Officials report that one of the cracks was repaired on-
site and that they are continuing to monitor the second crack.

BAE is considering casting, the process of building molds for parts and
pouring molten metal into the molds to form the parts, from 30 to 40 of the
gun parts that would have been fabricated by welding pieces of the metal
together. The introduction of castings will cause welding requirements to
decline; however, none of BAE?s current United States subcontractors
selected for production of the gun is capable of producing castings. BAE has
identified at least five potential casting suppliers, who are currently
developing quotes, cost estimates and delivery schedules based on casting
concepts approved by BAE, for providing titanium castings. BAE is currently
determining which castings will be incorporated into the production of the
two planned pilot production guns. Program Office officials told us that BAE
has been working with two casting producers under a technology assistance
agreement and expects to finalize casting contracts within the next 30 days.
The integrated program master schedule indicates that the first pilot
production gun that is to include castings is scheduled to be live fire
tested in March 2002.

New Technical Problems While enlarging the spade has reportedly addressed
the problem we identified in July 2000, three new problems with the spade
have been identified. In August 2000, testing of the enlarged spade
disclosed that the spade cracked in the lower portion of its blade when the
howitzer was fired in very hard soil. To solve the cracking that was
occurring in the spades, BAE made 14 design modifications that essentially
strengthened and reshaped the spades but added no weight. This redesign is
to be incorporated on the seven undelivered developmental guns still in
production and the first developmental testing howitzer. The Program Office
is confident that these changes will address the spade cracking problem,
however these changes to the spade have not been field- tested to date.

Testing of the first developmental gun at Yuma Proving Grounds in December
2000 and January 2001 revealed that the latches used to release tension from
the spade so

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 9 it can be removed from the
ground were becoming loose during firing of the gun.

This causes difficulty in removing the spades from the ground. This problem
occurred several times and is classified in test incident reports as a major
problem that still requires corrective action. Although Program Office
officials told us that a corrective action has been developed and will be
incorporated on howitzers to be delivered in the future, during our site
visit to observe a field test of the howitzer in March 2001, a Program
Office official identified this as a continuing problem. Current plans are
to conduct tests on the spade latch improvements prior to safety testing in
June 2001.

In addition, testing at Yuma identified another problem related to the
operation of the spades involving the spade damper. The spade damper is a
device that allows the trail arm 10 to compress against the howitzer body
during firing, orienting the spade for proper digging into the ground to
stabilize the gun during subsequent firings. Firing tests revealed that the
damper did not always allow the trail arm to properly compress against the
howitzer body in all soil types. The howitzer is tested in soil types
varying from sand to hardpan/ rock. The damper was designed with only a
single setting for all soil types. The Program Office is considering a new
design that would provide two settings for the spade damper that howitzer
operators could choose from depending upon soil type. Program Office
officials report that modifications will be incorporated in the howitzers
scheduled to be delivered on and after June 2001, and then retrofitted on
earlier delivered howitzers.

Another new technical problem involves the optical sight that is being
developed for the new howitzer. According to a Program Office official, the
lightweight howitzer program is modifying the M- 198 howitzer optical sight
and plans to use it on the new howitzer until the Army?s towed artillery
digitization upgrade program reaches full development. It will be retained
as a backup when the digital fire control becomes available. However, the
greater stresses created by the new howitzer, which result from the lighter
weight of the howitzer has proven damaging to the optical sight. A redesign
of the optical sight was recently completed, which Program Office officials
report has operated successfully in factory testing. The new optical sight
will not be tested in live- fire conditions until after the second
developmental gun is delivered in April 2001. A Program Office official told
us that the accuracy of the gun could not be determined until all of the
redesigns and the optical sight have been tested under livefire conditions.

AGENCY COMMENTS Representatives of the Program Office, as well as both the
Departments of the Army and Navy provided oral comments that were generally
technical in nature to a draft of this correspondence. We incorporated these
technical changes as appropriate.

10 The trail arm is an extension that extends outward from the base of the
howitzer to give it more stability.

GAO- 01- 603R 155mm Lightweight Howitzer Page 10 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To determine progress in meeting program schedule and cost estimates we
interviewed officials of the Program Office, Picatinny Arsenal, Picatinny,
New Jersey and obtained, reviewed, and analyzed data. These data include key
acquisition milestones dates, acquisition schedules for the delivery of the
eight developmental howitzers, and preliminary fiscal year 2002 budget
requirements program funding documents. We compared these data to
information previously provided by Program Office officials. We also met
with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics, the Departments of the Army and
Navy, Washington, D. C.; and the Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico,
Virginia.

In examining technical difficulties affecting the program, in addition to
meeting with and obtaining information, including test reports, from Program
Office officials listed above, we held discussions with representatives
performing the testing, and observed a test firing session of the howitzer
at Yuma Proving Grounds, Yuma, Arizona.

We conducted our work from February through March 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards and generally relied upon
agencyprovided data.

We plan no further distribution of this letter until 30 days after the date
of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this letter to the
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Robert B.
Pirie, Acting Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, Commandant of
the Marine Corps; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Acting Secretary of the
Army; the Honorable Mitchell Daniels, Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and interested congressional committees. The letter will also be
available on GAO's home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

If you have any questions, or need additional information, please call me at
(202) 512- 4841. Major contributors to this letter are James Solomon, Ted
Baird, Steve Martinez, and Lee Carroll.

Sincerely yours, R. E. Levin Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management

(120042)

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