Military Readiness: Management Focus Needed on Airfields for	 
Overseas Deployments (14-JUN-01, GAO-01-566).			 
								 
The National Military Strategy calls for the Department of	 
Defense (DOD) to maintain the transportation capability to	 
quickly move the large amounts of personnel and equipment needed 
to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars anywhere in the
world. To provide this mobility, DOD relies on a transportation  
system (the En Route System (ERS)) that includes an airlift fleet
of cargo aircraft and a critical network of overseas airfields	 
that provide logistical support to aircraft on their way to the  
war zones. Although the two-war requirement and other aspects of 
the National Military Strategy are currently under review by the 
new administration, the ERS remains critically important as the  
primary means of quickly moving U.S. soldiers and equipment to	 
areas of conflict around the world. This report addresses (1)	 
whether en-route airfields have the capacity to meet the	 
requirements of the National Military Strategy, (2) the causes of
any shortfalls and DOD's plans to correct them, and (3) whether  
DOD has the information and management structure needed to ensure
that the operations of the ERS can be carried out efficiently and
effectively.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-566 					        
    ACCNO:   A01026						        
  TITLE:     Military Readiness: Management Focus Needed on Airfields 
             for Overseas Deployments                                         
     DATE:   06/14/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Armed forces abroad				 
	     Combat readiness					 
	     Logistics						 
	     Military airlift operations			 
	     DOD En Route Basing System 			 
	     JCS National Military Strategy			 

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GAO-01-566
     
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 MILITARY READINESS

Management Focus Needed on Airfields for Overseas Deployments

GAO- 01- 566

Page i GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness Letter 1

Appendix I Responsibility for the En Route System Is Fragmented Among Many
Organizations 27

Appendix II Scope and Methodology 29

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 30

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 33

Tables

Table 1: Planned U. S. Funding Sources for ERS Projects, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2006 14

Figures

Figure 1: Location of En Route System Airfields 5 Figure 2: Reductions in U.
S. Overseas Troop Strength, Fiscal Years

1988- 99 10 Figure 3: Project Costs by Type 12 Figure 4: Construction Costs
for Pacific Bases, Fiscal Years

1997- 2006 12 Figure 5: Construction Costs for European Bases, Fiscal Years

1997- 2006 13 Figure 6: Funding Sources and Construction Costs by Region,

Fiscal Years 1997- 2006 14 Figure 7: Percentage of Funding Spent on ERS
Construction

Projects and Project Status 16 Figure 8: Organizations with Responsibility
for the ERS 20

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense ERS En Route System Contents

Page 1 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

June 14, 2001 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman Subcommittee on Military
Readiness Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: The National Military Strategy calls for the Department
of Defense (DOD) to maintain the transportation capability to quickly move
the large amounts of personnel and equipment needed to win two nearly
simultaneous major theater wars anywhere in the world. To provide this
mobility, DOD relies on a transportation system that includes an airlift
fleet of cargo aircraft and a critical network of overseas airfields that
provide logistical support to aircraft on their way to the war zones. DOD
calls this network of bases the En Route System (ERS). Although the twowar
requirement and other aspects of the National Military Strategy are
currently under review by the new Administration, the ERS remains critically
important as the primary means of quickly moving U. S. soldiers and
equipment to areas of conflict around the world. Because of concerns about
the adequacy of U. S. mobility capabilities, the former Chairman of the
Subcommittee asked us to assess whether U. S. airlift capabilities and the
supporting ERS infrastructure are up to the task of carrying out the
National Military Strategy.

This report is the third in a series to address the Subcommittee?s request.
The first two reports addressed DOD?s shortage of airlift and aerial
refueling capability needed to meet the two- war requirement of the National
Military Strategy. 1 This report addresses (1) whether en- route airfields
have the capacity to meet the requirements of the National Military
Strategy, (2) what are the causes of any shortfalls and DOD?s plans to
correct them, and (3) whether DOD has the information and management
structure needed to ensure that the operations of the En Route System can be
carried out efficiently and effectively.

1 Military Readiness: Air Transport Capability Falls Short of Requirements

(GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 135, June 22, 2000) and Military Readiness: Updated
Readiness Status of U. S. Air Transport Capability (GAO- 01- 495R, Mar. 16,
2001).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

DOD predicts a significant shortfall in the capacity of the En Route System
airfields to meet the delivery schedules required by the National Military
Strategy. 2 The airfields do not currently have enough ramp space, fuel
pumping capacity, and other infrastructure elements to move the large
amounts of personnel and equipment needed to win two nearly simultaneous
major theater wars. This means that required military forces and equipment
would arrive in the war zones later than planned, increasing the risk that
operations would not be executed as planned and casualties could increase.
DOD believes that projected improvements to the En Route System will largely
eliminate the shortfall by 2005. However, the assumptions and modeling
approach used to analyze airfield capacity raise some uncertainty about the
precise size of the shortfall. Some assumptions tend to underestimate the
shortfall, while the modeling approach used could overestimate it. The net
effect of these factors on estimates of system capacity is unclear.

DOD transportation officials attribute the shortfall to the shrinkage in U.
S. overseas presence and increased reliance on the remaining 13 bases of the
En Route System. Many of these bases are 60 year- old legacies of World War
II, with inadequate parking space and/ or antiquated, deteriorating fuel
systems increasingly prone to breakdowns. During our review, DOD?s cost
estimates of the improvements in facilities and fuel systems that are needed
increased from $1. 2 billion to about $2 billion. Most of the costs (58
percent) are associated with bases in the pacific region. DOD plans to have
over half (55 percent) of these costs funded by host nations and allies,
with the remainder to be paid for by a variety of U. S. fuel projects,
military construction, and other funding programs. The large majority of the
funding (86 percent) is associated with projects that had not yet begun
construction as of October 2000. During the drawdown of U. S. overseas
forces in the early 1990?s, little concern was voiced about the shrinking En
Route capacity. Calendar year 1997 was named the ?Year of the En Route
System? to draw attention to the problem and obtain increased funding
priority. U. S.- funded En Route System projects in Europe face competition
for funding from projects in the Pacific and from elsewhere in DOD, against
a backdrop of concerns about significant underfunding of DOD?s
infrastructure. Host nation involvement can create additional uncertainties
in construction timetables.

2 The specific amount of the shortfall is classified. DOD?s requirements are
identified in the Mobility Requirements Study 2005, released in January
2001. The study is an extensive update of DOD?s 1992 and 1995 analyses of
air, sea, and land transportation requirements for the United States to
mobilize for war. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Despite the En Route System?s strategic importance, DOD does not have the
basic information and coherent management structure needed to ensure that
the system?s operations can be carried out efficiently and effectively.
These weaknesses raise questions about the system?s plans and operations and
subject it to unnecessary risk and inefficiencies. For example, despite
growing estimates of the cost and other uncertainties over the system?s
construction projects, DOD has not developed an overall cost- benefit study
to document the rationale for its decisions and demonstrate that its
proposed projects represent the best solutions. Similarly, despite concerns
about aging and deteriorating facilities and equipment, the En Route System
has no centralized oversight system to provide data on airfield
deterioration and failure rates. No one organization is responsible for
managing and coordinating the En Route System: operation of the system is
fragmented among a host of military commands, subcommands, and other
organizations with differing interests and priorities. As a result, there is
also no formal, system- wide strategic plan to identify long- term plans and
guiding policies, operating priorities, and performance goals and
strategies. Finally, DOD does not discuss how En Route System shortfalls
affect overall strategic mobility performance in its annual performance plan
and report, resulting in an incomplete picture of mobility capabilities. 3

To increase management focus on the En Route System, we are recommending
that the Secretary of Defense make one organization responsible for
strategic management and coordination of overarching ERS issues, and develop
a formal strategic plan and overall cost- benefit study of its plans for the
ERS. We are also recommending that the Secretary include information on ERS
limitations and how they affect strategic mobility in DOD?s annual
performance report. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
agreed to consider making one organization responsible for certain ERS
matters, and to try to improve the integration, presentation, and
documentation of its plans for the ERS. However, it did not agree that the
ERS lacks a coherent management structure requiring an overall cost- benefit
study to document the rationales for plans to repair and improve the ERS, or
the need to include

3 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 required federal
agencies, including DOD, to submit to Congress annual performance plans and
reports. In essence, annual performance plans are to establish performance
goals and measures covering a given fiscal year and provide direct linkage
between an agency?s longer- term goals and dayto- day activities. Annual
reports are to subsequently identify the degree to which those performance
goals were met.

Page 4 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

information on ERS limitations in its annual performance report. It stated
that the existing organization, coupled with the readiness reporting,
planning and budgeting, and overall strategic mobility reviews amount to a
robust management structure and strategic plan for the ERS, and provide
adequate information on its cost- benefit rationales and the impact of ERS
limitations on strategic mobility. The individual organizations and
processes cited by DOD may provide some of the elements needed to
effectively manage the ERS. However, we believe the implied management
structure described by DOD cannot substitute for the strategic clarity,
comprehensiveness, and organizational commitment provided by a formal,
unified management structure. Because DOD is generally unwilling to take
action, the Congress might consider directing the Secretary to implement our
recommendations, and periodically report on DOD?s progress to ensure that it
implements prudent improvements to ERS management.

The ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is
the cornerstone of U. S. defense strategy. For planning purposes, the
military assumes that the two most likely places where these wars would take
place are Korea and Southwest Asia. Mobilization of U. S. forces for such
conflicts requires a global system of integrated land, sea, and air
resources, and supplies already stored overseas. The fleet of civilian and
military passenger and cargo aircraft and the En Route System (ERS)
airfields provide the critical air component. ERS airfields provide the
primary ?throughput? services for aircraft as they move from U. S. bases
through ERS airfields and on to their eventual destinations at bases located
in or near the war zones. As each aircraft lands at an ERS airfield, the
base must have the ramp space to park the aircraft and perform required
maintenance, the equipment to load and unload cargo if needed, and the
equipment needed to quickly refuel the aircraft and speed it to its final
destination. However, the ERS also provides the capabilities needed to
handle ongoing peacetime operations and requirements associated with
smaller- scale contingency operations. For example, ERS bases were used
extensively during recent operations in Kosovo. We discussed issues related
to the basing of combat aircraft in our recent report on Kosovo operations,
but not ERS operations. 4

4 Kosovo Air Operations: Combat Aircraft Basing Plans Are Needed in Advance
of Future Conflicts (GAO- 01- 461, May 29, 2001). Background

Page 5 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

As shown in figure 1, the 13 ERS airfields are located mostly in Europe and
throughout the Pacific. 5 DOD selected the 13 ERS bases according to their
proximity to the anticipated war zones, the host nation?s willingness to
allow the use of its bases, and other factors such as climate. Each is
planned to be within an area 3,500 nautical miles from the United States and
from the war zones. This distance is based on the maximum efficient range of
the C- 17 cargo aircraft without refueling.

Figure 1: Location of En Route System Airfields

Source: DOD.

Operation of the ERS airfields is shared between the host nation, which owns
the airfield, and a number of DOD organizations. Host nation
responsibilities vary and are documented in the Status of Forces Agreement
for each country. U. S. organizations with responsibility for the

5 The figure omits Rhein Main air base in Frankfurt, Germany. Although the
United States is currently using facilities there, it has agreed to withdraw
by December 31, 2005, in exchange for German construction of additional
facilities at Spangdahlem and Ramstein.

* 

 

 Spangdahlem  Ramstein  Fairford  Mildenhall

(Spain)  Rota  Moron  Elmendorf AFB

(Alaska)   Andersen AFB (Guam) Hickam AFB

(Hawaii)  Misawa

 Yokota  Iwakuni  Kadena  (Japan)

(Germany) (England)

Page 6 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

airfields include the Air Force, who provides day- to- day operations for
all but two of the airfields, and the U. S. Transportation, Air Mobility,
European, Central, and Pacific Commands, which have various functional or
geographical responsibilities. According to U. S. Transportation Command
officials, while space is sometimes shared between the host nation and the
United States, many airfields are primarily for U. S. cargo and refueling
operations. U. S. fighter aircraft are generally located at separate bases
because of the specialized equipment needed. The airfields are normally
staffed for the peacetime flow of aircraft. Additional personnel and
equipment would be brought in to handle the increased flow of aircraft in
the event of contingency operations or full- scale war.

According to DOD?s January 2001 estimate, in the event of overlapping major
theater wars in Korea and Southwest Asia, the 13 ERS airfields would not
currently have enough capacity to move the required amounts of personnel and
equipment to the war zones in the time required (the specific requirements
and capacities are classified). DOD expects the shortfall to be largely
eliminated by 2005. But the assumptions and modeling approach DOD uses in
its calculations raise some uncertainty about the precise size of the
shortfall. Some study assumptions tend to underestimate the shortfall, while
the modeling approach used could overestimate it. The net effect of these
factors on estimates of ERS capacity in 2005 is unclear.

DOD officials believe their analyses of ERS requirements and capacity are
accurate. The capacity requirements of the ERS are defined in the recent
Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which estimated the mobility assets and
supporting infrastructure needed to deploy for the two- war scenario and
compared them to current capabilities and those planned for 2005. The study
concluded that current capacity is significantly short of requirements but
that improvements to the ERS would largely eliminate the shortfall by 2005.
According to DOD officials, the effect of the shortfall would be that
required military forces and equipment would arrive in the war zones later
than planned, increasing the risk of operations not being executed as
planned and of higher casualties. The study estimated the shortfall by
simulating the movement of troops and equipment needed for each war with a
series of models 6 and calculated capacity in terms of the

6 We are currently reviewing the approach used by these models to estimate
requirements. Shortfall in Capacity

Predicted, Precise Amounts Unclear

Precise Size of Shortfall Is Unclear

Page 7 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

amount of cargo weight that could move through ERS bases in the first 40
days of a conflict (the period of highest demand).

We found that some of the study?s assumptions tend to underestimate the size
of the shortfall. For example, despite concerns about their old age and
deteriorating condition, DOD assumes that ERS airfields would operate
without breaking down. In addition, because the construction projects are
expected to run through 2006, the capacity of several airfields will still
be short of requirements at the end of 2005. The study at least partially
offsets these assumptions by calculating the capacity of ERS bases in Europe
on the assumption that DOD would lose access to one of six bases during
mobilization (the so- called ?six- lose- one? strategy). A similar strategy
is being considered for the Pacific, but it has not yet been approved.
Additional study assumptions that tend to underestimate the shortfall are
classified.

Capacity requirements for the ERS could be raised even higher if other
ongoing missions (such as peacekeeping) were added, further increasing the
shortfall. The Mobility Requirements Study 2005 analyzed the capacity of the
mobility system to handle additional missions occurring concurrently with
two wars and found that in general, the additional requirements could raise
airlift capacity requirements by about 7 percent. The ability of the ERS to
handle this extra requirement, however, is unclear. According to the study,
DOD needs to reanalyze the ERS to determine whether there might be any extra
capacity available to handle the additional missions or whether more
capacity must be built. Officials were unsure when this issue would be
tackled.

In contrast to the assumptions that tend to underestimate the shortfall, the
model DOD uses to simulate ERS operations- the Airlift Flow Model- could
overestimate the size of the shortfall. Air Mobility Command officials
acknowledge that the Airlift Flow Model, although designed to simulate or
describe complex systems such as the ERS, does not necessarily identify the
best or optimal solution to mobilization requirements. The model repeatedly
simulates cargo movements until it reaches a solution to the identified
mission, but the solution may or may not be the optimal one.

There are other types of models, called optimization models, that officials
say are designed to seek the best or optimal solutions to mission Some
Assumptions

Underestimate Shortfall Model Used Could Overestimate Shortfall

Page 8 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

requirements by identifying the best allocations of cargo to aircraft,
aircraft to routes, and ground resources to airfields. 7 For example, in
analyzing the movement of cargo aircraft through the ERS the Airlift Flow
Model would only be aware of what cargo is available for pickup at the
moment, while an optimization model would be aware of all cargo available
for pickup throughout the mission being modeled. As a result, in a situation
where 10 tons of cargo are ready to be loaded right now and 40 more tons
several hours in the future, the Airlift Flow Model would schedule an
aircraft to pick up the 10- ton cargo immediately since it is focused on
current conditions. It would then schedule another aircraft to pick up the
remaining 40 tons later when another plane became available. However, an
optimization model would likely wait a few hours until an aircraft was
loaded with all 50 tons before sending it off.

In 1997 DOD sponsored an ERS capacity analysis that compared the results of
an optimization model with those of the Airlift Flow Model. 8 The
optimization analysis agreed with the basic Airlift Flow Model conclusion
that there would be a capacity shortfall. However, the optimization analysis
also concluded that a better distribution of ERS resources could
significantly increase the flow of cargo compared with the flow predicted by
the Airlift Flow Model. For example, the optimization model predicted that
by redistributing the existing ramp space and fuel, DOD could boost cargo
deliveries by an estimated 12 to 13 percent. A second DODsponsored study
used an optimization model to analyze the impact of proposed construction
projects designed to increase the fuel handling capacity at ERS bases. 9 The
study concluded that the increase in throughput capacity provided by the
projects would be small and that using existing resources more effectively
may be the best way to increase fuel deliveries.

Although DOD officials believe that optimization models have promise, they
also believe that they have drawbacks and did not use them to analyze the
ERS in the Mobility Requirements Study 2005. They believe, for example, that
optimization models can come to unrealistic conclusions

7 One example of an optimization model is the Naval Postgraduate School/
RAND Corporation Mobility Optimization Model. 8 Documented Briefing:
Analyzing the Effects of Airfield Resources on Airlift Capacity,

RAND Corporation, 1999. 9 Correspondence with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Summary of Research Findings: Fuels MILCON Impacts on Air Mobility,
RAND Corporation, 1998.

Page 9 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

because they cannot simulate random events and may use information (such as
longer- range plans for an entire mobilization) that may not be available to
commanders early in the mobilization. Officials further state that loading
data into optimization models can be very labor intensive, making the models
relatively inflexible and slow, and that it is difficult to introduce
variables into analyses because optimization models attempt to analyze all
possible permutations. For their part, Air Mobility Command officials
responsible for operating the Airlift Flow Model believe that by repeated
analyses over time using their model, they were able to identify the best
solutions for mobilization missions. Officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense stated, however, that because optimization models show
promise, DOD is continuing to sponsor projects to further develop their use.

We were unable to quantify the overall impact of all these factors on the
size of the shortfall. As a result, their net effect on estimates of ERS
capacity in 2005 is unclear.

DOD officials attribute the shortfall in ERS capacity to the shrinkage in
the U. S. overseas presence since the end of the Cold War and to increased
reliance on the 13 remaining old and deteriorating ERS bases. DOD?s latest
estimate of ERS construction to eliminate the shortfall consists of 516
projects and costs about $2 billion. This revised figure is substantially
higher than the estimated $1.2 billion that DOD reported to us at the
beginning of our review in July 2000. Most (58 percent) of the costs are
associated with bases in the Pacific region. Host nations and U. S. allies
are expected to fund about 55 percent of the total, and the United States is
expected to fund the rest. But it is unclear whether all the projects will
be completed as planned, as the projects must compete with each other and
with other DOD projects for funding and face other uncertainties. Most of
the costs (86 percent) are associated with projects that had not yet started
construction as of October 2000.

Since the end of the Cold War, many U. S. military locations overseas have
been closed and their personnel relocated to bases in the continental United
States. Transportation Command officials state that with this drawdown (see
fig. 2) in the 1990s, the ERS lost many of its facilities and much of its
flexibility. Today, the ERS has access to only 13 locations, compared with
45 in the early 1990s. As a result, the remaining bases have become much
more important as the only airfield options available for enroute
mobilization support. Repair Estimates

Face Large Increases and Funding Uncertainties

Overseas Presence Reduced After Cold War

Page 10 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Figure 2: Reductions in U. S. Overseas Troop Strength, Fiscal Years 1988- 99

Source: DOD.

In July 2000, DOD officials told us that the cost to eliminate the shortfall
in ERS capacity was about $1.2 billion for fiscal years 1997 through 2006.
However, shortly after that the estimate was changed to $2.0 billion.
According to Transportation Command officials, no one is responsible for
monitoring the overall cost to eliminate the shortfall. The $1.2- billion
estimate was simply carried forward from an estimate developed in the mid-
1990s in conjunction with a major review of overall mobility requirements.
10 That estimate was based on a quick world tour by a team of engineers who
covered what at the time were about 35 ERS bases, with sometimes only half a
day spent at each base. Following our request for an updated estimate, the
Air Mobility Command agreed to query all of the various commands involved in
the ERS to determine the current cost to eliminate the shortfall and found
that the estimated cost had grown to about $2 billion. According to
officials, the increase reflects changes in the bases making up the ERS
since the mid- 1990s, increases in the costs of repairing/ improving system
components due to aging, and a more in- depth and accurate analysis of
costs.

10 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom Up Review Update, 1995. Estimated
Costs to

Eliminate Shortfall Have Increased Substantially

0 100

200 300

400 500

600 700

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 Fiscal year Troop strength

(thousands)

Page 11 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Transportation Command officials told us that most ERS airfields were built
during or immediately after World War II, and some components were built by
host nations even earlier. The $2 billion will fund repairs and improvements
to fuel systems, runways, ramp space, and other base elements needed to
bring system capacity up to requirements. As shown in figure 3, the largest
construction cost category is associated with fuel system repair and
improvement. According to Transportation and Air Mobility Command officials,
the standard fuel systems at current ERS bases were designed and built
during the early 1950s and had an estimated life span of 30 to 40 years. At
some bases refueling must be carried out by trucks, rather than by more
modern pipeline and hydrant systems. At other bases, hydrants are antiquated
or have deteriorating lines that slow and sometimes interrupt fueling
operations altogether. Bases in the Pacific are the worst off. As shown in
figure 6, repairs and improvements at bases in the Pacific region total
about $1.14 billion (58 percent), compared to about $825 million (42
percent) for the European bases.

Page 12 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Figure 3: Project Costs by Type

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

Figure 4: Construction Costs for Pacific Bases, Fiscal Years 1997- 2006

Source: DOD. 398.2 230.3

147 147

128.3 69.4

19.5 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Yokota

Misawa Andersen

Elmendorf Hickam

Kadena Iwakuni

Dollars, in millions Bases

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Fuel systems

Runways Facilities

Ramp space Environment

Other Pacific, as a percentage of regional total Europe, as a percentage of
regional total

20% 21% 28%

14% 23% 29% 3%

1% 2%

6%

Dollars, rounded in millions

53%

Page 13 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Figure 5: Construction Costs for European Bases, Fiscal Years 1997- 2006

Note: Although the United States has agreed to withdraw from Rhein Main by
2005, the base is included here to show the costs to prepare it for return
to German use.

Source: DOD.

Officials emphasize that the proposed projects are intended largely to
replace capability lost due to deterioration or base closures, not to
increase overall capacity. In fact, only 25 of the 516 projects provide
additional capacity. The remaining projects either upgrade existing capacity
to current environmental, safety, or operational standards or replace/
repair equipment due to obsolescence or failure.

DOD plans call for about 55 percent of the $2 billion in ERS construction
funding to come from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ($ 132.6
million) and host nations such as Germany ($ 430.8 million) and Japan ($
523.9 million) (see fig. 6). According to officials from the U. S.
Transportation, European, and Pacific Commands, funding commitments from the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Germany are contained in formal
agreements. Japanese funding is provided under the Japanese Facilities
Improvement Program. Japan has provided some $21 billion for projects under
this program, which started in 1979 to ease the financial burden of
stationing U. S. forces in Japan. However, funding for projects under this
program is voluntary, and there are no written agreements associated with
the ERS projects. Moreover, the level of funding has been Host Nations and
Allies

Expected to Fund Over Half of Costs

326 234.6

82. 2 72

60 28. 4

22. 1 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Ramstein

Spangdahlem Rota

Mildenhall Fairford

Moron Rhein Main

Bases Dollars, in millions

Page 14 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

declining somewhat since the early 1990s, and is also constrained by
prohibitions such as using the funds for projects viewed by the government
of Japan as increasing war- fighting capacity.

Figure 6: Funding Sources and Construction Costs by Region, Fiscal Years
1997- 2006

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

The remaining 45 percent ($ 878 million) is expected to come from a variety
of U. S. programs (see table 1). The largest contributors are the Defense
Logistics Agency and the Air Force Operation and Maintenance and Military
Construction programs.

Table 1: Planned U. S. Funding Sources for ERS Projects, Fiscal Years 1997
through 2006

Dollars in millions

Funding source

Defense Logistics Agency $505.2 Military Construction 141.4 Operation and
Maintenance 138.0 Transportation Working Capital Fund 70.7 Air Force
Material Command Equipment 14.5 Mobility Enhancement Funds 5. 1 Contingency
Funds 2. 9

Total $877.8

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 Construction costs

Funding sources United States (878) Host country/ NATO (1, 087)

European bases (825) Pacific bases (1, 140)

Dollars in millions

Page 15 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

It is unclear whether all the construction projects will be completed as
planned. According to Transportation Command officials, funding for the
projects covered by U. S. programs has been formally requested through the
DOD budget process, and they believe the projects will be funded within
planned time frames. However, U. S.- funded ERS projects in Europe must
compete for funding against Pacific projects and others within DOD in an
environment of concern about a growing backlog of facilities maintenance and
repair projects. According to these officials, DOD infrastructure is grossly
under funded, with facilities currently funded for replacement every 250
years. (See p. 18 for a discussion of DOD problems in infrastructure
management.) Projects planned in later years are more vulnerable to funding
changes since they have not yet been spent and they must continue to compete
against other projects in a highly competitive budget environment. Officials
also note that host nation involvement in funding can create some
uncertainty in construction timetables. For example, DOD had to reassign
fiscal year 2002 funding for construction projects at one ERS airfield in
Europe to other DOD projects because of a 2- to 3- year delay in host
government approval of funding requirements. According to officials, the
host government was concerned about sovereignty issues involved in its
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Formal approval has
now been received for these projects, and funding has been shifted by about
1 year.

Most of the projects have not yet started construction. As shown in figure
7, as of October 2000, about 4 percent ($ 75. 0 million) of total funding
had been spent on completed projects with another 10 percent ($ 194.6
million) spent on projects in progress. The remaining 86 percent ($ 1.7
billion) of funding was associated with projects in various stages of
planning, programming of funds, and engineering design running out through
2006. Funding for such projects is subject to future budgetary constraints
and uncertainties. Projects funded by U. S. programs have progressed
somewhat faster than those funded by host nations and allies. About 19
percent of funding under U. S. programs was associated with projects that
had either begun or completed work, compared to about 10 percent of host
nation and allied funding. Projects Face Funding

Competition and Other Uncertainties

Page 16 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Figure 7: Percentage of Funding Spent on ERS Construction Projects and
Project Status

Source: DOD.

According to Transportation Command officials only recently has the ERS
begun to receive high priority for funding. In the first few years after the
end of the Cold War and during the military drawdown, little concern was
voiced about shrinking ERS capacity. But as contingency operations began to
place increasing demands on the remaining airfields, Air Mobility Command
leaders realized how critical the airfields were and how they needed higher
resource priority. To publicize the problem and obtain higher priority, the
Air Mobility Command proclaimed 1997 the ?Year of the En Route System? and
funding began to increase. However, even with the increased priority,
officials told us that it still takes many years to move projects through
the budget process, obtain funding, and begin construction.

86% 4%

10% Completed = 95 In construction = 76 Planning, programming, and design =
345

Page 17 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Despite the strategic importance of the ERS, critical information on ERS
plans and operations is not available, and the system is not managed as a
coherent whole. For example, notwithstanding the increase in construction
cost estimates, DOD has not carried out overall cost- benefit studies to
document the rationale for its decisions and demonstrate that its proposed
projects represent the best solutions. Similarly, despite concerns about
aging and deteriorating facilities and equipment, the ERS has no centralized
oversight system to provide data on deterioration and failure rates. It has
no formal strategic plan to identify long- term plans and strategies,
guiding policies, and operating priorities for the ERS. No single
organization is responsible for managing and funding the ERS. These
weaknesses raise questions about system plans and operations, and
unnecessarily increase the risk of operational problems and inefficiencies.
Moreover, DOD does not include information on ERS shortfalls in its reports
on the performance of the overall strategic mobility system, resulting in an
incomplete picture of mobility capabilities.

Despite the increased cost estimates and other uncertainties surrounding ERS
construction projects, DOD has not developed overall cost- benefit studies
or other prudent assurances to demonstrate either the rationale for its
decisions or to show that the planned $2 billion in projects represent the
best solutions for correcting the shortfall.

According to Transportation Command officials, the process DOD used to
determine the en- route infrastructure was primarily focused on satisfying
mission war- fighting requirements while attempting to minimize costs where
possible. An overall cost- benefit analysis was not done, they said, because
the ERS evolved over many years in response to changing military and
political conditions and to hundreds of mobility and engineering analyses of
capacity trade- offs under different combinations of bases. Officials stated
that they attempted to make cost- effective decisions by, for example,
choosing to repair or improve existing bases rather than building new ones.
Because of the age of the facilities, many of the planned projects had
already been identified and justified in the military construction budgeting
process.

Moreover, despite concerns about aging and deteriorating facilities,
Transportation Command officials also told us that they could not provide
data on deterioration and failure rates. The ERS has no centralized
oversight system to provide readily available, up- to- date data on the
condition and readiness of the airfields, and officials said that they could
not identify any worthwhile measures that they could accurately produce
without an extended research effort. Critical Information

and Management Structure Lacking

Overall Cost- Benefit Studies Not Developed

Page 18 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Sound strategic planning that clearly lays out missions and goals, needed
resources, priorities, strategies, measures of performance, and assigned
responsibilities is crucial to achieving program success. According to
officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, some strategic
guidance for the ERS is expressed through the DOD budget process. However,
these officials acknowledged that DOD has no formal strategic plan for the
ERS. Without such a plan, DOD does not have the information- such as the
elements discussed above- or management structure needed to ensure the
success of the ERS. Over the years, we have noted similar gaps in DOD?s
overall strategic planning processes that have led to difficulties in
assessing performance in a variety of areas. As a result, we have classified
DOD strategic planning as a major management challenge. 11

We also classified DOD management of support infrastructure as a major
management challenge because of DOD?s problems in this area. DOD has reduced
force structure since the end of the Cold War, but it has not achieved
similar reductions in infrastructure costs. At the same time, DOD
acknowledges that it has not been spending enough money to offset the
growing backlog of facilities maintenance and repair projects. We concluded
that reducing unneeded infrastructure could free up the funding needed to
ensure that critical assets such as the ERS airfields are adequately funded.

In accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, DOD
reports annually on its performance in managing strategic mobility
capabilities by using three measures (airlift capacity, sealift capacity,
and overseas prepositioning of equipment). However, it does not include data
on ERS shortfalls in the report, despite the major effect such shortfalls
have on airlift capacity. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense said that they do not include ERS shortfalls because the report
covers only the highest- level measures of performance. They acknowledged
the importance of ERS airfield capacity but stated that it has not been
considered a primary criterion for measuring performance in strategic
mobility. According to the Air Mobility Command, the chief limiting factor
on deployment operations is not usually the number of available aircraft but
the capability of the en- route or destination infrastructure to accommodate
the ground operations of the aircraft.

11 Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO- 01- 244, Jan. 2001). Basic
Management

Structure Lacking

Page 19 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

According to Transportation Command officials, the absence of elements such
as an overall strategic plan is the result of no single organization having
overall responsibility for the ERS. Figure 8 illustrates the difficulty in
managing and coordinating the ERS. Management of the ERS is fragmented among
at least four unified commands and six subcommands, three services, host
nations, and other organizations such as the Defense Logistics Agency- each
with its own functional interests and priorities. (See app. I for more
details on the various responsibilities of these organizations.)

Page 20 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Figure 8: Organizations With Responsibility for the ERS

Note: NATO refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Source:
Developed from DOD information.

Because of the absence of centralized responsibility for the ERS, the
European and Pacific Commands established separate steering committees (the
En Route Infrastructure Steering Committees) to provide a forum for
coordination and resolution of ERS issues in each region. These two
committees are not required by any DOD- level guidance but are a
collaborative effort sanctioned by the geographical commands to solve ERS
operating issues. The committees are composed of all the organizations in
each region with responsibility for ERS airfields in the area (the European
steering committee also includes the Central Command). The Transportation
Command co- chairs both steering committees. While these committees perform
an important function,

Central Command

Navy Pacific

Fleet Pacific

Command Marine Forces Pacific

Pacific Air Forces

Pacific Command En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee European

Command Navy Europe

Air Force Europe

European Command En Route Infrastructure Steering Committee

Transportation Command

Air Mobility Command

Air Force Navy Marines Host country

State Department

Defense Logistics

Agency European

airfields Pacific

airfields NATO

Page 21 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

officials said that no organization is responsible for formally coordinating
and overseeing overall ERS operations.

The growth in importance of the En Route System has not been matched by a
commensurate improvement in its information and management structures.
Establishing the European and Pacific steering committees was an important
first step in organizing regional operations, but does not go far enough.
While the war- fighting responsibilities and authorities of the geographical
commands must be respected, one overarching organization with responsibility
for strategic operations and coordination of overall ERS operations during
peacetime is needed. Without such structure ERS operations are prone to a
higher risk of inefficiency in the form of confusing and overlapping lines
of authority and accountability for key decisions, a lack of coordination
and duplication of effort among responsible organizations, and wasteful
competition for resources.

A formal, written strategic plan that lays out missions and goals, guiding
principles and priorities, performance measures, and monitoring mechanisms
is also needed. This plan would help ensure that ERS operations are governed
by a coherent worldwide vision and not by limited regional or service
notions and perspectives. Without the vision and order provided by a formal
strategic plan, decisionmakers do not have the information they need to
ensure that ERS resources and operations are focused on the right goals and
outcomes. Without a system for ongoing monitoring of key aspects of ERS
operations, decisionmakers do not have the real time, readily available
information needed to quickly identify and correct problems, including the
status of projects needed to ensure that strategic requirements are met and
planned troop movements will not be delayed.

DOD also needs to develop an overall cost- benefit study of its construction
plans for the ERS. Without this information, DOD cannot compare options and
alternatives for improving the ERS, and document that the solutions it
chooses are the best ones. Moreover, DOD needs to be able to ensure that the
guiding principles and rationales at play in allocating scarce funding
dollars are not lost in the many individual decisions made by different
organizations to serve different interests and priorities. This study would
also serve as a useful review of ERS construction plans and projects in
light of the ongoing review of the National Military Strategy.

Finally, DOD needs to ensure that ERS problems and issues receive a
visibility consistent with their critical strategic importance. Omitting
data Conclusions

Page 22 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

on ERS limitations from DOD?s plan and reports on strategic mobility
presents an incomplete picture of DOD capability and tends to obscure ERS
problems and the resources needed to resolve them. Efforts to reduce
shortages of DOD cargo aircraft will have limited impact if those aircraft
do not have adequate airfields to land on.

To improve the visibility of the ERS and reduce the risk of management
problems and inefficiencies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

 make one organization responsible for strategic management and
coordination of overall ERS operations during peacetime,

 develop a formal strategic plan and monitoring system for the ERS,

 develop an overall cost- benefit study to document the rationales for
plans to repair and improve the ERS, and

 include information on ERS limitations and how they affect the
Department?s strategic mobility performance in DOD?s performance plan and
report.

Because DOD indicated in its written comments that it generally would not
implement the recommendations made in this report, the Congress may wish to
consider directing the Secretary of Defense to implement the
recommendations, and periodically report on DOD?s progress to ensure that
these prudent improvements to ERS management are carried out.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally disagreed with
our conclusions and recommendations. In particular, DOD did not agree with
our view that the ERS lacks a coherent management structure, our description
of the growth in costs of eliminating the shortfall in system capacity, or
our description of the modeling approach used to analyze ERS capacity.

Regarding our first recommendation, DOD believes that the existing
organization, in particular its ERS steering committees, readiness reporting
processes, 12 planning and budgeting system, and reviews of strategic
mobility already provide a ?robust? management structure for the ERS.
Nonetheless, it partially agreed with our recommendation to make one
organization responsible for overarching strategic issues. It believes

12 We reviewed these readiness reports and processes and considered them in
our analyses. Recommendations for

Executive Action Matter for Congressional Consideration

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 23 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

that base- level management of ERS airfields is best performed by the
responsible services but agreed to consider whether one organization should
be designated as responsible for some matters.

We remain convinced that the ERS needs a better management structure. We
agree that some elements of ERS operations are individually managed by
various organizations and processes and that some elements, such as base
level operations, fuels projects and readiness reporting, may be managed
quite intensively. We in fact describe examples of many of these
organizations and processes and their responsibilities for parts of ERS
operations in our report. However, ?robust? management in one or even
several areas does not constitute a coherent and coordinated overall
management structure. Our recommendation is intended to assign
responsibility for overarching issues- such as development of an overall
strategic plan, cost- benefit study, and monitoring system- to one
organization to help provide a clear, coordinated, and comprehensive
management structure for all ERS operations. It should be noted that during
our review this recommendation received strong support from officials at
organizations currently involved in ERS operations, including the
Transportation and Central commands.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to develop an overall ERS
strategic plan and monitoring system. It stated that the recent Mobility
Requirements Study 2005 already includes a strategic plan for the ERS. DOD
said it would nevertheless try to improve the integration, presentation, and
documentation of the plan to help outside organizations understand its
provisions.

We disagree that the January 2001 Mobility Requirements Study 2005 contains
a strategic plan for the ERS. Moreover, there seems to be some confusion in
DOD over this issue. During the course of our review we asked repeatedly for
copies of any strategic plan and DOD officials repeatedly told us that no
formal strategic plan for the ERS existed. In fact, during our formal
closeout meeting in April 2001 officials told us that a formal strategic
plan was being developed as a result of our review. The document cited by
DOD in the January 2001 Mobility Requirements Study 2005 is identified as
the ERS ?Infrastructure Analysis,? not as a strategic plan. It is simply an
analysis of current shortfalls in capacity and whether planned construction
projects will remedy those shortfalls by 2005- if they are completed on
schedule. The analysis does not include many of the elements needed for
sound strategic plans, which need to lay out missions and goals, necessary
resources, assigned responsibilities for accomplishing goals, priorities and
strategies to be followed, and performance measures for gauging progress
toward identified goals.

Page 24 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

In addition, the analysis does not identify the expected cost to remedy the
capacity shortfalls, or the organizational or procedural responsibilities
for achieving ERS goals. Similarly, the analysis does not identify
priorities between regions, bases, or projects to help identify strategies
to be followed in case of funding or other problems. Finally, the analysis
also does not identify any system of performance measures and monitoring
mechanisms to help decisionmakers gauge progress and problems in carrying
out strategic goals. For example, it simply assumes that projects will be
completed on schedule without any measures of actual progress. In fact,
during our review Transportation and Air Mobility Command officials could
not tell us how many projects were behind their original schedule because
there is no centralized monitoring system.

The Department also disagreed with our recommendation for an overall cost-
benefit study to document the rationales for plans to repair and improve the
ERS. DOD believes the guidance it provides through the planning and
budgeting process is sufficient to optimize the list of construction
projects to be funded. We disagree. We understand that developing a formal
cost- benefit analysis of the overall ERS infrastructure is difficult
because of the size of the ERS and the influence of diplomatic
considerations versus strictly economic considerations. However, our
experience has shown that relying exclusively on the budget process to
document funding rationales often results only in inferences as to why
decisions were made. This process lacks the benefit of clear information on
the pros and cons of available choices or on the guiding principles used to
make those decisions. DOD?s annual requests for funds contain no evidence
that projects are prioritized by importance or that progress toward an
established goal, such as modernizing the ERS, is being made in an efficient
and timely fashion.

DOD disagreed with our recommendation to include information on ERS
limitations in its annual performance plan and report along with the other
elements of strategic mobility: airlift, sealift, and prepositioned
equipment. DOD stated that information on ERS performance is already
included in other documents such as the mobility requirements studies, the
annual budget justification documents, and quarterly readiness reports. We
disagree that it is appropriate to exclude information on ERS performance
from the annual report while including information on the other elements of
strategic mobility. The ERS is an integral aspect of strategic mobility. In
fact, Air Mobility Command reports cite ERS infrastructure as the top
limiting factor in deployment operations. Omitting ERS information from the
key annual performance report gives an incomplete and misleading view of
strategic mobility capabilities.

Page 25 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

DOD also disagreed with our description of the growth in estimated costs for
improving the ERS. DOD stated that the different cost estimates we were
provided are not directly comparable because they were produced several
years apart and were premised on different sets of bases and analytical
methodologies. Our report clearly lays out these differences. Moreover, DOD
further claimed that we were using the comparison to point to ?unexplained?
cost growth. Whether DOD was aware of the reasons behind the increased
estimate was not the primary point we were trying to make. Our primary point
is that DOD did not know how much it would cost to bring ERS capacity up to
requirements because it does not monitor overall costs. Air Mobility Command
officials had to make a special query to all the commands to find out what
the current costs were and whether they had changed over previous estimates.
Similarly, when we requested an updated estimate late in our review,
officials responded that obtaining such an update would be very labor
intensive and time consuming. We believe that the lack of a strategy or
system for monitoring progress and overall costs is symptomatic of the
weaknesses in DOD?s management of the ERS.

Finally, DOD disagreed with our description of the modeling approach it used
to analyze ERS capacity. DOD stated that our report asserted that the
approach it used is ?flawed? and overestimates the shortfalls. DOD further
stated that any modeling provides only an approximation of real- world
systems and that no analysis can provide solutions that are 100- percent
accurate. DOD believes that it has applied the best tools available and that
it will continue to refine its capabilities, as new modeling tools become
available.

DOD appears to have misunderstood our point. Our report does not assert that
the modeling approach was flawed or that it overstated the shortfall. We
state that the assumptions and modeling approaches DOD used could
underestimate or overestimate the size of the shortfall, but that we could
not measure the precise effect of these factors on DOD?s estimate. Our
report does not attempt to endorse one modeling approach over the other. We
point out the uncertainties of both approaches- including DOD officials?
comments on the pros and cons of each- so that the reader can clearly
understand the degree of precision in DOD?s estimate. It is important to
fully consider all options in such analyses to ensure that, should an
optimal solution be available, it is identified.

DOD?s comments are reprinted in appendix III. DOD also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Page 26 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees and the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.
Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (757) 552- 8100 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. The major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.

Sincerely yours, Neal P. Curtin Director Operations and Readiness Defense
Capabilities and Management Team

Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route System Is Fragmented Among Many
Organizations

Page 27 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

According to Transportation and Air Mobility Command officials, all of the
organizations with responsibility for the En Route System (see fig. 8) play
some combination of three basic roles: owner/ manager, funder, and/ or
advocate in support of various ERS needs. The Transportation Command has
functional responsibility for managing the entire Defense Transportation
System, with the airlift portion handled by its air component, the Air Force
Air Mobility Command. The Transportation Command plans and coordinates
movements through the overall transportation system. The Air Mobility
Command uses the ERS airfields to help provide aerial refueling and airlift
through its fleet of air tankers and cargo airplanes. Both commands may act
as advocates for the resource needs of the ERS. However, even though the
Transportation Command has functional responsibility for managing the entire
Defense Transportation System, it is not in charge of the ERS airfields and
can provide only limited funding for repair and improvement projects. The
needs of the geographical commands (such as the European, Central, and
Pacific commands) take precedence over those of the functional commands
(such as the Transportation Command) because of the geographical commands?
war- fighting responsibilities. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization may
also use the bases to assist in carrying out its strategic operations.
Conflicts can and do occur. For example, in the late 1980s, the European
Command had planned to return U. S. facilities at two ERS airfields to the
host nations, in part because of budget reductions. However, Transportation
Command officials believed the airfields were needed for mobilizations to
the Middle East and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to oppose the European
Command?s plans. The airfield facilities were ultimately retained.

Overall management of a particular ERS airfield is shared between the
command with responsibility for that geographical area and the military
service that operates the airfield on a daily basis. The Air Force operates
11 ERS airfields; the Navy operates the airfield in Rota, Spain; and the
Marines operate the airfield in Iwakuni, Japan. The airfields are located on
bases owned by the host country, under agreements for support negotiated by
the State Department. Each military service must operate the airfield in
accordance with its primary service mission but may act as advocate for the
airfield?s ERS- related needs.

However, each service must also manage the airfield in accordance with the
policies set forth by the geographical command. These commands are
responsible for supporting and achieving U. S. interests in their particular
region and for planning and maintaining war- fighting capabilities in the
event of an outbreak of hostilities. They include component commands
Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route

System Is Fragmented Among Many Organizations

Appendix I: Responsibility for the En Route System Is Fragmented Among Many
Organizations

Page 28 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

drawn from each of the military services to manage the support associated
with each. For example, U. S. Navy Europe and U. S. Air Forces Europe
provide support for their naval and air bases in the region. The U. S.
Navy?s Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, and Pacific Air Forces provide
similar support in the Pacific. These commands may act as an advocate for
ERS needs consistent with their contribution to the commands? mission of
maintaining war- fighting capabilities. In Europe, both the European and
Central commands may act as advocates for the ERS airfields. The airfields
are in Europe, but their ERS purpose is to act as a conduit for aircraft
headed to war zones in the Middle East, which is managed by the Central
Command.

While the unified commands have some management responsibilities for the
airfields, they have no funding programs for base operations and
construction. The military services and the Defense Logistics Agency
generally provide U. S. funding for these purposes. For example, the Air
Force provides funds for the operation of its ERS airfield in Fairford,
England. If the base command needs funds for a construction project, it
requests them from its parent command in the region, U. S. Air Forces
Europe, which is under the European Command. Air Forces Europe would
validate the project and request funding through the various programs
available. These would be primarily Air Force programs funding military
construction, operations, and maintenance, or, in the case of fuels
projects, the Defense Logistics Agency. The Defense Logistics Agency has
responsibility for funding fuels projects across all services. In deciding
whether to include a project in funding requests, the services and the
Defense Logistics Agency assign their own priorities to the project in terms
of its relative contribution to their own missions, as well as its
contribution to the overall Department of Defense mission.

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology Page 29 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

To determine whether the ERS airfields have the capacity needed to meet the
requirements of the National Military Strategy, we obtained briefings,
reviewed documents, and interviewed officials at the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S.
Transportation Command, the European Command, the Central Command, the
Pacific Command, the Air Force Mobility Command, the RAND Corporation, and
the Naval Postgraduate School. Much of our analysis was focused on reviewing
the requirements and ERS capacity analyses set forth in the Mobility
Requirements Study 2005 and in earlier similar studies. We did not
independently verify DOD?s estimate of system capacity.

To identify the causes of any shortfalls and DOD?s plans to correct them, we
reviewed the processes DOD used to identify deficiencies and corrective
actions and discussed them with officials at the offices identified above,
as well as at DOD?s Office of the Inspector General. We reviewed
deficiencies and corrective actions identified in DOD Joint Monthly
Readiness Review Reports, Air Mobility Command reports, and reports and
other documents produced by the European and Pacific Steering committees and
the Inspector General. We obtained lists of construction projects at each
ERS airfield and analyzed them from a number of different perspectives,
including the total costs by base, by region, and systemwide; the purpose;
and the expected source of funding and discussed them with DOD officials.

To determine whether the ERS has the information and organizational
structure needed to ensure that its operations are carried out efficiently
and effectively, we analyzed data and reports on a variety of basic
management issues and discussed information gaps with DOD officials. We
identified all organizations with responsibility for or management duties at
ERS airfields and reviewed the scope of their individual responsibilities
with DOD officials.

We conducted our review from July 2000 through April 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix II: Scope and
Methodology

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 33 GAO- 01- 566 Military Readiness

William C. Meredith (202) 512- 4275 John W. Nelson (404) 679- 1949

In addition to those named above, Katherine Chenault, Lawrence E. Dixon,
Richard G. Payne, Stefano Petrucci, and Gregory J. Symons, made key
contributions to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Staff Acknowledgments

(702039)

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