Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities	 
Needed (18-MAY-01, GAO-01-493). 				 
								 
According to the Department of the Navy, the primary purpose of  
forward-deployed naval forces is to project power from the sea to
influence events ashore. To be successful, naval forces must be  
able to gain access to, and operate in the littoral regions of,  
potential adversaries. Consequently, they must be able to detect 
and neutralize enemy sea mines and other antiship weapons.	 
Finally, they must be able to launch and support offensive	 
operations against enemy forces ashore. In this report, GAO	 
assesses the Navy's (1) existing mine countermeasures, (2)	 
antisubmarine warfare, (3) ship self-defense, (4) surface fire	 
support capabilities, and (5) progress in the acquisition	 
programs the Navy is pursuing to address shortfalls in these	 
areas. GAO found that (1) the Navy's current forces of		 
specialized ships, helicopters, and other assets developed for	 
and dedicated to detecting and neutralizing enemy sea mines lack 
several key warfighting capabilities it needs for operations in  
littoral environs, (2) although the Navy is making some progress 
in overcoming  shortfalls in antisubmarine warfare, a lack of	 
resources and priorities among competing programs is still	 
prevalent, (3) the Navy's ship defense capabilities against	 
currently deployed cruise missiles are marginal, and surface	 
ships will be at risk when operating within the range of these	 
weapons, (4) the Navy will not meet the Marine Corps' naval	 
surface fire support requirements for at least another decade,	 
and (5) the Navy has shown limited progess in the acquisition	 
programs it is pursuing to address shortfalls in these areas.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-493 					        
    ACCNO:   A01037						        
  TITLE:     Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting	      
             Capabilities Needed                                              
     DATE:   05/18/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Antisubmarine warfare				 
	     Defense capabilities				 
	     Naval procurement					 
	     Naval warfare					 
	     Explosives 					 
	     Advanced Land Attack Missile			 
	     DOD Future Years Defense Program			 
	     Navy MK-54 Lightweight Torpedo Program		 
	     Naval Fire Control System				 
	     Navy Distributed Explosive Technology		 
	     Program						 
								 
	     Navy Mine Warfare Plan				 
	     Shallow Water Assault Breaching System		 

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GAO-01-493
     
Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2001 NAVY ACQUISITIONS Improved Littoral War- Fighting Capabilities
Needed

GAO- 01- 493

Page i GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions Letter 1

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 29

Figures

Figure 1: Sea Mine Threats by Water Depth 5 Figure 2: Sea Mine Damage to the
U. S. S. Tripoli in the Gulf War 6 Figure 3: Techniques Used in Littoral
Regions to Detect and Locate

a Diesel Submarine 13 Figure 4: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements 20

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense DET Distributed Explosive Technology NM nautical
miles NSFS Naval Surface Fire Support SABRE Shallow- Water Assault Breaching
System Contents

Page 1 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

May 18, 2001 The Honorable Duncan Hunter Chairman The Honorable Marty Meehan
Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on Military

Research and Development Committee on Armed Services House of
Representatives

According to the Department of the Navy, the primary purpose of
forwarddeployed naval forces is to project power from the sea to influence
events ashore. 1 To be successful, our naval forces must be able to gain
access to, and operate in the littoral 2 regions of, potential adversaries.
Consequently, they must be able to detect and neutralize enemy sea mines and
submarines, and to protect themselves against cruise missiles and other
antiship weapons. Finally, they must be able to launch and support offensive
operations against enemy forces ashore. In this context, the Navy has as one
of its missions the support of the Marine Corps as it conducts amphibious
operations. We have reported on the extent of these capabilities in several
individual reports over the last 6 years. 3 This report responds to your
request that we update and consolidate the assessments contained in these
reports and provide an overall assessment of the Navy?s capabilities to
operate in the littoral. Specifically, we assessed the Navy?s existing mine
countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, ship self- defense,

1 See Forward From the Sea (Mar. 1997). 2 According to the Navy, the term
?littoral? as it applies to naval operations, is not restricted to the
limited oceanographic definition, i. e., the world?s coastal regions but
includes that portion of the world?s land masses adjacent to oceans within
direct control of, and vulnerable to, the striking power of sea- based
forces.

3 See Naval Surface Fire Support: Navy?s Near- Term Plan Is Not Based on
Sufficient Analysis (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 160, May 19, 1995); Navy Mine Warfare:
Plans to Improve Countermeasures Capabilities Unclear (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 135,
June 10, 1998); Defense Acquisitions: Naval Surface Fire Support Program
Plans and Costs (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 91, June 11, 1999); Defense Acquisitions:
Evaluation of the Navy?s Anti- Submarine Warfare Assessment (GAO/ NSIAD- 99-
85, July 12, 1999); Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of the Navy?s 1999
Naval Fire Support Assessment (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 225, Sept. 14, 1999); and

Defense Acquisitions: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Ship Cruise
Missile Defense (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 149, July 11, 2000).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

and surface fire support capabilities, and the progress of the acquisition
programs the Navy is pursuing to address shortfalls in these areas.

The Navy has acknowledged that it currently lacks a number of key
warfighting capabilities it needs for operations in littoral environs. For
example, it does not have a means for effectively breaching enemy sea mines
in the surf zone 4 ; detecting and neutralizing enemy submarines in shallow
water; defending its ships against cruise missiles; or providing adequate
fire support for Marine Corps amphibious landings and combat operations
ashore. The current lack of capability in these areas increases the risk to
our naval forces and could limit their use in future conflicts.

The Navy has had acquisition programs under way to improve its capabilities
in each of these areas for many years, but progress has been slow. Unless
current efforts can be accelerated or alternatives developed, it will be
another 10 to 20 years before the Navy and the Marine Corps will have the
capabilities needed to successfully execute littoral warfare operations
against competent enemy forces.

This report contains two matters for congressional consideration that are
intended to increase management attention given to mine countermeasures and
antisubmarine warfare programs. It also recommends that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Navy to develop a more comprehensive mine countermeasures
plan that (1) identifies and address shortfalls and limitations in mine
countermeasures capabilities in the littoral- particularly shortfalls and
limitations in breaching and clearing minefields very close to the shore;
(2) identifies the mix of mine warfare capabilities and systems that the
Navy intends to field in the future; and (3) identifies the types,
quantities, and schedules of systems to be acquired and the resources that
will be required to develop, procure, and sustain them.

In written comments on this report, the Department of Defense agreed that it
provides an accurate assessment of the Navy?s mine countermeasures,
antisubmarine warfare, naval surface fire support, and ship cruise missile
defense capabilities. The Department also agreed with

4 Surf zone is defined as waters less than 10 feet in depth to the beach.
The hostile surf zone may contain anti- invasion mines, controlled mines,
buried mines, and other obstacles. (See. fig. 1.) Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

our recommendation for the Navy to more explicitly identify shortfalls and
limitations in mine countermeasures capabilities in the littoral. The
Department took issue with our statements related to a force structure
decision on mine warfare programs and to programmatic priorities for mine
warfare and antisubmarine mission areas. The Department? s position and our
response are presented in the Agency Comments section of this report.

Sea mines threaten the Navy?s ability to conduct amphibious landings and
logistical support operations. The Navy?s current forces of specialized
ships, helicopters, and other assets that have been developed for and
dedicated 5 to detecting and neutralizing enemy sea mines are not
effectively capable of breaching and clearing mines in very shallow water
near the shore. This capability is required to assure access to beachlanding
sites by combat and support forces. The Navy has had two systems in
development since 1993 to address this shortfall. However, their development
is currently on hold because the Navy and the Marine Corps are concerned
about their operation, safety, and reliability. Since the dedicated mine
countermeasures forces are not normally deployed with the ships that make up
the carrier battle and amphibious ready groups, the Navy is developing
organic 6 mine countermeasures capabilities- that is, systems that are on
and deployed with ships, helicopters and submarines, in the carrier battle
and amphibious ready groups. Seven new organic systems are in development,
and initial units are expected to begin entering the fleet in 2005. Although
it has developed and maintains an updated Mine Warfare Plan, the Navy has
not decided on a mix of organic and dedicated platforms (ships and aircraft)
and systems that will make up its future mine countermeasures force
structure. A decision is needed to determine the types and quantities of
systems to be procured, help set priorities among systems, and determine the
level of resources required

5 Dedicated mine warfare forces consist of the surface, airborne, and
explosive ordnance disposal forces that are linked, supported, and
controlled from a dedicated mine warfare control ship or mobile command
facility. They are based in the continental United States or at forward
locations, operating independently or in direct support of a carrier battle
group or amphibious ready group.

6 Organic mine warfare forces are defined as mine warfare- capable forces,
systems, and capabilities that are resident in and deployed with a carrier
battle group or amphibious ready group. Organic mine countermeasures systems
consist of integrated sensors and weapons that are part of the combat
systems of ships, submarines, and helicopters. An organic capability means
that a carrier battle or amphibious ready group can undertake limited mine
countermeasures missions as a core competency. Mine

Countermeasures

Page 4 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

for their development, procurement, and sustainment. A congressionally
mandated certification of the Navy?s Mine Warfare Plan by the Secretary of
Defense has enhanced the importance of mine countermeasures programs within
the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy. However, as currently
constructed, the certification requirement does not require the Navy to
report year- to- year progress toward achieving improved capabilities.

Enemy sea mines have been responsible for 14 of the 19 Navy ships destroyed
or damaged since 1950. Some countries are continuing to develop and
proliferate mines that are increasingly more difficult to detect and
neutralize. To appreciate the complexity of the mine countermeasures warfare
task, it is important to understand the environment in which mine warfare
operations take place. Figure 1 illustrates the five water depths of the
undersea battlespace and the types of mines found at those depths.
Background

Page 5 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Figure 1: Sea Mine Threats by Water Depth

Source: GAO reproduction of Navy graphic.

During the Gulf War, two Navy ships- the U. S. S. Princeton and the U. S. S.

Tripoli- were severely damaged and seven sailors injured by sea mines.
Figure 2 shows the damage 10 feet below the waterline from an Iraqi sea mine
to the U. S. S. Tripoli in the Persian Gulf on February 18, 1991.

Threat Types AntiPersonnel

Mines and Obstacles

10 FT

Moored Mines Bottom Mines Moored Mines

Bottom Mines Rising Mines

    40 FT 300 FT Deep

Water Shallow

Water Very- Shallow

Water Surf

Zone Craft Landing

Zone

Depth Regimes Anti- Tank

Mines Anti- Invasion

Mines and Obstacles

 * Bottom Type  Clutter  Buried Mines

Page 6 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Figure 2: Sea Mine Damage to the U. S. S. Tripoli in the Gulf War

Source: DOD.

The Navy?s existing specialized mine warfare forces, known as dedicated mine
warfare forces, consist of 12 coastal mine- hunting ships and 14 mine
countermeasures ships, 1 command and support ship, 20 mine- hunting and
mine- clearing helicopters, 15 explosive ordnance disposal detachments, a
very shallow water detachment, and marine mammal detachments. 7 According to
the Navy, the coastal minehunting ships and mine countermeasures ships of
the dedicated forces lack the speed and endurance needed to accompany
carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups on overseas deployments.
Because of this shortcoming, the Navy is developing organic mine
countermeasures systems for carrier

7 Marine mammal detachments consist of specially trained bottlenose dolphins
and sea lions for mine detection and neutralization, swimmer defense, and
the recovery of exercise mines and torpedoes.

Page 7 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

battle and amphibious ready groups. Organic systems would allow naval forces
to counter sea mines without having to wait for the dedicated mine
countermeasure forces to arrive. However, even if organic systems prove
effective, the Navy still intends to retain some of its dedicated mine
countermeasures force for larger- scale mine hunting 8 and sweeping 9
operations, such as those conducted after the Gulf War.

Almost a decade ago, the Congress expressed concerns that the Navy had
failed to sufficiently emphasize mine countermeasures in its research and
development program and noted the relatively limited funding allocation to
those efforts. To support a continuing emphasis on developing the desired
mine countermeasures, the Congress added an annual certification requirement
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993.
This legislation, and subsequent extensions, provides for the transfer of
primary responsibility for developing and testing mine countermeasures
systems from the Navy to an office within DOD 10 unless the Secretary of
Defense certifies that certain conditions are met each year. Specifically,
the Secretary of Defense could waive this transfer of responsibility by
certifying that the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, had submitted an
updated mine countermeasures master plan and provided sufficient resources
for executing the updated plan. The legislation also requires the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?s assessment of whether the Navy had programmed
sufficient resources to execute the plan. The Secretary of Defense has
certified the Navy?s mine warfare plan each year since the requirement was
enacted. Unless the Congress extends the certification requirement, it will
expire at the end of fiscal year 2003.

8 ?Mine hunting? is the employment of sensor and neutralization systems-
whether air, surface, or subsurface- to locate and dispose of individual
mines. 9 ?Minesweeping? is a technique of clearing mines using either
mechanical, explosive, or influence sweep equipment. Mechanical sweeping
removes, disturbs, or otherwise neutralizes the mine; explosive sweeping
causes sympathetic detonations (detonating another charge nearby) in the
mine, damages the mine, or displaces the mine; and influence sweeping
produces either the acoustic and/ or magnetic influence (simulating the
energy field generated by a passing ship) required to detonate the mine.

10 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
provided for transferring responsibility to the Director, Defense Research
and Engineering. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996
provided for transferring responsibility to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition and Technology.

Page 8 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

In June 1998, we reported that the Navy had spent $1.2 billion since 1992 on
research and development to improve the capabilities of mine countermeasures
systems, but none of them were ready for production. Included in these
developments were the Distributed Explosive Technology (DET) 11 and Shallow-
Water Assault Breaching System (SABRE), which are intended to provide the
Navy a near/ mid- term (2001 to 2010) breaching and clearing capability in
the surf zone.

We recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of the Navy, make a
determination on the mix of the Navy?s future mine countermeasure forces and
commit the funding deemed necessary for developing and sustaining these
capabilities. In addition, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretary of the Navy to sustain the dedicated mine
countermeasures forces until the Navy had demonstrated and fielded effective
new organic capabilities.

Finally, we reported that while the congressionally mandated certification
process increased the visibility of mine countermeasures requirements within
DOD and the Navy, it did not address the adequacy of overall resources for
this mission, nor contain any measures against which the Navy?s progress in
enhancing its mine countermeasures capabilities could be evaluated.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendations and said it had directed
the Navy to ensure that current and future mine warfare programs are
adequately funded. DOD also said that two studies were in progress to assess
the cost and effectiveness of various mixes of dedicated and organic mine
countermeasures forces.

The Navy has invested in seven organic systems designed to provide carrier
battle groups and amphibious ready groups with mine detection and limited
clearing capabilities. These include two helicopter- towed systems (one that
uses sonar for mine hunting and another that uses acoustic and magnetic
technologies for mine sweeping); a laser system for helicopters to use in
detecting, classifying, and localizing floating and

11 DET is a rocket- launched device consisting of a 180- square- foot
explosive net (constructed of detonating cord) detonated by a fuze and
designed to destroy sea- based mines in water depths of 3 feet to the shore.
Previous GAO Findings

Progress in Developing Organic Mine Countermeasures Capabilities

Page 9 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

near- surface mines; an expendable device deployed by helicopters to explode
certain types of mines; a helicopter- mounted modified gun to destroy mines;
and two types of unmanned sea vehicles to conduct mine reconnaissance. The
Navy expects the first units of these systems to reach the fleet in 2005.
Additionally, the Navy has begun or made progress on a number of other
initiatives to improve mine countermeasures capabilities as shown in the
following examples:

 In September 1998, the Navy began undertaking a new effort- known as the
Fleet Engagement Strategy- that is intended to facilitate the introduction
of organic mine countermeasures capabilities and educate the naval services
about the emphasis the Navy is placing on achieving proficiency in fleetwide
mine warfare. Among other things, the effort seeks to (1) increase the
number of sailors attending classroom and waterfront mine warfare training,
(2) increase the participation of the dedicated mine countermeasures forces
in fleet exercises and battle experiments, (3) develop mine warfare doctrine
and tactics, and (4) promote the fleet?s acceptance of the need to
strengthen mine warfare capabilities. The Navy has made some progress in
these areas. For example, the Mine Warfare Training Center in Corpus
Christi, Texas, experienced an almost 40- percent increase in the number of
students completing the basic mineman school from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal
year 1999 and a 35- percent increase from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year
2000.

 The Naval Oceanographic Office has focused its efforts on mapping and
documenting the condition of the ocean bottom along traditional sea lanes
(travel routes) to provide forces with information critical to conducting
mine countermeasures operations. The Office has also begun providing real-
time ocean bottom mapping support during fleet training exercises and
experiments.

 The Commander of the Surface Warfare Development Group has continued
implementing a mine warfare readiness and effectiveness measurement program,
which was started in 1995. The program is designed to provide the Navy with
a coordinated assessment of the effectiveness of its mine countermeasures
systems in a tactical environment. A database containing information
gathered from the program?s exercises, though still under development, has
already identified needed changes and improvements in systems and
techniques.

 In 1999, the Navy approved a new process to focus the Office of Naval
Research?s science and technology research resources on programs that

Page 10 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

respond to 12 desired future naval capabilities, including organic mine
countermeasures. The Navy said that its technology investments in organic
mine countermeasures will focus on unmanned underwater vehicles for
clandestine mine reconnaissance and precision- guided munitions for stand-
off breaching of beach mines and obstacles. Other areas of technology
investment will include the fusion of sensor data into a common tactical
picture, unmanned aerial vehicle sensors for rapid beach reconnaissance, and
buried mine detection sensors. According to budget plans, the Navy expects
to spend about $394 million on these activities from fiscal year 2002
through fiscal year 2007.

Although the Navy has made progress in advancing its overall mine
countermeasures capabilities, some of the shortcomings we discussed in our
last report remain. For example, the Navy has still not fielded a mine
breaching and clearing capability for the surf zone. That capability is
needed to enable the safe landing of combat and support forces. The Navy has
not made a decision on the size and composition of its future mine
countermeasures force structure. Without such a decision, the Navy cannot
properly develop comprehensive requirements or plan the acquisition of
future mine countermeasures platforms and systems. The annual certification
of the Navy?s Mine Warfare Plan by the Secretary of Defense has increased
the visibility of mine countermeasures programs within DOD. However, it does
not address the priorities among the various development programs or the
development of measures to gauge the Navy?s year- to- year progress toward
achieving improved capabilities.

The area from the very shallow water zone through the craft landing zone
(from 40 feet of water depth to the beach) presents the most difficult
environmental challenge for detecting mines and exposes mine countermeasures
forces to hostile action (see fig. 1). Nevertheless, the Navy?s ability to
land forces to clear open a path through an area containing mines and
obstacles is critical to the Marine Corps? ability to conduct amphibious
assaults, when avoidance is not feasible. Until the Navy develops a reliable
breaching capability, anti- landing and surf zone mines will continue to
limit its ability to conduct amphibious landings and follow- on logistical
support operations.

The Navy?s DET and SABRE development systems are intended to provide a mine
breaching and clearing capability. However, SABRE fuze failures and concerns
about operational limitations, safety, and reliability have caused the Navy
to temporarily suspend the development of these systems Issues Requiring

Resolution Shallow Water Breaching and Clearing Capability Still Lacking

Page 11 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

until the Navy Review Board assesses the validity of existing very-
shallowwater mine countermeasures requirements. The Navy plans to evaluate
various logistical aspects of DET and SABRE in an April 2001 fleet exercise.
A part of this exercise focused on the demands of storing, moving, and
deploying these systems. Following the exercise, the Board is scheduled to
meet again to review the results of the fleet exercise and consider whether
to resume the development of these systems or refer the decision to the Navy
Requirements Oversight Council. Currently, the Navy has no other acquisition
and technology programs that can address veryshallow- water breaching
requirements in the near- and mid- term.

The Navy?s lack of a decision about the size and composition of the future
mine countermeasures force structure makes it difficult for the mine warfare
community to articulate and defend mine warfare requirements in the Navy?s
budget process. A force structure decision could assist in determining the
types and quantities of platforms (ships and aircraft) and systems the Navy
needs to acquire for mine countermeasures, establishing priorities among
systems, and determining the level of resources required for their
development, procurement, and sustainment. The Navy has completed a study
addressing future force structure options but believes it cannot make
decisions until some of the organic mine countermeasures systems currently
under development are fielded and a more in- depth analysis of future mine
countermeasure operations has been conducted.

The annual certification of the Navy?s mine countermeasures plan by the
Secretary of Defense has been valuable in elevating the visibility of mine
countermeasures programs within DOD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy,
and the Marine Corps. The Office of the Secretary of Defense has made the
certification process more inclusive by involving all interested
participants earlier. However, the certification does not currently require
the Secretary of Defense to provide the Congress with a report detailing the
priorities of the various mine countermeasures programs the Navy is pursuing
under the Mine Warfare Plan or an annual accounting of the progress the Navy
has made with each program.

Although the Navy is making some progress in overcoming shortfalls
identified in the 1997 Anti- Submarine Warfare Assessment, a lack of
resources and priorities among competing programs is still prevalent.
Funding reductions within the MK- 54 Lightweight Torpedo program- the Navy?s
premier weapon against submarines in the littoral- will delay its fleetwide
introduction and reduce the number of torpedoes the Navy can Force Structure
Has Not Been

Decided Certification Requirement Has Produced Limited Results

Antisubmarine Warfare

Page 12 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

buy each year. Technical problems and cost growth have adversely affected
the SH- 60R helicopter conversion program that will work together with Navy
ships to detect, track, localize, and destroy enemy submarines. This
program?s high cost has already forced the Navy to reduce the number of
helicopters it intends to convert. The Navy has still not established
priorities among individual antisubmarine warfare acquisition programs,
which would allow it to concentrate resources on the systems that would
produce the highest payoff in added capability. The Navy is implementing a
new process to address the priority of the various capabilities it needs to
develop. However, this process does not address the priority of individual
projects within each capability area, relates only to early science and
technology projects, and does not extend to those research projects that
have transitioned to procurement. The Navy is pursuing several training
initiatives to improve the proficiency of crews. However, the shallow- water
training ranges the Navy says it needs may not be available for many more
years, owing to funding limitations.

The primary goal of antisubmarine warfare is to deny the enemy effective use
of its submarines against our ships. The Navy uses antisubmarine sensors and
weapons on its surface ships, submarines, and aircraft, along with fixed and
deployable acoustic and nonacoustic sensors to detect, track, and destroy
enemy submarines. Figure 3 illustrates antisubmarine warfare functions.
Background

Page 13 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Figure 3: Techniques Used in Littoral Regions to Detect and Locate a Diesel
Submarine

Source: GAO?s analysis based on U. S. Navy?s data. Most current
antisubmarine warfare systems were designed during the Cold War to pursue
nuclear submarines operating in the open- ocean environment. At the time,
antisubmarine warfare was one of the Navy?s highest- priority missions
because of the global threat posed by the former Soviet Union. Since the end
of the Cold War, DOD has shifted its focus to regional threats and conflicts
and has targeted antisubmarine efforts toward the threat posed by diesel-
electric submarines operating in the littorals. Despite this emphasis, the
Congress has been concerned about the Navy?s progress in developing the
capabilities necessary to conduct littoral operations, including
antisubmarine warfare in shallow waters. In response to congressional
direction, DOD conducted an assessment of antisubmarine warfare capabilities
and shortfalls in 1997. The assessment concluded that the proficiency of the
Navy?s antisubmarine warfare had

Page 14 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

declined and that improvements were needed in training, organization, and
the modernization of its weapon systems.

In July 1999, we reported that (1) the Navy?s Anti- Submarine Warfare
Assessment did not contain the rigorous analysis of antisubmarine warfare
shortfalls and capabilities required by the Congress, (2) the information to
support the Assessment?s findings was not always complete, and (3)
priorities among antisubmarine warfare programs had not been established.
The Assessment noted that funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget
provided for adequate programs and equipment to respond to the most likely
threats, but we reported that the funding levels for antisubmarine warfare
in the fiscal year 2000 budget were lower than they were in the fiscal year
1999 budget for some programs. Consequently, we concluded that the
Assessment was not a useful tool for making resource allocation decisions.

The Navy subsequently provided the Congress with an antisubmarine warfare
?Roadmap? that placed antisubmarine warfare programs in one of three
priority categories. We reported that the Roadmap provided useful
information on programs that the Navy believes are needed to improve
littoral antisubmarine warfare operations, but it did not identify
priorities within each category and was of limited use as a resource
allocation tool.

DOD agreed with the findings of our report. The Navy is making progress in
addressing shortfalls identified in the 1997 Anti- Submarine Warfare
Assessment. The Navy cited progress on several individual programs it
believes is necessary to improve its littoral antisubmarine warfare
capability, as shown in the following examples:

 The Navy has launched several new antisubmarine warfare training
initiatives, including the development of on- board training systems using
real- world data to help improve crew?s proficiency.

 The Navy has installed the first phase of its Acoustic Rapid Commercial
Off- the- Shelf Insertion program on 24 attack submarines. Subsequent phases
are scheduled for developmental and operational testing in fiscal years 2001
and 2002. This program is intended to enable the acceptance of major
software updates and capability enhancements among existing systems.
Previous GAO Findings

Some Progress Has Been Made

Page 15 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

 The Navy is using commercial off- the- shelf technology to replace and
upgrade older antisubmarine warfare combat systems on surface ships. In
April 1999, funds were reprogrammed to accelerate the development,
procurement, and installation of improved systems. The Navy plans to procure
and install 15 improved antisubmarine warfare systems on new DDG- 51 Arleigh
Burke class destroyers from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2009. The
Navy is also developing plans to backfit the new system on its other older
surface combatant ships.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy has a new process to focus science and
technology research resources on programs that respond to 12 desired future
naval capabilities, one of which is littoral antisubmarine warfare.
Integrated product teams have been established for each of the capabilities.
Each team is tasked to define the specific capabilities for its area,
establishing priorities within each capability area, and begin developing a
science and technology program to enable the realization of those
capabilities. The Anti- Submarine Warfare Requirements Division Director, as
Chair of the Littoral Anti- Submarine Warfare Integrated Product Team, leads
the development of the antisubmarine warfare science and technology
investment plan. The plan establishes objectives and priorities to guide
future science and technology investments.

To gauge the effectiveness of the investments in each capability area, the
Navy developed performance measures. For example, to measure the
effectiveness of investments in tactical sensing, the Navy established a
goal to increase the strength of its electronic signal by a specific number
of decibels against environmental clutter. From fiscal year 2002 through
fiscal year 2007, the Navy plans to invest $298 million in 13 different
science and technology programs to improve tactical sensing. However,
according to the plans we reviewed, the Navy made no attempt to develop a
priority among the 13 programs. Moreover, this process does not affect any
antisubmarine warfare programs that have already transitioned to production.

Further progress in developing improved capabilities may be limited by
funding reductions in specific programs and competition among a large number
of acquisition programs for the same resources. The Navy has not established
funding priorities among its various antisubmarine programs. This approach
has stretched out the acquisition and delayed the introduction of some
needed systems. Impact of Navy?s Funding

Decisions

Page 16 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

The Navy?s funding for antisubmarine warfare programs has not been at the
levels it deemed adequate to respond to the most likely threats, and funding
decisions may not reflect the most critical priorities. The Navy?s 1997
Anti- Submarine Warfare Assessment concluded that the funding levels for
fiscal years 1999 through 2003 contained in the budget request for fiscal
year 1999 provided adequate funding for programs and equipment needed to
respond to the most likely threats. The budget showed funds increasing for
antisubmarine warfare procurement during the period, but slightly decreasing
for research, development, testing, and evaluation. The budget submission
for fiscal year 2000 reduced the projected funding levels for antisubmarine
warfare procurement for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. As a result, a
number of procurements were delayed. The budget submission for fiscal year
2001 further reduced the planned increase in procurement funding.
Specifically, the President?s fiscal year 2001 budget represented a $283
million reduction in procurement funding for antisubmarine warfare aircraft,
sensors, and other weapons compared with the levels projected in the fiscal
year 2000 budget.

Funding for antisubmarine- warfare- related research, development, test, and
evaluation is projected to remain relatively flat from fiscal year 2001 to
2005. The President?s budget request for fiscal year 2001 was about $114
million more than the amount requested in the fiscal year 2000 budget.

A number of important individual programs have experienced funding
reductions, technical problems, schedule delays, and cost growth, as shown
in the following examples:

 Funding reductions within the MK- 54 Lightweight Torpedo program will
delay its fleetwide introduction by 2 years and reduce the number of
torpedoes the Navy can buy each year. As a result, the fleet will have only
about 40 percent of the required number of these weapons by fiscal year
2009.

 Technical problems and cost growth have adversely affected the Navy?s SH-
60R helicopter conversion program. The conversion includes refurbishing the
helicopter?s engine, rotors, and other equipment; upgrading electronics and
information- processing systems; and incorporating a new sonar system
designed to significantly improve the capability to detect and classify
diesel submarines. However, cost growth in the conversion program has
required the Navy to reduce the number of helicopters it intends to convert
from 145 to 112 for the next 7 years.

Page 17 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

 The Navy is pursuing several training initiatives to improve the crew?s
proficiency, but the shallow- water training ranges that the Navy says it
needs may not be available until fiscal years 2007- 2013 because of other
funding priorities.

 Navy officials delayed the procurement and installation of antisurface
improvement kits 12 on 10 P- 3C antisubmarine aircraft because $250 million
was redirected from this program to fund other competing, non- antisubmarine
requirements for naval aviation.

 The Navy said it may not have sufficient sonobuoys 13 to meet future
training and readiness inventory levels because $65.3 million was redirected
from this program to fund competing requirements.

The Navy?s ship defense capabilities against currently deployed cruise
missiles are marginal, and none of the acquisitions that the Navy is
currently pursuing will provide adequate protection against improved
versions of these weapons. Consequently, surface ships will be at risk when
operating within the range of these weapons. DOD is currently reviewing a
Navy draft strategy for addressing the threat posed by cruise missiles.

The proliferation of sophisticated antiship cruise missiles threatens Navy
ships? ability to operate and survive in the littoral. The threat to surface
ships from sophisticated antiship missiles is increasing. Nearly 70 nations
have deployed sea- and land- launched cruise missiles, and 20 nations have
air- launched cruise missiles. There are over 100 existing and projected
missile varieties with ranges up to about 185 miles. The next generation of
antiship cruise missiles- some of which are now expected to be fielded by
2007- will be equipped with advanced target seekers and stealthy design.
These features will make them even more difficult to detect and defeat.

In response to this threat, the Chief of Naval Operations directed a
comprehensive review of ship self- defense requirements. Completed in

12 Anti- surface improvement kits provide antisubmarine capability
improvements through the installation of state- of- the art nonacoustic
sensors and current technology communications suites.

13 Sonobuoys are expendable acoustic sensors used primarily by antisubmarine
aircraft. (See fig. 3.) Antiship Cruise

Missile Defense Background

Page 18 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

fiscal year 1996, this study formally identified the capabilities needed by
each ship class to defend against cruise missile threats. Since then, the
Navy has spent $3.8 billion, largely in research and development, to improve
its ship defense capabilities, and it plans to spend another $5.1 billion
over the next 6 years.

In July 2000, we reported that most surface ships have only limited cruise
missile defense capabilities and that the Navy lacked a comprehensive and
consistent strategy for improving ship self- defense. We recommended that
the Navy develop such a strategy. Specifically, we reported that the Navy?s
plans for meeting ship self- defense requirements did not include all
affected ship classes, establish priorities among the classes, consistently
use a baseline from which to measure progress, or provide time lines for
achieving the desired improvements. We also reported that the Navy?s
assessment of cruise missile defense capabilities overstated the actual and
projected capabilities against a growing threat. Furthermore, we reported
that funding shortfalls had reduced the readiness of existing ship
selfdefense systems.

DOD concurred and said that our report provides an accurate assessment of
the Navy?s ship self- defense situation. DOD subsequently directed the Navy
to develop a comprehensive strategy that clearly articulates priorities,
establishes baselines, provides time lines, and defines resource needs for
achieving required capabilities.

The Navy?s ship self- defense capabilities and programs are the same as we
reported last summer; however, the Navy is in the process of developing a
comprehensive strategy to address the antiship cruise missile threat. An
initial report outlining the strategy has been delivered to the Secretary of
Defense but not to us.

The Marine Corps will not have the ship- based fire support it needs for at
least another decade. The Navy?s program to develop an improved 5- inch gun
with an extended- range guided munition for its cruisers and destroyers has
experienced technical and contractual problems. The Navy said that recent
tests indicate that the program is on track to achieve an initial operating
capability currently scheduled for fiscal year 2005. However, this munition
will not meet all of the Marine Corps? requirements. The Navy is developing
a new 155- millimeter advanced gun and associated munitions for the DD- 21
land- attack destroyer and an Previous GAO Findings

Status of Programs Naval Surface Fire Support

Page 19 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Advanced Land Attack missile to meet the Marine Corps? fire support
requirements. The first ship of this class is not planned to be operational
until fiscal year 2011 and the last ship not until 2020. In addition to the
5- inch and 155- millimeter guns, the Navy is developing a Land Attack
Standard Missile. This missile is scheduled to achieve an initial operating
capability in fiscal year 2004.

The Marine Corps? future war- fighting concept for littoral operations will
stress speed, maneuverability, and avoidance of enemy strong points to
achieve military objectives. This concept assumes that amphibious assaults
will be launched from at least 25 nautical miles from shore to enhance
surprise and the survivability of the fleet and invading forces. According
to the Marine Corps, operating at this distance from shore and the need to
neutralize enemy artillery at its maximum range results in a near- term
requirement for naval gunfire support from 41 to 63 nautical miles to
support amphibious assault landings and combat operations ashore. However,
the Marine Corps expects to conduct operations farther inland in the future
and has revised the required range for future ship- based fire support to
200 nautical miles. Figure 4 illustrates the Marine Corps? naval surface
fire support requirements. Background

Page 20 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Figure 4: Naval Surface Fire Support Requirements

Source: U. S. Navy.

The Marine Corps has stated a need for both conventional unguided and
precision munitions to meet its requirements. Each fire support ship should
be able to deliver munition effects that equal the explosive weight and
volume of fire from an artillery battery of six 155- millimeter howitzers
firing high- explosive ammunition.

25nm 41nm

222nm 63nm

16nm 60nm 5? Extended Range

Guided Munitions 150nm Land Attack Standard Missile

200 - 300nm

Advanced Land Attack Missile Fire Support

Amphibious Lift 100nm Advanced Gun System

Page 21 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

The Navy has had no credible surface fire support capability since it
retired its Iowa class battleships. The Navy has said that it does not
intend to reactivate battleships because the munitions fired by their 16-
inch guns do not meet the Marine Corps? requirements for range and accuracy
and because of the high cost of manning and operating these ships. Instead,
the Navy is executing a two- phase plan to develop modern surface fire
support capabilities. In the first phase, planned for completion by 2009,
the Navy plans to develop a modified 5- inch gun and extended- range guided
munition, a land- attack missile, and a mission- planning system for
installation on the current classes of cruisers and new- construction DDG51
destroyers. The second phase of the modernization program includes the
development of a 155- millimeter gun and munition and an advanced land-
attack missile for the DD- 21 class of destroyers that are intended to fully
meet the Marine Corps? requirements.

In June 1999, we reported that the weapons developed during the first phase
were not expected to satisfy the full range of the Marine Corps? naval
surface fire support requirements but that the Navy expects the weapons
planned for the second phase to meet those requirements. We estimated that
the cost of both phases of the development program is about $2 billion- not
including the cost of the ships. We also reported that the development of
the modified 5- inch gun was on schedule but that the development of the
extended- range guided munition had been delayed by technical problems and
that its cost had increased. We concluded that even if the munition can be
successfully acquired, it will be many years before the fleet will have the
improved surface fire support weapons in the quantities that are needed to
support major combat operations.

DOD concurred with our report. The development of the modified 5- inch gun
appears to be on schedule and is undergoing shipboard testing. However, the
development and testing of an extended- range guided munition for this gun
has again been delayed by technical and contractor performance problems, and
the achievement of an initial operational capability has slipped by 4 years
to fiscal year 2005. Recent flight tests of this munition have achieved some
success, but it is still too soon to know if its development will be
successful. For example, it is still not certain that the munition can meet
range and lethality requirements. Even if this munition is successfully
developed, it will not provide the capabilities needed by the Marine Corps.
Alternatives to the current extended- range guided munition design are
Previous GAO Findings

Status of Program

Page 22 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

becoming available. The Navy has funded a number of technical demonstrations
to examine these alternatives.

The development of an advanced 155- millimeter gun system and associated
munition and an Advanced Land Attack Missile is intended to meet the Marine
Corps? surface fire support requirements. However, these weapons system are
planned for the new DD- 21 class of destroyers, which are not scheduled to
begin entering the fleet until fiscal year 2011. The final ship of this
class is not planned for completion until fiscal year 2020. Consequently, it
will be many years before the Navy will be able to meet the Marine Corps?
fire support requirements, even if the DD- 21 development schedule can be
executed as currently planned. Any delays in the development and procurement
of the DD- 21 ships will delay the achievement of needed fire support
capabilities.

The development of the Land Attack Standard Missile is currently on schedule
and within previously estimated costs. It is expected to reach initial
operating capability in fiscal year 2004. However, the cost of each missile-
estimated at about $400, 000- and the small quantity of missiles that will
be purchased will probably limit the use of this missile to highvalue
targets.

The Advanced Land Attack Missile is being developed for the DD- 21 and for
possible retrofitting onto other surface ships and submarines. The missile
is currently expected to reach initial operating capability with the DD- 21
in fiscal year 2011. The Navy is currently conducting a congressionally
directed Analysis of Alternatives to determine the future course of this
acquisition.

The Naval Fires Control System is a mission- planning system designed to tie
together the various sensor and fire- control systems of the various naval
surface fire support and land attack weapons. It will support the extended-
range guided munitions, Land Attack Standard Missile, Advanced Land Attack
Missile, and Tomahawk cruise missile system. It is expected to reach initial
operating capability in fiscal year 2003.

A lack of important war- fighting capabilities increases the risk to our
naval forces in the littoral and could limit their use until the needed
capabilities can be provided. Conclusions

Page 23 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

The congressionally required certification of the Navy?s Mine Warfare Plan
by the Secretary of Defense could be strengthened by requiring the Secretary
to provide an annual accounting of the Navy?s progress toward achieving
improved organic mine countermeasures and other capabilities. Unless the
Congress extends the certification requirement beyond fiscal year 2003, the
Navy?s mine warfare programs could lose the visibility and priority they
have gained in recent years. Moreover, until the Navy develops a shallow-
water mine breaching and clearing capability, sea mines will continue to
threaten amphibious landings and follow- on logistical support operations. A
decision on a future mine countermeasures force structure is needed to
determine the types and quantities of systems to be procured and help set
priorities among systems and the level of resources that will be required
for their development, procurement, and sustainment.

The Navy?s funding for antisubmarine programs continues to be below the
level that the Navy deemed adequate in its 1997 Assessment to respond to the
most likely threats. Currently, a large number of acquisition programs are
being funded at reduced levels, which is leading to delays in the
development of needed systems. Additional progress in overcoming shortfalls
identified in the Navy?s 1997 Anti- Submarine Warfare Assessment may be
limited by a lack of funding and the Navy?s failure to establish priorities
among competing antisubmarine warfare acquisition programs.

Given continuing shortfalls in the Navy?s ability to detect and neutralize
enemy mines and the slow pace of improvement, the Congress may wish to
extend its annual requirement for the Secretary of Defense to certify the
Navy?s Mine Warfare Plan through fiscal year 2006. The Congress may also
want to strengthen the effect of the certification by requiring the
Secretary to provide a report detailing the priorities of the various mine
countermeasures programs that the Navy is pursuing under the Mine Warfare
Plan and provide an annual accounting of the progress the Navy has made with
each program.

As the Navy?s antisubmarine warfare procurement funding is below the levels
that the Navy deems adequate to address the most likely threats, the
Congress may wish to require the Secretary of Defense to provide an updated
assessment of the Navy?s antisubmarine capabilities and shortfalls. The
assessment should identify the programs, their relative Mine Countermeasures

Antisubmarine Warfare Matters for Congressional Consideration

Page 24 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

priority, and the funding that will be required to develop the systems that
are needed to counter current and future threats.

We recommend that Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to
develop a more comprehensive mine countermeasures warfare plan. The plan
should identify and address shortfalls and limitations in mine
countermeasures capabilities in the littoral- particularly shortfalls and
limitations in breaching and clearing minefields very close to the shore. In
addressing limitations, the plan should identify the mix of mine warfare
capabilities and systems for its future force structure to include the types
and quantities of systems to be procured; priorities among systems;
development schedules for the systems; and the level of resources required
for development, procurement, and sustainment.

In written comments on this report, DOD agreed that it provides an accurate
assessment of the Navy?s mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare, naval
surface fire support, and ship cruise missile defense capabilities. DOD also
agreed with our recommendation for the Navy to more explicitly identify
shortfalls and limitations in mine countermeasures capabilities in the
littoral.

DOD said that our statement that the Navy had not decided on the future mix
of organic and dedicated mine countermeasures platforms and systems required
amplification. DOD noted that on the bases of preliminary system performance
estimates and studies, the Navy has determined an initial mine
countermeasures force level for organic systems. DOD also noted that initial
funding plans for achieving this force level are provided in the Future
Years Defense Program. However, this force level decision does not address
the size and composition of future dedicated mine countermeasures systems
and platforms. Furthermore, the Navy has not decided how much of the mine
warfare mission can be satisfied by organic systems and how much can be
satisfied by dedicated systems. We noted in the report that the Navy is
waiting for additional systems performance data and for more analytical
study results before deciding on the ultimate size and composition of it
organic and dedicated mine countermeasures forces. Until such decisions are
made, the Navy will not be able to plan the full extent of its future
funding needs for all mine countermeasures forces, from the standpoint of
development, procurement, maintenance, and modernization. Recommendation for

Executive Action Agency Comments

Page 25 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

DOD did not agree with our statement that the Navy has not established
funding priorities among its various antisubmarine and mine countermeasures
programs. DOD asserted that the budget takes into account priorities across
all of the military services and war- fighting areas and represents an
appropriate investment strategy. Since DOD?s budget represents the outcomes
of many diverse constituencies competing for limited resources, funding
tradeoffs and compromises are required to achieve agreement. As we have
previously reported, DOD employs overly optimistic planning assumptions in
its budget formulation, which leads to far too many programs for the
available dollars. 14 Optimistic planning provides an unclear picture of
defense priorities because tough decisions and trade- offs are avoided.

On multiple occasions, the Congress has unsuccessfully sought information
from DOD on the relative priorities of the programs being funded, the
priorities among requirements, and the priorities of programs not funded.
For example, the Congress, after directing the Secretary of Defense to
provide an assessment of needed antisubmarine warfare capabilities,
subsequently directed the Secretary to prioritize the programs discussed in
the assessment and provide the estimated costs over time to develop and
procure the needed capabilities. 15 The information the DOD has provided to
the Congress in its mine warfare certification submissions and its Anti-
submarine Warfare Assessment and the subsequent Roadmap did not provide a
prioritized ranking of competing capabilities or individual programs within
those capabilities. We have also reported that leading organizations follow
a defined process for ranking and selecting projects. 16 The selection of
projects is based on preestablished criteria and a relative ranking of
investment proposals. These organizations determine the right mix of
projects by viewing all proposed investments and their existing assets as a
portfolio. They find it beneficial to rank projects because the number of
requested projects exceeds available funding. If such specific rankings of
programs were provided to the Congress as supplemental information, they
could serve as reference points from

14 See DOD Budget: Substantial Risks in Weapons Modernization Plans

(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 99- 20, Oct. 8, 1998). 15 Classified Annex prepared by the
committee of conference to accompany the conference report on the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. 16 See Executive Guide:
Leading Practices in Capital Decision- Making

(GAO- AIMD- 99- 32, Dec. 1998).

Page 26 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

which to view year- to- year changes in budget request amounts relative to
the stated priorities.

DOD also disagreed with our statement that funding for antisubmarine warfare
programs has not been at the levels that the Navy deemed adequate to respond
to the most likely threats. DOD stated that current funding for
antisubmarine warfare is considered adequate when viewed in the context of
the total threat to the Navy when operating in littoral regions. We accept
DOD?s determination that current funding levels are adequate. Nevertheless,
as stated in our report, these levels are significantly less than the
funding levels the Navy previously said were adequate for fiscal years 1999
through 2003.

DOD provided a number of technical comments, which we have incorporated in
this report. DOD?s written comments are reprinted in appendix I.

To obtain updated information of the status of the Navy?s mine
countermeasure plans, programs, and the certification process, we
interviewed and obtained documentation from officials of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Office of the Secretary of
the Navy; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; the Naval Air and Sea
Systems Command; Office of Naval Intelligence; Naval Oceanographic Office;
Office of Naval Research; and the Surface Warfare Development Group. We also
interviewed and obtained information from officials engaged in mine
countermeasures scientific and technical research and development activities
at the Navy Coastal Systems Station in Panama City, Florida. To gain an
understanding of existing capabilities and requirements, and operational
perspective, we interviewed and obtained information from the staff of the
Commander, Mine Warfare Command, in Corpus Christi and Ingleside, Texas.
Finally, we interviewed an obtained information from officials engaged in
the development of mine countermeasures doctrine, concepts of operations,
and tactics at the Navy Warfare Development Command in Newport, Rhode
Island.

To determine the status of antisubmarine warfare programs and initiatives,
we interviewed officials of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and
the Navy Air and Sea Systems Command and its field activities. To identify
the progress the Navy is making to improve antisubmarine warfare
capabilities we obtained and analyzed data from the 1997 Anti- Submarine
Warfare Assessment and the 1999 antisubmarine warfare ?Roadmap.? We obtained
and discussed information on antisubmarine warfare capabilities Scope and

Methodology

Page 27 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

and selected antisubmarine warfare programs with officials of the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations; the Naval Sea and Air System Commands; and
the Submarine, Surface, Air, Anti- Submarine Warfare and Naval Training and
Education divisions under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare
Requirements and Programs. We also obtained and discussed data on
antisubmarine warfare littoral capabilities and selected programs with
officials of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Newport, Rhode Island; the
Surface Warfare Development Group in Norfolk, Virginia; and the Navy Warfare
Development Command in Newport, Rhode Island.

To determine the status of the Navy?s efforts to develop a comprehensive
antiship cruise missile defense strategy, we interviewed officials and
obtained documentation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

To determine the status of the Navy?s surface fire support modernization
programs, we interviewed officials and obtained documentation from officials
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Naval Sea Systems
Command, and the Marine Corps Combat Developments Command.

We conducted our review from June 2000 through February 2001 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are also sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Chairman,
and Senator Carl Levin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services;
Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking Member,
Senate Committee on Appropriations; and Representative C. W. Bill Young,
Chairman, and Representative David R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to
the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; Mr. Robert B. Pirie,
Jr., Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable Bruce A. Dauer, Deputy
Comptroller of the Navy; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.,
Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made
available to others upon request.

Page 28 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Please contact me on (202) 512- 4530 or Anton Blieberger on (757) 552- 8109
if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key
contributors to this assignment were Martha Dey, John Heere, Richard Price,
and Richard Silveira.

James F. Wiggins Director, Acquisition and

Sourcing Management

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Now on pp. 3, 4,10, and 11. Now on p. 24.

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 31 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

Now on p. 17. Now on pp. 10- 11.

Now on pp. 10, 11, and 15.

Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO- 01- 493 Navy Acquisitions

(

(707519)

Now on p. 16.

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