DEA's Mobile Enforcement Teams: Steps Taken to Enhance Program	 
Management, but More Can Be Done (26-JUL-01, GAO-01-482).	 
								 
This report discusses the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA)
Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) Program. GAO found that since the  
MET Program was established in 1995, DEA has enhanced its	 
management of the program and provided for greater headquarters  
oversight and monitoring. In implementing the program and	 
carrying out deployments, the field division METs generally	 
complied with some of the pertinent requirements and guidelines  
that GAO reviewed. However, because some DEA headquarters files  
did not contain adequate documentation, GAO could not determine  
whether the METs consistently and adequately assessed the	 
requesting local law enforcement agencies' abilities to address, 
on their own, the drug and related violence problems for which	 
DEA's MET assistance was requested. DEA expects METs to focus on 
specific, targeted gangs/organizations in the geographic areas in
which the METs are deployed and that deployments will generally  
continue until the targeted individuals are arrested and/or the  
targeted drug gangs/organizations have been disrupted or	 
dismantled. Consistent with the nature and objectives of the MET 
Program, MET investigators focused primarily on street-level drug
dealers and were mostly local and regional in scope. DEA collects
data for a variety of performance measures to assess the results 
of individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program. It	 
reports internally and externally on program results for some of 
the performance measures. However, the measures have problems and
limitations related primarily to the inconsistency in data	 
collection.							 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-482 					        
    ACCNO:   A01035						        
  TITLE:     DEA's Mobile Enforcement Teams: Steps Taken to Enhance   
             Program Management, but More Can Be Done                         
     DATE:   07/26/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Drug trafficking					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Gangs						 
	     Law enforcement agencies				 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     DEA Mobile Enforcement Team Program		 

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GAO-01-482
     
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 DEA'S MOBILE ENFORCEMENT TEAMS

Steps Taken to Enhance Program Management, But More Can Be Done

GAO- 01- 482

Page i GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams Letter 1

Executive Summary 2 Purpose 2 Background 3 Results in Brief 3 Principal
Findings 4 Recommendations for Executive Action 9 Agency Comments and GAO?s
Evaluation 9

Chapter 1 Introduction 12 Drug- Related Violent Crime 12 DEA?s Role in Drug
Law Enforcement 12 MET Program 14 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Chapter 2 Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies 20

DEA Headquarters Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Management of the MET
Program 21 METs Generally Followed Some Program Requirements;

Compliance With Other Requirements and Guidelines Is Unclear 25 MET
Deployments Generally Concluded When Objectives Were

Achieved 35 Conclusions 38 Recommendation for Executive Action 39 Agency
Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Chapter 3 MET Deployments Typically Investigated StreetLevel Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques 44

MET Deployments Focused Primarily on Street- Level Drug Dealers 44 MET
Deployments Involved Mostly Local and Regional Drug Cases 48 Drug Buys and
Informants Used More Than Most Other

Investigative Techniques 50 Contents

Page ii GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams Chapter 4 DEA Measures
of MET Program Results Have

Problems and Limitations 51 DEA Uses a Variety of Performance Measures 51
DEA Reports Results for Some MET Performance Measures 56 Performance
Measures Have Problems and Limitations 57 Conclusions 61 Recommendations for
Executive Action 62 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 62

Appendix I Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 67

Appendix II GAO Methodology for Selecting and Reviewing Completed DEA MET
Deployment Files 75

Appendix III Summary Examples of MET Assessments of Local Law Enforcement
Agencies? Capabilities 77

Appendix IV Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated, Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2000 80

Appendix V MET Program Arrests and Seizures Data, Fiscal Years 1995 Through
2000 81

Appendix VI Summary Examples of DEA- Reported Successful MET Deployments 82

Appendix VII Examples of Postdeployment Information Reported for Four Areas
84

Page iii GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams Appendix VIII Comments
From the Department of Justice 87

Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 96

Tables

Table 1: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Year 1995 Through First 6 Months
of Fiscal Year 2001 16 Table 2: MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through
2000 17 Table 3: Median Duration of MET Deployments Started in Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000 and Completed by September 30, 200038 Table 4: File
Review Strata for Completed MET Deployments 75

Figures

Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events Relating to MET Management 21 Figure 2:
MET Predeployment Assessment Process 28 Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of
MET Deployments Completed

as of June 30, 1999, Following Certain Required Procedures for Assessing
Drug and Violence Problems 29 Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of MET
Deployments Completed as

of June 30, 1999, with Targets and Primary Targets Arrested 37 Figure 5:
Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as

of June 30, 1999, Investigating Different Types of Suspected Drug Violators
45 Figure 6: Level of Drug Dealing Investigated During MET

Deployments at Six DEA Field Divisions 46 Figure 7: Selected Aspects of MET
Deployment Operations at Six

DEA Field Divisions 47 Figure 8: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated
During Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000 49 Figure 9: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments
Completed as

of June 30, 1999, Using Various Investigative Methods and Techniques 50
Figure 10: MET Program Performance Measures 52

Page iv GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams Abbreviations

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge DCI data collection instrument DEA
Drug Enforcement Administration DOJ Department of Justice GPRA Government
Performance and Results Act MET Mobile Enforcement Team OMB Office of
Management and Budget ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy RET
Regional Enforcement Team SAC Special Agent in Charge SOD Special Operations
Division VCTF Violent Crimes Task Force

Page 1 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

July 26, 2001 The Honorable Lamar Smith Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to a request from your Subcommittee, this
report discusses the results of our review of the Drug Enforcement
Administration?s (DEA) Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) Program. Specifically,
the report discusses (1) DEA?s management and implementation of the program;
(2) the types of individuals and groups investigated, geographic scope of
investigations, and investigative techniques used during MET operations; and
(3) the performance measures used by DEA to assess the program?s results. We
include recommendations to help improve program management and performance
measurement.

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will also provide copies
to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
contact Daniel C. Harris or me at (202) 512- 8777. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix IX.

Sincerely yours, Laurie E. Ekstrand Director, Justice Issues

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Executive Summary Page 2 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Since its creation in 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has
focused its efforts primarily on investigating major organizations involved
in interstate and international drug trafficking. DEA has also supported
state and local law enforcement efforts directed at lower levels of drug
trafficking. In this regard, DEA established the Mobile Enforcement Team
(MET) Program in February 1995 to help state and local law enforcement
agencies combat drug trafficking and related violent crime in local
communities, particularly such crimes committed by violent gangs.

Because the MET Program had been in operation for almost 5 years, the former
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary Committee, requested
that GAO review the management and performance of DEA?s MET Program. In
response to this request, GAO agreed to determine the following.

1. How DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program, including (a) how
DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations; (b) whether DEA field
divisions have complied with pertinent program requirements and guidelines;
and (c) whether the MET operations concluded when their objectives were
achieved.

2. What types of individuals and groups are investigated during MET
operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the
principal investigative techniques used.

3. How DEA measures the MET Program?s results and whether DEA?s performance
measures have any limitations.

To address our objectives, we reviewed DEA headquarters files for a
representative, national sample of 83 completed MET deployments (i. e.,
operations) selected from a population of 197 deployments 1 conducted from
the program?s inception in 1995 through June 1999. We also interviewed
officials at DEA headquarters, six DEA field divisions, 13 U. S. Attorneys?
Offices, 12 District Attorneys? Offices, and 25 local law enforcement
agencies. In addition, we collected MET Program resource, management,
workload, results, and performance measures information at DEA headquarters.

1 For GAO?s review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files, GAO considered
the deployment of both DEA?s Atlanta and Houston Field Division METs to
Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996, to August 12, 1996, as one deployment.
DEA counts this as two deployments. Executive Summary

Purpose

Executive Summary Page 3 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA established the MET Program to help overcome two drug enforcement
challenges facing many state and local agencies: (1) state and local police
agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce the drug
laws, and (2) local law enforcement personnel were known to local drug users
and sellers, making undercover drug buys and penetration of local
distribution rings difficult and dangerous.

Under the program, DEA may deploy a team of special agents (referred to as a
MET) to a community from one of its field divisions after receiving a
written request from a police chief, sheriff, or other local law enforcement
official. Because DEA?s resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed only
when it is determined that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities
of the requesting agency. DEA?s decision to deploy a MET is to be made only
after consulting with the law enforcement agency that made the request and a
thorough on- site assessment substantiating (1) the reported drug and
related violence problem and (2) the requesting law enforcement agency?s
inability to address the problem. DEA headquarters approves or disapproves
each MET deployment based on a field division?s written request for
authorization and funding. When deployed, the MET is to work cooperatively
with the requesting local law enforcement agency to investigate the targeted
individuals, gangs, and organizations responsible for the drug- related
violent crime.

DEA headquarters staff manages the MET Program. The primary responsibility
of the headquarters staff is to develop, disseminate, and continually
monitor the METs? compliance with program policy, requirements, and
guidelines.

Since the MET Program was established in 1995, and particularly since a 1998
DEA headquarters evaluation led to criticism of the program by the former
DEA Administrator, DEA has enhanced its management of the MET Program and
provided for greater headquarters oversight and monitoring. For example, DEA
increased the number of headquarters staff managing the program and
monitoring the field division METs? compliance with program requirements and
guidelines.

In implementing the program and carrying out deployments, the field division
METs generally complied with some of the pertinent requirements and
guidelines that GAO reviewed. However, because some DEA headquarters files
did not contain adequate documentation, GAO could not determine whether the
METs consistently and adequately assessed the requesting local law
enforcement agencies? abilities to address, on their Background

Results in Brief

Executive Summary Page 4 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

own, the drug and related violence problems for which DEA?s MET assistance
was requested. Unless the METs adequately assess each requesting law
enforcement agency?s capabilities, and then document and report their
assessments to headquarters, DEA has no assurance that the METs are helping
only those agencies with a legitimate need for assistance. GAO is making
recommendations to help improve this situation.

DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/ organizations in
the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed and that deployments
will generally continue until the targeted individuals are arrested and/ or
the targeted drug gangs/ organizations have been disrupted or dismantled.
The MET deployments GAO reviewed generally concluded when their objectives
were achieved.

Consistent with the nature and objectives of the MET Program, MET
investigations focused primarily on street- level drug dealers and were
mostly local and regional in scope. In addition, the investigative
techniques of purchasing illegal drugs (referred to as drug buys) and using
informants were employed more frequently than most other techniques to
investigate suspected drug violators. MET investigations sometimes led to
other investigations of higher- level drug traffickers and their
organizations.

DEA collects data for a variety of performance measures to assess the
results of individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program. It
reports internally and externally on program results for some of the
performance measures. However, the measures have problems and limitations
related primarily to the inconsistency in data collection. GAO is making
recommendations to help improve this situation.

DEA has enhanced its management of MET operations and provided for greater
headquarters oversight and monitoring. However, because of insufficient
documentation in DEA headquarters files, GAO could not determine whether the
field division METs consistently and adequately complied with the program
requirement that they assess each requesting local law enforcement agency?s
ability to address the drug and related violence problem for which DEA?s
assistance was requested. Principal Findings

DEA Has Enhanced MET Program Management but Lacks Assurance That METs Are
Assisting Only Agencies Incapable of Addressing Problems

Executive Summary Page 5 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA has enhanced its management and monitoring of the MET Program since it
was established in 1995. DEA headquarters developed a handbook containing
program requirements and guidelines, modified the requirements and
guidelines to improve the program, increased the number of staff managing
the program and monitoring the METs? compliance with the requirements and
guidelines, and took other actions to more actively oversee and monitor the
program. Most of these changes took place after a June 1998 DEA headquarters
evaluation of the MET Program led to criticism of the program by the former
DEA Administrator. Consequently, DEA concluded that additional oversight and
monitoring was necessary to ensure that the METs were operating in
accordance with program requirements and guidelines.

GAO?s review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files disclosed that the
METs generally followed some of the program requirements and guidelines GAO
selected for review. However, some deployment files did not contain
sufficient evidence that other requirements and guidelines were followed.

Two key MET Program requirements are that each DEA field division Special
Agent in Charge, after receiving a request to deploy a MET to a community,
and before deploying, must assess (1) the scope of the drug and related
violence problem and (2) the capability of the requesting law enforcement
agency to address the problem. Because DEA?s resources are limited, a MET is
to be deployed only when it is determined that the problem is beyond the
immediate capabilities of the requesting agency. The DEA headquarters files
GAO reviewed generally had documentation showing that the METs assessed the
drug and related violence problems for which DEA?s assistance was requested.
However, 30 percent 2 of the deployment files did not have documentation
showing that the METs consistently and adequately assessed whether the
requesting law enforcement agencies were capable of addressing their drug
and related violence problems. In addition, many of the deployment files
having documentation did not contain specific evidence that the identified
drug and violence problem was beyond the immediate capabilities of the
requesting agency or explain how this conclusion was reached as the result
of a MET assessment.

2 The sampling error for all estimates in this report based on GAO?s review
of DEA headquarters? MET deployment files is not greater than 10 percentage
points at the 95- percent confidence level unless otherwise noted. Appendix
II contains a thorough explanation of GAO?s probability sample of MET
deployment files. Steps Taken to Enhance MET

Program Management and Monitoring

Compliance With Some MET Program Requirements and Guidelines Is Unclear

Executive Summary Page 6 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA headquarters has not clearly required the METs to document their
assessments of the requesting agencies? capabilities, including the
rationale and basis used to determine that agencies are incapable of
handling their drug and violence problems. Further, DEA?s MET Program
handbook, which establishes program requirements and guidelines, does not
discuss how such assessments should be made and does not identify specific
factors that the METs should consider in making this determination, such as
the amount of money the agency has available to buy illegal drugs from
dealers, availability of technical equipment, and extent of the agency?s
drug law enforcement expertise. The Comptroller General?s internal control
standards 3 require that all transactions and other significant events be
clearly documented, and that the documentation be readily available for
examination. Appropriate documentation is an internal control activity to
help ensure that management?s directives are carried out. Without such
documentation, DEA has no assurance that the METs are helping only those
agencies with a legitimate need for assistance.

DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/ organizations in
the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed and that deployments
will generally continue until the targeted individuals are arrested and/ or
the targeted drug gangs/ organizations have been disrupted or dismantled.
GAO estimates that 62 percent of the 197 DEA headquarters files, or about
122 files, contained documents indicating one or more reasons that
deployments were concluded. Of these 122 files, an estimated 80 percent
indicated that at least one reason was that the deployment objectives had
been achieved or essentially achieved. The files also contained the
following other reasons relating to the achievement of the deployment
objectives: an estimated 96 percent of the 122 files included the reason
that targeted individuals had been arrested; an estimated 40 percent of the
files included the reason that targeted gangs/ organizations had been
disrupted; and an estimated 21 percent of the files included the reason that
targeted gangs/ organizations had been dismantled.

3 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/ AIMD- 00-
21. 3. 1). MET Deployments Generally

Conclude When Objectives Are Achieved

Executive Summary Page 7 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

MET deployments investigated a wide range of suspected drug violators.
However, consistent with the nature and objectives of the program, the
primary focus of the investigations was street- level drug dealers (an
estimated 87 percent of the 197 deployments). Other categories of suspected
violators investigated included drug organizations in an estimated 65
percent of the deployments, violent individuals in an estimated 64 percent
of the deployments, wholesale- level drug suppliers in an estimated 62
percent of the deployments, gangs in an estimated 33 percent of the
deployments, and international drug trafficking organizations in an
estimated 8 percent of the deployments.

According to DEA data, about 76 percent of the MET investigations initiated
through fiscal year 2000 were local or regional in scope, involving
suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas of the DEA
offices that conducted the investigations; an estimated 18 percent involved
drug traffickers operating on a broader scale within the United States; and
an estimated 6 percent involved traffickers operating internationally. A
variety of different methods and techniques were used during MET deployments
to investigate suspected drug violators, with drug buys and informants used
more frequently than most other investigative techniques (i. e., in an
estimated 92 and 90 percent, respectively, of the 197 deployments in GAO?s
review).

GAO?s file review and interviews with officials in six of DEA?s field
divisions indicated that MET investigations sometimes led to other DEA spin-
off investigations of higher- level drug traffickers and their
organizations. For example, GAO estimates that 14 percent of the 197
deployment files contained documentation indicating that the deployments led
to a spin- off investigation.

DEA uses various quantitative and qualitative performance measures to assess
the results of individual MET deployments and how well the overall MET
Program is achieving its goal of helping local law enforcement agencies to
disrupt or dismantle drug trafficking gangs or organizations responsible for
drug- related crime and violence. Some of the MET Program performance
measures are intended to measure program output (activity), while others are
intended to measure outcome (results). Two principal performance measures
are the disruption or dismantlement of targeted drug trafficking gangs or
organizations and the arrest of individuals identified as the primary
targets of the MET deployments. Other performance measures are differences
in the number of certain violent crimes (i. e., murder, robbery, and
aggravated assault) occurring in MET Deployments Typically

Involved Investigations of Street- Level Drug Dealers and Employed Various
Investigative Techniques

DEA?s Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Executive Summary Page 8 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

the geographic areas where the deployments take place, the total number of
arrests, the amount of drugs seized, the amount of assets seized, and the
analysis and opinions of local law enforcement agencies regarding four
outcome- oriented areas (i. e., reduction in drug sales, stability of the
target area, community reaction and involvement, and overall assessment of
the deployment).

DEA periodically summarizes and reports the results related to some of the
MET performance measures. This information is provided to DEA top management
and the Attorney General; some MET results information has been provided to
Congress, in support of DEA?s annual budgets and performance plans, and to
the public. For example, DEA reported that the MET deployments resulted in
11,283 arrests and the seizure of about 6,000 pounds of drugs (i. e.,
cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana) and about $16.9 million in
assets (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars) from fiscal years 1995 to
2000.

However, DEA lacks standard data collection methods for some of the MET
Program performance measures. For example, DEA has no written guidance and
specific criteria for determining whether a gang or organization has been
disrupted or dismantled, and DEA has no assurance that the METs are
consistently considering the same factors. Without standard data collection
methods, some performance measures may not provide information needed by DEA
to determine how well the MET Program is achieving its goal.

In addition, DEA does not compile information to compare the number of
primary individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted for investigation at
the beginning of and during deployments to the number arrested, disrupted,
and dismantled at the conclusion of deployments. Without such a comparison,
DEA cannot accurately determine the progress of the MET Program.

Moreover, the qualitative information collected during post- deployment
reviews for the four outcome- oriented areas that are used as performance
measures (i. e., reduction in drug activity, stability of the target area,
community reaction and involvement, and overall assessment of the
deployment) is not as useful as it could be for assessing results because it
is not collected and reported in a standardized, structured way.

Executive Summary Page 9 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

To help ensure that DEA?s MET resources are used only in those instances
where the requesting local law enforcement agencies are incapable of
addressing drug- related violence problems in their communities, GAO
recommends that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to (1)
provide clear guidance for METs to use in assessing local law enforcement
agencies? capabilities; and (2) ensure that the DEA field divisions document
such assessments and provide them to DEA headquarters before MET deployments
are approved.

With regard to DEA's MET Program performance measures, GAO recommends that
the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to (1) establish and
ensure the use of standardized data collection methods for obtaining
information on the performance measures DEA uses to assess the results of
the individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program; (2) compile data
and compare the number of primary individuals, gangs, and organizations
targeted at the beginning of and during deployments to the number arrested,
disrupted, and dismantled; (3) collect and report consistent violent crime
statistics that cover comparable crime types and time periods and relate to
(a) the specific geographic areas where the MET deployments were focused and
(b) to the extent feasible and practical, pertinent adjacent and comparable
areas; and (4) use more structured data collection methods, such as a survey
instrument, to collect qualitative data on the four outcome- oriented areas
included in the post- deployment reviews that can be used to assess the
results of the individual MET deployments and be aggregated to evaluate the
overall MET Program.

GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for comment.
DOJ?s written comments and our responses can be found at the end of chapters
2 and 4 and are reprinted in appendix VIII. In its written comments, DOJ
agreed with certain aspects of GAO?s recommendations and disagreed with
other aspects. GAO is retaining all of its recommendations.

With regard to GAO?s first recommendation that DEA provide clear guidance
for METs to use in assessing local law enforcement agencies? capabilities,
DOJ stated it will ask DEA to revise the MET Program handbook to address
GAO?s concern that it does not discuss how such assessments should be made
and identify specific factors for METs to address. Nevertheless, DOJ stated
that DEA has provided much guidance in a number of ways. However, GAO does
not believe those ways cited by Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and GAO?s Evaluation

Executive Summary Page 10 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DOJ provided clear, sufficient guidance for METs' use in assessing
capabilities.

Regarding GAO?s second recommendation concerning agency capability
assessments, DOJ stated that it would ask DEA to ensure that detailed field
assessments are documented for DEA headquarters before committing to MET
deployments. DOJ noted that DEA suggests that a field division's notice that
an assessment has been made and approved by field management is the key
documentation needed by headquarters. GAO states, however, that without
better documentation, as required by the Comptroller General's Internal
Control Standards, DEA headquarters management has no assurance that MET
resources are being used to help only those agencies with a legitimate need
for DEA?s assistance. DOJ also suggested that GAO could have made some
methodological changes relating to its findings on the documentation issue,
but GAO cites various reasons why such changes would not have been feasible
or resulted in different findings.

DOJ disagreed with GAO?s first performance measurement recommendation. DOJ
stated that DEA's MET Program now uses standardized data collection methods,
specifically citing the collection of disruption and dismantlement
information and violent crime statistics for each deployment. However, GAO
emphasizes that there is no assurance that this information is collected in
a standardized way because of the lack of guidance for applying the
definitions for disruption and dismantlement and the problems associated
with collecting consistent violent crime statistics at the local level.

DOJ disagreed with GAO?s second performance measurement recommendation that
DEA compile and compare the number of primary individuals, gangs, and
organizations targeted at the beginning of and during MET deployments to the
number arrested, disrupted, and dismantled. DOJ stated that because MET
investigations may evolve and change focus (with regard to targets), it is
very difficult to measure the success of a deployment strictly by comparing
the number of primary targets at the onset of a deployment against the
number of arrests at the conclusion. GAO recognizes that targets can change
during a deployment. However, without comparative information, taking into
account appropriate target changes, DEA cannot determine to what extent the
MET Program is achieving its goal of disrupting and dismantling targeted
drug trafficking gangs and organizations.

Executive Summary Page 11 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DOJ disagreed with the first part of GAO?s third performance measurement
recommendation concerning the collection and reporting of consistent violent
crime statistics. DOJ stated that as long as the pre- and postdeployment
crime data are based on consistent geographic areas, even though the areas
may be larger than the MET deployment areas, DEA will continue to use the
best available data. However, GAO believes that violent crime statistics
should, as often as feasible, relate to the specific geographic areas where
the METs were focused rather than broader geographic areas. When not
feasible, GAO believes DEA should ensure that only consistent violent crime
data for specific MET deployment geographic areas, time periods, and crime
types are aggregated and reported for MET Program performance measurement
purposes. With regard to the second part of the recommendation, DOJ stated
it would ask DEA to collect and report violent crime statistics for
pertinent adjacent and comparable areas whenever feasible and practical.

DOJ agreed with GAO's final performance measurement recommendation regarding
the use of more structured data collection methods to collect qualitative
data from local law enforcement agencies on the outcomeoriented areas
included in the MET postdeployment reviews. DOJ noted that given the
difficulty in aggregating the results of the deployments to evaluate the
overall MET Program, DEA will appraise creating a more structured data
collection instrument that can be used to gather data from a diversity of
communities.

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 12 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Since its creation in 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has
focused its efforts primarily on investigating major organizations involved
in interstate and international drug trafficking. DEA has also supported
state and local law enforcement efforts directed at lower levels of drug
trafficking. In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of DEA?s
policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately responding to
the nation?s drug trafficking problem and related violent crime. One of the
results of this review was the creation of the Mobile Enforcement Team (MET)
Program in 1995, to help state and local law enforcement agencies combat
violent, street- level drug gangs, and other drug- related violent crime in
local communities.

The demand for and supply of illegal drugs persists at very high levels and
adversely affects American society in terms of social, economic, and health
costs. In addition, many violent crimes committed are drug related,
according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). 1 There are
no overall quantitative data on drug- related violent crime and the
relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime. However,
ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking drug abuse or
trafficking and other crimes, including violent crimes.

According to ONDCP, many crimes such as murder, assault, and robbery are
committed under the influence of drugs or may be motivated by a need to
obtain money for drugs. Also, competition and disputes among drug
traffickers and dealers can cause violence, as can the location of drug
markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and social controls against
violence tend to be less effective. DEA reported that gangs responsible for
distributing drugs in local communities often commit violent crimes
associated with their drug activities.

The mission of DEA, which is a component of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
is to (1) enforce U. S. controlled substance laws and regulations and bring
drug traffickers to justice and (2) recommend and support nonenforcement
programs aimed at reducing the availability of illegal drugs in domestic and
international markets. DEA is the lead agency responsible for federal drug
law enforcement and for coordinating and pursuing drug investigations in
foreign countries.

1 See ONDCP?s Fact Sheet: Drug- Related Crime (March 2000, NCJ- 181056).
Chapter 1: Introduction

Drug- Related Violent Crime

DEA?s Role in Drug Law Enforcement

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 13 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA?s primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include:

 investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and
international levels;

 coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, local, and foreign law
enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including
interstate and international investigations;

 managing a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with other
federal, state, local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and
disseminate strategic, investigative, and tactical intelligence information;

 seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers? assets;

 providing leadership for, coordinating, and cooperating with federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies and foreign governments on
programs designed to reduce the availability of illegal drugs on the U. S.
market by developing drug enforcement institutions, enhancing drug
enforcement agencies? capabilities, and developing and promoting
nonenforcement methods, such as crop eradication; and

 coordinating all programs associated with drug law enforcement
counterparts in foreign countries under the policy guidance of the Secretary
of State and U. S. Ambassadors.

To carry out its mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its
headquarters office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United
States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of October 2000.
Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by a Special Agent
in Charge (SAC), were a total of 34 district offices, 117 resident offices,
and 49 posts of duty, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas, DEA
had 78 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 57 country offices,
each headed by a country attachï¿½, and 21 resident offices reporting to the
country offices. In addition, DEA manages a multiagency intelligence center
in El Paso, TX; conducts training at the Justice Training Center in
Quantico, VA; and maintains seven drug analytical laboratories in various
regions of the country and a special drug testing facility in McLean, VA.

DEA?s total budget authority for fiscal year 2001 was $1.4 billion. There
were 9,209 DEA employee positions authorized for fiscal year 2001. Of these,
4, 601 were special agent positions, 693 were intelligence specialist
positions, and 3,915 were other positions.

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 14 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA established the MET Program in February 1995 to help state and local law
enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking in their
communities, particularly crime committed by violent gangs. According to DEA
officials, federal assistance through the MET Program was designed to help
overcome two drug enforcement challenges facing many state and local
agencies: (1) they did not have sufficient resources to effectively enforce
the drug laws; and (2) their officers were known to local drug users and
sellers, making undercover drug buys and penetration of local distribution
rings difficult and dangerous.

The MET Program?s goal is to provide resources to assist local law
enforcement agencies in identifying, targeting, investigating, and
disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking gangs/ organizations that are
responsible for drug- related violence in local communities. Under the
program, DEA is to deploy a MET, which is typically comprised of 8 to 12 DEA
special agents, to a community only after (1) receiving a written request
from a police chief, sheriff, or other local law enforcement official; (2)
assessing the scope of the drug and related violence problem in the
community; (3) confirming a link between violent crime and identified drug
traffickers, gangs, and organizations; and (4) assessing and confirming the
requester?s need for assistance. METs are based in DEA?s field divisions
throughout the country.

During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law enforcement
officials to investigate and arrest the targeted violent drug offenders. The
MET generally collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates
in undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides support
to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence gathered in the course of a MET
investigation may also be used to prosecute the same individuals for related
crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of violence.

The MET Program is consistent with the Attorney General?s Anti- Violent
Crime Initiative, which was started in 1994 to establish partnerships among
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to address major violent
crime problems, including gangs. The program is also consistent with DOJ?s
Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2000- 2005. One of the plan?s goals is to keep
America safe by enforcing federal criminal laws, and one of this goal?s
objectives is to reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of violent
crime, especially as it stems from organized criminal enterprises and drug
and gang- related violence. Another of the goal?s objectives is to reduce
the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling drug trafficking organizations that are international or
multijurisdictional, or have an identified local impact. MET Program

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 15 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The MET Program is also consistent with ONDCP?s National Drug Control
Strategy. 2 One of the goals of the National Strategy is to increase the
safety of America?s citizens by substantially reducing drug- related crime
and violence, and one of this goal?s supporting objectives is to strengthen
law enforcement- including federal, state, and local drug task forces- to
combat drug- related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and arrest
and prosecute the leaders of illegal drug syndicates.

Finally, the MET Program is consistent with DEA?s Strategic Plan: Fiscal
Years 2000- 2005, which is derived from the goals and objectives delineated
in both the National Drug Control Strategy and DOJ?s Strategic Plan. DEA?s
overall strategic goal is to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and
dismantle the international, national, state, and local drug trafficking
organizations having the most significant impact on America. The METs are
specifically identified as a critical success factor in achieving DEA?s
Local Impact strategic objective of reducing drug- related crime in American
communities, including such crime caused by violent gangs, by providing
specialized expertise as required by the local situation.

Table 1 shows the number of active METs, the number of special agents
authorized for those METs, and MET costs reported by DEA from the inception
of the program through the first 6 months of fiscal year 2001.

2 The most recent National Drug Control Strategy was submitted to Congress
in February 1999.

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 16 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Table 1: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Year 1995 Through First 6 Months
of Fiscal Year 2001

Program data 1995 a 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 a

METs 19 19 23 24 24 25 b 25 b DEA special agents c 120 d 120 d 250 250 250
262 b 262 b Operating costs (millions) e $1.0 $2.5 $3.2 $4.4 $6.5 $6.4 $3.1
Operating costs in constant 2001 dollars (millions) e

$1.1 $2.7 $3.5 $4.7 $6.8 $6.6 $3.1 Payroll costs( millions) f $3.4 $12.9
$21.4 $23.1 $23.2 $9.7 Payroll costs in constant 2001 dollars (millions) f

$3. 7 $13. 8 $22.7 $24.0 $23.8 $9.7 a The data for fiscal year 1995 are for
the 6- month period ending September 30, 1995. The data for fiscal year 2001
are as of March 31, 2001. b In fiscal years 2000 and 2001, a second MET in
the New York Field Division was staffed with 10 special

agents that were not included in the total number of positions authorized
for the MET Program. The New York Special Agent in Charge redirected
resources to create this MET. Table 1 does not include these 10 special
agents. c The number of special agent positions were authorized as of the
end of each fiscal year, except for fiscal

year 2001 positions, which were as of March 31, 2001. d DEA?s approved
reprogramming authorized 120 special agent positions for the MET Program for
fiscal

years 1995 and 1996. DEA program managers reported that 167 special agents
were assigned to METs during these 2 years. e MET Program operating costs
include deployment expenses such as travel, rent, purchase of evidence,

and purchase of information. According to DEA, the costs are actual for
fiscal years 1995 through 2000 and obligations for the first 6 months of
fiscal year 2001. f The MET payroll costs are for special agents and support
personnel. However, DEA could not account for all of these payroll costs.
According to DEA officials, the costs are actual, as recorded in DEA?s
payroll system, for fiscal years 1996 through 2000, but not all of the MET
payroll costs were recorded because of timekeeping problems, especially in
fiscal years before 1998. The costs for the first 6 months of fiscal year
2001 are obligations.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

At the time of our review, DEA had 25 METs in 20 of its 21 domestic field
divisions. 3 Table 2 shows the number of MET deployments requested,
initiated, completed, and active from the program?s inception in fiscal year
1995 through fiscal year 2000.

3 DEA?s Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and New York field
divisions each had two METs. The Caribbean Field Division did not have a
MET.

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 17 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Table 2: MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 Deployment 1995- 96
a 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total b

Requested 112 67 79 70 56 384 Initiated 79 46 55 55 52 287 Completed c 79 46
55 55 35 270 Active d 0 00 01717 a Fiscal years 1995- 96 data are for the
18- month period ending September 30, 1996.

b Totals are as of September 30, 2000. c Completed deployments are
categorized according to the fiscal year they started. d Active deployments
were initiated but not completed as of September 30, 2000.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix I contains a list of MET deployments completed through fiscal year
2000 by DEA field division, including the location and time period for each
deployment.

Because the MET Program had been in operation for almost 5 years, the former
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary Committee, requested
that we review the management and performance of DEA?s MET Program. In
response to this request, we agreed to determine the following.

1. How DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program, including (a) how
DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations; (b) whether DEA field
divisions have complied with pertinent program requirements and guidelines;
and (c) whether the MET operations concluded when their objectives were
achieved.

2. What types of individuals and groups are investigated during MET
operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the
principal investigative techniques used.

3. How DEA measures the MET Program?s results and whether the performance
measures DEA uses have any limitations.

We did our review at DEA headquarters and at 6 of the 20 domestic field
divisions having MET teams. We did not independently verify the accuracy and
reliability of the funding and other statistical data we collected from DEA
and used in this report because they were used primarily for Objectives,
Scope,

and Methodology

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 18 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

background and descriptive purposes and generally were not directly related
to our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

The six DEA field divisions we visited were in Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA;
Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Phoenix, AZ; and Washington, D. C. These
offices were judgmentally selected based on, and to assure diversity among,
the following factors: geographic location, the year the field divisions
began conducting MET deployments, the length of the field divisions?
deployments, and whether rural or urban communities were involved in the
field divisions? deployments. We also obtained information from officials
representing 13 U. S. Attorneys? Offices, 12 District Attorneys? Offices,
and 25 local law enforcement agencies in the geographic regions of the 6 DEA
field divisions we visited. These agency representatives had either been
involved with or had knowledge of the MET deployments conducted in their
local areas.

To determine how DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program, including
(a) how DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations, (b) whether DEA
field divisions have complied with pertinent program requirements and
guidelines, and (c) whether the MET operations concluded when their
objectives were achieved, we interviewed DEA headquarters officials,
collected program management, resource, and workload information, and
analyzed pertinent DEA documents, including the MET Program handbook
containing program policies, requirements, and guidelines. 4 We also
reviewed DEA headquarters files for a representative, national sample of 83
completed MET deployments selected from a population of 197 deployments
conducted from the program?s inception in 1995 through June 1999. (Our
methodology for selecting and reviewing MET deployment files is discussed in
app. II.) In addition, using structured interviews, we interviewed (1) DEA
officials in the six selected field divisions we visited; and (2) U. S.
Attorney, District Attorney, and local law enforcement officials in the
geographic regions of the six DEA field divisions.

To determine what types of individuals and groups are investigated during
MET operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the

4 Based on our review of DEA documents, including the MET Program handbook,
and discussions with DEA officials, we identified what we considered
important program requirements and guidelines. We then consulted with the
Chief of DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section, which oversees the MET Program,
to determine whether the particular items were either requirements or
guidelines and when they became effective.

Chapter 1: Introduction Page 19 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

principal investigative techniques used, we reviewed the files for our
random sample of 83 completed MET deployments. We also obtained and analyzed
case initiation data from DEA headquarters for fiscal years 1995 through
2000. In addition, we interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials
in the six field divisions, and local law enforcement officials in the
geographic regions of the six divisions.

To determine how DEA measures the MET Program?s results and whether the
performance measures DEA uses have any limitations, we reviewed the files
for our random sample of 83 completed MET deployments; obtained and analyzed
DEA headquarters summary program results information for each fiscal year
from 1995 to 2000; and interviewed DEA headquarters officials, DEA officials
in the 6 selected field divisions, and local law enforcement officials in
the geographic regions of the 6 divisions. We also obtained and analyzed
DEA?s Annual Performance Plans for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, as well as
other DEA headquarters information on MET Program performance measures. We
used the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) as our basic
criteria along with Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOJ, and GAO
guidance on the act, including OMB Circular A- 11 and GAO guides for
assessing agency annual performance plans and strategic plans.

We performed our work from December 1999 to January 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. In May 2001, we requested
comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General. On June 14,
2001, we received written comments from the Acting Assistant Attorney
General for Administration. The comments are discussed at the end of
chapters 2 and 4 and reprinted in appendix VIII.

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 20 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA has enhanced its headquarters management and monitoring of the MET
Program since it was established in 1995, particularly since a 1998 DEA
headquarters? evaluation led to criticism of the program by the former DEA
Administrator. DEA headquarters developed and modified requirements and
guidelines for the program and increased the number of headquarters staff
assigned to manage and oversee MET operations.

Based on our examination of evidence contained in DEA headquarters
deployment files, the field division METs generally followed some of the
program requirements and guidelines we selected for review. However,
compliance with other program requirements and guidelines was unclear
because the files did not contain sufficient evidence to make that
determination.

A key program requirement is that the METs assess the requesting local law
enforcement agency?s ability to address the drug and related violence
problem for which DEA?s MET assistance was requested. According to DEA,
because its resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed only when it is
determined that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of the
requesting agency. However, insufficient documentation in many of the
headquarters deployment files made it impossible for us to determine how
consistently and adequately DEA?s 24 METs nationwide 1 carried out this
requirement. DEA headquarters has not clearly required that METs document
and report their assessments of agencies? capabilities. It also has not
provided clear, sufficient guidance for independently assessing an agency?s
capabilities and determining that they are inadequate to address the
identified drug and related violence problem for which MET assistance was
requested. Unless the METs adequately assess each requesting law enforcement
agency?s capabilities, and then document and report their assessments to
headquarters, DEA has no assurance that the METs are helping only those
agencies that have a legitimate need for assistance and, thus, that DEA?s
MET resources are being used appropriately.

In addition, we found that the MET deployments generally concluded when
their objectives were achieved- e. g., targeted individuals were arrested or
targeted gangs/ organizations were disrupted or dismantled- and at the same
time have been shorter in duration, on average, each year over the last few
years.

1 Although there were 25 METs at the time we completed our work in December
2000, there were 24 METs as of June 30, 1999, the cutoff date for our review
of completed deployments. Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only Incapable Local Agencies

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 21 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As the MET Program has evolved, DEA headquarters has taken a number of
actions to improve its management of the program, including increasing the
number of staff carrying out this function and becoming more assertive in
its oversight. The primary responsibility of the headquarters staff is to
develop, disseminate, and continually monitor compliance with MET Program
policy, requirements, and guidelines. Figure 1 provides a chronological
summary of the key steps DEA has taken to improve its management of the MET
program.

Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events Relating to MET Management

Source: Developed by GAO based on DEA information.

DEA Headquarters Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Management of the MET
Program

1995 1996 1997

1998 1999

2000

February May April/ May February June

August June October December

July May

First headquarters MET Program Staff Coordinator, responsible for overseeing
and monitoring the MET Program nationwide, was assigned to the State and
Local Programs Section in DEA's Office of Domestic Operations

MET Program handbook containing policies, requirements, and guidelines for
initiating and implementing MET deployments was first published and
distributed to field divisions

First MET conference held for field division managers Additional
headquarters Staff Coordinator assigned First Program Analyst assigned to
MET to assist management and the staff coordinators in overseeing and
monitoring the MET Program by, among other things, preparing reports and
providing analytical support

Second MET conference held Following a June 1998 DEA headquarters
evaluation, DEA headquarters assumed a more active oversight role of METs

Additional Program Analyst assigned MET Program handbook revised February
Third MET conference held

Mobile Enforcement Section established as a separate headquarters unit in
the Office of Domestic Operations with a Section Chief to oversee and
monitor program implementation by the field divisions consistent with
established policies and requirements

Two additional Staff Coordinators and one additional Program Analyst
assigned later to the Section

Fourth MET conference held

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 22 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

At the time of our review, the Mobile Enforcement Section 2 had a Section
Chief, 4 Staff Coordinators, 3 Program Analysts, a secretary, 2
administrative assistants, and a budget technician for a total of 12 staff.
According to the Section Chief, the additional staff has enhanced management
of the MET Program by allowing the Staff Coordinators to focus on fewer METs
and devote more time to each one. 3

Since DEA headquarters controls funds allocated for METs, before each
deployment the responsible field division must submit a written request to
the Mobile Enforcement Section for authorization and funding. This request
is to include the results of the MET?s predeployment assessment of the
situation in the requesting community. After receiving the request, DEA
headquarters authorizes or disapproves the deployment based on the
documented predeployment assessment results. According to the MET Program
handbook, the request is to include a discussion of the drug and related
violence problem, a summary of the deployment?s investigative strategies and
objectives, an estimate of the deployment?s duration, and an estimate of the
resources needed.

If any required information is not provided or is unclear in the request, a
headquarters section Staff Coordinator is to contact the MET supervisor to
obtain or clarify the information. The deployment should not be authorized
and funded until all predeployment requirements have been met. For example,
before a New York MET request for the authorization and funding of a
deployment to Watertown, NY, was approved, a Staff Coordinator requested
that additional information be provided, including information regarding
violence attributed to the deployment targets, crime statistics, and a short
statement explaining why Watertown needed a MET deployment.

2 In May 2001, DEA changed the name of this section to the Tactical
Enforcement Section. Because our work for this review was completed before
this change, our report refers to the Mobile Enforcement Section.

3 In addition to managing the MET Program, the Mobile Enforcement Section
has carried out similar responsibilities for DEA?s Regional Enforcement Team
(RET) Program since the program was established in fiscal year 1999. Under
the RET Program, DEA deploys mobile teams of special agents to target
organized crime syndicates that have established command and control
centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment points in small communities
throughout the United States. As of September 2000, DEA had established
three RET offices- Des Moines, IA; Charlotte, NC; and Las Vegas, NV. Three
of the four Staff Coordinators were responsible for monitoring and
coordinating with one RET in addition to six or seven METs.

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 23 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Headquarters is to provide a written deployment authorization that includes
approval of a specified length of time, and the amount of operational
funding and staffing to conduct the deployment. If it is later determined
that a deployment cannot be completed in the amount of time approved and
funded by headquarters, the MET can request an extension of time and
additional funds. There is no required timeframe for completing a MET
deployment. While headquarters guidance suggests that deployments should
generally last from 2 to 4 months, 4 it is expected that deployments will
generally continue until the targeted drug organization is disrupted or
dismantled.

In addition to the requests for authorization and funding of deployments,
each MET is to provide the Mobile Enforcement Section with various other
documents. These include (1) deployment request letters received from local
law enforcement agencies; (2) biweekly activity reports discussing the
investigative progress of deployments; (3) monthly reports containing
statistics such as the number of arrests, amount of drugs seized, amount of
assets seized, and number of deployments requested and pending; (4) a
summary of each deployment after completion; (5) an assessment of each
deployment?s impact immediately after completion; and (6) an assessment of
each deployment?s impact 6 months after completion. A file for each
deployment containing these and other documents is maintained at the
headquarters section.

MET operations are managed on a day- to- day basis at the field division
level by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Assistant Special Agent in
Charge (ASAC), and MET group supervisor. In carrying out program oversight
responsibilities, Mobile Enforcement Section Staff Coordinators are to
monitor all field MET activities, from the receipt of a deployment request
to the completion of the postdeployment review, to ensure that the METs are
operating in accordance with program policies, requirements, and guidelines.

When problems are identified, Staff Coordinators are to take needed
corrective actions in collaboration with field division MET supervisors. In
our review of headquarters MET deployment files, we noted that some

4 In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review, DEA
issued a revised MET Program handbook. The new handbook does not suggest a
length of time that deployments should last.

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 24 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

identified problems and related actions were noted in the pertinent files. 5
If warranted, Staff Coordinators are to provide on- scene consultation to
MET supervisors to resolve problems. If the problem persists, discussion is
to take place between headquarters management (e. g., the Mobile Enforcement
Section Chief or a higher level manager) and the field division ASAC or SAC.

The Mobile Enforcement Section is to inform DEA top management of the
progress of MET deployments and other program activities through briefings
and periodic reports. The section also is to (1) evaluate the success of
each deployment using violent crime statistics and other factors (as we
discuss in chapter 4); (2) evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each MET
by examining factors such as the number of deployment requests received, the
age of pending requests, how deployments are conducted, and the amount of
oversight and correction needed; and (3) track all MET obligations using an
automated data base program.

In addition, since 1996, DEA headquarters has organized and conducted
conferences for field division MET supervisors and the ASACs to whom they
report. As shown in figure 1, four such conferences have been held since the
MET Program began. According to DEA, the goal of these conferences has been
to (1) establish the future objectives and direction of the MET Program, (2)
enhance the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the METs, and (3)
communicate to the conference attendees the support that the program
receives from top DEA management, DOJ, and Congress. DEA headquarters
managers have used these conferences to reiterate and clarify reporting
requirements and respond to questions. Conferences have also featured guest
speakers who have discussed successful MET deployments in their communities
and other topics of interest. The conferences also provide MET supervisors
with an opportunity to meet one another and share information based on their
deployments, such as lessons learned, innovative investigative techniques,
and successful approaches to implementing deployments.

Since a June 1998 DEA headquarters evaluation of the MET Program, which
included an analysis of each field division MET, DEA headquarters has
assumed a more active role in overseeing the program and each

5 We did not attempt to determine whether all such problems and related
actions were documented in the files. DEA Headquarters Has

Assumed a More Active Oversight Role

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 25 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

deployment. Based on this evaluation, the former DEA Administrator expressed
concern and criticism regarding headquarters leadership and oversight of the
MET Program. In response to the DEA Administrator, DEA concluded that
additional oversight and monitoring was necessary to ensure that METs were
operating in accordance with program requirements and guidelines. DEA also
concluded that MET deployment problems needed to be quickly identified and
addressed to avoid wasted time and resources.

In addition to the biweekly activity reports and monthly statistical
reports, which were already being submitted to the headquarters section and
considered to be primary oversight mechanisms, the Mobile Enforcement
Section Chief said he now meets with headquarters managers on a daily basis
to apprise them of noteworthy MET deployment activity. In addition, he said
the Mobile Enforcement Section prepares a monthly MET activity report for
the DEA Administrator describing the progress of each ongoing deployment.
Also, the biweekly activity report was revised to improve monitoring and
help ensure that the METs continually direct their investigative resources
and activities toward individuals and organizations identified and targeted
in each deployment.

Our review of DEA headquarters deployment files disclosed that in
implementing the MET Program, the field division METs generally followed
some of the requirements and guidelines we reviewed that were contained in
the MET Program handbook. However, some deployment files did not contain
evidence that other requirements and guidelines that we reviewed were being
followed. Most significantly, it was not clear whether the METs were
adequately assessing each requesting law enforcement agency?s capabilities
as required before deciding whether to approve a deployment request.

Two key MET Program requirements are that each DEA field division SAC, after
receiving a request to deploy a MET to a community and before deploying,
must assess (1) the scope of the drug and related violence problem and (2)
the capability of the requesting law enforcement agency to address the
problem. Particular attention is to be given to determining the violent
crime rate in the requesting community and establishing a link between the
targeted narcotics group( s) and violence. The decision to METs Generally

Followed Some Program Requirements; Compliance With Other Requirements and
Guidelines Is Unclear

METs Are Required to Assess Local Drug and Related Violence Problems and
Local Law Enforcement Agencies? Capabilities to Address the Problems

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 26 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

deploy a MET is to be made only after careful consultation with the law
enforcement official who made the request and a thorough on- site assessment
substantiating the need for a deployment. According to DEA, because its
resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed only when it is determined
that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of the requesting
agency.

MET supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in six DEA field divisions told us
that their MET special agents almost always visit the requesting law
enforcement agency and discuss the drug and related violence problem and the
agency?s capabilities and limitations with requesting agency officials. The
officials said MET agents also (1) visit the specific problem area, (2)
identify the potential deployment targets already known by the requesting
agency, and (3) obtain information about the area (e. g., crime statistics)
and the potential targets (e. g., criminal histories) as part of their
assessment of the need for a MET deployment.

Officials we interviewed representing 24 of the 25 local law enforcement
agencies included in our review 6 said DEA assessed the drug and related
violent crime problems in their communities prior to initiating a
deployment. Officials at 19 of these 25 agencies also said DEA assessed
whether their agency was capable of handling the problem; officials at 2 of
the agencies said DEA did not assess their capabilities; and officials at 4
of the agencies did not know whether such assessments had been made. The MET
supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in five of the six DEA field divisions
said requests for deployments had previously been denied because it was
determined there was not a high level of violent crime or there was no
established link between drugs and violence. 7 None of the officials we
spoke with said a request for a deployment was denied because it was
determined that the requesting agency was capable of addressing the
identified drug and violence problem.

6 As discussed in chapter 1, we obtained information from officials
representing 25 local law enforcement agencies in the geographic regions of
the 6 DEA field divisions we visited. These agency representatives had
either been involved with or had knowledge of MET deployments that DEA
carried out at the request of their agencies. The 25 local law enforcement
agencies all carried out police operations and did not include the 13 U. S.
Attorneys? Offices and 12 District Attorneys? Offices also included in our
review.

7 The DEA officials in one field division did not know if any requests for
deployments had been denied.

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance METs Are Assisting
Only Incapable Local Agencies

Page 27 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

In conducting its predeployment assessment, after the MET visits the
requesting law enforcement agency, it is required to review the information
collected and prepare a thorough and complete written summary of its
assessment of the violent drug situation in that community, including a
description of the link between drugs and violence. The written summary is
also to (1) identify the individuals and organization( s) to be targeted,
(2) outline the investigative methods to be used, (3) state the deployment
objective( s) to be accomplished, and (4) estimate the duration of the
deployment and the resources required. The summary must also include violent
crime statistics for, at a minimum, murder, robbery, and aggravated assault,
which are supposed to be derived from the area most impacted by the
individuals or organization( s) to be targeted and cover the 6- month period
prior to the deployment. In addition, the summary must explain the
requesting law enforcement agency?s reason for requesting MET assistance.
After concurrence by the DEA field division SAC, the written summary of the
predeployment assessment is to be forwarded to DEA headquarters in the form
of a request for the authorization and funding for the deployment.

Figure 2 summarizes the key steps in the MET predeployment assessment
process.

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Figure 2: MET Predeployment Assessment Process

Source: Developed by GAO based on DEA information.

Consistent with the remarks of officials in 6 DEA field divisions and of 25
law enforcement representatives we interviewed, our review of a probability
sample of DEA headquarters files for 197 MET deployments completed as of
June 30, 1999, revealed that the METs generally adhered to the key
requirement that they assess the drug and related violence problems for
which DEA?s assistance was requested. Figure 3 shows the estimated
percentages of the files that contained documentation indicating that the
METs carried out certain required procedures relating to predeployment
assessments of drug and related violence problems. 8

8 The sampling error for all estimates in this report based on our review of
DEA headquarters MET deployment files is not greater than 10 percentage
points at the 95- percent confidence level unless otherwise noted. Appendix
II contains a thorough explanation of our probability sample of MET
deployment files. METs Generally Assessed

Drug and Violence Problems As Required

MET assesses the drug and related violence problem (e. g., determines
violent crime rate, establishes a link between drugs and violence,
identifies individuals and gangs involved, and visits problem area) MET
visits the

requesting agency to conduct a predeployment assessment

DEA field division

MET MET assesses the capability of the

requesting agency to address the drug and related violence problem

MET reviews and analyzes information collected; prepares summary of
predeployment assessment

Field division sends request for MET deployment authorization and funding
(including predeployment assessment summary) to DEA headquarters

DEA headquarters notifies the field division of approval or disapproval

If approved, MET deploys to authorized location DEA receives letter

from local law enforcement agency requesting MET assistance

Local law enforcement

agency DEA headquarters

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Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30,
1999, Following Certain Required Procedures for Assessing Drug and Violence
Problems

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

Due to insufficient documentation in the files we reviewed, it is unclear
whether the METs consistently and adequately assessed the requesting law
enforcement agencies? capabilities to address drug and related violence
problems. The lack of sufficient documentation could be the result of DEA
headquarters (1) not clearly requiring that the assessments be documented
and (2) not providing clear, sufficient guidance to the METs on how to make
these assessments.

We estimate that 30 percent of the headquarters files for the 197
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, had no documentation indicating
that the METs assessed the capability of requesting law enforcement agencies
to address their own drug and related violence problems. Even for the six
field divisions we visited, where the officials told us they always assess
the requesting agency?s capabilities, we Unclear Whether METs

Consistently and Adequately Assessed Local Agencies? Capabilities

Insufficient Documentation Relating to the Assessment of Requesting
Agencies? Capabilities

95 92

85 89

0 20 40 60 80 100

Estimated percentages

METs consulted with the requesting local law enforcement agency

METs assessed the scope of the drug and related violence problem

METs established a link between drugs and violence

METs identified one or more individuals, gangs, or organizations as a target
of the deployment

Predeployment assessment procedures

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Page 30 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

estimate that 34 percent of the headquarters files did not contain this
documentation. 9

For the estimated 70 percent of the headquarters deployment files that did
contain this documentation, the documents generally indicated, as
justification for the deployments, that the agencies had a limited number of
personnel (often providing the number of officers in the police department
and in the drug unit) or limited funds. However, many of these documents did
not provide specific evidence or an explanation of how, based on its
predeployment assessment, the MET concluded that the identified drug and
violence problem was beyond the immediate capabilities of the requesting
agency.

Appendix III contains four examples from our random sample of deployments
that illustrate how METs, in their requests for authorization and funding,
summarized the results of their predeployment assessments of requesting
agencies? capabilities and the diversity of evidence and support provided.
Although all four requests were approved by DEA headquarters, as noted in
our analysis of each example, the first two do not provide specific evidence
or explain why the requesting agencies were incapable of addressing their
drug and related violence problems. To illustrate, in the first example, the
MET?s request for authorization and funding to deploy stated that the
requesting local police department had 357 persons, including 12 narcotics
officers, and that the department was seeking DEA?s assistance in targeting
mid- and upperlevel organizations in select violent neighborhoods. However,
the MET request did not explain why or cite specific evidence that the
identified drug and violence problem was beyond the police department?s
immediate capabilities, i. e., why the 12 narcotics officers and perhaps
other officers could not successfully target and investigate the drug
trafficking organizations of concern without MET assistance.

The third example in appendix III cites a specific reason why the local law
enforcement agency cannot successfully address the drug and violence
problems identified, but does not put the reason into context by explaining
why a particular investigative technique must be used to address the
problems. The fourth example cites several specific reasons why two local
law enforcement agencies cannot successfully address the drug and

9 The sampling error for this estimate based on our review of DEA
headquarters MET deployment files is 14 percentage points at the 95- percent
confidence level.

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violence problems identified. In the example, the request for deployment
authorization and funding cites the requesting sheriff department?s lack of
manpower, insufficient money to make drug purchases, and inability to
recruit informants. It explains that the local police department is also
incapable of successfully addressing the problems because its drug
enforcement activities have been limited to investigating juveniles and it
did not have sufficient funds to buy drugs and pay informants. In addition,
the request cites prior unsuccessful sheriff and police department efforts
against the identified drug trafficking organization.

DEA headquarters requires METs to document and report their assessments of
drug and related violence problems in their requests for authorization and
funding. However, it has not clearly required the METs to similarly document
and report their assessments of the requesting agencies? capabilities,
including the METs? rationale and basis for concluding that the requesting
agencies are incapable of addressing the drug and violence problems for
which DEA?s assistance was requested. The MET Program handbook, in
discussing the information the METs are to include in their predeployment
assessment summaries requesting authorization and funding of deployments,
does not require that information relating to the requesting agency?s
capabilities be included.

At the February 1999 and May 2000 MET conferences, DEA headquarters provided
each MET supervisor with information explaining the elements that are
required for the predeployment assessment summaries requesting authorization
and funding of deployments. One document provided at the conferences
indicated that the METs? deployment requests are to explain the requesting
agency?s ?reason for requesting? a MET deployment, citing such possible
reasons as limited manpower, limited expertise, and the need for federal
prosecution. Another document indicated that the METs? deployment requests
are to explain the requesting agency?s ?need for? a deployment, citing such
possible reasons as limited budget for drug purchases, officers known to
traffickers, limited expertise, and limited technical equipment. However,
neither of these documents indicated that the METs should explain how they
determined that the requesting agency was incapable of addressing its
identified drug and related violence problem without DEA?s assistance.

The Comptroller General?s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 21. 3.1) requires that all transactions and other
significant events be clearly documented, and that the documentation be
readily available for examination. The documentation should appear in
management directives, administrative policies, or No Clear Requirement That

Assessments of Requesting Agencies? Capabilities Be Documented

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operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation
and records should be properly managed and maintained. The documentation of
transactions or other significant events should be complete and accurate and
should facilitate tracing the transaction or event and related information.
Appropriate documentation is an internal control activity to help ensure
that management?s directives are carried out.

While DEA headquarters has provided the METs with guidance for assessing
drug and related violence problems, including specific factors to address,
it has not developed and provided the METs with clear, sufficient guidance
for determining whether a requesting agency is capable of addressing its
identified drug and related violence problem without DEA?s assistance. The
MET Program handbook does not discuss how such assessments should be made
and does not identify specific factors for the METs to address in making
their assessments. The absence of such guidance may have contributed to the
lack of sufficient information at DEA headquarters regarding MET assessments
of agencies? capabilities.

DEA headquarters provided a predeployment assessment checklist developed by
DEA?s Miami field division to each MET supervisor at the February 1999 and
May 2000 MET conferences. While the checklist identifies some factors to
address in assessing the drug and related violence problem, it contains
limited guidance for assessing agencies? capabilities. The items on the
checklist pertaining to an agency?s capabilities are (1) total number of
sworn officers, (2) number of narcotics officers, (3) availability of K- 9
assistance, 10 (4) ongoing/ prior investigations of targeted individuals or
organizations, and (5) reason( s) MET assistance was requested.

As previously mentioned, other documents provided at MET conferences
indicate that deployment requests are to explain the requesting agency?s

?reason for requesting? a deployment or ?need for? a deployment. These
documents cite other reasons an agency may need assistance that are not
included on the checklist provided to MET supervisors, such as officers
known to traffickers, limited budget for drug purchases, limited expertise,
limited equipment, and the need for federal prosecution. These documents,
however, do not discuss or provide guidance on how to carry out an
assessment and determine whether an agency is capable of

10 K- 9 assistance is the use of one or more dogs for the detection of
illegal drugs. Unclear Guidance for Determining

Whether Agencies Are Capable of Addressing Drug and Violence Problems

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Page 33 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

addressing its identified drug and violence problem without DEA?s
assistance.

In discussing the MET predeployment assessment requirements, the Chief of
the Mobile Enforcement Section acknowledged that DEA headquarters has not
specified how the assessments should be conducted. He said headquarters
relies on field division managers to determine how to conduct the required
assessments. Thus, according to the Section Chief, the length, approach,
methodology, and scope of predeployment assessments, including assessments
of each requesting agency?s ability to address the specific drug and
violence problem DEA was asked to address, could vary among the various
field divisions.

In our visits to six DEA field divisions, we asked how the METs conducted
their assessments of requesting agencies? capabilities. The MET supervisors
and ASACs told us they considered the availability of funds and whether
local narcotics officers were known or recognizable in the community.
Officials in five of the field divisions said they also considered the
requesting agencies? number of personnel; officials in four of the field
divisions said they also considered the officers? level of expertise; and
officials in four of the field divisions said they also considered the
agencies? technical capability (i. e., equipment). The DEA officials said
that MET personnel collected information and made determinations regarding
these factors by talking to officials representing the requesting law
enforcement agencies.

The MET Program handbook cites various other matters that are to be
discussed with the requesting law enforcement agency prior to initiating a
MET deployment. We reviewed a probability sample of DEA headquarters files
for 197 deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, to determine whether the
METs complied with some of these requirements. Our review found that the
files did not always contain evidence of compliance. The requirements and
guidelines we reviewed and our corresponding findings are summarized below.

 The requesting agency must commit to assigning a specific number of
personnel for the duration of the deployment. DEA officials in the six field
divisions we visited said they always obtain this commitment. We estimate
that 32 percent of the 197 deployment files contained documentation
indicating that the METs obtained such a commitment before initiating the
deployments. Compliance With Other MET

Program Requirements and Guidelines Is Unclear

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Page 34 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

 The MET should work with the requesting agency to make certain that the
deployment is coordinated with other federal, state, or local law
enforcement agencies or task forces operating within the same jurisdiction
to prevent any overlap of ongoing investigations. DEA officials in five of
the field divisions we visited said they always coordinate with other law
enforcement organizations, and officials in one division said they sometimes
coordinate. We estimate that 54 percent of the 197 deployment files had
documentation indicating that the METs carried out such coordination.

 Prior to each deployment, the MET should obtain the commitment of federal
or local prosecutors to fully support the deployment to ensure the most
effective prosecutions. Only four deployments in the probability sample of
files we reviewed started after December 1998, when the MET handbook first
required that a prosecutor?s commitment be obtained to support each
deployment. Consequently, we could not reach a conclusion regarding
compliance with this requirement. However, we noted that an estimated 53
percent of the 197 deployment files had documentation discussing MET
coordination with either, or both, U. S. Attorneys? Offices and District
Attorneys? Offices. Of those files, the documents in 60 percent mentioned
that the MET had obtained a commitment from prosecutors regarding potential
prosecutions. DEA officials in the six field divisions we visited said the
MET always coordinates with prosecutors, either federal or state, prior to
deployments. Officials in five of the six divisions also said the MET always
obtains a federal or state prosecutor?s commitment of support, while the
officials in one division said they usually, but not always, obtain such a
commitment.

 Within 1 month after each deployment is concluded, an ?immediate?

postdeployment review is to be completed evaluating the deployment?s impact
in the requesting jurisdiction from the time the deployment started. Since
April 1997, METs have also been required to prepare a postdeployment review
discussing the deployment?s impact 6 months after its completion. This
review is to include violent crime statistics, supplied by the requesting
law enforcement agency, covering the periods 6 months before and 6 months
after the deployment. Based on our review of DEA headquarters files for
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, we estimate that 30 percent of
the 197 files contained an immediate postdeployment review, and 81 percent
of the files contained a 6- month postdeployment review. For those files
containing a 6- month postdeployment review, 89 percent of the reviews
included violent crime statistics.

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DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/ organizations in
the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed. DEA further expects
that deployments will generally continue until the targeted individuals are
arrested and/ or the targeted drug gangs/ organizations have been disrupted
or dismantled. The deployments included in our review were generally
concluded when these objectives were achieved- e. g., targeted individuals
were arrested or targeted gangs/ organizations were disrupted or dismantled.
We also noted that while there is no required standard timeframe for
completing a deployment, the deployments have been shorter in duration, on
average, each year over the last few years.

We reviewed a probability sample of DEA headquarters files for the 197
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, to determine the reasons the
deployments were concluded. We estimate that 62 percent of the files, or
about 122 files, 11 contained documents indicating one or more reasons for
concluding the deployment. Of these 122 files, we found that an estimated 80
percent indicated that at least one reason was that the deployment
objectives had been achieved or essentially achieved. The files also
contained the following other reasons relating to the achievement of the
deployment objectives: an estimated 96 percent of the 122 files included as
a reason for terminating the deployment that targeted individuals 12 had
been arrested; an estimated 40 percent of the files included the reason that
targeted gangs/ organizations had been disrupted; and an estimated 21
percent of the files included the reason that targeted gangs/ organizations
had been dismantled.

The MET supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in the six DEA field divisions
we visited said that generally the key reason for concluding a deployment
was that the MET and the involved local law enforcement agency collected
sufficient evidence to make arrests and seek prosecution. Some of the
officials pointed out that not all of the primary targets may have been
arrested; for example, some targets may have fled, and their whereabouts may
be unknown. However, officials in four of the divisions said that generally
the objectives are achieved when a deployment is concluded.

11 Because of sampling error, the range for this estimate extends from 104
files to 140 files at the 95- percent confidence level. 12 The targeted
individuals arrested include those identified and targeted during DEA?s
predeployment assessment and targets added during the deployment. MET
Deployments

Generally Concluded When Objectives Were Achieved

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Our review of the DEA headquarters deployment files also found that targeted
individuals were usually arrested when the MET deployments concluded. Figure
4 shows the estimated percentage of the 197 deployment files that contained
documentation indicating that, in most instances, all or some of the targets
and primary targets had been arrested. 13

13 Documents in the DEA headquarters deployment files referred to ?targets?
and ?primary

targets?. The Mobile Enforcement Section Chief told us that there is no
official definition for these terms; however, he noted that a primary target
is generally the head, or in the upper echelon, of an organization.

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Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30,
1999, with Targets and Primary Targets Arrested

Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding. Source: GAO
review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

Although the MET Program handbook states there is no required timeframe for
completing a deployment, it suggests that deployments should generally last
2 to 4 months. 14 Our analysis of DEA data on the timeframes for the 269
deployments completed as of September 30, 2000, showed that the overall
median duration was 130 days (or slightly over 4 months) and that the median
duration has decreased each year over the

14 In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review,
DEA issued a revised MET Program handbook. The new handbook does not suggest
a length of time that deployments should last.

Some Unclear

All None

75% 12%

11%

All Unclear None

No primary targets identified

49% 23%

22% 4%

3% 2% Some

Targets Arrested Primary Targets Arrested

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last few years. Table 3 shows the median duration for the completed
deployments categorized by the fiscal year in which they started. 15 , 16

Table 3: Median Duration of MET Deployments Started in Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2000 and Completed by September 30, 2000

Deployments completed through fiscal year 2000 a 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
2000

Number completed 26 52 46 55 55 35 Median duration in days 78 181 148 130
123 122 a The deployments are categorized according to the fiscal year they
started. The table does not include 17 deployments started in fiscal year
2000 and not completed by September 30, 2000. The duration of these 17
deployments may change the median duration for fiscal year 2000.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Nine percent of the 269 deployments in table 3 were completed within 60 days
and 44 percent were completed within 120 days. The median duration for the
deployments decreased about 33 percent from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year
2000.

DEA has enhanced its management of MET operations. However, because of
insufficient documentation in DEA headquarters deployment files, we could
not determine whether the METs consistently and adequately complied with the
requirement that they assess each requesting local law enforcement agency?s
ability to address the drug and related violence problem for which DEA?s
assistance was requested. DEA headquarters has not clearly required the METs
to document and report their assessments of agencies? capabilities. Also,
DEA headquarters has not developed clear guidance for the METs to assess
whether each requesting agency is capable of handling the identified drug
and violence problem for which

15 We report the median durations because the distribution of durations is
skewed by some unusually long deployments, making the median a better
indicator of the central tendency of durations. We calculated the durations
by subtracting the starting dates from the ending dates, using figures
provided by DEA and verified for those cases in our file review sample.
Deployments may be considered completed even though DEA special agents may
carry out certain postdeployment activities, such as testifying in court,
and even though further indictments and arrests may be obtained at a later
date.

16 Appendix I of this report contains a list of all MET deployments
completed through September 30, 2000, and includes the starting and ending
dates of each. For our calculation of the overall median duration of these
deployments, we considered the deployment of both DEA?s Atlanta and Houston
Field Division METs to Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996, to August 12,
1996, as one deployment. DEA counts this as two deployments. Conclusions

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DEA?s assistance was requested and comprehensively identifying specific
factors to be addressed in making such assessments. Absent such guidance,
and internal controls requiring that such assessments be documented and
forwarded to DEA headquarters for consideration before MET deployments are
authorized and funded, DEA cannot be sure that METs are only being deployed
to those requesting law enforcement agencies that have a legitimate need for
assistance. As a result, the MET Program may not be making the most
effective use of its limited resources.

To help ensure that DEA?s MET resources are used only in those instances
where the requesting local law enforcement agencies are incapable of
addressing drug- related violence problems in their communities, we
recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to (1)
provide clear guidance for METs to use in assessing local law enforcement
agencies? capabilities; and (2) ensure that the DEA field divisions document
such assessments and provide them to DEA headquarters before MET deployments
are approved.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ essentially agreed
with the two recommendations contained in this chapter. However, it had some
comments on the related findings.

With regard to our recommendation relating to guidance for METs to use in
assessing whether local law enforcement agencies are capable of addressing
drug and related violence problems without DEA?s assistance, DOJ stated it
will ask DEA to revise the MET Program handbook to address our concern that
the handbook does not discuss how such assessments should be made and does
not identify specific factors for the METs to address. In agreeing with the
recommendation, however, DOJ referred to our finding that DEA does not
currently provide clear guidance for assessing a local law enforcement
agency's capabilities as "largely interpretive in nature." DOJ said that
while DEA has provided much guidance on what to look for in assessing
agencies? capabilities, GAO would like to see more detail and the guidance
published in the MET Program handbook.

We acknowledge that DEA headquarters has provided the field division METs
with some guidance for assessing local law enforcement agencies?
capabilities. In fact, our report states on page 32 that a predeployment
assessment checklist and other documents provided to MET supervisors at MET
conferences cite various reasons why a local agency may need Recommendation
for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

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assistance. However, neither these documents nor the MET handbook discusses
or provides clear, sufficient guidance to the METs on how to carry out an
assessment and determine whether an agency is capable of addressing its
identified drug and violence problem without DEA?s assistance. They do not
provide specific guidance on how to assess the situation by (1) establishing
what the requesting agency?s capabilities are; (2) determining what
enforcement methods, techniques, resources, and capabilities are needed to
resolve the specific, identified problem that DEA has been asked to help
address; and (3) determining if there are one or more valid reasons why the
requesting agency cannot resolve the problem without a MET deployment.

DOJ discussed three ways it believes DEA has provided guidance for assessing
an agency?s capabilities. However, as discussed below, we do not believe the
three ways cited by DOJ provided clear, sufficient guidance for field
division METs to use in conducting their assessments.

First, DOJ stated that it is established policy that DEA will assign MET
resources to address a documented threat only when the local police are not
capable of doing so themselves. DOJ cites two possible reasons for judging a
local law enforcement agency as incapable of addressing the threat without
DEA?s assistance and notes that there are other reasons. In our opinion, the
fact that it is established DEA policy that MET resources be assigned only
when the local police are judged incapable of addressing the identified
problem for any of a number of reasons is not the same as providing guidance
on how to implement the policy and on reasons or factors to be considered in
assessing capabilities.

Second, DOJ stated that annual MET conferences provide MET managers with an
opportunity to exchange views on best practices and enable DEA headquarters
to clarify management issues related to MET deployments. While we agree that
the conferences are good forums for exchanging MET experiences and best
practices and clarifying issues, our review of detailed summaries of the
conferences provided by DEA shows that the topic of assessing agencies?
capabilities apparently was not an agenda item at the conferences and was
not addressed.

Third, DOJ stated that DEA field division managers are primarily responsible
for assessing local agencies? capabilities, and the uniqueness of many
situations makes the development of standard protocols difficult. In our
opinion, the fact that DEA field division managers are primarily responsible
for conducting agency capability assessments, which may address many unique
situations, does not constitute guidance on how to

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carry out such assessments. On the contrary, the fact that there are 25
different METs in 20 DEA field divisions making capability assessments
emphasizes the importance of and need for guidance, that is, established
general principles, standards, or criteria to which the field divisions can
refer.

With regard to our recommendation relating to the documentation of agency
capability assessments, DOJ stated that it accepts our recommendation and
will ask DEA to ensure that detailed field office assessments be documented
for DEA headquarters before committing funds to MET deployments. DOJ noted
that the crucial point is to determine the best use of federal resources in
addressing drug and violence problems around the country. DOJ stated that it
planned to ask DEA to review this matter, especially as it relates to the
MET Program, in the coming months. In our opinion, having clearer, more
detailed guidance for assessing local law enforcement agencies' capabilities
in the MET Program handbook together with more adequate documentation and
explanations of the basis for field assessments and decisions would provide
DEA headquarters officials with a sounder basis for making resource
decisions related to the deployment of METs across the United States.

Although DOJ accepted our recommendation, it stated that it was based
largely on the finding that headquarters program files, in 30 percent of the
MET deployments reviewed, did not contain documentation indicating that the
field divisions had assessed the capabilities of local law enforcement
agencies. While this is true, it is also important to emphasize that, as
discussed on page 30, many of the other 70 percent of the files that contain
documentation did not provide specific evidence or an explanation of how the
METs, based on their predeployment assessments, concluded that the local law
enforcement agencies were incapable of addressing the identified drug-
related violence problems in their communities.

DOJ also suggested that we could have made three changes in our methodology
to probe the documentation issue and determine more definitively whether DEA
erred in deploying METs to areas where local law enforcement agencies could
have addressed the drug and violence threat by themselves.

First, DOJ suggested that since DEA relies on its field managers and SACs to
determine local agencies? capabilities, we could have reviewed DEA field
division files to find and examine more detailed documentation on

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Page 42 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

this issue. The objectives of our review focused mainly on DEA headquarters?
overall management and oversight of the MET Program carried out by field
division METs and not on determining specifically whether DEA erred in
deploying METs to areas where local law enforcement agencies could have
addressed the drug and violence threat by themselves. In developing our
methodology, we considered reviewing DEA?s field office MET deployment
files. However, the head of DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section 17 informed us
that the section maintains all key documents pertinent to each deployment
for management purposes. Also, a significant constraint was that travel to a
number of different locations around the country, as compared with reviewing
all files in a central location, would have been costly and time- consuming.
In addition, the preliminary work we carried out at two field division
offices indicated that these field divisions generally did not have more
detailed documentation related to their actions to comply with MET Program
requirements and guidelines, including the required MET predeployment
assessments, than DEA headquarters.

DOJ also stated that DEA suggests that a field division?s notice to
headquarters that an assessment has been made and the field division SAC
concurs with the assessment is the key documentation needed at headquarters
for the capability assessment requirement. However, as discussed on pages
31- 32, the Comptroller General?s internal control standards require that
the documentation of significant events, which we believe the assessments of
local law enforcement agencies? capabilities are, should be complete and
accurate and facilitate tracing the transaction or event and related
information. Appropriate documentation can help ensure that management?s
directives are carried out. Therefore, in our opinion, without better
documentation than we found during our review, DEA headquarters management
has no assurance that the field division METs are helping only those
agencies with a legitimate need for DEA?s assistance and that the MET
Program is making the most effective use of limited DEA resources.

Second, DOJ stated that we could have sampled and compared deployment files
before and after the Mobile Enforcement Section was created (in July 1999)
to determine whether increased headquarters

17 In May 2001, DEA changed the name of this section to the Tactical
Enforcement Section. Because our work for this review was completed before
this change, our report refers to the Mobile Enforcement Section.

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oversight has led to an increase in detailed documentation of MET deployment
decisions. DOJ noted that our review of MET deployment files pertained
mostly to deployments initiated before DEA expanded its headquarters
oversight of the MET program in 1998, after the DEA Administrator reviewed
an internal evaluation. In our opinion, changing the sample would not have
changed the results because neither the May 1995 nor December 1998 MET
Program handbooks containing policies, requirements, and guidelines for
initiating and implementing deployments require that information relating to
the requesting agencies? capabilities be documented or included in the
predeployment assessment summaries requesting authorization and funding of
deployments. Thus, there is no reason to believe that increased headquarters
oversight to ensure that METs operate in accordance with program
requirements and guidelines would have led to an increase in detailed
documentation regarding assessments of agencies? capabilities.

Third, DOJ stated that in addition to approved MET deployments files, our
evaluation could have reviewed MET requests that were denied at the field or
headquarters level to help determine whether proper management decisions
were being made regarding the legitimacy of MET deployments. We considered
doing that when we were designing our review and developing our methodology.
However, our preliminary work at the time indicated that DEA did not
formally track denials. The head of DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section told us
when we were developing our methodology that headquarters did not routinely
collect and maintain complete information on denied MET deployment requests,
including the number of denials and the reasons for the denials. Also, our
preliminary work at two field division offices indicated that they did not
have documentation containing the reasons for all denied requests. In
addition, as discussed on page 26, while officials in five of the six field
divisions we visited during our review cited reasons that deployment
requests had been denied, none told us a request was denied because it was
determined that the requesting agency was capable of addressing the
identified drug and violence problem.

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 44 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Consistent with the MET Program?s nature and objectives as discussed in
chapter 1, the MET deployments we reviewed focused primarily on streetlevel
drug dealers and involved mostly local and regional investigations. In
addition, to investigate suspected drug violators, the techniques of
purchasing illegal drugs (referred to as drug buys) and using informants
were employed more frequently than most other investigative techniques. MET
investigations also sometimes led to other investigations of higherlevel
drug traffickers and their organizations.

Our review showed that investigations done as part of MET deployments
focused primarily on individuals suspected of street- level drug dealing,
with considerable attention also directed at drug trafficking organizations,
violent individuals involved in drug activities, and wholesale- level drug
suppliers. A wide range of different types of suspected drug violators were
investigated during MET deployments, including those in the categories of
gangs, drug transporters, drug importers, money launderers, drug
manufacturers, and national and international trafficking organizations.
Figure 5 shows, based on our review of a probability sample of DEA
headquarters files for 197 MET deployments completed as of June 30, 1999,
the estimated percentage of deployments in which different types of
suspected drug violators were investigated. Chapter 3: MET Deployments
Typically

Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers and Used Various Investigative
Techniques

MET Deployments Focused Primarily on Street- Level Drug Dealers

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 45 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 5: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30,
1999, Investigating Different Types of Suspected Drug Violators

Note: The types of drug violators overlap. For example, a drug organization
could include a gang, national drug trafficking organization, international
drug trafficking organization, as well as other types of organizations not
listed here such as a local or regional trafficking group.

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six DEA field divisions we
visited about the extent to which their deployments were directed at various
types of drug violators. Figure 6 summarizes their responses, which indicate
that the deployments among the six divisions focused primarily on street-
level drug dealers. This is consistent with the results of our file review
shown in figure 5 above.

87 65 64 62

44 33

13 11 9 8 8

0 10

20 30

40 50

60 70

80 90

100

Estimated percentage of deployments

Street- level drug dealers

Drug organizations Violent individuals

Wholesale- level drug suppliers

Drug transporters Gangs

Drug importers National drug trafficking

organizations Money launderers

Drug manufacturers International drug

trafficking organizations

Type of drug violator

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 46 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 6: Level of Drug Dealing Investigated During MET Deployments at Six
DEA Field Divisions

Source: GAO structured interviews of DEA field division officials.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six field divisions whether
their MET deployments had ever led to other investigations (referred to as
spin- off investigations) of higher- level drug traffickers. In addition, we
asked about certain aspects of their deployments that provide indications
that the deployments involved or led to investigations of higher- level
traffickers. Specifically, we asked whether (1) DEA?s Special Operations
Division (SOD) 1 was ever involved in any of the deployments, (2) any of the
deployments had ever been part of a major operation or multijurisdictional
drug enforcement effort coordinated by SOD or some other organization or
agency, and (3) the divisions? deployments ever

1 SOD implements an investigative approach and initiatives to support
domestic and foreign investigations of major drug traffickers and
trafficking organizations. This approach focuses on intercepting the
communications of major drug trafficking organizations to target the leaders
and dismantle their operations.

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 47 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

involved investigative efforts in locations other than the area of the
deployment. The officials? responses are summarized in figure 7.

Figure 7: Selected Aspects of MET Deployment Operations at Six DEA Field
Divisions

Source: GAO structured interviews of DEA field division officials.

As figure 7 shows, officials in five of the six divisions said that
deployments have led to some spin- off investigations of higher- level drug
traffickers and involved investigative efforts in other locations. In our
review of DEA headquarters files for the 197 MET deployments completed as of
June 30, 1999, we found that an estimated 14 percent of the files contained
documentation indicating that the deployment led to a spin- off
investigation. Our file review also showed that an estimated 30 percent of
the files contained documentation indicating that the deployment involved
investigative efforts in other locations.

We asked DEA headquarters for quantitative data on the extent that MET
deployments have led to investigations of higher- level drug traffickers. In
response to our request, a DEA headquarters official said this information
was not systematically maintained in an automated data base and would be
extremely difficult to track. However, according to DEA, it is not uncommon
for MET deployments to lead to more complex, long- term investigations, such
as Title III (wiretap and other electronic surveillance) investigations.
When this occurs, the deployment- related investigation is

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 48 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

usually transferred to another DEA enforcement group for additional
investigation.

DEA categorizes each investigation, also called a case, as either local,
regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according to the geographic
scope covered. 2 As shown in figure 8, the MET deployments conducted in
fiscal years 1995 through 2000 involved mostly local and regional
investigations of suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas
covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. Local cases were
the single largest category, making up about 50 percent of the total during
that period, followed by regional cases, which made up about 26 percent.
About 18 percent of the MET cases involved drug traffickers operating on a
broader scale within the United States, including on a national basis, and
about 6 percent involved traffickers operating internationally.

2 As defined by DEA, a local case involves a domestic target who operates
principally within a local geographic area less extensive than a regional
case; a regional case involves a domestic target who is criminally active
throughout the geographic region of the DEA office conducting the
investigation; a domestic case is an investigation of a target who is active
principally within the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign case
involves a target active principally outside the jurisdiction of the United
States; and an international case involves a target whose criminal
activities are both domestic and foreign. MET Deployments

Involved Mostly Local and Regional Drug Cases

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 49 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 8: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2000

a Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6- month period. Note: No foreign cases
were initiated. Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.
In addition, figure 8 does not include (1) one case initiated in fiscal year
1995 that DEA categorized as ?other? in the geographic scope data it
provided us and (2) one case initiated in fiscal year 2000 that was not
categorized according to its geographic scope.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data. 0

10 20

30 40

50 60

70 80

90 100

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Estimated percentage of deployments

Local/ regional Domestic International

Fiscal years

a

75 15

8 69

23 8

74 23

3 75

16 9

86 9 5

93 5

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically Investigated Street- Level Drug Dealers
and Used Various Investigative Techniques

Page 50 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

While the MET deployments we reviewed employed a variety of different
methods and techniques to investigate suspected drug violators, drug buys
and informants were used more frequently than most other investigative
techniques. Undercover operations, search warrants, and physical
surveillance were also frequently used. Figure 9 shows the estimated
percentage of the deployments that employed various investigative methods
and techniques based on our review of a probability sample of DEA
headquarters files for 197 deployments completed as of June 30, 1999.

Figure 9: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30,
1999, Using Various Investigative Methods and Techniques

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six DEA field divisions we
visited about the types of investigative methods and techniques used during
deployments. Their responses were consistent with the results of our file
review. Drug Buys and

Informants Used More Than Most Other Investigative Techniques

92 90 85

76 75 53

9

0 10

20 30

40 50

60 70

80 90

100

Estimated percentage of deployments

Drug buys Co

nfidential sources (i. e., informants)

Undercover operations Search warrants

Wiretaps Technical surveillance

(other than wiretaps) Physical surveillance

Investigative method/ technique

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 51 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The MET Program?s goal- to provide resources to assist local law enforcement
agencies in identifying, targeting, investigating, and disrupting or
dismantling drug trafficking gangs/ organizations that are responsible for
drug- related violence in local communities-- is consistent with DEA?s
overall strategic goal and Local Impact strategic objective as discussed in
chapter one. DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section collects data for a variety of
performance measures or indicators 1 to assess the results of individual MET
deployments as well as the overall MET Program. These performance measures,
which are a mix of quantitative and qualitative data, are intended to
measure program output 2 (activity) and outcome 3 (results). DEA uses some
of the performance measures to report internally and externally on program
results. However, the measures have problems and limitations related
primarily to the inconsistency in data collection which could impair their
value in assessing the extent to which the MET Program is achieving its goal
and contributing to DEA?s overall strategic goals and objectives.

In an effort to assess the level of success in achieving the MET Program?s
goal, the Mobile Enforcement Section collects data for specified performance
measures from the individual METs. Figure 10 provides basic information on
these performance measures.

1 A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National
Drug Control Strategy, means data, variables, and events used to track
progress toward performance targets or the desired end state to be achieved.
The term is largely interchangeable with performance indicators, which as
defined by OMB for purposes of the GPRA, means a particular value or
characteristic used to measure output or outcome and is associated with
performance goals.

2 Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of the GPRA, are the products and
services produced by a program or process and delivered to customers,
whether internal or external. Outputs are important for measuring internal
work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate the extent to which
progress has occurred toward the program?s mission or what impact a program
has had on a particular goal or objective.

3 Outcomes, as defined by DOJ for purposes of the GPRA, means an event,
occurrence, or condition that indicates progress toward achievement of the
mission of the program. Outcomes can be measured in terms of the extent to
which they are achieved, or they can reflect the quality of service delivery
or customer satisfaction. Intermediate outcomes are expected to lead to the
desired ends but are not in themselves ends. In many programs, a progression
or sequence of outcomes usually occurs. End outcomes are the derived end or
ultimate results that the agency hopes to achieve through its program
activities. These results are directly related to the agency?s mission.
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations DEA Uses a Variety of Performance
Measures

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 52 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 10: MET Program Performance Measures

Source: GAO analysis.

Qualitative Quantitative

Output Outcome

Performance Measures

Disruption or dismantlement of targeted drug trafficking gang( s) or
organization( s) (determined at the completion of the deployment)

Primary target( s) arrested Number of arrests

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 53 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 54 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 55 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

a The Management Initiative Tracking System report, which the DEA
Administrator submits quarterly to the Attorney General, contains
information on several major initiatives of interest to the Attorney
General, including the MET Program. b In some instances, the 6- month pre-
and 6- month postdeployment violent crime statistics are included under
these headings in the 6- month postdeployment reviews without any additional
information. METs collect, and the Mobile

Enforcement Section compiles, data based on drugs and assets seized

METs collect from requesting local law enforcement agencies, and the Mobile
Enforcement Section compiles selected violent crime statistics

METs primarily obtain analysis and opinions of requesting local law
enforcement agencies

Significance of results difficult to interpret, e. g., (universe of
available illegal drugs unknown)

No standardized collection methods, including

geographic area of statistics may not match deployment area and variances in
local law enforcement agencies' data collection capabilities

Difficulty in determining the specific MET contribution

Data reported without appropriate qualifiers

Subjective No standardized collection methods Difficulty in determining the
specific MET contribution METs report in the biweekly reports,

monthly statistical analysis of deployment reports, and summary/ completion
of deployment teletype

Mobile Enforcement Section reports overall data in the monthly statistical
report and on each ongoing and completed deployment to DEA's Administrator
in the monthly activity report

DEA reports to (1) the Attorney General in its quarterly Management
Initiative Tracking System report, (2) Congress in support of its annual
budgets and performance plans, and (3) the public

METs report in the immediate and 6- month postdeployment reviews

DEA reports to (1) the Attorney General in its quarterly Management
Initiative Tracking System report, (2) Congress in support of its annual
budgets and performance plans, and (3) the public

METs report in the immediate and 6- month postdeployment reviews

How data are collected How data are reported Measurement issues

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 56 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As the figure shows, the performance measures include quantitative data,
such as the number of arrests or quantity of drugs seized, and qualitative
data, such as the stability of the deployment target area following a MET
deployment. While most of the quantitative measures are output oriented, all
of the qualitative measures are outcome oriented. Both output and outcome
measures are helpful for assessing overall program performance, although
outcome measures are generally stronger indicators of whether a program is
achieving its goals and objectives.

The Mobile Enforcement Section periodically summarizes and reports the
results of the MET Program. As indicated in Figure 10, the results
information relating to some of the performance measures is provided to DEA
top management and the Attorney General. DEA also reports some MET results
to Congress, in support of its annual budgets and performance plans, and to
the public. Program results reported externally by DEA are summarized below.

 As shown in appendix V, DEA reported to the Attorney General, as well as
Congress and the public, that the MET deployments resulted in 11,283 arrests
and the seizure of about 6,000 pounds of drugs (i. e., cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana) and about $16.9 million in assets
(in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars) from fiscal years 1995 through 2000.

 DEA reported to the Attorney General and the public that as of September
30, 2000, the MET Program?s aggregate effect on violent crime nationwide was
a 16- percent reduction in murders, a 14- percent reduction in robberies,
and a 15- percent reduction in assaults.

In addition to the results related to the above performance measures, DEA
reports to the Attorney General the number of recently completed deployments
and includes examples of successful MET deployments. Examples of the MET?s
positive effect on local communities are also included in DEA?s annual
performance plans. Appendix VI contains summaries of examples of MET
deployments that DEA has reported internally and externally as being
successful. DEA Reports Results

for Some MET Performance Measures

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 57 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As figure 10 shows and as discussed below, the various performance measures
on which DEA collects data and reports internally and externally have
problems and limitations.

According to DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section Chief, and consistent with the
goal of the MET Program, disruption or dismantlement of the targeted drug
trafficking gangs or organizations is a principal performance measure.
Recently, the section began to systematically collect data on the total
number of targeted drug trafficking gangs/ organizations that were disrupted
or dismantled for each completed deployment and report this information to
DEA top management. 4

With regard to data collection, although METs are to use the definitions for
disruption and dismantlement that were developed by DOJ, 5 no written
guidance or specific criteria has been provided for applying the definitions
and determining if and when a targeted drug trafficking gang/ organization
has actually been disrupted or dismantled. The Mobile Enforcement Section
Chief said that, in making this determination, DEA field divisions consider
various factors, with the key determining factor being whether the hierarchy
of the organization (usually the primary targets) was arrested and is no
longer capable of running the organization. The absence of written guidance
or specific criteria could lead to inconsistent judgements and
determinations among the field divisions and, thus, the collection of
inconsistent information.

In addition, the Mobile Enforcement Section does not compile information to
measure the MET Program?s actual performance against its intended
performance. Specifically, while drug trafficking gangs and organizations
are to be identified and targeted by the METs at the beginning of and

4 In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review, DEA
issued a revised MET Program handbook. The new handbook requires that a
summary of each completed deployment include a statement regarding the total
number of drug trafficking organizations that were either disrupted or
dismantled.

5 Disruption occurs when the normal effective operation of an identified
gang/ organization is significantly impacted so that it is temporarily
unable to conduct criminal operations for a significant period of time.
Dismantlement occurs when the identified gang/ organization is deprived of
vital content or force and is no longer capable of operating as a
coordinated criminal enterprise. Performance

Measures Have Problems and Limitations

Disruption or Dismantlement of Drug Trafficking Gangs/ Organizations

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 58 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

during deployments, the Section does not compile either this information or
information on the number of targeted gangs and organizations determined to
be disrupted and dismantled at the end of the deployments to make a
comparison. 6 Without such a comparison, it would be difficult to monitor
and evaluate the overall progress of the MET Program in achieving its goal
of disrupting and dismantling the targeted drug trafficking gangs and
organizations.

According to the Mobile Enforcement Section Chief, another principal
performance measure is whether the primary individuals targeted by the MET
deployments were arrested. 7 However, similar to the disruption/
dismantlement measure, the Mobile Enforcement Section does not compile
information to measure the MET Program?s actual performance against its
intended performance. While it is consistent with the MET Program goal to
compile and report the number of primary targets arrested, the significance
of such information as a measure of success is difficult to interpret
without comparing it to the total number of primary individuals targeted
initially and during a deployment. 8 Moreover, it would be difficult to
monitor and evaluate the MET Program?s overall progress in achieving its
objective of apprehending such individuals. For instance, if four of five
primary targets were arrested the deployment may have done well in achieving
its goals. However, if 4 of 10 primary targets were arrested, the success of
the deployment might be viewed quite differently. Furthermore, as discussed
below, the use of arrest data as a performance measure has other
limitations.

Another performance measure used by the Mobile Enforcement Section is the
total number of arrests, which includes the primary targets arrested
discussed above, made during the MET deployments. Arrest data alone are
difficult to interpret in terms of their significance. In this regard, DEA
stated in its fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan that there is
currently no analytical process in place to determine the value of a

6 A MET deployment can target more than one drug trafficking gang/
organization and can add or delete targets based on their investigations. 7
Depending on the circumstances, a primary target could include an
organization leader, a member, or a street- level dealer. 8 A MET deployment
can target more than one individual and can add or delete individual targets
based on its investigation. Primary Targets Arrested

Number of Arrests

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 59 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

specific arrest. For example, the current process does not distinguish the
arrest of a street- level dealer from an organization leader. Moreover, the
use of total arrest data as a performance measure can be misleading without
information on the extent to which arrests lead to prosecutions and
convictions.

The Mobile Enforcement Section also uses the amount of drugs and assets
seized during MET deployments as a performance measure. However, as with the
arrest data, these results are difficult to interpret in terms of their
significance. While the amount of drugs and assets seized may be important
output- oriented measures for MET deployments, they do not measure the
extent to which the deployments may have reduced the availability of drugs
and the assets of drug dealers in the target areas. In this regard, DEA?s
fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan states that the actual impact of
drug seizure amounts cannot be determined because the universe of available
illegal drugs cannot be measured. It further states that there is no way to
ascertain if seized drugs have been replaced by lesser, equal, or greater
quantities.

A quantitative outcome measure that DEA uses to determine the results of MET
deployments is the difference between violent crime statistics 6 months
before and 6 months after each deployment. This measure is directly linked
as an outcome to the MET Program?s goal of reducing the level of drug
trafficking and related violence. The statistical data for this measure are
to be collected and provided to DEA by the requesting local law enforcement
agencies in the deployment target areas.

The Mobile Enforcement Section has instructed the METs to obtain statistics
on specific violent crimes (i. e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault)
in the targeted geographic areas for 6 months before and after each
deployment. However, our review of DEA?s deployment files showed that the
statistics obtained from local law enforcement agencies by some METs varied
in that they included additional types of crimes, different geographic areas
than where the deployments were focused, and different time periods. In
explaining the data variances among METs, DEA indicated that it must deal
with the fact that local law enforcement agencies vary in their capabilities
to collect and provide this data. For example, some have automated systems
while other may keep statistics on index cards. Amount of Drug and Asset

Seizures Pre- Versus Postdeployment Violent Crime Statistics

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 60 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Notwithstanding, these inconsistencies in the collection of violent crime
statistics among the METs raise concerns about the validity and usefulness
of the data depending on how they are used and reported. For example,
reporting violent crime statistics for an entire city rather than the
specific geographic area where the MET deployment took place could distort
program results. Indeed, reporting for a geographic area substantially
larger than the area of the MET deployment could result in underestimating
MET results, depending on the circumstances.

To illustrate, as reported in one of the 6- month postdeployment reviews
included in our sample of deployment files, the Chicago MET assisted a local
police department in containing the spreading gang and drug activity in
three targeted areas within the city where the MET deployed. The review
provided violent crime statistics for both the city and the three targeted
areas. The citywide statistics showed that robberies and homicides increased
8 and 23 percent, respectively. On the other hand, robberies and homicides
in the three targeted areas of the deployment decreased 59 and 100 percent,
respectively. Thus, if the review had only provided the citywide statistics,
the MET results would have been understated.

Despite these inconsistencies, DEA periodically reports internally and
externally on the MET Program?s effect on violent crime without appropriate
qualifiers. For example, DEA's September 30, 2000, Management Initiative
Tracking Report to the Attorney General did not indicate that the violent
crime data included geographic areas other than where METs were deployed.
Also, such reporting does not consider the effect of other factors on the
crime rate, such as the local economy and anti- crime social programs.

Further, recognizing DEA?s dependency on local law enforcement agencies and
the associated problems, the usefulness of pre- and postdeployment violent
crime statistics as a measure of MET performance could be enhanced if
similar statistics were collected for adjacent areas or other areas with
demographic characteristics and past crime statistics similar to the
geographic areas covered by the MET deployments. Such statistics could allow
changes in violent crime rates to be considered in relation to any general
trends (such as recent overall drops in violent crime rates) in adjacent or
comparable areas that were not the focus of a MET deployment.

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 61 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

In addition to the above performance measures, the MET Program handbook
requires the METs to conduct two postdeployment reviews- one immediately
after completion and another 6 months later-- to assess the effectiveness of
each MET deployment. The handbook requires that each review address five
areas: (1) reduction in drug sales and/ or reduced visible drug sales; (2)
stability of the target area, including any noticeable reduction in violent
crime; (3) community reaction and involvement; (4) an overall assessment of
the deployment; and (5) media coverage. While the MET handbook requires that
the postdeployment reviews include information on media coverage, the Mobile
Enforcement Section Chief stated that media coverage is not used as a
performance measure for the MET Program.

With regard to the other four outcome- oriented areas, the Mobile
Enforcement Section has not prescribed standardized data collection methods
for obtaining and reporting information. Rather, as stated in the handbook,
the METs are to rely primarily on, and report the opinions and analyses of,
the cognizant local law enforcement agencies. While opinions and perceptions
can be part of a valid qualitative measurement program, without standardized
guidance as to specific criteria or factors to consider in developing these
judgements, interpretation of the results can be problematic. Also, without
a standard, structured method, such as a survey instrument, for collecting
such qualitative information, the results are inconsistent and not
comparable. For example, with regard to reduction in drug sales, one MET
reported that crack cocaine arrests had increased substantially following
the MET deployment; but, the MET did not relate or link this information to
any change in drug sales. In contrast, another MET reported that the
availability of certain illegal drugs in a deployment area had decreased
significantly and that drug traffickers were attempting to conceal their
illegal activities. The MET noted that the local police had received fewer
calls concerning complaints about narcotic or violent drugrelated activity.
Appendix VII contains these and other examples of how METs reported
information in postdeployment reviews.

DEA?s current measures for determining the results of MET deployments and
the overall MET Program have several problems and limitations. For example,
as a result of the lack of standard data collection methods and written
guidance, DEA has no assurance that all METs are consistently using the same
criteria or factors for determining whether they have disrupted or
dismantled their targeted gangs and organizations. Also, DEA cannot measure
actual against intended performance because it does not compile data to
compare the number of primary individuals, gangs, and Postdeployment
Information

on Specific Areas Conclusions

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 62 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

organizations targeted at the beginning of and during deployments to the
number actually arrested, disrupted, and dismantled. In addition, DEA?s
attempts to measure the effect of MET deployments by comparing pre- and
postdeployment violent crime statistics has been affected by (1) variances
in the data provided to DEA, including some agencies providing data for a
larger area than that targeted by the MET deployment; and (2) the lack of
violent crime statistics for adjacent and other areas with similar
demographic characteristics, to be used for purposes of comparison.
Moreover, because the postdeployment information used to assess MET
effectiveness is not collected and reported in a standardized, structured
way, its usefulness is limited. As a result of these various problems and
limitations, DEA management has no way of accurately assessing the effect of
individual METs or the effectiveness of the MET Program as a whole.

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to (1)
establish and ensure the use of standardized data collection methods for
obtaining information on the performance measures DEA uses to assess the
results of the individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program; (2)
compile data and compare the number of primary individuals, gangs, and
organizations targeted at the beginning of and during deployments to the
number arrested, disrupted, and dismantled; (3) collect and report
consistent violent crime statistics that cover comparable crime types and
time periods and relate to (a) the specific geographic areas where the MET
deployments were focused and (b) to the extent feasible and practical,
pertinent adjacent and comparable areas; and (4) use more structured data
collection methods, such as a survey instrument, to collect qualitative data
on the four outcome- oriented areas included in the postdeployment reviews
that can be used to assess the results of individual MET deployments and be
aggregated to evaluate the overall MET Program.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ indicated agreement
with certain aspects of our recommendations in this chapter and disagreement
with other aspects.

DOJ disagreed with our recommendation on standardized data collection
methods. DOJ stated that DEA?s MET Program now utilizes such methods for
obtaining information on performance measures used to assess the results of
individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program. DOJ specifically
cited the collection of disruption and dismantlement Recommendations for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 63 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

information and violent crime statistics. While DEA recently began
collecting this information for each deployment, there is no assurance that
METs are collecting it in a standard way. Therefore, we are retaining our
recommendation.

With regard to the collection of disruption and dismantlement information,
DOJ stated that the criteria used in determining the disruption or
dismantlement of MET targeted drug trafficking gangs or organizations are
the DOJ definitions for disruption or dismantlement. We believe the
development and use of definitions for disruption and dismantlement is a
good first step. However, these definitions are broad and, as indicated on
page 57, no written guidance or specific criteria have been provided to
assist the DEA field divisions in applying the definitions and determining
if and when a targeted drug trafficking organization has actually been
disrupted or dismantled. Without such guidance or criteria, there is little
assurance that judgments and determinations relating to disruption and
dismantlement are being made in as standard and consistent a manner as
possible. In this regard, DEA's 2001 and 2002 annual performance plans
indicate that DEA staff are developing criteria to determine whether or not
enforcement activities meet the threshold of either disruption or
dismantlement as defined by DOJ.

With regard to the collection of violent crime statistics, DOJ noted that
the MET guidelines require, at a minimum, that the (pre- and postdeployment)
assessment( s) include violent crime statistics for murder, robbery, and
aggravated assault, which (according to the requesting agency) are derived
from the area most impacted by the targeted organizations. DOJ further noted
that, as indicated in our report, DEA instructed the METs to obtain
statistics on these crimes (in the targeted geographic areas for the 6
months before and after each MET deployment). However, as discussed below,
the METs are not collecting and reporting consistent violent crime
statistics. Thus, while DEA has promulgated standard guidelines, the field
divisions are not consistently following them.

DOJ disagreed with our recommendation regarding compiling data on the number
of primary individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the beginning
of and during deployments and comparing them with the number arrested,
disrupted, and dismantled. DOJ stated that a MET investigation may evolve,
or redirect its focus several times, making it very difficult to measure the
success of a deployment strictly by comparing the number of primary
individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the onset of a deployment
against the number of arrests at the conclusion. We recognize that targets
identified at the onset of a deployment can change

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 64 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

during the deployment. We are not suggesting that DEA measure the success of
the METs only by comparing the number of primary targets identified at the
onset of a deployment against the number of arrests, disruptions, and
dismantlements at the conclusion. That is why our recommendation states that
DEA should compile data on the number of primary targets identified during,
as well as at the beginning of, deployments and compare them with the number
actually arrested, disrupted, and dismantled. Further, we recognize that
changes in targets complicate the comparison, although DEA has a basis for
tracking changes in targets in that, as DOJ notes, DEA requires that field
divisions inform DEA headquarters of target changes in their biweekly
activity reports. Nevertheless, without comparative information, taking into
account appropriate target changes, DEA cannot measure actual against
intended performance and determine to what extent the MET Program is
achieving its goal of disrupting and dismantling targeted drug trafficking
gangs and organizations. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation on
this matter.

In commenting on this recommendation, DOJ also noted that some assessment of
a MET?s success is subjective and can only be measured on a case- by- case
basis when the quality of life in the community is studied. DOJ further
stated that it is extremely important to recognize that the number of
arrests at the conclusion of a deployment does not adequately measure, by
itself, the success of the deployment. We agree with these two statements.
In fact, on pages 58- 59, we discuss the limitations of arrest data as a
measure of the success of a deployment. Moreover, our report indicates that
DEA uses a variety of qualitative and quantitative performance measures to
assess the individual MET deployments as well as the overall MET Program,
and we agree with this approach.

DOJ disagreed with the first part of our recommendation regarding the
collection and reporting of consistent violent crime statistics. DOJ stated
that as long as the pre- and postdeployment crime data are based on
consistent geographic areas, DEA will continue to use the best available
data, ensuring that the data collection areas are the same within each
deployment. DOJ acknowledged that in many cases, a local law enforcement
agency provides crime data for a geographic area that is larger than DEA?s
MET deployment area. Due to differences in the data collection systems used
by local law enforcement agencies, DEA often takes the best available data
rather than the exact data for the specific deployment area. DOJ believes
that it is unreasonable to expect local law enforcement agencies to manually
count statistics in order to satisfy DEA?s data collection standards for the
MET Program.

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 65 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

While we agree that local law enforcement agencies should not be expected to
expend an unreasonable amount of time and resources obtaining data for DEA,
it is not clear how much effort would be involved in some cases. All things
being equal, we continue to believe that the data should, as often as
feasible, relate to the specific geographic areas where the METs were
focused because, as discussed on page 60, the inconsistencies in the
collection of violent crime statistics raise concern about the validity and
usefulness of the data as a measure of MET deployment results. Therefore, we
are retaining our recommendation.

To the extent it is not already doing so, DEA needs to make sure it is
making a reasonable, concerted effort to obtain the required data. For
example, DEA could emphasize in its promotion of the MET program, and in its
initial contact with local law enforcement agencies requesting MET
deployments, the need to have pre- and postdeployment violent crime
statistics for the specific targeted area of the MET deployments as well as
for the specified time period and crime types. To the extent that DEA is
unsuccessful in obtaining violent crime statistics for the specific
deployment area, it needs to ensure that only data for the specific
geographic areas where the METs were focused, specified time periods, and
specified crime types are aggregated and reported for purposes of measuring
the performance of the overall MET Program.

DOJ agreed with the second part of our recommendation regarding violent
crime statistics, stating that it would ask DEA to collect and report
pertinent adjacent and comparable statistics whenever feasible and
practical. However, it noted that collecting both adjacent and comparable
statistics would be difficult in many areas where METs are deployed. We
recognize that DEA may not be able to obtain these data for all deployments,
but we believe that, to the extent feasible, DEA should make a concerted
effort to collect these statistics for all of its MET deployments.

Finally, DOJ agreed with our recommendation regarding the use of more
structured data collection methods to collect qualitative data from local
law enforcement agencies on the four outcome- oriented areas included in the
MET postdeployment reviews. DOJ stated that the current system of capturing
qualitative data from police departments allows DEA to grasp the sentiment
and reaction of the departments and is within the parameters of the MET
guidelines (namely, obtaining the analysis or opinions of police department
officials as to the impact or success of the deployments). However, DOJ
noted that given the difficulty in aggregating the results of the
deployments to evaluate the overall MET Program, DEA

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 66 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

will appraise creating a more structured data collection instrument that
will still be able to gather data from a diversity of communities.

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 67 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days) Atlanta Columbus, GA 6/ 15/ 95 10/ 1/ 95 108

Bowden, GA 6/ 15/ 95 10/ 15/ 95 122 Monroe, NC 10/ 3/ 95 1/ 5/ 96 94
Chattanooga, TN 10/ 15/ 95 12/ 30/ 95 76 Atlanta, GA (lead) 1/ 16/ 96 8/ 12/
96 209 Spartanburg, SC 9/ 9/ 96 12/ 20/ 96 102 Greenville, SC 9/ 9/ 96 2/ 5/
97 149 Marietta, GA 1/ 6/ 97 6/ 1/ 97 146 Macon, GA 7/ 7/ 97 12/ 3/ 97 149
Kinston, NC 7/ 8/ 97 12/ 30/ 97 175 Glynn County, GA 3/ 16/ 98 8/ 11/ 98 148
Durham, NC 9/ 14/ 98 1/ 27/ 99 135 Griffin, GA 3/ 23/ 99 7/ 14/ 99 113
Dalton, GA 3/ 23/ 99 7/ 27/ 99 126 Clarksville, TN 8/ 23/ 99 2/ 11/ 00 172
Dillon, SC 3/ 27/ 00 7/ 21/ 00 116

Boston Worcester, MA (# 1) 5/ 15/ 95 8/ 7/ 95 84 Lynn, MA 5/ 15/ 95 11/ 1/
96 536 Revere, MA 12/ 15/ 95 3/ 28/ 97 469 Boston, MA (# 1) 4/ 1/ 96 3/ 12/
97 345 Worcester, MA (# 2) 5/ 22/ 96 1/ 7/ 97 230 Boston, MA (# 2) 8/ 16/ 96
3/ 28/ 97 224 Webster, MA 5/ 14/ 97 9/ 23/ 97 132 Pawtucket, RI 11/ 15/ 97
8/ 13/ 98 271 Springfield, MA 6/ 30/ 98 1/ 19/ 99 203 Lawrence, MA 9/ 25/ 98
5/ 1/ 99 218 Everett, MA 3/ 3/ 99 10/ 15/ 99 226 Fitchburg, MA 5/ 17/ 99 12/
31/ 99 228 Southbridge, MA 1/ 4/ 00 4/ 14/ 00 101 Bridgeport, CT 4/ 25/ 00
6/ 23/ 00 59

Chicago Fort Wayne, IN 7/ 1/ 95 9/ 1/ 95 62 Racine, WI 2/ 1/ 96 7/ 29/ 96
179 Kankakee, IL 6/ 15/ 96 1/ 9/ 97 208 North Chicago, IL 10/ 1/ 96 4/ 16/
97 197 Milwaukee, WI 4/ 21/ 97 10/ 4/ 97 166 Minneapolis, MN 9/ 2/ 97 11/
20/ 97 79 Aurora, IL 1/ 2/ 98 8/ 19/ 98 229 Beloit, WI 9/ 21/ 98 12/ 2/ 98
72 Chicago Heights, IL 1/ 19/ 99 6/ 30/ 99 162

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 68 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days) Chicago (cont.) Indianapolis, IN 8/ 2/ 99 11/ 19/ 99 109

Bloomington, IL 1/ 18/ 00 4/ 13/ 00 86 Chicago, IL 6/ 5/ 00 9/ 22/ 00 109

Dallas Arlington, TX 5/ 10/ 95 7/ 6/ 95 57 Wichita Falls, TX 8/ 28/ 95 11/
16/ 95 80 Tyler, TX 12/ 5/ 95 6/ 21/ 96 199 Ft Worth, TX 3/ 6/ 96 10/ 26/ 96
234 Athens, TX 4/ 1/ 96 8/ 22/ 96 143 Greenville, TX 11/ 1/ 96 3/ 6/ 97 125
Paris, TX 11/ 1/ 96 4/ 15/ 97 165 Terrell, TX 5/ 5/ 97 11/ 18/ 97 197 Mt.
Pleasant, TX 6/ 23/ 97 12/ 17/ 97 177 Henderson, TX 10/ 27/ 97 5/ 12/ 98 197
Corsicana, TX 1/ 15/ 98 9/ 22/ 98 250 Fort Worth, TX 5/ 27/ 98 9/ 14/ 99 475
Brownwood, TX 10/ 26/ 98 3/ 25/ 99 150 Sherman, TX 4/ 20/ 99 11/ 16/ 99 210
Texarkana, TX 1/ 24/ 00 7/ 28/ 00 186

Denver Denver, CO (# 1) 4/ 1/ 95 7/ 1/ 95 91 Lakewood, CO 11/ 1/ 95 5/ 21/
96 202 Albuquerque, NM 11/ 1/ 95 12/ 1/ 96 396 Durango, CO 12/ 1/ 95 9/ 25/
96 299 Denver, CO (# 2) 2/ 16/ 96 6/ 15/ 96 120 Clayton, NM 7/ 1/ 96 9/ 1/
96 62 Salt Lake City, UT 7/ 22/ 96 11/ 14/ 96 115 Denver, CO (# 3) 11/ 27/
96 12/ 29/ 97 397 Edgewater, CO 12/ 13/ 96 2/ 28/ 97 77 Park County (Cody),
WY 7/ 13/ 97 9/ 16/ 97 65 Denver, CO (# 4) 10/ 1/ 97 4/ 1/ 98 182 Avon, CO
3/ 1/ 98 6/ 15/ 98 106 Eagle/ Garfield Counties, CO

3/ 1/ 98 9/ 15/ 98 198 Pueblo, CO 8/ 10/ 98 11/ 2/ 98 84 La Plata County, CO
2/ 1/ 99 7/ 14/ 99 163 Longmont, CO 7/ 12/ 99 12/ 30/ 99 171 Midvale, UT 4/
10/ 00 6/ 7/ 00 58

Detroit Pontiac, MI 4/ 12/ 95 5/ 10/ 95 28 Ypsilanti, MI 7/ 17/ 95 10/ 2/ 95
77 Lincoln Park/ Melvindale, MI

11/ 14/ 95 8/ 23/ 96 283 Toledo, OH 7/ 29/ 96 12/ 31/ 96 155

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 69 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days)

Inkster, MI 2/ 10/ 97 6/ 30/ 97 140 E Cleveland, OH 7/ 28/ 97 10/ 26/ 97 90

Detroit (cont.) Louisville, KY 7/ 30/ 97 9/ 27/ 97 59 Muskegon, MI 8/ 20/ 97
10/ 14/ 97 55 Jefferson County, OH 2/ 8/ 98 5/ 20/ 98 101 Benton Harbor, MI
6/ 15/ 98 9/ 22/ 98 99 Village of Lincoln Heights, OH

10/ 1/ 98 1/ 21/ 99 112 Warren, OH 2/ 1/ 99 5/ 5/ 99 93 Youngstown, OH 2/ 1/
99 5/ 5/ 99 93 Mount Clemens, MI 7/ 6/ 99 11/ 3/ 99 120 Flint, MI 1/ 26/ 00
6/ 15/ 00 141

El Paso El Paso County, TX 11/ 17/ 97 3/ 27/ 98 130 Odessa, TX 4/ 26/ 98 7/
21/ 98 86 El Reno, OK 9/ 10/ 98 11/ 27/ 98 78 Midland, TX 1/ 19/ 99 6/ 29/
99 161 Portales, NM 8/ 24/ 99 11/ 30/ 99 98 Las Vegas, NM 1/ 18/ 00 5/ 30/
00 133

Houston Galveston, TX 5/ 15/ 95 12/ 1/ 95 200 Atlanta, GA (assist) 1/ 16/ 96
8/ 12/ 96 209 Orange County, TX 6/ 10/ 96 11/ 21/ 97 529 Port Arthur, TX 6/
10/ 96 11/ 21/ 97 529 East Harris County, TX 9/ 4/ 97 3/ 27/ 99 569
Freeport, TX 6/ 2/ 98 3/ 31/ 99 302 Kingsville, TX 3/ 1/ 99 10/ 7/ 99 220
Corpus Christi, TX 5/ 14/ 99 9/ 2/ 99 111 Victoria, TX 11/ 15/ 99 4/ 6/ 00
143 Tomball, TX 5/ 1/ 00 9/ 14/ 00 136

Los Angeles San Luis Obispo, CA (# 1) 5/ 22/ 95 7/ 31/ 95 70 Oxnard/
Ventura, CA 9/ 9/ 95 11/ 19/ 95 71 Gardena, CA 11/ 20/ 95 1/ 12/ 96 53
Century, Los Angeles, CA 2/ 21/ 96 7/ 29/ 96 159 Rampart, Los Angeles, CA

4/ 13/ 96 7/ 29/ 96 107 Antelope Valley, CA 9/ 10/ 96 12/ 13/ 96 94 El
Monte, CA 2/ 18/ 97 4/ 18/ 97 59 Santa Maria, CA 5/ 5/ 97 7/ 3/ 97 59

?Quad Cities? (4 cities), L. A. Metro Area, CA

8/ 4/ 97 10/ 3/ 97 60 Coachella Valley, CA 10/ 20/ 97 12/ 23/ 97 64
Wilshire, Los Angeles, CA

1/ 17/ 98 5/ 22/ 98 125

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 70 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days)

Reno, NV 6/ 29/ 98 8/ 29/ 98 61 Pico Rivera, CA 10/ 19/ 98 2/ 5/ 99 109
Devonshire (North Hills), CA

10/ 26/ 98 2/ 26/ 99 123 Hawthorne, CA 3/ 15/ 99 7/ 16/ 99 123 San Luis
Obispo, CA (# 2) 4/ 19/ 99 7/ 19/ 99 91

Los Angeles (cont.) Carson City, NV 8/ 29/ 99 11/ 23/ 99 86 Ontario, CA 9/
1/ 99 11/ 23/ 99 83 Hawaii County, HI 2/ 23/ 00 5/ 7/ 00 74 Inglewood, CA 3/
6/ 00 8/ 6/ 00 153

Miami Fort Pierce/ St Lucie, FL 7/ 18/ 95 8/ 28/ 95 41 Collier County, FL
11/ 25/ 95 3/ 10/ 97 471 Opa Locka, FL 2/ 5/ 96 1/ 22/ 98 717 Homestead, FL
3/ 24/ 97 8/ 1/ 97 130 Hendry County, FL 5/ 28/ 97 11/ 12/ 97 168 Sarasota,
FL 8/ 18/ 97 1/ 5/ 98 140 South Miami, FL 3/ 1/ 98 5/ 19/ 98 79 Florida
City, FL 3/ 6/ 98 9/ 6/ 98 184 Hardee County, FL 3/ 8/ 98 11/ 13/ 98 250
North Miami Beach, FL 9/ 1/ 98 12/ 3/ 98 93 Riviera Beach, FL 10/ 5/ 98 3/
10/ 99 156 Franklin County, FL 1/ 19/ 99 5/ 12/ 99 113 Fort Lauderdale, FL
4/ 26/ 99 12/ 31/ 99 249 Key West, FL 6/ 21/ 99 12/ 9/ 99 171 Fernandina
Beach, FL 9/ 20/ 99 2/ 23/ 00 156 Delray/ Boca Raton, FL 2/ 22/ 00 7/ 12/ 00
141 Fort Pierce, FL 4/ 17/ 00 5/ 7/ 00 20 Highland County, FL 6/ 12/ 00 8/
25/ 00 74

New Orleans Selma, AL 5/ 12/ 95 7/ 29/ 95 78 Pritchard, AL 7/ 20/ 95 3/ 1/
96 225 Jackson, MS (# 1) 1/ 18/ 96 12/ 6/ 96 323 Alexandria, LA (# 1) 8/ 1/
96 7/ 10/ 97 343 Alabaster, AL 1/ 6/ 97 9/ 10/ 97 247 Pine Bluff, AR 1/ 13/
97 7/ 15/ 97 183 Donaldsonville, LA 6/ 16/ 97 2/ 10/ 98 239 Hancock County,
MS 10/ 14/ 97 3/ 18/ 98 155 Enterprise, AL 12/ 1/ 97 5/ 20/ 98 170 Concordia
Parish, LA 4/ 13/ 98 9/ 2/ 98 142 Gadsden, AL 5/ 1/ 98 11/ 4/ 98 187
Slidell, LA 9/ 9/ 98 4/ 21/ 99 224 Hammond, LA 10/ 1/ 98 4/ 7/ 99 188

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 71 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days)

New Orleans, LA 10/ 5/ 98 12/ 31/ 98 87 Anniston, AL 1/ 4/ 99 9/ 8/ 99 247
Jackson, MS (# 2) 3/ 15/ 99 7/ 2/ 99 109 Brent /Fairfield, AL 6/ 14/ 99 12/
3/ 99 172 Greenville, MS 8/ 9/ 99 11/ 4/ 99 87 Alexandria, LA (# 2) 2/ 1/ 00
4/ 7/ 00 66

New Orleans (cont.) Hattiesburg, MS 2/ 1/ 00 6/ 2/ 00 122 Green /Tuscaloosa
Counties, AL

6/ 12/ 00 8/ 25/ 00 74

New York Niagara Falls, NY 6/ 21/ 95 11/ 2/ 95 134 Southampton, NY 8/ 22/ 95
10/ 14/ 95 53 Albany, NY 10/ 26/ 95 8/ 1/ 96 280 Schenectady, NY 6/ 15/ 96
9/ 30/ 97 472 Troy, NY 11/ 21/ 96 9/ 1/ 97 284 Amsterdam, NY 10/ 21/ 97 4/
20/ 98 181 Utica, NY 5/ 29/ 98 9/ 22/ 98 116 Monticello, NY 7/ 1/ 98 10/ 26/
98 117 Watertown, NY 11/ 15/ 98 2/ 25/ 99 102 Poughkeepsie, NY 11/ 24/ 98 8/
27/ 99 276 Kingston, NY 4/ 6/ 99 9/ 13/ 99 160 Mount Vernon, NY 10/ 29/ 99
6/ 7/ 00 222 Newburgh, NY 11/ 1/ 99 5/ 12/ 00 193 Liberty, NY 5/ 22/ 00 9/
25/ 00 126

Newark Asbury Park, NJ 9/ 27/ 95 5/ 21/ 96 237 Camden, NJ 11/ 29/ 95 5/ 21/
96 174 Paterson, NJ 3/ 11/ 96 2/ 28/ 97 354 Newark, NJ 2/ 13/ 97 9/ 10/ 97
209 Atlantic City, NJ 7/ 14/ 97 7/ 31/ 97 17 Lakewood, NJ 8/ 18/ 97 12/ 9/
97 113 Elizabeth, NJ 2/ 2/ 98 7/ 30/ 98 178 Passaic, NJ 9/ 1/ 98 1/ 17/ 99
138 Plainfield, NJ 2/ 24/ 99 9/ 24/ 99 212 Pleasantville, NJ 10/ 4/ 99 2/
15/ 00 134 Trenton, NJ 3/ 28/ 00 6/ 28/ 00 92

Philadelphia Bristol, PA 6/ 8/ 95 10/ 4/ 95 118 Chester City, PA 5/ 21/ 96
9/ 1/ 96 103 Clairton, PA 6/ 3/ 96 11/ 26/ 96 176 Easton, PA 9/ 3/ 96 5/ 8/
97 247 Norristown, PA 6/ 24/ 97 6/ 18/ 98 359 Wilmington, DE 2/ 9/ 98 5/ 13/
98 93 Philadelphia, PA 6/ 5/ 98 11/ 1/ 98 149

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 72 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days)

Reading, PA 12/ 21/ 98 5/ 27/ 99 157 Allentown, PA 6/ 14/ 99 10/ 8/ 99 116
York, PA 10/ 18/ 99 2/ 25/ 00 130 Pottstown, PA 4/ 26/ 00 8/ 25/ 00 121

Phoenix Eloy/ Pinal, AZ 11/ 12/ 95 7/ 29/ 96 260 Bullhead City, AZ 2/ 1/ 96
7/ 29/ 96 179 Prescott, AZ 8/ 14/ 96 11/ 26/ 96 104

Phoenix (cont.) Lake Havasu, AZ 11/ 19/ 96 5/ 20/ 97 182 Sierra Vista, AZ 6/
18/ 97 2/ 13/ 98 240 Apache County, AZ 3/ 10/ 98 7/ 9/ 98 121 Coconino
County, AZ 7/ 28/ 98 3/ 16/ 99 231 Navajo County, AZ 4/ 1/ 99 7/ 30/ 99 120
Payson, AZ 10/ 18/ 99 4/ 20/ 00 185

San Diego Oceanside, CA 8/ 4/ 95 10/ 15/ 95 72 El Cajon, CA 4/ 10/ 96 10/
10/ 96 183 Chula Vista, CA 6/ 3/ 96 10/ 26/ 96 145 National City, CA 10/ 1/
96 9/ 10/ 97 344 Vista, CA 6/ 2/ 97 3/ 5/ 98 276 San Diego (Logan Heights),
CA

4/ 1/ 98 12/ 4/ 98 247 San Diego (Mid- City), CA 4/ 1/ 98 12/ 4/ 98 247 La
Mesa , CA 1/ 4/ 99 3/ 3/ 99 58 Escondido, CA 4/ 26/ 99 2/ 18/ 00 298 San
Marcos, CA 3/ 6/ 00 8/ 17/ 00 164

San Francisco Richmond, CA 10/ 16/ 95 1/ 8/ 96 84 Vallejo, CA 3/ 1/ 96 6/
21/ 96 112 Seaside/ Marina, CA 7/ 29/ 96 11/ 14/ 96 108 Merced, CA 1/ 21/ 97
4/ 3/ 97 72 Modesto, CA 4/ 28/ 97 8/ 27/ 97 121 Oakland, CA 10/ 27/ 97 2/
27/ 98 123 W. Contra Costa County, CA

5/ 14/ 98 8/ 29/ 98 107 Eastern Kern County, CA 9/ 29/ 98 2/ 4/ 99 128 Yuba
County, CA 3/ 8/ 99 7/ 2/ 99 116 San Jose, CA 8/ 23/ 99 12/ 10/ 99 109
Stanislaus County, CA 1/ 17/ 00 5/ 5/ 00 109 Oakland, CA 5/ 15/ 00 7/ 15/ 00
61 Woodland, CA 7/ 17/ 00 9/ 8/ 00 53

Seattle Puyallup/ Tacoma, WA 7/ 7/ 95 10/ 1/ 95 86 Woodburn, OR 4/ 1/ 96 6/
20/ 96 80 Lewiston, ID 7/ 8/ 96 9/ 24/ 96 78

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 73 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date
Duration (in days)

Madras, OR 11/ 10/ 96 1/ 31/ 97 82 Klamath Falls, OR 3/ 1/ 97 6/ 30/ 97 121
Washington County, OR 7/ 27/ 97 8/ 23/ 97 27 Keizer, OR 11/ 9/ 97 1/ 30/ 98
82 Portland, OR 3/ 15/ 98 6/ 3/ 98 80 Everett, WA 6/ 22/ 98 1/ 8/ 99 200
Chehalis, WA 2/ 1/ 99 6/ 2/ 99 121 Thurston /Yelm, WA 6/ 7/ 99 9/ 28/ 99 113
Seattle, WA 6/ 23/ 99 1/ 16/ 00 207

Seattle (cont.) Lakewood, WA 2/ 28/ 00 6/ 30/ 00 123

St Louis Sikeston, MO 7/ 5/ 95 8/ 5/ 95 31 Fountain Park, MO 10/ 16/ 95 12/
15/ 95 60 East St Louis, IL 3/ 4/ 96 9/ 27/ 96 207 Alton, IL 11/ 1/ 96 4/
11/ 97 161 Lexington, NE 3/ 31/ 97 5/ 2/ 97 32 St. Charles County, MO 11/ 3/
97 1/ 30/ 98 88 Audrain County, MO 3/ 2/ 98 5/ 29/ 98 88 Yankton Sioux
Reservation, SD

7/ 6/ 98 7/ 23/ 98 17 Crystal City, MO 8/ 17/ 98 10/ 23/ 98 67 Berkley, MO
12/ 8/ 98 3/ 26/ 99 108 Hannibal, MO 4/ 6/ 99 5/ 20/ 99 44 Madison, IL 7/ 6/
99 2/ 25/ 00 234 Fort Dodge, IA 4/ 17/ 00 6/ 28/ 00 72

Washington, DC Manassas City, VA 5/ 1/ 95 6/ 9/ 95 39 Chincoteague, VA 6/
26/ 95 8/ 10/ 95 45 Fredericksburg, VA 9/ 12/ 95 10/ 6/ 95 24 Richmond, VA
11/ 29/ 95 10/ 11/ 96 317 Washington, DC 10/ 21/ 96 4/ 3/ 97 164 Baltimore,
MD 4/ 28/ 97 9/ 26/ 97 151 Annapolis, MD 11/ 3/ 97 3/ 3/ 98 120 Petersburg,
VA 4/ 27/ 98 8/ 14/ 98 109 Hampton, VA 10/ 5/ 98 6/ 30/ 99 268 Charles Town,
WV 5/ 3/ 99 8/ 20/ 99 109 Hagerstown, MD 10/ 13/ 99 3/ 23/ 00 162 Prince
William County, VA

5/ 1/ 00 8/ 31/ 00 122 Note: An asterisk (*) marks each of the 197 MET
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999. We reviewed DEA headquarters
files for a representative, national sample of these deployments.

a The Atlanta, GA, deployment was led by DEA?s Atlanta Field Division MET,
and the Houston Field Division MET assisted. DEA counts this as two
deployments. For our review of DEA?s MET deployment files, we considered the
deployment of the two METs as one deployment.

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 74 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and Reviewing Completed DEA MET
Deployment Files

Page 75 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As discussed in chapter 1, to address several of our objectives, we reviewed
a probability sample of DEA headquarters files 1 for 83 randomly selected
MET deployments. 2 We obtained from DEA a listing of all 197 MET deployments
completed by June 30, 1999. 3 Because we needed to review DEA?s 6- month
postdeployment reports, we used June 30, 1999, as our cutoff date. To
recognize the potential effect of program policy and procedural changes on
the implementation of deployments, we divided the 197 deployments into 4
strata depending on whether they started before January 1, 1997, or later,
and whether they lasted up to or more than 6 months. 4 We then randomly
selected a total of 83 deployments from the 4 separate strata, to assure
coverage of deployments of varying length and age. Table 4 provides details
of the strata samples and populations.

Table 4: File Review Strata for Completed MET Deployments Initiation date/
duration of deployment Population size Sample size

Prior to Jan. 1997/ 6 months or less 55 15 Prior to Jan. 1997/ longer than 6
months 34 17 Jan. 1997 or later/ 6 months or less 82 31 Jan. 1997 or later/
longer than 6 months 26 20

Total 197 83

Source: GAO.

Our probability sample allows us to make estimates to the population of all
197 deployments. Because we used random sampling, the results

1 We reviewed DEA headquarters files rather than field division files
because the head of DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section, a headquarters unit
which oversees the MET Program, advised us that the section maintains all
key documents pertinent to each deployment for management purposes.

2 A probability sample is drawn using statistical, random selection methods
that assure that each member of the population has a known, positive
probability of being selected. This approach allows us to make inferences
about the entire population.

3 For our file review, we considered the deployment of both DEA?s Atlanta
and Houston Field Division METs to Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996, to
August 12, 1996, as one deployment. DEA counts this as two deployments.

4 We consulted with the head of DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Section regarding
the appropriate date for stratifying MET deployments to recognize
significant policy and procedural changes that could have affected how
deployments were implemented over time. He advised us that January 1, 1997,
was an appropriate date. Regarding the length of deployments, we used 6
months to distinguish between short and long. While MET Program guidelines
state that deployments generally should last 2 to 4 months, DEA advised us
that the average length of a deployment at the time was 163 days. Appendix
II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and

Reviewing Completed DEA MET Deployment Files

Appendix II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and Reviewing Completed DEA MET
Deployment Files

Page 76 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

obtained are subject to some uncertainty or sampling error. The sampling
error can be expressed in terms of confidence levels and ranges. The
confidence level indicates the degree of confidence that can be placed in
the estimates derived from the sample. The range is a pair of values derived
from the sample data, an upper and lower limit, between which the actual
population values might be found. Our samples were designed so that the
sampling error around the estimates of percentages would not be greater than
10 percentage points at the 95- percent confidence level. Thus, if all cases
in our population had been examined, the chances are 95 out of 100 that the
results obtained would be included in the range formed by adding or
subtracting no more than 10 percentage points from the sample estimates. In
this report, all sampling errors fall within this range, unless otherwise
noted.

In addition to the reported sampling errors, the practical difficulties of
conducting any file review may introduce other types of errors, commonly
referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how two
reviewers interpret a question, or in the ways in which two DEA officials
provided documentation, can introduce unwanted variability into the results.
We took steps to minimize such nonsampling errors. We developed our data
collection instrument (DCI) in consultation with DEA officials, and we
conducted collective training and pretesting with our reviewers. During the
review process, a second reviewer was involved in assuring consistency and
accuracy for all key questions on the DCI. When reviewers did not find
required documentation in the deployment files, we provided DEA the
opportunity to obtain the documents from its filing system and provide them
for our review; and we considered these documents as part of the files. We
verified all data entry of the DCIs as well as all the programming used in
the analyses.

Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET Assessments of Local Law Enforcement
Agencies? Capabilities

Page 77 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following four examples are from DEA headquarters files for the 197 MET
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999 that were included in our review.
The examples show how four METs, in their requests for authorization and
funding, summarized the results of their predeployment assessments of
requesting local law enforcement agencies? capabilities and the diversity of
evidence and support provided. Our analysis is included at the end of each
example.

?The [name deleted] Police Department is 357 persons strong, with a dozen
officers assigned to narcotics to date. The [name deleted] Police Department
has addressed the drug epidemic at a street level but would now like to
target mid and upper level organizations in select violent neighborhoods . .
. . [name deleted] Police Department would like MET to assist them in
targeting some of these areas of friction where rival drug dealers and
street gangs continue an open air drug market, and where gunfire and
homicides permeate surrounding streets and area residents.?

Based on our analysis, this example does not cite specific evidence that the
identified drug and violence problem is beyond the police department?s
immediate capabilities. There is no explanation of why the 12 police
officers assigned to narcotics cannot, without MET assistance, successfully
target and investigate the drug trafficking organizations that are of
concern. The request for authorization and funding does not cite possible
reasons such as an insufficient amount of money available to buy drugs, a
lack of needed technical equipment, officers? lack of necessary
investigative or foreign language skills, or the officers being incapable
because they are known by the drug traffickers.

?The [name #1 deleted] Department consists of eighty- four sworn officers.
[name #1 deleted] has a four- man Special Investigations Unit that
investigates vice related crimes including drug complaints. [name #1
deleted] has members of the department assigned to the [name #2 deleted]
Violent Crimes Task Force, [name #3 deleted] Law Enforcement Task Force and
[name #4 deleted] Task Force. The [name #3 deleted] Law Enforcement Task
Force consists of approximately eight local municipality police departments
and the [name #3 deleted] Sheriff?s Department. This task force directs its
efforts to high profile criminal activity including drug distribution
investigations. The [name #2 deleted] . . . operates a Violent Crimes Task
Force (VCTF). This task force consists of ten to twelve local police
officers. The VCTF investigates violent crimes Appendix III: Summary
Examples of MET

Assessments of Local Law Enforcement Agencies? Capabilities

Example 1 Analysis

Example 2

Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET Assessments of Local Law Enforcement
Agencies? Capabilities

Page 78 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

in [name #3 deleted] and [name #5 deleted] counties of northeast [name #6
deleted]. The [name #5 deleted] Sheriff?s Department has a drug
investigation unit that works independently of any local law enforcement
task forces. There is no local area task force that concentrates its efforts
solely on drug trafficking investigations.?

In this example, it is not clear why the police department?s four- man unit
and the various task forces in the area cannot resolve the drug and violence
problem DEA was asked to address. As in the first example, the request for
authorization and funding does not explain specifically why the problem is
beyond the immediate capabilities of the local law enforcement resources.
Possible limiting factors, such as a lack of money available to buy drugs
and the unavailability of needed technical equipment, are not addressed.

?The [name #1 deleted] police force has 130 full time police officers with
four officers assigned to work narcotics full time. In addition to the full
time narcotics officers there is a drug task force comprised of [name #2
deleted] state troopers and officers from neighboring communities to include
one officer from [name #1 deleted]. The [name #1 deleted] narcotic officers
and the drug task force officers are well known to the owners of these bars,
making it difficult and dangerous for undercover operations.?

This example does cite a specific reason as to why the local police
department and drug task force officers are not considered capable of
resolving the identified drug and violence problems, i. e., that there is a
high risk that the narcotics officers would be recognized if they were to
conduct undercover operations. However, the example does not put the reason
into context by explaining why the investigative technique of undercover
operations must be carried out to successfully address the drug and violent
crime problems, and it does not discuss the viability of, and the police
department?s and task force?s capabilities relating to, other techniques and
approaches.

?The [name #1 deleted] County Sheriff?s Department has approximately 170
officers with 18 assigned to their narcotics division. The drug unit is
further divided into small enforcement groups assigned to cover particular
areas within county jurisdiction. The Sheriff?s Department has identified
the communities of [name #2 deleted], East [name #3 deleted], and [name
Analysis

Example 3 Analysis

Example 4

Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET Assessments of Local Law Enforcement
Agencies? Capabilities

Page 79 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

#4 deleted] as the most active and difficult areas for the department to
police . . . in large part due to relentless daily crack cocaine
distribution activity and related violent crime conducted openly on the
streets . . . . The Sheriff?s department has deemed drug law enforcement in
[name #2 deleted] to be virtually impossible citing a lack of manpower, a
small budget to purchase evidence, and an inability to recruit reliable
confidential informants to work in the area. Drug trafficking in [name #2
deleted] continues with minimal police presence, resulting in increased
community concern over the apparent lawlessness that exists. . . . The [name
#5 deleted] crack cocaine and cocaine distribution organization operates
within the East [name #3 deleted] and the [name #4 deleted] areas of [name
#1 deleted] County. Continuous sheriff department enforcement efforts
against [name #5 deleted] have met with negative results due to similar
manpower problems and the inability to infiltrate this organization . . . .
The [name #3 deleted] Police Department consists of 70 officers with two
detectives assigned to a drug unit to cover approximately 13 square miles.
Due to the small size of the drug unit and department budgetary constraints,
narcotics enforcement has been limited to investigation of juveniles and
juvenile gang activity . . . . The [name #3 deleted] Police Department has
also been unsuccessful infiltrating the [name #6 deleted] group due to a
lack of undercover police personnel not already known to [name #3 deleted]
drug distributors. The [name #3 deleted] Police Department also does not
have the funds necessary to purchase evidence and secure informants to
effectively investigate the activities of this organization. Virtually all
narcotic enforcement has been limited to assistance provided by outside law
enforcement agencies . . .?

This example cites several specific reasons why local law enforcement
agencies cannot successfully address the drug and violence problems
identified. For example, the request for deployment authorization and
funding points out the sheriff department?s lack of manpower, insufficient
money to buy drugs, and inability to recruit informants in the area. The
request also cites the negative results of previous sheriff department
enforcement efforts against the identified crack cocaine and cocaine
trafficking organization. In addition, the request explains that the local
police department is also incapable of successfully addressing the
identified problem: its narcotics enforcement activities have been limited
to investigating juveniles; it was unable to infiltrate the identified
trafficking organization; and it did not have sufficient funds to buy drugs
and pay informants. Analysis

Appendix IV: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated, Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2000

Page 80 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

1997 1998 1999 2000 Total Scope of case #%#%#%#%#%

Local 8 7 54.4 69 48.6 35 62.5 25 58.1 289 49.6 Regional 3

2 20.0 38 26.8 13 23.2 15 34.9 154 26.4 Domestic 3

6 22.5 23 16.2 5 8.9 2 4.7 104 17.8 Foreign 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0. 0 0 0.
0 International 5 3. 1 12 8.5 3 5.4 0 0.0 34 5. 8 Other/ unknown 0 0. 0 0 0.
0 0 0. 0 1 2. 3 2 0. 3

Total 1 6 0

100.0 142 100.1 56 100.0 43 100.0 583 99.9

a Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6- month period ending September 30, 1995.
Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding. Source:
Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix IV: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated, Fiscal Years 1995
Through 2000

Appendix V: MET Program Arrests and Seizures Data, Fiscal Years 1995 Through
2000

Page 81 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Selected data 1995- 96 a 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Deployments completed 79 46 55 55 35 270 Arrests 2, 577 2,157 2,250 1,965
2,334 11,283 Cocaine seized (pounds) 95 747 342 333 195 1,712
Methamphetamine seized (pounds)

68 115 199 86 135 603 Heroin seized (pounds) 3 29 18 17 36 103 Marijuana
seized (pounds) 159 953 646 998 672 3,428 Assets seized (millions) b $3.8
$2.7 $3.9 $3.1 $3.4 $16.9 a Fiscal year 1995- 96 data are for the 18- month
period ending September 30, 1996.

b The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant fiscal year
2001 dollars. Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix V: MET Program Arrests and Seizures Data, Fiscal Years 1995 Through
2000

Appendix VI: Summary Examples of DEA- Reported Successful MET Deployments

Page 82 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following are summaries of examples of successful MET deployments
reported internally and externally by DEA.

 In its fiscal year 2001 congressional budget submission, DEA reported that
from July 1998 until March 1999, the Phoenix Field Office MET worked closely
with the Northern Arizona Street Crimes Task Force in targeting two drug
trafficking organizations. One organization was responsible for supplying
street- level dealers with multiple- pound quantities of methamphetamine.
The other, a polydrug trafficking group, had a reputation for extreme
violence; some of its members had criminal histories, which included armed
robberies, home invasions, assault, sex crimes, and child abuse. Using
confidential sources, the MET was able to successfully infiltrate these
organizations and severely disrupt their operations. The 9- month deployment
resulted in the seizure of 7 operational and 3 dismantled methamphetamine
labs, 44 grams of heroin, 22 pounds of marijuana, 500 dosage units of LSD,
40 weapons, 18 motor vehicles, and $16,292 in U. S. currency. In addition,
the MET secured 86 arrests, including the arrest of 2 primary targets.

 In its fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, DEA reported that in June
1998, the New York MET initiated a deployment at the request of the Utica
Chief of Police who indicated that Utica was experiencing a surge in
drugrelated criminal activity attributable to turf battles between competing
drug organizations, drug- related robberies, and retaliation shootings. The
MET, in conjunction with the Utica Police Department, identified two
significant drug trafficking organizations operating in the Utica area.
Utilizing cooperating sources and undercover operations, MET and Utica
agents successfully infiltrated the targeted organizations. This cooperative
investigative strategy led to the indictment of 25 defendants by a federal
grand jury. The indictments included the primary deployment targets and
their identified source of supply. On September 22, 1998, the New York MET--
working in conjunction with their local, state and federal counterparts--
conducted a round- up which concluded its 3- month deployment. Nineteen of
the 25 indicted subjects were arrested and the targeted organizations were
dismantled.

 In its September 1999 quarterly Management Initiative Tracking Report, DEA
reported that from April 1999 until July 1999, the Los Angeles MET deployed
to a county that was experiencing an epidemic of violent criminal conduct
perpetrated by gang members. The Los Angeles MET infiltrated the
methamphetamine trafficking activities of the deployment targets by
utilizing: (1) observation posts in areas of high pedestrian traffic where
gangs sell narcotics in the open; (2) undercover operations in an Appendix
VI: Summary Examples of

DEA- Reported Successful MET Deployments

Appendix VI: Summary Examples of DEA- Reported Successful MET Deployments

Page 83 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

attempt to eliminate sources of supply; and (3) search warrants to eliminate
locations where narcotics were being produced and stored. During the course
of this 3- month deployment, the following seizures were made: 144.38 grams
of powder cocaine; 2,268.5 grams of methamphetamine; 3.55 grams of heroin;
3,907.57 grams of marijuana; 1,330 marijuana plants; 35 weapons; and $23,014
in U. S. currency. Arrests took place throughout the investigation, and
there was a limited round- up operation. A total of 51 suspects, including
the 3 primary targets of the investigation, were arrested.

Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 84 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following are examples from DEA headquarters files for the 197 MET
deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, that were included in our review.
The examples show the inconsistencies in the type and amount of data
reported by the METs, in their 6- month postdeployment reviews, from
requesting local law enforcement agencies. Our analysis is included at the
beginning of each review area.

Based on our analysis, the first two examples do not relate or link the
provided information to any change in drug sales and/ or reduced visible
drug sales. In contrast, the third example provides information indicating
that there was a reduction in visible sales.

?Sgt. [name #1 deleted] ([ name #2 deleted] Police Department) stated that
crack cocaine arrests have increased substantially for the six- month period
following termination of the MET deployment. This is attributable to the
success of the MET deployment. Patrol officers assigned to the designated
area are taking a more aggressive posture in the enforcement of state
narcotics laws. This aggressive position is most evident in the statistics
regarding unlawful possession of a controlled substance.?

?The reputation for the [name deleted] as being a principal in the
distribution of methamphetamine and cocaine has been eliminated.?

?According to the [name deleted] Police Department, the availability of
cocaine, methamphetamine and other controlled substances has decreased
significantly. During the MET deployment, drug sales were conducted with
little fear of police intervention. [Name deleted] Police Department
officials report that traffickers now attempt to conceal their illegal
activity and have been hampered by increasing police pressure. Open narcotic
activity in the area has been almost completely eliminated. Patrol Officers
in this community no longer respond to as many drug related incident calls
as in the past. The department receives fewer calls concerning complaints
about narcotic or violent drug related activity.?

Based on our analysis, the first example does not relate or link the
provided information to the stability of the targeted area and any
noticeable difference in violent crime. The second example while containing
a statement that there has been a difference in violent crime, does not
provide any supporting information. In contrast, the third example provides
supporting information that there was a noticeable difference in violent
crime. Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment

Information Reported for Four Areas Reduction in Drug Sales or Reduced
Visible Drug Sales

Example 1 Example 2 Example 3

Stability of Targeted Area or Noticeable Difference in Violent Crime

Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 85 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

?It should be noted that during the MET deployment to [name deleted] there
was a homicide committed in the community. As a result of undercover
purchases which were made by DEA agents, homicide detectives were able to
bring in suspects and uncooperative witnesses for questioning based on
arrest warrants obtained from MET undercover operations.?

?Chief [name deleted] reported that there has been a decrease in street
crime associated with drug trafficking in the target area since the
deployment.?

?Information provided by the [name deleted] PD narcotics unit disclosed that
there has been a reduction in narcotics activity within the targeted area.
There has also been a reduction in threats against citizens and violent
related calls. A review of the statistical data provided by the [name
deleted] PD crime analysis unit revealed the following:? [pre- and
postdeployment violent crime statistics provided].

Based on our analysis, the first two examples do not cite any information
pertaining to community reaction and involvement. In contrast, example 3
provides information about community involvement while example 4 provides
information about community reactions.

?Since the arrests of members of the [name #1 deleted] and [name #2 deleted]
organizations, activity typically attributed to those organizations (i. e.:
narcotics trafficking, assaults and citizen harassment) have been greatly
reduced. According to the [name #3 deleted] PD detectives, life in the city
of [name #3 deleted] is of better quality. Patrol officers who worked the
downtown [name #3 deleted] area appreciated the efforts of MET 2.?

?Since the arrest of the high level organizations members, activity
typically attributed to the group (i. e., narcotics trafficking, assaults
and citizen harassment) have been greatly reduced. Suspected narcotics
traffickers believe that their distribution areas continue to be surveilled
by MET- 2. According to a confidential source, the crack cocaine in the
targeted area is either fake or of very poor quality. The source confirmed
reports by the [name deleted] PD officers that narcotics activity is ?almost
non- existent?.?

?Chief [name #1 deleted] advised that since the deployment the [name #2
deleted] PD has joined a program with local churches to attempt to reduce
crime and revitalize crime laden areas. Chief [name #1 deleted] stated that
Example 1

Example 2 Example 3

Community Reaction and Involvement

Example 1 Example 2 Example 3

Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 86 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

the police department has also become involved in the ?Weed and Seed?
Program.?

?Community reaction was positive, mostly stemming from local newspaper
stories. There was no attempt made by the police department to gauge local
reaction or to establish any new programs as a result of the MET operation.?

Based on our analysis, the first example provides some statistics and the
opinion of a police official as to the state of the community after the MET.
However, there is no supporting trend analysis of the statistics or evidence
of a cause/ effect relationship between the MET deployment and the trends in
violent crime. Moreover, the official's statement does not demonstrate how
the community is noticeably difference and how the MET contributed to making
the difference. The last two examples are statements of opinion without any
supporting evidence and analysis.

?Listed below are the statistics furnished by the [name #1 deleted] Police
Department?s Crime Analysis Section. . . . . Sgt. [name #2 deleted] stated
that there is a noticeable difference in the community and that very few of
the violent drug dealers are on the streets of [name #1 deleted].?

?It is apparent that MET- 2?s deployment was not only successful but greatly
appreciated by the [name #1 deleted] Police Department. [Name #1 deleted] PD
Chief [name #2 deleted} has expressed his appreciation in writing to DEA
Administrator [name #3 deleted].?

?The [name deleted] deployment was not only successful, but was also greatly
appreciated by the [name deleted] PD.? Example 4

Agency Assessment Example 1 Example 2 Example 3

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 87 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 88 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 24. Now on p. 14. Now on p. 32.

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 89 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 74. Now on p. 74. Now on pp. 5- 6.

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 90 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 26.

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 91 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 59. Now on p. 57.

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 92 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 93 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

See comment 1.

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 94 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 95 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following is GAO's comment on DOJ's letter of June 14, 2001. 1. For
clarification purposes, we revised the introductory portion of our

third recommendation in Chapter 4 as follows: "( 3) collect and report
consistent violent crime statistics that cover comparable crime types and
time periods and relate to (a) the specific geographic areas ? and (b)?."
(See pp. 9 and 62 of this report.) GAO Comment

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Page 96 GAO- 01- 482 DEA?s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Laurie E. Ekstrand (202) 512- 8777 Daniel C. Harris (202) 512- 8777

In addition to the persons named above, the following persons made key
contributions to this report: Ronald G. Viereck, Katrina R. Moss, Lemuel N.
Jackson, Roosevelt R. Burns, Lawrence T. Kinch, Barry J. Seltser, Michael P.
Dino, Michael H. Little, Katherine M. Raheb, Jena Y. Sinkfield, and Ann H.
Finley. Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments GAO Contacts Acknowledgments

(186774)

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