    Army Training: Improvements Are Needed in 5-Ton Truck Driver
    Training and Supervision (11-APR-01, GAO-01-436).

    Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of
    Army truck driver training. Fort Leonard Wood, which trains about
    90 percent of truck drivers, is especially affected by the
    instructor shortage. The end result is that student drivers are
    not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when
    they graduate. If formal schools had enough instructors on-hand,
    they would presumably be able to teach the entire instruction
    program. The student imbalance between the schools at Fort
    Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss creates an ineffective use of
    resources. If the annual student load were more equally
    distributed between the two schools, student graduates from Fort
    Leonard Wood might receive more complete training. The formal
    schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls
    for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no
    training is provided in how to pull equipment.	Similarly,
    students are not being trained to drive under different weather
    and surface conditions. Because annual check rides and
    sustainment are not always being performed, unsafe driving habits
    may go undetected. Although performing and recording check rides
    and sustainment may be time-consuming, these procedures can save
    lives. The Army Safety Center's accident database could be used
    to identify trends that may show the need for greater training
    emphasis in certain driving maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the
    database could assist school officials, instructors, and
    supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or mentoring
    drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all
    fields of information contained in the database were complete.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-436
        ACCNO:   A00807
        TITLE:   Army Training: Improvements Are Needed in 5-Ton Truck
                 Driver Training and Supervision
         DATE:   04/11/2001
      SUBJECT:   Accident prevention
    	     Military training
    	     Traffic accidents
    	     Military land vehicles
    	     Data bases
    	     Motor vehicle safety
    	     Human resources utilization
    	     M939 Truck

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    GAO-01-436

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    United States General Accounting Office

    GAO

    April 2001 ARMY TRAINING Improvements Are Needed in 5- Ton Truck Driver
    Training and Supervision

    GAO- 01- 436

    Page i GAO- 01- 436 Army Training Letter 1

    Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21

    Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 23

    Tables

    Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve Programs
    Satisfied With Training 10

    Figures

    Figure 1: Three M939 series Trucks 3 Figure 2: Number of Authorized,
    Assigned, and On- hand

    Instructors at Fort Leonard Wood, January- September 2000 6

    Figure 3: On- hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned Instructors at
    Three Schools, January- September 2000 8

    Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal Year 2000 9

    Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit Restriction
    13

    Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident Reports, 1988- 99
    17 Contents

    Page 1 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    April 11, 2001 The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd The Honorable Joseph I.
    Lieberman United States Senate

    The Honorable Rosa L. Delauro House of Representatives

    In April 1997, a 5- ton M939 Army truck was involved in a fatal accident in
    which two reservists died. The Army has over 30,000 of these trucks, which
    are used extensively to carry personnel and pull equipment. You asked us to
    report on the M939's accident history and to assess the training and
    supervision received by its drivers. We broke your request into two issues.
    The first dealing with the accident history and any inherent mechanical/
    design defects in the truck itself. The second dealing with issues involving
    the safe handling of the truck– the training and supervision of the
    truck's drivers. In April 1999, we reported on the M939's accident history
    and mechanical soundness. 1 For this second report, we (1) evaluated the
    capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck driver training programs to fully train
    drivers, (2) determined whether oversight procedures and processes for these
    drivers are being followed, and (3) determined whether and how the Army uses
    accident data to improve training, supervision, and safety.

    The 5- ton truck driver training programs we reviewed do not graduate
    drivers that are fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program and
    for some tasks they may be required to perform. The main reasons for these
    shortcomings are instructor shortages, limited environmental conditions
    (lack of snow, ice, steep or rocky terrain, etc.) at the training sites, and
    certain mission- related driving skills not being taught. There is also an
    imbalance between the two formal truck driver training schools: the larger
    one is understaffed to teach the number of students there, while

    1 Military Safety: Army M939 5- Ton Truck Accident History and Planned
    Modifications

    (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 82, Apr. 9, 1999).

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

    Results in Brief

    Page 2 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    the other one has smaller classes, conducts fewer classes per year, and
    maintains a lower student- teacher ratio. In addition, some communication
    problems hinder the flow of information to instructors, students,
    supervisors, and licensed drivers.

    Some supervisory procedures and processes designed to ensure that 5- ton
    trucks are operated safely are not being performed or documented as
    required. In particular, required annual “check rides” and
    “sustainment

    training” are either not properly performed or recorded. We reviewed
    over 450 driver records and found that more than three- quarters of them did
    not contain a required entry indicating that the driver had received an
    annual check ride and/ or sustainment training as stipulated in Army
    regulations.

    The Army Safety Center maintains an accident database that has already
    proven useful in developing some policies aimed at improving the safe
    operation of M939 trucks. We analyzed M939 accident data from 1988 through
    1999 and found trends that we believe could be used to improve driving
    safety and to better focus training on problem areas. But the database is
    not being periodically analyzed for these purposes, and opportunities are
    thus being missed. Also, some accident reports have missing information,
    thus limiting the usefulness of the database for some analytical processes
    using these fields.

    We are making recommendations aimed at improving the quality of truck driver
    training, increasing compliance with Army regulations, and increasing the
    safety of M939 truck driver operations. The Department of Defense concurred
    with all our recommendations.

    Page 3 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    The Army has around 97,000 “medium tactical wheeled vehicles”
    (about 57,000 5- ton trucks and 41,000 2- 1/ 2- ton trucks) in its fleet.
    The M939 accounts for more than half its 5- ton trucks. The truck is used to
    carry personnel or pull equipment under all weather and road conditions,
    including rain, snow, ice, unpaved roads, sand, and mud (see fig. 1).

    Figure 1: Three M939 Series Trucks

    Source: Shane G. Deemer.

    Background

    Page 4 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    The active Army uses formal and informal programs to train 5- ton truck
    drivers. 2 The formal program is aimed at military personnel whose official
    primary occupation will be “88M Motor Transport Operator”- or
    truck driver. The program lasts 6 weeks and is taught in schools at Fort
    Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Fort Bliss, Texas. Fort Leonard Wood trains
    about 90 percent of all 88M students. Fort Bliss for the most part trains
    the

    “overflow” of students that Fort Leonard Wood cannot
    accommodate. The formal instruction program calls for about 1 week in the
    classroom and 5 weeks of hands- on training. Students who complete the
    program do not immediately receive a license to drive a 5- ton truck; they
    are licensed at their next duty station after undergoing additional training
    and testing there. The Army Transportation Center and School at Fort Eustis,
    Virginia, is responsible for the content of the instruction program used by
    the formal training schools. It aligns under the Army Training and Doctrine
    Command at Ft. Monroe, Virginia.

    According to Army officials, informal programs are taught at installations
    or units that need occasional 3 truck drivers but are not authorized any or
    enough 88M drivers to handle their needs. Occasional drivers do not drive
    trucks as their primary occupation; they do so on a part- time or as- needed
    basis. Informal programs are usually 40 to 120 hours long and combine
    classroom and driving time. Graduates are not automatically licensed and
    must usually meet additional driving and testing requirements by their
    units. Occasional drivers receive the same license as 88M drivers and,
    accordingly, may be required to perform the same driving maneuvers.

    The Army Reserve trains both Reserve and National Guard 88M drivers using a
    two- part program that contains the same instructional material as the
    formal program. The first part (81 hours) is conducted at the soldier's home
    station during weekend drills. The second part (120 hours) is usually
    conducted at a Reserve training center during a 2- week active duty session.
    Like active Army truck drivers, program graduates must undergo additional
    training and testing by their units before being licensed.

    2 We define formal programs as resident training programs taught in a
    school- house setting; and informal programs as those conducted by
    individual Army units at many different installations.

    3 We define an occasional driver as a driver licensed to operate a 5- ton
    truck but not possessing the military occupation specialty designator or 88M
    – Motor Transport Operator.

    Page 5 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Graduates of the Army's truck driver training programs are not skilled
    enough to safely handle 5- ton trucks in some situations for which they
    should have received training. This is because of instructor shortages and
    limited training conditions. Graduates are either partially trained or
    untrained in some skills found in the instruction program. In addition, the
    schools do not teach driving skills that are essential to performing the 5-
    ton truck's primary mission.

    One of the Army's two formal truck driver training schools, the school at
    Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, operates with sizable instructor shortages.
    Because of this Fort Leonard Wood operates at a higher student- instructor
    ratio than called for in the instruction program. In fiscal year 2000, the
    Fort Leonard Wood facility trained nearly 90 percent of the Army's 88M
    drivers in spite of these shortages. Instructors at the informal and Reserve
    programs also said that their programs suffer from instructor shortages.

    During the first 9 months of 2000, Fort Leonard Wood operated with an
    average of 53 percent of its authorized instructors on- hand to teach the
    program. The main reasons were 1) fewer personnel were assigned to teach
    than were authorized and 2) even fewer were available (on- hand) than were
    assigned due to other commitments (such as bus driving, funeral and parade
    duty, leave, etc.). Authorized refers to the number of instructors the Army
    determines are needed to teach a program; assigned refers to the number of
    instructors the Army allocates to teach a program; and on- hand refers to
    the number of instructors that are present and teaching a program. Figure 2
    shows the number of instructors authorized, assigned, and on- hand at Fort
    Leonard Wood in the first 9 months of 2000, when on average about 45 of 84
    authorized instructors were available. Some Essential

    Driving Skills Are Not Taught

    Instructor Shortages

    Page 6 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Figure 2: Number of Authorized, Assigned, and On- hand Instructors at Fort
    Leonard Wood, January- September 2000.

    Source: Our analysis of Army data.

    Assuming that (1) the Army continues assigning instructors at about 85
    percent of authorized levels and that (2) the number of instructors on- hand
    remains constant at about 53 percent of those assigned, the Army would have
    to increase its present authorized level of instructors from 84 to158, an
    increase of 88 percent, in order to have a full complement on- hand.

    The formal instruction program calls for a 6- to- 1 student- instructor
    ratio- and Fort Leonard Wood is structured to operate at this ratio when
    staffed at 100 percent of its authorized level. In the first 9 months of
    2000, our review showed that Fort Leonard Wood operated overall at a higher
    ratio of about 9 to 1. Nonetheless, training officials stated that the
    school has been conducting the behind- the- wheel (hands- on) training
    portion of the program at the 6- to- 1 ratio the instruction program calls
    for. This means one instructor overseeing 3 trucks with two students per
    truck. However, Army regulations stipulate a 1- to- 1 truck- instructor
    ratio when a student driver is behind the wheel. In December 1998, Fort
    Leonard Wood requested a waiver to allow the 6- to- 1 ratio when students
    were driving

    Page 7 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    trucks. While the request has yet to be officially approved, school
    officials claim that if required to maintain the 1- to- 1 ratio, each
    student might drive as little as 30 miles during the entire course, instead
    of the present target of about 100 miles per student on average.

    Effects of Instructor Shortages

    Instructor shortages affect the quantity and quality of training. Students
    do not get sufficient hands- on driving experience and are not trained in
    all the skills required by the instruction program.

    Program officials at Fort Leonard Wood said that at times, instructors could
    fully teach only about three- quarters of the instruction program's required
    tasks. For example, in the second half of fiscal year 1999 two training
    modules- driving off- road and basic vehicle control- were often carried out
    only in part or demonstrated but not practiced. These two modules account
    for almost 93 percent of the 85.5 hours students are supposed to spend
    driving trucks. Because of instructor shortages during these two quarters,
    the average number of miles driven by each student at Fort Leonard Wood
    dropped from nearly 100 to less than 50. In addition, hands- on training is
    presently limited to mostly driving in controlled settings only. Students
    drive in convoys on unpaved but graded and regularly maintained training
    routes at no more than 25 mph – receiving almost no training in how to
    drive on public highways or in suburban settings. One group of trainers
    stated that with more instructors, they could take students on some
    realistic training rather than the “follow- theleader” driving
    students now receive.

    Students are also not being taught all the tasks that 5- ton- truck drivers
    are expected to perform. Training officials at the two formal programs
    stated they thought drivers should be trained in hauling loads or pulling
    equipment- the primary mission of 5- ton trucks. While the instruction
    program calls for 20 percent of all vehicles to operate with a load in the
    cargo area, this is not being done, according to training officials, because
    of logistical problems that make it difficult to train this skill. Pulling
    equipment is not taught because it is not specified in the instruction
    program. Therefore, students must learn these essential skills after
    graduation and rotation to their next duty stations.

    Neither the Marine Corps, which co- trains its 5- ton truck drivers with the
    Army at Fort Leonard Wood, nor the smaller Fort Bliss school, which mostly
    trains the overflow from Fort Leonard Wood, experience as severe Comparison
    of On- hand

    Instructors

    Page 8 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    instructor shortages as Fort Leonard Wood. Thus, neither encounters problems
    teaching the instruction program in its entirety. According to Marine Corps
    training officials, its detachment is authorized 76 instructors, and in the
    first 9 months of 2000, averaged having 70 instructors assigned and 65 on-
    hand (93 percent). During that same period of time, Fort Bliss training
    officials stated its school was authorized 17 instructors but actually had
    18 assigned and on- hand (106 percent).

    During the first 9 months of 2000, the Marine Corps program averaged a
    higher percentage of its assigned instructors on- hand than the Fort Leonard
    Wood Army program – 93 percent versus 63 percent (see fig. 3). This,
    according to Marine Corps training officials, was mostly because their
    instructors did not have other commitments or assignments as did Army
    instructors. Also, the average class size for the Marine Corps was much
    smaller than that for the Army (44 versus 70 students), and they had more
    instructors available to teach (65 on average versus the Army's 45). Because
    of the smaller class size and larger number of on- hand instructors, the
    Marine Corps can staff each truck at the 1- to- 1 instructorto- truck ratio
    regulations call for. This, according to them, allows students to gain
    driving skills in uncontrolled settings such as driving off- post, on public
    highways, and in various urban settings.

    On the other hand, the Fort Bliss school actually had a surplus of
    instructors: it had 106 percent of its assigned instructors on- hand (see
    fig. 3). According to program officials, their instructors also did not have
    other commitments and assignments as did Fort Leonard Wood Army instructors.

    Figure 3: On- hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned Instructors at
    Three Schools, January- September 2000

    Source: our analysis of Army data.

    Page 9 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    During fiscal year 2000, Fort Bliss also graduated fewer students, utilized
    less of its overall available classroom capacity, averaged smaller class
    sizes, and conducted about one- third the classes that Fort Leonard Wood
    conducted (see fig. 4).

    Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal Year 2000

    Source: Our analysis of Army data.

    Student Opinions Show Varied Satisfaction With Training Received

    We surveyed 139 students at the two formal school programs, 72 students at
    10 informal programs, and 98 students at 1 Army Reserve training program. We
    asked them to rate their satisfaction with the type of training there were
    receiving in various driving techniques and conditions. As table 1 shows,
    students at Fort Bliss felt better about the training they received in many
    driving skills than their counterparts at Fort Leonard Wood. Students in the
    Reserve program were the most satisfied overall with the training they
    received, while students in the informal programs were generally the least
    satisfied. Imbalances Between the

    Two Formal Army Schools

    Page 10 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve Programs
    Satisfied With Training

    Fort Bliss Fort Leonard Wood Informal Reserve

    Backing empty truck 92 55 69 87 Overall wheel time 100 64 55 80 Small
    inclines/ slopes– empty truck 38 66 15 50 Wheel time in different
    weather/ surfaces– empty truck 08 07 09 57 Load in cargo area/ pulling
    equipment a N/ A N/ A 02 04 Driving at night 00 23 09 32 a N/ A (not
    applicable). The formal schools do not teach driving with a load, and the
    instruction program does not call for training while pulling equipment.
    Source: Our analysis of survey responses.

    According to the instruction program, the majority of driving training time
    (about 65 hours) should be dedicated to driving on and off roads through
    woods, streams, brush, sand, mud, snow, ice, rocky terrain, ditches,
    gullies, and ravines. However, we found that neither of the two formal
    schools provides all these conditions in its training routes.

    Students at Fort Bliss are well trained to drive in sand because the
    school's training routes have sand. But the school seldom sees snow or ice
    because these conditions seldom occur there. And the school's training
    routes we observed were for the most part flat and unchallenging. One route
    we drove offered few or no opportunities to drive through woods and brush,
    over rocky terrain, or through gullies and ravines. The problem, according
    to school officials, is that the land the training routes are on is too flat
    and lacking in undergrowth. Training officials also told us that money
    constraints and the fact that Fort Bliss' mission is to handle the overflow
    of students from Fort Leonard Wood impede the development of more
    challenging driving routes.

    Training routes at Fort Leonard Wood also offered limited obstacles or
    challenges. We drove what school officials said was the most difficult
    training route and found that it did go through some woods and rocky terrain
    and over some hills and inclines. However, it contained no sand and
    engineering units maintained the surface the trucks drove on by routinely
    smoothing out bumps, ruts, and other obstacles. Environmental Limitations

    at Formal Training Schools

    Page 11 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training Simulators Can Be Useful Training Tools

    When adverse weather, dangerous road conditions, or other problems arise,
    the formal schools hesitate to allow students to drive because of safety
    concerns. However, the Army has determined that simulators can be used to
    teach some driving skills that cannot be taught in high risk driving
    conditions because of the dangers involved.

    Because of safety concerns, the Fort Leonard Wood command has issued an oral
    directive prohibiting students from driving off the installation. As a
    result, students do not learn to drive trucks in traffic at highway speeds
    or in urban settings. Furthermore, the training command frequently cancels
    hands- on driver training in the presence of ice, snow, or fog because it
    believes the risk of student drivers having a serious accident outweighs the
    benefits of the driving experience.

    Not training under adverse weather and road conditions limits the ability of
    drivers to handle a truck safely in these situations when they rotate to
    their new duty stations and begin to drive. In May 2000 the Analysis Center
    at the Army Training and Doctrine Command completed a study that concluded,
    among other things, that students graduating from the formal schools were
    only about 15- percent proficient 4 in skills needed to drive in fog, ice,
    or snow and 27- percent proficient in skills needed to drive on sand.

    The study concluded that simulators could overcome these and other
    shortcomings in driver training. It reviewed 31 critical driving tasks
    taught at the formal schools and concluded that simulators could help
    students obtain higher proficiency levels in as many as 22 of them. The
    study also concluded that simulators might help reduce the potential for
    accidents both during training and- most importantly- during the first year
    after training by increasing driving proficiency in fog, snow, or ice.

    4 The study defined proficiency as how well a school graduate performed a
    specific driving task when compared to a driver with 1 year of post-
    training experience, as assessed by qualified instructors.

    Page 12 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Formal training program personnel agreed, stating that they cannot teach
    students to drive under some of the more common hazardous conditions 5
    because it is too dangerous. Other Army officials also said that simulators,
    especially more advanced ones, can recreate such situations and give
    students a sense of driving under these conditions without putting lives at
    risk. Training personnel at both formal schools, Army Transportation School
    officials, as well as the simulator study itself strongly cautioned,
    however, that simulators should not replace actual behind- the- wheel
    driving time.

    The private sector uses simulators in its truck driving schools and
    considers them very useful. Officials at two commercial driving schools
    stated that their simulators help students learn to drive under various
    high- risk driving and weather conditions, including braking with a load on
    steep inclines or on wet and icy surfaces.

    Some safety rules relating to M939 trucks are not being communicated
    effectively. Moreover, many informal training programs seem to be unaware of
    available assistance from the Army Transportation School. Better
    communication is key to improving the flow of this type of information.

    The M939 series trucks are not supposed to be driven over 40 mph, even under
    ideal conditions. However, we found that some licensed drivers, students,
    instructors, and supervisors alike were either unaware of the speed limit,
    had forgotten about it, or did not know this restriction is still in effect
    for M939s without anti- lock brake systems 6 . Two- thirds of licensed
    drivers we interviewed, as well as about one- third of student drivers in
    formal training programs and over two- thirds of student drivers in informal
    training programs, did not know or could not recall the 40- mph limit. And
    none in a group we interviewed from a recently graduated formal program
    class were able to tell us the correct maximum speed

    5 In 1995 the Army Deputy Director of Safety concluded that M939 trucks were
    involved in a disproportionately high number of accidents in which a panic
    stop on a wet surface with a partially loaded truck going over 40 mph were
    among the factors that contributed to the accident.

    6 For all M939s having been outfitted with anti- lock brake kits, the speed
    limit restriction of 40 mph is no longer in effect. However, we did not
    observe an M939 equipped with such during our on- site visits. Some
    Information Not

    Reaching Its Target

    Page 13 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    limit. Although nearly all the 65 formal and Reserve program instructors we
    interviewed could state the correct speed limit, only about two- thirds of
    informal program instructors and driver supervisors could do so. By
    contrast, all of the nearly 100 students we interviewed at the Army Reserve
    training program knew of the speed limit, and for a simple reason: all the
    M939 trucks used for training had a dashboard sticker to remind the driver
    of the speed limit. (See fig. 5.)

    Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit Restriction

    Source: Our analysis of interview responses.

    There also appears to be a communication problem between informal program
    instructors and the Army Transportation School. Although the instructors
    believe their training programs are good ones, they also stated they do not
    have enough time to focus on improving and upgrading these programs and
    would like more input from “knowledgeable personnel,” such as
    those at the Fort Eustis Transportation School who developed the formal
    training program. Some said they could have avoided difficulties they
    encountered in developing a high- quality informal program if such expertise
    had been available. Many suggested that standardized, Armywide training
    packages tailored for each type of vehicle would be an efficient and
    economical way of training informal drivers.

    However, none of the instructors we interviewed knew that the Transportation
    School has a program available designed specifically for informal training
    of M939 drivers. In November 1999, the Transportation School distributed a
    CD- ROM driver training program 7 , which includes

    7 Army Model Drivers Training Program M939, 5- ton Tactical Cargo Truck.

    Page 14 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    lessons on driving and performing operator maintenance on the M939 to Army
    standards. Transportation School officials stated that the program was sent
    to around 1,800 different Army locations (according to the number and
    location of M939 trucks) and is also available through the Army's web site.

    While facing similar instructor shortages and limited driving conditions,
    the informal and Reserve training programs we reviewed must also try to
    train drivers in a shorter time than the formal programs. The reserves also
    have problems with their equipment.

    The 10 informal programs we reviewed ranged between 40 and 120 hours
    (compared to 6 weeks for the formal program). As a result, instructors focus
    mostly on teaching the basics (driving on surfaced roads, backing up on flat
    surfaces, and performing some required maintenance and service). Instructors
    teach more difficult skills only if time and circumstances allow. Several
    instructors questioned how their 40 to 80 hour programs could possibly teach
    as much as was taught in the 6- week formal course.

    The reserves have problems not only with instructor shortages, but also with
    training equipment. Reserve officials said their 5- ton truck driver
    training programs are generally understaffed because of a lack of available
    senior noncommissioned officers to teach. Also, because programs are usually
    not authorized a fleet of trucks exclusively for training, units must borrow
    trucks from the installation where training is taking place or from other
    nearby Army installations. The training unit is responsible for picking up
    and returning the trucks or for paying to have the trucks delivered and
    returned. They also pay an established usage fee to the units that lend the
    trucks. This is costly, especially if a borrowed vehicle needs repair work
    before it can pass the required safety inspection so that it can be used for
    training. Reserve training officials told us that this happens frequently
    and adversely impacts training. Additional Challenges

    Facing Informal and Reserve Training Programs

    Page 15 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Army regulations 8 require that truck drivers undergo a so- called
    “check

    ride” and “sustainment training 9 ” once a year (once
    every 2 years for the Army Reserve and National Guard). Performing these
    procedures- which are aimed at identifying and correcting poor driving
    habits, maintaining high driving proficiency levels, and ensuring safe
    driving- is the responsibility of the driver's assigned unit. Both
    procedures must also be documented in personnel driving records. However, we
    found that they are either not being performed or are not being recorded as
    required.

    We reviewed over 450 driving records and found that over 80 percent did not
    contain an entry indicating a check ride had been performed every year and
    for each type of vehicle in which the driver was licensed to drive. Eighty-
    five percent of records also did not have an entry documenting that
    sustainment training had been given annually as required. Seventy percent of
    the drivers we interviewed (both 88M drivers and occasional drivers) stated
    they either did not know what a check ride was or had not been given one
    annually. Three- quarters of the drivers we interviewed also said they had
    not attended an annual sustainment training course.

    Supervisors 10 are responsible for administering check rides to assess a
    driver's capabilities and overall driving habits. According to Army
    officials, unit commanders and supervisors must also develop and implement
    annual sustainment training programs, in part, on the basis of the results
    of check rides. A number of supervisors told us that they do not always
    conduct formal check rides because of personnel shortages and high operating
    tempo; rather, they try to assess drivers' skills and give correctional
    guidance- a sort of “informal” check ride- whenever they ride
    with a driver. None of them knew about the Transportation School's informal
    driver training program, which includes guidelines for sustainment training.

    8 ArmyRegulation 600- 55, Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program
    (Selection, Training, Testing, and Licensing). 9 Instruction and practice to
    ensure that mastery of specific skills are maintained.

    10 Supervisors are those in the driver's immediate chain- of- command who
    oversee and direct the driver's day- to- day activities. Some Supervisory

    Procedures Are Not Being Performed or Documented

    Page 16 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    The Army Safety Center maintains a ground accident database 11 that has been
    used in the past to identify accident anomalies that in turn led to safety
    improvements involving the operation of M939 series 5- ton trucks. The
    database, however, is not complete because not all data fields in accident
    investigation reports are always filled in. The database is also not being
    analyzed on a regular basis to identify trends or recurring problems.

    One of the purposes of the ground database is to provide demographic
    information that can be used for statistical comparisons. The Army Safety
    Center did so in 1998 when it compared accident rates of different Army
    trucks 12 and found that the M939 series trucks had a much higher serious
    accident rate than other similar trucks. In other, earlier studies, the
    Center reviewed M939 accident data and found a series of recurring accident
    conditions. On the basis of these studies, the Army Tank- automotive and
    Armaments Command in December 1992 issued the first of several Army- wide
    messages 13 warning of these problems and imposing the 40- mph speed limit
    on the M939. Also on the basis of these studies, the Command conducted
    additional studies on the M939, which in turn led to an estimated $122.4
    million in recommended design modifications. 14

    We analyzed nearly 400 M939 accident reports dating from 1988 through 1999
    contained in the Safety Center's database and found that four of the 36 data
    fields of information we requested for our analysis were often not filled
    in. Safety Center personnel acknowledged that the missing data could weaken
    any conclusions reached using these fields. Two fields –

    Was the Driver Licensed at the Time of the Accident and What was the
    Driver's Total Accumulated Army Motor Vehicle Mileage – contained no
    information 45 and 50 percent of the time respectively, and because of this,
    could not be included in the analyses we performed. Two other Fields

    –What Was the Mistake Made and Why Was the Mistake Made- were also
    often left blank.

    11 Army regulations require that an accident investigation report be filled
    out for all class A through C occupational injury accidents and all class A
    through D property damage accidents. The classes denote the severity of the
    accident, with “A” as the most serious or costly.

    12 The M34/ 35 trucks, the M939 trucks, and the Family of Medium Tactical
    Vehicle trucks. 13 The Army uses Ground Precautionary Messages and Safety of
    Use Messages to disseminate service- wide safety information. 14 See
    Military Safety: Army M939 5- Ton Truck Accident History and Planned
    Modifications (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 82, Apr. 9, 1999). Accident Database

    Not Used Effectively

    Page 17 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Our analysis also revealed patterns that, if studied further, might be
    useful in improving training programs. For example, many of the reported
    accidents occurred on wet or slippery surfaces or when the truck was hauling
    cargo or pulling equipment. Furthermore, three- quarters of accidents
    involved occasional drivers (those trained at informal schools). Some
    patterns we identified are illustrated in figure 6.

    Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident Reports, 1988- 99

    Source: Our analysis of Army Safety Center ground accident database.

    Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of truck driver
    training, especially at Fort Leonard Wood. The end result is that student
    drivers are not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when
    they graduate. This places an additional burden on the drivers' assigned
    units, which must further train these drivers, and on supervisors, who must
    be more vigilant in identifying drivers' shortcomings. If formal schools had
    enough instructors on- hand, they would presumably be able to teach the
    entire instruction program.

    The student imbalance between the schools at Fort Leonard Wood, which is
    understaffed, and Fort Bliss, which has smaller class sizes and a lower
    student- instructor ratio, creates an ineffective use of resources. This
    imbalance places an unnecessarily heavy burden on Fort Leonard Wood. If the
    annual student load were more equally distributed between the two schools,
    student graduates from Fort Leonard Wood might receive more complete
    training. Conclusions

    Page 18 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    The formal schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which calls
    for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no training is
    provided in how to pull equipment. With a high percentage of M939 accidents
    taking place under these two conditions, the formal schools should provide
    some training in these areas.

    Similarly, students are not being trained to drive under different weather
    and surface conditions. While it is understandable why formal schools
    hesitate to take the risk of having students drive under hazardous or
    highrisk conditions, it is also necessary that students receive such
    training. An army study concluded that simulators can provide an effective
    means of safely training drivers in high- risk weather and different road-
    surface situations.

    Because annual check rides and sustainment training are not always being
    performed, unsafe driving habits may go undetected. Further, if corrective
    oversight or training is not recorded, unit commanders and supervisors
    cannot know which drivers need attention. Although performing and recording
    check rides and sustainment training may be time- consuming, these
    procedures can save lives.

    Some important safety information, such as M939 speed limit restrictions, is
    not always being passed on to or remembered by drivers, supervisors, and
    trainers. Using inexpensive devices, such as dashboard stickers, is a simple
    way to remind these personnel of the speed restrictions.

    The Safety Center's accident database could be used to identify trends that
    may show the need for greater training emphasis in certain driving
    maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the database could assist school
    officials, instructors, and supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or
    mentoring drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all
    fields of information contained in the database were complete.

    We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of the
    Training and Doctrine Command to

    ? review and modify, as needed, instructor levels for the formal training
    programs to ensure that the programs are adequately staffed to teach the
    anticipated class size;

    ? balance the student load between the two schools by bringing the Fort
    Bliss school up to fuller capacity and/ or increasing the number of classes
    Recommendations

    Page 19 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    annually taught there, thereby reducing the student load and associated
    problems created by such at Fort Leonard Wood;

    ? enforce the instruction program used by the two formal schools to ensure
    that students receive hands- on training in driving trucks loaded with cargo
    and also modify the program to include driving when pulling equipment- two
    essential skills in performing the primary mission of the 5- ton tactical
    fleet; and

    ? consider using simulators at the two formal schools to safely teach known
    training shortfalls such as driving under hazardous conditions, with the
    understanding that simulators not be used to replace hands- on driving
    conducted under less risky conditions.

    We also recommend that the Secretary of the Army issue instructions to all
    applicable major army commands to

    ? require adherence to Army regulations on check rides and sustainment
    training of licensed truck drivers and

    ? require that warning stickers indicating speed restrictions be prominently
    displayed in the cabs of all M939 trucks not equipped with anti- skid brake
    systems.

    We further recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of
    the Army Safety Center to

    ? ensure that all information fields in accident reports are properly filled
    in and

    ? periodically review accident data for the presence of trends or anomalies
    for the purposes of informing trainers and supervisors of any information
    that may help them perform their duties or help improve safety.

    In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of Defense officials
    concurred with all our recommendations.

    We are providing copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,
    Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Ph. D., Acting
    Secretary of the Army; and interested congressional committees. Copies will
    also be made available to other interested parties upon request. Agency
    Comments

    and Our Review

    Page 20 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    If you or your staff have questions concerning the report, please call me at
    (202) 512- 5559. Our scope and methodology is explained in appendix I. GAO
    contacts and staff acknowledgments to this report are listed in appendix II.

    Derek B. Stewart Director Defense Capabilities and Management

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 21 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck
    driver training programs to fully train drivers, (2) determine whether
    oversight procedures and processes for these drivers are being followed, and
    (3) determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve
    training, supervision, and safety.

    To evaluate the capacity of the Army's 5- ton truck driver training programs
    to fully train drivers, we reviewed applicable training programs in terms of
    compliance and completeness at both of the Army's formal schools (Fort
    Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss) and 10 different informal training facilities
    located at 4 installations. We also reviewed the training provided at one of
    eight Army Reserve training centers. Reserve training centers all use the
    same Program of Instruction. We reviewed these programs for compliance with
    existing regulations and standard operating procedures established by the
    various training components. To assess the completeness of training, we made
    observations and collected documentation relating to the actual training
    being conducted and compared that documentation to the training specified in
    each training schools/ program's instruction program and also in relation to
    the primary mission of the 5- ton truck fleet. We also discussed these
    issues with officials responsible for designing the training programs,
    training command personnel, driving instructors, and student drivers to gain
    their perspectives. Lastly we compared the formal Marine Corps 5- ton
    training program and two commercial sector training programs to the Army's
    formal program to identify any training techniques and/ or devices that
    might benefit 5- ton training curriculums.

    To determine whether oversight procedures and processes for these drivers
    are being followed, we documented the duties of supervisors of medium
    tactical vehicles as found in Department of Defense and Army guidance,
    instructions, procedures, and regulations. Through observations and
    discussions with nearly 80 driver supervisors and nearly 200 truck drivers
    stationed at 12 different Army and National Guard units, we then assessed
    the degree to which they accomplished these responsibilities or followed
    required documentary procedures. In addition, at the units visited we
    collected over 450 historical driving records for truck operators and
    reviewed them for required annual supervisory annotations relating to check
    ride and sustainment training specified in Army regulations.

    To ensure we collected information representative of the universe of
    existing 5- ton truck informal training programs and the administering of
    driver supervision responsibilities, we selected- for review and observation
    purposes- four installations aligned under the U. S. Army Appendix I:
    Objectives, Scope, and

    Methodology

    Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

    Page 22 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Forces Command. This major command, according to the Army Materiel Command's
    Logistic Support Activity, controls 94 percent of the active army's M939
    series 5- ton trucks in the continental United States. Because Army
    automated record- keeping systems cannot provide 5- ton truck densities or
    locations below the major command level, we engaged the services of Army
    Internal Review personnel to assist us. Within the four installations, we
    requested that Internal Review personnel set up meetings with subordinate
    commands conducting the majority of 5- ton truck driver training and with
    commands maintaining the largest concentrations of 5ton trucks and/ or
    drivers.

    In discussing accident data with Army Safety Center personnel, we learned of
    Army notifications currently in effect and relevant to the safe handling of
    5- ton trucks that resulted from past analyses performed on the Center's
    ground accident database. We reviewed these notifications, including
    existing Army regulations and procedures pertaining to how this information
    is to be disseminated Army- wide. We then queried 5- ton truck driver-
    trainers, student drivers, supervisors, and licensed drivers to gain an
    understanding of how knowledgeable they were of restrictions imposed by
    these notifications.

    To determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve
    training, supervision, and safety, we interviewed safety center personnel
    and obtained and reviewed past studies and analyses conducted by the Center.
    In addition to identifying data that could be useful in improving training
    or supervision, we analyzed 12 years of demographic accident information
    pertaining to M939 series 5- ton tactical cargo trucks. Our analysis of this
    information, compiled for us by Army Safety Center personnel, included Class
    A, B, and C accidents occurring from January 1988 through December 1999 and
    for which some degree of fault was attributable to an M939 driver. This
    truck series accounts for about onehalf of the Army's 5- ton fleet and is
    the series specifically mentioned in the request letter. We focused on
    identifying the presence of any demographic anomalies or commonality factors
    that, when compiled statistically, might prove beneficial to trainers,
    supervisors, or the safer operation of M939 series trucks. We also discussed
    the results of our accident analysis with Army Safety Center officials,
    trainers, and supervisors to obtain their input and/ or concurrence.

    We performed our work from May 1999 through July 2000 in accordance with
    generally accepted government auditing standards.

    Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

    Page 23 GAO- 01- 436 Army Training

    Reginald L. Furr, Jr. (202) 512- 5426 In addition to those named above,
    Aisha A. Mahmood, Stefano Petrucci, William R. Simerl, Lorelei St. James,
    and Gerald L. Winterlin made key contributions to this report. Appendix II:
    GAO Contact and Staff

    Acknowledgments GAO Contact Acknowledgments

    (702001)

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