Firearms: Purchased From Federal Firearm Licensees Using Bogus
Identification (19-MAR-01, GAO-01-427).
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 required the
Attorney General of the United States to establish the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Referred to as
an instant background check, NICS is a computerized system
operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Based on
inquiries from federal firearm licensees (FFL), NICS searches the
backgrounds of prospective firearms purchasers for criminal and
other information that would disqualify them from purchasing
firearms. GAO, acting in an undercover capacity, purchased
firearms from five states--Virginia, West Virginia, Montana, New
Mexico, and Arizona--using counterfeit driver's licenses with
fictitious identifiers. In these states, the FFLs GAO contacted,
with the possible exception of one, adhered to existing federal
and state law regarding the mechanics of such a purchase.
Consistent with the Brady Act, in the five states GAO found that
the instant background check does not positively identify
purchasers of firearms. Rather, it is a negative check that
cannot ensure that the prospective purchaser is not a felon or
other prohibited person whose receipt and possession of a firearm
would be unlawful. Similarly, in one state--Virginia--the
additional step of requiring a state criminal history was also a
negative check. Further, in one state when GAO purchased a
revolver, the salesperson advised GAO that the NICS check was not
required because the firearm had been manufactured over 100 years
ago. GAO also made inquiries of private entities that advertised
firearms on the Internet. Of the 10 advertisers GAO contacted,
two individuals agreed to sell their firearms with no background
checks.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-427
ACCNO: 577970
TITLE: Firearms: Purchased From Federal Firearm Licensees Using
Bogus Identification
DATE: 03/19/2001
SUBJECT: Firearms
Fraud
Gun control law
Identification cards
Internet
Law enforcement information systems
Licenses
Arizona
FBI Interstate Identification Index
FBI National Instant Criminal Background
Check System
Internet
Montana
New Mexico
Virginia
West Virginia
******************************************************************
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GAO-01-427
A
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Government Reform, House of
Representatives
March 2001 FIREARMS Purchased From Federal Firearm Licensees Using Bogus
Identification
GAO- 01- 427
Lett er
March 19, 2001 The Honorable Henry A. Waxman Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives Dear Mr. Waxman:
This report responds to your request and subsequent conversations with your
office that we conduct an investigation that demonstrates the difficulty
that law enforcement officials have in preventing the illegal purchase of
firearms. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 1 required the
Attorney General of the United States to establish the National
Instant Criminal Background Check System, known as NICS. Referred to as an
instant background check, NICS is a computerized system operated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Based on inquiries from federal
firearm licensees (FFL), 2 NICS searches the backgrounds of prospective
firearm purchasers for criminal or other information that would disqualify
them from purchasing firearms.
Specifically, you asked that we attempt to purchase firearms, acting in an
undercover capacity and using counterfeit identification, in states that
rely on the instant background check and do not require fingerprinting or a
waiting period 3 for such purchases. In addition, you requested that we
determine how easily firearms can be purchased using the Internet.
The five states that we selected to purchase firearms in- Virginia, West
Virginia, Montana, New Mexico, and Arizona- conformed to the Brady Act's
minimum requirements, relying on an instant background check. They do not
have additional requirements for fingerprinting or waiting periods. Some
other states impose such requirements for purchasing 1 18 U. S. C. sect. 922(
t).
2 A federal firearm licensee (FFL) is a person licensed by the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) as a manufacturer, dealer, or importer
of firearms. 28 C. F. R. sect. 25. 2. 3 A waiting period generally refers to the
period of time between the date an individual applies to purchase a firearm
and the date the individual is allowed to take delivery of it.
firearms in addition to those of the Brady Act. These requirements include,
among others, the successful completion of firearm safety or training
courses, approval of license applications by the local police commissioners
or chiefs of police, waiting periods as long as 2 weeks, and fingerprinting.
To address your concerns, we created counterfeit state driver's licenses for
the five states with fictitious names, dates of birth, and/ or social
security numbers using off- the- shelf software, a scanner, a laminator, and
a color laser printer. Two special agents acting in an undercover capacity
used the counterfeit driver's licenses in attempts to purchase firearms from
gun stores and pawnshops that were licensed by the federal government to
sell firearms in the five selected states. We selected these gun stores and
pawnshops at random from the yellow pages of local telephone directories. We
also searched an Internet Web site that labels itself as a ?directory
service,? contacted 10 advertisers of firearms, and attempted to purchase
firearms from 2 individuals. Neither individual would send firearms through
the mail, but both were willing to complete the transactions in person. As
agreed with your office, we did not attempt to complete these
transactions. We performed our investigation from late October 2000 through
February 2001 in accordance with investigative standards established by the
President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Results in Brief We purchased firearms in five selected states- Virginia,
West Virginia, Montana, New Mexico, and Arizona- using counterfeit driver's
licenses with fictitious identifiers. In these states, the FFLs we
contacted, with the possible exception of one, adhered to existing federal
and state law regarding the mechanics of such a purchase. We will refer the
matter relating to that FFL to the appropriate law enforcement agency.
Consistent with the Brady Act, in the five states we found that the instant
background check does not positively identify purchasers of firearms.
Rather, it is a negative check that cannot ensure that the prospective
purchaser is not a felon or other prohibited person whose receipt and
possession of a firearm would be unlawful. Similarly, in one state-
Virginia- the additional step of requiring a state criminal history check
was also a negative check. Further, in one state when we purchased a
revolver,
the salesperson advised us that the NICS check was not required because the
firearm had been manufactured over 100 years ago, in approximately 1893. 4
We also easily made inquiries of private entities that advertised firearms
on the Internet. Of the 10 advertisers we contacted, 2 individuals agreed to
sell us their firearms with no identification required if we met face- to-
face.
Brady Act The Brady Act requirement for instant background checks pertains
to Requirements
prospective purchasers of firearms that were manufactured after 1898, i. e.,
firearms that are not considered antiques. To accomplish this, the NICS
Operations Center searches three separate databases: 5
the NICS Index, which contains records on persons known to be disqualified
under federal law from possession of firearms;
the National Crime Information Center, a computerized information system
of criminal justice data established by the FBI, which contains records on
protective orders, deported felons, and fugitives from justice; and
the Interstate Identification Index, which contains criminal history
records. In certain states, a point- of- contact state agency serves as an
intermediary between those licensed to sell firearms and the NICS. A state
that is operating as a point of contact for NICS checks may simultaneously
search
available databases in state and local law enforcement agencies. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) regulations implementing the Brady Act
provide that before an FFL may sell or deliver a firearm, the prospective
purchaser must provide photo- identification issued by a government entity.
The identification must contain the purchaser's name, state of residence,
age, gender, and race. 6 Because driver's licenses are
4 Antique firearms, which include weapons manufactured before 1899, are not
subject to NICS checks. 18 U. S. C. sect. 921( a)( 3) and 27 C. F. R. sect. 178.11.
5 28 C. F. R sect. 25. 6 (c)( 1)( iii). 6 28 C. F. R. sect. 25. 7.
issued by individual states, prospective purchasers of firearms frequently
use them as a form of identification. ATF regulations provide that prior to
the transfer of a firearm to a prospective purchaser, the purchaser must
complete, sign, and date section A of ATF Form 4473, ?Firearms Transaction
Record Part I Over- theCounter.?
7 (See app. I.) The form requests the purchaser's name, gender, height,
weight, race, residence address, birth date, and place of birth. It also
requires ?yes? or ?no? answers to 12 personal background questions. To avoid
misidentification of firearm purchasers as felons or other prohibited
persons, the ATF form also solicits certain optional information about the
purchaser, such as the purchaser's social security number. 8 Upon receiving
an FFL's request for an instant background check, the NICS Operations Center
or state point of contact 9 must provide one of three responses:
? Proceed? means that no disqualifying or negative information is in the
system to indicate that a firearm purchase would be unlawful and the
transaction may proceed.
? Denied? means that the purchase would be unlawful and prohibits the FFL
from transferring the firearm to the purchaser.
? Delayed? means that the transferee must delay the transaction until
contacted again by NICS or 3 business days have elapsed. 10 If NICS does not
provide a response after 3 business days, the FFL may transfer the
firearm. Accordingly, if there is no disqualifying or negative information
to indicate that the sale may be unlawful, the sale may take place.
7 27 C. F. R. sect. 178.124( a). 8 27 C. F. R. sect. 178.124( c)( 2). 9 In some
instances, states acting as points of contact may use terms other than those
used by NICS. For example, an ?approve? response may be the equivalent of a
?proceed? response, a ?pended? response may be the equivalent of a ?delayed?
response, and a ?nonapproval?
response may be equivalent to a ?denied? response. 10 An ATF official and
several FFLs informed us that the most common reason for a delay is that the
gun purchaser's name and identification are similar to the name and
identification of a prohibited individual.
Undercover Agents In Virginia, West Virginia, Montana, New Mexico, and
Arizona, special Purchased Firearms
agents acting in an undercover capacity purchased a total of seven firearms
and a number of magazines. One firearm was a semiautomatic assault Using
Counterfeit
weapon, and some of the magazines exceeded 10 rounds of ammunition. 11
Driver's Licenses With All purchases were made from FFLs at gun stores,
pawnshops, and a Fictitious Identifiers sporting goods store. The agents
used counterfeit driver's licenses with fictitious names and identifiers as
identification. With the possible exception of one in New Mexico, the FFLs
we contacted complied with
both the Brady Act and respective state laws when they sold the firearms to
the undercover agents. Virginia Purchase An undercover agent, using a
counterfeit Virginia driver's license and a counterfeit earnings and leave
payroll statement 12 in the same fictitious
name, purchased a Smith & Wesson Model 6906 9mm stainless steel
semiautomatic pistol with two 12- round ammunition magazines from a gun
store in Richmond, Virginia. (See fig. 1.) The salesperson told the agents
that this firearm was part of a group of firearms sold to the gun store by a
Virginia police department for resale.
11 The sale of either semiautomatic assault weapons or magazines containing
more than 10 rounds is illegal unless, as here, the weapons and magazines
were manufactured before Sept. 13, 1994. 18 U. S. C. sect. 922( v) and (w); 27
C. F. R. sect. 178. 40( a) and (b)( 1); and 27 C. F. R. sect. 178.40a.
12 Virginia state law requires two forms of identification. Virginia Code
Ann.
sect. 18. 2- 308. 2: 2 B. 1.
Figure 1: Richmond, Virginia, Purchase
Model 6906 Smith & Wesson 9mm Stainless Steel Semiautomatic Pistol With 12-
Round Ammunition Magazine
The gun store salesperson requested that the agent complete ATF Form 4473
and a Virginia State Police firearm purchase form. After checking both forms
to make sure information provided was identical and complete, the
salesperson ran the standard instant background check on the fictitious
name, date of birth, and social security number provided by the undercover
agent. He also provided the same information to the Virginia State Police
for a state criminal record check. The records checks by both NICS and the
Virginia State Police immediately came back with a proceed- to- sell
response, meaning that no criminal record was associated with the
information provided. The agent paid for the firearm and, with a fellow
agent, departed the store, carrying the firearm and ammunition magazines.
Virginia requires an additional background check not required by the Brady
Act. Under Virginia law, a prospective firearm purchaser must consent in
writing to having an FFL telephone the Virginia State Police to check for a
criminal history record. 13 In checking for a criminal history, the FFL must
provide essentially the same identifying information to the Virginia State
Police as it provides to the NICS. The state police are to inform the FFL
whether the sale is prohibited or it may proceed with the sale. Under
Virginia law, the state police are encouraged to provide a response ?to the
requesting dealer [FFL] during the dealer's call or by return call without
delay.? Also under Virginia law, an FFL may proceed with the sale of a
firearm without penalty if the FFL has not heard from the Virginia State
Police by the end of the next business day following the criminal history
request. An FFL's ability to make the sale under this condition is
contingent on NICS's having advised the FFL that it may proceed. West
Virginia Purchase An undercover agent used a counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license with a
fictitious name to purchase a Bresa .380 semiautomatic pistol and a box of
.380 ammunition from a sporting goods store in Berkeley County, West
Virginia. (See fig. 2.)
13 Virginia Code Ann. sect. 18. 2- 308. 2: 2.
Figure 2: Berkeley County, West Virginia, Purchase
.380 Bresa Semiautomatic Pistol With 8- Round Magazine and .380 Ammunition
The agent presented a counterfeit West Virginia driver's license and
completed the ATF Form 4473. The initial NICS check by the salesperson came
back with a delay response, indicating that the system was either down or
that the name, date of birth, and/ or social security number
submitted was similar to ones associated with a criminal history. The
salesperson told the agent that NICS had 3 business days from the time he
called in the name- check to respond and that if NICS did not respond within
that period, he could sell the firearm to the agent. During this
transaction, the salesperson stated that his main concern about a delay
notification from the NICS was the potential loss of the sale. In this case,
the proceed- to- sell order came back from NICS in less than 24 hours. The
agent returned to the sporting goods store, paid for the firearm and
ammunition, and departed the store with the merchandise and a companion
agent.
Montana Purchases An undercover agent purchased (1) a Russian Samozariadnyia
Karabina Simonova (SKS) 7. 62mm semiautomatic rifle with a bipod rest and a
4x scope and (2) a .22 caliber semiautomatic rifle with a folding stock, 4x
scope, and a 10- shot magazine. (See fig. 3.) The agent purchased the
firearms from a Billings, Montana, pawnshop and filled out the ATF Form
4473 using a counterfeit Montana driver's license. The initial NICS check by
the salesperson came back as a delay, and the salesperson explained that he
could sell the firearms to the agent if NICS did not respond after the
required 3 business days. During this transaction, the salesperson told us
that his main concern in getting the delay notification from the NICS was
the potential loss of the sale. When the proceed- to- sell order came back
from NICS, in less then 24 hours, the agent and a companion agent returned
to the pawnshop, paid for the firearms and ammunition, and left with the
merchandise.
At a second pawnshop in Billings, Montana, the two agents also purchased 2
boxes of 7.62mm Russian- made ammunition and a box of .22 caliber ammunition
along with a 30- round ?banana clip,? or magazine, for the Russian SKS and 2
additional 10- shot magazines for the .22 caliber. No identification or
paperwork was required to purchase the ammunition or magazines. (See fig.
3.)
Figure 3: Billings, Montana, Purchases
7.62mm Russian- Manufactured Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova Semiautomatic
Rifle With Bipod Rest, 4x Scope, 30- Round Banana Clip, and 7.62mm
Ammunition (Top)
.22 Caliber Semiautomatic Rifle With Folding Stock, 4x Scope, 3 10- Shot
Magazines, and .22 Caliber Ammunition (Bottom)
New Mexico Purchase An undercover agent attempted to purchase an Intratec
9mm semiautomatic pistol, model AB- 10, and a 32- shot magazine from a
pawnshop in Santa Fe, New Mexico. New Mexico requires only a valid state
photo- identification and the completion of the ATF Form 4473. On the first
day, the salesman's attempt to contact NICS was unsuccessful because the
circuits were busy. When the agent called the next day, the salesman told
the agent that he had contacted NICS and received a delay message. Later
that same day, the undercover agent and a fellow agent returned to the
pawnshop. At that time, the salesperson suggested that the individual
accompanying the agent could purchase the firearm and transfer it to the
first agent using a bill of sale. The second agent, also using a counterfeit
New Mexico driver's license, filled out the ATF Form 4473. The salesperson
checked the second agent's form against his license for accuracy and
initiated the NICS background check, which came back immediately as a
proceed- to- sell response. The first agent then used his credit card to
purchase the previously selected firearm and magazine in the second
agent?s name. The first agent also used his credit card to purchase a box of
9mm 124- grain Hydra- Shok jacketed hollow- point ammunition. This purchase
was based on the salesperson's statement that it was the best ammunition he
had in stock to penetrate a bulletproof vest similar to those worn by police
officers. (See fig. 4.)
Figure 4: Santa Fe, New Mexico, Purchase
Model AB- 10 Intratec 9mm Semiautomatic Pistol With 32- Shot Magazine and
9mm 124- Grain Hydra- Shok Jacketed Hollow- Point Ammunition
FFLs are required to make entries on the ATF Form 4473 for the sale of
firearms and include on the form the name of the intended recipient of the
firearm. Title 18 U. S. C. sect. 924( a) provides that whoever knowingly makes
any false statement or representation in the records required to be kept for
the sale of firearms shall be fined, imprisoned for 5 years, or both.
Further, instructions for ATF Form 4473 warn that ?[ A] licensee who
knowingly delivers a firearm to an individual who is not buying the firearm
for himself or herself or as a gift violates the law by maintaining a false
ATF F [Form] 4473.? In this instance, the FFL may have violated the law by
selling a firearm to an individual who he knew was not the intended
recipient.
Arizona Purchases An undercover agent used a counterfeit Arizona driver's
license to purchase (1) a Spanish- manufactured half- break .38 caliber 5-
shot revolver,
circa 1893, with a box of Smith & Wesson .38 caliber ammunition and (2) an
Italian- manufactured .25 caliber semiautomatic pistol from a gun store in
Tucson, Arizona. (See fig. 5.)
Figure 5: Tucson, Arizona, Purchases
.38 Caliber Spanish- Manufactured Half- Break 5- Shot Revolver, Circa 1893,
With .38 Caliber Ammunition (Top)
Model GT27 Italian- Manufactured .25 Caliber Semiautomatic Pistol With 7-
Shot Magazine (Bottom)
Prior to purchasing the firearms, the agent completed the ATF Form 4473.
Arizona requires an individual wanting to purchase a firearm to show a valid
photo- identification. The NICS check by the salesperson came back with a
proceed- to- sell response. Because Arizona is a point- of- contact state,
the salesperson contacted the Arizona Department of Public Safety
for the NICS check. The department simultaneously searched available state
and local law enforcement files. Both searches were negative, allowing the
sale to proceed.
During the transaction, the salesperson stated that he was required to do an
NICS check only on the .25 caliber semiautomatic handgun because the .38
caliber revolver was over 100 years old and was considered a ?curio.?
The agent paid for the weapons and ammunition, and he and a companion agent
departed the store with the merchandise. Attempt to Purchase a
We also investigated the possibility of purchasing a firearm over the
Internet by searching a Web site that labels itself a directory service. 14
An Firearm Over the
agent acting in an undercover capacity responded to 10 of 21 Internet
advertisements offering firearms for sale; 8 of the advertisers were FFLs
and 2 were individuals. The FFL advertisers would ship the firearm offered
for sale to only an FFL and refused to ship it to an individual. We also
attempted to purchase firearms from the two advertisers we determined to be
individuals but did not complete the transactions.
One individual, in Warner Robbins, Georgia, advertised a Smith & Wesson .45
caliber firearm for sale for $390. An agent acting in an undercover capacity
contacted the individual by telephone and told him he was calling
from the Northern Virginia area. After verifying that the firearm was for
sale, the agent attempted to convince the individual to mail the firearm to
him; but he refused to mail the firearm to anyone other than an FFL. The
agent then told the individual that he would be in the Warner Robbins area
in a few days, and the individual readily agreed to sell the firearm to the
agent in a ?face- to- face? transaction. The individual asked the agent if
he was a criminal; the agent assured him that he was not and provided a
fictitious name. The individual then agreed to sell the firearm for cash and
stated that he would not require any identification. He then asked the agent
to call him for directions to his home when he arrived in Warner Robbins. In
a second advertisement, an individual in Orlando, Florida, offered to sell a
9mm semiautomatic firearm for $339. An undercover agent telephoned the
individual; stated that he was calling from the Washington, D. C., area; and
verified that the firearm was for sale. The seller refused to send the
firearm through the mail but agreed to meet the agent to complete the
transaction. He stated that he would sell the firearm for cash and would not
require identification.
14 The site notes that it makes no warranty that the seller or the guns
actually exist and that all gun transfers must comply with ATF and shipping
regulations.
As arranged with your office, unless you disclose its contents earlier, we
plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the letter's
date. At that time, we will send copies of the report to interested
congressional committees, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney
General, and the Directors of the FBI and ATF. The report will also be
available on GAO's home page at www. gao. gov. If you have any questions,
please call Assistant Director Patrick Sullivan at (202) 512- 6722. Senior
Special Agents John Cooney, Woodrow Hunt, William McDaniel, and Thomas Wiley
and Senior Attorney Barry Shillito made key contributions to
this investigation and report. Sincerely yours,
Robert H. Hast Managing Director for Special Investigations
Appendi xes Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
Appendi x I
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GAO United States General Accounting Office
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Appendix I
Appendix I Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Form 4473
Page 18 GAO- 01- 427 Firearms Purchased With Bogus Identification
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Correction Requested Presorted Standard
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