Nuclear Waste: Agreement Among Agencies Responsible for the West 
Valley Site Is Critically Needed (11-MAY-01, GAO-01-314).	 
								 
The West Valley nuclear facility in western New York State was	 
built in the 1960s to convert spent nuclear fuel from commercial 
reactors into reusable nuclear fuel. New York State, the owner of
the site, and the Atomic Energy Commission--the predecessor of	 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of	 
Energy (DOE)--jointly promoted the venture. However, the timing  
of the venture was poor because the market for reprocessed	 
nuclear fuel was limited and because new, more restrictive health
and safety standards raised concerns about the facility. West	 
Valley was shut down in the 1970s, and Congress enacted the West 
Valley Demonstration Project Act in 1980, which brought DOE to	 
West Valley to carry out cleanup activities. This report examines
the: (1) status of the cleanup; (2) factors that may be hindering
the cleanup; (3) degree of certainty in the Department's	 
estimates of total cleanup costs and schedule; and (4) degree to 
which the West Valley cleanup may reflect, or have implications  
for, larger cleanup challenges facing DOE and the nation. DOE has
almost completed solidifying the high-level wastes at West	 
Valley, but major additional cleanup work remains. These tasks,  
which could take up to 40 years to complete, include		 
decontaminating and decommissioning structures, remediating soil 
and groundwater, and removing nuclear wastes stored and buried	 
onsite. The following three factors are hindering DOE's attempts 
to clean up West Valley: (1) DOE and New York State still have	 
not agreed on the overall future of the site, (2) NRC cleanup	 
standards for West Valley do not exist, and (3) cleanup planning 
has been limited by uncertainty about where West Valley's nuclear
wastes are to go. In addition, DOE's estimates of the total costs
and completion date for the West Valley cleanup are uncertain	 
because of a lack of agreement on many strategic issues affecting
the site, such as the extent to which the site is to be cleaned  
up, what it will then look like, how the land is to be used, and 
what regulatory cleanup standards are to be used. DOE's plan to  
deal with the underground high-level waste storage tanks at West 
Valley has potential implications for other DOE disposal efforts.
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-314 					        
    ACCNO:   A01010						        
    TITLE:   Nuclear Waste: Agreement Among Agencies Responsible for  
             the West Valley Site Is Critically Needed                        
     DATE:   05/11/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Nuclear fuel plant safety				 
	     Nuclear fuel reprocessing				 
	     Nuclear waste disposal				 
	     Nuclear waste management				 
	     Tanks (containers) 				 
	     DOE West Valley Demonstration Project		 
	     (NY)						 
								 

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************
GAO-01-314
     
Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

May 2001 NUCLEAR WASTE Agreement Among Agencies Responsible for the West
Valley Site Is Critically Needed

GAO- 01- 314

Page i GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 Background 5 High- Level Waste Vitrification Is Nearing
Completion, but Other

Major Work Remains 12 Several Factors Are Hindering Progress on the West
Valley

Cleanup 17 West Valley?s Total Cleanup Costs and Schedule Cannot Be

Estimated With Reasonable Certainty Until the Future of the Site Is Agreed
On 31 West Valley Reflects DOE- Wide Cleanup Dilemmas and Has

Implications for National Decisions on Nuclear Waste Disposal 35 Conclusions
40 Matters for Congressional Consideration 41 Recommendations for Executive
Action 41 Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 44

Appendix II West Valley Time Line 46

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Energy 47

Appendix IV Comments From New York State 51

Appendix V Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 54

Tables

Table 1: Changes in Estimated Total West Valley Cleanup Costs and Completion
Schedule 32 Contents

Page ii GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste Figures

Figure 1: Aerial View of the West Valley Site During DOE Operations 6 Figure
2: A Trench in the State- Licensed Disposal Area During Past

Operations 9 Figure 3: West Valley Nuclear Waste Vitrification and Storage
11

Abbreviations

DOE Department of Energy EIS environmental impact statement EPA
Environmental Protection Agency GAO General Accounting Office NEPA National
Environmental Policy Act NRC National Regulatory Commission WIPP Waste
Isolation Pilot Project

Page 1 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

May 11, 2001 The Honorable Sherwood L. Boehlert Chairman, Committee on
Science House of Representatives

The Honorable W. J. (Billy) Tauzin Chairman, Committee on Energy and
Commerce House of Representatives

The West Valley nuclear facility, in western New York State, was built in
the 1960s to convert spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors into
reusable nuclear fuel- an industrial process referred to as reprocessing.
The facility was part of the nation?s post- World War II effort to harness
nuclear energy for commercial power generation. Specifically, the facility
was intended to reprocess spent fuel in order to help meet expected
commercial demand for nuclear power. New York State, as the owner of the
site, and the Atomic Energy Commission- the predecessor of both the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Department of Energy (DOE)- jointly
promoted the venture. However, the timing of the venture was inopportune
because the market for reprocessed nuclear fuel was limited and because new,
more restrictive health and safety standards raised concerns about the
facility. These factors contributed to its permanent shutdown in the 1970s.
Also during the 1970s, U. S. policies intended to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation ran counter to the concept of commercial reprocessing because
reprocessed nuclear fuel can be used to make nuclear weapons. With West
Valley?s shutdown, spent fuel, liquid high- level wastes, and other nuclear
contamination at the facility had to be cleaned up. To facilitate the
cleanup, especially the solidification of the liquid high- level wastes, the
Congress enacted the West Valley Demonstration Project Act in 1980, which
brought DOE to West Valley to carry out cleanup activities.

DOE originally estimated that the cleanup effort could be completed by about
1990. Over the years, DOE has developed varied and increasing estimates of
the West Valley cleanup?s total costs and completion time. Concerned about
these changing estimates, you asked us to examine the overall status of the
effort and the causes and implications of any problems that may be
occurring. Specifically, as agreed with your offices, we examined (1) the
status of the cleanup, (2) factors that may be

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

hindering the cleanup, (3) the degree of certainty in the Department?s
estimates of total cleanup costs and schedule, and (4) the degree to which
the West Valley cleanup may reflect, or have implications for, larger
cleanup challenges facing DOE and the nation. To compare DOE?s cost
estimates, which have been made at different times since 1978, we converted
the estimates to year- 2000 present value dollars. See appendix I for our
detailed scope and methodology.

DOE has almost completed solidifying the high- level wastes at West Valley,
but major additional cleanup work remains. Since 1982, DOE has conducted a
technologically challenging, first- of- a- kind industrial process to
stabilize the liquid, high- level wastes left on- site- a process called
vitrification. To date, this process has emptied West Valley?s four on-
site, underground, high- level waste storage tanks of over 99 percent of
their long- lived radioactivity. The vitrification work, which represents
the first phase of the cleanup, is expected to be completed in September
2002, and has enhanced the site?s environmental, safety, and health status.
Furthermore, as indicated by our examination of environmental and safety
data for West Valley and the views of interested parties, DOE has generally
operated the facility safely. Work on the overall cleanup, however, is not
nearly complete. Major additional cleanup steps that must be taken include
decontaminating and decommissioning structures, remediating soil and
groundwater, and removing nuclear wastes stored and buried onsite. These and
other steps could take up to four decades, with West Valley cleanup costs
totaling about $4.5 billion, according to DOE projections.

Several factors are hindering DOE?s attempts to clean up West Valley. First,
and most importantly, the Department and New York State, the principal
parties to the West Valley cleanup, still have not agreed on the overall
future of the site, particularly their future on- site roles and
responsibilities. Their differences reflect the fact that, historically,
neither the federal government nor the state has wanted to take full
responsibility for West Valley?s nuclear wastes. Their relationship is key
to facilitating the site cleanup and has been a factor in delayed
environmental planning milestones for West Valley. For example, in 1996,
expecting that interested parties could soon agree on the site?s future, DOE
estimated that a record of decision on cleaning up West Valley could be
reached as early as 1997. However, the latest estimate is 2005, at the
earliest. Since 1999, DOE and New York State have been attempting to resolve
their differences through confidential negotiations, but this effort broke
down in January 2001 without an agreement. Second, NRC cleanup standards for
West Valley- referred to in the West Valley Act as decontamination and
decommissioning requirements- do not exist. These standards, which are
Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

important regulatory criteria for determining the overall future of the
site, are expected to be issued in final form in 2001, perhaps in the
spring. However, as drafted, they differ from the Environmental Protection
Agency?s (EPA) guidance and standards implementing the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and
the Safe Drinking Water Act, which could also apply onsite. This situation
could lead to costly, dual federal regulation of the site. Third, cleanup
planning has been limited by uncertainty about where West Valley?s nuclear
wastes are to go. Under the West Valley Act, the site?s high- level wastes
and transuranic wastes are to be removed off- site, 1 but DOE and the state
have not yet obtained access to permanent off- site disposal for either of
these types of waste. Hundreds of millions of dollars in future costs could
be at stake in these disposal questions, depending on which options are
chosen for storing and monitoring these wastes before disposal. We are
raising matters for congressional consideration and making recommendations
to DOE, NRC, and EPA to address these issues.

DOE?s estimates of the total costs and completion date for the West Valley
cleanup are uncertain because there has been no agreement on strategic
issues affecting the site- that is, the extent to which the site is to be
cleaned up and what it will then look like, how the land is to be used, and
what regulatory cleanup standards are to be used. Departmental estimates in
the 1990s have varied by billions of dollars, and the completion schedule by
decades, depending on the programmatic assumptions made. The Department
currently estimates the total cleanup costs at about $4. 5 billion, with the
effort taking an additional 40 years- including more than two decades of
major additional cleanup work, and additional time for interim on- site
storage of vitrified high- level wastes. This estimate is based on a better
understanding of the cleanup challenge than in 1978, when the Department
generated its initial estimate-$ 180 million, or $1. 1 billion in year- 2000
dollars, with completion in about 10 years. 2 However, DOE?s current
estimate continues to be based on uncertain assumptions, such as what will
be done with various on- site wastes and when the wastes can be shipped off-
site. These uncertainties reflect an overall lack of agreement

1 Transuranic wastes are rags, tools, and other miscellaneous waste items
containing traces of radioactive elements with atomic numbers higher than
uranium- principally plutonium. 2 Among a range of cost estimates generated
at the time by DOE, most interested parties, including state and federal
officials, considered the $180 million estimate, as well as a startup date
of about 1980, to be reasonable. Using an estimated 10- year cleanup
timetable, a completion date of about 1990 was indicated.

Page 4 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

on strategic issues related to directing the overall cleanup effort,
including cleanup standards, what the site will look like when the cleanup
is done, and how the wastes will be disposed of. Until such issues are
resolved, any estimates of the total costs and schedule for the West Valley
cleanup could change significantly.

The problems at West Valley reflect many of the same dilemmas DOE faces with
its complexwide nuclear cleanup effort. Moreover, DOE?s planned approach at
West Valley to deal with its underground high- level waste storage tanks has
potential implications for other DOE disposal efforts. Specifically, West
Valley is yet another example of how complicated, uncertain, and subject to
cost and schedule changes the cleanup planning process can be at sites where
(1) first- of- a- kind technological cleanup challenges are being addressed;
(2) major decisions on strategic cleanup issues, including cleanup standards
to be used, have yet to be made; and (3) multiple types of contamination,
laws and regulations, and regulators are involved. As a result, at sites
such as West Valley, planners have difficulty estimating with a reasonable
degree of certainty cleanup projects? overall costs and schedules. By
extension, because other, larger DOE sites, such as Savannah River, South
Carolina, and Hanford, Washington, also have less than fully defined cleanup
goals and land uses, DOE?s ability to quantify cleanup costs and timetables
across the entire nuclear complex is to some degree in question.
Furthermore, as the first DOE site projected to complete vitrification, West
Valley is a potential test case for a national decision on what do with the
over 200 underground storage tanks across the complex and the traces of
wastes left in them after high- level waste vitrification. Are these tanks
to be dug up, using a technology that is not yet available, and removed to
an as- yet- undetermined disposal location, or can they be safely entombed
in place and subjected to long- term stewardship? The Natural Resources
Defense Council is currently challenging in court DOE?s radioactive waste
management order, under which tank entombment could be implemented at sites
such as West Valley.

We provided a draft of this report to DOE, the New York State Energy
Research and Development Authority, NRC, and EPA for comment. DOE found the
report to be a credible assessment of West Valley issues, and New York State
concurred in the report?s conclusions. However, DOE and New York State
continued to differ on who should assume ultimate responsibility at West
Valley. Furthermore, DOE disagreed with our recommendation on high- level
waste disposal, citing the need for New York State to enter into a disposal
contract with the Department. We have modified the wording of our
recommendation to more clearly recognize

Page 5 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

that resolving the question of responsibility for the high- level wastes at
West Valley is part of any long- term solution regarding their disposal. NRC
and EPA provided technical clarifications only. All four agencies? technical
clarifications were incorporated into the final report where appropriate.

The West Valley site, about 30 miles southeast of Buffalo, includes an
approximately 200- acre area of nuclear operations within a 3, 300- acre
area owned by the state of New York. (See fig. 1.) The facility began
construction in 1963 as the first- and ultimately the only- commercial spent
fuel reprocessing plant to be operated in the United States. A firm called
Nuclear Fuel Services operated the plant, which reprocessed spent fuel from
1966 to 1972. Regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor to
NRC), the plant reprocessed approximately 640 metric tons of spent nuclear
fuel to recover usable uranium and plutonium. In 1972, the plant was shut
down to meet regulatory changes, including more stringent seismic criteria
and worker safety requirements. In 1976, facing rising estimates of the cost
to modify the plant to meet the new safety requirements, the operator
announced its withdrawal from the business. (A time line of historical and
projected West Valley milestones is presented in app. II.) Background

Page 6 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Figure 1: Aerial View of the West Valley Site During DOE Operations

Source: DOE.

The commercial reprocessing era at West Valley left behind major
environmental, safety, and health risks from multiple types of nuclear
contamination at the site, including high- level wastes, radioactive buried

Page 7 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

wastes, and environmental contamination. 3 Specific on- site radiation risks
that were generated then and still exist include the following: 4

 The reprocessing building- significantly contaminated with strontium- 90
and cesium- 137 (both potentially carcinogenic radionuclides)- and four
adjacent single- shell underground storage tanks encased in concrete vaults.
These tanks originally contained about 600,000 gallons of liquid, high-
level wastes generated during reprocessing. 5

 A 5- acre, NRC- licensed waste disposal area, used from 1966 to 1986. This
area contains several types of buried wastes resulting from the reprocessing
era, such as about a third of a cubic meter of spent fuel from Hanford?s N-
Reactor; this spent fuel was buried instead of being reprocessed because the
outer layer of a fuel assembly was ruptured. 6

 A storage pool originally containing several hundred spent nuclear fuel
assemblies, and now containing 125 assemblies.

 Groundwater contamination under the reprocessing building, in the form of
a plume of strontium- 90 that first developed during 1968 to 1971 and was
identified in 1994.

3 One safety problem noted was that some areas in the reprocessing building
were designed for direct, ?contact? maintenance by workers, not for more
modern remote- controlled maintenance. Worker exposures increased
significantly overall during 1968 to 1971, though within standards; at the
time, the Atomic Energy Commission questioned the operator?s efforts to
limit workers? exposure to radiation. 4 Among these problems, not all
require DOE attention pursuant to the West Valley Act of 1980 and the
implementing DOE- New York State cooperative agreement; while DOE and the
state agree that the Department is not responsible for decommissioning the
statelicensed disposal area or for cleaning up materials buried in the NRC-
licensed disposal area prior to DOE?s presence, they disagree on who is
responsible for cleaning up some on- site contamination. 5 Of the tanks, two
are 70- feet- in- diameter carbon steel tanks, one a spare and the other

originally containing most of the on- site high- level wastes. The two other
tanks are 12- feetin- diameter stainless steel tanks, one a spare and the
other originally containing 12, 000 gallons of acidic high- level wastes
from thorium fuels. Both spare tanks have been contaminated over time. To
date, the four tanks are not known to have leaked. However, the two larger
tanks and vaults floated as much as 3 to 4 feet during construction from
accumulated water- a ?bathtubbing? problem related to abundant rainfall, and
low soil permeability at the site. 6 The area also contains low- level
wastes, 42 spent fuel elements, and various other

radioactive wastes.

Page 8 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

 Contamination in the form of cesium- 137 in surface soils on- and off-
site, resulting from airborne releases, identified as principally occurring
in 1968. The releases were caused by ventilation failures in the plant?s
main stack. The cesium contamination levels are only slightly
distinguishable from background radiation levels. The contamination extends
about 3. 7 miles northwest from the plant stack into heavily wooded off-
site areas.

 An inactive 15- acre, state- licensed and -managed commercial low- level
radioactive waste disposal facility. This facility, which operated from 1963
to 1975, contains, among other wastes, highly radioactive wastes from naval
and commercial reactors and nuclear fuel processing facilities that are
buried in trenches, as shown in figure 2.

Page 9 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Figure 2: A Trench in the State- Licensed Disposal Area During Past
Operations

Source: Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes.

The West Valley Demonstration Project Act, enacted to assist in the cleanup
of the facility, was signed into law in October 1980. The act required DOE
to, among other things, (1) solidify and develop suitable

Page 10 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

containers for the site?s high- level radioactive wastes; (2) transport the
solidified waste to a permanent repository; and (3) dispose of the low-
level and transuranic wastes created during the project. 7 In cooperation
with the state?s Energy Research and Development Authority, DOE took control
of project operations in 1982. The West Valley Act and an implementing
cooperative agreement divided projected operating costs between DOE (90
percent) and the state (10 percent). West Valley Nuclear Services, Inc. (now
under Washington Group International, Inc.) was awarded the solidification
project contract and remains the primary contractor. In carrying out its
responsibilities under the act, DOE has constructed the solidification
facility and conducted solidification operations- referred to as
vitrification. These operations have involved (1) chemically treating the
high- level wastes- a step called pretreatment- to separate out voluminous
less- radioactive wastes (which are then stored as low- level wastes) and
(2) mixing the remaining high- level wastes with a form of molten glass and
pouring the mixture into cylindrical stainless steel storage canisters. (The
canisters are shown in fig. 3.) As vitrification nears completion, DOE and
the New York State energy authority are shifting their focus to the
remaining cleanup tasks- decontaminating and decommissioning structures,
remediating soil and groundwater, and removing nuclear wastes stored and
buried on- site, among other activities.

7 Prior to enactment, we reported on West Valley issues needing resolution
following the end of commercial operations, including what was to be done
with the reprocessing plant and wastes, how much dealing with these wastes
would cost, and who would be responsible for dealing with them. See Issues
Related to the Closing of the Nuclear Fuel Services, Incorporated,
Reprocessing Plant at West Valley, New York (EMD- 77- 27, Mar. 8,

1977); and Status of Efforts to Clean Up the Shut- Down Western New York
Nuclear Service Center (EMD- 80- 69, June 6, 1980).

Page 11 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Figure 3: West Valley Nuclear Waste Vitrification and Storage

Source: DOE.

Various entities oversee West Valley under several statutes. The site was
originally licensed to the operator and New York State by the Atomic Energy
Commission and subsequently by NRC. For the duration of DOE?s presence, the
NRC license to the state has been placed in abeyance, leaving DOE, as
authorized by the Atomic Energy Act, to regulate radioactive materials at
West Valley, as it does at other departmental

Thousands of drums of low- level waste resulting from high- level waste
pretreatment in storage.

Canisters of vitrified high- level waste in storage. Canister of vitrified
high- level waste.

Page 12 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

facilities. After DOE concludes its on- site tasks, the site is to be turned
back over to the state and the NRC license is to be reinstated and/ or
terminated following decommissioning. Until then, under the terms of the
West Valley Act and a 1981 memorandum of understanding with DOE, NRC is to
provide informal review and consultation and is authorized to prescribe
decontamination and decommissioning criteria for the site. West Valley must
also comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), which
requires integrated environmental planning leading to the choice of a
preferable cleanup alternative, and a 1987 Stipulation of Compromise
Settlement with the Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes and the
Radioactive Waste Campaign, which resulted from litigation concerning DOE?s
on- site disposal of wastes generated by the project. The stipulation
required DOE to conduct a full environmental impact study under NEPA,
instead of the less detailed environmental assessment the Department had
considered sufficient. Additionally, EPA and the state?s Department of
Environmental Conservation have oversight responsibilities at the site. For
example, under authorization from EPA, the state regulates radioactive air
emissions under the Clean Air Act and the hazardous components of
radioactive mixed wastes under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA).

DOE has almost completed vitrifying the high- level wastes at West Valley,
overcoming numerous technological challenges along the way. Vitrification
has enhanced the site?s environmental, safety, and health status, and on the
basis of our examination of DOE data and reports, as well as interviews with
interested parties, the Department has generally operated the facility
safely. However, the cleanup could take four more decades, including more
than two decades of major additional cleanup work that still needs to be
performed, and additional time for interim onsite storage of vitrified high-
level wastes. In the near term, various wastes need to be managed and
structures need to be decontaminated. In the longer term, depending on the
cleanup level chosen for the site, these structures need to be torn down and
either removed off- site or left in place and capped, and the site needs to
be decommissioned.

DOE?s operations at West Valley began in 1982 and included the construction
of a vitrification facility from 1985 to 1995. From the late 1980s into the
mid- 1990s, waste pretreatment, sludge washing operations, and vitrification
testing took place. As we reported in 1989 and 1996, High- Level Waste

Vitrification Is Nearing Completion, but Other Major Work Remains

Page 13 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

construction was subject to delays and cost overruns early on. 8 , 9 During
pretreatment (1988- 95), about 1.7 million gallons of low- level waste were
generated and placed into almost 20, 000 drums in an on- site storage area.
(See fig. 3.) Pretreatment reduced the waste volume to be vitrified by over
80 percent. Vitrification operations began in 1996. They are now nearing
completion, which is scheduled for September 2002. To date, the four onsite
underground high- level waste tanks have been emptied of over 99 percent of
their long- lived radioactivity in tank sludge, as well as 95 percent of
their cesium- 137 activity. To date, 255 stainless steel, cylindrical waste
canisters have been filled with vitrified high- level waste. Vitrification
of the remaining traces of wastes is continuing. Tank sludge, known as ?tank
heel,? is being removed from the tank bottoms (which have an intricate,
grid- like internal support structure).

In removing the liquid, high- level wastes from the underground tanks and
vitrifying them, DOE has overcome numerous technological challenges.
Technological successes related to West Valley vitrification have included
(1) developing a separation process for pretreating the wastes (an ion
exchange method, using titanium- treated zeolite for separation, which was
developed at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory); (2) developing tank
liquid mobilization pumps that would work in a highly radioactive
environment (adapted from a Savannah River Site design); (3) implementing a
glass melter technology developed by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory for use at West Valley; and (4) developing a canister waste-
level monitoring system using infrared detection- a system adopted at
Savannah River. The West Valley and Savannah River melter technologies have
subsequently been considered for low- level waste vitrification efforts
being planned at Fernald, Ohio; Savannah River; Hanford; and Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.

West Valley?s vitrification operations are part of a multibillion- dollar
DOE effort to immobilize its liquid, high- level wastes at other, larger
sites- including Savannah River, Hanford, and the Idaho National
Environmental

8 Nuclear Waste: DOE?s Program to Prepare High- Level Radioactive Waste for
Final Disposal (GAO/ RCED- 90- 46FS, Nov. 9, 1989). 9 Department of Energy:
Opportunity to Improve Management of Major System Acquisitions (GAO/ RCED-
97- 17 , Nov. 1996 ).

Page 14 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

and Engineering Laboratory. 10 West Valley and Savannah River are currently
vitrifying their wastes, 11 while the efforts at Hanford and the Idaho
Laboratory- whose solid- form wastes, stored in bins, will be processed
differently 12 -are not as far along. The West Valley, Savannah River, and
Hanford vitrification efforts differ in technical details, including methods
of pretreatment. 13 Vitrification at Savannah River could continue until the
mid- 2020s, according to DOE. We reported in 1999, however, that Savannah
River was having difficulties with its chosen pretreatment technology.
Pending resolution of this matter, the site has been restricting its
vitrification efforts to the sludge in its tanks. 14 At Hanford, DOE?s plans
call for vitrification operations to begin in the late 2000s and continue
until the mid to late 2010s for 10 percent or more of the high- level
wastes, and an undetermined longer period for the rest.

According to the federal and state oversight officials and local officials
we contacted, DOE has generally operated the site safely. In addition,
available DOE environmental and safety monitoring data and oversight reviews
for West Valley (from 1990 to 2000) do not indicate a pattern of
environmental, safety, or health issues. During pretreatment and
vitrification operations, DOE has not reported serious exposures to
radioactivity of on- site workers, although a few incidents DOE judged to be
noncritical have put workers at risk of such exposure, according to DOE and
NRC records. For example, in November 1996, radioactive waste migrated into
a pipe intended for demineralized water at the vitrification facility; in
December 1997, two workers came into contact with

10 The wastes stored at West Valley (before vitrification) have been less
than 1 percent of the total at Department- operated facilities. As of 1988,
Hanford had about 61 percent, in 177 underground tanks, containing about 57
million gallons of wastes; Savannah River had about 36 percent, in 51
underground tanks, containing about 34 million gallons of wastes; and the
Idaho Laboratory had about 3 percent, in four sets of bins instead of tanks,
containing about 2.9 million gallons of wastes in the form of dry waste
granules called calcines. 11 As of Feb. 2000, 775 canisters containing
vitrified wastes were in storage at Savannah

River. 12 At the Idaho Laboratory, the solid wastes (or calcines) are to be
immobilized into a glassceramic waste form for placement in canisters. Waste
immobilization could take until 2035 under current plans. 13 Pretreatment
varies among the three sites because of differences in their spent fuels and

the reprocessing techniques used to generate the wastes. 14 Nuclear Waste:
Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work
(GAO/ RCED- 99- 69, Apr. 30, 1999).

Page 15 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

radioactive waste that went onto the ground in the area of the waste tanks;
and in August 1999, radioactive liquids entered pipes intended to indicate
fluid levels. As reported, and according to DOE officials, none of these
incidents caused a significant loss in work time, and all were aggressively
investigated. The site was given a departmental award in February 2000 for
excellence in occupational safety and health protection. Off- site
contamination at West Valley was generally within regulatory limits in the
1980s and 1990s, according to DOE. Surface water and sediment downstream
from the site in Buttermilk and Cattaraugus Creeks have not shown elevated
contamination from DOE activities, according to the Department. These creeks
carry groundwater and surface water from the site, through nearby Seneca
Nation of Indians lands to Lake Erie (about 35 miles distant), and
eventually over Niagara Falls.

Despite the progress made, decades of major cleanup work remain at West
Valley, including waste management, decontamination, and decommissioning. In
the near term, structures previously used for reprocessing operations and
currently used for vitrification operations need to be decontaminated. In
the longer term, into the mid- 2020s, depending on the agreed- upon cleanup
level for the site, these structures need to be torn down and either removed
off- site or left in place as radioactive rubble- prospectively encased in a
long- lasting protective cap. As currently projected by DOE, on- site
storage of vitrified high- level wastes is to continue for another decade
beyond the mid- 2020s, after which the site is to be decommissioned
according to NRC criteria and closed. Under current DOE plans, specific
actions include the following:

 Shutting down the vitrification facility. This process includes melter
deactivation, equipment and piping removal, and decontamination, and may
extend to about 2017.

 Placing into on- site storage and maintaining the high- level waste
canisters pending permanent disposal. On- site canister storage could extend
to 2036 through 2040 (followed by site closure in 2041).

 Decontamination and decommissioning, shipping waste, and completing
various on- site tasks required by the West Valley Act. For example, low-
level wastes are being shipped off- site, possibly until 2022, and on- site
transuranic wastes are to be addressed (including potentially shipping the
wastes to a receiver site) from 2003 to 2021.

Page 16 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

 Removal of spent fuel elements stored on- site. The fuel, in the form of
125 assemblies, is to be shipped to the Idaho Laboratory in 2001 so that
deactivating the storage facility at West Valley can occur during 2001 to
2005. 15

Some of these cleanup actions cannot be implemented without further
technological advances. According to DOE, at least 50 innovative
technologies are being pursued in connection with the West Valley cleanup in
the following five areas:

 cleaning up vitrification equipment, including the melter;

 detecting and characterizing radioactive constituents- for example, in
waste containers and wastewater discharge;

 treating and disposing of waste, including, for example, developing
alternate transportation systems for transuranic wastes;

 remediating subsurface contamination, including, for example, developing a
permeable barrier and construction techniques to address the on- site
groundwater plume; 16 and

 decontaminating and decommissioning facilities, including, for example,
reducing massive metal structures to a smaller size.

Specific needs related to cleaning up the vitrification facility have
included a remote- handled tooling system to segregate, reduce in size,
characterize, and package radioactively contaminated metal materials that
have been removed from the facility. A system to perform this task has been
in operation since July 1999 and is a first step toward a larger,
remotehandled waste facility for the site. This larger facility will be
needed to

15 Of an original 750 spent fuel assemblies, by 1985, DOE returned 625 to
the utilities that generated them. DOE had taken title to the remaining 125
assemblies in 1984 and plans to ship them to the Idaho Laboratory, under a
1996 settlement agreement with the state that permits shipment there after
2000. 16 Strontium- 90- contaminated groundwater, which emanated from the
original reprocessing

building and migrated on- site, has existed since the late 1960s to early
1970s, according to DOE, but was not identified and characterized until the
mid- 1990s. The plume now covers an area that is approximately 300 feet by
900 feet. The water is being pumped and treated, and a permeable
subterranean wall intended to prevent further migration is being tested on
an arm of the plume.

Page 17 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

conduct comparable tasks for larger equipment and materials in the
vitrification facility and in the tank area. A West Valley official said
that additional technologies would need to be developed if the agreed- upon
cleanup level and end state for West Valley were to require that the
underground tanks, buried highly radioactive wastes, and spent fuel onsite
are to be dug up and removed from the site.

Attempts to clean up West Valley are being hindered by several factors.
First, and most importantly, DOE and New York State continue to disagree on
which entity is principally responsible for exercising long- term
operational stewardship of the site under the West Valley Act, which entity
should pay the site?s prospective high- level waste disposal fees, and what
the site should look like in the future. Their differences are key to
facilitating long- term progress and are contributing to delays in
environmental planning milestones for the site. Specifically, because the
parties to the cleanup have not yet agreed on strategic issues affecting the
site?s cleanup- that is, what the site is to look like after the cleanup is
completed, how the land is to be used, and what regulatory cleanup standards
are to be used- a final environmental impact statement (EIS) for
decommissioning and closing the site has not yet been issued and the
scheduled date for a record of decision on a cleanup level has been
extended. An early scheduled date was 1997 but is now 2005 and could be
extended further. Until recently, DOE and the state had been formally
negotiating in an attempt to resolve their differences. As an incentive for
agreement, DOE had included a proposal addressing the issue of the payment
of prospective multimillion- dollar fees for disposal of West Valley?s high-
level wastes at a permanent repository. However, these confidential
negotiations broke down in January 2001 without an agreement. Second,
prospective NRC cleanup standards- referred to as decontamination and
decommissioning criteria- for the cleanup effort are to be issued in 2001,
perhaps in the spring. However, these standards as drafted differ from the
EPA environmental guidance and standards under CERCLA and the Safe Drinking
Water Act (as well as New York State radiation protection guidance) that
could be applied on- site. Third, it is uncertain where West Valley?s
nuclear wastes are to go, including both high- level and transuranic wastes.
Hundreds of millions of dollars in future costs could be at stake in
addressing these disposal questions. Several Factors Are

Hindering Progress on the West Valley Cleanup

Page 18 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The principal parties to the West Valley cleanup- DOE as site operator and
New York State as site owner- have been attempting to reach an agreement on
strategic issues affecting the site?s future in order to facilitate cleanup
planning and the timely and cost- effective cleanup and closure of the site.
However, to date, they have not reached such an agreement. Their current
relationship reflects the fact that, historically, the federal government
and the state have continuously differed on who should assume responsibility
for the wastes generated by commercial reprocessing at West Valley. For
example, in 1980, we reported that interested parties at West Valley were
influenced more by their desire to minimize their own responsibilities than
by attempting to arrive at the most practical solution. The issue of who
will take on- site responsibility is likely to continue for the foreseeable
future.

Although the West Valley Act does not require that DOE and New York State
reach agreement on the site?s future or how DOE will complete the cleanup
effort, NEPA encourages interested parties to cooperate in environmental
decisionmaking regarding sites such as West Valley. Consequently, it has
been DOE?s stated policy to work closely with the state on the West Valley
cleanup. Since mid- 1999, the two entities have been conducting confidential
negotiations on their future roles and responsibilities, particularly in the
areas of (1) on- site operational stewardship, (2) future cost- sharing, and
(3) an appropriate cleanup level and eventual use for the site. However, in
mid- January 2001, these negotiations broke down without an agreement.
Afterward, representatives of the two sides agreed that prospective long-
term operational stewardship of West Valley?s wastes was a major unresolved
issue. In this regard, DOE, as the site operator, prefers a cleanup level
that would involve significant remedial efforts but not require removal of
all the nuclear wastes off- site in order to achieve unrestricted site use.
DOE also foresees a limited operational presence on- site, although one
which could still last for decades. Conversely, New York State, as the site
owner, appears to prefer that DOE stay on- site operationally as long as
nuclear wastes are there (possibly for many more decades). To date, the
state has not put forward a preferred cleanup alternative for the site. It
has not ruled out the idea of leaving some nuclear wastes on- site, as DOE
favors, but has not yet agreed to DOE?s preferred approach. New York State
believes (1) the Department needs to do further analysis to demonstrate the
adequacy of its favored approach and (2) reaching an agreement is contingent
on DOE and the state agreeing on long- term on- site stewardship. DOE and
New York State

Have Not Resolved Issues Concerning the Site?s Future, Including Their Roles
and Responsibilities and Cost- Sharing

Page 19 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The two parties disagree in large part because they interpret the West
Valley Act differently and because they have clearly different interests to
protect. Specifically at issue is the extent of cleanup activities DOE is
required to conduct under the act, as well as the duration of DOE?s
obligation to conduct operations on- site to deal with the radioactive
contamination in buildings and burial areas resulting from commercial
reprocessing operations that preceded the Department?s presence. According
to DOE, under the act, New York State, as the site owner, is responsible for
the preexisting contamination, and ultimately responsible for addressing
land use issues there. DOE plans to limit its on- site decontamination and
decommissioning efforts to areas, facilities, and materials used in
conducting the waste vitrification project. The Department states that after
cleaning up West Valley, it does not become owner of the site. In this
regard, DOE foresees a long- term, but ultimately limited, departmental
operating role at West Valley, after which it expects to leave the site. 17
In recent years, DOE?s estimates for completing its onsite role have ranged
from 2005 to 2041, depending on programmatic and waste disposal assumptions.

On the other hand, New York State interprets the West Valley Act to require
a more extensive cleanup role for DOE and a longer- term departmental
operating presence- that is, as long as any nuclear waste remains on- site.
According to the state, DOE is responsible for decontaminating and
decommissioning all facilities and wastes in the 200- acre operations area,
except for the state disposal area and the materials buried in the NRC-
licensed disposal area prior to DOE?s presence. The state asserts that if
DOE?s cleanup efforts result in the need for long- term institutional
controls on- site, the Department should provide such controls. New York
State estimates the federal government is responsible for about 75 percent
of the spent fuel reprocessed at West Valley and therefore should rightly
stay on- site as a long- term caretaker- if one is needed- for any remaining
wastes generated from reprocessing. 18 New York State officials have also
said the state does not want responsibility for ensuring the long- term
performance of the high- level waste tanks or

17 According to DOE, after the Department leaves West Valley, in order to
help protect public health and the environment, it would bear at least a
part of the financial responsibility for monitoring and maintaining- and
revisiting where necessary- any onsite cleanup remedies it had put in place
there. 18 New York State further asserts that DOE has additional
responsibilities for the waste in

the state- licensed and NRC- licensed disposal areas under CERCLA.

Page 20 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

other DOE- engineered barriers. As in the past, New York State believes that
the federal government, in addition to its legal responsibilities, has the
necessary technical and financial resources to fully clean up West Valley.

DOE and New York State also have historically disagreed on who is
responsible for paying the fees that are due if West Valley?s high- level
wastes are to be disposed of in a permanent repository. The disagreement is
not about who owns the wastes- the two sides agree that they are state
owned. At issue is who should pay for disposal and under which laws. Under
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, nuclear facilities seeking access to a
prospective permanent repository must sign a contract for disposal and pay a
fee into the nuclear waste fund that was set up to cover the disposal costs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the West Valley Act and its implementing
cooperative agreement between the Department and New York State, DOE
officials said that, under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, West Valley?s
owner, like the owners of other nuclear facilities, must pay this fee, which
covers full disposal costs, prior to having the site?s wastes disposed of in
the repository. On the other hand, the state argues that the provisions of
the West Valley Act and its implementing cooperative agreement make the
signing of a disposal contract under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
both inappropriate and redundant. 19 In the state?s view, the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act requires payment from a nonfederal party only for the disposal of
spent fuel or high- level waste from a civilian nuclear power reactor.
According to the state, the West Valley high- level wastes are a unique
federal- civilian mixture not covered under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(or, if covered, are ?wastes from atomic energy defense activities? for
which DOE is liable).

DOE has unsuccessfully pursued the resolution of this matter for many years.
In the recent confidential negotiations, the Department offered a proposal
concerning the degree to which DOE and New York State would be responsible
for paying the fee, in order to give the state an incentive to reach a
timely agreement on a proposed cleanup level for the site and to resolve
other important issues at the site. According to DOE, under its proposal,
(1) to settle all outstanding issues between the Department and

19 Under an agreement between New York State and the original site operator
and the 1980 cooperative agreement between DOE and New York, the state has
been managing a perpetual care fund for West Valley that was intended to be
paid to the Department upon delivery of the solidified high- level wastes to
a repository. Currently, this fund contains about $21.9 million. This
amount, according to DOE, does not begin to cover the site?s total
prospective costs for high- level waste disposal.

Page 21 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

the state, the Department would agree to assume a portion of New York
State?s responsibility to pay for the disposal of the high- level waste in
return for monetary and other valuable considerations from the state and (2)
DOE would still have no obligation to take title to and dispose of West
Valley?s high- level waste unless New York State enters into a disposal
contract under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and pays the disposal fee.
According to DOE officials, the proposal would achieve long- term,
multimillion- dollar overall cleanup cost savings for both DOE and the
state. Following the recent breakdown of the DOE- New York State
negotiations, DOE withdrew the proposal, and it is unclear whether it could
be revived. According to DOE, the Department and New York State are
exchanging information to help determine when negotiations should
appropriately be resumed.

The DOE- New York State relationship is key to facilitating the cleanup of
West Valley and has been a factor in delaying environmental planning
milestones for the site. The differences between the two parties were less
important in the past, when on- site cleanup efforts were focused almost
entirely on vitrification- a cleanup step favored by all interested parties.
However, the parties? differences have become more prominent in recent years
as cleanup planning has turned increasingly toward long- term
decommissioning and closure of the facility. Facility decommissioning will
require decisionmaking on controversial, unresolved issues, such as
prospective off- site high- level waste tank removal versus entombment
onsite.

The differences between DOE and the state, including their lack of agreement
on the site?s future, are affecting the pace of the West Valley
environmental planning process under NEPA. Under NEPA, the Department is
required to integrate environmental considerations into its planning, and
the Department has historically included the state as a joint participant in
the environmental analysis for the site. DOE has conducted NEPA compliance
efforts for West Valley since the 1980s, 20 but this

20 An environmental impact statement (EIS) for the vitrification phase at
West Valley was completed in 1982. In 1987, a U. S. district court in New
York State approved a Stipulation of Compromise that outlined NEPA
compliance requirements for DOE to follow, directing the Department to
include its on- site waste disposal practices in a full EIS for West Valley,
instead of addressing these wastes in a less extensive environmental
assessment that the Department had regarded as sufficient. The stipulation
resulted from a suit brought by the Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes
and Radioactive Waste Campaign, local environmental interests that were
concerned about DOE?s waste disposal practices at the site.

Page 22 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

process still has not resulted in a final EIS for the site or a record of
decision on a cleanup level. 21 Specifically, because of a lack of agreement
among the parties, including DOE and the state, the draft EIS for cleaning
up the site was issued in 1996 without including a preferred cleanup
alternative. Instead, it laid out five cleanup alternatives that ranged
widely, from limited remedial actions, referred to as ?in place
stabilization? of the contamination (at costs ranging from about $400
million to about $1. 1 billion, depending on the specific option chosen), to
more extensive actions, ranging from ?on premises storage? of the
contamination in new facilities (at a cost of about $3.7 billion) to full
cleanup of the site to an unrestricted end state- referred to as the
?removal? option (at a cost of about $8. 3 billion). To date, none of these
alternatives has been selected as preferred, and no final EIS has been
issued.

The continuing inability of the parties, especially DOE and New York State,
to choose among cleanup alternatives for West Valley limits progress with
NEPA compliance, as well as overall cleanup planning, and has resulted in
changing DOE estimates of when- following issuance of a final EIS- a record
of decision for the site could be issued. The estimated date for a record of
decision has been extended several times, from October 1997, to May 2000, to
the latest estimate of 2005. 22 In retrospect, according to DOE officials at
West Valley, the changing estimates indicate overly optimistic past
assessments of how difficult it might be for interested parties to decide on
a preferred cleanup alternative for the site. They said the 2005 date is a
reasonable current estimate, and while it could be marginally accelerated,
if at all, it could also be extended if there is no agreement soon on the
site?s future. Concerned about potential cleanup delays, DOE has recently
chosen to split the EIS development process into

21 NEPA requires agencies, prior to major programmatic actions such as the
West Valley cleanup, to consider whether these actions will significantly
affect the quality of the human environment. Under NEPA, similar to the
cleanup process required by CERCLA, interested parties work toward an agreed
end- state for a site cleanup, which they develop through (1) issuing a
draft EIS, (2) choosing a preferred cleanup alternative, (3) issuing a final
EIS, and (4) issuing a record of decision formally detailing the cleanup
agreement. 22 If met, this date will conclude a roughly two- decade West
Valley cleanup decisionmaking

process under NEPA.

Page 23 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

two phases, so that near- term post- vitrification cleanup work will not be
delayed by NEPA compliance considerations. 23

DOE and New York State officials maintain that their negotiating differences
have not yet seriously affected the pace of environmental planning for West
Valley or the overall progress of the cleanup. According to DOE headquarters
and field officials, this is because, until recently, the Department has
been more focused on vitrification than on later phases of the cleanup and
is only now turning more attention to decontamination and subsequent
decommissioning. Also, according to the Department, its environmental
planning for West Valley does not depend on its negotiating efforts with the
state, and therefore if no agreement is reached with the state, the
Department can proceed with its NEPA compliance efforts without the state?s
participation. A DOE official said that difficulties in developing a
preferred alternative and the desire to give the public an ample opportunity
to comment have been reasons for not including a preferred alternative in
the 1996 draft EIS and for not having made it final since then. Departmental
officials said that despite the lack of a preferred alternative for West
Valley, day- to- day cleanup work is continuing, focusing on nearer- term
work steps (such as decontamination of structures) that will be necessary
regardless of which alternative is eventually chosen.

According to DOE, the Department can complete all of its responsibilities
under the West Valley Act even if negotiations with New York State never
resume, but a DOE official said that if differences with the state continue
in coming years, there could be more serious effects on the overall costs
and schedule of the cleanup. In our view, the Department underestimates the
degree to which the continuing lack of agreement among the parties-
especially DOE and New York State- concerning the site?s long- term future
is already limiting the precision and pace of DOE?s cleanup planning for
West Valley, as evidenced in lengthy NEPA compliance efforts, frequently
changing planning milestones, and uncertain, varying cleanup cost and
schedule estimates.

23 In September 2000, DOE announced that it would continue its environmental
impact analysis for West Valley in two phases, with two separate final EISs-
the first phase covering agreed- upon cleanup steps (over the next year or
2), and the second phase covering more controversial cleanup steps that have
not yet been agreed upon (over the next few years).

Page 24 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Under the West Valley Act, DOE?s cleanup of the facility is to occur in
accordance with cleanup standards to be issued by NRC. 24 However, these
standards, which are important regulatory criteria for decontaminating and
decommissioning the site, have been lacking since the act was passed in
1980. NRC first developed cleanup standards for its licensees, such as
commercial nuclear power plants, in 1997. However, these standards (referred
to as NRC?s license termination rule) were not designed specifically for
West Valley. Prospective standards for West Valley were issued in draft form
in December 1999 and are based substantially on the 1997 standards.
Following a period of public comment, NRC is now reviewing the draft
standards, and NRC officials expect them to be issued in 2001, perhaps in
the spring. 25 Such standards- principally including numerical limits on
public exposure to any remaining on- site nuclear radiation after the site
is cleaned up- are a necessary component of any nuclear cleanup effort.
Commonly expressed as millirem of exposure to an individual annually, these
limits help to quantify ?how clean is clean? at a cleanup site. 26

Like NRC?s 1997 standards, the prospective West Valley standards are to
include an exposure limit of 25 millirem a year to an individual from all
means of exposure (or ?pathways?)- through air, water, and soil on- site at
West Valley. Also, according to NRC officials, the standards will likely
include higher limits for on- site locations where the level of 25 millirem
a year for unrestricted access is not attainable. In such locations, such as
burial areas for high- activity wastes, higher limits (100 or 500 millirem a
year, depending on the situation) would be applicable, combined with
restrictions on public access to these areas. Such a regulatory approach
would recognize the need for long- term institutional controls at some
locations at West Valley.

The timing of the issuance for, and the prospective content of, the West
Valley standards have been of concern to interested parties. Such

24 NRC is not currently an on- site regulator but will be in the future when
its license to New York State is reinstated. 25 NRC is authorized under the
West Valley Act to prescribe the standards, which it published in the
Federal Register in the form of a Draft Policy Statement on Decommissioning
Criteria for the West Valley Demonstration Project and the West Valley Site

26 A millirem is a commonly used unit of measurement of the biological
effect of radiation. The radiation from a routine chest X- ray is equivalent
to about 6 millirem. NRC Has Drafted Cleanup

Standards for West Valley, but EPA?s Guidance and Standards Could Also Apply
at the Site

Page 25 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

standards were arguably less needed in the 1980s, when the first phase of
the cleanup- the high- level waste vitrification project at West Valley- was
gearing up. According to the 1981 DOE- NRC memorandum of understanding
accompanying the West Valley Act, NRC was to issue the standards after DOE
analyzed environmental options for the site. In this regard, DOE?s analyses
have been ongoing for at least a decade (including the development of the
1996 draft EIS), and are still under way. The Department has been concerned
that NRC may issue final cleanup standards prematurely, before West Valley?s
environmental analyses are completed. Specifically, DOE has said that the
issued standards could contain restrictions developed on the basis of
incomplete environmental analysis that could prevent consideration of
potentially cost- effective cleanup alternatives. On the other hand, some
observers, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, have argued that
issuance of the NRC standards is long overdue and should not be further
delayed because they are needed to help guide cleanup planning and analysis.
Some have said the standards should adhere closely to the 1997
decommissioning standards and not include provisions, or ?exceptions,? that
could circumvent the standards? protective intent. According to NRC
officials, a few years after the final standards for West Valley are issued,
prior to a prospective record of decision for the site, the agency plans to
(1) review whether DOE applied the standards in developing a decommissioning
EIS for the facility and (2) decide whether DOE?s preferred cleanup approach
in the EIS meets NRC?s standards. The officials said the evaluation would
take into account lessons learned from any further environmental analysis
that DOE may conduct in the meantime.

Although NRC has standard- setting authority under the West Valley Act,
EPA?s environmental guidance and standards- which apply to both chemicals
and radionuclides, versus NRC?s radiation- specific standards- could also
apply on- site. In this regard, implementation of the West Valley Act does
not preclude EPA from exercising its own, potentially more restrictive
cleanup authority at West Valley under CERCLA and the Safe Drinking Water
Act. 27 While NRC?s standards could be applied on- site

27 While NRC?s standards are radiation- dose- based, CERCLA is risk based (a
lifetime cancer risk range of 1 in 10, 000 to 1 in 1 million from both
chemicals and radionuclides). Also, under EPA?s CERCLA guidance, radiation
exposure to individuals is limited to 15 millirem a year from all exposure
means. Further, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, EPA?s approach includes
separate, additional groundwater protection to meet drinking water standards
(which originally were roughly equivalent to 4 millirem a year, but now vary
in dose equivalency, depending on the radionuclide).

Page 26 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

during decommissioning, CERCLA could be separately enforced- for example, in
response to a citizen?s petition, according to EPA and NRC officials. In
regard to groundwater protection, an area of special EPA protective concern,
EPA?s approach may be more restrictive than NRC?s and therefore potentially
significantly more costly to comply with. In addition, New York State?s
Department of Environmental Conservation has issued cleanup guidance that
could apply to West Valley. 28

On the basis of its 1987 and 1995 assessments, EPA does not plan to take
future remedial actions at West Valley under CERCLA. However, in a May 1999
letter to DOE?s West Valley office, EPA cautioned that cleaning up the site
to prospective NRC standards of 25 millirem a year might not adequately
protect human health or the environment. In addition, in commenting in
January 2000 on NRC?s developing standards for West Valley, EPA called for
West Valley?s groundwater to be protected to drinking water standards and
for additional site- specific analysis to ensure such protection in the long
term. NRC, EPA, and New York State officials have had discussions during
2000 on their different standards and guidance. They have agreed that they
need to further explain to DOE how their various criteria and guidance may
apply to different locations and activities at West Valley. However, to
date, they have not said how their different standards and guidance are to
be implemented on- site so as to avoid potential dual regulation.

As we reported in 1994 and in June 2000, NRC and EPA have had ongoing
differences on cleanup standards. 29 They have recently attempted to resolve
the differences through a memorandum of understanding. Their history of
disagreement at other NRC- licensed sites indicates that cleanup standards
for West Valley could also be disputed, especially with respect to
groundwater protection. According to EPA, the two agencies have generally
coordinated their regulatory activities effectively at NRClicensed sites
where their standards both apply. However, NRC and EPA

28 New York State guidance calls for 10- millirem- a- year protection to an
individual, plus 4 millirem a year for groundwater. New York State officials
have spoken in favor of one set of sitewide standards for West Valley. 29
Nuclear Health and Safety: Consensus on Acceptable Radiation Risk to the
Public Is Lacking (GAO/ RCED- 94- 190, Sept. 19, 1994); Radiation Standards:
Scientific Basis Inconclusive, and EPA and NRC Disagreement Continues (GAO/
RCED- 00- 152, June 30,

2000). In the latter report, we recommended that the congressional
committees of jurisdiction may wish to clarify the two agencies? regulatory
responsibilities relating to decommissioning NRC- licensed sites.

Page 27 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

have disagreed for many years on this matter and have been attempting for
over a year to issue a final memorandum of understanding clarifying their
regulatory roles. Such a memorandum could likewise apply to West Valley (an
NRC- licensed site whose license is currently in abeyance). As of March
2001, the two agencies were keeping the Congress informed of their efforts
but had not completed a final memorandum.

Unresolved issues concerning the disposal of West Valley?s high- level and
transuranic nuclear wastes may also hinder cleaning up the site in a more
timely manner. The vitrified high- level wastes are being temporarily stored
in a work room or ?cell? in the current vitrification facility (which is
part of the former spent fuel reprocessing facility), awaiting further
disposition. (See fig. 3.) The transuranic wastes are currently stored at
two locations- a building for so- called ?lag? storage and the chemical
process cell waste storage area (and some were buried in the NRC- licensed
disposal area during commercial reprocessing operations). 30 Questions of
where these wastes will eventually go, when, and at what cost are still to
be addressed.

Under the West Valley Act, both types of waste are to be disposed of before
the cleanup is completed. If disposal does not happen in a timely manner,
their care and maintenance could add substantially to the overall costs and
schedule for the West Valley cleanup- potentially hundreds of millions of
dollars, with schedule extensions of up to two decades. In 1997, DOE issued
a policy- in the form of a programmatic EIS and two records of decision-
stating that high- level and transuranic wastes are to remain stored at
sites where they have been generated for the foreseeable future, pending a
decision on final disposition. Thus, any options for interim offsite storage
of West Valley?s high- level and transuranic wastes would require the
Department to make an exception to this policy. 31

Off- site removal of West Valley?s high- level wastes could result in
hundreds of millions of dollars in potential savings, in part through not
having to construct an interim storage facility for the canisters at West
Valley. This could be accomplished by removing the wastes to another DOE
site for interim storage, followed by later disposal in a permanent
repository. Other DOE sites, such as Savannah River, the Idaho

30 About 521 cubic meters of transuranic wastes are in the inventory, and 24
cubic meters more are expected to be generated during the cleanup. 31 In
regard to on- site low- level waste, substantial quantities (over 61, 000
cubic feet) have

been shipped off- site to the Envirocare facility in Utah since 1997. The
Future Location of

West Valley?s Nuclear Wastes Is Unresolved

Page 28 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Laboratory, Hanford, and the Nevada Test Site, could feasibly accept the
West Valley wastes for interim storage, according to DOE officials. They
said such a step could result in net cost savings from the elimination of
years of storage and maintenance costs at West Valley. Sites such as
Savannah River are expected to spend substantial amounts for storage of
their own vitrified high- level wastes, beyond which the added costs of
storing a relatively few canisters from West Valley are likely to be
marginal. Furthermore, a 1997 DOE headquarters analysis estimated cost
avoidance of about $770 million over the next 10 years through interim
offsite storage of West Valley?s high- level wastes. 32 The analysis assumed
that early deployment of a high- level waste shipping system and off- site
interim storage of the West Valley wastes would occur as part of an
integrated, DOE- wide nuclear waste management effort. However, DOE
officials recognized that state compliance agreements, other legal
constraints, and political equity considerations among states could preclude
taking such an action.

DOE?s plans in the 1990s to ship the West Valley canisters to the Savannah
River Site at the beginning of the 2000s are a case in point. The canisters
could have been added to the larger inventory there on an interim basis,
pending removal to a permanent repository. According to various DOE West
Valley analyses, shipment would have begun anywhere from 2001 to 2007. The
Department presented the option to the Savannah River citizens? advisory
board, which recommended the option be implemented (with some dissenters on
equity grounds). In 1999, however, the state of South Carolina halted the
plan. According to DOE officials, state officials said DOE had not properly
informed them of the plan and the governor opposed it. DOE officials said
that on the basis of the recent experience with the state of South Carolina,
they have no current plans for interim offsite storage of West Valley?s
high- level wastes.

With regard to permanent disposal, DOE currently plans to remove the West
Valley canisters to a permanent repository. Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is the
prospective repository and, if approved, is projected to open in 2010.
However, meeting this target date will depend on many technological and
political factors. As discussed earlier, not the least of these factors is a
timely decision on who- New York State or DOE- should pay the fee for

32 Contractor Report to DOE on Opportunities for Integration of
Environmental Management Activities Across the Complex (pre- decisional
draft), INEL/ EXT- 97- 00065, Mar. 1997. In the report, cost avoidance
represented money that would not have to be added to departmental 10- year
plans to fill program gaps.

Page 29 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

disposal of West Valley?s wastes. Because DOE assumes a pessimistic scenario
for prospective disposal of West Valley?s wastes at Yucca Mountain, the
Department currently projects that the high- level waste canisters would not
be shipped to the prospective Nevada repository until 2036 to 2040, at the
end of the time frame projected for disposal there. Current DOE estimates
indicate that if the wastes could instead be shipped to permanent off- site
disposal in the mid 2020s, up to $100 million in West Valley cleanup costs
could be saved. 33

With respect to West Valley?s transuranic wastes. millions of dollars could
be saved in disposal costs, depending on which disposal option is chosen. 34
Under the West Valley Act, the transuranic wastes generated as part of
project activities are to be disposed of prior to site closure. DOE?s recent
plans do not specify a destination, but the latest plans have projected
offsite removal of these wastes between 2007 and 2021. Both interim off-
site storage and direct shipment to permanent disposal may be options,
depending on technological, legal, and political factors, and any of several
larger DOE sites could be candidates for interim storage.

An existing transuranic waste disposal facility- the Waste Isolation Pilot
Project (WIPP) in New Mexico, which has been in operation since 1999-
appears to be a feasible permanent destination for West Valley?s transuranic
wastes. However, under the authorizing legislation for WIPP, the facility is
to receive only transuranic wastes generated in connection with defense-
related activities. According to DOE officials, West Valley?s transuranic
wastes do not meet this criterion and are considered commercial wastes.
Departmental officials said options for gaining access for these wastes to
WIPP include seeking an amendment to the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act or an
administrative change to recategorize West Valley?s transuranic wastes as
defense- related. The basis for such an administrative change would be the
fact that the site?s transuranic wastes consist of

33 Beyond off- site disposal of West Valley nuclear wastes, DOE- wide
consolidation of nuclear wastes now located at multiple sites around the
country could save many billions of dollars. For example, DOE?s Mar. 1997
study on integration opportunities estimated total savings for high- level
waste storage at over $18 billion over 10 years, and for transuranic waste
storage at over $3 billion. The study took legal and regulatory constraints
into account but did not attempt to fully account for equity considerations
and political acceptability. 34 These wastes come in two forms: Some are
more highly radioactive, requiring remote

handling by machinery for worker safety; others are less radioactive and can
be handled by personnel wearing protective clothing.

Page 30 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

commingled wastes resulting from spent fuel generated in both commercial and
defense nuclear reactors. According to a DOE official, the Department
currently favors obtaining a legislative change to gain access to WIPP for
West Valley?s wastes, but officials said that seeking an immediate amendment
to the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act may be inopportune since implementation of
disposal operations at WIPP has only recently begun.

The 1997 DOE study on integration opportunities estimated that $13 million
in cost avoidance could be achieved over 10 years at West Valley if a
significant portion of the site?s remote- handled transuranic wastes could
be shipped to off- site locations for interim storage, pending potential
WIPP access. This estimate assumed appropriate packaging in large containers
for shipment to alternate sites and the implementation of a new
transportation package to handle the containers. 35 The same analysis
estimated that disposing of all of West Valley?s transuranic wastes at WIPP
(assuming access was obtained) could avoid about $4 million in storage and
maintenance costs at West Valley. 36 As with high- level waste disposal,
state compliance agreements, other legal constraints, and equity issues
among states could be factors in any effort to implement an interim storage
approach for West Valley?s transuranic wastes. States with facilities that
could readily accept such wastes- such as South Carolina and Washington
State, for example- do not wish to be perceived as continually receiving
transuranic and other nuclear wastes from other states, particularly from
states that may have historically carried an arguably lesser share of the
overall national burden for disposing of nuclear waste. In states that host
DOE?s nuclear facilities, the Department has already invested substantial
time and resources in negotiating acceptable arrangements for nuclear waste
management, in response to the requirements of the Federal Facility
Compliance Act and commitments made to governors.

35 This analysis also assumed that these efforts would be part of an overall
departmental waste management integration effort. 36 Moreover, the analysis
estimated that implementing mobile packaging systems for use at multiple
sites where transuranic wastes were located- and using such a system to
package 466 cubic meters of remotely handled transuranic wastes at West
Valley- could potentially avoid $250 million in costs.

Page 31 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

DOE?s estimates of West Valley?s total cleanup costs and a date for
completing the cleanup have been uncertain and will remain so until
strategic issues are agreed upon, including the extent to which the site is
to be cleaned up and what it will then look like, how the land is to be
used, what regulatory cleanup standards are to be used, and where the site?s
nuclear wastes are to go. DOE?s estimates have shown large cost increases
and schedule extensions- as well as variations- since DOE first reported
them to the Congress in 1978, as part of congressional deliberations leading
to enactment of the 1980 West Valley Act. In 1978, the estimated cleanup
cost was $180 million, or about $1. 1 billion in year- 2000 dollars, with
cleanup completion in 1990. 37 These were preliminary estimates, made before
the cleanup challenge at the site was fully understood. Estimates in the
1990s have shown considerably greater costs. These cost estimates also have
varied by billions of dollars, and the completion schedule by decades,
depending on the programmatic assumptions made. DOE?s current estimate of
total cleanup costs is about $4. 5 billion, with site closure by 2041. The
various estimates are listed in table 1.

37 In 1978, the Department estimated initial costs could range between $41.6
million and $1.1 billion (in 1978 dollars) depending on the cleanup option
chosen. As we stated in our report, Status of Efforts to Clean Up the Shut-
Down Western New York Nuclear Service Center (EMD- 80- 69, June 6, 1980),
most parties, at that time, agreed that a more reasonable

initial cost estimate would be about $180 million (in 1978 dollars). The
Department also estimated in the 1978 report that the cleanup could begin as
early as October 1980 and, depending on the cleanup option chosen, be
completed within about 10 years, or by about 1990. West Vall ey?s Total

Cleanup Costs and Schedule Cannot Be Estimated With Reasonable Certainty
Until the Future of the Site Is Agreed On

Page 32 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Table 1: Changes in Estimated Total West Valley Cleanup Costs and Completion
Schedule

Dollars in billions (Present Value 2000)

Date and source of DOE estimate Estimated total

cleanup cost Estimated completion date Cost above

1978 estimate Years more than 1978 estimate

Nov. 1978: Study supporting the West Valley Act a $1.1 1990 June 1996:
Baseline Report b 5.8 2025 $4.7 35 July 1996: Ten- Year Plan c 3.8 2005 2.7
15 Dec. 1997: Draft 2006 Plan d 3.8 2005 2.7 15 Feb. 1998: Paths to Closure
Update e 3.8 2006 2.8 16 July 1999: Paths to Closure Update f 4.3 2015 3.3
25 May 2000: Current plan g 4.5 2041 h 3.5 51

a The estimates were contained in the study, Western New York Nuclear
Services Center Study, TID28905- 2, made before the West Valley Act was
enacted. The estimates were preliminary, based on a study that assumed
cleanup could begin as early as October 1980. The estimates used available
information and experience rather than detailed designs. In the study, DOE
identified technical options for cleaning up the facilities and nuclear
waste at the site. Included in the study were cost and schedule estimates
associated with these options. We examined these options closely, focusing
on the cost estimates in the study that were most consistent with the
Department?s currently preferred cleanup approach- a degree of aggressive
on- site cleanup, with some radioactive contamination left in place under
long- term stewardship. We converted the 1978 estimates to present value
2000 dollars, resulting in estimated cleanup costs of about $1. 1 billion.
Similarly, we focused on schedule estimates in the study that were most
consistent with DOE?s currently planned cleanup approach, resulting in an
approximate cleanup start date of October 1980 and an approximate completion
date of September 1990.

b Baseline Environmental Management Report. The report, called BEMR,
averaged the cost of several cleanup alternatives reported in the West
Valley Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Jan. 1996, DOE/ EIS- 0226- D. c
Ten- Year Plan. The plan was used to support DOE?s fiscal year 1998 budget
formulation.

d Fiscal year 1997- 98 Draft 2006 Plan. The plan was used to support DOE?s
fiscal year 1999 budget formulation and became known as the Accelerated
Clean- up: Paths to Closure report. e Fiscal year 1998 Accelerated Clean-
up: Paths to Closure (ACPC) Update. The plan was used to support DOE?s
fiscal year 2000 budget formulation. f Fiscal year 1999 ACPC Update. The
plan was an internal DOE document used to support DOE?s fiscal year 2001
budget formulation. Estimated completion date based on funding at a higher,
more efficient level. Funding at a level closer to actual current
appropriations was estimated to extend the completion date to 2023. g Fiscal
year 2000 Integrated Planning Accountability and Budgeting System (IPABS)
Planning Module Update. The plan was an internal document used to support
the fiscal year 2002 budget formulation and is consistent with
implementation of DOE?s currently envisioned action alternative for site
closure. We did not include in the table a publicly released DOE estimate,
in the report entitled Status Report on Paths to Closure, March 2000, which
was based on 1999 data. h Estimated completion date, based on the most
likely funding level, is 2023 for all tasks except disposition of high-
level waste canisters. DOE?s plan is to ship the canisters to an off- site
federal repository from 2036 to 2040, with site closure in 2041.

Page 33 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

As shown in table 1, the initial cost estimate has more than quadrupled,
from about $1.1 billion to about $4. 5 billion in the latest estimate, while
the initial time estimated to complete the cleanup has increased by about 50
years (from 1990 to 2041). Several factors contributed to these changes. The
initial 1978 DOE estimates were preliminary, using available information and
experience rather than detailed designs. Furthermore, according to DOE
officials, when the initial estimate was made of project costs and cleanup
duration, it did not adequately consider the changing environmental
landscape for this first- of- a- kind project and did not anticipate the
complex regulatory environment and laws that have since come into existence.
In addition, as we previously reported, DOE management problems occurred at
West Valley in the 1980s, resulting in cost and schedule overruns.

As also shown in the table, during the 1990s, the estimated costs for West
Valley varied, with totals ranging from $3.8 billion to $5. 8 billion.
Moreover, different estimates both extended and shortened the estimated
schedule, with the estimated increase in the duration of the cleanup ranging
from 15 to 51 years. These different totals reflect different, evolving
departmental initiatives to quantify the total costs and schedule of the
Department?s cleanup effort across the nuclear complex. Causes of variations
in the estimates have included different estimation methods and varying
major assumptions related to cleanup and nuclear waste disposal. For
example, DOE officials said the June 1996 Baseline Report estimates for West
Valley were part of a first departmental attempt to quantify the extent of
the cleanup problem complexwide, and these estimates were not precise. They
were taken from data supporting the site?s 1996 draft EIS and simply
averaged the cost of several cleanup alternatives shown in the draft.

The July 1996, 1997, and 1998 estimates for West Valley were lower than the
Baseline Report estimates, in part because they were based on departmental
guidance that called upon DOE?s sites, including West Valley, to use
ambitious assumptions aimed at accelerating the cleanup and reducing costs
within current budget trends. For example, these estimates assumed an
accelerated period of about 10 years to complete the cleanup, off- site
interim storage of the high- level waste canisters, and generally flat
funding of $123 million annually. Accelerating the cleanup schedule at West
Valley without funding adjustments created a substantial planning gap
between funding needs and availability within the given time frame. The
Department proposed closing the gap through cost savings generated by
conducting cleanup projects more efficiently. However, according to DOE West
Valley officials, the idea of accelerating the

Page 34 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

cleanup of West Valley to achieve completion in 2005 was not realistic and
could not be implemented.

The current estimate of about $4.5 billion with completion in 2041 is based
on DOE?s latest cleanup plans for West Valley. DOE officials said this
estimate is reasonable, solidly grounded, and the best available based on
known information. The estimate, according to these officials, includes
opportunities to lower the cost as well as areas that could end up costing
more. For example, the current estimate indicates completion of major
cleanup tasks by the mid- 2020s, and assumes that the high- level waste
canisters cannot be shipped to a permanent off- site repository until 2036
through 2040 (with site closure in 2041). According to DOE, although this
time frame assumes a lack of earlier access to a prospective permanent
repository, such as Yucca Mountain, earlier shipment is a possibility if a
valid contract assigning disposal costs can be signed with New York State.
Shipping them earlier, such as in the mid- 2020s, would lower the total cost
of the cleanup. Conversely, some cleanup tasks, such as dealing with the
melter used in vitrification, might cost much more than currently estimated
because of uncertainty about how to conduct these tasks. DOE officials
recognize that the current estimate is uncertain, in part because it does
not reflect an agreed- upon cleanup level and site end use. Depending on the
cleanup level, on- site cleanup costs could vary widely, as illustrated in
the analysis done for DOE?s 1996 draft EIS for West Valley. In the draft
EIS, DOE outlined action alternatives ranging from limited remedial actions,
referred to as ?in place stabilization? of the contamination (at costs
ranging from about $400 million to about $1. 1 billion, depending on
specific options), to more extensive actions such as ?on premises storage?
of the contamination in new facilities (at a cost of about $3. 7 billion),
to full cleanup of the site to an unrestricted end state- referred to as the

?removal? option (at a cost of about $8. 3 billion). 38 A DOE official said
that until an appropriate end state for the site is agreed upon, any
estimates of total West Valley cleanup costs and completion date will not be
entirely credible.

38 In 1996 dollars.

Page 35 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The problems DOE faces at West Valley reflect many of the same dilemmas it
faces elsewhere in the nuclear complex. West Valley is yet another example
of how complicated, uncertain, and subject to cost and schedule changes the
cleanup process can be, especially at technologically difficult cleanup
sites where an appropriate cleanup level and land use have not been agreed
upon and multiple types of contamination are involved. In such
circumstances, planners find it difficult to estimate with a reasonable
degree of certainty an individual cleanup project?s overall costs and
schedule. By extension, DOE?s ability to quantify with a degree of certainty
the costs and timetables for the cleanup across the entire complex is to
some degree in question- especially at other, larger DOE sites that also
lack fully agreed- upon cleanup levels and/ or end states. With regard to
nuclear waste disposal, West Valley is part of an approaching national
decision on what to do with the over 200 underground tanks across the DOE
complex and the traces of high- level wastes left in them after
vitrification. Are the tanks to be dug up, using technologies that are still
to be developed and that potentially require significant expenditures, and
removed to an as- yet- undetermined disposal location, or can they be safely
left in place and under long- term stewardship? The Natural Resources
Defense Council is currently challenging in court DOE?s waste management
order that could permit a tank ?entombment? strategy to be implemented at
West Valley and elsewhere.

Since the late 1980s, DOE has been committed to estimating total cleanup
costs and schedules complexwide. Such estimates are potentially useful to
the Department in planning for over 300 cleanup projects at its over 100
nuclear sites. The estimates are also useful to the Congress in fulfilling
its oversight responsibilities, and they help to inform the public about the
status of the cleanup program. These estimates have grown over time as more
is learned about the number of sites contaminated and the types of
contamination. However, as we have previously reported, these estimates have
varied considerably, and their reliability has been questioned. In April
1999, we reported that the uncertainty of DOE?s estimates of the cost and
schedule for the complexwide cleanup was a matter of concern and depended on
various programmatic assumptions. 39 Such assumptions may include funding
levels, the facilities and wastes that are to be included in

39 Nuclear Waste: DOE?s Accelerated Cleanup Strategy Has Benefits but Faces
Uncertainties (GAO/ RCED- 99- 129, Apr. 30, 1999). West Valley Reflects

DOE- Wide Cleanup Dilemmas and Has Implications for National Decisions on
Nuclear Waste Disposal

West Valley Reflects Dilemmas in DOE?s Complexwide Cleanup Planning

Page 36 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

the scope of the analysis, the availability of waste disposal options, or
other factors.

West Valley?s recent widely varying cost and schedule estimates call into
question DOE?s estimates at other sites, especially those that lack
agreedupon cleanup levels and land uses. Many sites across the complex lack
a final agreement with their regulators, such as EPA and the state, on the
cleanup levels that must be achieved- that is, ?how clean is clean.?
Furthermore, two of the largest cleanup sites in the complex, Savannah River
and Hanford, have long- term cleanup goals that have been less than
completely defined. Hanford has a land use plan, but cleanup levels and
disposal standards remain to be established, and Savannah River has a
comprehensive site use plan, but land uses could change significantly as
they are further considered by interested parties. Moreover, like West
Valley, both sites face decisions on high- level waste disposal and the
disposition of their on- site underground storage tanks. The disposition of
these tanks- 51 at Savannah River and 177 at Hanford- remains a
multibillion- dollar cost uncertainty. The estimated total costs at these
two sites alone will likely dominate DOE?s cleanup program for the
foreseeable future because they account for a major part of the cost of the
entire program. (In 1998, Hanford?s total costs were estimated at about $50
billion and Savannah River?s at about $30 billion, compared with a
thenestimated complexwide cost of $147 billion.)

On a complexwide basis, DOE?s cleanup cost and schedule estimates are likely
to be revised as more becomes known at many sites about the levels of
cleanup that must be reached and the technologies to be used. In this
regard, the Department has made some recent strides in improving the quality
of its annual estimates of the costs and schedule for cleaning up the
complex. As we reported in 1998, DOE has called upon field offices to
provide more information on (1) the range of potential site cleanup options
for sites whose cleanup levels are uncertain and (2) long- term maintenance
and surveillance costs for sites that have been cleaned up. The latest
estimate, about $198 billion, is based on a range of from $184 billion to
$212 billion. According to DOE, the range reflects uncertainties recognized
in the estimate and better communicates the uncertainties of projects that
are innovative and complex. 40

40 To obtain the estimates, DOE?s environmental management office analyzed
field office data to estimate projects? base, high, and low costs, using a
Monte Carlo model to find the cost uncertainty range.

Page 37 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

West Valley also illustrates some of the dilemmas created by DOE?s approach
to funding the cleanup across the nuclear complex. DOE?s current estimate
for total West Valley cleanup costs is based on maintaining funding for the
foreseeable future at current levels- about $107 million a year. This
planning approach is referred to as ?flat? funding. According to DOE
officials, DOE?s Ohio Area Office has implemented the flat funding approach
for West Valley and four other nuclear cleanup sites in the region that it
oversees. 41 DOE Ohio and West Valley officials said they do not consider
the flat funding approach appropriate for West Valley, but they said it is
the policy direction of DOE headquarters, on the basis of Office of
Management and Budget direction. DOE Ohio and West Valley officials said the
Ohio office receives an annual cleanup funding allocation for the five
cleanup sites combined, including West Valley. In recent years, these
offices have worked within the current ?flat? budget estimates while at the
same time working to accelerate the cleanup- an ambitious undertaking.

Flat funding may not always be cost- effective. In fact, according to DOE
officials, the cost profile of cleanup projects is generally not flat:
Often, annual costs increase early in the project and are followed by
declining costs in later years. As a result, flat funding can add to overall
costs and extend the time needed for project completion. Ohio and West
Valley DOE officials agreed that flat funding may be a factor in the costs
and time required to complete the West Valley cleanup, but they said any
extra funds directed to West Valley could reduce the amount of funds
directed to one or more of the other sites overseen by the Ohio office. In
2000, a departmental analysis done at West Valley showed that incrementally
higher funding for West Valley could help to complete the cleanup faster and
with substantial cost savings. Specifically, if the West Valley cleanup
could be funded at about $130 million annually from 2006 through 2013, and
at $135 million in 2014 and 2015, instead of $107 million for those years,
West Valley?s total cleanup costs could decrease by about $509

41 During 1996- 98, West Valley?s funding actually decreased, from $119
million a year, to $118 million, to $114 million, and has been flat at $107
million for 1999 and 2000. It is projected to be flat at $107 million for
2001 and 2002. West Valley Illustrates

DOE- wide Cleanup Funding Dilemmas

Page 38 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

million and essential cleanup tasks could be completed about 8 years
earlier. 42

Funding constraints at West Valley are not unique. They reflect DOE?s
funding dilemma across the nuclear complex. Complexwide, the Department has
assumed that cleanup work will be funded annually at the same level. This
assumption is based on recent appropriations and Office of Management and
Budget guidance to promote balanced federal budgets, according to DOE
officials. For DOE?s nuclear cleanup program, such an approach can result in
a significant gap between the funds needed for the complex cleanup versus
the funds available, leading to cleanup delays and cost growth. To
illustrate, as we testified in June 2000, projected annual cleanup needs for
2001 through 2010 at DOE?s Paducah, Kentucky, uranium enrichment plant could
exceed average annual funding by many millions of dollars. 43 This gap could
delay the Paducah cleanup and add to its overall costs. Extended across the
complex, the costs multiply. In 1998, DOE estimated a complexwide gap of
$3.9 billion from 1999 to 2006 (in 1998 dollars), assuming flat funding of
the Department?s cleanup program at $5. 75 billion a year. Our 1999 report
on DOE?s accelerated cleanup strategy questioned whether DOE sites could
achieve the assumed cleanup goals and schedule, given the flat funding
assumption. On the other hand, according to DOE, fiscal realities are likely
to prevent fully closing the gap between funding needs and available funds.

As the first DOE location likely to have all of its on- site high- level
waste vitrified, West Valley is a potential early test case on the important
issue of tank entombment versus removal. According to DOE plans, a record of
decision on the disposition of the site?s high- level waste tanks could be
issued in 2005. At West Valley, four tanks are involved, but Hanford and
Savannah River, which are also involved in making tank disposition
decisions, have a combined total of over 200 tanks. At issue is whether
these tanks are to be dug up, at great potential expense, and removed to

42 The estimated time saved excludes disposition of the high- level waste
canisters. The canisters are assumed to remain on- site in interim storage
until shipment to a federal repository between 2036 and 2040. Thus, final
site closure would occur in 2041, even with funding at a level somewhat
above flat funding. 43 Nuclear Waste Cleanup: DOE?s Cleanup Plan for the
Paducah, Kentucky, Site Faces Uncertainties and Excludes Costly Activities
(GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 225, June 27, 2000). West Valley Has

Implications for National Decisionmaking on HighLevel Waste Disposal

Page 39 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

locations not yet chosen, or whether they can safely be left in place and
subjected to long- term stewardship.

Tank closure is addressed in DOE orders, as well as in NRC decommissioning
requirements and EPA and state of New York RCRA closure requirements. A DOE
radioactive waste management order (O435.1) and accompanying manual provide
a process that can result in reclassification of high- level wastes,
allowing for the possibility of managing the wastes as low- level wastes.
This could allow traces of the high- level wastes to remain in place,
entombed in the tanks. In the waste management manual, these traces are
referred to as ?wastes incidental to reprocessing.? With regard to Savannah
River and Hanford, NRC has been advising DOE on its methodology for
classification and stabilization of incidental waste. In the case of
Hanford, NRC recommended three criteria for categorizing the wastes as
incidental. Under these criteria, first, the wastes must be processed to
remove key radionuclides to the maximum extent technically and economically
practical; second, it must be shown that the wastes will be incorporated in
a solid form at a concentration that does not exceed applicable
concentration limits in applicable regulations (10 C. F. R., part 61); and
third, the wastes must be managed pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act to meet
safety requirements comparable to the performance objectives in the
regulations (10 C. F. R., part 61, subpart C). In the case of Savannah
River, NRC in June 2000 approved a more riskinformed and performance- based
approach in analyzing DOE?s methodology, principally aimed at satisfying the
first and third criteria. For West Valley, NRC is considering whether to
deal with the incidental waste issue in its cleanup standards.

Dealing with the tanks at West Valley and elsewhere will be costly and
challenging. If West Valley follows these criteria and empties the site?s
four tanks as completely as technically feasible and at ?economically
practical? costs, and leaves them in place, such a decision would preclude
anything approaching an unrestricted future use for the site. Conversely,
according to DOE estimates, if the wastes are removed off- site so that
future use of the site can be unrestricted, total cleanup costs for the site
could roughly double, to over $8 billion. Moreover, this estimate is very
uncertain because technologies for cutting the tanks up and removing them
from the ground have yet to be developed. By extension, at Savannah River
and Hanford, more extensive technological challenges and broader decisions
costing many more billions of dollars are at stake.

Any decision on what to do with the tanks will be controversial. Some local
interested parties appear to support to some degree DOE?s idea of

Page 40 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

entombing the West Valley tanks, recognizing that digging them up would be
costly, may not be technologically feasible, and would put workers and the
public at greater risk of radiation exposure. There is some indication that
New York State could agree to a form of tank entombment that would involve
something less than an unrestricted land use for the site. However, the
state?s Energy Research and Development Authority has said that if
incidental waste is to be left at West Valley, DOE should remain on- site to
administer long- term institutional controls. Some, including New York State
officials, have spoken in favor of the idea of monitored retrievable storage
of the tanks. 44 On the other hand, according to the Natural Resources
Defense Council, the West Valley Act makes no provision for incidental
quantities of high- level wastes to be exempted from permanent off- site
disposal. The matter may be resolved in the courts. Currently, the Natural
Resources Defense Council is challenging in court DOE?s radioactive waste
management order that could permit a tank

?entombment? strategy to be implemented at Savannah River and other DOE
sites. 45 In addition, according to a DOE official, there could be a legal
challenge to any record of decision at West Valley to entomb the site?s
high- level waste tanks.

Substantial cleanup progress has been made at West Valley, particularly the
successful vitrification of the site?s high- level wastes. However, several
factors are affecting the costs and pace of the remaining cleanup, and need
resolution. In particular, if the differences between DOE and New York State
on strategic issues affecting the site?s future continue, including
disagreements over their respective roles and responsibilities, they will
likely further limit the precision of cleanup planning and potentially add
to the costs and schedule for the West Valley cleanup. DOE and the state
have spent several years trying to resolve their differing views on their
long- term stewardship responsibilities at West Valley, particularly who
will pay for permanent disposal of the site?s vitrified wastes, and the
extent to

44 The local citizens? task force has recommended that all wastes remaining
at the site be stored so they can be monitored and retrieved if the
containment system and/ or institutional controls fail. The group does not
want a permanent ?monolith? built at the site. DOE has supported this
retrievable storage concept by developing a special grout (referred to as
?reversible?) with which the tanks would be filled. A DOE official at West
Valley said the grout is considered suitable for removal from the tanks,
should they be dug up in the future. 45 Also, the Natural Resources Defense
Council has petitioned NRC to exercise what the council interprets to be NRC
licensing authority over the 51 tanks at Savannah River, although NRC does
not agree that it has such authority, as stated in the Federal Register on
Oct. 18, 2000. Conclusions

Page 41 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

which the site is to be cleaned up. The recent breakdown in negotiations,
along with the historical federal- state conflict on who should take
responsibility for West Valley?s wastes, indicates to us that the two
parties simply may not be able to resolve these issues on their own. In
addition, the long- standing NRC- EPA disagreement on cleanup levels for
NRClicensed sites could have ramifications for West Valley?s cleanup levels
and costs. In June 2000, we raised as a matter for congressional
consideration the need to clarify the two agencies? regulatory
responsibilities relating to decommissioning NRC- licensed sites. In this
context, specific steps by EPA and NRC to avoid dually regulating West
Valley are warranted. Finally, a timely decision about the final disposition
of West Valley?s highlevel and transuranic wastes could save hundreds of
millions of dollars.

Because DOE and New York State appear to be unable to reach an agreement on
their future responsibilities under the West Valley Act, the Congress should
consider amending the act to clarify their responsibilities- especially
their respective stewardship responsibilities for historical radioactive
contamination left on- site and their financial liabilities for fees that
are to be paid for permanent disposal of high- level waste in an off- site
repository.

To help address NRC?s and EPA?s regulatory responsibilities at NRClicensed
sites, we recommend that, specifically for West Valley, the Chairman, NRC,
and the Administrator, EPA, in coordination with New York State, agree on
how their different regulatory cleanup criteria should apply to the site.

To resolve where West Valley?s high- level wastes should go, once DOE?s and
New York State?s stewardship and cost- sharing responsibilities have been
clarified, and potentially save hundreds of millions of dollars, we
recommend that the Secretary of Energy pursue the timely removal of onsite
vitrified high- level wastes, where feasible, either directly to a permanent
repository, or to an interim site until a permanent repository is available.

To clarify where West Valley?s transuranic wastes should go and potentially
save millions of dollars, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy pursue
timely removal of the site?s transuranic wastes to an interim off- site
storage location, or to WIPP for permanent disposal, as appropriate, either
through administrative action or by seeking an amendment to the WIPP Land
Withdrawal Act. Matters for

Congressional Consideration

Recommendations for Executive Action

Page 42 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

We provided DOE, the New York State Energy Research and Development
Authority, NRC, and EPA with a draft of this report for their review and
comment. DOE found the report to be a credible synopsis and assessment of
the issues West Valley faces, while New York State concurred with the
report?s conclusions that clear radiological requirements, an agreed- upon
preferred cleanup alternative, and resolution of nuclear waste disposal
issues are critical to the success of the cleanup. However, in their
comments, DOE and New York State continued to differ on who should assume
ultimate responsibility for the wastes generated by past commercial
reprocessing at West Valley. For example, DOE stated that, under the West
Valley Act, it does not become the owner of the site and that after site
decommissioning it does not envision a continuous on- site presence or long-
term operational control there. DOE did say that in the event it leaves
wastes behind, in the interest of public health and environmental
protection, it would bear at least part of the financial responsibility for
monitoring any remedies it had put in place. In contrast, New York State
commented that one of the complicating factors at West Valley has been the
conflicting interests of the state as site owner and DOE as site operator,
and stated that one way to resolve conflicting jurisdictions on- site would
be for DOE to agree to assume title and custody of the site pursuant to the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. Finally, the Department supported our
recommendations concerning regulatory cleanup standards and the disposal of
transuranic wastes, but disagreed with the recommendation on high- level
waste disposal, stating that the Department has no disposal obligation until
New York State enters into a disposal contract under the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act. In this regard, we have modified the wording of our
recommendation to more clearly recognize that resolving the question of
responsibility for the highlevel wastes is part of any long- term solution
regarding their disposal.

DOE and New York State also provided technical clarifications on the draft
report. NRC?s and EPA?s comments were limited to technical clarifications-
NRC?s by letter and EPA?s by e- mail. We incorporated all four agencies?
clarifications in the final report where appropriate. (The DOE, New York
State Energy Research and Development Authority, and NRC comment letters are
included in apps. III, IV, and V.)

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Page 43 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Honorable
Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Richard Meserve,
Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and the Honorable Christine Todd
Whitman, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency. We will also make
copies available to others upon request.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me on (202) 512-
3841. Major contributors to this report were James Noel, Dave Brack, Michael
Sagalow, and Ginger Tierney.

(Ms.) Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and Environment

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 44 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

As requested, we examined (1) the status of the cleanup, (2) factors that
may be hindering the cleanup, (3) the degree of certainty in the Department
of Energy?s (DOE) estimates of total cleanup costs and schedule, and (4) the
degree to which the West Valley cleanup may reflect, or have implications
for, larger cleanup challenges facing DOE and the nation. Specifically, to
address the status of the cleanup, we interviewed and obtained documents
from several federal, New York State, and local area officials associated
with West Valley. Specifically, we spoke with representatives of, and/ or
obtained documents from, the following agencies:

 DOE, including the headquarters Offices of Environmental Management,
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Environment, Safety, and Health,
General Counsel, and Inspector General; and the DOE Ohio and West Valley
field offices;

 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), including headquarters and regional officials of both
agencies; and

 New York State?s Energy Research and Development Authority and Department
of Environmental Conservation.

In addition, we interviewed representatives of, and/ or obtained documents
from, the Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes, the Citizen?s Task Force
on West Valley, the Seneca Nation of Indians, and the Natural Resources
Defense Council. To obtain information on past site status, we examined
several GAO reports issued since 1977, as well as historical DOE reports. In
addition, in order to independently assess DOE?s environmental, safety, and
health performance at West Valley, we talked to a range of federal, state,
and local officials and examined DOE and NRC safety and oversight reports.
In addition, we examined DOE data on West Valley in several departmental
databases related to environmental, safety, and health matters.

To address factors that may be hindering the cleanup, we interviewed and/ or
obtained documentation from representatives of many of the above- listed
federal, state, and local agencies and other interested parties. Using this
documentary and testimonial evidence, we examined in particular the pace of
the National Environmental Policy Act?s compliance process at West Valley,
as well as matters at issue in negotiations between DOE and the state of New
York on their responsibilities for the site. Our review was limited in that
these negotiations were and continue to be Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 45 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

considered confidential between the two parties. As a result, while we had
access to various details of the negotiations, this report does not fully
describe the negotiating positions of the two parties. Additionally, we
documented the status of NRC?s development of cleanup standards for the
site, as well as the current status and potential future disposition of the
site?s high- level and transuranic wastes.

To address the degree of certainty in DOE?s cleanup cost and schedule
estimates, we interviewed DOE headquarters, Ohio, and West Valley officials
and obtained documentation from them. To compare DOE?s cost estimates to
clean up the West Valley site that were made at different times since 1978,
we converted the estimates of future costs to year- 2000, present value
dollars, using a 5.5- percent discount rate (i. e., the U. S. 30year
Treasury bond rate at the time of our conversion). For all cost estimates
except the 1978 estimate, we used annual cost data (annual cost data for the
1978 estimate was not given) to make the conversion process more precise. To
further obtain meaningful comparisons, we added historical annual costs to
any DOE estimate that did not already include these costs, and future valued
(i. e., escalated) all historical costs to year 2000 dollars using the
actual U. S. 30- year Treasury bond rate for the respective year of each
estimate. For the 1978 estimate, we future- valued the lump- sum amount to
year- 2000 dollars, using an 8. 5- percent rate (i. e., the actual 1978 30-
year U. S. Treasury bond rate). Because the 1978 estimate was a lump sum,
its conversion to year- 2000 dollars slightly biases upward the resulting
year- 2000 cost estimate, thereby reducing the estimated increase of the
other cost estimates above the 1978 estimate.

To address the degree to which the West Valley cleanup may reflect, or have
implications for, larger cleanup challenges facing DOE and the nation, we
compared our analysis of West Valley with analyses we and others have
performed of DOE?s environmental management and nuclear waste disposal
programs. We used this comparison to develop observations about West
Valley?s cleanup in context with the cleanup challenges at other DOE sites.

We performed our review from June 2000 through April 2001 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Appendix II: West Valley Time Line Page 46 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Appendix II: West Valley Time Line

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 47 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end
of this letter.

See comment 1.

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 48 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

See comment 4. See comment 3. See comment 2.

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 49 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 50 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The following are GAO?s comments on the letter dated April 13, 2001, from
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, Department of
Energy.

1. We agree that the West Valley Act does not require DOE and New York State
to reach an agreement on the overall future of the site or how DOE should
complete its responsibilities there. We also agree that the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) encourages DOE and the state to cooperate on
environmental decisionmaking. Accordingly, wording in the final report has
been clarified. Furthermore, we believe DOE?s stated policy of cooperation
with the state in addressing strategic issues related to the West Valley
cleanup- and its specific pursuit of negotiations with the state- is a
preferable course of action as well as key to progress with the cleanup.
Nevertheless, because DOE and the state appear to be unable to reach
agreement on these strategic issues, we have raised the matter of clarifying
their on- site responsibilities for congressional attention.

2. We agree that DOE does not become the site owner after the cleanup is
completed, and wording has been clarified in the final report to reflect
DOE?s views. However, we believe DOE?s ongoing and prospective cleanup
tasks, as the Department views them under NEPA and the West Valley Act, are
inevitably related to West Valley?s overall future- its ultimate end state
and land use. For example, if DOE?s mandated tasks are to involve leaving
the high- level waste tanks in place, this could preclude achieving an end
state for the site that would permit unrestricted land use. Considering
this, we believe it was appropriate that DOE and New York State, in their
recent unsuccessful negotiations, attempted to reach agreement on the site?s
overall future- in the form of a preferred cleanup alternative or ?vision?
for the site.

3. We have clarified wording in the final report to reflect DOE?s views.
Nevertheless, from reading both DOE?s and the New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority?s comments on our draft report, it remains unclear
to us if or when the proposal will be revived and/ or formal negotiations
resumed.

4. We have modified the wording of our recommendation on high- level wastes
to more clearly recognize that resolving the question of ultimate
responsibility for the wastes is part of any long- term solution regarding
their disposal.

Appendix IV: Comments From New York State Page 51 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Appendix IV: Comments From New York State

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the end
of this letter.

Appendix IV: Comments From New York State Page 52 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

See comment 1.

Appendix IV: Comments From New York State Page 53 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The following are GAO?s comments on the letter dated April 11, 2001, from
the Program Director, West Valley Site Management Program, New York State
Energy Research and Development Authority.

1. We agree with this comment about the use of the term ?cleanup level? and
have changed the title of the final report and selected language throughout
the report.

Appendix V: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 54 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

Appendix V: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

See comment 1. Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this letter.

Appendix V: Comments From the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 55 GAO- 01- 314 Nuclear Waste

The following are GAO?s comments on the letter dated April 13, 2001, from
the Executive Director for Operations, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

1. Where appropriate, wording reflecting NRC?s clarifications has been added
to the final report.

(141462)

The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are
$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of
Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also accepted.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are
discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100 700 4 th St., NW (corner of 4 th and G Sts. NW) Washington, DC
20013

Orders by phone:

(202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

Orders by Internet

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an email
message with ?info? in the body to:

Info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO?s World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov

Contact one:

 Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm

 E- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov

 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system) Ordering Information

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
*** End of document. ***