    Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy
    Air Defenses (Letter Report, 01/03/2001, GAO/GAO-01-28).

    To suppress enemy air defenses, U.S. armed forces use specialized
    aircraft designed to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy
    air defense systems through either physical attack or electronic
    warfare. Concerns have been raised that the Air Force's decision to
    retire EF-111 and F-4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing
    threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created a
    gap between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. GAO
    (1) examined the steps that the military has taken since 1996 to improve
    its ability to suppress enemy air defenses and (2) evaluated the
    services' plans to eliminate any gap between their suppression
    capabilities and needs. GAO found that the services have improved their
    suppression capabilities, such as increasing the size of their fleets of
    F-16CJ and EA-6B suppression aircraft, improving the electronic warfare
    and missile systems on these aircrafts, studying cost-effective
    alternatives for suppression in the future, and reviewing electronic
    warfare programs to determine if these programs are adequately managed,
    prioritized, and funded. However, GAO also found that current
    suppression capabilities are not adequate and that no comprehensive,
    cross-service strategy exists for achieving the suppression mission.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-28
         TITLE:  Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for
    	     Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses
          DATE:  01/03/2001
       SUBJECT:  Electronic warfare
    	     Military aircraft
    	     Weapons systems
    	     Defense capabilities
    	     Air defense systems
    	     Surface to air missiles
    IDENTIFIER:  F-4G Aircraft
    	     EF-111 Aircraft
    	     F-16C/J Aircraft
    	     EA-6B Aircraft
    	     F-117 Aircraft

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    GAO-01-28

    A Report to Congressional Requesters

    January 2001 ELECTRONIC WARFARE

    Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses

    GAO- 01- 28

    Lett er

    January 3, 2001 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman, Subcommittee on Military
    Research and Development Committee on Armed Services

    House of Representatives The Honorable Bob Smith United States Senate

    The U. S. armed services must suppress enemy air defenses to be able to
    accomplish their war fighting objectives and survive. 1 To achieve this
    suppression, the services use specialized aircraft designed to neutralize,
    destroy, or temporarily degrade enemy air defense systems through either
    physical attack or electronic warfare. Specialized aircraft use electronic
    warfare devices, called jammers, to temporarily suppress enemy air defenses
    by transmitting electronic signals that disrupt enemy radar and
    communications. Other specialized aircraft use anti- radiation missiles that
    home in on radar used by surface- to- air missile or anti- aircraft
    artillery systems to physically degrade or destroy them. Because suppression
    aircraft are charged with protecting all of the services' aviation assets in
    hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily crosses individual

    service lines. You have expressed concern that a 1996 decision to retire the
    Air Force's EF- 111 and F- 4G suppression aircraft, combined with a growing
    threat from increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses, has created a gap
    between the services' suppression capabilities and their needs. 2 This
    report

    responds to your request that we (1) describe the actions the services have
    taken since 1996 to improve their capabilities for suppressing enemy air
    defenses and (2) evaluate the services' plans for eliminating any gap
    between their suppression capabilities and needs.

    1 The suppression of enemy air defenses mission increases U. S. air forces'
    ability to accomplish other missions by reducing their vulnerability to air
    defense missiles or guns. 2 By May 1998, all of the Air Force's EF- 111 and
    F- 4G suppression aircraft had been retired.

    Results in Brief Since 1996, the services have taken some actions to restore
    suppression capabilities lost through the retirement of the EF- 111 and F-
    4G aircraft,

    mainly by increasing the number of Air Force F- 16CJ and Navy/ Marine Corps
    EA- 6B suppression aircraft. These aircraft, together with their electronic
    warfare equipment and high- speed anti- radiation missiles, provide limited
    capability against sophisticated enemy air defenses. To enhance this
    capability, the Air Force is improving the performance of the

    F- 16CJ's targeting system. In addition, the Navy is upgrading the
    electronic warfare equipment on the EA- 6B to improve its radar jammer
    performance and is working on improvements to increase the effectiveness of
    the high- speed anti- radiation missile. Also, the Navy is conducting a
    study- scheduled for completion in late 2001- to determine the most cost-
    effective alternatives for the future. Alternatives being considered include
    modifications to manned and unmanned aircraft for replacement of the EA- 6B
    by 2015.

    According to a 1998 study conducted for the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3 the services have not adapted to
    the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone radar systems
    that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses incorporating
    modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other sophisticated
    means

    of avoiding suppression. 4 In a follow- on 1999 study, also conducted for
    the Joint Chiefs, the services were found not to have the quality or
    quantity of systems necessary to protect their aircraft across the full
    range of military

    operations. 5 Successfully addressing the evolving threat, according to
    these studies, will require innovative suppression solutions utilizing
    multiple technologies and cutting across individual service lines. We found
    that the

    Air Force's and the Navy's efforts, while beneficial, do not reflect a
    comprehensive, cross- service approach. Despite their interdependence in
    carrying out the suppression mission, the services act on an individual 3
    Coleman Research Corporation, Arlington, Virginia, conducted this study for
    the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology)
    and the Joint Chiefs of Staff between June 1996 and March 1998.

    4 Integrated air defense systems use modern telecommunications equipment and
    computers to create networks of early warning radar, targeting radar and
    passive detection equipment that pick up aircraft communications or engine
    heat or other means to track and target aircraft. 5 The Department convened
    a special Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Integrated Product Team,
    sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct this assessment.

    basis to define and prioritize suppression requirements and to develop,
    manage, and fund solutions to those requirements. Within the Department of
    Defense, no comprehensive, cross- service strategy for closing the gap

    between the services' suppression capabilities and needs exists- and no
    coordinating entity has been tasked with preparing such a strategy- to
    identify, among other things, suppression mission objectives, needed
    solutions, funding, timelines, and mechanisms to track progress.
    Consequently, service- level decisions are, in our view, much less likely to
    reflect the needed priority for closing the gap and to be the most cost-
    effective solutions for the Department overall. We are recommending that the
    Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity, including officials
    from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive cross- service
    strategy to close the gap between the U. S. armed services' suppression
    capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving the
    suppression objectives. In comments on a draft of this report, the
    Department agreed with our findings but disagreed with our recommendation.
    It maintained that it is already addressing some shortfalls, citing as
    evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrade efforts described in this report.
    Furthermore, the Department stated that it is performing a study- the
    ongoing analysis of alternatives- to underlie a

    Department- wide strategy for the suppression mission and that it will
    ensure the outcome of the study leads to a balanced set of acquisition
    programs between the services. We remain convinced that the Department is
    not likely to close the gap between suppression capabilities and needs
    without developing a comprehensive, cross- service strategy for doing so and
    assigning responsibility for this task to a coordinating entity. The ongoing
    analysis of alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy.
    In disagreeing with our recommendation to designate a coordinating entity,
    the Department also expressed concern that such an entity may lead to the
    neglect of unique service requirements but added that any such authority
    should be staffed in a manner that allowed coordination of planning and
    explanation of those unique requirements. To address the Department's
    concern about the need for representation from

    the services, we revised our recommendation to include such representation.
    Background The United States experienced heavy aircraft and aircrew losses
    to enemy air defenses during the Vietnam War. Since then, the services have

    recognized air defense suppression as a critical component of air
    operations. Consequently, when a crisis arises, suppression aircraft are

    among the first to be called in and the last to leave. Suppression aircraft
    such as the now retired EF- 111 and F- 4G played a vital role in protecting
    other U. S. aircraft from radar- guided missile systems during Operation
    Desert Storm in Iraq. In fact, Air Force strike aircraft were normally not
    permitted to conduct air operations unless protected by these suppression
    aircraft. The EF- 111 was equipped with transmitters to disrupt or
    “jam” radar equipment used by enemy surface- to- air missile or
    anti- aircraft artillery systems. The F- 4G used anti- radiation missiles
    that homed in on enemy radar systems to destroy them (see fig. 1).

    Figure 1: AGM- 88 High- Speed Anti- Radiation Missile

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    Since the end of Desert Storm in 1991, U. S. suppression aircraft have been
    continuously deployed in support of Operations Northern and Southern Watch
    protecting fighter aircraft maintaining the no- fly zones over Iraq. In
    1999, during Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, EA- 6B

    suppression aircraft (see fig. 2) carrying electronic jamming equipment and
    anti- radiation missiles were extremely important for protecting strike
    aircraft from enemy radar- guided missiles.

    Figure 2: EA- 6B Prowler

    Source: U. S. Navy.

    Radar is the primary means used by enemy forces to detect, track, and target
    U. S. aircraft. Hence, U. S. suppression aircraft focus on trying to
    neutralize, degrade, or destroy the radar equipment of an enemy's air
    defense system. Enemy radars in the past were often fixed in position,
    operated in a stand- alone mode, and turned on for lengthy periods of time-
    all of which made them relatively easy to find and suppress through

    electronic warfare or physical attack. U. S. suppression aircraft, using
    missiles and jammers, begin suppressing enemy air defenses after they begin
    emitting radio- frequency signals. At some risk to the aircraft and aircrew,
    the suppression aircraft must also be in the vicinity of the enemy air
    defenses to complete their mission. In response to this suppression
    capability, according to the Department, countries have been seeking to make
    their air defenses more resistant to suppression. These efforts include
    increasing the mobility of their surface- to- air missiles and radar
    equipment (see fig. 3), connecting radars

    together into networks, and adding sophisticated capabilities so that the
    radar can detect aircraft while turned on for shorter periods of time.

    Figure 3: Mobile SA- 6 Surface- to- Air Missile System Source: Federation of
    American Scientists.

    Additionally, many nations, including some hostile to U. S. interests such
    as Iraq and North Korea, operate what is referred to as integrated air
    defense systems. These systems use various means to track and target
    aircraft, including modern telecommunications equipment and computers to
    create networks of early warning radar, missile system radar, and passive
    detection systems that pick up aircraft communications or heat from

    aircraft engines. 6 Integrated networks provide air defense operators with
    the ability to track and target aircraft even if individual radar elements
    of the network are jammed or destroyed. During Operation Allied Force in
    1999, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency, U. S. suppression
    aircraft faced Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system and experienced
    significant difficulty trying to destroy

    it, as Yugoslav forces often engaged in elaborate efforts to protect their
    air defense assets. These protective efforts allowed Yugoslav forces to
    thwart many attacks, but they also reduced Yugoslav opportunities to track
    and 6 Alternatives to radar for tracking aircraft include electro- optical,
    infrared, laser, and passive means.

    engage U. S. and coalition aircraft because their air defense assets could
    not be utilized and protected simultaneously. Nevertheless, Yugoslav forces
    managed to shoot down an F- 117 stealth fighter (referred to as stealth
    because it is harder to detect with radar) (see fig. 4) and an F- 16CJ on a
    suppression mission. (Specific details about the two aircraft losses and
    tactics used by Yugoslav forces to avoid destruction are considered

    classified by the Department.) In addition to the two losses, the inability
    of the U. S. to destroy the Yugoslav air defense network forced the U. S. to
    (1) fly its strike missions at higher altitudes to reduce risk; (2) fly

    thousands of dedicated suppression missions, pushing its EA- 6B force in
    Europe to its limits; and (3) keep many low- flying aircraft, such as the
    Army's Apache attack helicopters, out of combat.

    Figure 4: F- 117 Stealth Fighter

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    At one point in time, advocates of acquiring more stealth aircraft believed
    that the Air Force's successful fielding of F- 117 fighters and B- 2 bombers
    would allow the services to reduce their suppression aircraft requirements.
    However, the loss of the F- 117 over Yugoslavia in 1999 demonstrated that
    stealth aircraft could also benefit from improved suppression capabilities.

    Moreover, even if stealth aircraft required no suppression support, and even
    if the services do introduce more of them in the future, the majority of

    the aircraft in the U. S. fleet will not have stealth capabilities for many
    years and will still require suppression support. The Services Have

    In 1996, we expressed concern about the decision to retire the Air Force's
    F- 4G and EF- 111 without comparable replacements. 7 Subsequently, the Taken
    Some Actions to services realized that the decrease in their suppression
    capabilities had Improve Their

    increased U. S. aircraft vulnerability and could potentially frustrate
    Suppression achievement of U. S. military objectives and prolong future
    conflicts. Capabilities

    Therefore, since 1996, the services have taken a number of actions to
    improve their suppression capabilities. First, the Air Force is increasing
    the size of its fleet of F- 16CJ suppression aircraft (see fig. 5), and the
    Navy and the Marine Corps are adding EA- 6B suppression aircraft to help
    reverse the quantitative impact of the retirement of the EF- 111s and F-
    4Gs.

    Figure 5: F- 16CJ Aircraft

    Source: U. S. Air Force.

    7 See Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air
    Defenses May Be Too Low (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 128, Apr. 10, 1996).

    Although not comparable in capability to the F- 4G it replaced, the Air
    Force F- 16CJ has an electronic targeting system and is equipped with high-
    speed anti- radiation missiles to attack enemy radar. The Air Force is
    acquiring 30 additional F- 16CJ aircraft to bring its total to 210. The Navy
    and the Marine

    Corps EA- 6B is a modified A- 6 strike aircraft outfitted with special
    electronic transmitters for disrupting radar and communications. The EA- 6B
    can also fire anti- radiation missiles. The Navy has brought back from
    retirement 20 EA- 6Bs to increase the total to 123 aircraft, of which 104
    are available for combat operations. Recent operations in Yugoslavia,
    Kosovo, and no- fly zones in Iraq have required extensive use of Air Force
    F- 16CJs and Navy and Marine Corps EA- 6B suppression aircraft.

    Second, the services are improving the electronic warfare and missile
    systems on these aircraft to enhance their limited capability against
    sophisticated enemy air defenses. The Air Force is upgrading the targeting
    system on the F- 16CJ. The Navy is upgrading the radar jamming equipment on
    the EA- 6B to improve its performance. The upgraded EA- 6B equipment is
    scheduled to be fielded beginning in 2004 and to reach Initial Operational
    Capability 8 in 2005. The Navy and the Air Force are also working together
    on improvements to increase the effectiveness of the high- speed anti-
    radiation missile. (Further details about these upgrades are classified.)

    Third, the Navy is conducting a study to determine the most cost- effective
    alternatives for suppression in the future. According to the Department, it
    is the most important electronic warfare study presently ongoing and has

    considerable resources being applied to it. Numerous options for augmenting
    the EA- 6B starting in 2010 and replacing it by 2015 are being considered,
    including using a modified version of the Navy's new F/ A- 18 E/ F aircraft
    equipped with electronic warfare systems, or making modifications to other
    manned or unmanned aircraft. According to the Department, the study will
    also identify deficiencies and/ or limitations and seek corrective actions.
    It is scheduled for completion in late 2001.

    Fourth, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
    Logistics is conducting a Department- wide review of electronic warfare
    programs, which include suppression programs. The purpose of this internal
    review is to determine whether these programs are adequately

    managed, prioritized, and funded. 8 Initial Operational Capability will be
    reached when the first EA- 6B squadron equipped with the upgraded systems is
    ready to be deployed.

    No Comprehensive Despite actions taken by the services since 1996, a gap
    remains between Strategy Exists to

    the services' current suppression capabilities and their aircraft's need for
    protection from sophisticated enemy air defenses. Without a Address Evolving
    comprehensive, cross- service strategy for addressing that gap and a Threats

    coordinating entity charged with developing such a strategy and evaluating
    progress, it is unlikely that the actions needed to close the gap will be
    taken.

    Current Suppression In the mid- 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found in
    its Joint Tactical Aircraft Capabilities Are Not

    Electronic Warfare Study that the services' suppression capabilities were
    Adequate diminishing while the proliferation and modernization of enemy air
    defenses were increasing. Recognizing this, in 1996 the Deputy Secretary of
    Defense directed that a Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses mission

    area architecture study be conducted. The purpose of the study was to
    develop well- grounded bases for decisions regarding platform, weapon, and
    support system modernization and to explore new ways and means for
    conducting suppression operations.

    The study, completed in 1998, found that the services had not adequately
    adapted to the evolution of enemy air defenses from fixed, stand- alone
    radar systems that could be easily suppressed to integrated air defenses
    incorporating modern telecommunications links, passive sensors, and other
    sophisticated means of avoiding suppression. It also found that maintaining
    an effective suppression capability will require the development of
    innovative and nontraditional solutions cutting across

    individual service and functional (e. g., suppression, reconnaissance, and
    command and control) lines.

    The willingness to adopt innovative approaches has provided the armed
    services with large suppression dividends in the past. For instance, during
    Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991, the U. S. launched unmanned
    aircraft as decoys from beyond the reach of enemy air defenses to cause the
    Iraqis to turn on their radar and/ or fire, thereby revealing their
    positions

    to suppression aircraft so they could be attacked. These attacks were highly
    successful when the Iraqi air defense forces remained fixed in position with
    their radar sites emitting signals that could be tracked by anti- radiation
    missiles fired from U. S. suppression aircraft such as the F- 4G and EA- 6B.
    As demonstrated in Yugoslavia in 1999, however, these tactics cannot succeed
    if enemy air defense forces choose not to reveal

    themselves or move quickly after firing.

    To address these shortcomings, the 1998 study envisioned the leveraging of
    advances in sensor and data link technologies to build a multifunctional U.
    S. suppression mission “network” in which loitering decoys and
    other unmanned aircraft, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft,
    suppression aircraft, command and control aircraft, and strike aircraft are
    all interconnected by high- speed data links. Military commanders could then

    use this network to locate targets and launch coordinated Army, Navy, and
    Air Force attacks on the enemy air defense forces' positions.

    According to the study, suppression weapon development is also ripe for
    innovation. Future weapons could include, for instance, unmanned loitering
    drones with high- explosive warheads waiting silently high above to dive on
    enemy air defense forces before they can fire, or precisionguided munitions
    or anti- radiation missiles fired from unmanned aircraft that track enemy
    air defense forces as they move. By using unmanned

    aircraft, the suppression mission controller could take risks that would be
    unacceptable using manned aircraft. The potential loss of the unmanned
    aircraft or decoys in these scenarios is far preferable to the risk the
    services face today of losing manned EA- 6B and F- 16CJ aircraft conducting
    suppression missions (such as the F- 16CJ lost over Yugoslavia in 1999).

    The results of the mission area architecture study also led to a follow- on
    mission needs assessment to identify suppression mission deficiencies and
    technological opportunities to address them. According to the mission needs
    assessment completed in 1999, the services' overriding suppression mission
    deficiency is that they do not have the quality or quantity of systems
    necessary to protect U. S., allied, and coalition air forces across the

    full range of military operations. In terms of technological opportunities
    to address these shortcomings, the assessment concluded that a mix of manned
    and unmanned aircraft and lethal and nonlethal weapons (e. g., anti-
    radiation missiles and jammers) will be required to meet current and future
    operational objectives. 9 To provide near- term relief until these new
    systems can be acquired, the mission needs assessment proposed the
    appointment of a single entity to conduct joint suppression mission
    experiments involving assets from air, land, sea, information, and space-
    based forces. The objective of these experiments would be to try to develop
    joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to aid in the

    suppression mission. 9 The Department today has no lethal or nonlethal
    weapons- equipped unmanned aircraft with which to conduct suppression
    missions.

    No Comprehensive, CrossService Although Air Force and Navy suppression
    aircraft are charged with

    Strategy Exists for protecting all of the services' aviation assets in
    hostile airspace,

    Achieving Suppression suppression mission requirements are defined and
    prioritized by the

    Mission individual services. Also, the material and nonmaterial solutions
    that address these requirements are developed, managed, and funded by the
    individual services. The services' ongoing decisions to add F- 16CJ and

    EA- 6B aircraft and to improve the EA- 6B aircraft and the high- speed anti-
    radiation missile, while beneficial, do not reflect a comprehensive, cross-
    service approach to improving their suppression capabilities. Within the
    Department, no comprehensive, cross- service suppression mission strategy
    exists that identifies, specifically,

    the suppression objectives, preferably measurable, to be achieved; the
    actions, including material and nonmaterial solutions, needed to

    achieve those objectives; special technologies to be developed; funding,
    timelines, and responsibilities; and evaluation mechanisms to track progress
    or signal the need for

    adjustments. Also, while it tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff with conducting
    the mission area architecture study and mission needs assessment, the
    Department did not give responsibility to the Joint Chiefs or any other
    entity for

    (1) developing a comprehensive strategy and (2) evaluating to what extent
    suppression mission objectives are being achieved.

    Without such a strategy or coordinating entity, service- level decisions
    are, in our view, much less likely to reflect the needed priority or the
    most cost- effective solutions for the services overall. For instance, in
    July 1999, the Commanding General of the Army's 101st Airborne Division
    wrote to Army headquarters that, due to the retirement of the Air Force's
    EF- 111 and the shortage of Navy EA- 6B suppression aircraft, there were
    insufficient suppression assets to meet the Army's needs. He expressed
    concern that the lack of required suppression support and failure to degrade
    enemy air

    defenses could result in catastrophic losses of his soldiers and equipment.
    The Commanding General's proposed solution to this shortfall was for the
    Army to develop its own suppression mission aircraft.

    Conclusions Since retiring the EF- 111 and F- 4G, the Air Force and the Navy
    have been acquiring additional suppression aircraft to restore some lost
    suppression

    capabilities and have begun improving their existing suppression systems.
    However, recent studies have pointed to a number of suppression mission area
    deficiencies. In our view, the development of a comprehensive, cross-
    service strategy for suppressing enemy air defenses is the best- and,
    perhaps, the only- way to really know whether the services are

    successfully closing the gap between suppression capabilities and needs. And
    the designation of a coordinating entity would provide the necessary
    institutionalized leadership to develop a strategy and evaluate its
    implementation. Until the gap is closed, U. S. aircraft will remain
    vulnerable in future conflicts, possibly resulting in the loss of lives and
    expensive assets and forcing U. S. aircraft to continue modifying their
    tactics (as they had to do in Yugoslavia in 1999) to reduce their exposure
    to increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses.

    Recommendation to To significantly increase the likelihood that needed
    actions are taken to the Executive Agency improve the ability of U. S.
    aircraft to suppress enemy air defenses, we

    recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate a coordinating entity,
    including officials from each of the services, to develop a comprehensive,
    cross- service strategy for closing the gap between the services'
    suppression

    capabilities and their needs and to evaluate progress toward achieving
    suppression objectives.

    Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report, the
    Department of Defense

    Our Review agreed with our findings regarding shortcomings in suppression

    capabilities but did not concur with our recommendation. The Department
    maintained that the services are already addressing some shortfalls, citing
    as evidence, for example, the ongoing upgrades of F- 16CJ and EA- 6B
    aircraft and the high- speed anti- radiation missile as described in this
    report. Furthermore, the Department stated that the ongoing analysis of
    alternatives will underlie a Department- wide strategy and that it will
    ensure the outcome of this study will lead to balanced, joint suppression of
    enemy air defense acquisition programs between the services. In disagreeing
    with our recommendation to appoint a coordinating entity, the Department
    expressed concern that such an entity may neglect unique service
    requirements, but it also added that any such entity should be staffed in a
    manner that allows coordination of planning and explanation of those unique
    requirements.

    Although the Department asserted that it would ensure that the outcome of
    the ongoing alternatives analysis would lead to a balanced program for
    addressing the shortfalls, it did not explain how it would do so. We remain
    convinced that the Department is not likely to eliminate the gap between
    suppression capabilities and needs without assigning responsibility to a
    coordinating entity to develop a comprehensive strategy and evaluate
    progress toward achieving suppression objectives. The ongoing analysis of
    alternatives is a necessary step, but a study is not a strategy. As
    emphasized in this report, a comprehensive, cross- service strategy would
    increase the likelihood that actions would be taken. Among other things, it
    would identify objectives, material and nonmaterial solutions, funding,
    timelines, and mechanisms to track progress in closing the gap. Regarding
    the

    Department's concern that the coordinating entity would neglect unique
    service requirements, we revised our recommendation to include
    representation from the services.

    The Department's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. Scope and To
    describe the actions taken to improve the U. S. armed services' Methodology

    capabilities for suppressing enemy air defenses, we interviewed Office of
    the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force, and Navy
    officials responsible for electronic warfare requirements, EA- 6B aircraft
    requirements, and F- 16CJ aircraft requirements. We interviewed officials

    from the EA- 6B, F- 16CJ, and high- speed anti- radiation missile programs.
    We interviewed Defense Intelligence Agency officials and reviewed
    performance data related to the Department's current suppression
    capabilities and the capabilities of enemy air defense systems. To evaluate
    the services' plans for eliminating the gap between U. S. suppression

    capabilities and needs, we reviewed the results of the Department's Joint
    Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Mission Area Architecture Study and
    follow- on Mission Needs Assessment and compared them to the actions taken
    by the Department to improve its suppression capabilities since 1996. To
    determine whether successful fielding of stealth aircraft has affected
    overall suppression requirements, we interviewed Air Force officials
    knowledgeable about stealth aircraft and stealth operations.

    We conducted our work at Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force,
    Army, Marine Corps, and Navy locations. We visited requirements,
    acquisition, logistics, and testing offices of the military services; field
    commands and operating units; various program offices; government

    organizations involved in developmental efforts or military studies; and
    contractor facilities. Specific locations we visited are listed in appendix
    I.

    We performed our review from December 1998 through November 2000 in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are
    sending copies of this report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and Senator
    Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services, and
    Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman, and Representative Ike Skelton,
    Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services. We are also
    sending copies to the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the
    Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten
    Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director,
    Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to
    others upon request. We are also sending copies of this report to other
    interested congressional committees. The report will also be available on
    our home page at http:// www. gao. gov.

    If you have questions, please contact me on (202) 512- 4841. Major
    contributors to this report were Michael Aiken, Terry Parker, Charles Ward,
    and Neil Wickliffe.

    R. E. Levin Director, Acquisition and

    Sourcing Management

    Appendi Appendi xes x I

    Locations Visited During This Review Office of the Secretary of Defense,
    Washington, D. C. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D. C. Headquarters
    Elements, Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy, Washington, D. C.

    Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C. Defense Advanced Research
    Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia Institute for Defense Analyses,
    Alexandria, Virginia

    Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia Naval Research Laboratory,
    Washington, D. C. U. S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida U.
    S. Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia Air Combat Command, Langley Air
    Force Base, Virginia U. S. 9th Air Force and 20th Tactical Fighter Wing,
    Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina

    Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland Marine Corps Warfighting
    and Development Division, Quantico, Virginia U. S. Air Force Aeronautical
    Systems Center, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

    U. S. Air Force Air Armament Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida U. S. Air
    Force Air Warfare Center, Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada Naval Strike and Air
    Warfare Center, Fallon, Nevada Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida
    Warner Robbins Air Logistics Center, Robbins Air Force Base, Georgia

    Electronic Attack Wing, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey
    Island, Washington

    38th Marine Air Control Group, Miramar, California 355th Operations Group,
    Davis- Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing, 53rd Test
    Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida 169th Air National Guard, McEntire Air
    Force Base, South Carolina RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California
    Coleman Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia

    Appendi x II Comments From the Department of Defense

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    GAO United States General Accounting Office

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    Appendix I

    Appendix I Locations Visited During This Review

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    Appendix II

    Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense

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    Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense

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    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

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