Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped, but Training and
Readiness Reporting Problems Remain (Letter Report, 11/14/2000,
GAO/GAO-01-27).

The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that chemical and biological
weapons are likely to be used early in a conflict to disrupt U.S.
operations and logistics and to potentially offset the overwhelming
conventional warfare capabilities of U.S. forces; however, studies
confirmed that U.S. forces were not fully prepared to defend against the
use of chemical or biological weapons and could have suffered
significant casualties had they been used during conflict. A study of
Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps divisions showed that recent changes
to the system are a step in the right direction to improving chemical
and biological defense readiness reporting, but the changes do not
require units to report on the condition of their chemical and
biological defense equipment; thus, these reports could provide
incomplete or misleading information on the status of equipment, a key
element in assessing overall unit readiness.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-27
     TITLE:  Chemical and Biological Defense: Units Better Equipped,
	     but Training and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain
      DATE:  11/14/2000
   SUBJECT:  Combat readiness
	     Army supplies
	     Military training
	     Defense contingency planning
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Private sector practices
	     Biological warfare
	     Chemical warfare
	     Military research and development
	     Defense capabilities
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Status of Resources and Training System
	     DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO Testimony.                                               **
**                                                              **
** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
******************************************************************

GAO-01-27

A Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives

November 2000 CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

Units Better Equipped, but Training and Readiness Reporting Problems Remain

GAO-01-27

Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: Individual Protective Equipment 22

Appendix II: Medical Decontamination Supplies 23 Appendix III: Comments From
the Department of Defense 27

Lett er

November 14, 2000 The Honorable Floyd D. Spence Chairman, Committee on Armed
Services House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that chemical
and biological weapons are likely to be used early in a conflict to disrupt
U. S. operations and logistics and to potentially offset the overwhelming
conventional warfare capabilities of U. S. forces. However, following the
Persian Gulf War in 1990, studies confirmed that U. S. forces were not fully
prepared to defend against the use of chemical or biological weapons and
could have

suffered significant casualties had they been used during this conflict. In
1996, we reported that early deploying Army divisions (units that would
respond during the first 30 days of a conflict) continued to have many of
the same problems with their chemical and biological defenses that U. S.
forces experienced in the Gulf War. 1 Among these problems were the
following: Many units did not have their required chemical and biological
protective equipment.

Many units were inadequately trained in basic tasks critical to surviving
and operating in a chemical or biological environment. Military medical
capabilities to prevent and treat casualties on a

contaminated battlefield were very limited. Our 1996 report also stated that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Status of Resources and Training System (DOD's
system for reporting the overall readiness of units) was of limited value in
determining the readiness of units to operate in a chemically or
biologically contaminated environment. The system was established to provide
the current status of specific

elements considered essential to readiness assessments, such as personnel
and equipment on hand, equipment condition, and the training of operating
forces. However, we found that commanders could subjectively upgrade their
unit's overall readiness rating regardless of the unit's actual readiness to
operate in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment.

1 Chemical and Biological Defense: Emphasis Remains Insufficient to Resolve
Continuing Problems (GAO/ NSIAD- 96- 103, Mar. 29, 1996).

At the request of the late Herbert Bateman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Military Readiness, and in response to his concerns about the readiness of
early deploying U. S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment, we selected three Army divisions, two Air Force
fighter wings, and one Marine Corps expeditionary force, 2 and determined if
they had (1) their required personnel protection, detection, and
decontamination equipment and medical supplies 3 and (2) incorporated
chemical and biological defense training into readiness exercises and had
their authorized personnel to provide this training. We also examined DOD's
actions to improve the Status of Resources and

Training System's value in determining the readiness of units to operate in
a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. The units'
requirements for chemical and biological equipment and medical supplies are
derived from their services' guidance and regulations and computed based on
various factors, such as the size of the unit, its wartime mission, and type
of unit. We did not independently compute or verify the equipment and supply
requirements for the forces in the units that would deploy within 30 days of
a conflict, but accepted the units' requirements computations, which are
reported to higher headquarters within their services.

For our review, we judgmentally selected the units based on their missions
and the early deployment of their forces to a military conflict. The results
of our work cannot be generalized to other units or the military services,

but they provide insight into DOD's efforts to address problems with the
preparedness of U. S. forces to operate in a chemically or biologically
contaminated environment. This is the second in a series of reports we are

preparing on the issue of chemical and biological defense. 4 2 We do not
identify the specific units we reviewed because that would make the report
classified. 3 Items needed to decontaminate chemical casualties on the
battlefield prior to moving them to medical treatment facilities. 4 Chemical
and Biological Defense: Critical Facility Protection Is Improved, but Major
Policy Questions Remain Unresolved (GAO/ C- NSIAD- 00- 3, July 17, 2000).

Results in Brief The units we reviewed had all their required individual
protective equipment (such as suits, boots, and gloves) and most medical
supplies and detection and decontamination equipment needed to operate in a
chemically or biologically contaminated environment. Overall, they were
better equipped for chemical or biological warfare than the units reviewed

for our 1996 report. Specifically, the Army divisions had all of their
medical supplies. The Air Force wings had most of their medical supplies,
but they had shortages in some critical medical items. For example, one wing
had only 25 percent of the protective masks required to treat contaminated
patients and only 48 percent of required patient decontamination kits. The
Marine Corps did not require specific supplies for treating and

decontaminating patients exposed to chemical agents. The units had shortages
in detection and decontamination equipment, but those shortages varied
across the services and within a service. For example, the Marine Corps unit
and one Air Force unit had 31 percent and 50 percent, respectively, of their
chemical agent monitors, whereas the other Air Force unit had 100 percent of
its monitors. The three Army units we reviewed had between 88 and 103
percent of their requirements for the same item. Officials at the units with
shortages of equipment said that, when the units deploy, the shortages would
be filled from stocks held by later deploying units or from war reserves.
However, the units had not determined whether this solution would meet their
equipment requirements or what impact this action might have on the later
deploying units' capabilities or on war

reserves. We are examining the ability of depots to support equipment
requirements and will present our results in a later report.

Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD's Office of the
Inspector General found that commanders were not integrating chemical and
biological defense into unit exercises and the training was not always
realistic in terms of how units would operate in war. For example, we were

told by Marine Corps officers responsible for chemical and biological
defense training at the unit we reviewed that commanders are not fully
integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises, as required
by Marine Corps policies, because operating in protective equipment is
difficult and time consuming and this (1) decreases the number of combat
essential tasks that can be performed during an exercise and (2) limits
offensive combat operations. We were also told that the training often lacks

realism. For example, during one exercise, Marines who were simulating
operations during a chemical attack were required to wear protective masks
but not protective gloves because it was too cumbersome to work in the
gloves. In September 1999, we reported that the Army's combat training
centers were restricting the simulated use of chemical weapons against the
units being trained because units were arriving at the centers with lower
levels of proficiency in chemical and biological defense than in the past. 5
In 1998, DOD's Office of the Inspector General similarly reported that
chemical and biological defense preparedness training in the services was

often not fully integrated into unit exercises and, when included, was not
always realistic in terms of how units would operate in war. 6 Officials at
the units we reviewed stated that chemical and biological defense training
is

being adversely impacted by (1) a shortage of chemical and biological
defense specialists and (2) specialists being assigned multiple
responsibilities unrelated to their specialties. For example, Army units we
reviewed had from 76 to 102 percent of their authorized enlisted chemical
personnel and from 75 to 88 percent of their chemical officers. Officials at
one of the units with shortages said that personnel shortages required them
to use inexperienced specialists to provide training, which adversely
impacted the quality of that training. The Marine Corps unit we visited had
84 percent of its authorized enlisted chemical specialists and 80 percent of
its chemical officers. In addition to the personnel shortages, chemical
specialists were assigned tasks unrelated to their specialties, such as

coaching and training individuals at the rifle/ pistol range. 5 Military
Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army's Combat Training Centers Are
Not Being Realized (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 210, Sept. 17, 1999). 6 Unit Chemical
and Biological Defense Readiness Training (Report No. 98- 174, July 17,
1998).

In April 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed changes to the Status of
Resources and Training System that will require units to more clearly report
on the quantity of chemical and biological equipment on hand and on training
readiness. However, the recent changes do not require that units report on
the condition of their chemical and biological defense

equipment. Thus, for example, these reports could indicate that a unit had
its chemical and biological equipment, but not show that most of that
equipment was unusable.

To further improve the readiness of U. S. forces and the readiness reporting
system, we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the
Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps to require that units include realistic chemical and biological
defense training in exercises and these exercises adhere to realistic
wartime scenarios. Additionally, we recommend that the Secretary of

Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enhance the
Status of Resources and Training System by including in chemical and
biological readiness ratings the condition of chemical and biological
equipment.

DOD concurred with our first recommendation and stated that it has taken
actions and has on- going actions to improve chemical and biological defense
training. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that the Status

of Resources and Training System should show whether available equipment is
usable. It stated that revising the current system further by adding
additional reporting requirements for equipment condition is unnecessary and
would place redundant requirements on unit commanders. We continue to
believe that the system should require the

separate reporting of both on- hand equipment levels and the serviceability
of this equipment because during this and prior reviews, we were told of and
observed equipment that was unserviceable and yet reported as being on hand
for readiness reports. Background The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 directs the

Secretary of Defense to provide Congress with an annual assessment of the
overall readiness of U. S. forces to fight in a chemical or biological
warfare environment. 7 DOD provides this required annual assessment in the
form of 7 Pub. L. 103- 160, sec. 1703, 107 Stat. 1547, 1854 (Nov. 30, 1993).

an annual report to Congress entitled Chemical and Biological Defense
Program. This program was established to coordinate and integrate the
research, development, and acquisition of chemical and biological defense
materiel and systems to support the joint war- fighting forces.

The probability of U. S. forces encountering chemical or biological weapons
during worldwide conflicts remains high, according to DOD. Moreover, those
countries with chemical weapons programs are adding agents and more
sophisticated delivery systems. As a result, an effective defense which
reduces the probability of an attack and enables U. S. forces to

survive, continue operations, and win, if an attack were to occur is vital.
According to DOD's fiscal year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, U. S. forces need equipment that would allow
them to avoid contamination so that they can conduct successful

operations under chemically or biologically contaminated battlefield
conditions. However, once contaminated, they need to protect and
decontaminate themselves and their equipment to sustain operations.

DOD's joint doctrine for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense states
that chemical and biological defense should be integrated into individual
and unit training in order to develop and evaluate the readiness of U. S.
forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment. 8 It further
states that performing operations in chemical and biological protective

equipment is difficult and that training is essential to countering
reductions in job proficiency caused by the equipment. All Required
Individual

The units we reviewed were better equipped for chemical or biological
Protective Equipment

warfare than the units reviewed for our 1996 report, possessing most of
their required equipment and medical supplies. For example, all of the units
and Most Medical

had their required individual protective equipment (such as suits, boots,
Supplies and Other

and gloves). Also, the Army divisions had all of their medical supplies, and
Equipment Are on the Air Force wings had shortages in only a few critical
medical items. There were shortages of detection and decontamination
equipment;

Hand however, those shortages were not consistent across the services or
even

within a service. According to officials at the units, most shortages
resulted from the services' insufficient allocation of funds to purchase the
items. Officials at the units with equipment shortages said that the
shortages 8 Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense,
Joint Pub 3- 11, July 10, 1995.

would be filled when the units deploy from stocks held by later deploying
units or from war reserves. However, the units had not determined whether
this solution would meet their equipment requirements or what impact this
action might have on the later deploying units' capabilities or on war

reserves. This solution for meeting shortages could pose a risk for those
later deploying units or adversely impact the war reserves, which would be
needed to sustain military operations under chemical and biological attacks.
We are examining the ability of depots to support equipment requirements and
will present our results in a later report.

Units Had Required Individual protective equipment consists of various
items, such as the Individual Protective individual's protective mask,
gloves, and suits. According to equipment Equipment records and statements
by Army officials at the units we visited, the required individual
protective equipment items were on hand or had been requisitioned. We found
similar conditions at the Air Force and Marine Corps units that we visited.
A list of required individual protective

equipment is included as appendix I. Figure 1 shows a soldier in individual
protective equipment.

Figure 1: Soldier in Individual Protective Equipment Decontaminating a
Vehicle

Source: U. S. Army.

In contrast, our 1996 report stated that the Army's early deploying
divisions had shortages of various types of critical individual protective
equipment. For example, three of the active divisions had 50 percent or
greater shortages of protective clothing (battle dress overgarments) and
shortages of other critical individual protective equipment items such as
boots,

gloves, and hoods. Air Force Units Had The Army and the Air Force required
specific patient chemical Shortages in Medical decontamination items- such
as aprons, gloves, sponges, and utility Supplies

pails- for decontaminating casualties, whereas, the Marine Corps did not
require such supplies. For the units included in our review, the Army
divisions had all of their required medical supplies and the Air Force wings
had most of their medical supplies. Lists of the Army and Air Force required
patient decontamination items are included as appendix II.

The Air Force wings had shortages in a few items, including some categorized
as critical by the Air Force. Specifically, one wing had requirements for 87
medical items and had shortages in 8 item areas,

5 critical. For example, it had only 25 percent of the protective masks
required to treat contaminated patients and 48 percent of its patient
decontamination kits. The masks would be used to protect the patient from
further contamination after that individual has been decontaminated. The
other wing had requirements for 85 medical items and had shortages in 14
item areas, 10 critical. For example, it had only 21 percent of its required

protective masks. In contrast, our 1996 report stated that medical units
assigned to support the early deploying Army divisions we visited often
lacked specific supplies needed to treat casualties in a chemically or
biologically contaminated environment. For example, the Army medical units
had on hand only about 50 to 60 percent of their authorized medical
supplies.

Units Had Most Detection The units were required to have equipment that
would be used to detect and Decontamination

and identify the presence of chemical agents and to decontaminate Equipment
on Hand

equipment and personnel. As table 1 shows, the shortages in detection and
decontamination equipment at the units we visited were not consistent across
the services or even within a service. However, the shortages were less
severe for the early deploying Army and Air Force units that we reviewed
than the overall servicewide shortages reported in DOD's fiscal

year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

Table 1: On- hand Percentage of Requirements for Primary Detection and
Decontamination Equipment Marine Corps Army Air Force Items Unit visited
Servicewide Unit visited Servicewide Unit visited Servicewide

A A B C A B

Detection

M8A1, automatic a 71 98 99 102 65 100 63 38

chemical agent alarm Chemical agent monitor 31 114 b 99 103 88 35 100 50 7
M21 remote sensing

62 87 a a a 127 a a a chemical agent alarm Decontamination

M- 17, lightweight 79 67 66 100 95 41 a a 72

decontamination apparatus M11, portable 90 586 c a 100 70 a a a
decontaminating apparatus

Note: Individual units are referred to by letter (A, B, C). a No requirement
for the unit or service.

b Almost 60 percent of the Corps' inventory of chemical agent monitors were
awaiting repair at their logistics center. c Equipment on hand, but no
requirement.

Source: GAO developed from unit reports and DOD's fiscal year 2000 report to
Congress on its Chemical and Biological Defense Program.

Officials at the units we visited told us that in the event of a conflict,
equipment shortages would be filled from stocks taken from later deploying
units or from war reserves at equipment depots. However, they had not
determined whether these sources could provide sufficient equipment to fill
shortages in time to meet deployment requirements or

what effect this solution might have on the detection and decontamination
capability of later deploying units. Without this information, the services
cannot be sure that this solution for meeting shortages would not place

later deploying units at risk or adversely impact the war reserves, which
would be needed to sustain military operations under chemical and biological
attacks. We have work under way to review the extent to which chemical and
biological defense equipment stocks (1) are adequate to meet

requirements and (2) can be delivered from depots to deploying or deployed
forces in time to effectively support operations.

Chemical and Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD's Office
of the

Biological Defense Inspector General found that commanders were not
integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises and the
training was not always Training Continues to

realistic in terms of how units would operate in war. Officials at the Army
Be a Problem Area and Marine Corps units we reviewed stated that chemical
and biological defense training is being adversely affected by (1) a
shortage of chemical and biological defense specialists and (2) specialists
being assigned

multiple responsibilities unrelated to their specialties. Policies Require
That

Joint doctrine provides expectations for continuing mission- essential
Chemical and Biological operations in a chemical or biological environment.
Joint Publication 3- 11 Defense Be Fully Integrated

contains overall policy guidance for operations in a chemical or biological
Into Readiness Training environment. The policy prescribes that U. S. forces
be prepared to conduct operations in a chemical or biological warfare
environment with minimal degradation of capabilities. The publication states
that chemical and biological defense training will be integrated into
individual and unit training programs.

The objectives of this training are to develop and evaluate the readiness of
U. S. forces to operate in a chemical or biological environment and to
ensure proficiency with defensive equipment, materiels, and procedures. Each
service is responsible for incorporating chemical and biological defense
training into overall training plans for units and individuals. Army and
Marine Corps policies require that chemical and biological defense training
be fully integrated into unit exercises. Similarly, Air Force policy
requires that units conduct exercises that include chemical and biological
defense training at least annually.

Training Not Fully Our current and prior work as well as the work of DOD's
Inspector General Integrated and Lacks

found that Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force commanders were not Realism

integrating chemical and biological defense into unit exercises and the
training was not always realistic in terms of how units would operate in
war. For example, we were told by Marine Corps officers responsible for
chemical and biological defense training at the unit we reviewed that
commanders are not fully integrating chemical and biological defense into

unit exercises, as required by Marine Corps policies. According to the
officials, realistic chemical and biological defense training requires that
individuals put on protective clothing and masks and perform in that
equipment for extended periods, which makes it difficult and time

consuming for the individuals to perform combat essential tasks. Therefore,
many commanders do not integrate chemical and biological defense into
training scenarios because it would (1) decrease the number of combat
essential tasks that can be performed during an exercise and

(2) severely limit offensive combat operations. We were also told that the
training often lacks realism. For example, during one exercise, Marines, who
were simulating operations during a chemical attack, were required to wear
protective masks, but not protective gloves because it was too

cumbersome to work in the gloves. Air Force officials at one of the units
visited stated that readiness exercises were suspended for over 3 years
because of deployment requirements. They stated that the readiness exercise,
conducted in February 1999, included minimal chemical and biological defense
because the unit was not familiar with the chemical and biological equipment
and procedures. The

unit reported that during the February 1999 exercise, personnel from that
unit did not consistently practice proper contamination avoidance procedures
and did not have protective equipment readily available.

DOD's fiscal year 2000 report to Congress on its Chemical and Biological
Defense Program stated that the Army's combat training centers continue to
see units at the company, battalion, and brigade levels unable to perform
all chemical and biological defense tasks to standard. The report concludes
that this less than satisfactory performance is directly attributable to the
lack of chemical and biological training at the units' home installations.

In September 1999, we reported that the Army's combat training centers were
restricting the simulated use of chemical weapons against the units being
trained because the units were not proficient in chemical and

biological defense. Specifically, we reported that a ceiling was placed on
the numbers, types, and times that the opposing force can use chemical
weapons against units that demonstrate a low level of proficiency in

chemical defense. In 1998, DOD's Office of the Inspector General reported
that chemical and biological defense preparedness training is often not
fully integrated into unit exercises, and when included, is not always
realistic. At 187 of 232 units it reviewed, unit commanders generally were
not fully integrating

chemical and biological defense into unit mission training. As a result,
commanders could not adequately assess unit readiness to successfully
complete wartime missions under chemical and biological conditions. The
Inspector General recommended that the Army, Air Force, and Marine

Corps revise the format of periodic training briefings to include reports by
unit commanders on the readiness of their units to conduct their wartime
missions under chemical and biological conditions, require the use of
internal and external evaluations in assessing unit readiness for those
periodic briefings, require that support units receive evaluations of
chemical and biological defense readiness similar to the evaluations
received by combat units, and elevate the results of external evaluations to
a higher level.

Personnel Shortages and Officials at the units we visited cited a shortage
of experienced personnel, Inexperienced Personnel as well as assigned
personnel having multiple responsibilities, as adversely Adversely Affect
Training

impacting chemical and biological defense training and equipment
maintenance. In addition, we were told that shortages in chemical and
biological specialists at the Marine Corps unit we visited could also
negatively affect the unit's ability to fully perform their wartime mission.

The three services have specialists who are responsible for training combat
and combat support personnel in chemical and biological defense
preparedness. For the most part, these specialists are also responsible for
maintaining chemical and biological equipment. In wartime, these specialists
would perform various functions, including operating chemical and biological
detection and decontamination equipment.

The following table shows the authorized and assigned chemical specialists
at the Army, Marine Corps and Air Force units we visited.

Table 2: Authorized and Assigned Chemical Specialists at Army, Marine Corps,
and Air Force Units Officers Enlisted Service Authorized Assigned Percent
assigned Authorized Assigned Percent assigned Army

Unit A 32 24 75 335 255 76 Unit B 43 38 88 300 270 90 Unit C 37 31 84 308
314 102

Marine Corps

Unit A 39 31 80 228 192 84

Air Force

Unit A 1 1 100 10 7 70 Unit B 1 1 100 9 6 67

Source: Service units.

At one Army unit, officials said that personnel shortages required them to
use inexperienced personnel to provide training, which adversely affected
the quality of that training. At another Army unit, we were told that
specialists responsible for chemical and biological defense training and
equipment maintenance did not have the correct qualifications and/ or
experience required for the job.

Marine Corps officials said that chemical and biological specialists are
required to perform multiple tasks, such as preparing Status of Resources
and Training System reports and coaching and training individuals at the
rifle/ pistol range, and that these multiple tasks diminish their ability to
train other personnel on chemical and biological defense. We were also told
by officials of the subordinate unit that would be responsible for
decontaminating personnel and equipment in wartime that the subordinate unit
only had 44 of 62 (or 71 percent) of its authorized enlisted personnel and
that without its full complement of personnel, the unit's decontamination
capabilities would be seriously degraded.

Monitoring of DOD's monitoring of chemical and biological defense readiness
has Chemical and

improved since our 1996 report. Since 1993, DOD has required units from all
the military services to assess their equipment and training status for
Biological Defense operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated
environment and

Needs Further to report this data as a distinct part of the Status of
Resources and Training

Improvement System. However, DOD did not require that chemical and
biological defense readiness be factored into the units' overall readiness
assessment.

In 1996, we reported that this system's effectiveness for reporting unit
chemical and biological defense readiness was limited for a variety of
reasons. For example, although the reporting of critical equipment shortages
was required, the determination of which equipment was critical was left up
to the unit commander. As a result, data across units were inconsistent.
Also, units were not required to report on some critical equipment items if
they were being centrally stored as opposed to being on

hand in the individual units, thus presenting an inaccurate picture of their
equipment status. Our report recommended that DOD consider modifying the
Status of Resources and Training System to require that chemical and
biological readiness be factored into units' overall readiness assessments.
However, DOD disagreed with this recommendation, stating that this reporting
system provided a broad range of information on selected unit status
indicators and was not intended to function as a detailed management tool.
Nevertheless, DOD officials told us that unit commanders would no longer be
allowed to subjectively determine what equipment is critical for reporting
purposes.

In April 2000, the Joint Staff directed changes to the system that make the
units' chemical and biological defense readiness data much more comparable
to their overall readiness data. 9 For example, the new guidance requires
the units to (1) report on the availability of chemical and biological

defense equipment and supplies and training status and (2) assign a chemical
and biological defense readiness rating to their units. The chemical and
biological defense readiness rating would be in addition to the units'
overall readiness rating. The guidance, however, does not require reporting
on equipment serviceability or personnel on hand as is required for the
unit's overall readiness rating. During this and prior reviews, we were told
of and observed equipment that was unserviceable and yet

9 The changes are found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
3150. 02, April 15, 2000.

reported as being on hand for readiness reporting. Thus, despite the recent
changes to the readiness reporting system, these reports could indicate that
a unit had all its chemical and biological defense equipment, but not show
that some of the equipment was unserviceable. Conclusions DOD believes that
chemical and biological weapons are likely to be used in a conflict to
disrupt U. S. operations and logistics and to potentially offset the
overwhelming conventional warfare capabilities of U. S. forces.

Chemical and biological defense equipment, supplies, and training are
essential to counter this threat. Although the units we reviewed have
improved in the equipment and supplies they have on hand, our current and

prior work as well as the work of the DOD's Inspector General found that
commanders were not integrating chemical and biological defense into unit
exercises and the training that was conducted was not always realistic in
terms of how units would operate in war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Status of Resources and Training System is used
to measure the extent individual service units possess the required
resources and training to complete their wartime missions. Recent changes to
the system are a step in the right direction to improving chemical and
biological defense readiness reporting, but the changes do not require units
to report on the condition of their chemical and biological defense
equipment. Thus, these reports could provide incomplete or misleading
information on the status of equipment, a key element included in assessing
overall unit readiness.

Recommendations for To further improve the readiness of U. S. forces and the
effectiveness of the Executive Action

readiness reporting system, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense
direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and the Commandant of
the Marine Corps to require that units include realistic chemical and
biological defense training in exercises. We also recommend that these
exercises adhere to realistic wartime scenarios. Finally, we recommend that
the Secretary of Defense direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
enhance the Status of Resources and Training System by including

the condition of chemical and biological equipment in its chemical and
biological readiness ratings.

Agency Comments and The Deputy for Chemical/ Biological Defense, Office of
the Assistant to the

Our Evaluation Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological
Defense

Programs, provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD partially
concurred on the recommendations in the draft report. Regarding our first
recommendation, DOD concurred and stated that it has taken actions and has
on- going actions to improve chemical and biological defense training. For
example, DOD stated that the April 2000 Defense

Planning Guidance directs the services and Commander in Chiefs to ensure
that routine individual, unit, joint, and combined training and exercises
incorporate realistic chemical and biological warfare threats. Also, to
facilitate the proper training of U. S. forces to counter chemical and
biological warfare threats or use, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will ensure that the Universal Joint Task List includes chemical and
biological conditions in all applicable tasks. Moreover, combatant
commanders, service component commands, combat support agencies, and
services are working towards the full integration of chemical and biological
defense related Joint Mission Essential Tasks into joint training.

Our draft report submitted to DOD for comments recommended that DOD further
improve the Status of Resources and Training System by including the
condition of chemical and biological equipment and the on- hand levels of
chemical and biological personnel in its chemical and biological readiness
ratings. DOD disagreed with those recommended improvements.

It stated that, although the Status of Resources and Training System should
be enhanced, revising the current system further by adding additional
reporting requirements for chemical personnel and equipment condition is
unnecessary and would place redundant requirements on unit commanders. DOD
said that (1) the only chemical personnel not captured

in the system are the small numbers of chemical soldiers assigned to other
than chemical units, (2) because of the small numbers of personnel involved,
designating chemical and biological defense personnel as a

critical specialty could distort readiness reports, and (3) personnel
shortages can be highlighted in commanders' comments, which are included in
the Status of Resources and Training System. We agree with DOD's position on
chemical personnel and have deleted reference to this part of the
recommendation. With regards to the condition of chemical and biological
equipment in readiness ratings, DOD said that the majority of this
equipment, primarily individual protection and unit detection equipment, is
presently reported as either fully serviceable or not reported at all. It
stated that the serviceability

of unit- level power- driven decontamination systems is presently not
reported but that the services are being encouraged to incorporate the
serviceability of these systems into readiness ratings and that they are
currently performing analyses to determine the feasibility of doing this.

We continue to believe that the new chemical and biological reporting
requirement in the Status of Resources and Training System should require
the separate reporting of both on- hand equipment levels and the
serviceability of this equipment. We acknowledge that this distinction may
not be as important for some types of individual protective equipment as
mentioned in DOD's comments above. However, much of a military unit's
capability to perform essential chemical and biological defense functions-

such as the detection of chemical and biological agents and the
decontamination of major items of equipment- is dependent on unit as opposed
to individual equipment. As stated previously, during this and

prior reviews, we were told of and observed equipment that was unserviceable
and yet reported as being on hand for readiness reports. For example, in a
recent review of deployed forces, we found that a large unit overseas was
reporting that it had all of its power- driven decontamination systems on
hand and was consistently reporting a high degree of unit readiness.
However, unit personnel could not locate over half of the systems and only
one system that they located was known to have a usable water storage
bladder, which is critical to the system's effectiveness. Moreover, it took
unit personnel several attempts over 2 hours and partial

disassembly and cleaning of this system's motor before the system could be
operated. In ongoing work, we continue to find problems with equipment
serviceability, including individual protective equipment, in some units
reporting high levels of readiness in the chemical and biological portion of
their Status of Resources and Training System report. Furthermore, the April
2000 changes to the Status of Resources and Training System now require the
units to report on the availability of chemical and biological equipment and
supplies and training status and to assign a chemical and biological defense
readiness rating to their units. The system previously required and still
requires that units report on these elements as well as equipment
serviceability for overall readiness reporting. Therefore, we do not believe
the reporting on equipment serviceability would be redundant but rather it
would improve the visibility of the real status of chemical and

biological equipment. DOD also provided some technical comments, which we
incorporated into the report, where appropriate. DOD's overall comments are
included in appendix III.

Scope and To determine whether U. S. forces were adequately equipped,
staffed, and Methodology

trained, we compared service- and command- level requirements for chemical
and biological defense to the equipment and personnel reported to be on hand
and to the training that had been conducted at selected units of the Army,
Marine Corps, and Air Force. We discussed with key command and unit
officials the significance of any reported shortages of equipment or
personnel. We also discussed with officials whether equipment reported as on
hand was in working condition. During our observation of storage locations,
we randomly selected some items of equipment and asked unit officials to
operate them for us. We reviewed training reports and held discussions with
officials on the extent to which chemical and biological factors were
included in the major training exercises. The units visited

were one Marine Corps expeditionary force, two Air Force fighter wings, and
three Army divisions. We also interviewed officials and obtained documents
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the
headquarters of the Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force; U. S. Joint Forces
Command; Army Forces Command; and the Air Force Air Combat Command.

To determine what actions had been taken to improve chemical and biological
defense readiness reporting, we reviewed recent revisions to the guidance
for preparing Status of Resources and Training System reports

and discussed these changes with officials from the staff of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. We also compared these revisions to our prior
recommendations and to the conditions that we found at the units visited to
determine if the revisions would adequately surface readiness problems.

Our review was conducted from February through September 2000 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are providing
copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of
Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable
F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; General James Jones,
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and interested congressional committees.
Copies of this report will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 6020 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. Key contributors to this report were Robert
Pelletier, Connie Sawyer, Linda Koetter, and William Cawood.

Sincerely yours, Raymond Decker Director, Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendi x I

Individual Protective Equipment Equipment Description

M256 chemical agent detector kit Kit is used to detect and identify
concentrations of nerve agents (e. g., sarin, tabun), blister agents (e. g.,
mustard, phosgene oxime), and blood agents (e. g., hydrogen cyanide and
cyanogen chloride) in vapor form in about 15- 20 minutes.

M9 detector paper Dye impregnated papers that change color when exposed to
liquid chemical agents M8 detector paper or aerosols.

M291 skin decontamination kit Kit consists of fiber applicator pads which
enable individual to remove, neutralize, and destroy chemical warfare agents
on contaminated skin. M295 equipment decontamination kit Kit consists of
individual mitts which enable the individual to remove, neutralize, or
destroy chemical agents and toxins on personal items and equipment. C2/ C2A1
filters The filters are used with the protective mask and provide the
ingredients that absorb chemical agent particles as small as .3 microns in
size. Protective mask Masks that provide face and respiratory protection
from chemical and biological

agents, toxins, and radioactive fallout particles. Chemical protective
helmet covers and hoods These items fit over the helmet to protect the
individual against chemical and

biological agents. Battlefield protective suit A garment that is typically
worn over the duty uniform to protect the individual against chemical agent
vapors and liquid droplets, biological agents, and

radioactive particles. Chemical protective gloves Rubber outer gloves for
protection from chemical agents and a cotton inner glove

for perspiration absorption. Chemical protective overshoes Overshoes that
are worn over the combat boots to provide chemical agent and/ or

moisture protection.

Appendi x II

Medical Decontamination Supplies The Army maintains its medical
decontamination supplies in kits. The three units we visited were required
to have 12, 32, and 46 kits comprised of the items in table 3.

Table 3: Required Medical Decontamination Supplies for Army Units
Description Authorized

Scissors bandage 16 Hypodermic syringe 1 Folding litter support 8 Folding
litter 2 No. 4 chest 3 No. 6 chest 1 M8 chemical agent paper 6 M9 chemical
agent paper 1 Calcium hyprochlorite 49 Decontaminating kit 2 Utility pail 10
Black pencil 2 Cellulose sponge 10 Plastic bag 2 Roll, plastic sheet 1
Apron, toxic agent protect, small 2 Apron, toxic agent protect, medium 4
Apron, toxic agent protect, large 2 Chemical protective glove set, small 2
Chemical protective glove set, medium 4 Chemical protective glove set, large
2 Chemical gloves insert, small 25 Chemical gloves insert, medium 25 Source:
Army units.

Table 4 provides a list of medical decontamination supplies that are
required by the Air Force units we visited and the on- hand amounts and
percent.

Table 4: Required Medical Decontamination Supplies for Air Force Units Unit
A Unit B

Percent Percent Description Critical Required On hand on hand On hand on
hand

Aircraft cargo pallet X 1 1 100 1 100 Top cargo net tie down X 1 1 100 1 100
Side cargo net tie down X 2 2 100 2 100 Insecticide sprayer 2 2 100 2 100
Air conditioner, 50/ 60 HZ 2 2 100 2 100 Decontaminating kit 100 100 100 48
48 Chemical/ biological mask, hood X 160 160 100 268 167 Chemical/
biological mask, small X 7 6 86 6 86 Chemical/ biological mask, medium X 38
3 8 0 0 Chemical/ biological mask, large X 7 2 29 7 100 Chemical/ biological
mask, canister X 160 117 73 160 100 Manual inflating pump X 1 1 100 1 100
Centrifugal pump unit 1 1 100 1 100 Dry chemical water purifier X 2 2 100 2
100 Rubber water hose, 50 feet X 16 16 100 16 100 Garden hose nozzle X 4 4
100 4 100 Crash steel blade knife X 10 10 100 10 100 Safety rescue knife X
20 20 100 20 100 Shovel 4 4 100 4 100 Collapsible fabric tank X 2 3 150 1 50
Standard distribution box X 2 2 100 2 100 Distribution box X 2 2 100 2 100
Convenience outlet accessory X 3 0 0 3 100 Nonrechargeable battery 9 9 100 9
100 Electric power cable assembly 100 feet X 3 3 100 3 100 Right angle
flashlight 40 40 100 40 100 Fluorescent light set X 5 5 100 5 100 Povidone-
Iodine cleaner, 1 gallon 6 6 100 10 167 Gauze surgical sponge X 24 24 100 35
146 Surgical sponge, 12 ply X 24 24 100 220 92 Tongue depressor 5 5 100 5
100 Scissors bandage X 80 76 95 80 100 Hand operated resuscitator X 2 2 100
2 100

Unit A Unit B Percent

Percent Description Critical Required On hand on hand On hand on hand

Wheeled litter carrier X 14 14 100 14 100 Aluminum litter, polegreen X 12 14
117 15 125 Chemical agent detector paper X 50 50 100 50 100 Chemical
detector kit X 10 10 100 10 100 Chemical agent monitor X 6 6 100 2 33
Chemical agent paper X 20 20 100 20 100 Simulator detector ticket X 3 3 100
3 100 ADM 300A multifunction survey meter X 3 3 100 3 100 Radiac
verification kit X 1 1 100 1 100 Calcium hypochlorite tech 5 5 100 0 0 Skin
decontaminating kit X 2 2 100 2 100 Individual decontaminating kit 4 2 50 4
100 Folding steel chair X 12 12 100 12 100 Food storage shelving 2 0 0 2 100
Utility pail X 20 12 60 35 175 Waste receptacle, 32 gallon 15 9 60 15 100
Steel dustpan, 7 inches long 2 2 100 2 100 Plastic coat hanger 40 0 0 41 102
Pressure sensitive adhesive tape X 20 20 100 20 100 Bench dusting brush 13
inches 6 6 100 6 100 Upright broom 2 2 100 4 200 Plastic bag 1 1 100 1 100
Plastic bag, 60 X 36 200S X 1 1 100 1 100 Ship and storage container X 2 3
150 2 100 Pin tent wood 24 inches long X 60 60 100 60 100 Pin tent 0. 625 X
12 inches X 60 60 100 60 100 Single ply floor tent X 4 4 100 7 175 Tent pin
container X 3 3 100 3 100 Fly, tent X 4 4 100 4 100 Fly, tent section TAN X
5 5 100 5 100 Tent door X 2 2 100 2 100 Tent window X 8 8 100 13 162 Frame
section, tent X 10 10 100 10 100 Apron toxic agent, protect M- 2 X 20 20 100
20 100 Apron toxic agent, protect M- 2 X 20 20 100 20 100

Unit A Unit B Percent

Percent Description Critical Required On hand on hand On hand on hand

Chemical protective suit, small X 5 4 80 5 100 Chemical protective suit,
medium X 80 25 31 80 100 Chemical protective suit, large X 80 27 34 80 100
Glove insert large X 160 160 100 161 101 Black rubber chemical gloves, small
X 10 10 100 10 100 Black rubber chemical gloves, medium X 160 160 100 160
100 Black rubber chemical gloves, large X 10 10 100 10 100 Overshoes
chemical, mens 8 X 20 20 100 20 100 Overshoes chemical, mens 9 X 50 50 100
50 100 Overshoes chemical, mens 10 X 50 50 100 50 100 Overshoes chemical,
mens 11 X 30 30 100 30 100 Overshoes chemical, mens 12 X 10 10 100 10 100
Overshoes chemical, mens 13 X 20 21 105 20 100 Overshoes chemical, mens 14 X
20 20 100 20 100 Trunk locker plywood 2 2 100 2 100 Diatomaceous earth 50
pound 3 3 100 3 100 Contamination sign kit 2 2 100 2 100 Battery charger
analyzer 1 a 0 0 Chemical protective suit, x- large 5 a 5 100

a No requirement for the unit. Source: Air Force units

Appendi x II I Comments From the Department of Defense

(702038) Lett er

Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional
copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to

the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are
accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single
address are discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail: U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington,
DC 20013

Orders by visiting: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)
U. S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC

Orders by phone: (202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

Orders by Internet: For information on how to access GAO reports on the
Internet, send an e- mail message with “info” in the body to:
info@ www. gao. gov or visit GAO's World Wide Web home page at: http:// www.
gao. gov

To Report Fraud,

Contact one:

Waste, or Abuse in Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm

Federal Programs

e- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering system)

GAO United States General Accounting Office

Page 1 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Contents

Page 2 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 3 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense United States General
Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 4 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 5 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 6 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 7 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 8 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 9 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 10 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 11 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 12 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 13 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 14 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 15 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 16 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 17 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 18 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 19 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 20 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 21 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 22 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix I

Page 23 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II

Appendix II Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 24 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 25 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix II Medical Decontamination Supplies

Page 26 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Page 27 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 28 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 29 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 30 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 32 GAO- 01- 27 Chemical and Biological Defense

United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

Address Correction Requested Bulk Rate

Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***