Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
Results (Letter Report, 10/17/2000, GAO/GAO-01-26).

The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help the Colombian National Police and other law
enforcement agencies, the military, and civilian agencies reduce illegal
drug production and trafficking. Recognizing that illegal drug
activities are a serious problem, the Colombian government announced a
counternarcotics plan known as Plan Colombia. This report reviews the
U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. Although U.S.-provided
assistance has enhanced Colombian counternarcotics capabilities, its
usefulness has sometimes been limited because of long-standing problems
in planning and implementation. For example, little progress has been
made in launching a plan to have Colombia's National Police assume a
larger role in managing the aerial eradication program, which requires
costly U.S. contractor assistance. The governments of the United States
and Colombia face continuing and new financial and management challenges
in implementing Plan Colombia. The costs and activities needed to
implement the plan are unknown at this time, and it will take years
before any significant reduction in the drug trade is seen. Colombia
must resolve problems with its political and economic stability and
improve its management of counternarcotics funding in order to
successfully implement Plan Colombia. GAO summarized this report in
testimony before Congress; see: Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing
Plan Colombia, by Jess T. Ford, Associate Director for International
Affairs and Trade, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human Resources, House Committee on Government Reform.
GAO-01-76T, Oct. 12 (13 pages).

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  GAO-01-26
     TITLE:  Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years
	     to Produce Results
      DATE:  10/17/2000
   SUBJECT:  Drug trafficking
	     Federal aid to foreign countries
	     Narcotics
	     International cooperation
	     Helicopters
	     Political corruption
	     Strategic planning
IDENTIFIER:  Colombia
	     Plan Colombia
	     UH-1 Helicopter

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GAO-01-26

A

Letter 3 Appendixes Appendix I: U. S. Assistance and Support for
Counternarcotics

Activities in Colombia 30 Appendix II: Comments From the Department of State
36 Appendix III: Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy 37 Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 39
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40

Related GAO Products 41 Tables Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to
Colombia (fiscal years

1996- 2000) 6 Table 2: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia (fiscal
years

1996- 2000) 30 Table 3: State Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia (fiscal years 1996- 2000) 31

Table 4: USAID Support for Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia (fiscal
years 1996- 2000) 33 Table 5: Fiscal Year 1999 Supplemental Funding
Specifically for

Colombian Counternarcotics Program 34 Table 6: Section 506 (a)( 2)
Assistance Allocated and Delivered to Colombia (fiscal years 1996- 1999) (as
of Sept. 1, 2000) 35

Figures Figure 1: Trends in Colombian Coca Cultivation, 1995- 99 8 Figure 2:
Colombian Cocaine Production Potential, 1995- 99 9

Figure 3: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and Drug- trafficking
Activities 11

Abbreviations

USAID U. S. Agency for International Development DEA Drug Enforcement
Administration DOD Department of Defense SOUTHCOM U. S. Southern Command

Lett er

October 17, 2000 The Honorable John L. Mica Chairman The Honorable Patsy
Mink Ranking Member Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources

Committee on Government Reform House of Representatives

The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the early
1970s to help the Colombian National Police and other law enforcement
agencies, the military, and civilian agencies in their efforts to reduce
illegal drug production and trafficking activities. Despite this assistance,
Colombia remains the world's leading producer of cocaine and

has become the source of the majority of heroin being used in the United
States. In addition, Colombia faces internal problems, including active
insurgent and paramilitary groups that control large sections of the country
where most illegal drug activities are occurring. Recognizing that illegal
drug activities are a serious problem in Colombia, the Colombian government,
in October 1999, announced a $7. 5 billion counternarcotics plan known as
Plan Colombia. Among other things, Plan Colombia proposes to reduce the
cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over 6
years. To assist in this effort, in July 2000,

the United States agreed to provide about $860 million to Colombia for
fiscal years 2000- 01, in addition to previously programmed U. S. assistance
to Colombia of over $330 million for the same period. U. S. counternarcotics

assistance to Colombia has almost doubled compared to 1999 levels. Because
of congressional concerns over the increasing involvement of the United
States in Colombian efforts to control illegal narcotics, you requested that
we review U. S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. As agreed with your
staffs, we determined (1) how the drug threat has

changed in recent years; (2) what problems, if any, the United States has
had in providing its assistance to Colombia; and (3) what challenges the
United States and Colombia face in reducing the illegal drug activities.

During fiscal years 1996- 2000, the United States provided Colombia more
than $765 million in assistance to support its efforts to reduce illegal
drug activities. Although the United States has no direct role in carrying
out Colombia's counternarcotics program, the Departments of State and

Defense manage most of the U. S. assistance. State has primarily supported
the National Police in its efforts to eradicate coca and opium poppy and
interdiction operations by providing them equipment such as helicopters,
fixed- wing aircraft, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment,
logistical support, fuel, and training. Moreover, a State- funded U. S.
contractor conducts aerial spraying eradication operations. The Department
of Defense has supplied equipment, logistics, ammunition, weapons, training,
and other support to both the National Police and the military. Other U. S.
agencies that provide assistance include the U. S. Agency for International
Development, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and other U. S. law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.

To address your concerns, we met with cognizant U. S. officials and reviewed
pertinent planning, implementation, and related documentation at the
Departments of State and Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the
U. S. Agency for International Development, and the

Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington, D. C.; the U. S.
Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; and the U. S. Embassy in
Bogota, Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Colombian military, police,
and government officials and visited the Colombian aviation brigade located
at Tolemaida and operational sites at Larandia and Tres Esquinas.

Results in Brief Despite U. S. and Colombian efforts, the illegal narcotics
threat from Colombia continues to grow and become more complex. From 1995

through 1999 coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia more than
doubled and Colombia became a major supplier of heroin consumed in the
United States. Moreover, over time, the drug threat has become more
difficult to address. This is because the increasing number and types of
organizations involved in illegal drug activities, including insurgent
groups,

and the lack of Colombian government control over more than 40 percent of
its territory make eradication and interdiction operations to reduce illegal
drug activities more difficult. Although U. S.- provided assistance has
enhanced Colombian counternarcotics capabilities, it has sometimes been of
limited utility because of long- standing problems in planning and
implementing this assistance. For example, helicopters that State provided
to the National Police and the military have not had sufficient spare parts
or the funding

necessary to operate and maintain them to the extent possible for conducting
counternarcotics operations. Moreover, the U. S. Embassy has made little
progress implementing a plan to have the National Police

assume more responsibility for the aerial eradication program, which
requires costly U. S. contractor assistance to carry out. U. S. Embassy
officials also expressed concern that the National Police has not always

provided documentation about its use of some counternarcotics assistance.
The governments of the United States and Colombia face continuing and new
financial and management challenges in implementing Plan Colombia. At this
point, the total cost and activities required to meet the plan's goals
remain unknown, and it will take years before drug activities are

significantly reduced. U. S. agencies are still developing comprehensive
implementation plans, and manufacturing and delivering equipment and finding
and placing staff in Colombia to manage activities will take time. As a
result, agencies do not expect to have many of the programs to support Plan
Colombia in place until late 2001. Moreover, additional funds will be needed
to ensure that equipment provided remains operable. State planning documents
indicate that it has not budgeted funds to train pilots and mechanics,
provide logistical support, and support the operations of certain U. S.-
provided helicopters. To date, the Colombian government has not demonstrated
that it has the detailed plans, management structure, and

funding necessary to effectively implement its programs and achieve stated
goals. While Colombia is relying on international donors in addition to the
United States to help fund Plan Colombia, much of that support has yet to
materialize. Colombia faces continuing challenges associated with its
political and economic instability fostered by Colombia's long- standing
insurgency and the need to ensure that the Colombian Police and military
comply with human rights standards in order for U. S. assistance to
continue.

We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Defense to
help ensure that U. S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia is used most
effectively and problems in supporting U. S.- provided equipment do not
recur. In commenting on a draft of this report, State and Defense generally
concurred with the information presented and the recommendations.

Background For more than two decades, the United States has supported
Colombia's efforts to reduce drug- trafficking activities and to stem the
flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The U. S. National Drug
Control Strategy calls for a 15- percent reduction in the net flow of
illegal drugs from source countries, including Colombia, by 2002. 1 The
United States hopes to achieve this by assisting Colombia in its efforts to
(1) reduce and dismantle

drug- trafficking organizations, (2) reduce the availability of drugs
through the eradication of crops and enforcement efforts, and (3) strengthen
Colombian institutions that support a full range of counternarcotics
activities.

U. S. Assistance Provided to Table 1 shows the assistance the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Colombia

Department of State, and the U. S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) have provided Colombia in terms of counternarcotics equipment,
training, logistics, and related support for fiscal years 1996- 2000.

Table 1: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia (fiscal years
1996-2000) Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Agency 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 a Total

State b $22.6 $ 44. 4 $83.1 $237. 7 $76.3 $464. 1

DOD c 14.5 53.2 61.4 80. 9 72.5 282.5

USAID 0 0 3. 3 6.3 9. 0 18. 6 Total $37.1 $97. 6 $147.8 $324. 9 $157.8 $765.
2

a We did not include the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246) in
fiscal year 2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the
funding between fiscal year 2000 and 2001. b Includes $173.2 million in
Colombia- specific counternarcotics assistance provided to State in the

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal
Year 1999 (Division B of P. L. 105- 277). c Includes amounts delivered
through September 1, 2000, from emergency drawdowns of DOD inventories
authorized in fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. For fiscal year 1996,
DOD could not provide funding data on its other assistance programs.

Further details on U. S.- provided counternarcotics assistance are contained
in appendix I.

1 The strategy is prepared by the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
which established five goals to reduce drug demand and supply. The strategy
includes two goals for reducing the flow of drugs entering the United States
by breaking foreign and domestic drug sources of supply and protecting U. S.
air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat.

Plan Colombia and The Colombian government's $7.5 billion, 6- year
counternarcotics plan, Associated U. S. Support

issued in October 1999, represents a significant change from prior efforts.
Colombia has pledged to provide $4 billion to support the plan and called on
the international community, including the United States, to provide the
remaining $3. 5 billion to assist in this effort. The government recognizes
that the program must address the conditions that foster the growth in
illegal drug activities. Central to the effort is that the Colombian

government must gain control of the drug- producing regions of the country
from insurgent and paramilitary groups, increase drug interdiction efforts,
provide coca farmers alternative ways to earn a living, and enhance the
protection of human rights. As such, Plan Colombia focuses on five key
areas: advancing the ongoing peace process with the insurgents, improving

the economy, combating narcotics, reforming the judicial system and
promoting civil rights, and supporting democratization and social
development. All key Colombian ministries, including the Justice and Defense
ministries, are assigned roles and specific tasks in the plan. In July 2000,
Congress appropriated over $860 million for fiscal years 2000- 01 to
directly support Plan Colombia. 2 The funds are allocated as follows:

$519 million for equipment and training assistance to support Colombian
military counternarcotics operations, $123 million for similar assistance to
support National Police operations,

$69 million for alternative development projects in drug- producing areas,
$58 million for judicial reform and rule of law initiatives, $51 million for
strengthening human rights organizations within Colombia,

$38 million for persons displaced as a result of counternarcotics
operations, and $3 million for peace process initiatives. 2 The act
(Division B of P. L. 106- 246) provides $1. 3 billion, but about $440
million was for other Andean countries and for U. S. agencies involved in
drug interdiction and law enforcement.

The Changing Nature U. S. estimates indicate that the drug threat from
Colombia has both of the Drug Threat in expanded and become more complex
over the past several years. Drug

cultivation and production have significantly increased since 1995. Colombia

Moreover, the role of insurgent and paramilitary groups in drug- trafficking
activities has become more prevalent, severely complicating U. S. and
Colombian efforts to reduce illicit drug cultivation and production.

Drug Cultivation and Historically, Colombia has been the world's largest
producer of cocaine. Production Are Increasing

However, starting in 1997, Colombia surpassed Bolivia and Peru as the
world's largest cultivator of coca, which is used to produce cocaine. As
shown in figure 1, the area under coca cultivation in Colombia expanded by
over 140 percent during 1995- 99. Most of this increase has occurred in the
areas of southern Colombia that are controlled by insurgents and
paramilitary groups.

Figure 1: Trends in Colombian Coca Cultivation, 1995- 99

400,000 Net acres cultivated

300,000 200,000 100,000

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

Source: Department of State.

In addition, the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia has increased by 126
percent since 1995, from 230 metric tons to 520 metric tons, as shown in
figure 2.

Figure 2: Colombian Cocaine Production Potential, 1995- 99

600

Metric tons

500 400 300 200 100

0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Source: Department of State.

According to U. S. law enforcement officials, this increase has occurred not
only because of the increase in coca cultivation but also because of the use

of higher yielding varieties of coca leaf and more efficiency in processing
coca leaf into cocaine. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), Colombia has become a major source of the heroin consumed in the
United States. Recent U. S. estimates indicate that Colombia produced
approximately 8 metric tons of heroin in 1999, most of which was destined
for the United States.

Despite U. S. and Colombian efforts to disrupt drug- trafficking activities,
the U. S. Embassy in Colombia has not reported any net reduction in the
processing or export of refined cocaine to the United States. Moreover,
according to DEA, while two major groups (the Medellin and Cali cartels)
dominated drug- trafficking activities during the late 1980s and early
1990s, hundreds of smaller and more decentralized organizations are now
involved in all aspects of the drug trade. According to DEA, several billion
dollars flow into Colombia each year from the cocaine trade alone. This vast
amount of drug money has made it possible for these organizations to

gain unprecedented economic, political, and social power and influence.
Increased Involvement of The challenge of reducing drug- related activities
has become more difficult Insurgent and Paramilitary as the two largest
insurgent groups-the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Groups in Drug-
Trafficking

Colombia and the National Liberation Army-and paramilitary groups have
Activities expanded their involvement in drug trafficking. The insurgents
exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia's territory east
and south of the Andes, an area equal in size to Texas (see fig. 3).

Figure 3: Areas of Colombian Insurgent, Paramilitary, and Drug- trafficking
Activities

Caribbean Sea

Venezuela

Bogota

Colombia Ecuador

Brazil

Paramilitary activities Insurgents activities

Peru

Opium poppy growing areas Coca growing areas

Source: Figure prepared by GAO based on information from various U. S.
agencies.

According to U. S. officials, the alliance between the insurgents and the
drug traffickers challenges Colombia's ability to conduct effective
counternarcotics operations. DEA reported that the presence of units from
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in Colombia's eastern lowlands
and southeastern jungle areas was especially troublesome. According to DEA,
these areas include most of the new coca cultivation sites and most of the
major drug production facilities.

According to DOD, two- thirds of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
units and one- third of the National Liberation Army units are involved in
some form of drug- trafficking activity. These two insurgent groups are
estimated to comprise 20, 000 armed people. According to DEA, these groups
have assisted drug traffickers in providing security for cocaine- processing
laboratories, storing and transporting cocaine within Colombia, and other
trafficking-related activities; they also appear to be engaged in opiate
trafficking within Colombia. According to U. S. Embassy

officials, information over the past 2 years indicates that units of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia have become more heavily involved in
growing coca, establishing coca prices, and transporting cocaine in
Colombia. Because of the lack of reliable data, U. S. estimates of insurgent
groups' income from narcotics trafficking activities vary widely- from $30
million to $600 million annually. During the 1980s, paramilitary groups
emerged as self- defense forces in

response to the insurgents' violence. In 1998, DEA reported that certain
leaders of some of these groups had become major drug traffickers. Current
U. S. estimates indicate that these groups have between 5,000 and 7,000
personnel. However, U. S. officials have no estimates of the income that
paramilitary groups derive from illegal narcotics.

In its February 2000 report on international human rights conditions, State
noted that Colombian paramilitary and insurgent groups were responsible for
the vast majority of political and extrajudicial killings during 1999. 3
This report stated that paramilitary groups were the source of 153 massacres
that claimed 889 victims, but did not attribute a figure to the insurgents.
According to State officials, the paramilitary groups operate with relative
impunity in parts of northern Colombia, and according to U. S. Embassy
officials, paramilitary groups also appear to have established a permanent 3
1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Department of

State, Feb. 2000).

base in a major coca- growing area in southern Colombia, where the
insurgents are heavily concentrated.

Problems in Managing The United States has encountered long- standing
problems in providing U. S. Assistance to counternarcotics assistance to
Colombian law enforcement and military

agencies involved in counternarcotics activities. These problems continue.
Colombia

Although State has provided equipment, particularly helicopters and
fixedwing aircraft, to the National Police and military, it has not provided
enough financial or logistical support to ensure that the equipment can be

operated and maintained as intended. DOD could not provide some equipment
that the U. S. Embassy requested for the National Police and the military
because it was not available from DOD stocks. In addition, a U. S. program
designed to give operational control and responsibility for the aerial
eradication program to the National Police has not made much progress. U. S.
Embassy officials also expressed concern about their ability to oversee the
National Police's use of some U. S.- provided assistance.

Prior Management In 1998, we reported that planning and management problems
hampered Problems

U. S. counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. 4 Specifically, we noted that
State and the U. S. Embassy were not prepared for the increases in program
costs to support State's 1996 decision to increase the number of aircraft
and U. S. contractor personnel involved in the aerial eradication program.
We also reported that limited planning and coordination between U. S.
agencies

hampered the delivery of some counternarcotics equipment, such as 5 fixed-
wing aircraft, 12 transport helicopters, and 6 patrol craft, to the National
Police and the Colombian military. We reported that this equipment required
substantial funding to make them operational. A list of recent GAO products
on drug control issues related to Colombia is in appendix VI. State Has Not
Provided

According to State and DOD officials, U. S.- provided assistance to Colombia
Support for Some U. S. Supplied should include not only major equipment but
also the spare parts and

Equipment funding needed to operate and maintain it because the National
Police and

4 Drug Control: U. S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing
Challenges (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 60, Feb. 12, 1998).

the military lack adequately trained personnel and financial resources.
However, the United States has not always provided the necessary spare parts
and funding. As a result, the equipment has not been used to the extent
possible to reduce illegal drug activities.

Spare Parts Unavailable for During fiscal years 1996- 2000, State provided
the National Police with a

Helicopters variety of helicopters for use in eradication and drug
interdiction

operations without enough spare parts to operate and maintain them. In 1998,
State and the U. S. Embassy became aware that the National Police did not
have enough spare parts to support 6 Bell 212 and 14 UH1H helicopters.
State's Narcotics Affairs Section at the U. S. Embassy

planned to provide $1 million from its fiscal year 1999 budget for
helicopter spare parts. However, State did not provide funds to support
these helicopters because of budgetary constraints.

Between October 1998 and August 1999, State provided the National Police
with six additional Bell 212 helicopters and six UH- II helicopters. Because
of budget constraints, neither set of aircraft was provided with adequate
spare parts or the funds to ensure adequate logistics support.

Recognizing that the National Police could not operate and maintain these
aircraft, the Narcotics Affairs Section budgeted $1.25 million from its
fiscal year 2000 program budget to replenish the low supply of spare parts.

However, according to a U. S. Embassy official, the Section did not provide
this funding to the National Police until March 2000 because of delays in
submitting State's plan for using the funds to the Congress. Moreover, the

Embassy requested spare parts for some of these helicopters from DOD stocks.
While DOD agreed to provide $3. 1 million worth of helicopter spare parts,
only $378,000 worth of parts had been delivered as of September 1, 2000.
According to DOD data, it intends to deliver the remainder. However, a DOD
official did not know when delivery would be completed. Inadequate Funding
for

In 1999, State purchased 37 UH- 1N helicopters and spare parts from the
Helicopter Support

Canadian government for about $18 million. In September 1999, State, with
assistance from Defense, initiated a plan to provide the Colombian Army 33
of the helicopters to support operations of its three counternarcotics
battalions. State retained four of these helicopters for use in State-
funded coca eradication missions conducted by a U. S. contractor.

Between November 1999 and February 2000, 18 of the 33 helicopters were
delivered to Colombia, and a U. S. contractor trained 24 civilian pilots
under a Colombian contract and 28 Colombian Army copilots to operate them.

According to U. S. Embassy personnel, the original plan was to begin using
these helicopters in May 2000 to support the first counternarcotics
battalion, which was ready to begin operations on January 1, 2000. 5 The
helicopters were to move troops into insurgent- controlled areas so they
could secure the areas and enable the National Police to conduct eradication
or interdiction missions.

At the time State agreed to purchase the aircraft, it had not included the
funds necessary to procure, refurbish, and support the UH- 1Ns in its fiscal
year 1999 and 2000 budgets. As a result, State did not provide the funds

needed for the battalion to begin using the helicopters for conducting
counternarcotics operations. State officials stated that they decided not to
reprogram any more funds from other counternarcotics programs but to wait
until the Congress approved the President's request for emergency support
for Plan Colombia. This request was enacted into law on July 13,

2000. Because of the lack of funds, 17 of the 24 contractor pilots trained
to fly the 18 UH- 1Ns were laid off beginning in May 2000. In August 2000,
State reprogrammed $2. 2 million from the U. S. counternarcotics program for
Mexico to rehire and retrain additional personnel. According to State and U.
S. Embassy officials, it will take about 3 months to commence operations
with the counternarcotics battalion.

DOD Has Not Provided Drawdowns of defense articles and services under
section 506 of the

Some Equipment Requested Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, require
that DOD and other by the U. S. Embassy

agencies support State Department requests for equipment supplies and
services from existing stocks and within current capabilities. The U. S.
Embassy requested and the United States agreed to provide Colombia almost
$148 million worth of equipment and services from DOD inventories

to support counternarcotics efforts during fiscal years 1996- 99. However,
as of September 1, 2000, DOD was able to provide only about $58.5 million.
According to DOD officials, the difference between the amount of assistance
that State requested and the amount delivered is the result of a combination
of factors- from overvaluing the items when the request was

5 According to U. S. embassy officials, the remaining 15 helicopters and the
training of 25 additional pilots and 22 additional copilots would be
provided once State receives congressional approval to allocate the funds
recently provided as part of the U. S. support for Plan Colombia.

initially developed to the unavailability of some items in DOD inventories
and the length of time to obtain and ship the articles. For example, in
1996, DOD agreed to provide the Colombian military and National Police 90
secure radios and supporting communications equipment from DOD stocks.
However, according to DOD records, this equipment was not available.
Moreover, although DOD did provide the National Police and military with
equipment such as minigun ammunition, machine guns, field radios, and
helicopter and fixed- wing aircraft spare parts, it provided fewer items
than U. S. agencies had agreed to provide because they were not available in
the quantities requested.

Colombian National Police In October 1996, State officials decided to
significantly increase U. S. Have Not Assumed Control

support of and participation in Colombia's aerial eradication of coca leaf.
Over Aerial Eradication

State increased the number of aircraft and U. S. contractor personnel
Operations involved in the aerial eradication program. State estimates show
that the direct costs of supporting the contractor in Colombia increased
from about $6. 6 million in fiscal year 1996 to $36.8 million in fiscal year
1999. According to the State Inspector General, U. S.- provided contractor
pilots and mechanics are paid between 2.5 and 4 times more than the
Colombian contractors employed by the National Police. For example, the
average annual salary cost of a U. S. contractor helicopter pilot is
$110,500, while the Colombian counterpart's annual salary is $29,000.
According to the U. S. Embassy, 111 contractor personnel were in Colombia in
August 2000 to plan and conduct aerial eradication missions.

U. S. Embassy officials stated that beginning in 1998, they became concerned
with the increased U. S. presence in Colombia and associated costs. At the
time, the Embassy began developing a plan to phase out U. S. contractor
support of aerial eradication over 3 years by having the National Police
assume increased operational control over this program. This would be
accomplished by providing the National Police with training, aircraft,

and other support needed to develop an infrastructure to enhance their
overall abilities to eradicate coca leaf and opium poppy. According to
Embassy personnel, the National Police have not formally approved the plan
and State has not approved the funding needed to begin the phaseout. Now,
according to State officials, implementing Plan Colombia is a higher
priority, and they do not know when the phaseout program will be approved.

According to U. S. Embassy officials, despite extensive training and other
efforts to have the National Police develop a management program that

would ensure a more effective aerial eradication program, little progress
has been made. In a November 1999 memorandum, the Narcotics Affairs Section
stated that the National Police continue to emphasize training high- ranking

officers, even though the Section had previously said that the Police should
be training junior officers in areas such as logistics, operations, flight
instructors, maintenance, and administration. According to U. S. Embassy
officials, this has limited the National Police's efforts to better manage
its equipment and assets.

A July 2000 State Inspector General report stated that the National Police
rotate more experienced mechanics into other areas for developmental
purposes. 6 The Police are therefore constantly training new personnel,
making it difficult to maintain a skilled workforce that is needed to repair
the aerial eradication aircraft. According to the

Inspector General report, it will take 3 to 4 years before entry level
mechanics become productive journeymen. U. S. Embassy officials stated that
the failure to develop a program to manage the flight hours of aircraft
could negatively impact operational

readiness. According to the July 2000 State Inspector General report, when
the six Bell 212 helicopters were sent to Colombia in October 1998, the
Narcotics Affairs Section informed the National Police that it needed to
manage the flight hours so that only one of the helicopters would be in
maintenance at any time. The National Police instead often placed several
aircraft in maintenance at the same time, which constrained its ability to
conduct eradication operations.

U. S. Embassy Concerns Department of State policy requires that Narcotics
Affairs Sections in each About Program Oversight

country receiving U. S. counternarcotics assistance provide adequate Over
Some U. S.- Provided

oversight to ensure that it is being used as intended and that it can be
Assistance adequately accounted for. This policy requires that U. S. and
recipient country officials have the right to (1) examine any property
procured through or financed by the United States to ensure that it is being
used

under the terms of the program; (2) inspect or audit any records and
accounts regarding U. S.- provided funds, properties, and contract services;
and (3) access available, pertinent information needed to evaluate the
effectiveness of U. S.- provided assistance.

6 Report of Audit: Review of INL- Administered Programs in Colombia, 00- CI-
021 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of State, July 2000).

However, U. S. Embassy officials stated that the National Police have not
always provided necessary documents, such as budgetary and planning
documents, to determine if the National Police are using the resources in
accordance with eradication and interdiction plans. In two instances, U. S.
Embassy officials said they observed the National Police using U. S.
provided helicopters for purposes other than counternarcotics, but the
Police did not cooperate in their attempts to clarify how the helicopters
were being used.

Also, until recently, neither the U. S. Embassy nor the National Police had
conducted program reviews, as required in annual bilateral agreements.
Recognizing it may have a problem, the Narcotics Affairs Section requested

in early 2000 that the State Inspector General audit the major National
Police accounts for the first time in 15 years. In September 2000, the State
auditors reported that the National Police could not account for 469,000 of
the 2.76 million gallons of fuel provided for counternarcotics missions in
1999. The auditors concluded that the fuel may have been misused.

Although the National Police provided several reasons for this discrepancy,
the State auditors were unable to verify their authenticity because the
information was provided subsequent to their fieldwork.

Financial, The governments of the United States and Colombia face a number
of Management, and financial and management challenges in implementing
Colombia's strategy to reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution
of narcotics by 50 Social Challenges Will

percent in 6 years. At this point, the total cost and activities required to
Complicate Efforts to meet the plan's goals remain unknown, and it will
likely take years before Meet Goals of Plan drug activities are
significantly reduced. State, DOD, and other U. S.

agencies are still developing implementation plans and do not have Colombia
sufficient staff in place to support Plan Colombia. As a result, the United
States does not expect to have many programs operating until at least late
2001, and much of the U. S. assistance will not be delivered until 2002.
Moreover, although the United States has approved $860 million to support

the Plan, additional funds will be needed to support the helicopters
included in Plan Colombia. As for Colombia, its government has not
demonstrated that it has the

funding, detailed plans, and management structure necessary to effectively
implement programs to meet its stated goals. Although Colombia is seeking
support from international donors in addition to the United States for Plan

Colombia, such funding has yet to materialize. Colombia faces continuing
challenges associated with its political and economic instability fostered
by

its long- standing insurgency and the need to ensure that the Colombian
Police and military comply with human rights standards in order for U. S.
assistance to continue.

Financial and Management Initially, State documents indicated that the $860
million (and over $330 Concerns Continue to Affect

million previously programmed) in U. S. assistance to Colombia for fiscal U.
S. Efforts years 2000- 01 would provide the necessary equipment, training,
and technical assistance to meet Colombia's urgent need to assert
sovereignty over its drug- producing regions, improve its administration of
justice, support economic development, and advance the peace process. Plan
Colombia seeks to address the illegal drug threat on a broad scale and
involves an array of U. S. and Colombian government agencies. However,
considering the planning weaknesses and complexity and breadth of the

programs, more funding and time will be needed to meet Plan Colombia goals.
Additional Funding Will Be

As in the past, State and DOD will have to request additional funding,
Needed to Support Equipment

reprogram funds from other activities, or permit some helicopters to go
Provided Under Plan Colombia unused. For example, the act providing funding
for Plan Colombia directs State to disburse not less than $60 million to
procure, refurbish, and support up to 30 Huey II helicopters that State
plans to provide Colombia. According to a July 31, 2000, report to the
Congress, 7 State will provide training for pilots and mechanics, logistical
support, and associated operations and maintenance costs if funds permit.

Moreover, according to State, the funding proposed by the administration and
approved by the Congress was not intended to support the equipment scheduled
to be provided through the 6- year Plan Colombia. State officials

noted that they are developing cost estimates for fiscal year 2002 and
beyond but these estimates were in preliminary stages and not yet available
for dissemination. However, these officials stated that funding just to
sustain the equipment included in the fiscal year 2000- 01 assistance for
Colombia would be substantial. In addition, officials from State and DOD

said that as of September 2000, they did not know if sufficient funding
would be available to procure the number of helicopters mandated by the
Congress because they had not determined how the helicopters would be
equipped and configured.

7 Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, from the Department of State, July 2000.

During our recent visit to Colombia, Colombian government defense and
budgeting officials said that with their already tight defense budget they
cannot afford to operate and sustain the new U. S. helicopters by
themselves. Colombian and U. S. Embassy officials agreed that Colombia will
need to establish a new logistical and support system, including

maintenance and repair, for the Huey IIs, which are not currently in the
Colombian's inventory. Although U. S. officials stated that this will likely
require continuing U. S. support, they have not developed estimates of the

funding required. U. S. Plans to Implement the

Most of the assistance provided under Plan Colombia is targeted for the
Counternarcotics Program Have Colombian military. However, according to U.
S. Southern Command Not Been Finalized

(SOUTHCOM) officials, at the time the administration was developing its
assistance package, Colombia did not have a military plan on which to base
its needs, and SOUTHCOM did not have sufficient information to determine the
actual requirements for the Colombian military. U. S. military

officials in the U. S. Embassy stated that they had not compiled this
information before because U. S. assistance was previously targeted for
specific purposes, such as supporting the drug interdiction efforts of the
Colombian Marines; big increases in the levels of assistance for the
military had not appeared

likely; and the daily management of the current assistance program precluded

them from assessing Colombian needs overall. SOUTHCOM officials said that
they provided their input of Colombian needs based on information they had
and intuitive assessments of the Colombian military's basic needs. To better
define the Colombian military's needs and requirements, DOD

recently undertook two studies. The first specifically targeted the
deployment of the helicopters included in the assistance package and
addressed issues such as support for mission requirements and the
organization, personnel, and logistical support needed. The second addressed
how the Colombian military must structure and modernize itself to address
the internal threats of narcotics and insurgents. DOD officials

said that these two studies provide sufficient information to develop the
operational doctrine, structure, and systems necessary to use U. S.
assistance and meet counternarcotics goals effectively.

State is also drafting an implementation plan for U. S. assistance.
According to State officials, this plan is necessary to better synchronize
all U. S. programs and activities involved in supporting Plan Colombia.
These officials also stated that they have presented their draft to the
government of Colombia to help them in developing the Colombian strategy for
the use of U. S. funds. State officials stated that they expect the U. S.
implementation plan to be approved by U. S. agencies in October 2000.

Additional Staff Positions Will Be U. S. Embassy officials said that the
ability to begin implementing programs Needed to Implement U. S. would hinge
on obtaining additional staff to manage programs. At the time

Assistance of our review, State and other agencies involved were still
determining the

number of additional personnel needed and ways to address security and other
issues associated with increasing Embassy staff. As of September 2000, no
decision had been made on the amount of additional staff that would be
necessary.

The Narcotics Affairs Section estimated it might need up to 24 additional
staff, and USAID estimated it might need 40 to implement programs envisioned
under Plan Colombia. The U. S. Ambassador stated that such large- scale
increases must be carefully assessed. The Embassy, as configured, cannot
house additional staff, but for the Narcotics Affairs Section, State has
approved the temporary use of modular office units inside the Embassy walls.
These units will not be available for at least a

year, however, Embassy officials noted that even if safe space within the
Embassy can be found, the dangerous conditions in Colombia often deter staff
from moving there.

It Will Take Time to See State obligated most of the funds appropriated for
Plan Colombia in late Results of Assistance

September 2000. As a result, DOD will be able to train and provide weapons,
ammunition, and communications equipment to the Colombian counternarcotics
battalions. However, some U. S. assistance, especially large equipment such
as helicopters, will arrive incrementally because of

the time involved in its manufacture and delivery. A State official noted
that it will take 2 years to deliver the full complement of Huey II
helicopters for the counternarcotics battalions with the first Huey II
scheduled for delivery in mid- 2001. Regarding the Blackhawk helicopters,
the State official also said that if a contract with the manufacturer is
signed by mid- December 2000, the first Blackhawk helicopters will begin
arriving in July 2001, with the full complement in Colombia by the end of
the year.

Other projects will also take time to achieve results. State expects to
initiate the economic and social development portion of Plan Colombia with
pilot projects (such as alternative and economic development and

judicial reform) around September or October 2000. However, State and the U.
S. Embassy cautioned that it will take years to show measurable results.
Financial and Management To date, the Colombian government has not
demonstrated that it can

Factors May Limit adequately finance and manage the projects and activities
required to

Colombia's Successful reduce the country's narcotics threat. Uncertainties
regarding international Implementation of Plan financial support, the
potential for a negotiated settlement with the

insurgent forces, and an end to human rights violations will affect
Colombia's response but to what degree remains unknown. Colombia Has Not
Determined

Although the government of Colombia has pledged $4 billion for Plan How It
Will Fund Its Share

Colombia, State and Colombian government officials were pessimistic about
Colombia's ability to obtain much new money without cutting other government
programs. State noted that Colombia is coming out of the worst recession in
recent history, and although economic indicators are positive, U. S. Embassy
officials do not know how additional revenue can be raised even in an
improved economy. However, these officials expect that Colombia will try to
raise $1 billion from bonds and loans. As of August

2000, it had collected $325 million from domestic bonds and planned to
collect an additional $325 million from bonds by the end of 2001.

Colombian government officials indicated that at best, most of the funds
that will be available are already included in the national budget. However,
according to an official with the Planning Ministry, it is difficult to
document the purposes of funding in Colombian budgets because Colombian
ministries' budget preparation and coordination vary. He noted,

for example, that the Defense Ministry can demonstrate how funds will
support goals, and he expects that the military can estimate their support
for the new counternarcotics program. On the other hand, the planning
official did not expect that a clear estimate would emerge from the Justice
Ministry. At the time of our review, Ministry officials had not attended any
planning sessions to discuss budgeting for Plan Colombia.

The Colombian government is also seeking donations of more than $2 billion
from donors other than the United States to fund the social, economic, and
good governance development portions of Plan Colombia. As of July 2000,
donors had pledged about $621 million. However, State

officials were optimistic that the remainder could be obtained. They said
that many donors responded favorably to Plan Colombia but could not offer
firm pledges at the time because most were in the middle of their budget
cycles. State officials told us that the international community is ready to
assist Colombia on a larger scale than it has in the past and noted

that the donors made plans to discuss this issue in the fall. Colombia Still
Developing The Colombian government has not yet finalized the plans
necessary for Detailed Plans to Address Plan

funding, sequencing, and managing activities included in Plan Colombia. In
Colombia Goals

early 2000, State officials began asking the Colombian government for plans
showing, step- by- step, how Colombian agencies would combat illicit crop
cultivation in southern Colombia, institute alternative means of making a
livelihood, and strengthen the Colombian government's presence in the area.
In May 2000, State officials provided Colombia extracts from

the draft U. S. implementation plan with expectations that the Colombian
government would develop a similarly detailed plan. However, according to
State officials, Colombia's product, provided in June 2000, essentially
restated Plan Colombia's broad goals without detailing how Colombia would
achieve them. In response, a U. S. interagency task force went to

Colombia in July 2000 to help the Colombians prepare the required
implementation plan. In September 2000, the Colombian government provided
their action plan, which addressed some of the earlier concerns.

Moreover, according to State, Colombia must also organize the institutions
involved with Plan Colombia and integrate them under one authority to
coordinate activities, such as initiating alternative crop development

projects only after eradicating drug crops and securing the area from
insurgents. State noted that this unity of effort is crucial to success. The
Colombian government has named a coordinator to oversee activities on a
national level but at the time of our review had not yet established how the
coordinator would ensure that activities are appropriately integrated,
sequenced, and monitored. Insurgency and Human Rights

According to State, the Colombian government agrees that ending the civil
Conditions Further Complicate conflict is central to solving Colombia's
problems. State reports have noted Counternarcotics Efforts

that a peace agreement would stabilize the nation, speed economic recovery,
help ensure the protection of human rights, and restore the authority and
control of the Colombian government in the coca- growing regions. However,
unless such an agreement is reached, the continuing violence would limit the
government's ability to institute its planned economic, social, and
political improvements.

The U. S. Embassy has already reported that initial Plan Colombia activities
have been affected because of security concerns. Specifically, the lack of
security on the roads in southern Colombia prevented the Justice Ministry

from establishing a justice center there. Moreover, indications are that the
insurgents have warned farmers in one area not to participate in alternative
crop development projects unless they are part of an overall peace plan. The
Embassy has reported that the security impediments encountered are probably
a small indication of future security problems if peace is not achieved.

Regarding human rights, the Colombian government has stated that it is
committed to protecting the human rights of its citizens. State and Defense
officials reiterated that they will not assist those who violate the basic
tenets of human rights, and State officials said that they will apply the
strictest human rights standards before approving assistance under Plan
Colombia. For example, until recently, State held up approval for training
the second counternarcotics battalion until an individual officer suspected

of a violation was removed from the unit, even though the Colombian
government had cleared the person of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, human rights
organizations continue to allege that individuals in the Colombian armed
forces have been involved with or condoned human rights violations and that
they do so with impunity. If this is the case, Colombia's failure to

adhere to U. S. to human rights policies could delay or derail planned
counternarcotics activities.

In providing support for Plan Colombia, the Congress required that the
President certify that Colombia had met certain human rights standards prior
to disbursing the assistance. 8 The legislation allows the President to

waive this certification if providing these funds was deemed in U. S.
national security interest. 9 On August 22, 2000, the President issued such
a waiver. According to State officials, this waiver was issued because it
was too soon to determine the extent to which Colombia was complying with
the requirements set forth in the legislation. 8 Section 3201( a)( 1) of the
Emergency Supplemental Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106246),

requires the President to certify that Colombia has met specific human
rights criteria. 9 P. L. 106- 246, section 3201( a)( 4).

Conclusions As evidenced by past U. S. counternarcotics assistance programs
to Colombia, the United States has not always provided the necessary

training, financial, and logistical support for Colombia to operate and
maintain the U. S.- provided helicopters and other major equipment items. As
a result, the assistance has not been used to the extent possible to help
counter the illegal drug activities in Colombia. If these past problems
continue, the dramatic increase in U. S. support for Plan Colombia will not

be used in the most effective way. Further complicating the situation, the
respective governments face a number of new challenges in implementing Plan
Colombia. The Departments of State and Defense (and other U. S. agencies

involved) have not completed their implementation plans to support Plan
Colombia. Even without further delay, many U. S. programs to support Plan
Colombia cannot begin until at least late 2001, and much of the U. S.
assistance-helicopters for instance-cannot all be delivered until at least
2002.

Colombia has not yet developed the detailed implantation plans necessary to
manage, sequence, and fund activities included in Plan Colombia. In
addition, although Colombia has pledged $4 billion to support the plan and
Colombia is trying to obtain more than $2 billion from other international
donors, the source of most of this funding has not been identified.

As a result of these challenges, the total costs and specific programs
required to meet Plan Colombia's goals remain unknown, and a significant
reduction in drug production and trafficking activities will likely take
years to materialize. At a minimum, if the United States or Colombia do not
follow through on their portion of Plan Colombia, or international donors do
not support Colombia's appeals for additional assistance, Plan Colombia
cannot succeed as envisioned.

Recommendations for To help ensure that U. S. counternarcotics assistance to
Colombia is used

Executive Action most effectively and problems in supporting U. S.- provided
equipment do

not recur, we recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense determine
training and logistical support requirements and identify future funding
sources to support the U. S.- provided helicopters and other major equipment
items already delivered to Colombia and

complete U. S. implementation plans and coordinate with Colombian plans for
Plan Colombia so that any future U. S. assistance is adequately supported
and plans for its use are clearly identified and agreed to.

Agency Comments and State, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and
DOD provided

Our Evaluation written comments on a draft of this report (see apps. II
through IV, respectively). All generally concurred with the report's
findings and

provided technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate. State
said that the report is a fair representation of the challenges facing the
counternarcotics program in Colombia and concurred with our recommendations.

The Office of National Drug Control Policy agreed with our conclusion that
the United States and Colombia face many challenges in successfully
implementing Plan Colombia and noted that the United States is acting to
address the problems identified. It said, for example, that the U. S.
government is aligning its functions and planning to support the Colombian
effort because existing management structures were not designed to manage a
situation as complex and large as that in Colombia and the Andean region.

Although DOD generally concurred with our findings, it only partially
concurred with our recommendation that the Secretaries of State and Defense
determine support requirements and identify future funding sources to
support the major equipment items already delivered to

Colombia. The Secretary of Defense's position is that DOD is not responsible
to do so for equipment provided by State. We recognize that State provided
much of the counternarcotics assistance, including helicopters, already
delivered to Colombia. Our recommendation is intended to help ensure that
the Departments work together in determining

Colombia's future needs and identifying the necessary training, spare parts,
or other assistance needed, regardless of which Department originally
provided the equipment. Overall, the recommendation's objective is to help
ensure that equipment already provided to both the Colombian National Police
and military services is used to the maximum extent possible for
counternarcotics activities.

Scope and To determine how the drug threat has changed in recent years, we
received Methodology

briefings from U. S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military officials
and reviewed documentation in Washington, D. C.; at SOUTHCOM headquarters in
Miami, Florida; and at the U. S. Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.

To determine what problems, if any, the United States has had in providing
counternarcotics assistance and how the U. S. and Colombian governments are
addressing certain challenges in carrying out Plan Colombia, we visited
various agencies in Washington, D. C.; Miami, Florida; and Colombia. In
Washington, D. C., we interviewed officials and reviewed planning and

implementation documents, and other related documents at State, DOD, DEA,
USAID, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy. In Miami, we
interviewed SOUTHCOM officials and reviewed documents related to
counternarcotics activities in Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed U. S.

Embassy officials, including the Ambassador, and analyzed reports and other
documents from various U. S. agencies responsible for implementing
counternarcotics programs in Colombia. While in Colombia, we interviewed
Colombian military, police, and other government officials to obtain their
views on issues discussed in this report. We also visited the Colombian
aviation brigade located at Tolemaida and operational sites at Larandia and
Tres Esquinas.

Our review was conducted from March through September 2000 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies
of this report to the Honorable Madeleine K. Albright, the Secretary of
State; the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of Defense; the
Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, the Director, U. S. Office of National Drug
Control Policy; the Honorable Donnie R. Marshall, the Administrator, DEA;
and the Honorable J. Brady Anderson, the Administrator, USAID. Copies will
also be made available to other

interested parties upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call
me at (202) 512- 4268. Other contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed
in appendix V.

Jess T. Ford, Director International Affairs and Trade

U. S. Assistance and Support for

Appendi x I

Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia During fiscal years 1996- 2000,
State, DOD, and USAID have provided over $765 million worth of
counternarcotics assistance to Colombia from a variety of funding sources
(see table 2).

Table 2: U. S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia (fiscal years
1996-2000)

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Agency 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 a Total

State b $22.6 $ 44. 4 $83.1 $237. 7 $76.3 $464. 1

DOD c 14.5 53.2 61.4 80. 9 72.5 282.5

USAID 0 0 3. 3 6.3 9. 0 18. 6 Total $37.1 $97. 6 $147.8 $324. 9 $157.8 $765.
2

a We did not include the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246), in
fiscal year 2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the
funding between fiscal year 2000 and 2001. b Includes $173.2 million in
Colombia- specific counternarcotics assistance provided to State in the

Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Fiscal
Year 1999 (Division B of P. L. 105- 277). c Includes amounts delivered
through September 1, 2000, from emergency drawdowns of DOD inventories
authorized in fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. For fiscal year 1996,
DOD could not provide funding data on its other assistance programs.

Sources: State, DOD, and USAID.

State Counternarcotics The Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Assistance

Affairs is responsible for formulating and implementing the international
narcotics policy, coordinating the narcotics activities of all U. S.
agencies overseas, and overseeing State's International Narcotics Control
Program. The program uses an air wing, through a U. S. contractor, to
support eradication and interdiction operations in several countries,
including

Colombia. The Narcotics Affairs Section at the U. S. Embassy provides
equipment and training, operational support, and technical assistance and
coordinates with Colombian agencies involved in counternarcotics activities.
Table 3 summarizes counternarcotics aid provided by State to Colombia since
1996.

Table 3: State Support for Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia (fiscal
years 1996-2000)

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Activity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 a

Aviation support $6.6 $10.9 $37. 8 $36.8 $31.3

National police support 13.0 26.5 40.3 21.9 36. 8

Military counternarcotics support 0 5.0 0 2.7 4.0

Infrastructure support 0.5 0 0 0 0

Demand reduction 0. 5 0 0 0.9 2.0

Administration of justice 0 0 1. 8 0 0

C- 26 aircraft support 0 0 1. 0 0 0

Program development and support 2. 0 2.0 2. 2 2.2 2.2 Total $22. 6 $44.4
$83. 1 $64.5 $76. 3

Note: These figures do not include funds appropriated to State but
transferred to USAID for projects to encourage farmers that grow coca and
opium poppy to convert to licit economic activities. a We did not include
the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246), in fiscal year
2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the funding between
fiscal years 2000 and 2001.

Source: Department of State.

DOD Counternarcotics Since 1996, more than $224 million in counternarcotics
assistance has been Assistance provided to Colombia through DOD- managed
programs and activities.

Within DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict is DOD's principal staff assistant and adviser to the
Secretary of Defense for drug enforcement policy, requirements, priorities,
resources, and programs. SOUTHCOM is DOD's principal liaison with

Colombia for coordinating U. S. military counternarcotics support to
Colombia. In Colombia, DOD's aid is primarily managed by the Embassy's U. S.
Military Group. The Group's responsibilities include coordinating security
assistance programs with the Colombian military and other U. S. agencies
involved in counternarcotics operations and monitoring assistance provided
to Colombian military units to ensure that it is being used for
counternarcotics purposes.

DOD has two programs for providing counternarcotics assistance to Colombia.
The primary program was authorized by section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1991. 1 Section 1004 authorizes the Secretary of
Defense to support active military units for the counterdrug

activities of other federal agencies or of any state, local, or foreign law
enforcement agencies. Assistance provided to Colombia under section 1004 has
focused on the training of Colombian forces, the construction of facilities,
and the provision of intelligence. DOD teams have trained the

Colombian Army's 950- man counternarcotics battalion, deployed teams to
Colombia to provide specialized small unit and intelligence training, and
constructed facilities to house the Joint Intelligence Center in Tres
Esquinas and upgraded existing facilities and infrastructure. The Colombian
Air Force has received equipment upgrades and air interdiction

training from DOD personnel. According to DOD, $202 million worth of
assistance has been provided through section 1004 during fiscal years
19962000.

The second DOD program is authorized by section 1033 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1998 and allows DOD to provide Colombia and Peru with
assistance to strengthen their ability to stop drug- trafficking along the
rivers of their respective countries. 2 This aid has included river patrol
boats, nonlethal equipment such as night vision equipment, navigation and
communications systems, and maintenance and equipment training. According to
DOD, $22 million worth of assistance was provided through section 1033
during fiscal years 1998- 2000.

USAID Prior to the announcement of Plan Colombia, USAID's program was
Counternarcotics

relatively small and focused on promoting alternative economic development,
the administration of justice, and human rights observance Assistance

(see table 4). 1 P. L. 101- 510, Division A, Title X, section 1004, as
amended. Congress has extended the program's authority through 2002. See P.
L. 105- 261, Division A, Title X, section 1021 (Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999).

2 P. L. 105- 85, Division A, Title X, section 1033.

Table 4: USAID Support for Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia (fiscal
years 1996-2000)

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year Activity 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 a

Judicial reform 0 0 $2. 8 $1.0 $3. 0

Alternative development a 0 0 0. 5 5. 0 5.0

Revitalization of Colombia's 0 0 0 0. 3 0

economy Human rights 0 0 0 0 1.0 Total 0 0 $3.3 $6. 3 $9.0

a We did not include the $860 million appropriated through the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY 2000 (Division B of P. L. 106- 246), in
fiscal year 2000 figures because the agencies have not yet allocated the
funding between fiscal years 2000 and 2001. b Transferred from State.
Source: USAID.

For Plan Colombia, USAID will be responsible for implementing alternative
economic development projects, assisting persons displaced because of
counternarcotics operations, and implementing projects to reform

Colombia's judicial practices and strengthen its rule of law and democratic
system. The Omnibus

Enacted on October 21, 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Consolidated and Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (P. L. 105- 277)
provided an additional $732 million to support antidrug and drug
interdiction activities. Emergency Of the total amount, $173.2 million was
allocated to State to support Supplemental counternarcotics activities in
Colombia. Most of the funds made available Appropriations Act of

to State were either to procure helicopters and other aircraft or to support
the activities of the National Police (see table 5). 1999

Table 5: Fiscal Year 1999 Supplemental Funding Specifically for Colombian
Counternarcotics Program Dollars in millions

Project Funding

Procurement and upgrade of UH- 1H/ 1N helicopters for the National Police
$40. 0 Procurement of six UH- 60 helicopters for the National Police 96. 0
Operations and support for National Police aircraft 6. 0 Procurement of DC-
3 transport for the National Police 2. 0 Procurement of minigun system for
National Police aircraft 6. 0 Reconstruction of Miraflores counternarcotics
base 2. 0 Base and force security for counternarcotics bases 6. 0
Enhancements to prison security systems 1. 2 Programs to extend the life of
interdiction aircraft a 10. 0 Podded radar for interdiction aircraft a 4.0

Total $173. 2

a Amounts have been prorated based on the number of interdiction aircraft in
the Colombian and Peruvian inventory. Source: House Conference Report 105-
825 (Oct. 19, 1998).

Section 506( A)( 2) During a crisis, section 506 of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as Counternarcotics

amended (22 U. S. C. 2318), authorizes the President to provide up to $75
million per year in articles, services, and training from U. S. government-
Assistance

primarily DOD-inventories to friendly countries and international
organizations for counternarcotics purposes. Since 1996, Colombia has been
the largest recipient of section 506( a)( 2) counternarcotics assistance.

Table 6 summarizes the counternarcotics assistance authorized and actually
provided to Colombia under the act since 1996.

Table 6: Section 506 (a)( 2) Assistance Allocated and Delivered to Colombia
(fiscal years 1996- 1999) (as of Sept. 1, 2000)

Year of drawdown Allocated a Delivered a

1996 $40, 000, 000 $14, 466, 077 1997 14, 200, 000 9, 404, 619 1998 38, 100,
000 18, 841, 923 1999 56, 000, 000 15, 824, 595

Total $148, 300, 000 $58, 537, 214

a According to DOD officials, the difference between the amount of
assistance requested and the amount delivered is the result of a combination
of factors- from overvaluing the items when the request was initially
developed to the unavailability of some items in DOD inventories and the
length of time to obtain and the ship articles.

Source: Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Following is a list of the major items of counternarcotics assistance
provided to the Colombian government under section 506( a)( 2) since 1996
(as of Sept. 1, 2000).

Aircraft Ammunition and explosives

12 UH- 1H helicopters 5. 56mm ammunition

7 C- 26 A/ B aircraft 7. 62mm ammunition

Aircraft spare parts .45 caliber ammunition UH- 1H helicopter spare parts

.50 caliber ammunition 40 UH- 1H helicopter hulks

40mm and thermite grenades UH- 60 helicopter spare parts 40 pound shaped
charges C- 130 spare parts

Communications equipment A- 37 spare parts PRC- 90 radios OV- 10 spare parts

PRC- 104 radios Boats and patrol craft

PRC- 112 radios 6 MKII patrol boats

Field telephones and spares 3 Boston Whaler patrol boats

Other equipment and support Weapons Defensive support equipment M- 16A2
rifles Field gear and equipment M- 60 machine guns Flak vests M2 .50 caliber
machine guns Flight suits and gear M- 1911 .45 caliber pistols 2 ï¿½- ton
trucks M- 203 grenade launchers Fuel

Appendi x II Comments From the Department of State

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Appendi x II I Control Policy

Appendi x V I Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendi x V

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Albert H. Huntington, III
(202) 512- 4140 Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above,
Ronald Hughes, Allen Fleener,

Joan Slowitsky, and Nancy Ragsdale made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products Drug Control: U. S. Efforts in Latin America and the
Caribbean (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 90R, Feb. 18, 2000). Drug Control: Narcotics
Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 136, June 22, 1999).
Drug Control: Status of U. S. International Counternarcotics Activities
(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 116, Mar. 12, 1998). Drug Control: Counternarcotics
Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 98- 60, Feb.
26, 1998).

Drug Control: U. S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing
Challenges (GAO/ NSIAD- 98- 60, Feb. 12, 1998). Drug Control: Delays in
Obtaining State Department Records Relating to Colombia (GAO/ T- NSIAD- 97-
202, July 9, 1997). Drug Control: Observations on Elements of the Federal
Drug Control Strategy (GAO/ GGD- 97- 42, Mar. 14, 1997). Drug Control: Long-
Standing Problems Hinder U. S. International Efforts (GAO/ NSIAD- 97- 75,
Feb. 27, 1997).

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DRUG CONTROL U. S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce Results

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug

Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives

October 2000

P P U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1991- 523- 762 GAO- 01- 26 Printed
copies of this document will be available shortly.

GAO Form 171 Rev. (3/ 99)

Page 1 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Contents

Page 2 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Page 3 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia United States General Accounting
Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

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Appendix I

Appendix I U. S. Assistance and Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia

Page 31 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix I U. S. Assistance and Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia

Page 32 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix I U. S. Assistance and Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia

Page 33 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix I U. S. Assistance and Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia

Page 34 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix I U. S. Assistance and Support for Counternarcotics Activities in
Colombia

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Appendix II

Page 37 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix III

Appendix III Comments From the Office of National Drug Control Policy

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Page 39 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix IV

Page 40 GAO- 01- 26 Drug Control in Colombia

Appendix V

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