Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of	 
Justice (01-JAN-01, GAO-01-250).				 
								 
This report, part of GAO's performance and accountability series,
discusses the major management challenges and program risks	 
facing the Department of Justice (DOJ). These include (1)	 
improving the enforcement of immigration laws and immigration	 
naturalization services, (2) managing programs designed to	 
support state and local efforts to reduce crime, (3) developing  
measurable performance targets to help the Drug Enforcement	 
Agency determine its progress in reducing the availability of	 
illegal drugs, (4) achieving excellence in financial management, 
and (5) improving management and accountability over DOJ asset	 
forfeiture program.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-250 					        
    ACCNO:   164402						        
    TITLE:   Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
             of Justice                                                       
     DATE:   01/01/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Accountability					 
	     Crime prevention					 
	     Drug trafficking					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Financial management				 
	     Immigration and naturalization law 		 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Performance measures				 
	     Risk management					 
	     DOJ National Asset Seizure and			 
	     Forfeiture Program 				 
								 
	     DOJ Operation Weed and Seed Program		 
	     High Risk Series 2001				 
	     ONDCP National Drug Control Program		 

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GAO-01-250

Performance and Accountability Series

January 2001 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks

Department of Justice

GAO- 01- 250

Letter 3 Overview 6 Major

13 Performance and Accountability Challenges

Related GAO 43

Products Performance

46 and Accountability Series

Lett er

January 2001 The President of the Senate The Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This report addresses the major performance and accountability challenges
facing the Department of Justice (Justice) as it seeks to enforce laws in
the public interest and protect the public from violence and criminal
activity. It includes a summary of actions that Justice has taken and that
are under way to address

these challenges. It also outlines further actions that GAO believes are
needed. This analysis should help the new Congress and administration carry
out their responsibilities and improve government for the benefit of the
American people.

This report is part of a special series, first issued in January 1999,
entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management
Challenges

and Program Risks. In that series, GAO advised the Congress that it planned
to reassess the methodologies and criteria used to determine which federal
government operations and functions should be highlighted and which should
be designated as “high risk.” GAO completed the assessment,
considered comments provided on a publicly available exposure draft, and
published its guidance document, Determining Performance and Accountability
Challenges and High Risks (GAO- 01- 159SP), in

November 2000. This 2001 Performance and Accountability Series contains
separate reports on 21 agencies- covering each cabinet department, most
major independent agencies, and the U. S. Postal Service. The series also
includes a governmentwide perspective on performance

and management challenges across the federal government. As a companion
volume to this series, GAO is issuing an update on those government
operations and programs that its work identified as “high risk”
because of either their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement or major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency,
or effectiveness.

David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

Overview As the nation's chief law enforcement agency, the Department of
Justice is charged with, among other things, enforcing laws in the public
interest and playing a key role in protecting the public from violence and
criminal activity, such as drug smuggling and acts of terrorism. With a
budget of over $21 billion and a staff of nearly 110, 000, including
attorneys, investigators, and agents, Justice is a multifaceted organization
whose

functions range from securing the nation's borders to helping state and
local agencies improve their capacity to prevent and control crime.
Justice's responsibilities are divided among a number of major components,
including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Office of
Justice Programs (OJP), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United States Marshals
Service (USMS). In meeting their missions, these

components must confront several contemporary performance and accountability
challenges.

Improve the enforcement of immigration laws and provision of immigration and
naturalization services.

? Better manage programs designed to support state and local efforts to
reduce crime.

? Develop measurable performance targets to help DEA determine its progress
in reducing the availability of illegal drugs.

? Achieve excellence in financial management, including, but not limited to,
a departmentwide unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and beyond.

? Improve management and accountability over Justice's asset forfeiture
program.

Immigration Law With a budget of $4. 3 billion and a workforce of nearly
Enforcement and

33, 000 employees, INS faces significant challenges in Services carrying out
its dual mission to enforce laws regarding illegal immigration and provide
immigration and naturalization services for aliens who enter and reside
legally in the United States. For example, recommendations and proposals to
restructure INS have been made as a result of several critics' conclusion
that “mission overload” has impeded INS from succeeding at
either of its primary functions. However, the details of a

new organizational structure have not yet been decided. INS also faces
significant challenges in implementing several of its programs. Our reviews
of these programs have resulted in numerous recommendations related to INS'
ability to secure the country's borders, control alien

smuggling, strengthen interior enforcement of immigration laws, expedite the
removal of criminal aliens, and manage its information technology. While INS
has taken action to address some of the deficiencies that we identified, it
continues to face major challenges in each of these areas as it works to
develop the organizational, management, and information

infrastructure needed to effectively meet its program goals.

Support for State and In its role to support state and local efforts to
reduce Local Crime

crime, Justice faces management challenges in two Reduction Efforts

programs that we have reviewed- Weed and Seed and Police Corps. Weed and
Seed is a community- based, multiagency program whose mission is to help
“weed out” crime in targeted neighborhoods, then
“seed” the

neighborhood with a variety of programs and resources to prevent a
resurgence of crime. The Police Corps' overall objective is to help state
and local law

enforcement agencies fight violent crime by increasing the number of
officers with advanced education and training who are assigned to community
patrol. Justice,

through the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), has made some
progress in responding to our recommendations to develop adequate internal
controls and improve monitoring of the program. In addition, EOWS has begun
to address our recommendation to develop funding criteria to award various
funding recipients. Less progress, however, has been made at EOWS in
developing better performance measures to be able to adequately judge Weed
and Seed's success. Separately, the Police Corps program had experienced
challenges that related to states' participation in the program due to
inadequate funding to pay the states'

costs for program administration or recruitment and selection of program
participants. OJP has made some progress in addressing this issue, such as
obligating funds and establishing interagency agreements with participating
states. However, it is too soon to tell

whether these actions will result in increased participation.

Reduce Availability of The supply and use of illegal drugs remains a major
Illegal Drugs

national problem that is estimated to cost our society upwards of $100
billion annually. As the lead drug enforcement agency with responsibilities
for the drug supply reduction portion of the National Drug Control Strategy,
DEA faces challenges related to measuring its progress in reducing the
availability of illegal drugs. DEA has made some progress in developing
strategic goals and objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives
during the 1990s have been consistent with those of the National Strategy.
However, DEA has not fully addressed our recommendation to develop

measurable performance targets for its programs and initiatives that are
consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy. As a result, it is
difficult for DEA and Justice to assess how effective DEA has been in
achieving its strategic goals and how effective its programs and initiatives
have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs.

Financial Justice has made significant progress toward achieving

Management an unqualified opinion on its departmentwide financial Excellence

statements. However, to achieve excellence in financial management, it is
critical that Justice fully address identified significant internal control
weaknesses. The total number of reported weaknesses at Justice's 10
reporting components increased from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999,
and Justice's auditors reported 3 departmentwide material weaknesses 1 in
internal controls. The auditors also reported that internal control
weaknesses at five of Justice's components were significant departures from
the requirements of the

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). Two of its key
components, INS and DEA, contributed to these departmentwide deficiencies
and had additional internal control weaknesses, which, for example,
contributed to a qualified opinion for INS and, at DEA, increased the risk
that assets were not properly safeguarded from loss or unauthorized use.
Until its components correct the underlying causes of these challenges,
Justice, regardless of the type of opinion received, continues to be at risk
of errors, fraud,

or noncompliance occurring and not being promptly detected.

Justice's Asset The separate but similar asset forfeiture programs
Forfeiture Program

operated by Justice and Treasury were first designated as high risk 2 in
1990 because neither agency had adequately focused on managing and
accounting for 1 A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce,
to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities, in
amounts that would be material to the financial statements, may occur and
not

be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their
duties. 2 Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations
that we have identified as “high risk” because of their greater
vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

seized assets or formed a plan to consolidate the two programs, as was
mandated by Congress. As of September 30, 1999, these programs managed
assets valued at more than $1 billion, plus large amounts of nonvalued
assets, such as seized drugs and weapons. We reported in 1999 that Justice
had made progress in managing its real property. However, we and others have
continued to report on the program's inadequate information systems and
financial management weaknesses, including accountability over seized
assets. Further, Justice and Treasury have still not moved to consolidate
their two programs. Justice has taken or plans to take actions to address
the information systems

and financial management issues, including accountability, that were
identified in recent GAO and OIG reports. In addition, Justice and Treasury
are conducting a formal study of opportunities for cooperation in the
administration of their programs, which is to result in recommendations for
improving the effectiveness and efficiency of property management functions
within the federal asset forfeiture program. In determining whether to
remove the high- risk designation for the asset forfeiture program in the

future, we will consider the results of this study, including the
implementation of any related recommendations, as well as the results of
ongoing initiatives for resolving Justice's and Treasury's respective
financial management and accountability issues.

Figure 1 summarizes the performance and accountability challenges facing
Justice and its major components. The section that follows provides a more
detailed discussion of these challenges.

Figure 1: Summary of the Performance and Accountability Challenges Facing
Justice and Its Components

Department of Justice major components facing challenges

Performance and accountability challenges

INS OJP

DEA FBI

USMS

Improve the enforcement of immigration laws and provision of immigration and
naturalization services.

Better manage programs designed to support state and local efforts to reduce
crime.

Develop measurable performance targets to help DEA determine its progress in
reducing the availability of illegal drugs.

Achieve excellence in financial management, including, but not limited to, a
Department- wide unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and beyond.

Improve management and accountability of Justice's asset forfeiture program.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

Major Performance and Accountability Challenges

The Department of Justice faces performance and accountability challenges in
a number of areas. These challenges include enforcing the nation's
immigration laws; developing and maintaining accurate, useful financial and
program information; managing programs

designed to support state and local efforts to reduce crime; measuring the
effect of Justice's efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs; and
managing assets seized during drug enforcement operations. Addressing each
of these challenges requires sustained managerial attention

and commitment. Improve the

INS is faced with the formidable task of deterring, Enforcement of
apprehending, and removing persons who violate Immigration Laws immigration
laws. At the same time, INS is charged with and Provision of providing an
array of services and benefits to those who Immigration and

legally enter and reside in the United States, such as Naturalization
providing employment authorization and processing Services naturalization
applications. Over the past several years, Congress has repeatedly expressed
concern about INS' ability to carry out its functions and, accordingly,
significantly increased the agency's resources. INS' fiscal year 2000 budget
of $4. 3 billion represented an increase of about 187 percent over its
fiscal year 1993 budget. INS' workforce also increased by about 83 percent,
from 18, 000 to nearly 33, 000 employees during

the same period. Despite the significant increase in resources, INS
continues to face challenges in achieving its intended results. Those
challenges are related to INS' organizational structure and program
implementation efforts, such as controlling the border, reducing alien
smuggling and unauthorized alien employment, and

addressing aliens' failure to appear for removal hearings. In addition, INS
continues to have problems successfully developing and fielding the
information technology that is critical to its operations.

INS' Organizational Proposals to restructure INS have been issued as a

Structure Remains result of several critics' conclusion that “mission
Undecided

overload” has impeded INS from succeeding at either of its primary
functions. For example, in 1997, the bipartisan Commission on Immigration
Reform stated that INS' service and enforcement functions were incompatible
and that tasking one agency with carrying out both functions caused
problems, such as competition for resources, lack of coordination and
cooperation, and personnel practices that created confusion regarding
mission and responsibilities. In 1998, the administration acknowledged the
need for fundamental reform and concluded that organization problems impeded
INS' ability to carry out its dual missions. In 1999, the INS Commissioner
stated that mission conflict at the local operational level impeded
accountability and that the bureaucratic chain of command hampered
efficiency. She further acknowledged that INS did not uniformly provide
consistent, courteous, and timely services to aliens who sought INS
benefits.

To remedy these problems, the Commission on Immigration Reform, the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, INS, and several Members of Congress have
recommended ways to restructure INS. The reorganization proposals have
ranged from dismantling INS and replacing it with a new agency that

would handle immigration enforcement functions, while moving immigration
service functions to the Departments of State and Labor, to restructuring
INS internally by creating two separate chains of command- one for
enforcement and the other for services- and leaving it as a single agency
within the Department of Justice. As of October 2000, the details of a new
structure for carrying out the nation's immigration

laws had not been decided. The ability of the reorganization to resolve INS'
long- standing

management and program implementation challenges remains unclear. INS
Implementing

INS' Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and Southwest Border
deterring aliens from illegally entering the United States Strategy, But
between ports of entry. The Border Patrol is currently in Effectiveness

the second phase of a four- phase strategy to reduce and Unknown deter
illegal entry along the southwest border. The strategy calls for first
increasing Border Patrol agents and resources in San Diego and El Paso and
then increasing them in Arizona and south Texas. INS

allocated nearly 75 percent of its new agent positions to Arizona and Texas
in fiscal year 1998. Although INS generally allocated newly hired Border
Patrol agents in accordance with its strategy, INS was not able to meet its
goal of increasing its onboard strength of Border Patrol agents by at least
1,000 in fiscal year 1999, as was congressionally mandated. 1 Specifically,
figure 2 shows that while INS exceeded its goal in fiscal years 1997 and
1998, it saw an increase of only 369 agents in fiscal year 1999 due to
recruitment and retention problems.

1 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(P. L. 104- 208), among other things, directed the Attorney General to
increase the number of Border Patrol agents onboard by not less than 1,000
in each fiscal year, from 1997 through 2001.

Figure 2: Results of INS' Efforts to Increase Border Patrol Onboard
Strength, Fiscal Years 1997 Through 1999

1200 Net gain/ loss of agents

1002 1035

1000 800 600 400

369

200 0

1997 1998 1999

INS' goal to increase its onboard strength of Border Patrol agents by not
less than 1,000 in each fiscal year.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

INS made progress in implementing its southwest border strategy, such as
building new fencing in California and Arizona, increasing the amount of
time Border Patrol agents spent on border enforcement, and deploying
additional technologies such as remote video

surveillance cameras. In fiscal year 1999, INS was testing a model to help
it determine the right mix of staffing, equipment, and technology for its
Border Patrol

sectors. In two reports issued in 1997 and 1999, we noted that data on the
interim effects of the Attorney General's strategy were limited, although
some of the changes

anticipated by the strategy were occurring. For example, illegal alien
apprehensions declined in such traditional routes of entry as San Diego and
El Paso but increased elsewhere. An unintended consequence of the strategy
was that deaths, resulting from attempted crossings in remote areas,
appeared to increase. INS lacks performance information to determine the
overall impact of its strategy to reduce the illegal alien flow across the
border, reduce flow to the border, and reduce the number of illegal aliens
who reside in the United States. Although INS contracted with private
research firms to conduct several geographically specific studies along the
southwest border, its actions

did not meet the intent of our recommendation that INS conduct a systematic,
comprehensive evaluation of its southwest border strategy. We believe that
such an evaluation could have helped INS determine whether, and to what
extent, its investment of billions of dollars

in implementing the strategy produced the intended results. The challenge
for INS remains in determining how it will know, in an overall sense,
whether the strategy has successfully met its objectives. Shortcomings in
This country's ability to combat the significant and Programs to Control

growing problem of alien smuggling is hampered by Alien Smuggling management
and operational problems at INS, such as fragmented and uncoordinated
investigative efforts and

lack of staff to perform intelligence functions. For example, INS does not
have procedures in place to coordinate its resources for initiating and
managing antismuggling cases. In several border areas, multiple
antismuggling units exist that operate autonomously, overlap in
jurisdiction, and report to different INS officials. In addition, INS field
officials lack clear criteria on which cases to investigate, resulting in
inconsistent decision- making across locations. In addition, INS lacks an
agencywide automated case tracking and management system to help it (1)
monitor ongoing

investigations, (2) determine if multiple antismuggling units may be
investigating the same target individual or organization, or (3) know if
previous investigations had been conducted on a particular target. Further,
INS' antismuggling intelligence efforts have been hampered by an inefficient
and cumbersome process for retrieving and analyzing intelligence information
and by a lack of clear guidance to INS staff about how to gather, analyze,

and disseminate intelligence information. We reported that limited
performance measurement has hampered INS' ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of its antismuggling program. INS' fiscal year 1999
performance goals focused mainly on the number of smugglers presented for
prosecution to the U. S.

Attorneys and the number of designated priority cases. Such indicators
measure program outputs, but they do not provide information to measure the
extent to which INS' antismuggling efforts have helped achieve the
strategy's objective of deterring and disrupting alien smuggling. INS has
not specified how other expected results from the strategy, such as a shift
in smuggling activity between geographic areas along the border, will

be measured. We noted that while we recognize the difficulty in directly
measuring outcomes such as deterrence and disruption of antismuggling, we
believe that there are a variety of measures available- including

information on smuggling fees, usage and tactics, and shifts in the flow of
smuggled alien traffic- that could be used to collect systematic data and
develop a composite picture of progress toward achieving the

strategy's objectives. We also reported that the above impediments have made
it difficult, if not impossible, for INS to meet the challenges posed by
increasingly sophisticated major smuggling organizations. To address these
concerns, we recommended that INS (1) establish criteria for opening an
antismuggling case to help ensure that its antismuggling resources are
focused on the highest

priority cases; (2) establish a cost- effective case tracking and management
system of alien smuggling investigations that is automated, agencywide, and
readily available to investigative personnel and program managers to
facilitate the sharing of case information and prevent duplication of
effort; (3) establish performance measures for the antismuggling efforts and
intelligence program with which to gauge program

effects; and (4) require that intelligence reports be prepared using a
database format so that the information can be systematically analyzed. In
making these recommendations, we noted that without such improvements, INS'
ability to disrupt and deter increasingly sophisticated and organized alien
smugglers and dismantle their organizations would continue to be hampered.

Efforts to Reduce Although Congress enacted legislation in 1986 that
Unauthorized created an employment verification process and

Employment Face prohibited employers from hiring unauthorized aliens,

Impediments significant numbers of unauthorized aliens are still

obtaining employment. The effectiveness of the verification process has been
undermined by aliens' use of fraudulent documents. In addition, employers
face little chance of being investigated by INS, in part because resources
for worksite enforcement have been relatively small. Figure 3 shows that in
fiscal year 1998,

INS devoted about 2 percent (slightly over 300 workyears) of its enforcement
workyears to worksite enforcement.

Figure 3: INS Enforcement Program Workyears as a Percentage of Total
Enforcement Program Workyears for Fiscal Year 1998

2% Worksite investigations a 1% Intelligence

26% 44%

Border Patrol 16%

11% Other investigations b Detention and deportation Inspections N = 18,824

Note: For the major INS enforcement programs, fiscal year 1998 workyears are
budget amounts. Actual workyear data for these programs were not available
at the time of our review. a Includes actual time spent by INS agents and
support staff on

investigations that target employers who are suspected of hiring
unauthorized workers. b Includes all other investigations (other than
employers), such as

criminal aliens, drug trafficking, fraud, smuggling, and immigration status
violations.

Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

With these limited worksite enforcement resources, INS conducted about 6,500
investigations of employers, which equated to about 3 percent of the
country's estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens.

Even among employers who were investigated, INS was not likely to find that
they knowingly violated the law, collect fines from them, or seek to bring
charges against

them. When INS identified and arrested unauthorized workers, it could not
determine whether employers replaced them with authorized workers, nor
whether the unauthorized workers were placed into deportation hearings and
removed from the country. In 1999, INS was taking several steps to improve
the employment verification process and make it less

susceptible to fraud. For example, INS was testing several programs to make
it possible for employers to electronically verify an employee's eligibility
to work. However, INS was having difficulty getting employers to enroll in
its pilot programs. INS was also taking steps to increase the integrity of
the documents it issues to aliens in order to reduce fraudulent document
use.

In addition, INS issued an interior enforcement strategy that called for INS
to pursue the criminal investigation of employers who are flagrant or grave
violators. However, the strategy left unclear what was meant by a flagrant
or grave violation, what criteria would be used for opening investigations
of employers suspected of criminal activities, and how INS would measure the
effectiveness of its strategy. We recommended that, in implementing the
interior enforcement strategy, INS needed to clarify the criteria for
opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal activities. We
believe that having clear criteria is important if INS is to effectively
focus its limited staff to achieve its enforcement goals and intended
results. Released Aliens Not

By statute, INS is to detain aliens who attempt to enter Appearing for the
United States by engaging in fraud or Removal Hearings misrepresentation and
those who arrive with fraudulent, improper, or no documents. INS favors
releasing such aliens from detention if an asylum officer determines

that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture and do not pose a
risk of flight or danger to the community. For fiscal year 1999, INS
reported releasing from detention 78 percent of those aliens found to have a
credible fear of persecution or torture. Between April 1, 1997, and
September 30, 1999, there were 2, 351 aliens who received an immigration
judge's decision (immigrants whose claims are denied by an asylum officers
may appeal that determination to an immigration judge). Of the 2,351 aliens,
1,000 (or 43 percent) of them had not appeared for their removal hearings.
At the time of our review, INS had various

efforts under way to analyze issues associated with the low appearance rate.
In addition, we recommended that INS analyze the characteristics of those
aliens who appeared and those who did not appear for their removal hearing
and use the results to reevaluate its

policy for when to release aliens in cases when an asylum officer determined
the aliens to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. Key Contact
Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov INS'
Information Each year INS invests hundreds of millions of dollars on

Technology information technology (IT) systems and activities. In Management
fiscal year 2000, INS obligated about $327 million on IT Weaknesses

activities and it plans to spend about $226 million in fiscal year 2001.
However, INS continues to have problems effectively managing its IT
resources that are critical to its operations. Justice's Office of Inspector
General (OIG) has reported that (1) estimated completion dates for some IT
projects had been delayed without explanation, (2) project costs continued
to spiral upward with no

justification for how funds were spent, and (3) projects were nearing
completion with no assurance that they would meet performance and functional
requirements. In August 2000, we reported that INS lacked (1) an enterprise
architecture- or agencywide blueprint- to manage its IT efforts effectively
and efficiently and (2) the fundamental management structures and processes
needed to effectively develop one. The lack of such an architecture has
hindered INS' ability to ensure that the hundreds of millions of dollars it
spends each year on IT will optimally support its mission needs. In December
2000, we reported that INS lacked defined and disciplined processes to
select, control, and evaluate its

IT investments. Consequently, INS is hampered in its ability to know whether
it is making the right investment decisions, whether it has selected the mix
of investments that best meet its overall mission and business priorities,
or whether it is adequately managing the risks associated with these
investments.

To address these serious weaknesses, we have made a series of
recommendations to introduce effective IT management practices at INS, such
as (1) developing a

complete enterprise architecture, and (2) developing and implementing
effective IT investment management processes. INS has begun taking action to
address these recommendations. However, until they are corrected, we also
recommended that INS limit requests for future IT appropriations to efforts
that (1) support ongoing operations and maintenance of existing systems, (2)
are small and represent low technical risk and can be delivered in a short
period of time, (3) are congressionally mandated, or (4) support efforts to
develop an enterprise architecture and implement IT investment management
processes. We plan to monitor

INS' actions to implement our recommendations. Key Contact Randolph C. Hite,
Director

Information Technology Systems Issues

(202) 512- 6204 hiter@ gao. gov Better Manage

Providing leadership and support to state and local Programs Designed
efforts is one of Justice's key roles in further developing to Support State

the nation's capacity to prevent and control crime. As and Local Efforts to

part of this role, Justice attempts to support innovative, Reduce Crime
community- based programs aimed at reducing crime and violence in U. S.
communities through (1) encouraging community- based approaches to crime and

justice at the state and local level by comprehensive and collaborative
programs, such as Weed and Seed and (2) supporting community- policing
initiatives, such as providing funding to hire and deploy police officers.
Weed and Seed and Police Corps are two programs currently funded by the
Department of Justice to support state and local efforts to reduce crime.
Our reviews of both programs have shown that, while Justice

has made some progress toward addressing administrative and management
weaknesses, challenges remain related to developing better performance
measures at Weed and Seed and increasing states' participation in the Police
Corps program.

Progress Made, but The Weed and Seed program is Justice's flagship effort
Program

in community- based efforts to prevent and control Management violent crime
and provide a safe environment in which Weaknesses Still community residents
can live, work, and raise their Remain in Weed and

families. Weed and Seed's objective is to help “weed out” Seed
Program crime from targeted neighborhoods, then “seed” the site
with a variety of programs and resources to prevent a resurgence of crime.
In 1999, we reported that Justice's

Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), which is responsible for the
national management and administration of the program, lacked an adequate
internal control to require that significant decisions related to funding
allocations be documented. Without this control, EOWS could not ensure that
it was making

the best allocation of available funds when it made important program
decisions, such as qualifying new and existing sites for funding. In
addition, EOWS had not always ensured, through its grant monitoring process,
that site progress reports- a grant requirement- were submitted or that
grant monitors documented their site visits. We recommended that EOWS
develop an adequate internal control to ensure that the basis and rationale
for new and existing site qualification for funding decisions were always
fully documented. We also recommended that EOWS improve program

monitoring to ensure that sites met the grant requirement of submitting
reports and that site visits were documented.

Since then, EOWS has made progress in implementing our recommendations. EOWS
issued a policy and procedures manual that included criteria and basic
requirements for site qualification for funding eligibility, and Justice
indicated that written internal control

procedures for making and documenting site selection decisions were being
refined. In addition, EOWS reported that all site monitoring visits were
being documented. EOWS also reported that new approaches will be explored to
ensure that grantees submit program progress reports in a timely manner,
such as restricting funding access to grantees that continually fail to
submit progress reports in a timely manner. Further, EOWS emphasized the
importance of filing timely progress

reports at its regional training conferences for grantees. According to EOWS
officials, the timeliness of submitted progress reports has improved. Our
work in 1999 also showed that EOWS lacked criteria to determine when sites
became self- sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Seed funds,
even though the objective of sites' becoming self- sustaining was a central
program goal. We recommended that EOWS develop criteria for determining when
to reduce or withdraw program funding from self- sustaining sites.

Subsequently, EOWS announced a policy to redeploy Weed and Seed grant funds
to include a different neighborhood after 5 years of funding. Finally, our
work showed that although current performance measures addressed a variety
of activities taking place at Weed and Seed sites, those measures were
generally not adequate to judge program success. While EOWS had made some
changes in the way it measured program effectiveness, those indicators still

generally tracked activities, not program outcomes. We recognize the
difficulty involved in precisely measuring the results of this type of
community- based program or strategy. However, we recommended that EOWS
develop additional performance measures to track program outcomes, noting
that the indicators would help EOWS make more informed program decisions,
such as whether to continue existing funding. In response, EOWS officials
recognized the need to expand

efforts to measure performance, including quality of life factors and other
program measures. These officials informed us that they sought
appropriations for fiscal year 2001 to expand evaluation and performance

measurement efforts to include the use of sociodemographic indicators, but
that the additional funds requested for fiscal year 2001 had not been
approved by Congress as of November 2000. Police Corps

The Police Corps program and the Federal Office of the Program Had a

Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education (Office of Slower Than the Police
Corps) were established by the Violent Crime Expected Start, Due Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The overall to Funding and goal of the Police
Corps program is to address violent Staffing Limitations crime by helping
state and local law enforcement agencies increase the number of officers
with advanced

education and training assigned to community patrol. Specifically, the
program provides competitive scholarships to college students who agree to
earn a Bachelor's Degree and subsequently serve as police

officers on community patrol for at least four years in an area with great
need for additional law enforcement officers and where they will be used
most effectively. The program also provides financial assistance to law
enforcement agencies that hire program participants.

The Office of the Police Corps provides the funds to participating states,
who in turn provide the funds to individual program participants, colleges,
approved law enforcement training providers, and law enforcement agencies.
In February 2000, we reported that under the Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS), the Police Corps program started out slower than expected
and, as a result, the majority of participant slots

remained unfilled. According to federal and state officials, one factor
contributing to this slow start was that the Police Corps statute did not
provide funding to pay states' costs for program administration or for

recruitment and selection of program participants. Several states cited this
as a reason for not participating in the program, and several others cited
it as a reason for the slow growth of their Police Corps programs. In
addition, we noted that COPS' operation of the Police Corps as a direct
reimbursement program made determining program status difficult, as it
slowed the

rate at which funds were obligated. 2 We also reported that according to
federal and state officials, one factor contributing to the delay was that
COPS dedicated insufficient staff to the program. This understaffing led to
delays in providing program

2 Under COPS, the Police Corps program paid scholarship money directly to
the educational institution and payments directly to law enforcement
agencies. In addition, it provided reimbursement for (1) the prior
educational expenses incurred by students who did not enter the Police Corps
program until their sophomore year in college or later and (2) the costs
incurred by approved law enforcement training providers.

guidance, processing program applications and payments, and answering
participants' questions about the program.

In December 1998, the Police Corps program was transferred from COPS to OJP.
We reported that OJP had made significant progress in obligating funds and
establishing interagency agreements with the participating states and
providing program guidance. However, at the time of our review, it was too
soon to

tell whether OJP would succeed in filling empty participant slots in a
timely manner. Key Contact Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov Develop The
supply and use of illegal drugs remains a major

Measurable national problem that is estimated to cost our society
Performance

upwards of $100 billion annually. The Office of National Targets to Help
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which has responsibility DEA Determine Its for
setting federal priorities for drug control and

Progress in implementing a National Drug Control Strategy, has

Reducing the three strategic goals for reducing the supply of illegal
Availability of

drugs to our nation. Consistent with this strategy, one of Justice's
strategic objectives is to reduce the threat and Illegal Drugs trafficking
of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug
trafficking organizations that are international, multijurisdictional, or
have an identified local impact.

Although several Justice components share the responsibility for achieving
this objective, DEA has the lead responsibility for enforcing federal drug
laws and for coordinating and pursuing U. S. drug investigations in foreign
countries. Accordingly, DEA has a strategic goal

of identifying, targeting, investigating, disrupting, and dismantling the
international, national, state, and local drug trafficking organizations
that are having the most significant impact on our nation. To achieve this
goal and other goals, DEA's funding significantly increased over the past
few years. For example, DEA's total fiscal year 2000 budget exceeded $1. 5
billion, an increase of about 69 percent (in nominal terms) since fiscal
year 1993. DEA also increased its staff from about 7, 100 to nearly 8,600
(about 20 percent) over the same period. Difficulties in The seriousness of
the nation's drug problem and the

Measuring Progress growing resources devoted to the “drug war”
highlight in Reducing the

the importance of Justice's and DEA's strategic planning Availability of
Illegal and performance measurement. Effective planning and Drugs

performance measurement can assist Justice in achieving its goal of (1)
reducing the nation's illegal drug supply and related crime and violence by
disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations and (2) ensuring
that Justice and DEA are achieving this goal in an efficient and effective
manner, as mandated by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA). Despite progress that DEA made in developing strategic goals and
objectives and in enhancing its programs and initiatives, which are
consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy, limitations in DEA's
performance measures make it difficult to determine its progress in reducing
the availability of illegal drugs.

In 1999, we reported DEA's process for determining staffing needs and
allocating staff within DEA was consistent with applicable federal laws,
regulations, and OMB procedures and took into consideration congressional
guidance on staff allocations. We also reported that DEA's strategic and
annual performance plans, strategic goals and objectives, and enhanced
programs and initiatives in the 1990s were consistent with ONDCP's National
Drug Control Strategy, the blueprint for overall federal drug control
efforts. The

DEA and ONDCP strategies sought to reduce the illegal drug supply and drug-
related violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and international
drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA's performance measures focused
generally on outputs such as the amount of drugs seized and did not
operationally define outcome goals such as “disrupt” and
“dismantle” major drug trafficking organizations. Thus, it was
difficult to assess

DEA's success in achieving its strategic goals and objectives and the effect
of its programs and initiatives in reducing the illegal drug supply.

While we recognize that measuring success in reducing the availability of
illegal drugs is difficult, we and others identified inconsistencies and
limitations in Justice's

and DEA's efforts to establish goals and measure performance relative to its
drug enforcement activities. For example, Justice's OIG reported in March
2000 that Justice's fiscal year 2000 Summary Performance Plan 3 generally
met the requirements of GPRA and the Office

of Management and Budget (OMB). However, some aspects of the plan, including
those dealing with drug enforcement, needed improvements to fully meet the
requirements. Among other things, the OIG found that (1) a discussion on
strategies covering all performance goals was lacking, (2) some performance
goals and indicators were not measurable, and (3) information on external
data sources that could be used to measure performance was missing. Justice
generally concurred with the OIG's recommendations for making future summary
performance plans compliant with GPRA and OMB requirements.

One of Justice's key performance outcomes is “Reduced Availability
and/ or Use of Illegal Drugs.” In June 2000, 3 Audit Report:
Government Performance and Results Act- Department of Justice FY 2000
Summary Performance Plan (OIG- 00- 11, Mar. 2000); Office of Inspector
General, Department of Justice.

we reported that Justice's fiscal year 1999 Performance Report and fiscal
year 2001 Performance Plan included key measures for this outcome that
focused on outputs, such as increased amounts of drugs seized. This

measure can reflect either (1) improved success in reducing drug
availability or (2) an increase in the amount of drugs that are available
for seizure. Further, targets were not set for most of the measures- a
recurring theme from our 1999 report on DEA's strategies and operations. We
recommended that the Attorney General direct the DEA administrator to work
closely with Justice and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA performance targets
for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations consistent
with the performance targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. In
response to our recommendation, DEA (1) developed a new strategic plan,
which was approved in May 2000; (2) participated with a Department of
Justice work group in defining the terms “disrupt” and
“dismantle”;

and (3) formed an internal GPRA Work Committee to assess and develop a
feasible management approach to identify and establish quantifiable
performance targets. Once they have been developed and approved, the
performance targets are to be reflected in DEA's future annual performance
plans and used to hold managers accountable.

In its November 1999 report 4 on DEA's National Drug Pointer Index System
(NDPIX), 5 Justice's OIG found that the system was adequately planned and
developed, did not duplicate existing systems, and could be a useful tool
for improving interagency communication. However, the report also indicated
that DEA could improve management controls over NDPIX by enhancing its
performance measures to include

measures related to the index system's goals, such as the number of
cooperative investigations resulting from positive “hits.” DEA
agreed with the OIG's related recommendation.

Key Contact Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Tax Administration and Justice
(202) 512- 8777 ekstrandl@ gao. gov 4 Audit Report: The Drug Enforcement
Administration's National Drug Pointer Index System (OIG- 00- 03, Nov.
1999); Office of Inspector

General, Department of Justice. 5 NDPIX is a computerized pointer system
designed to provide information about ongoing drug investigations to
participating federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies nationwide.
Its purpose is to (1) promote information sharing; (2) facilitate drug-
related investigations; (3) prevent duplicate investigations; (4) increase

coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and
(5) enhance the personal safety of law enforcement officers.

Achieve Excellence Justice has made significant progress toward achieving

in Financial an unqualified opinion on its departmentwide financial

Management, statements, which has been one of the Attorney

Including, But Not General's foremost priorities. Specifically, Justice
Limited to, a

improved from receiving a disclaimer of opinion on its Departmentwide

fiscal year 1998 departmentwide financial statements to Unqualified
receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1999

Opinion for Fiscal departmentwide financial statements. While obtaining an
unqualified opinion on annual financial statements is Year 2000 and

an important objective, it is not an end in and of itself. Beyond The key is
to take steps to continuously improve internal control and underlying
financial and management information systems as a means to ensure
accountability, increase the economy, improve the efficiency, and enhance
the effectiveness of government. These systems must generate timely,
accurate, and useful information on an ongoing basis, not just as of the end
of the year. To achieve excellence in financial management, it is critical
that Justice fully addresses

significant internal control weaknesses identified at its 10 reporting
components. 6 Until its components correct the underlying causes of these
weaknesses, Justice,

regardless of the type of opinion received, continues to be at risk that
information generated by the financial systems throughout the year is
inaccurate and errors, fraud, or noncompliance could occur and not be
promptly detected. A sustained commitment of Justice's

management will be needed to fully address these challenges. 6 For financial
statement reporting purposes, Justice's reporting entity is comprised of 10
components, which are (1) Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit
Fund; (2) Working Capital Fund; (3) Offices, Boards, and Divisions; (4)
USMS; (5) OJP; (6) DEA; (7) FBI; (8) INS;

(9) Bureau of Prisons; and (10) Federal Prison Industries, Inc.

Significant Internal For fiscal year 1999, Justice's auditors summarized 14
Control Weaknesses

material weaknesses 7 and 28 reportable conditions 8 , Exist

which were reported at the component level, into three departmentwide
material weaknesses in internal controls-( 1) ineffective component
financial management systems and computer controls at the Department's data
centers; (2) lack of policies and procedures for recording financial
transactions in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
and (3) ineffective financial statement

preparation processes. Further, the auditors for five of Justice's
components reported that certain internal control weaknesses identified at
these components were significant departures from the federal system
requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
(FFMIA). In addition to contributing to these departmentwide deficiencies,
two

of Justice's key components, INS and DEA, had additional internal control
weaknesses. Internal Control Issues Auditors for 9 of the 10 components
reported Reported by

weaknesses in financial management systems and Component Auditors

related computer controls over such systems that increase the risk of
software programs and data processed on these systems not being adequately
protected from unauthorized access. For components that had not implemented
new financial management systems, these weaknesses represented long-
standing 7 A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce,
to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities, in
amounts that would be material to the financial statements, may occur and
not

be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their
duties. 8 Reportable conditions are matters coming to the attention of the
auditors that, in their judgment, should be communicated to management
because they represent significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of internal control that could adversely affect the organization's ability
to meet the objectives of reliable financial reporting and compliance with
applicable laws and regulations.

challenges that had not been adequately addressed by management. The
auditors reported that other weaknesses noted may have been the result of
insufficient management attention to general controls during the
implementation phase of new systems. In addition to computer control
weaknesses reported at the component level, the auditors also reported that
the

Justice's data centers did not have formalized control procedures for
changes in application software or a comprehensive plan to recover primary
systems, exposing the agency to a potential disruption of operations.
Further, departmentwide computer- security

policies and procedures were outdated and did not adequately address
security responsibilities or define authority. The auditors reported that 8
of the 10 components did not have policies or procedures in place or were
not always following them to ensure that financial transactions were
recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
Auditors for 6 of the 10 components reported weaknesses over the financial
statement preparation process. Because of the weaknesses identified by the
auditors- insufficient resources, technical and clerical errors, and lack of
supervisory review and management support- many of the components missed
Justice's

deadlines for submitting financial statements or submitted financial
statements that resulted in Justice having to adjust the departmentwide
financial statements. Financial Management As reported in our January 1999
report on management Weaknesses at INS challenges at Justice, INS' auditors
identified numerous Continue to Exist material weaknesses in internal
controls, which INS continues to experience. INS received a qualified
opinion on its fiscal year 1999 financial statements,

because, according to its auditor, INS had not

maintained appropriate accounting records and relevant documentation to
support the deferred revenue and intragovernmental accounts payable balances
in the financial statements. These problems also resulted in a qualified
opinion on Justice's departmentwide financial statements. The auditor also
identified material internal control weaknesses related to (1) computer
security controls, (2) the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation
process, (3) intragovernmental accounts payable, and (4) systems and
procedures to support deferred revenue.

Recently, Justice's OIG reported serious control weaknesses in INS' fee
collection program at land ports of entry. Specifically, the OIG found that
cashiers could easily steal cash before it is recorded in the cash register
and conceal the loss by either failing to ring up the transaction or voiding
the transaction after it had been rung up. Further, port of entry managers
could not account for many of the cash register tapes

documenting thousands of transactions, and certain staff were not held
accountable for cash shortages. In addition, we reported that INS service
centers, which processed approximately 75 percent of the immigration
applications received by INS, generally did not deposit the related fees
collected within Treasury's required time frames, resulting in at least
$640,000 in interest cost to the government. We also found that INS lacked
the data necessary to determine how long district offices,

which processed the remaining 25 percent of the applications, took to
deposit the related fees. As reported in our January 1999 report on
management challenges at Justice, INS financial management systems (1) were
not integrated, resulting in significant delays and burdensome
reconciliation efforts; (2) had significant internal control weaknesses,
affecting the accuracy and reliability of financial information; and (3)
limited, rather than enhanced, effective decisionmaking. According to INS,
it urgently needed to replace

its financial management system, which was over 20 years old and did not
have the functionality INS needed to efficiently manage and account for its
resources. In 1997, INS selected its new Federal Financial Management System
but continues to experience delays in implementing this new system. Instead
of analyzing

its financial management processes and developing and implementing a risk-
management plan, as we recommended, INS tasked its contractor with helping
to ensure that risks associated with implementing the new

system would be identified and necessary steps taken to mitigate them. Since
the new system had not yet been implemented, INS had to rely on the old
system to prepare its fiscal year 1999 financial statements.

In addition to reassessing the implementation of its new financial
management system, other actions INS is either taking or has taken to
address its financial

management weaknesses are reorganizing its finance functions and continuing
to reconcile fund balance with Treasury differences. However, according to
INS' auditors, INS has become heavily dependent on contractor resources to
support its growing financial

management needs due to lack of staff resources in INS' accounting office in
headquarters. The auditors reported that without sufficient regular
staffing, INS may not be able to ensure the continuity of finance personnel
to operate effectively or have sufficient resources to ensure adequate
oversight over the expanding

contractor base. Reported Internal Although DEA obtained an unqualified
opinion on its Control Weaknesses fiscal year 1999 financial statements, the
number of Increase at DEA

reported internal control weaknesses at DEA increased from fiscal year 1998
to fiscal year 1999. These material weaknesses related to (1) information
systems controls, (2) the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation process,
(3) the lack of a system to accurately and completely account for property
and equipment, and (4)

DEA's weak financial reporting process. Other weaknesses included not fully
following generally accepted accounting principles and deficiencies in DEA's
ability to prepare accurate and timely financial

statements. In September 1998, we reported that several DEA employees had
been involved in two different cases of embezzling DEA funds. One case
involved a single employee who allegedly embezzled more than $6 million

during a 6- year period. The employee allegedly submitted hundreds of false
payment vouchers, seeking reimbursement for services never performed by a
sham corporation he established. The second case involved collusion among
three DEA employees who used DEA funds to purchase various electronic and
other equipment- valued at approximately $2. 7 million- that was diverted
for their own use. DEA's auditors have not reported any subsequent
embezzlements. However, the ineffective internal controls over property and
fund balance with Treasury reconciliations reported by the auditors increase
the risk that assets were not properly safeguarded from loss or unauthorized
use. Actions DEA is either taking or has taken to address its financial
management weaknesses are continuing to reconcile fund balance with Treasury
differences and

correcting computer security control deficiencies. However, according to
DEA's auditor, DEA has also become dependent on contractor resources to
support its financial management needs, including routine accounting
functions. The DEA auditor reported that,

without sufficient regular staffing, DEA may not be able to ensure the
continuity of properly trained finance personnel to operate effectively. Key
Contact Gary T. Engel, Director

Financial Management and Assurance

(202) 512- 3406 engelg@ gao. gov Improve The Departments of Justice and
Treasury operate

Management and similar but separate asset forfeiture programs. 9 As of
Accountability Over

September 30, 1999, the combined value of assets in Justice's Asset these
two programs was more than $1 billion, of which Forfeiture Program about
$378 million were assets under Justice's management. Both programs also hold
large amounts of nonvalued property such as drugs and weapons. These

programs have been designated as high- risk since our high risk program was
initiated in 1990 because (1) over the years, neither Justice nor Treasury
adequately focused on managing and accounting for seized and

forfeited items and (2) Justice and Treasury had not formed a plan to
consolidate postseizure administration of certain properties to eliminate
duplication of resources and reduce administrative costs. Since 1990,

we and others have reported on the program's continuing inadequate
information systems and financial management weaknesses, including
accountability over certain seized property.

In recent years, Justice has taken many actions to improve the management
and disposition of seized and forfeited property. For example, in 1999, we
reported that Justice had improved its management of real property, such as
cars, boats, and houses, in the four locations we visited. Specifically, our
report indicated that we were able to account for all of the seized assets
included in our review at those four locations. We also found that the
seized assets generally appeared to be in 9 The asset forfeiture program
involves the management of property

seized in consequence of a violation of public law, including monetary
instruments, real property, and tangible personal property of others in the
actual or constructive possession of the custodial agency and forfeited
property or property for which the title has passed to the U. S. Government.

good condition and were stored and secured properly, in accordance with
physical security and property management provisions in storage and
maintenance contracts. In addition, Treasury and Justice are undertaking a
joint study to examine opportunities for increased cooperation in the
management of the two programs. However, challenges remain to address the
programs' inadequate information systems and financial management
weaknesses, including accountability over seized assets. Further, the
results of the joint study have yet to be determined.

Improved In September 1998, Justice's OIG reported weaknesses

Management and in the management of seized drugs at most of the INS
Accountability

Border Patrol stations it visited. In response to Needed recommendations
contained in that report, the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
reported that INS now

has written policies or procedures on handling and storing seized drugs,
adhering to proper chain- ofcustody procedures, and specifying an individual
responsible for evidence. To address the reported failure to store seized
drugs securely, INS plans to inspect its

drug storage facilities, report on deficiencies noted, and develop a
schedule of short- and long- term facility improvements.

In late 1999, we recommended that DEA and FBI take several specific actions
to address physical safeguards over drugs and firearm evidence and to
strengthen accountability over such evidence. The types of problems
reported- such as missing chain- of- custody documentation, inaccurate
recordkeeping of drug and weapon evidence, and improper accounting for drug
weights- increase the risk of theft, misuse, and loss or compromise of
evidence needed for prosecution

purposes. As a result of this work, DEA and FBI are taking actions to
address identified deficiencies related to accountability controls over
seized property. For example, DEA and FBI policies are currently being

modified to address issues of documenting the weight of drug evidence to
improve accountability. In February 2000, independent auditors for Justice
reported weaknesses in Justice's financial accounting controls used to
report on and account for seized and forfeited property. These weaknesses
included (1) seizing and custodial agencies not taking required steps to
ensure that corrections to the Consolidated Asset Tracking System inventory
records were properly made, (2) lack of a reliable system at DEA to
accurately report bulk drugs, seized property, and funds held as evidence,

(3) system deficiencies at FBI affecting the completeness of summary reports
on acquiring and disposing of evidence, and (4) the need for improving
inventory procedures used to validate the status and value of seized
property at year- end. Although increasing accountability for the asset

forfeiture program is not included as a performance goal in Justice's
Performance Plan as it was in the past, the Asset Forfeiture Fund component
of Justice's Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan stated that as

enhancements and refinements are made to two of Justice's automated systems,
data supporting seizure and forfeiture activities will be strengthened.
While automated systems enhancements and Justice's other planned corrective
actions should help overcome weaknesses identified in its asset forfeiture
program, its individual components must continue to address the concerns
noted above, with Justice's oversight. We will continue to monitor Justice's
progress in this area. Seized Asset Legislation in 1988 required Treasury
and Justice to Management develop a plan to consolidate their seized
property Programs Not Yet

management functions. In 1991 we recommended they Consolidated But
consolidate the postseizure management and Under Study disposition of
noncash seized properties to reduce administrative costs. Although the
Departments have

not made plans for consolidating their programs, in September 2000, they
contracted for a study to identify opportunities for increased cooperation
and sharing of agency and contractor resources. The study is to result in
recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of property
management functions within the

federal asset forfeiture program. While the study is not expected to fully
embrace the concept of consolidating the two separate seized asset
management and disposal functions, we believe that taking advantage of
opportunities for cooperation and sharing of agency and

contractor resources encompasses the spirit of the recommendation designed
to reduce the programs' administrative costs.

To determine whether to remove the high risk designation for the asset
forfeiture program in the future, we will consider the results of Justice's
and Treasury's study, including the implementation of any related
recommendations, as well as the results of ongoing initiatives for resolving
Justice and Treasury's respective management and accountability issues.

Key Contacts Gary T. Engel, Director Financial Management and Assurance
(202) 512- 3406 engelg@ gao. gov Richard M. Stana, Director

Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov

Related GAO Products Improve the

Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its IT Enforcement of
Investment Management Capability (GAO/ AIMD- 01- 146,

Immigration Laws Dec. 29, 2000).

and Provision of Illegal Aliens: Opportunities Exist to Improve the
Immigration and Expedited Removal Process (GAO/ GGD- 00- 176, Sept. 1,
Naturalization 2000). Services Information Technology: INS Needs to Better
Manage the Development of Its Enterprise Architecture (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 212,
Aug. 1, 2000).

Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
Growing Problem (GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000).

Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring
Goal Was Not Met (GAO/ GGD- 00- 39, Dec. 17, 1999). Illegal Immigration:
Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May
19, 1999). Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized
Alien Employment Exist (GAO/ GGD- 99- 33, April 2, 1999). Illegal
Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation
Needed (GAO/ GGD- 98- 21, Dec. 11, 1997).

Better Manage Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year
Programs Designed 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 to Support
State

Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). and Local Efforts to

Police Corps: Some Problems Resolved, But Most Reduce Crime

Positions Remain Unfilled (GAO/ GGD- 00- 69, Feb. 22, 2000). Federal Grants:
More Can Be Done to Improve Weed and Seed Program Management (GAO/ GGD- 99-
110, July 16, 1999).

Develop Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year Measurable
1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance

Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). Targets to Help

Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the DEA Determine Its 1990s
(GAO/ GGD- 99- 108, July 21, 1999). Progress in

Reducing the Availability of Illegal Drugs

Achieve Excellence Immigration Benefits: INS Not Making Timely Deposits in
Financial

of Application Fees (GAO/ GGD- 00- 185, Sept. 29, 2000). Management,
Including, But Not

Financial Management: Control Weaknesses Reported at Limited to, a the Drug
Enforcement Administration Departmentwide

(GAO/ AIMD- 98- 271R, Sept. 11, 1998). Unqualified Opinion for Fiscal Year
2000 and

Beyond

Improve Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year Management
and 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Accountability of
Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000).

Justice's Asset Observations on the Department of the Treasury's Fiscal
Forfeiture Program

Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (GAO/
GGD/ AIMD- 00- 231R, June 30, 2000).

Seized Drugs and Firearms: FBI Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards
and Strengthen Accountability (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 18, Dec. 16, 1999).

FBI Accountability for Drugs Used in Special Operations: Deficiencies
Identified and Actions Taken (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 34R, Dec. 2, 1999). Seized
Drugs and Weapons: DEA Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards and
Strengthen Accountability (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 17, Nov. 30, 1999). Asset
Forfeiture: Marshals Service Controls Over Seized Assets (GAO/ GGD- 99- 41,
Mar. 26, 1999). Asset Forfeiture: Noncash Property Should Be Consolidated
Under the Marshals Service (GAO/ GGD- 91- 97, June 28, 1991).

Lett er

Performance and Accountability Series

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective
(GAO- 01- 241)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Agriculture
(GAO- 01- 242)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce (GAO-
01- 243)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education (GAO-
01- 245)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy (GAO-
01- 246)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services (GAO- 01- 247)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing and
Urban Development (GAO- 01- 248)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Interior
(GAO- 01- 249)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice (GAO-
01- 250)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor (GAO- 01-
251)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State (GAO- 01-
252)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation
(GAO- 01- 253)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Treasury
(GAO- 01- 254)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs (GAO- 01- 255)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Agency for International
Development (GAO- 01- 256)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency (GAO- 01- 257)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (GAO- 01- 258)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(GAO- 01- 259)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business Administration
(GAO- 01- 260)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration (GAO- 01- 261)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U. S. Postal Service (GAO-
01- 262)

High- Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263)

(182108) Lett er

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GAO United States General Accounting Office

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Contents

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Comptroller General of the United States

Page 3 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges United States General Accounting
Office

Washington, D. C. 20548

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Overview Page 7 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

Overview Page 8 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

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Overview Page 10 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

Overview Page 11 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

Overview Page 12 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

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Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 14 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
Challenges

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Challenges

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Challenges

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Challenges

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Challenges

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Related GAO Products Page 44 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

Related GAO Products Page 45 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

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Performance and Accountability Series

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