    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
    Justice (01-JAN-01, GAO-01-250).

    This report, part of GAO's performance and accountability series,
    discusses the major management challenges and program risks
    facing the Department of Justice (DOJ). These include (1)
    improving the enforcement of immigration laws and immigration
    naturalization services, (2) managing programs designed to
    support state and local efforts to reduce crime, (3) developing
    measurable performance targets to help the Drug Enforcement
    Agency determine its progress in reducing the availability of
    illegal drugs, (4) achieving excellence in financial management,
    and (5) improving management and accountability over DOJ asset
    forfeiture program.
    -------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
    REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-250
        ACCNO:   164402
        TITLE:   Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
                 of Justice
         DATE:   01/01/2001
      SUBJECT:   Accountability
    	     Crime prevention
    	     Drug trafficking
    	     Federal/state relations
    	     Financial management
    	     Immigration and naturalization law
    	     Internal controls
    	     Performance measures
    	     Risk management
    	     DOJ National Asset Seizure and
    	     Forfeiture Program

    	     DOJ Operation Weed and Seed Program
    	     High Risk Series 2001
    	     ONDCP National Drug Control Program

    ******************************************************************
    ** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
    ** GAO Testimony.                                               **
    **                                                              **
    ** No attempt has been made to display graphic images, although **
    ** figure captions are reproduced.  Tables are included, but    **
    ** may not resemble those in the printed version.               **
    **                                                              **
    ** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
    ** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
    ** document's contents.                                         **
    **                                                              **
    ******************************************************************
    GAO-01-250

    Performance and Accountability Series

    January 2001 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks

    Department of Justice

    GAO- 01- 250

    Letter 3 Overview 6 Major

    13 Performance and Accountability Challenges

    Related GAO 43

    Products Performance

    46 and Accountability Series

    Lett er

    January 2001 The President of the Senate The Speaker of the House of
    Representatives

    This report addresses the major performance and accountability challenges
    facing the Department of Justice (Justice) as it seeks to enforce laws in
    the public interest and protect the public from violence and criminal
    activity. It includes a summary of actions that Justice has taken and that
    are under way to address

    these challenges. It also outlines further actions that GAO believes are
    needed. This analysis should help the new Congress and administration carry
    out their responsibilities and improve government for the benefit of the
    American people.

    This report is part of a special series, first issued in January 1999,
    entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management
    Challenges

    and Program Risks. In that series, GAO advised the Congress that it planned
    to reassess the methodologies and criteria used to determine which federal
    government operations and functions should be highlighted and which should
    be designated as “high risk.” GAO completed the assessment,
    considered comments provided on a publicly available exposure draft, and
    published its guidance document, Determining Performance and Accountability
    Challenges and High Risks (GAO- 01- 159SP), in

    November 2000. This 2001 Performance and Accountability Series contains
    separate reports on 21 agencies- covering each cabinet department, most
    major independent agencies, and the U. S. Postal Service. The series also
    includes a governmentwide perspective on performance

    and management challenges across the federal government. As a companion
    volume to this series, GAO is issuing an update on those government
    operations and programs that its work identified as “high risk”
    because of either their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
    mismanagement or major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency,
    or effectiveness.

    David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States

    Overview As the nation's chief law enforcement agency, the Department of
    Justice is charged with, among other things, enforcing laws in the public
    interest and playing a key role in protecting the public from violence and
    criminal activity, such as drug smuggling and acts of terrorism. With a
    budget of over $21 billion and a staff of nearly 110, 000, including
    attorneys, investigators, and agents, Justice is a multifaceted organization
    whose

    functions range from securing the nation's borders to helping state and
    local agencies improve their capacity to prevent and control crime.
    Justice's responsibilities are divided among a number of major components,
    including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Office of
    Justice Programs (OJP), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the United States Marshals
    Service (USMS). In meeting their missions, these

    components must confront several contemporary performance and accountability
    challenges.

    Improve the enforcement of immigration laws and provision of immigration and
    naturalization services.

    ? Better manage programs designed to support state and local efforts to
    reduce crime.

    ? Develop measurable performance targets to help DEA determine its progress
    in reducing the availability of illegal drugs.

    ? Achieve excellence in financial management, including, but not limited to,
    a departmentwide unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and beyond.

    ? Improve management and accountability over Justice's asset forfeiture
    program.

    Immigration Law With a budget of $4. 3 billion and a workforce of nearly
    Enforcement and

    33, 000 employees, INS faces significant challenges in Services carrying out
    its dual mission to enforce laws regarding illegal immigration and provide
    immigration and naturalization services for aliens who enter and reside
    legally in the United States. For example, recommendations and proposals to
    restructure INS have been made as a result of several critics' conclusion
    that “mission overload” has impeded INS from succeeding at
    either of its primary functions. However, the details of a

    new organizational structure have not yet been decided. INS also faces
    significant challenges in implementing several of its programs. Our reviews
    of these programs have resulted in numerous recommendations related to INS'
    ability to secure the country's borders, control alien

    smuggling, strengthen interior enforcement of immigration laws, expedite the
    removal of criminal aliens, and manage its information technology. While INS
    has taken action to address some of the deficiencies that we identified, it
    continues to face major challenges in each of these areas as it works to
    develop the organizational, management, and information

    infrastructure needed to effectively meet its program goals.

    Support for State and In its role to support state and local efforts to
    reduce Local Crime

    crime, Justice faces management challenges in two Reduction Efforts

    programs that we have reviewed- Weed and Seed and Police Corps. Weed and
    Seed is a community- based, multiagency program whose mission is to help
    “weed out” crime in targeted neighborhoods, then
    “seed” the

    neighborhood with a variety of programs and resources to prevent a
    resurgence of crime. The Police Corps' overall objective is to help state
    and local law

    enforcement agencies fight violent crime by increasing the number of
    officers with advanced education and training who are assigned to community
    patrol. Justice,

    through the Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), has made some
    progress in responding to our recommendations to develop adequate internal
    controls and improve monitoring of the program. In addition, EOWS has begun
    to address our recommendation to develop funding criteria to award various
    funding recipients. Less progress, however, has been made at EOWS in
    developing better performance measures to be able to adequately judge Weed
    and Seed's success. Separately, the Police Corps program had experienced
    challenges that related to states' participation in the program due to
    inadequate funding to pay the states'

    costs for program administration or recruitment and selection of program
    participants. OJP has made some progress in addressing this issue, such as
    obligating funds and establishing interagency agreements with participating
    states. However, it is too soon to tell

    whether these actions will result in increased participation.

    Reduce Availability of The supply and use of illegal drugs remains a major
    Illegal Drugs

    national problem that is estimated to cost our society upwards of $100
    billion annually. As the lead drug enforcement agency with responsibilities
    for the drug supply reduction portion of the National Drug Control Strategy,
    DEA faces challenges related to measuring its progress in reducing the
    availability of illegal drugs. DEA has made some progress in developing
    strategic goals and objectives, and its enhanced programs and initiatives
    during the 1990s have been consistent with those of the National Strategy.
    However, DEA has not fully addressed our recommendation to develop

    measurable performance targets for its programs and initiatives that are
    consistent with those adopted for the National Strategy. As a result, it is
    difficult for DEA and Justice to assess how effective DEA has been in
    achieving its strategic goals and how effective its programs and initiatives
    have been in reducing the supply of illegal drugs.

    Financial Justice has made significant progress toward achieving

    Management an unqualified opinion on its departmentwide financial Excellence

    statements. However, to achieve excellence in financial management, it is
    critical that Justice fully address identified significant internal control
    weaknesses. The total number of reported weaknesses at Justice's 10
    reporting components increased from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 1999,
    and Justice's auditors reported 3 departmentwide material weaknesses 1 in
    internal controls. The auditors also reported that internal control
    weaknesses at five of Justice's components were significant departures from
    the requirements of the

    Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). Two of its key
    components, INS and DEA, contributed to these departmentwide deficiencies
    and had additional internal control weaknesses, which, for example,
    contributed to a qualified opinion for INS and, at DEA, increased the risk
    that assets were not properly safeguarded from loss or unauthorized use.
    Until its components correct the underlying causes of these challenges,
    Justice, regardless of the type of opinion received, continues to be at risk
    of errors, fraud,

    or noncompliance occurring and not being promptly detected.

    Justice's Asset The separate but similar asset forfeiture programs
    Forfeiture Program

    operated by Justice and Treasury were first designated as high risk 2 in
    1990 because neither agency had adequately focused on managing and
    accounting for 1 A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
    operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce,
    to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities, in
    amounts that would be material to the financial statements, may occur and
    not

    be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their
    duties. 2 Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations
    that we have identified as “high risk” because of their greater
    vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.

    seized assets or formed a plan to consolidate the two programs, as was
    mandated by Congress. As of September 30, 1999, these programs managed
    assets valued at more than $1 billion, plus large amounts of nonvalued
    assets, such as seized drugs and weapons. We reported in 1999 that Justice
    had made progress in managing its real property. However, we and others have
    continued to report on the program's inadequate information systems and
    financial management weaknesses, including accountability over seized
    assets. Further, Justice and Treasury have still not moved to consolidate
    their two programs. Justice has taken or plans to take actions to address
    the information systems

    and financial management issues, including accountability, that were
    identified in recent GAO and OIG reports. In addition, Justice and Treasury
    are conducting a formal study of opportunities for cooperation in the
    administration of their programs, which is to result in recommendations for
    improving the effectiveness and efficiency of property management functions
    within the federal asset forfeiture program. In determining whether to
    remove the high- risk designation for the asset forfeiture program in the

    future, we will consider the results of this study, including the
    implementation of any related recommendations, as well as the results of
    ongoing initiatives for resolving Justice's and Treasury's respective
    financial management and accountability issues.

    Figure 1 summarizes the performance and accountability challenges facing
    Justice and its major components. The section that follows provides a more
    detailed discussion of these challenges.

    Figure 1: Summary of the Performance and Accountability Challenges Facing
    Justice and Its Components

    Department of Justice major components facing challenges

    Performance and accountability challenges

    INS OJP

    DEA FBI

    USMS

    Improve the enforcement of immigration laws and provision of immigration and
    naturalization services.

    Better manage programs designed to support state and local efforts to reduce
    crime.

    Develop measurable performance targets to help DEA determine its progress in
    reducing the availability of illegal drugs.

    Achieve excellence in financial management, including, but not limited to, a
    Department- wide unqualified opinion for fiscal year 2000 and beyond.

    Improve management and accountability of Justice's asset forfeiture program.

    Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges

    The Department of Justice faces performance and accountability challenges in
    a number of areas. These challenges include enforcing the nation's
    immigration laws; developing and maintaining accurate, useful financial and
    program information; managing programs

    designed to support state and local efforts to reduce crime; measuring the
    effect of Justice's efforts to reduce the supply of illegal drugs; and
    managing assets seized during drug enforcement operations. Addressing each
    of these challenges requires sustained managerial attention

    and commitment. Improve the

    INS is faced with the formidable task of deterring, Enforcement of
    apprehending, and removing persons who violate Immigration Laws immigration
    laws. At the same time, INS is charged with and Provision of providing an
    array of services and benefits to those who Immigration and

    legally enter and reside in the United States, such as Naturalization
    providing employment authorization and processing Services naturalization
    applications. Over the past several years, Congress has repeatedly expressed
    concern about INS' ability to carry out its functions and, accordingly,
    significantly increased the agency's resources. INS' fiscal year 2000 budget
    of $4. 3 billion represented an increase of about 187 percent over its
    fiscal year 1993 budget. INS' workforce also increased by about 83 percent,
    from 18, 000 to nearly 33, 000 employees during

    the same period. Despite the significant increase in resources, INS
    continues to face challenges in achieving its intended results. Those
    challenges are related to INS' organizational structure and program
    implementation efforts, such as controlling the border, reducing alien
    smuggling and unauthorized alien employment, and

    addressing aliens' failure to appear for removal hearings. In addition, INS
    continues to have problems successfully developing and fielding the
    information technology that is critical to its operations.

    INS' Organizational Proposals to restructure INS have been issued as a

    Structure Remains result of several critics' conclusion that “mission
    Undecided

    overload” has impeded INS from succeeding at either of its primary
    functions. For example, in 1997, the bipartisan Commission on Immigration
    Reform stated that INS' service and enforcement functions were incompatible
    and that tasking one agency with carrying out both functions caused
    problems, such as competition for resources, lack of coordination and
    cooperation, and personnel practices that created confusion regarding
    mission and responsibilities. In 1998, the administration acknowledged the
    need for fundamental reform and concluded that organization problems impeded
    INS' ability to carry out its dual missions. In 1999, the INS Commissioner
    stated that mission conflict at the local operational level impeded
    accountability and that the bureaucratic chain of command hampered
    efficiency. She further acknowledged that INS did not uniformly provide
    consistent, courteous, and timely services to aliens who sought INS
    benefits.

    To remedy these problems, the Commission on Immigration Reform, the Carnegie
    Endowment for International Peace, INS, and several Members of Congress have
    recommended ways to restructure INS. The reorganization proposals have
    ranged from dismantling INS and replacing it with a new agency that

    would handle immigration enforcement functions, while moving immigration
    service functions to the Departments of State and Labor, to restructuring
    INS internally by creating two separate chains of command- one for
    enforcement and the other for services- and leaving it as a single agency
    within the Department of Justice. As of October 2000, the details of a new
    structure for carrying out the nation's immigration

    laws had not been decided. The ability of the reorganization to resolve INS'
    long- standing

    management and program implementation challenges remains unclear. INS
    Implementing

    INS' Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and Southwest Border
    deterring aliens from illegally entering the United States Strategy, But
    between ports of entry. The Border Patrol is currently in Effectiveness

    the second phase of a four- phase strategy to reduce and Unknown deter
    illegal entry along the southwest border. The strategy calls for first
    increasing Border Patrol agents and resources in San Diego and El Paso and
    then increasing them in Arizona and south Texas. INS

    allocated nearly 75 percent of its new agent positions to Arizona and Texas
    in fiscal year 1998. Although INS generally allocated newly hired Border
    Patrol agents in accordance with its strategy, INS was not able to meet its
    goal of increasing its onboard strength of Border Patrol agents by at least
    1,000 in fiscal year 1999, as was congressionally mandated. 1 Specifically,
    figure 2 shows that while INS exceeded its goal in fiscal years 1997 and
    1998, it saw an increase of only 369 agents in fiscal year 1999 due to
    recruitment and retention problems.

    1 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
    (P. L. 104- 208), among other things, directed the Attorney General to
    increase the number of Border Patrol agents onboard by not less than 1,000
    in each fiscal year, from 1997 through 2001.

    Figure 2: Results of INS' Efforts to Increase Border Patrol Onboard
    Strength, Fiscal Years 1997 Through 1999

    1200 Net gain/ loss of agents

    1002 1035

    1000 800 600 400

    369

    200 0

    1997 1998 1999

    INS' goal to increase its onboard strength of Border Patrol agents by not
    less than 1,000 in each fiscal year.

    Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

    INS made progress in implementing its southwest border strategy, such as
    building new fencing in California and Arizona, increasing the amount of
    time Border Patrol agents spent on border enforcement, and deploying
    additional technologies such as remote video

    surveillance cameras. In fiscal year 1999, INS was testing a model to help
    it determine the right mix of staffing, equipment, and technology for its
    Border Patrol

    sectors. In two reports issued in 1997 and 1999, we noted that data on the
    interim effects of the Attorney General's strategy were limited, although
    some of the changes

    anticipated by the strategy were occurring. For example, illegal alien
    apprehensions declined in such traditional routes of entry as San Diego and
    El Paso but increased elsewhere. An unintended consequence of the strategy
    was that deaths, resulting from attempted crossings in remote areas,
    appeared to increase. INS lacks performance information to determine the
    overall impact of its strategy to reduce the illegal alien flow across the
    border, reduce flow to the border, and reduce the number of illegal aliens
    who reside in the United States. Although INS contracted with private
    research firms to conduct several geographically specific studies along the
    southwest border, its actions

    did not meet the intent of our recommendation that INS conduct a systematic,
    comprehensive evaluation of its southwest border strategy. We believe that
    such an evaluation could have helped INS determine whether, and to what
    extent, its investment of billions of dollars

    in implementing the strategy produced the intended results. The challenge
    for INS remains in determining how it will know, in an overall sense,
    whether the strategy has successfully met its objectives. Shortcomings in
    This country's ability to combat the significant and Programs to Control

    growing problem of alien smuggling is hampered by Alien Smuggling management
    and operational problems at INS, such as fragmented and uncoordinated
    investigative efforts and

    lack of staff to perform intelligence functions. For example, INS does not
    have procedures in place to coordinate its resources for initiating and
    managing antismuggling cases. In several border areas, multiple
    antismuggling units exist that operate autonomously, overlap in
    jurisdiction, and report to different INS officials. In addition, INS field
    officials lack clear criteria on which cases to investigate, resulting in
    inconsistent decision- making across locations. In addition, INS lacks an
    agencywide automated case tracking and management system to help it (1)
    monitor ongoing

    investigations, (2) determine if multiple antismuggling units may be
    investigating the same target individual or organization, or (3) know if
    previous investigations had been conducted on a particular target. Further,
    INS' antismuggling intelligence efforts have been hampered by an inefficient
    and cumbersome process for retrieving and analyzing intelligence information
    and by a lack of clear guidance to INS staff about how to gather, analyze,

    and disseminate intelligence information. We reported that limited
    performance measurement has hampered INS' ability to evaluate the
    effectiveness of its antismuggling program. INS' fiscal year 1999
    performance goals focused mainly on the number of smugglers presented for
    prosecution to the U. S.

    Attorneys and the number of designated priority cases. Such indicators
    measure program outputs, but they do not provide information to measure the
    extent to which INS' antismuggling efforts have helped achieve the
    strategy's objective of deterring and disrupting alien smuggling. INS has
    not specified how other expected results from the strategy, such as a shift
    in smuggling activity between geographic areas along the border, will

    be measured. We noted that while we recognize the difficulty in directly
    measuring outcomes such as deterrence and disruption of antismuggling, we
    believe that there are a variety of measures available- including

    information on smuggling fees, usage and tactics, and shifts in the flow of
    smuggled alien traffic- that could be used to collect systematic data and
    develop a composite picture of progress toward achieving the

    strategy's objectives. We also reported that the above impediments have made
    it difficult, if not impossible, for INS to meet the challenges posed by
    increasingly sophisticated major smuggling organizations. To address these
    concerns, we recommended that INS (1) establish criteria for opening an
    antismuggling case to help ensure that its antismuggling resources are
    focused on the highest

    priority cases; (2) establish a cost- effective case tracking and management
    system of alien smuggling investigations that is automated, agencywide, and
    readily available to investigative personnel and program managers to
    facilitate the sharing of case information and prevent duplication of
    effort; (3) establish performance measures for the antismuggling efforts and
    intelligence program with which to gauge program

    effects; and (4) require that intelligence reports be prepared using a
    database format so that the information can be systematically analyzed. In
    making these recommendations, we noted that without such improvements, INS'
    ability to disrupt and deter increasingly sophisticated and organized alien
    smugglers and dismantle their organizations would continue to be hampered.

    Efforts to Reduce Although Congress enacted legislation in 1986 that
    Unauthorized created an employment verification process and

    Employment Face prohibited employers from hiring unauthorized aliens,

    Impediments significant numbers of unauthorized aliens are still

    obtaining employment. The effectiveness of the verification process has been
    undermined by aliens' use of fraudulent documents. In addition, employers
    face little chance of being investigated by INS, in part because resources
    for worksite enforcement have been relatively small. Figure 3 shows that in
    fiscal year 1998,

    INS devoted about 2 percent (slightly over 300 workyears) of its enforcement
    workyears to worksite enforcement.

    Figure 3: INS Enforcement Program Workyears as a Percentage of Total
    Enforcement Program Workyears for Fiscal Year 1998

    2% Worksite investigations a 1% Intelligence

    26% 44%

    Border Patrol 16%

    11% Other investigations b Detention and deportation Inspections N = 18,824

    Note: For the major INS enforcement programs, fiscal year 1998 workyears are
    budget amounts. Actual workyear data for these programs were not available
    at the time of our review. a Includes actual time spent by INS agents and
    support staff on

    investigations that target employers who are suspected of hiring
    unauthorized workers. b Includes all other investigations (other than
    employers), such as

    criminal aliens, drug trafficking, fraud, smuggling, and immigration status
    violations.

    Source: GAO analysis of INS data.

    With these limited worksite enforcement resources, INS conducted about 6,500
    investigations of employers, which equated to about 3 percent of the
    country's estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens.

    Even among employers who were investigated, INS was not likely to find that
    they knowingly violated the law, collect fines from them, or seek to bring
    charges against

    them. When INS identified and arrested unauthorized workers, it could not
    determine whether employers replaced them with authorized workers, nor
    whether the unauthorized workers were placed into deportation hearings and
    removed from the country. In 1999, INS was taking several steps to improve
    the employment verification process and make it less

    susceptible to fraud. For example, INS was testing several programs to make
    it possible for employers to electronically verify an employee's eligibility
    to work. However, INS was having difficulty getting employers to enroll in
    its pilot programs. INS was also taking steps to increase the integrity of
    the documents it issues to aliens in order to reduce fraudulent document
    use.

    In addition, INS issued an interior enforcement strategy that called for INS
    to pursue the criminal investigation of employers who are flagrant or grave
    violators. However, the strategy left unclear what was meant by a flagrant
    or grave violation, what criteria would be used for opening investigations
    of employers suspected of criminal activities, and how INS would measure the
    effectiveness of its strategy. We recommended that, in implementing the
    interior enforcement strategy, INS needed to clarify the criteria for
    opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal activities. We
    believe that having clear criteria is important if INS is to effectively
    focus its limited staff to achieve its enforcement goals and intended
    results. Released Aliens Not

    By statute, INS is to detain aliens who attempt to enter Appearing for the
    United States by engaging in fraud or Removal Hearings misrepresentation and
    those who arrive with fraudulent, improper, or no documents. INS favors
    releasing such aliens from detention if an asylum officer determines

    that they have a credible fear of persecution or torture and do not pose a
    risk of flight or danger to the community. For fiscal year 1999, INS
    reported releasing from detention 78 percent of those aliens found to have a
    credible fear of persecution or torture. Between April 1, 1997, and
    September 30, 1999, there were 2, 351 aliens who received an immigration
    judge's decision (immigrants whose claims are denied by an asylum officers
    may appeal that determination to an immigration judge). Of the 2,351 aliens,
    1,000 (or 43 percent) of them had not appeared for their removal hearings.
    At the time of our review, INS had various

    efforts under way to analyze issues associated with the low appearance rate.
    In addition, we recommended that INS analyze the characteristics of those
    aliens who appeared and those who did not appear for their removal hearing
    and use the results to reevaluate its

    policy for when to release aliens in cases when an asylum officer determined
    the aliens to have a credible fear of persecution or torture. Key Contact
    Richard M. Stana, Director

    Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov INS'
    Information Each year INS invests hundreds of millions of dollars on

    Technology information technology (IT) systems and activities. In Management
    fiscal year 2000, INS obligated about $327 million on IT Weaknesses

    activities and it plans to spend about $226 million in fiscal year 2001.
    However, INS continues to have problems effectively managing its IT
    resources that are critical to its operations. Justice's Office of Inspector
    General (OIG) has reported that (1) estimated completion dates for some IT
    projects had been delayed without explanation, (2) project costs continued
    to spiral upward with no

    justification for how funds were spent, and (3) projects were nearing
    completion with no assurance that they would meet performance and functional
    requirements. In August 2000, we reported that INS lacked (1) an enterprise
    architecture- or agencywide blueprint- to manage its IT efforts effectively
    and efficiently and (2) the fundamental management structures and processes
    needed to effectively develop one. The lack of such an architecture has
    hindered INS' ability to ensure that the hundreds of millions of dollars it
    spends each year on IT will optimally support its mission needs. In December
    2000, we reported that INS lacked defined and disciplined processes to
    select, control, and evaluate its

    IT investments. Consequently, INS is hampered in its ability to know whether
    it is making the right investment decisions, whether it has selected the mix
    of investments that best meet its overall mission and business priorities,
    or whether it is adequately managing the risks associated with these
    investments.

    To address these serious weaknesses, we have made a series of
    recommendations to introduce effective IT management practices at INS, such
    as (1) developing a

    complete enterprise architecture, and (2) developing and implementing
    effective IT investment management processes. INS has begun taking action to
    address these recommendations. However, until they are corrected, we also
    recommended that INS limit requests for future IT appropriations to efforts
    that (1) support ongoing operations and maintenance of existing systems, (2)
    are small and represent low technical risk and can be delivered in a short
    period of time, (3) are congressionally mandated, or (4) support efforts to
    develop an enterprise architecture and implement IT investment management
    processes. We plan to monitor

    INS' actions to implement our recommendations. Key Contact Randolph C. Hite,
    Director

    Information Technology Systems Issues

    (202) 512- 6204 hiter@ gao. gov Better Manage

    Providing leadership and support to state and local Programs Designed
    efforts is one of Justice's key roles in further developing to Support State

    the nation's capacity to prevent and control crime. As and Local Efforts to

    part of this role, Justice attempts to support innovative, Reduce Crime
    community- based programs aimed at reducing crime and violence in U. S.
    communities through (1) encouraging community- based approaches to crime and

    justice at the state and local level by comprehensive and collaborative
    programs, such as Weed and Seed and (2) supporting community- policing
    initiatives, such as providing funding to hire and deploy police officers.
    Weed and Seed and Police Corps are two programs currently funded by the
    Department of Justice to support state and local efforts to reduce crime.
    Our reviews of both programs have shown that, while Justice

    has made some progress toward addressing administrative and management
    weaknesses, challenges remain related to developing better performance
    measures at Weed and Seed and increasing states' participation in the Police
    Corps program.

    Progress Made, but The Weed and Seed program is Justice's flagship effort
    Program

    in community- based efforts to prevent and control Management violent crime
    and provide a safe environment in which Weaknesses Still community residents
    can live, work, and raise their Remain in Weed and

    families. Weed and Seed's objective is to help “weed out” Seed
    Program crime from targeted neighborhoods, then “seed” the site
    with a variety of programs and resources to prevent a resurgence of crime.
    In 1999, we reported that Justice's

    Executive Office for Weed and Seed (EOWS), which is responsible for the
    national management and administration of the program, lacked an adequate
    internal control to require that significant decisions related to funding
    allocations be documented. Without this control, EOWS could not ensure that
    it was making

    the best allocation of available funds when it made important program
    decisions, such as qualifying new and existing sites for funding. In
    addition, EOWS had not always ensured, through its grant monitoring process,
    that site progress reports- a grant requirement- were submitted or that
    grant monitors documented their site visits. We recommended that EOWS
    develop an adequate internal control to ensure that the basis and rationale
    for new and existing site qualification for funding decisions were always
    fully documented. We also recommended that EOWS improve program

    monitoring to ensure that sites met the grant requirement of submitting
    reports and that site visits were documented.

    Since then, EOWS has made progress in implementing our recommendations. EOWS
    issued a policy and procedures manual that included criteria and basic
    requirements for site qualification for funding eligibility, and Justice
    indicated that written internal control

    procedures for making and documenting site selection decisions were being
    refined. In addition, EOWS reported that all site monitoring visits were
    being documented. EOWS also reported that new approaches will be explored to
    ensure that grantees submit program progress reports in a timely manner,
    such as restricting funding access to grantees that continually fail to
    submit progress reports in a timely manner. Further, EOWS emphasized the
    importance of filing timely progress

    reports at its regional training conferences for grantees. According to EOWS
    officials, the timeliness of submitted progress reports has improved. Our
    work in 1999 also showed that EOWS lacked criteria to determine when sites
    became self- sustaining and when to reduce or withdraw Weed and Seed funds,
    even though the objective of sites' becoming self- sustaining was a central
    program goal. We recommended that EOWS develop criteria for determining when
    to reduce or withdraw program funding from self- sustaining sites.

    Subsequently, EOWS announced a policy to redeploy Weed and Seed grant funds
    to include a different neighborhood after 5 years of funding. Finally, our
    work showed that although current performance measures addressed a variety
    of activities taking place at Weed and Seed sites, those measures were
    generally not adequate to judge program success. While EOWS had made some
    changes in the way it measured program effectiveness, those indicators still

    generally tracked activities, not program outcomes. We recognize the
    difficulty involved in precisely measuring the results of this type of
    community- based program or strategy. However, we recommended that EOWS
    develop additional performance measures to track program outcomes, noting
    that the indicators would help EOWS make more informed program decisions,
    such as whether to continue existing funding. In response, EOWS officials
    recognized the need to expand

    efforts to measure performance, including quality of life factors and other
    program measures. These officials informed us that they sought
    appropriations for fiscal year 2001 to expand evaluation and performance

    measurement efforts to include the use of sociodemographic indicators, but
    that the additional funds requested for fiscal year 2001 had not been
    approved by Congress as of November 2000. Police Corps

    The Police Corps program and the Federal Office of the Program Had a

    Police Corps and Law Enforcement Education (Office of Slower Than the Police
    Corps) were established by the Violent Crime Expected Start, Due Control and
    Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The overall to Funding and goal of the Police
    Corps program is to address violent Staffing Limitations crime by helping
    state and local law enforcement agencies increase the number of officers
    with advanced

    education and training assigned to community patrol. Specifically, the
    program provides competitive scholarships to college students who agree to
    earn a Bachelor's Degree and subsequently serve as police

    officers on community patrol for at least four years in an area with great
    need for additional law enforcement officers and where they will be used
    most effectively. The program also provides financial assistance to law
    enforcement agencies that hire program participants.

    The Office of the Police Corps provides the funds to participating states,
    who in turn provide the funds to individual program participants, colleges,
    approved law enforcement training providers, and law enforcement agencies.
    In February 2000, we reported that under the Community Oriented Policing
    Services (COPS), the Police Corps program started out slower than expected
    and, as a result, the majority of participant slots

    remained unfilled. According to federal and state officials, one factor
    contributing to this slow start was that the Police Corps statute did not
    provide funding to pay states' costs for program administration or for

    recruitment and selection of program participants. Several states cited this
    as a reason for not participating in the program, and several others cited
    it as a reason for the slow growth of their Police Corps programs. In
    addition, we noted that COPS' operation of the Police Corps as a direct
    reimbursement program made determining program status difficult, as it
    slowed the

    rate at which funds were obligated. 2 We also reported that according to
    federal and state officials, one factor contributing to the delay was that
    COPS dedicated insufficient staff to the program. This understaffing led to
    delays in providing program

    2 Under COPS, the Police Corps program paid scholarship money directly to
    the educational institution and payments directly to law enforcement
    agencies. In addition, it provided reimbursement for (1) the prior
    educational expenses incurred by students who did not enter the Police Corps
    program until their sophomore year in college or later and (2) the costs
    incurred by approved law enforcement training providers.

    guidance, processing program applications and payments, and answering
    participants' questions about the program.

    In December 1998, the Police Corps program was transferred from COPS to OJP.
    We reported that OJP had made significant progress in obligating funds and
    establishing interagency agreements with the participating states and
    providing program guidance. However, at the time of our review, it was too
    soon to

    tell whether OJP would succeed in filling empty participant slots in a
    timely manner. Key Contact Richard M. Stana, Director

    Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov Develop The
    supply and use of illegal drugs remains a major

    Measurable national problem that is estimated to cost our society
    Performance

    upwards of $100 billion annually. The Office of National Targets to Help
    Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which has responsibility DEA Determine Its for
    setting federal priorities for drug control and

    Progress in implementing a National Drug Control Strategy, has

    Reducing the three strategic goals for reducing the supply of illegal
    Availability of

    drugs to our nation. Consistent with this strategy, one of Justice's
    strategic objectives is to reduce the threat and Illegal Drugs trafficking
    of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling drug
    trafficking organizations that are international, multijurisdictional, or
    have an identified local impact.

    Although several Justice components share the responsibility for achieving
    this objective, DEA has the lead responsibility for enforcing federal drug
    laws and for coordinating and pursuing U. S. drug investigations in foreign
    countries. Accordingly, DEA has a strategic goal

    of identifying, targeting, investigating, disrupting, and dismantling the
    international, national, state, and local drug trafficking organizations
    that are having the most significant impact on our nation. To achieve this
    goal and other goals, DEA's funding significantly increased over the past
    few years. For example, DEA's total fiscal year 2000 budget exceeded $1. 5
    billion, an increase of about 69 percent (in nominal terms) since fiscal
    year 1993. DEA also increased its staff from about 7, 100 to nearly 8,600
    (about 20 percent) over the same period. Difficulties in The seriousness of
    the nation's drug problem and the

    Measuring Progress growing resources devoted to the “drug war”
    highlight in Reducing the

    the importance of Justice's and DEA's strategic planning Availability of
    Illegal and performance measurement. Effective planning and Drugs

    performance measurement can assist Justice in achieving its goal of (1)
    reducing the nation's illegal drug supply and related crime and violence by
    disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking organizations and (2) ensuring
    that Justice and DEA are achieving this goal in an efficient and effective
    manner, as mandated by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
    (GPRA). Despite progress that DEA made in developing strategic goals and
    objectives and in enhancing its programs and initiatives, which are
    consistent with the National Drug Control Strategy, limitations in DEA's
    performance measures make it difficult to determine its progress in reducing
    the availability of illegal drugs.

    In 1999, we reported DEA's process for determining staffing needs and
    allocating staff within DEA was consistent with applicable federal laws,
    regulations, and OMB procedures and took into consideration congressional
    guidance on staff allocations. We also reported that DEA's strategic and
    annual performance plans, strategic goals and objectives, and enhanced
    programs and initiatives in the 1990s were consistent with ONDCP's National
    Drug Control Strategy, the blueprint for overall federal drug control
    efforts. The

    DEA and ONDCP strategies sought to reduce the illegal drug supply and drug-
    related violence by disrupting and dismantling domestic and international
    drug trafficking organizations. However, DEA's performance measures focused
    generally on outputs such as the amount of drugs seized and did not
    operationally define outcome goals such as “disrupt” and
    “dismantle” major drug trafficking organizations. Thus, it was
    difficult to assess

    DEA's success in achieving its strategic goals and objectives and the effect
    of its programs and initiatives in reducing the illegal drug supply.

    While we recognize that measuring success in reducing the availability of
    illegal drugs is difficult, we and others identified inconsistencies and
    limitations in Justice's

    and DEA's efforts to establish goals and measure performance relative to its
    drug enforcement activities. For example, Justice's OIG reported in March
    2000 that Justice's fiscal year 2000 Summary Performance Plan 3 generally
    met the requirements of GPRA and the Office

    of Management and Budget (OMB). However, some aspects of the plan, including
    those dealing with drug enforcement, needed improvements to fully meet the
    requirements. Among other things, the OIG found that (1) a discussion on
    strategies covering all performance goals was lacking, (2) some performance
    goals and indicators were not measurable, and (3) information on external
    data sources that could be used to measure performance was missing. Justice
    generally concurred with the OIG's recommendations for making future summary
    performance plans compliant with GPRA and OMB requirements.

    One of Justice's key performance outcomes is “Reduced Availability
    and/ or Use of Illegal Drugs.” In June 2000, 3 Audit Report:
    Government Performance and Results Act- Department of Justice FY 2000
    Summary Performance Plan (OIG- 00- 11, Mar. 2000); Office of Inspector
    General, Department of Justice.

    we reported that Justice's fiscal year 1999 Performance Report and fiscal
    year 2001 Performance Plan included key measures for this outcome that
    focused on outputs, such as increased amounts of drugs seized. This

    measure can reflect either (1) improved success in reducing drug
    availability or (2) an increase in the amount of drugs that are available
    for seizure. Further, targets were not set for most of the measures- a
    recurring theme from our 1999 report on DEA's strategies and operations. We
    recommended that the Attorney General direct the DEA administrator to work
    closely with Justice and ONDCP to develop measurable DEA performance targets
    for disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organizations consistent
    with the performance targets in the National Drug Control Strategy. In
    response to our recommendation, DEA (1) developed a new strategic plan,
    which was approved in May 2000; (2) participated with a Department of
    Justice work group in defining the terms “disrupt” and
    “dismantle”;

    and (3) formed an internal GPRA Work Committee to assess and develop a
    feasible management approach to identify and establish quantifiable
    performance targets. Once they have been developed and approved, the
    performance targets are to be reflected in DEA's future annual performance
    plans and used to hold managers accountable.

    In its November 1999 report 4 on DEA's National Drug Pointer Index System
    (NDPIX), 5 Justice's OIG found that the system was adequately planned and
    developed, did not duplicate existing systems, and could be a useful tool
    for improving interagency communication. However, the report also indicated
    that DEA could improve management controls over NDPIX by enhancing its
    performance measures to include

    measures related to the index system's goals, such as the number of
    cooperative investigations resulting from positive “hits.” DEA
    agreed with the OIG's related recommendation.

    Key Contact Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Tax Administration and Justice
    (202) 512- 8777 ekstrandl@ gao. gov 4 Audit Report: The Drug Enforcement
    Administration's National Drug Pointer Index System (OIG- 00- 03, Nov.
    1999); Office of Inspector

    General, Department of Justice. 5 NDPIX is a computerized pointer system
    designed to provide information about ongoing drug investigations to
    participating federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies nationwide.
    Its purpose is to (1) promote information sharing; (2) facilitate drug-
    related investigations; (3) prevent duplicate investigations; (4) increase

    coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and
    (5) enhance the personal safety of law enforcement officers.

    Achieve Excellence Justice has made significant progress toward achieving

    in Financial an unqualified opinion on its departmentwide financial

    Management, statements, which has been one of the Attorney

    Including, But Not General's foremost priorities. Specifically, Justice
    Limited to, a

    improved from receiving a disclaimer of opinion on its Departmentwide

    fiscal year 1998 departmentwide financial statements to Unqualified
    receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1999

    Opinion for Fiscal departmentwide financial statements. While obtaining an
    unqualified opinion on annual financial statements is Year 2000 and

    an important objective, it is not an end in and of itself. Beyond The key is
    to take steps to continuously improve internal control and underlying
    financial and management information systems as a means to ensure
    accountability, increase the economy, improve the efficiency, and enhance
    the effectiveness of government. These systems must generate timely,
    accurate, and useful information on an ongoing basis, not just as of the end
    of the year. To achieve excellence in financial management, it is critical
    that Justice fully addresses

    significant internal control weaknesses identified at its 10 reporting
    components. 6 Until its components correct the underlying causes of these
    weaknesses, Justice,

    regardless of the type of opinion received, continues to be at risk that
    information generated by the financial systems throughout the year is
    inaccurate and errors, fraud, or noncompliance could occur and not be
    promptly detected. A sustained commitment of Justice's

    management will be needed to fully address these challenges. 6 For financial
    statement reporting purposes, Justice's reporting entity is comprised of 10
    components, which are (1) Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit
    Fund; (2) Working Capital Fund; (3) Offices, Boards, and Divisions; (4)
    USMS; (5) OJP; (6) DEA; (7) FBI; (8) INS;

    (9) Bureau of Prisons; and (10) Federal Prison Industries, Inc.

    Significant Internal For fiscal year 1999, Justice's auditors summarized 14
    Control Weaknesses

    material weaknesses 7 and 28 reportable conditions 8 , Exist

    which were reported at the component level, into three departmentwide
    material weaknesses in internal controls-( 1) ineffective component
    financial management systems and computer controls at the Department's data
    centers; (2) lack of policies and procedures for recording financial
    transactions in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
    and (3) ineffective financial statement

    preparation processes. Further, the auditors for five of Justice's
    components reported that certain internal control weaknesses identified at
    these components were significant departures from the federal system
    requirements of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
    (FFMIA). In addition to contributing to these departmentwide deficiencies,
    two

    of Justice's key components, INS and DEA, had additional internal control
    weaknesses. Internal Control Issues Auditors for 9 of the 10 components
    reported Reported by

    weaknesses in financial management systems and Component Auditors

    related computer controls over such systems that increase the risk of
    software programs and data processed on these systems not being adequately
    protected from unauthorized access. For components that had not implemented
    new financial management systems, these weaknesses represented long-
    standing 7 A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
    operation of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce,
    to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or irregularities, in
    amounts that would be material to the financial statements, may occur and
    not

    be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of performing their
    duties. 8 Reportable conditions are matters coming to the attention of the
    auditors that, in their judgment, should be communicated to management
    because they represent significant deficiencies in the design or operation
    of internal control that could adversely affect the organization's ability
    to meet the objectives of reliable financial reporting and compliance with
    applicable laws and regulations.

    challenges that had not been adequately addressed by management. The
    auditors reported that other weaknesses noted may have been the result of
    insufficient management attention to general controls during the
    implementation phase of new systems. In addition to computer control
    weaknesses reported at the component level, the auditors also reported that
    the

    Justice's data centers did not have formalized control procedures for
    changes in application software or a comprehensive plan to recover primary
    systems, exposing the agency to a potential disruption of operations.
    Further, departmentwide computer- security

    policies and procedures were outdated and did not adequately address
    security responsibilities or define authority. The auditors reported that 8
    of the 10 components did not have policies or procedures in place or were
    not always following them to ensure that financial transactions were
    recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
    Auditors for 6 of the 10 components reported weaknesses over the financial
    statement preparation process. Because of the weaknesses identified by the
    auditors- insufficient resources, technical and clerical errors, and lack of
    supervisory review and management support- many of the components missed
    Justice's

    deadlines for submitting financial statements or submitted financial
    statements that resulted in Justice having to adjust the departmentwide
    financial statements. Financial Management As reported in our January 1999
    report on management Weaknesses at INS challenges at Justice, INS' auditors
    identified numerous Continue to Exist material weaknesses in internal
    controls, which INS continues to experience. INS received a qualified
    opinion on its fiscal year 1999 financial statements,

    because, according to its auditor, INS had not

    maintained appropriate accounting records and relevant documentation to
    support the deferred revenue and intragovernmental accounts payable balances
    in the financial statements. These problems also resulted in a qualified
    opinion on Justice's departmentwide financial statements. The auditor also
    identified material internal control weaknesses related to (1) computer
    security controls, (2) the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation
    process, (3) intragovernmental accounts payable, and (4) systems and
    procedures to support deferred revenue.

    Recently, Justice's OIG reported serious control weaknesses in INS' fee
    collection program at land ports of entry. Specifically, the OIG found that
    cashiers could easily steal cash before it is recorded in the cash register
    and conceal the loss by either failing to ring up the transaction or voiding
    the transaction after it had been rung up. Further, port of entry managers
    could not account for many of the cash register tapes

    documenting thousands of transactions, and certain staff were not held
    accountable for cash shortages. In addition, we reported that INS service
    centers, which processed approximately 75 percent of the immigration
    applications received by INS, generally did not deposit the related fees
    collected within Treasury's required time frames, resulting in at least
    $640,000 in interest cost to the government. We also found that INS lacked
    the data necessary to determine how long district offices,

    which processed the remaining 25 percent of the applications, took to
    deposit the related fees. As reported in our January 1999 report on
    management challenges at Justice, INS financial management systems (1) were
    not integrated, resulting in significant delays and burdensome
    reconciliation efforts; (2) had significant internal control weaknesses,
    affecting the accuracy and reliability of financial information; and (3)
    limited, rather than enhanced, effective decisionmaking. According to INS,
    it urgently needed to replace

    its financial management system, which was over 20 years old and did not
    have the functionality INS needed to efficiently manage and account for its
    resources. In 1997, INS selected its new Federal Financial Management System
    but continues to experience delays in implementing this new system. Instead
    of analyzing

    its financial management processes and developing and implementing a risk-
    management plan, as we recommended, INS tasked its contractor with helping
    to ensure that risks associated with implementing the new

    system would be identified and necessary steps taken to mitigate them. Since
    the new system had not yet been implemented, INS had to rely on the old
    system to prepare its fiscal year 1999 financial statements.

    In addition to reassessing the implementation of its new financial
    management system, other actions INS is either taking or has taken to
    address its financial

    management weaknesses are reorganizing its finance functions and continuing
    to reconcile fund balance with Treasury differences. However, according to
    INS' auditors, INS has become heavily dependent on contractor resources to
    support its growing financial

    management needs due to lack of staff resources in INS' accounting office in
    headquarters. The auditors reported that without sufficient regular
    staffing, INS may not be able to ensure the continuity of finance personnel
    to operate effectively or have sufficient resources to ensure adequate
    oversight over the expanding

    contractor base. Reported Internal Although DEA obtained an unqualified
    opinion on its Control Weaknesses fiscal year 1999 financial statements, the
    number of Increase at DEA

    reported internal control weaknesses at DEA increased from fiscal year 1998
    to fiscal year 1999. These material weaknesses related to (1) information
    systems controls, (2) the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation process,
    (3) the lack of a system to accurately and completely account for property
    and equipment, and (4)

    DEA's weak financial reporting process. Other weaknesses included not fully
    following generally accepted accounting principles and deficiencies in DEA's
    ability to prepare accurate and timely financial

    statements. In September 1998, we reported that several DEA employees had
    been involved in two different cases of embezzling DEA funds. One case
    involved a single employee who allegedly embezzled more than $6 million

    during a 6- year period. The employee allegedly submitted hundreds of false
    payment vouchers, seeking reimbursement for services never performed by a
    sham corporation he established. The second case involved collusion among
    three DEA employees who used DEA funds to purchase various electronic and
    other equipment- valued at approximately $2. 7 million- that was diverted
    for their own use. DEA's auditors have not reported any subsequent
    embezzlements. However, the ineffective internal controls over property and
    fund balance with Treasury reconciliations reported by the auditors increase
    the risk that assets were not properly safeguarded from loss or unauthorized
    use. Actions DEA is either taking or has taken to address its financial
    management weaknesses are continuing to reconcile fund balance with Treasury
    differences and

    correcting computer security control deficiencies. However, according to
    DEA's auditor, DEA has also become dependent on contractor resources to
    support its financial management needs, including routine accounting
    functions. The DEA auditor reported that,

    without sufficient regular staffing, DEA may not be able to ensure the
    continuity of properly trained finance personnel to operate effectively. Key
    Contact Gary T. Engel, Director

    Financial Management and Assurance

    (202) 512- 3406 engelg@ gao. gov Improve The Departments of Justice and
    Treasury operate

    Management and similar but separate asset forfeiture programs. 9 As of
    Accountability Over

    September 30, 1999, the combined value of assets in Justice's Asset these
    two programs was more than $1 billion, of which Forfeiture Program about
    $378 million were assets under Justice's management. Both programs also hold
    large amounts of nonvalued property such as drugs and weapons. These

    programs have been designated as high- risk since our high risk program was
    initiated in 1990 because (1) over the years, neither Justice nor Treasury
    adequately focused on managing and accounting for seized and

    forfeited items and (2) Justice and Treasury had not formed a plan to
    consolidate postseizure administration of certain properties to eliminate
    duplication of resources and reduce administrative costs. Since 1990,

    we and others have reported on the program's continuing inadequate
    information systems and financial management weaknesses, including
    accountability over certain seized property.

    In recent years, Justice has taken many actions to improve the management
    and disposition of seized and forfeited property. For example, in 1999, we
    reported that Justice had improved its management of real property, such as
    cars, boats, and houses, in the four locations we visited. Specifically, our
    report indicated that we were able to account for all of the seized assets
    included in our review at those four locations. We also found that the
    seized assets generally appeared to be in 9 The asset forfeiture program
    involves the management of property

    seized in consequence of a violation of public law, including monetary
    instruments, real property, and tangible personal property of others in the
    actual or constructive possession of the custodial agency and forfeited
    property or property for which the title has passed to the U. S. Government.

    good condition and were stored and secured properly, in accordance with
    physical security and property management provisions in storage and
    maintenance contracts. In addition, Treasury and Justice are undertaking a
    joint study to examine opportunities for increased cooperation in the
    management of the two programs. However, challenges remain to address the
    programs' inadequate information systems and financial management
    weaknesses, including accountability over seized assets. Further, the
    results of the joint study have yet to be determined.

    Improved In September 1998, Justice's OIG reported weaknesses

    Management and in the management of seized drugs at most of the INS
    Accountability

    Border Patrol stations it visited. In response to Needed recommendations
    contained in that report, the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections
    reported that INS now

    has written policies or procedures on handling and storing seized drugs,
    adhering to proper chain- ofcustody procedures, and specifying an individual
    responsible for evidence. To address the reported failure to store seized
    drugs securely, INS plans to inspect its

    drug storage facilities, report on deficiencies noted, and develop a
    schedule of short- and long- term facility improvements.

    In late 1999, we recommended that DEA and FBI take several specific actions
    to address physical safeguards over drugs and firearm evidence and to
    strengthen accountability over such evidence. The types of problems
    reported- such as missing chain- of- custody documentation, inaccurate
    recordkeeping of drug and weapon evidence, and improper accounting for drug
    weights- increase the risk of theft, misuse, and loss or compromise of
    evidence needed for prosecution

    purposes. As a result of this work, DEA and FBI are taking actions to
    address identified deficiencies related to accountability controls over
    seized property. For example, DEA and FBI policies are currently being

    modified to address issues of documenting the weight of drug evidence to
    improve accountability. In February 2000, independent auditors for Justice
    reported weaknesses in Justice's financial accounting controls used to
    report on and account for seized and forfeited property. These weaknesses
    included (1) seizing and custodial agencies not taking required steps to
    ensure that corrections to the Consolidated Asset Tracking System inventory
    records were properly made, (2) lack of a reliable system at DEA to
    accurately report bulk drugs, seized property, and funds held as evidence,

    (3) system deficiencies at FBI affecting the completeness of summary reports
    on acquiring and disposing of evidence, and (4) the need for improving
    inventory procedures used to validate the status and value of seized
    property at year- end. Although increasing accountability for the asset

    forfeiture program is not included as a performance goal in Justice's
    Performance Plan as it was in the past, the Asset Forfeiture Fund component
    of Justice's Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan stated that as

    enhancements and refinements are made to two of Justice's automated systems,
    data supporting seizure and forfeiture activities will be strengthened.
    While automated systems enhancements and Justice's other planned corrective
    actions should help overcome weaknesses identified in its asset forfeiture
    program, its individual components must continue to address the concerns
    noted above, with Justice's oversight. We will continue to monitor Justice's
    progress in this area. Seized Asset Legislation in 1988 required Treasury
    and Justice to Management develop a plan to consolidate their seized
    property Programs Not Yet

    management functions. In 1991 we recommended they Consolidated But
    consolidate the postseizure management and Under Study disposition of
    noncash seized properties to reduce administrative costs. Although the
    Departments have

    not made plans for consolidating their programs, in September 2000, they
    contracted for a study to identify opportunities for increased cooperation
    and sharing of agency and contractor resources. The study is to result in
    recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of property
    management functions within the

    federal asset forfeiture program. While the study is not expected to fully
    embrace the concept of consolidating the two separate seized asset
    management and disposal functions, we believe that taking advantage of
    opportunities for cooperation and sharing of agency and

    contractor resources encompasses the spirit of the recommendation designed
    to reduce the programs' administrative costs.

    To determine whether to remove the high risk designation for the asset
    forfeiture program in the future, we will consider the results of Justice's
    and Treasury's study, including the implementation of any related
    recommendations, as well as the results of ongoing initiatives for resolving
    Justice and Treasury's respective management and accountability issues.

    Key Contacts Gary T. Engel, Director Financial Management and Assurance
    (202) 512- 3406 engelg@ gao. gov Richard M. Stana, Director

    Tax Administration and Justice (202) 512- 8777 stanar@ gao. gov

    Related GAO Products Improve the

    Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its IT Enforcement of
    Investment Management Capability (GAO/ AIMD- 01- 146,

    Immigration Laws Dec. 29, 2000).

    and Provision of Illegal Aliens: Opportunities Exist to Improve the
    Immigration and Expedited Removal Process (GAO/ GGD- 00- 176, Sept. 1,
    Naturalization 2000). Services Information Technology: INS Needs to Better
    Manage the Development of Its Enterprise Architecture (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 212,
    Aug. 1, 2000).

    Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to Address
    Growing Problem (GAO/ GGD- 00- 103, May 1, 2000).

    Border Patrol Hiring: Despite Recent Initiatives, Fiscal Year 1999 Hiring
    Goal Was Not Met (GAO/ GGD- 00- 39, Dec. 17, 1999). Illegal Immigration:
    Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation (GAO/ GGD- 99- 44, May
    19, 1999). Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized
    Alien Employment Exist (GAO/ GGD- 99- 33, April 2, 1999). Illegal
    Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation
    Needed (GAO/ GGD- 98- 21, Dec. 11, 1997).

    Better Manage Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year
    Programs Designed 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 to Support
    State

    Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). and Local Efforts to

    Police Corps: Some Problems Resolved, But Most Reduce Crime

    Positions Remain Unfilled (GAO/ GGD- 00- 69, Feb. 22, 2000). Federal Grants:
    More Can Be Done to Improve Weed and Seed Program Management (GAO/ GGD- 99-
    110, July 16, 1999).

    Develop Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year Measurable
    1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance

    Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000). Targets to Help

    Drug Control: DEA's Strategies and Operations in the DEA Determine Its 1990s
    (GAO/ GGD- 99- 108, July 21, 1999). Progress in

    Reducing the Availability of Illegal Drugs

    Achieve Excellence Immigration Benefits: INS Not Making Timely Deposits in
    Financial

    of Application Fees (GAO/ GGD- 00- 185, Sept. 29, 2000). Management,
    Including, But Not

    Financial Management: Control Weaknesses Reported at Limited to, a the Drug
    Enforcement Administration Departmentwide

    (GAO/ AIMD- 98- 271R, Sept. 11, 1998). Unqualified Opinion for Fiscal Year
    2000 and

    Beyond

    Improve Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year Management
    and 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Accountability of
    Performance Plan (GAO/ GGD- 00- 155R, June 30, 2000).

    Justice's Asset Observations on the Department of the Treasury's Fiscal
    Forfeiture Program

    Year 1999 Performance Report and Fiscal Year 2001 Performance Plan (GAO/
    GGD/ AIMD- 00- 231R, June 30, 2000).

    Seized Drugs and Firearms: FBI Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards
    and Strengthen Accountability (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 18, Dec. 16, 1999).

    FBI Accountability for Drugs Used in Special Operations: Deficiencies
    Identified and Actions Taken (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 34R, Dec. 2, 1999). Seized
    Drugs and Weapons: DEA Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards and
    Strengthen Accountability (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 17, Nov. 30, 1999). Asset
    Forfeiture: Marshals Service Controls Over Seized Assets (GAO/ GGD- 99- 41,
    Mar. 26, 1999). Asset Forfeiture: Noncash Property Should Be Consolidated
    Under the Marshals Service (GAO/ GGD- 91- 97, June 28, 1991).

    Lett er

    Performance and Accountability Series

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective
    (GAO- 01- 241)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Agriculture
    (GAO- 01- 242)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce (GAO-
    01- 243)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
    01- 244)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education (GAO-
    01- 245)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy (GAO-
    01- 246)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
    Human Services (GAO- 01- 247)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing and
    Urban Development (GAO- 01- 248)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Interior
    (GAO- 01- 249)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice (GAO-
    01- 250)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor (GAO- 01-
    251)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State (GAO- 01-
    252)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation
    (GAO- 01- 253)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Treasury
    (GAO- 01- 254)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
    Affairs (GAO- 01- 255)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Agency for International
    Development (GAO- 01- 256)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
    Agency (GAO- 01- 257)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration (GAO- 01- 258)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
    (GAO- 01- 259)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business Administration
    (GAO- 01- 260)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
    Administration (GAO- 01- 261)

    Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U. S. Postal Service (GAO-
    01- 262)

    High- Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263)

    (182108) Lett er

    Ordering The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of
    reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made Information

    out to the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are
    accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single
    address are discounted 25 percent.

    Orders by mail:

    U. S. General Accounting Office P. O. Box 37050 Washington, DC 20013

    Orders by visiting:

    Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U. S. General
    Accounting Office Washington, DC

    Orders by phone:

    (202) 512- 6000 fax: (202) 512- 6061 TDD (202) 512- 2537

    Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To
    receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30
    days, please call (202) 512- 6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu
    will provide information on how to obtain these lists.

    Orders by Internet:

    For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an e-
    mail message with “info” in the body to: info@ www. gao. gov or
    visit GAO's World Wide Web home page at: http:// www. gao. gov

    To Report Fraud, Contact one:

    Waste, or Abuse in

    ? Web site: http:// www. gao. gov/ fraudnet/ fraudnet. htm

    Federal Programs

    ? e- mail: fraudnet@ gao. gov ? 1- 800- 424- 5454 (automated answering
    system)

    GAO United States General Accounting Office

    Page 1 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Contents

    Page 2 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Comptroller General of the United States

    Page 3 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges United States General Accounting
    Office

    Washington, D. C. 20548

    Page 4 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Page 5 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Page 6 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 7 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 8 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 9 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 10 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 11 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Overview Page 12 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Page 13 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 14 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 15 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 16 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 17 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 18 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 19 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 20 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 21 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 22 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 23 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 24 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 25 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 26 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 27 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 28 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 29 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 30 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 31 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 32 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 33 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 34 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 35 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 36 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 37 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 38 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 39 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 40 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 41 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Major Performance and Accountability Challenges Page 42 GAO- 01- 250 Justice
    Challenges

    Page 43 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Related GAO Products Page 44 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Related GAO Products Page 45 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Page 46 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    Performance and Accountability Series

    Page 47 GAO- 01- 250 Justice Challenges

    United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001

    Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300

    Address Correction Requested Bulk Mail

    Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
    *** End of document ***