Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Agriculture
(Letter Report, 01/01/2001, GAO/GAO-01-242).
This report, part of GAO's high risk series, discusses the major
management challenges and program risks facing the Department of
Agriculture (USDA). These challenges include (1) improving USDA's farm
loan programs to reduce its vulnerability to loss, (2)improving delivery
of services to farmers, (3) maintaining the integrity of the food
assistance programs, (4) minimizing foodborne illnesses, (5)
strengthening Department-wide information security, (6) improving USDA's
financial accountability, (7) providing Congress and the public with a
better understanding of what it accomplishes with appropriated funds,
and (8) improving USDA's processing of discrimination complaints.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-242
TITLE: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
of Agriculture
DATE: 01/01/2001
SUBJECT: Risk management
Accountability
Financial management
Information resources management
Agricultural programs
Employment discrimination
Customer service
Internal controls
IDENTIFIER: High Risk Series 2001
GAO High Risk Program
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GAO-01-242
Performance and Accountability Series
January 2001 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
Department of Agriculture
GAO- 01- 242
Letter 3 Overview 6 Major
13 Performance and Accountability Challenges
Related GAO 40
Products Performance
44 and Accountability Series
Lett er
January 2001 The President of the Senate The Speaker of the House of
Representatives
This report addresses the major performance and accountability challenges
facing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) as it seeks to carry out its
diverse
missions, including ensuring the safety of the nation's food supply,
providing food assistance for the needy, supporting the agricultural sector,
and managing the national forests. It includes a summary of actions that
USDA has taken and that are under way to address these challenges. It also
outlines further actions that GAO believes are needed. This analysis should
help the new Congress and administration carry out their responsibilities
and improve government for the benefit of the American people.
This report is part of a special series, first issued in January 1999,
entitled the Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management
Challenges
and Program Risks. In that series, GAO advised the Congress that it planned
to reassess the methodologies and criteria used to determine which federal
government operations and functions should be highlighted and which should
be designated as “high risk.” GAO completed the assessment,
considered comments provided on a publicly available exposure draft, and
published its guidance document, Determining Performance and Accountability
Challenges and High Risks (GAO- 01- 159SP), in
November 2000. This 2001 Performance and Accountability Series contains
separate reports on 21 agencies- covering each cabinet department, most
major independent
agencies, and the U. S. Postal Service. The series also includes a
governmentwide perspective on performance and management challenges across
the federal government. As a companion volume to this series, GAO is issuing
an update on those government operations
and programs that its work identified as “high risk” because of
either their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement or major challenges associated with their economy, efficiency,
or effectiveness.
David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States
Overview The U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is one of the nation's
largest federal agencies, employing over 110,000 people and managing a
budget of over $75 billion. Its 29 agencies and offices are responsible for
operating more than 200 programs that, among other things, support the
profitability and productivity of farming, protect the environment, ensure
food safety, improve the well- being of rural America, promote domestic
marketing and the export of food and farm products, conduct biotechnological
and other agricultural research, and
provide food assistance to Americans who need it. Managing the breadth and
diversity of these responsibilities is a daunting task, but an important
one. U. S. agriculture remains a vital component of our
national economy, accounting for about 13 percent of the nation's gross
domestic product, and is the economic heart of many rural communities. Since
1995, USDA has been engaged in a reorganization and modernization effort
targeted at achieving greater economy and efficiency and better customer
service in the agricultural and rural areas. However, USDA still faces a
number of specific performance and management challenges. The Congress also
has a key role in ensuring that USDA effectively addresses these challenges.
USDA's farm loan programs remain vulnerable to loss, but high- risk areas
have been addressed
? Delivery of services to farmers has improved, but challenges remain
? USDA needs to effectively and efficiently provide food assistance benefits
to eligible individuals while maintaining program integrity
? Fundamental changes are needed to minimize foodborne illnesses
? USDA needs to strengthen Department- wide information security
? USDA continues to lack financial accountability over billions of dollars
in assets
? The Forest Service must provide the Congress and the public with a clear
understanding of what it accomplishes with appropriated funds
? Problems persist in processing discrimination complaints
Improving USDA's Since our previous report in January 1999, the financial
Farm Loan Programs
condition of USDA's farm loan programs has improved dramatically. The unpaid
principal of USDA's loan portfolio held by delinquent borrowers was reduced
by about $2. 8 billion between September 1995 and September 2000. As such,
we are removing the programs' high- risk designation. The decline in the
amount of the loan portfolio held by delinquent borrowers in part reflects
the positive actions that the Congress and USDA have taken to address the
underlying causes of the programs' past weaknesses. Specifically, the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (the 1996 farm bill)
contained numerous provisions, based in part on recommendations we
previously made, aimed at improving the solvency of USDA's farm loan
programs,
including prohibiting certain high- risk loans. For example, provisions in
the bill generally prohibit borrowers who caused losses on past USDA farm
loans
from obtaining new loans and specifically prohibit borrowers who are behind
on payments on existing loans from obtaining new direct operating loans.
Despite these important improvements, because of an unpaid principal of more
than $16. 6 billion in direct and guaranteed farm loans, USDA and the
Congress need to continue to monitor the effects of the positive actions
already taken to ensure that improvements in the financial integrity of the
farm loan programs continue.
Improving the While the 1996 farm bill was aimed at reducing Delivery of
Services government involvement in maintaining the strength of to Farmers
the farm economy, USDA continues to have an important role in providing an
effective means for distributing benefits and addressing farmers' concerns.
Since 1995, USDA has been engaged in a reorganization and modernization
effort targeted at achieving greater economy and efficiency and better
customer service. As of March 2000, USDA's effort to collocate its service
centers was almost complete. While USDA collocated its county field offices,
little has changed in how these offices serve their customers, and many
modernization and reengineering projects have encountered delays. In August
1998, we reported that USDA lacked a
comprehensive plan to guide the modernization effort and a management
structure with the accountability and authority to resolve differences among
the agencies. USDA is still working to address these challenges. In
addition, in February 2000, we reported that the need for a change in the
existing organizational culture was an
even more basic challenge that USDA needed to address before further
progress could be made on each of the other modernization and reorganization
initiatives. In December 2000, USDA officials told us they had made progress
in changing the Department's organizational
culture. Maintaining Food Since one in six Americans receives some sort of
food Assistance Program assistance, USDA is challenged to ensure that
eligible Integrity individuals receive the proper benefits from the 15
programs administered by its Food and Nutrition Service. In 2001, the
Congress appropriated $34 billion to operate these programs. This financial
capacity also dictates that USDA continually address and minimize the amount
of fraud and abuse occurring in these programs in order to ensure their
integrity. For example, over $1 billion in overpayments were made under the
Food Stamp Program in 1999, and less than 20 percent was recovered. In
addition, the trafficking of food stamps continues to be a problem.
Estimates are that hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits are sold for
cash annually by recipients at retail food stores and only a very small
percentage of the financial penalties assessed to storeowners for
trafficking is being collected, in part because of difficulties in
collecting this type of debt, including problems in locating debtors and
their refusal to pay. In recent reports, we have recommended various ways
that USDA can improve its debt collection activities and better use
electronic data to identify suspected storeowner and recipient
traffickers. USDA must also take steps to develop a costeffective strategy
for the school lunch program to address the large percentage of ineligible
children who
are certified as eligible to receive free lunches. Since these and other
food assistance programs account for almost 45 percent of USDA's fiscal year
2001 budget, it is critical that the Department implement an effective
strategy to ensure that eligible individuals receive the proper benefits
while minimizing the occurrence of
fraud and abuse before the programs' integrity is diminished. Minimizing The
level of foodborne illnesses has heightened Foodborne Illnesses
concerns about the federal government's effectiveness in ensuring the safety
of both the nation's domestic food supply and the food products imported
into the U. S. marketplace. In response to a recommendation we made in an
October 1997 report, USDA is implementing a new scientific system, called
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point, to better ensure the safety of
meat and
poultry. USDA must also determine if foreign countries have implemented
equivalent food safety and inspection systems before those countries can
export products into the United States. However, as we have stated in
numerous reports and testimonies, these requirements do not address the
continuing fundamental problem
facing USDA, namely, that the current food safety system is highly
fragmented with as many as 12 different federal agencies administering over
35 laws regarding food safety. As we have maintained since 1992, until this
fragmented system is replaced with a risk- based inspection system under a
single food agency, the U. S.
food safety system will continue to suffer from inconsistent oversight, poor
coordination, and the inefficient allocation of resources.
StrengtheningUSDA's Significant weaknesses in USDA's information security
Information Security program and its two major data centers place the
Department's computer systems, which support billions
of dollars in benefits, at significant risk. USDA has taken positive steps
to improve its information security by developing its August 1999 action
plan to address
specific vulnerabilities and potential threats. However, little progress has
been made to implement many of the components of the action plan that are
critical to strengthening Department- wide information security. For
example, as we reported in August 2000, at the time
of our review USDA had not established a comprehensive list of sensitive
computer systems as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987. USDA also
needed to develop and document a detailed strategy with time frames and
milestones to fully implement the action plan and demonstrate that
information security at USDA is a departmental priority.
Enhancing USDA's At headquarters, USDA continues to face major Ability to
Account for challenges in correcting severe and long- standing Its Financial
financial management problems and achieving financial Activities
accountability over the billions of dollars of assets required to carry out
its diverse missions. Since 1991, USDA's Office of Inspector General has
issued a series of unfavorable financial audit reports on USDA's
consolidated financial statements. The Inspector General also reported that
USDA's persistent internal control weaknesses and noncompliance with key
laws and regulations have contributed to the Department's inability to
achieve financial accountability. In addition,
we reported in September 2000 that USDA continues to have significant
problems with its electricity loan portfolio and that increased competition
in the electricity industry has increased the risk that the federal
government will incur future losses.
Improving USDA's Forest Service is at a critical juncture in its Performance
evolution. The agency is refocusing the mix of its Accountability at the
activities and attempting to identify where or under Forest Service what
circumstances it should restore degraded lands through active management.
These issues are
controversial and represent significant changes in the Forest Service's
mission and funding priorities. It is, therefore, important for the agency
to provide the Congress and the public with a better understanding of what
is achieved with the funds that are being spent.
While the Forest Service has, in recent months, completed several actions
and begun others to improve performance accountability, it does not appear
to be fully committed to making performance accountability one of its top
priorities, and major hurdles to achieving performance accountability
remain. For instance, the agency has no plan to replace its existing
organizational structure with one that is better linked to its strategic
goals and objectives or to the way that work is routinely accomplished on
the national forests. Improving the
Finally, USDA's Civil Rights Office continues to Efficiency of USDA's
experience problems in the timely processing of Civil Rights Office
discrimination complaints. While some progress has been made to address
identified weaknesses, USDA has not implemented a number of recommendations
made by us and the Inspector General to improve its
processing timeliness. Problems continue with (1) management turnover, (2)
continued reorganizations within the Civil Rights Office, (3) inadequate
staff and managerial expertise, (4) a lack of clear and up- to- date
guidance and procedures, and (5) poor working relationships and
communication within the Civil Rights Office and between the office and
other USDA entities.
As we reported in January 1999, delays in processing discrimination
complaints result in USDA's failure to comply with federal regulations that
affect the livelihood and well- being of individuals who believe they have
been discriminated against. The Secretary of Agriculture has recently taken
steps to address the Department's chronic problems in addressing
discrimination complaints. However, these efforts will require sustained
implementation, including additional funding for hiring and training
personnel and, hence, long- term monitoring.
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges
Over the years, we, USDA's Inspector General, and others have documented
problems with USDA's performance and management and have recommended
reforms. This report summarizes findings from our previously issued reports
on the effectiveness of USDA's efforts in (1) further reducing farm loan
defaults, (2) improving the delivery of services to farmers,
(3) providing food assistance benefits to eligible individuals while
maintaining the food assistance programs' integrity, (4) minimizing
foodborne illnesses in our nation's food supply, (5) strengthening USDA's
information security, (6) effectively accounting for billions of dollars in
assets and expenditures, (7) improving performance accountability at the
Forest Service, and (8) addressing problems in processing civil
rights complaints. We have also indicated, where applicable, actions that
USDA has taken to address these management and performance problems,
including actions taken that support removing the farm loan programs' high-
risk designation, and areas where the Congress has a key role in ensuring
that USDA effectively addresses its performance and management challenges.
Farm Loan
USDA's farm loan programs are intended to provide Programs Remain temporary
financial assistance to farmers and ranchers Vulnerable to Loss, who are
unable to obtain commercial credit at but High- Risk reasonable rates and
terms. In operating the farm loan Issues Have Been programs, USDA faces the
conflicting tasks of (1)
Addressed providing high- risk borrowers with temporary credit so they can
stay in farming until they are able to secure commercial credit and (2)
ensuring that the taxpayers' investment is protected. The unpaid principal
on USDA's farm loan portfolio totaled more than $16. 6 billion on
September 30, 2000- about $8. 7 billion in direct loans and almost $8
billion in guaranteed loans.
USDA's farm loan programs have been identified as high- risk since 1990
because of significant problems primarily with the direct loans. As we have
previously reported, the farm loan programs had experienced a high rate of
defaults on repayments; billions of dollars of losses had occurred and were
likely to occur; and the Department had evolved into a continuous source of
subsidized credit for thousands of borrowers. These problems occurred
because of (1) program policies- some of which were congressionally
directed- that contributed to financial risks and (2) the failure of the
Department's field office officials to comply with existing loan and
property management standards. For example, program policies allowed
borrowers who
defaulted and caused losses on past USDA farm loans to obtain new loans and
allowed borrowers to obtain new direct loans for operating expenses without
demonstrating their ability to pay their existing USDA debt. Also, field
office lending officials approved loans on the basis of unrealistic
estimates of production, income, and expenses and often failed to verify
borrowers' existing debts.
We are now removing the programs' high- risk designation. Over the last 2
years the financial condition of USDA's farm loan programs has continued to
improve. The unpaid principal of USDA's loan portfolio held by delinquent
borrowers was reduced by about $2. 8 billion between September 1995 and
September 2000. During the early to mid- 1990s, GAO made a variety of
recommendations to USDA and the Congress that were aimed at improving the
financial condition and operation of the farm loan programs. In addition,
various pieces of legislation in recent years have had a significant impact
on the operation of USDA's farm loan programs. Specifically, the 1996 farm
bill made a variety of changes, based in part on recommendations we
previously made, to the lending and servicing policies of USDA that were
intended to reduce the risks associated with the farm loan programs. For
example, it included
provisions that (1) prohibit borrowers who were delinquent on USDA direct or
guaranteed farm loans from obtaining additional direct farm operating loans,
(2) generally prohibit borrowers whose past defaults resulted in loan losses
from obtaining new direct or
guaranteed farm loans, and (3) limit borrowers to one instance of debt
forgiveness on direct loans. The effect of these and other initiatives is
now being recognized.
As of September 30, 2000, delinquent borrowers held more than $1. 8 billion
(about 21 percent) of the outstanding principal on direct loans. This
compares with about $2. 1 billion (23. 5 percent) in September 1999 and $2.
4 billion (over 26 percent) in September 1998.
Furthermore, the amount owed by delinquent borrowers was $4. 6 billion
(about 41 percent) in September 1995. As figure 1 shows, the outstanding
principal and the amounts owed by delinquent borrowers on direct farm loans
have declined each year since the end of fiscal year 1995 and the enactment
of the farm bill.
Figure 1: Outstanding Principal and Amount Owed by Borrowers Who Were
Delinquent on Direct Farm Loans, End of Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 12
Dollars in billions 10
8 6 4
2 0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Fiscal year
Outstanding principal Owed by delinquent borrowers
Note: The percentage of outstanding principal owed by delinquent borrowers
was as follows: 40.7 percent in 1995, 34.2 percent in 1996, 28.2 percent in
1997, 26.4 percent in 1998, 23.5 percent in 1999, and 20.9 percent in 2000.
Source: GAO's analysis of information in USDA's farm loan automated
databases.
In addition, delinquent borrowers held about $282 million (3. 5 percent) of
the outstanding principal on guaranteed farm loans as of September 30, 2000.
By comparison, delinquent borrowers owed about $363 million (5 percent) in
September 1999 and
$325 million (5 percent) in September 1998. Furthermore, the amount owed by
delinquent borrowers
was $218 million (about 4 percent) in September 1995. While the total
outstanding principal owed on guaranteed farm loans has risen since 1995,
the amount owed by borrowers who were delinquent on guaranteed farm loans
has remained relatively steady (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Outstanding Principal and Amount Owed by Borrowers Who Were
Delinquent on Guaranteed Farm Loans, End of Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000
10
Dollars in billions 8 6 4 2 0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Fiscal year
Outstanding principal Owed by delinquent borrowers
Note: The amount and percentage of outstanding principal owed by delinquent
borrowers were as follows: $218 million, or 3.7 percent, in 1995; $280
million, or 4.4 percent, in 1996; $300 million, or 4.6 percent, in 1997;
$325 million, or 5. 0 percent, in 1998; $363 million, or 5.0 percent, in
1999; and $282 million, or 3.5 percent, in 2000.
Source: GAO's analysis of information in USDA's farm loan automated
databases.
We believe that these improvements in part reflect actions that the Congress
and USDA have taken to address the underlying causes of the programs' past
weaknesses. Although the programs' high- risk designation has been removed,
USDA and the Congress need to monitor the effects of the lending and
servicing reforms and any future legislation to ensure that improvements in
the financial integrity of the farm loan programs continue.
Key Contact Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director Natural Resources and Environment
(202) 512- 3841 dyckmanl@ gao. gov
Delivery of Services Since 1995, USDA has been engaged in a reorganization
to Farmers Has
and modernization effort targeted at achieving greater Improved, but
economy and efficiency and better customer service in agricultural and rural
areas. 1 USDA's effort consists of Challenges Remain
five interrelated initiatives: (1) locating USDA agencies' county offices at
one site within each county and state offices at one location in each state;
(2) merging the administrative functions at the state and headquarters
levels under a single support organization; (3) redesigning how the agencies
do their work; (4)
providing an updated communications network and a common computing
environment so that agency employees can share information; and (5) changing
the culture within the agencies to implement a seamless approach to
delivering services, reaching out to meet customers' needs, and working
cooperatively with state and local governments and private organizations. As
of February 2000, we reported that USDA had spent over $380 million on these
initiatives and will need to invest another $544 million through fiscal year
2004 to complete them.
USDA's progress in implementing its initiatives has been mixed. As of March
2000, efforts to collocate the Department's service centers were about 96
percent complete. USDA had also deployed personal computers and a modern
telecommunications network to most of its service centers. However, as we
reported in February 2000, despite these positive actions, little has
changed in how USDA serves its customers in agricultural and rural
areas, and many modernization and reengineering projects have encountered
delays. For example, as of November 1999, the overall reengineering
initiative and
the initiative to modernize information technology were 1 USDA provides
service in these areas through its Farm Service Agency, the Natural
Resources Conservation Service, and the agencies in the rural development
mission area.
both 2 years behind schedule. At that time, USDA officials attributed the
delays to (1) program demands and funding constraints, (2) limited
cooperation among the USDA agencies involved in the modernization and
reorganization effort, and (3) some employees'
resistance to change. In addition, the Congress stopped USDA from
implementing the administrative convergence initiative. In addition to these
problems, we identified three related challenges that have impeded USDA's
progress toward completing its overall initiatives. In August 1998, we
identified two of these challenges- the lack of a comprehensive plan to
guide the modernization effort and the lack of a management structure with
the accountability and authority to resolve differences among the agencies.
USDA is working to address these challenges. A third challenge we identified
in our February 2000 report- the need to change the existing organizational
culture- is even more basic and must be addressed before further progress
can be made on each of the other initiatives. As we reported in February
2000, USDA has recognized the importance of this issue by making it the
focus of one of the five initiatives. In December 2000, USDA officials told
us they had made progress in changing the Department's organizational
culture; however, USDA has not fully succeeded in overcoming resistance from
affected agencies and employees.
Key Contact Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director Natural Resources and Environment
(202) 512- 3841 dyckmanl@ gao. gov
Department Needs Each day, one in every six Americans receives nutrition to
Effectively and assistance through 1 or more of the 15 programs
Efficiently Provide administered by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service. Food
Assistance
These programs account for almost 45 percent of Benefits to Eligible USDA's
fiscal year 2001 budget and provide children and
Individuals While low- income adults with access to food, a healthful diet,
Maintaining and nutrition education. For fiscal year 2001, the
Program Integrity Congress appropriated $34 billion to operate these
programs, including the Food Stamp Program and child
nutrition programs, such as the school breakfast and school lunch programs.
To determine the eligibility of millions of children and families and
distribute program
benefits, the Food and Nutrition Service works in publicprivate partnerships
with over 450,000 organizations, including state and local governments,
nonprofit organizations, and retail grocery stores. USDA faces some serious
challenges in ensuring that eligible individuals receive the proper benefits
while minimizing the amount of fraud and abuse in its programs.
These challenges are clearly evident in the operation of the Food Stamp
Program- the cornerstone of USDA's nutrition assistance programs. In fiscal
year 1999, this program provided 18 million individuals with about $16
billion in benefits. Participation has decreased from about 71 percent of
eligible individuals in September 1994 to about 62 percent in September
1997. As we previously reported, some state and local governments that went
further than the law permits in limiting food stamp benefits may have caused
some of this decrease. In addition, USDA must continue to address the
challenge of accurately issuing food stamp benefits to those who are
eligible under the program. In fiscal year 1999, about 7 percent ($ 1. 1
billion) of the benefits issued were estimated to be overpayments, while
about 3 percent ($ 0. 45 billion) were underpayments. Moreover,
welfare reform changes have increased the already complex process of
determining households' eligibility and benefit levels.
In addition to ensuring that eligible individuals receive proper benefits,
USDA faces the formidable challenge of minimizing the fraud and abuse
associated with the misuse of the billions of dollars in food stamp benefits
that are accepted by about 185, 000 authorized retail food stores. For
example, individuals sometimes illegally sell their benefits for cash- a
practice known as trafficking. A recent USDA study estimated that stores
trafficked about $660 million, or about 3. 5 cents of every dollar of food
stamp benefits issued per year from 1996 through
1998. In addition, storeowners generally do not pay the financial penalties
assessed for trafficking. For example, from 1993 through 1998, USDA and the
courts assessed or levied about $78 million in financial penalties and
interest against storeowners for violating food stamp
regulations. But during this period, USDA and the courts collected only $11.
5 million, or about 13 percent, of the total penalties. USDA reduced the
remaining amount owed by storeowners by about $49 million, or about 55
percent, through waivers, adjustments, and write- offs. While weaknesses in
debt collection practices contribute to low collection rates, USDA officials
noted that these rates also reflect the difficulties involved in collecting
this type of debt, including problems in locating storeowners who have been
removed from the Food Stamp Program and the refusal of some storeowners to
pay their debts. Better use of information technology has the potential to
help USDA minimize fraud, waste, and abuse in the
Food Stamp Program. As a result of a recommendation we made in 1998, the
Congress now has a USDA report on options for a national database to track
participation
in federal public assistance programs, including the Food Stamp Program.
Such a system could make the payment of food stamp benefits more accurate.
In addition, in March 2000, we recommended that the Food and Nutrition
Service make better use of data from electronic benefit transfers (EBT) to
identify and assess penalties against storeowners who violate the Food
Stamp Program's regulations. Food and Nutrition Service officials agreed and
have initiated actions to implement our recommendations. We also recommended
that the Food and Nutrition Service work with the states to implement best
practices for using EBT data to identify and take action against recipients
engaged in trafficking food stamp benefits. Again, Food and Nutrition
Service officials agreed and have action under way to implement our
recommendation.
USDA also faces serious fraud and abuse challenges in other nutrition
programs, including the $1. 6 billion Child and Adult Care Food Program
(CACFP) and the $5. 5 billion School Lunch Program. In fiscal year 1999,
CACFP provided subsidized meals for a daily average of 2.6 million children
and 62, 500 adults in the care of about 220,000 day care providers. In
conducting over 55 audits and investigations since 1993, USDA's Inspector
General identified case after case of the intentional misuse of federal
funds, including cases in which program sponsors created fictitious day care
providers and inflated the number of meals served. In November 1999, we
recommended that USDA develop and implement a comprehensive plan for
strengthening the controls for detecting and preventing fraud and abuse in
the program. In response to our recommendation and
reports of the Department's Inspector General, the Congress, in June 2000,
passed legislation to strengthen management controls in this program and
reduce its vulnerability to fraud and abuse. In its strategic plan for 2000
to 2005, USDA identified the program integrity challenge it also faces in
ensuring that only eligible participants are provided benefits in the School
Lunch Program. This program provides nutritionally balanced, low- cost or
free lunches for
nearly 27 million children each school day in over 96, 000 public and
nonprofit private schools and residential child care institutions. In 1997,
the number of children certified as eligible to receive free lunches in this
program was 18 percent greater than the estimated number of children
eligible for this benefit. USDA has taken some initial steps at developing a
cost- effective strategy to address this integrity issue. Key Contact Robert
E. Robertson, Director
Education Workforce and Income Security (202) 512- 7215 robertsonr@ gao. gov
Fundamental
Although the American food supply is regarded as one of Changes Are the
safest in the world, foodborne illnesses in the United Needed to Minimize
States are an extensive and expensive problem. The Foodborne magnitude of
the problem is uncertain, however,
Illnesses because these illnesses are underreported and health officials
cannot always determine their source. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention estimates
that unsafe foods cause as many as 76 million illnesses, 325,000
hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths each year. According to USDA, the costs
for medical treatment and productivity losses associated with seven major
foodborne pathogens range from $7 billion to $37 billion
annually. The federal government, spending over $1 billion annually, plays a
critical role in reducing the health and economic consequences of foodborne
illnesses. A number of factors have heightened concerns about the federal
government's effectiveness in ensuring the safety of the nation's food
supply. These include the emergence of new foodborne pathogens, the finding
of old pathogens in new foods (e. g., fresh produce), the recognition of the
long- term health effects of foodborne diseases, the globalization of the
nation's food supply,
and the growing segment of the U. S. population at increased risk to
foodborne disease (e. g., the elderly and immune- compromised). These
concerns in part helped
spawn a major new approach to food safety regulation. This approach, in line
with our prior recommendations, requires meat, poultry, and seafood plants
to use a scientific system called Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point
(HACCP) to better ensure the safety of their products. Under these new
regulations, USDA and
the meat and poultry slaughter plants conduct microbial tests for E. Coli
0157: H7, salmonella, and Listeria monocytogenes.
As we noted in our last Performance and Accountability Series report in
January 1999, requiring HACCP and microbial testing is without question an
important step toward a more scientific approach to ensuring a safer food
supply. However, as we have stated in numerous reports and testimonies,
these requirements do not address several other fundamental problems with
our current food safety system. Most important, the current system is highly
fragmented: As many as 12 different federal agencies, administering over 35
different laws, oversee food safety. Since 1992, we have advocated replacing
this fragmented system with a risk- based inspection system under a single
food agency. Until this is done, the current food safety system will
continue to suffer from inconsistent oversight, poor coordination,
and the inefficient allocation of resources, as shown in the following
examples: ? Subtle differences in food products often dictate
which agency regulates a product and what actions it takes. A case in point:
USDA is responsible for inspecting plants that produce open- faced meat
sandwiches and pizzas with meat topping. The Department conducts these
inspections at least once each operating day. On the other hand, the
Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
is responsible for inspecting plants that produce traditional meat
sandwiches and nonmeat pizzas. FDA inspects the plants under its
jurisdiction once every 5 years, on
average. In fiscal year 1999, more than $145 million was spent to conduct
both agencies' inspections. In other cases, different agencies have
overlapping responsibilities for ensuring food safety. For
example, while FDA has primary responsibility for ensuring the safe use of
irradiation on all foods, USDA is responsible for the irradiation of meat,
poultry, and some egg products. ? More than one- fourth of the over $1
billion federal
budget for food safety- about $296 million- could be used more efficiently
if the current requirement for carcass- by- carcass slaughter inspections
were eliminated. These statutory inspections do not optimize federal
resources because they do not detect the most serious health threat
associated with meat and poultry- microbial contamination. Some of the funds
currently used for these inspections could be better spent on other food
safety activities at FDA,
such as increasing inspections at nonmeat and poultry plants; conducting
more laboratory tests of food products; or conducting better surveillance of
imported foods, including making equivalency
determinations of foreign countries' food safety systems. While USDA has
tried to shift some of the burden for inspections under its carcass- by-
carcass inspection program to industry personnel, recent court action
continues to require USDA to conduct these expensive and time- consuming
inspections
using its own resources. ? Both USDA and FDA have primary responsibility for
ensuring the safety of imported foods and require these foods to meet the
same standards as domestic foods. However, their approaches to enforcing
these requirements differ. USDA places the principal burden for safety on
the exporting countries by allowing imports only from those countries with
food systems it deems equivalent to the U. S. system- 37 countries at the
present time. FDA, on the other
hand, is not required to make equivalency determinations and, as such,
allows food imports
from almost any country and takes on the burden of ensuring the safety of
imported foods as they arrive at U. S. ports of entry. Both of these
approaches have weaknesses that need to be addressed to strengthen the
safety of imported foods. For example, since USDA accepts imports from
foreign food systems deemed equivalent, it focuses its inspections on
shipments from exporting firms with a history of violations for such things
as incorrect or missing shipping labels. Since these violations bear little
relationship to food safety, USDA could redirect its
resources to areas with greater potential for increasing the safety of our
imported food supply. Conversely, FDA depends on resource- intensive
inspections at ports of entry that require selecting, physically inspecting,
and testing samples. This method has been widely discredited because
individual products tested at ports of entry may not represent the health
risks of the entire shipment. In addition, this labor- intensive effort
resulted in the inspection of less than 1 percent of all imports in 1999.
Key Contact Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director Natural Resources and Environment
(202) 512- 3841 dyckmanl@ gao. gov Department Needs
USDA faces information security challenges in to Strengthen Its
protecting its computer systems from serious threats Information
and cyber attacks. USDA's Office of Inspector General Security and we found
significant weaknesses in the Department's information security program and
at the Department's two major data centers. These weaknesses placed USDA
computer systems that support billions of dollars in benefits at significant
risk. Such problems
leave the Department's computer systems vulnerable to unlawful and
destructive penetration and disruption.
According to USDA, attacks by hackers on its computer systems are occurring
more frequently every passing month. USDA has begun to address its
information security problems, but more needs to be done. In August 2000, we
reported that USDA had taken positive steps to begin
improving its information security by developing its August 1999 action plan
with recommendations to strengthen Department- wide information security and
by hiring a new Associate Chief Information Officer (CIO) for Cyber-
Security to address specific vulnerabilities and other potential threats.
However, since the plan was issued in August 1999, little progress
has been made to implement its other recommendations for strengthening
Department- wide information security. For example, at the time of our
review, USDA had not established a comprehensive list of sensitive
computer systems as required by the Computer Security Act of 1987. Moreover,
USDA had not developed and documented a strategy for implementing the action
plan's recommendations with established priorities and the detailed steps,
time frames, milestones, and total resources needed to fully carry them out.
To correct these problems, we recommended in August 2000 that USDA develop a
detailed strategy for implementing the action plan and demonstrate that
information security at USDA is a departmental priority by (1) directing
that sufficient resources be available to fund the Department's information
security improvement strategy and implementing plan, (2) holding the CIO and
Associate CIO for Cyber- Security accountable for carrying out the strategy
and plan, and
(3) requiring quarterly reports to the Secretary of Agriculture that
describe the results of these efforts. We also recommended that USDA report
its information security program as a material internal control weakness
under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act. USDA agreed with our
recommendations
for ensuring that information security is strengthened at the Department and
said that dramatic changes are needed to improve cyber security. While USDA
officials told us they are working to improve computer security, as of the
end of December 2000, USDA had not provided its written response to our
August 2000 report outlining the actions taken or planned to address our
recommendations.
Key Contact Bob Dacey, Director Information Technology (202) 512- 3317
daceyb@ gao. gov Lack of Financial
As evidenced by the Inspector General's sixth Accountability Over
consecutive disclaimer of opinion 2 on USDA's Billions of Dollars
consolidated financial statements, the Department has in Assets Continues
serious accountability problems over the $118 billion in assets and $120
billion in budgetary resources provided for fiscal year 1999 to carry out
its diverse missions. As such, USDA does not have meaningful and accurate
financial information to evaluate its financial performance. Before USDA can
achieve financial accountability, it or its component agencies must address
a number of issues that USDA's Office of Inspector General or we have
reported as serious problems.
2 A disclaimer of opinion means that the auditor is unable to form an
opinion on the financial statements. A disclaimer results when a pervasive
material uncertainty exists or there is a significant restriction on the
scope of the audit.
Since fiscal year 1994, the Inspector General has reported material
weaknesses in the processes and procedures used by USDA's lending agencies
to estimate and reestimate loan subsidy costs for the Department's net
credit program receivables, which totaled about $70. 7 billion as of
September 30, 1999. As a result, USDA has been unable to implement the
Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 and related accounting standards. 3 This
problem has contributed to the Inspector General's disclaimer of opinion on
the Department's consolidated financial statements as well as our disclaimer
of opinion
on the consolidated financial statements of the U. S. government. The
Inspector General also reported that USDA was unable to reconcile its Fund
Balance accounts with the
U. S. Treasury's accounts. 4 As of September 30, 1999, these USDA accounts
totaled $38 billion. Prior to May 1999, USDA merely adjusted its records to
agree with Treasury's without determining which, if either, were correct. In
addition, USDA did not establish or analyze the causes of the differences
between its and Treasury's records before reporting its ending balance to
Treasury. Since May 1999, USDA has been disclosing any differences in its
reports to Treasury. While USDA made great strides during fiscal year 2000
to reconcile its Fund Balance accounts with Treasury's accounts, the
Inspector General testified that the accounts remain unreconciled because of
several internal control 3 Accounting of Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees,
Statement of
Federal Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS) No. 2, as amended by
Amendments to Accounting Standards for Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees,
SFFAS No. 18.
4 USDA records its budget authority in asset accounts called Fund Balance
with the Department of the Treasury and increases or decreases these
accounts as it collects or disburses funds.
weaknesses related to the accounting system. 5 In addition, the Inspector
General stated that USDA is working aggressively to identify and eliminate
the unreconciled amounts. The Forest Service still faces major hurdles in
achieving financial accountability despite corrective measures in place to
address its accounting and reporting
deficiencies. For instance, the Forest Service received a disclaimer of
opinion on its fiscal year 1999 financial statements- its fourth disclaimer
in a row- which demonstrates that the Forest Service remained unable to
reliably track and report on major assets worth
billions of dollars. The Office of Inspector General reported that it could
not verify the accuracy of the Forest Service's pooled assets (such as roads
and trails) valued at $1. 5 billion because the Service lacked sufficient
documentation to support the purchase price
of these assets, the date acquired, and the related depreciation costs.
Furthermore, the independence afforded by the Forest Service's autonomous
field structure has hampered efforts to correct accounting and financial
reporting weaknesses. These shortcomings mean that the Forest Service and
the Congress do not have accurate financial data to track the cost of
programs and activities and to help make informed decisions about future
funding. Therefore, we continue to designate the Forest Service's financial
management as a high- risk area because of the serious and longstanding
accounting and financial reporting weaknesses plaguing its operations.
USDA has several persistent internal control weaknesses that contributed to
the Inspector General's 5 Testimony of Roger C. Viadero, Inspector General,
Department of Agriculture, before the Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry's Subcommittee on Research, Nutrition, and General
Legislation, September 27, 2000.
inability to form an opinion on the Department's fiscal year 1999
consolidated financial statements. Among others, the Inspector General has
identified internal control weaknesses over USDA's financial management
systems, food stamp recipient claims, accounting for personal property, and
security controls for information technology. For example, the Inspector
General has reported that USDA's financial systems do not always process and
report Department- wide financial
information accurately and that many of these systems are not fully
integrated with other USDA systems. The Inspector General also noted that
documentation supporting the purchase price of property was lacking
and that numerous errors in property values were recorded in the system. For
example, the Inspector General found a motor vehicle recorded in the system
at over $97 million and a microscope recorded at $11 million.
The Inspector General also reported that USDA does not fully comply with
certain key laws and regulations. For example, like most other federal
agencies, USDA does not substantially comply with the three requirements of
the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act- federal financial systems
requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the Standard
General Ledger at the transaction level. Furthermore, the Department has not
fully addressed problems related to compliance with the Chief Financial
Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act). Specifically, USDA has not (1) implemented
a fully integrated financial information system; (2) conducted required
biennial reviews of the fees, royalties, and other charges for services
imposed by USDA's agencies; and (3) made recommendations on revising those
charges to reflect the costs incurred by the USDA agencies in providing
those services, as required by the CFO Act. In addition, USDA continues to
have significant problems with its electricity loan portfolio. In
September 2000, we reported that the Department had incurred several billion
dollars in loan losses and continues to experience problems with its
financially troubled generation and transmission borrowers. For
example, from fiscal year 1992 through July 1999, the Rural Utilities
Service wrote off $1. 8 billion of debt related to financially troubled
generation and
transmission borrowers and, as directed by the bankruptcy courts, is in the
process of writing off an additional $3 billion in loans to one borrower.
USDA has
incurred additional losses totaling $7. 2 million in the form of forgiveness
of interest due to the Department as a result of restructuring the loans of
another financially troubled borrower. Furthermore, increased competition in
the electricity industry has increased the risk that the federal government
will incur future losses on loans to the Department's generation and
transmission borrowers. USDA has completed several actions and begun others
that, if successfully implemented, represent important steps toward first
achieving a “clean” opinion on its
financial statements and ultimately obtaining overall financial
accountability. USDA has also recognized the need to improve its financial
systems and, according to USDA's Chief Financial Officer, has obtained
additional
funding to address this issue. Also, USDA has created a project team to
develop the financial systems and standards necessary to implement its new
accounting system and achieve reforms required by financial management
legislation. Currently, USDA's key financial
management goal is to achieve a “clean” opinion on its financial
statements for fiscal year 2001. However, to correct many of its deeply
rooted problems, USDA must sustain top management's commitment and have
substantial additional resources devoted to addressing its accounting and
reporting deficiencies. Moreover, if USDA is to achieve financial
accountability, it must also fundamentally improve its underlying internal
controls, financial management systems, and operations that
allow for the routine production of accurate, relevant, and timely data to
support program management and accountability. Key Contact McCoy Williams,
Acting Director
Financial Management and Assurance (202) 512- 6906 williamsm1@ gao. gov The
Forest Service The Forest Service is at a critical juncture in its
Must Provide the evolution. It is, therefore, important for the agency to
Congress and the provide the Congress and the public with a clear Public
With a Clear
understanding of what is being achieved with the funds Understanding of that
are being spent. However, we have concluded, and What It
the Forest Service agrees, that it is still several years Accomplishes With
away from attaining this goal. Appropriated
Accountability is important because the Forest Service Funds
is refocusing the mix of its activities, shifting from producing timber and
other goods and services toward restoring and protecting land health and
forest resources. It is also attempting to identify where or under what
circumstances it should restore degraded lands through active management
rather than allow
nature to take its course. These issues are controversial and represent
significant changes in the agency's mission and funding priorities as well
as in its management approaches. In addition, after the Forest Service
promised to become more accountable for its performance, the Congress twice
simplified the agency's budget structure, thus giving the Forest Service
greater discretion in deciding where to spend appropriated funds. However,
in neither instance did the agency fulfill its promise. We have observed
that, to provide the Congress and the public with a better understanding of
what it
accomplishes with appropriated funds, the Forest Service will need to link
its budget and organizational structures as well as its allocation criteria,
forest plans, and performance measures to its strategic goals, objectives,
and strategies. The agency has, in recent months, completed several actions
and begun others to improve performance accountability. For example, it has
revised its strategic plan, prepared under the Results Act, to better focus
on outcomes and results to be achieved over time and to better link
strategic goals and objectives to long- term measures and 5- year
milestones. The agency also plans to (1) implement a new budget process for
fiscal year 2003 to better link on- the- ground priorities, needs, and
capabilities to the strategic plan and (2) base instructions for formulating
out- year program budgets on the annual performance plan required under the
Results Act.
Despite these efforts, the Forest Service does not appear to be fully
committed to making performance accountability one of its top priorities,
and major hurdles to achieving performance accountability remain. For
instance, we have recommended that the agency revise its planning
regulations to require the national forests to clearly link their plans to
the Forest Service's strategic goals, objectives, and strategies. However,
on November 9, 2000, the agency promulgated new
planning regulations that merely require that its strategic plan be
“considered” in managing the national forests, not that forest
plans be clearly linked to the strategic plan. In addition, the agency has
no plan to replace its existing organizational structure with one that is
better linked to its strategic goals and objectives or to the way that work
is routinely accomplished on the
national forests. As a result, the national forests must continue to combine
projects and activities from multiple programs to address issues and
problems- such as reducing the risk of catastrophic wildfires to communities
and natural resources- that are not aligned with the Forest Service's
organizational
structure. Moreover, to date, the agency has not developed new annual
performance measures or improved existing ones to better align them with its
strategic goals and objectives and its long- term measures and activities.
We believe that the Congress could provide an incentive to the Forest
Service to become more accountable for its performance by requiring that any
further revisions to the agency's budget coincide with actions by the Forest
Service to correct remaining performance- related deficiencies. The Congress
could also help to expedite the process by requiring that the agency develop
a firm schedule to implement these actions.
Key Contact Barry T. Hill, Director Natural Resources and Environment (202)
512- 3841 Hillb@ gao. gov Problems Persist in USDA's civil rights program
has long been troubled by a
Processing variety of problems and internal discord. The Secretary
Discrimination of Agriculture has acknowledged that the civil rights
Complaints
program is in serious need of repair and has made civil rights a top
priority. However, while some progress has been made in addressing
identified weaknesses, many of the problems are intransigent, and civil
rights continues to be a serious management challenge at USDA.
In December 1996, in response to allegations of discrimination at USDA, the
Secretary appointed the Civil Rights Action Team to review civil rights
issues and develop recommendations, as appropriate. The team's resulting
report described serious problems in the civil rights program and made 92
recommendations to address the problems. Since then, we and USDA's Office of
Inspector General have issued reports with many
recommendations concerning ongoing problems in employment and program
discrimination. Specifically, in January 1999, we reported that despite
efforts to process discrimination complaints more expeditiously, USDA was
not processing these complaints in a timely manner. As a result, USDA was
failing to comply with federal regulations that affect the livelihood and
well- being of individuals who believe they have been discriminated
against. We made recommendations aimed at addressing a number of long-
standing problems that were impeding USDA's efforts to improve its
processing timeliness. These problems included ? continuing human capital
issues relating to management turnover and reorganizations in USDA's Office
of Civil Rights;
? inadequate staff and managerial expertise; ? a lack of clear, up- to- date
guidance and procedures;
and ? poor working relationships and communication
within the Office of Civil Rights and between the office and other USDA
entities.
The human capital problems in USDA's Office of Civil Rights can be seen as
part of a broader pattern of human capital shortcomings that have eroded
mission capabilities across the federal government. See our High- Risk
Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263, January 2001) for a discussion of human
capital as a newly designated governmentwide high- risk area. The Inspector
General has issued seven evaluations of the Department's civil rights
program since February 1997. The most recent evaluation, issued in March
2000, 6 6 Office of Civil Rights: Management of Employment Complaints
(60801- 3- Hq) and Office of Civil Rights: Status of the Implementation of
Recommendations Made in Prior Evaluations of Program Complaints (60801- 4-
Hq).
reported that, among other things, many of the Inspector General's prior
recommendations had not been acted upon. The Inspector General also reported
that the Office of Civil Rights' employment discrimination database was
unreliable, its case files were chaotic, and it continued to be inefficient
in processing program
complaints. In testimony before the Senate Agriculture Committee in
September 2000, we noted that USDA had not fully implemented any of our
recommendations. Subsequent to our testimony, the Secretary stated that
while USDA had made progress in addressing its problems, more needed to be
done. In that regard, in October 2000, USDA published a long- term
improvement plan, and the Secretary announced that the Department had hired
three firms to go into those USDA field offices with high volumes of
discrimination
complaints to determine why the complaints persist and to identify factors
that contribute to discrimination.
Key Contact Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director Natural Resources and Environment
(202) 512- 3841 dyckmanl@ gao. gov
Related GAO Products Improving USDA's Farm Service Agency: Updated Status of
the Farm Loan
Multibillion- Dollar Farm Loan Program (GAO- 01- 222, Programs Jan. 10,
2001) Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks (GAO/ OCG- 99- 2, Jan. 1999). Farm Service Agency: Information
on Farm Loans and Losses (GAO/ RCED- 99- 18, Nov. 27, 1998).
Farm Service Agency: Status of Farm Loan Portfolio and the Use of Three
Contracting Provisions for Loan Servicing (GAO/ RCED- 98- 141, May 5, 1998).
High- Risk Series: Quick Reference Guide (GAO/ HR- 97- 2, Feb. 1997). Farm
Loans: Information on the Status of USDA's Portfolio (GAO/ T- RCED- 97- 78,
Feb. 21, 1997). High- Risk Series: Quick Reference Guide (GAO/ HR- 95- 2,
Feb. 1995). High- Risk Series: Farmers Home Administration's Farm Loan
Programs (GAO/ HR- 93- 1, Dec. 1992).
Improving the U. S. Department of Agriculture: State Office Collocation
Delivery of
(GAO/ RCED- 00- 208R, June 30, 2000). Services to Farmers
USDA Reorganization: Progress Mixed in Modernizing the Delivery of Services
(GAO/ RCED- 00- 43, Feb. 3, 2000). U. S. Department of Agriculture:
Administrative Streamlining Is Expected to Continue Through 2002 (GAO/ RCED-
99- 34, Dec. 11, 1998).
U. S. Department of Agriculture: Status of Closing and Consolidating County
Offices (GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 250, July 29, 1998). Farm Programs: Service to
Farmers Will Likely Change as Farm Service Agency Continues to Reduce Staff
and Close Offices (GAO/ RCED- 98- 136, May 1, 1998).
Farm Programs: Administrative Requirements Reduced and Further Program
Delivery Changes Possible (GAO/ RCED- 98- 98, Apr. 20, 1998). Farm Programs:
Impact of the 1996 Farm Act on County Office Workload (GAO/ RCED- 97- 214,
Aug. 19, 1997). Maintaining Food Food Assistance: Reducing the Trafficking
of Food Assistance Program
Stamp Benefits (GAO/ RCED- 00- 250, July 19, 2000). Integrity
Food Stamp Program: Better Use of Electronic Data Could Result in
Disqualifying More Recipients Who Traffic Benefits (GAO/ RCED- 00- 61, Mar.
7, 2000). Food Assistance: Efforts to Control Fraud and Abuse in the Child
and Adult Care Food Program Should Be Strengthened (GAO/ RCED- 00- 12, Nov.
29, 1999).
Food Stamp Program: Storeowners Seldom Pay Financial Penalties Owed for
Program Violations (GAO/ RCED- 99- 91, May 11, 1999). Minimizing
Food Safety: Overview of Food Safety and Inspection Foodborne Service and
Food and Drug Administration
Illnesses Expenditures (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 300, Sept. 20, 2000).
Food Irradiation: Available Research Indicates That Benefits Outweigh Risks
(GAO/ RCED- 00- 217, Aug. 24, 2000).
Food Safety: Actions Needed by USDA and FDA to Ensure That Companies
Promptly Carry Out Recalls (GAO/ RCED- 00- 195, Aug. 17, 2000). Food Safety:
U. S. Needs a Single Agency to Administer a Unified, Risk- Based Inspection
System (GAO/ T- RCED- 99- 256, Aug. 4, 1999). Food Safety: Opportunities to
Redirect Federal Resources and Funds Can Enhance Effectiveness (GAO/ RCED-
98- 224, Aug. 6, 1998).
Food Safety: Federal Efforts to Ensure the Safety of Imported Foods Are
Inconsistent and Unreliable (GAO/ RCED- 98- 103, Apr. 30, 1998). Food
Safety: Fundamental Changes Needed to Improve the Nation's Food Safety
System (GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 24, Oct. 8, 1997).
Strengthening Information Security: USDA Needs to Implement Its
USDA's Information Departmentwide Information Security Plan Security (GAO/
AIMD- 00- 217, Aug. 10, 2000).
USDA Information Security: Weaknesses at National Finance Center Increase
Risk of Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure (GAO/ AIMD- 99- 227, July 30,
1999).
Enhancing USDA's Financial Management: Impact of RUS' Electricity Loan
Ability to Account Restructurings (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 288, Sept. 29, 2000).
for Its Financial Activities
Financial Management: USDA Continues to Face Major Financial Management
Challenges (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 334, Sept. 27, 2000).
Credit Reform: Improving Rural Development's Credit Program Cost Estimates
(GAO/ AIMD- 00- 286R, Aug. 22, 2000). Financial Management: USDA Faces Major
Financial Management Challenges (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 115, Mar. 21, 2000).
Improving Forest Service: Actions Needed for the Agency to Performance
Become More Accountable for Its Performance Accountability at (GAO/ T- RCED-
00- 236, June 29, 2000). the Forest Service Forest Service: Status of
Efforts to Improve Accountability (GAO/ T- RCED/ AIMD- 00- 93, Feb. 16,
2000). Forest Service: A Framework for Improving Accountability (GAO/ RCED/
AIMD- 00- 2, Oct. 13, 1999).
High- Risk Series: An Update (GAO/ HR- 99- 1, Jan. 1999). Improving the
U. S. Department of Agriculture: Problems in Processing Efficiency of
Discrimination Complaints (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 286,
USDA's Civil Rights Sept. 12, 2000).
Office U. S. Department of Agriculture: Problems Continue to Hinder the
Timely Processing of Discrimination
Complaints (GAO/ RCED- 99- 38, Jan. 29, 1999).
Performance and Accountability Series
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective
(GAO- 01- 241)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Agriculture
(GAO- 01- 242)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce (GAO-
01- 243)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-
01- 244)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education (GAO-
01- 245)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy (GAO-
01- 246)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services (GAO- 01- 247)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing and
Urban Development (GAO- 01- 248)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Interior
(GAO- 01- 249)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice (GAO-
01- 250)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor (GAO- 01-
251)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State (GAO- 01-
252)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Transportation
(GAO- 01- 253)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the Treasury
(GAO- 01- 254)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs (GAO- 01- 255)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Agency for International
Development (GAO- 01- 256)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency (GAO- 01- 257)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (GAO- 01- 258)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(GAO- 01- 259)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business Administration
(GAO- 01- 260)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration (GAO- 01- 261)
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U. S. Postal Service (GAO-
01- 262)
High- Risk Series: An Update (GAO- 01- 263)
GAO United States General Accounting Office
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Comptroller General of the United States
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Washington, D. C. 20548
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