Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the	 
Munition Requirements Determination Process (05-APR-01, 	 
GAO-01-18).							 
								 
To determine the number and type of munitions needed, the	 
military services annually evaluate their munition requirements  
using a multiphase analytical process. The Department of Defense 
is working to ensure that the requirements determination process 
results in accurate numbers and types of munitions necessary to  
defeat threats as specified in the Defense Planning Guidance.	 
While the Department has made progress and has identified	 
specific areas still requiring attention, there is no clear plan 
with time frames for resolving key issues. Some of these issues  
have only been partially completed and others are in the early	 
stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates have not been
completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been updated, 
nor have decisions been made regarding more detailed warfighting 
scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the	 
reliability of the services' munitions requirements remain	 
uncertain and could adversely affect munitions planning,	 
programming, budgeting, and industrial production base decisions.
Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities-Based 
Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of	 
the munitions requirements will remain uncertain.		 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-18						        
    ACCNO:   A00749						        
    TITLE:   Defense Logistics: Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability  
             of the Munition Requirements Determination Process               
     DATE:   04/05/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Defense budgets					 
	     Defense contingency planning			 
	     Defense procurement				 
	     Logistics						 
	     Munitions						 
	     Procurement planning				 
	     Reporting requirements				 

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GAO-01-18

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support,
Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office GAO

April 2001 DEFENSE LOGISTICS Unfinished Actions Limit Reliability of the
Munition Requirements Determination Process

GAO- 01- 18

Page i GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics Letter 1 Appendix I Scope and
Methodology 16

Appendix II Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports 17

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 19

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment 21 Contents

Page 1 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

April 5, 2001 The Honorable James M. Inhofe Chairman, Subcommittee on
Readiness and Management Support Committee on Armed Services United States
Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: The military services' budget for conventional
munitions 1 is about $4.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 and is projected to
increase annually until fiscal year 2005 when the budget is expected to be
about $5.4 billion. To determine the number and type of munitions needed,
the services annually evaluate their munition requirements using a
multiphase analytical process. The accuracy of this process is critical as
its outcome defines the numbers and types of munitions necessary to defeat
potential threats; affects munitions planning, programming, and budgeting
decisions; and influences industrial production base decisions. Since 1994,
the Department of Defense Inspector General has issued 17 reports and we
have issued 3 reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns

about the accuracy of the process used by the Department of Defense to
determine these requirements. The Department of Defense has acknowledged the
weaknesses and is working to achieve a more accurate process for determining
these requirements.

As requested, we assessed the Department of Defense's progress in improving
the requirement determination process. Specifically, this report addresses
(1) the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the

process and (2) those areas where additional actions are needed. The scope
and methodology of our work are described in appendix I. This is the second
in a series of reports that addresses ammunition management issues. 2 1
Conventional munitions are nonnuclear ammunition or ordnance, including
rockets, missiles projectiles, and bombs required by a given force structure
to neutralize a threat.

2 Defense Management: Army Could Achieve Efficiencies by Consolidating
Ammunition Management (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 230, Sept. 30, 1999).

United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548

Page 2 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

The Department of Defense is improving the munition procurement requirement
determination process. Improvements are being implemented to correct
weaknesses in the process that could result in over or

understated requirements. Improvements include coordinating the threat
assessment, updating projections about the amount of time it would take a
potential enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and
damage assessments for input into the services' battle simulation models,
modifying the target allocation process, and making a more comprehensive
risk assessment- all important components of the requirement determination
process. Notwithstanding the above improvements, uncertainties remain about
the

process's reliability because of actions to be completed and other issues
that are still under deliberation. The Department has yet to complete a
database providing detailed descriptions of the types of targets on large
enemy installations that would likely be encountered based on warfighting
scenarios; information the services and warfighting Commanders in Chief 3
also need in order to make accurate munitions decisions. And although the

Department has provided $34 million to update its munitions effectiveness
database, it has not set a time frame for completing the update. Finally,
the Department is debating whether (1) to include greater specificity in its
warfighting scenarios and (2) to rate the warfighting scenarios by the
probability of their occurrence. 4 These process components significantly
affect the numbers and types of munitions needed to meet the warfighting
Commanders in Chief's objectives. Until the Department completes all of

these improvements and fully incorporates them into the requirement
determination process, concerns about the reliability of the process will
remain and could adversely affect munitions planning, programming,

budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. This report recommends
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics take the lead in establishing a plan
for resolving the outstanding issues. Such a plan should include time frames
for resolving the outstanding issues, metrics

3 The Commander in Chief is the senior U. S. military officer of the Unified
Combatant Command. The Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from
two or more military services, has broad and continuing missions, and is
normally organized on a geographical basis. There are currently nine Unified
Combatant Commands. 4 These scenarios present conditions that may exist
during the conduct of two major theaters of war. Results in Brief

Page 3 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

for measuring progress, and milestones for implementing the proposed
changes. The Department concurred with the report and outlined actions it
has underway addressing all aspects of the report's recommendations.

The military services annually determine their current and future munition
procurement requirements in accordance with the Defense Planning Guidance. 5
Historically, the Defense Planning Guidance has directed the military
services to arm a given force structure to win two nearly simultaneous major
theaters of war. In recent years, the Department of Defense has engaged in a
number of military operations that vary in size and circumstance from a
major theater of war; consequently, the current National Military Strategy 6
and the Defense Planning Guidance call for the

services to prepare for a number of small- scale contingency 7 operations in
addition to the two major theaters of war.

The conditions under which small- scale operations are fought may differ
from conditions in a major theater war, which may increase the services'
requirements for highly technical precision munitions 8 designed to limit
loss of life and expensive military assets. The increased use of precision
munitions in recent conflicts reduced inventories and raised questions about
whether adequate attention had been paid to the impact of smallscale
contingencies on the ability of U. S. forces to respond and sustain
operations for the two major theaters of war. Of the approximately $4.2
billion of munitions the services are planning to procure in fiscal year

2001, 46 percent (or $1.9 billion) will be used to procure precision
munitions designed to reduce the number of conventional munitions

5 The Secretary of Defense and his staff prepare the Defense Planning
Guidance, issue policy, and articulate strategic objectives that reflect the
National Military Strategy. It includes the Secretary of Defense's force and
resource guidance to the military departments, other combat support agencies
and the unified commands.

6 The National Military Strategy provides the advice of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over
the next 3 to 5 years. 7 Small- scale contingencies include, among other
operations, peacekeeping operations,

humanitarian relief and evacuations, monitoring and enforcing cease- fires,
and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict. 8
Precision munitions refer both to guided and smart munitions. Guided
munitions are one- on- one munitions- one munition for one target- that are
guided to their target through a targeted acquisition sensor or laser
designation system. Smart munitions are “fire and forget” and
have an autonomous capability to search, detect, classify, select, and
engage targets with a lethal mechanism. Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

needed to defeat enemy targets while at the same time limiting loss of
expensive weapons systems and life. By fiscal year 2005, the services are
planning to increase their procurement of precision guided munitions by
about 5 percent. In 1994, to generate consistent munition requirements
Department- wide,

and to ensure that the military services have both an adequate supply and
the appropriate types of munitions to address changing mission needs, the
Department of Defense standardized the process by which the services
determine their munition requirements. In 1997, the Department of

Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and
responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as they
develop their munition requirements. This instruction is referred to as the
Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements process and is the

responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics.

The instruction describes a multiphased analytical process that begins when
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops, in consultation with the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and the
warfighting Commanders in Chief, policy on munition requirements for

the Defense Planning Guidance. The Defense Intelligence Agency uses the
Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying warfighting scenarios as well
as other intelligence information to develop a threat assessment. This
assessment contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that the
United States and allied forces could expect to meet for each of the

two major theaters of war scenarios. The warfighting Commanders in Chief,
responsible for the major theaters of war scenarios, in coordination with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the threat assessment to allocate each
service a share of the identified targets by phases of the war.

Next, the services develop their combat requirements using battle simulation
models and scenarios to determine the number and mix of munitions needed to
meet the Commanders in Chief's objectives

separately by each major theater of war scenario. To develop these
requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and assumptions from
the Defense Planning Guidance requirements, warfighting scenarios, and
target allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for
enemy targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and
installations. Other munition requirements include munitions (1) needed for
forces not committed to support combat operations, (2) to provide a post-
major theater of war combat capability, and (3) to train the force,
Requirements Process

Page 5 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

support service programs, and peacetime requirements. These requirements, in
addition to the combat requirement, comprise the services' total munitions
requirement. The total munitions requirement is then balanced along with
projected inventory and affordability to determine how many of each munition
the services will procure within their specified funding limits and used to
develop the services' Program Objectives Memorandum 9 and Presidential
budget submission.

Despite Department efforts to standardize the process and generate
consistent requirements, many questions have been raised about the accuracy
or reliability of the requirements determination process. Between the
Department of Defense Inspector General and our agency, 20 reports have been
issued that state that systemic problems - such as questionable and
inconsistently applied data, inconsistency of processes

among and between services, and unclear guidance - have inflated the
services' requirements for certain categories of munitions. A list of these
reports is included in appendix II. The Department acknowledged these
weaknesses and recognized that inflated requirements can negatively

affect munitions planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as
assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base.
As a result, the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000- 2005,

dated April 1998, directed that a Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements
working group 10 develop recommendations to improve the accuracy of the
process. In October 1998, the group recommended several corrective actions
to address weaknesses identified by both the Inspector General and our
agency. 9 A Program Objectives Memorandum details the specific forces and
programs that the service proposes over the 6 year Future Years Defense Plan
period to meet the military

requirements identified in the planning guidance within the financial limits
that are mandated by the Secretary of Defense. 10 Representatives from the
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Policy and Requirements and Plans, the Joint Staff, the
Combatant Commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military
services make up the Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements working
group. Prior Audits Note

Problems

Page 6 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Based on the recommendations of the Capabilities- Based Munitions
Requirements working group, the Department has improved several key
components of the requirements determination process. Process improvements
include Department- wide coordination of the threat assessment, updated
projections as to the amount of time it takes a

potential enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and
target damage assessments, modifications to the target allocation process,
and a risk assessment that includes the impact of small- scale contingency
operations. The Department expects these improvements to correct weaknesses
in the process that can result in over- or understated munition
requirements.

The Defense Intelligence Agency develops an annual threat assessment that
identifies potential threats that the United States and allied forces could
expect to meet for each of the two major theaters of war scenarios. The
Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements instruction directs that the
Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff use the threat assessment
to allocate targets to each of the services. The Department has

identified weaknesses in this area and taken steps to strengthen this
assessment.

Defense Intelligence Agency officials stated that in the past, the services
could, based on input from their own intelligence sources or direction from
the warfighting Commanders in Chief, develop an independent threat analysis
that could result in the services planning to destroy the same

targets and, consequently, overstating munitions requirements. To resolve
this issue, the working group directed that the Defense Intelligence Agency
fully coordinate the threat assessment with the services and throughout the
Defense intelligence communities. In accordance with this directive, the
Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated the most recent threat assessment
that describes the threat for the fiscal year 2002- 2007 planning cycle. By
adopting a coordinated threat assessment, the Department expects to be
better able to ensure that the services' munition requirements will be more
accurate. Actions Being Taken

to Improve the Process

Coordinated Threat Assessment

Coordinated threat assessment Revised repair rates for damaged targets and
target damage assessments

Modified the target allocation process Revised risk assessments

Page 7 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Repair rates are a projection of the amount of time it takes a potential
enemy to repair and return a target to the battlefield and determine the
number of attacks needed to destroy a target, which directly influences
munition quantities. Since the services use these rates as input into their
warfighting simulation models to determine their munition requirements,
these rates should be current and reflect a country's existing repair
capability. In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General review
of this process, the Department has taken steps to address the quality of
its data on projected repair rates.

A Department of Defense Inspector General audit 11 of service requirements
for specific categories of munitions reported that the services used repair
rates that overstated the requirement for these munitions. According to an
official from the Joint Staff, the services were using repair rates for
countries from the Cold War era that were able to repair and return damaged
property to the battle more quickly than could countries used in today's war
planning scenarios. To address this issue, in

December 1999, the Defense Intelligence Agency updated and standardized the
repair rates the services used in their battle simulation models, and the
Department expects these actions will address the issue of overstated
requirements.

Battle damage assessments are more critical to munitions requirement
planning with the increased use of precision guided munitions and changes in
warfighting. Previously, munitions were fired from a range that allowed a
visual damage assessment, but precision guided munitions are often fired
miles from the target, which eliminates the ability to visually assess
whether the target has been damaged or destroyed. Knowing in

advance the probability that a specific munition will destroy the target is
necessary to accurately determine the number and mix of munitions that will
be required. To improve battle damage assessments, the Defense Intelligence
Agency developed battle damage assessment factors that measure (1) whether a
target was hit, (2) the extent of the damage, and (3) whether the objective
was met. These factors are more predictive if the munition has a guidance
system that provides damage information to the launch site. According to a
Navy official, using the newly developed battle damage assessment

11 Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions
Requirements,

Department of Defense Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2000. Revised Repair Rates
and

Assessments

Page 8 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

factors for the fiscal year 2002- 2007 requirements planning cycle
significantly reduced the requirement for certain categories of naval
munitions. According to an official from the Joint Staff, these assessments
have also reduced the potential for overstated munition requirements for the
services' air components.

Allocating targets to the services is one of the most critical steps in the
requirement determination process as it defines the services' role in the
war fight and determines the number and type of munitions for which the
services need to plan. In accordance with the Capabilities- Based Munitions
Requirements instruction, the warfighting Commanders in Chief are required
to allocate targets to the services for their area of responsibility. This
is an area that has proven problematic in reaching an agreement among the
services, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided direction to
strengthen the process.

In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General audit 12 critical
of the Central Command's allocation process, a 1999 pilot project was
initiated that transferred the U. S. Central Command's target allocation
role to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in coordination with the services,
developed a methodology to allocate targets. According to officials at the
Joint Staff and the Central Command, the methodology was intended to better
align the Commanders in Chief's near- term objectives (which

generally cover a 2- year period) and the services' long- term planning
horizon (which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that
the Joint Staff could validate the services' munition requirements by
matching requirements to target allocations. The Army, the Navy, and a
warfighting Commander in Chief objected to the pilot's results and
criticized the methodology used to allocate the targets because it allocated
significantly more targets to the Air Force and fewer targets to the Army.
Army officials objected that the methodology did not adequately address land
warfare, which is significantly different than air warfare. 13 The Navy did
not concur with the results, citing the lack

12 Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U. S. Central Command
and U. S. Forces Korea, Department of Defense Inspector General, May 20,
1998. 13 The Army's position was that unlike the air services that plan
munition requirements to destroy assigned targets, assigning specific
targets to a land battle is meaningless as the number of targets destroyed
may not be an accurate measure of a successful operation. Specifically, in a
land battle, circumventing the enemy or surrounding them and cutting off
their supply lines may meet the Commander in Chief's operational plan.
Improved Target

Allocation Process

Page 9 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

of recognition for the advanced capabilities of future munitions. U. S.
Central Command officials disagreed with the results, stating that a change
in methodology should not in and of itself cause the allocation to shift. In
July 2000, citing substantial concerns about the pilot, the Under

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology suspended the target
allocation for fiscal year 2000 and directed that the services use the same
allocations applied to the fiscal year 2002- 2007 Program Objectives
Memorandum.

In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff structurally changed the threat
allocation process to address the services' and the warfighting Commander in
Chief's objections. The warfighting Commanders in Chief will now prepare a
near- term target allocation using a methodology developed by the Joint
Chiefs. Each warfighting Commander in Chief will develop two allocations-
one for strike (air services) forces and one for engagement (land troops)
forces for his area of responsibility. The first will allocate specific
targets to strike forces under the assumption that the air services can
eliminate the majority of enemy targets. The second allocation will assume
that less than perfect conditions exist (such as bad weather), which will
limit the air services' ability to destroy their assigned targets and
require that the engagement force complete the mission. The Commanders in
Chief will not assign specific targets to the engagement

forces, but they will estimate the size of the expected remaining enemy land
force. The Army and the Marines will then be expected to arm themselves to
defeat those enemy forces. The Joint Staff will use the Commanders in
Chief's near- year threat distribution and extrapolate that information to
the last year of the Program Objectives Memorandum for the purpose of the
services' munitions requirement planning. The Department expects that these
modifications should correct over- or understated requirements and bridge
the gap between the warfighting Commanders in Chief's near- term interest
and objectives and the services' longer planning horizon. Until recently,
the Department lacked an assessment of the impact of small- scale
contingencies on munition requirements, and uncertainties

existed regarding the impact on service abilities to meet the requirements
of the two major theaters of war. However, the Department has taken action
to better address this issue. Department Is Making Its

Risk Assessment More Comprehensive

Page 10 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

In October 1999, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 14 directed that
the Joint Staff coordinate an assessment of the risk associated with current
and projected munition inventories available for two major theaters of war
and inventories depleted by a challenging sequence of small- scale
contingency operations. According to an official from the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, the increased use of precision guided munitions during the
contingency operation in Kosovo 15 prompted several Department studies that
addressed whether the military services have sufficient munitions to fulfill
the two major theaters of war requirement. However, initial studies focused
on the difference between the services' two theaters of war requirement and
the actual number of munitions procured, but did not demonstrate the impact
of shortfalls of specific munitions on the services ability to respond to
two major theaters of war.

The assessment, completed in April 2000, which focused on inventories of
precision guided munitions, concluded that small- scale contingencies would
have a negligible impact on the Commanders in Chief's ability to meet the
two major theaters of war requirement. An official from the Joint Staff
stated that the study's conclusion was based on the assumption that in a
major theater war, precision guided munitions might be used during

the early phases of the war for critical targets and then other, less
accurate munitions could be substituted. However, according to an Air Force
official, the assessment did show that small- scale contingency operations
negatively affect inventories of some precision munitions, which may limit
the Commanders in Chief's flexibility in conducting two major theater wars.
Department officials added that the assessment should give the services
information they need to plan for inventories of specific munitions that
would be affected more than others during contingency operations.

The Department is incorporating the actions that have been taken to improve
the process into a revised Capabilities- Based Munitions 14 The Joint
Requirements Oversight Council was formed over a decade ago to make
decisions about what mix of weapons is required to meet future threats and
to ensure against program duplication by the services. The Council is
composed of the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Vice Chief of
Staff, U. S. Army; the Vice Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force; the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations; and the Assistant Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps. 15
While Kosovo is characterized as a contingency operation, Air Force
officials have stated that Kosovo stressed Air Force resources, based on the
number of missions flown, much like a major theater of war.

Page 11 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Requirements instruction that it expects to issue in the spring 2001 and to
be used to determine the services' fiscal year 2004- 2009 requirements.

Notwithstanding the corrective actions the Department has taken or has
underway to improve the process, other key components have either not been
completed or not been decided upon. The Department has not completed a
database listing detailed target characteristics for large

enemy installations based on warfighting scenarios and has not developed new
munitions effectiveness data to address deficiencies the services and the
Commanders in Chief have identified. Completion dates for these tasks have
been exceeded or not established. Additionally, the Department has not
determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in

the Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their
probability. Such an action could increase reliability of the requirement
determination process and ensure consistency in the services' analyses in
support of their requirements. The Department is in the process of
incorporating the completed actions into a revised Capabilities- Based

Munitions Requirements instruction to be issued in the spring 2001 and used
by the services to determine their fiscal year 2004- 2009 munitions
procurement requirements. However, the Department has no clear plan of
action for resolving these issues or a time frame for their completion.
Until

the remaining tasks are completed and incorporated into the process,
questions are likely to remain regarding the accuracy of the munition
requirements process as well as the Department's ability to identify
munitions most appropriate to defeat potential threats.

According to Department officials, the Department lacks a common picture of
the number and types of targets on large enemy installations as identified
in the warfighting scenarios and as a result, the services have been
identifying targets on enemy installations differently. According to an

official from the Joint Staff, the Department has been concerned that this
lack of common target characteristics could over- or understate requirements
for certain munition categories. To resolve this issue, the Joint Chiefs
instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination with the
warfighting Commanders in Chief, to develop target templates Unresolved
Issues Affect Reliability of

Munition Requirements Process

List of Targets Is Overdue

List of targets

Munitions effectiveness data Warfighting scenarios

Page 12 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

that would provide a common picture of the types of potential targets on
enemy installations. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, the
services and the Commanders in Chief could also use this information

to attack these targets with munitions that would minimize damage to the
installation, reduce reconstruction costs after a conflict, and allow U. S.
forces to use it if needed. An official from the Joint Staff stated that
while the Defense Intelligence Agency was to complete the target templates
by August 31, 2000, it has yet to do so and a specific completion date has
not

been established. How effective a munition is against a target can predict
the number of munitions necessary to defeat it. According to an official at
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics,

funding to maintain the manual containing this information has historically
been limited. The Department recognizes that munitions effectiveness data is
a critical component for requirements planning and that outdated

information could over- or understate munition requirements. To address this
shortfall, the Department provided $34 million in fiscal year 2001 to update
and publish munitions effectiveness data for use by the services in their
battle simulation models. At the time of our review, the Department

did not know when this project would be completed. The Defense Planning
Guidance contains an appendix of warfighting scenarios that detail
conditions that may exist during the conduct of the two major theaters of
war; these scenarios are developed with input from several sources,
including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff,

and the services. This appendix provides a common base line from which the
services determine their munition requirements. However, according to
several Department officials, the warfighting scenarios in the Defense
Planning Guidance need to include more detail. Specifically, these officials
stated that information about the potential constraints under which the

war will be fought and casualty and asset loss guidance can affect the types
and numbers of munitions the services plan to procure. Some Department
officials stated that the Defense Planning Guidance used to

contain specifics on the conduct of the war fight; however, when the
Department adopted the Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements
instruction, the detail was eliminated in favor of broader guidance.

Conversely, other Department officials disagree with the need for increased
guidance. According to an official from the Office of Secretary of Defense,
Requirements and Plans, additional guidance and specificity is Munitions
Effectiveness

Data Not Yet Updated Department Undecided on Specificity Needed in
Warfighting Scenarios

Page 13 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

not necessary because the services should use the scenarios in the Defense
Planning Guidance to plan their force structure rather than their munition
requirements. Some Air Force and Army officials agree, stating that the
Defense Planning Guidance provides sufficient guidance for munition planning
for the mandatory two major theaters of war scenarios. The chief of the Army
Combat Support War Reserve Branch suggested that specific guidance would
only be necessary if the Army was required to

plan for small- scale contingencies with restrictions on the conduct of the
war fight. However, according to some Department officials, while the
Defense Planning Guidance provides the services a basis for their force
structure, it is also an integral part of the requirements determination
process. From this vantage point, Department officials suggest that if
small- scale contingency operations are becoming a part of an overall

military strategy then the Defense Planning Guidance should reflect this by
incorporating more detailed guidance on the conduct of such operations. By
providing additional guidance on the conduct of the war fight, such as
limiting loss of weapon systems and lives, the services would be better able
to plan their munition requirements to ensure the stated conditions were
met.

In addition to lacking sufficient specificity on warfighting scenarios, the
Defense Planning Guidance does not rank the scenarios by the probability of
their occurrence. In 1998, we reported that the services were using the
warfighting scenario that supported additional requirements for specific
munitions. In addition, the requirement for a specific Army munition was

inflated partly because the Army disregarded the Defense Planning Guidance
scenarios and instead used two scenarios it had developed independently.
Consequently, the requirement for the munition was tripled and the Army's
justification for the requirement was inconsistent with the Commanders in
Chief's objectives and the Army's doctrine.

To ensure that the services plan for the most likely scenario in the Defense
Planning Guidance and not use unlikely events to support certain munitions,
the Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements working group requested that
the Defense Intelligence Agency develop probability factors for the various
warfighting scenarios. While the Defense Intelligence Agency has developed
these factors, at the time of our review, the

Department was still debating whether to prioritize the scenarios. The
Department is working to ensure that the requirements determination process
results in accurate numbers and types of munitions necessary to defeat
threats as specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. While the Conclusion

Page 14 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Department has made progress and has identified specific areas still
requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving
key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and
others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates
have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been
updated, nor have decisions been made regarding more detailed warfighting
scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the reliability of the
services' munitions requirements remain uncertain and could adversely affect
munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and industrial production base
decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a revised Capabilities- Based
Management Requirements instruction is issued, the accuracy of the munitions
requirements will remain uncertain.

To ensure that additional actions are taken to improve the munitions
requirements determination process we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology

and Logistics to take the lead in establishing a plan for resolving
outstanding issues. Such a plan should include time frames for resolving the
outstanding issues, metrics for measuring progress, and milestones for
implementing the proposed changes. Specific areas needing attention include

? completing target templates,

? publishing the updated munitions effectiveness data,

? resolving the issues involving the level of detail to include in the
Defense Planning Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the
warfighting scenarios,

? incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement process in a
revised Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements instruction, and

? establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions requirements once all
improvements have been implemented. The Director of Strategic and Tactical
Systems in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics provided written comments to our report, which are
included in appendix III. The Department concurred with the report and
outlined actions underway addressing all aspects of the report's
recommendations such as resolving

the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense Planning
Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the warfighting
scenarios, incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement
process in a revised Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements
Recommendation for

Executive Action Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

Page 15 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

instruction, and establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions
requirements once all improvements have been made. The Department also
provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as
appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees; the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the
Acting Secretary of the Army, Joseph W. Westphal; the Acting Secretary of
the Air Force, Lawrence J. Delaney; the Acting Secretary of the Navy,

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; the Director, Office and Management and Budget,
Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson.

Please contact me at (202) 512- 8412 if you or your staff has any questions
concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IV.

Sincerely yours, Barry W. Holman, Director Defense Capabilities and
Management

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 16 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

To assess the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the
munition requirements determination process, we reviewed the Department's
Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements to ascertain
roles and oversight responsibilities and to identify required inputs into
the process. We reviewed the Defense

Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000- 2005 and the update for fiscal
years 2001- 2005 to determine what instruction the Department provided to
guide the services as they determine their munition requirements. To
identify factors that affect the accuracy of the requirements determination
process, we reviewed 20 Department of Defense Inspector General and GAO
reports relating to the Department's munitions requirements determination
process. We also reviewed the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council memorandums to determine the focus of the Joint Staff's
study on the impact of small- scale contingency operations on inventories of
specific munitions. We met with service officials to determine how each
service develops its munition requirements and obtained data on the
assumptions and inputs that go into its simulation models. We also obtained
information on how each service reviews the outcome of its munitions
requirement process. In addition, we obtained information on the Commanders
in Chief's Operating Plan, Integrated Priority List, and other planning data
necessary to assist the services with their requirements planning.

To address those areas needing additional action, we met with Department and
service officials to obtain their views on the impact of how the unresolved
issues could affect the accuracy of the requirements determination process.
In addition, we obtained documentation pertaining to the areas still needing
action. We met with senior officials and performed work at the Offices of
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D. C.; the Joint Chief of Staff,
Washington, D. C.; and the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force
Base, Washington, D. C. We also interviewed senior officials from Army
Combat Support War Reserve Branch, Washington D. C.; Navy Requirements
Planning, Naval Air Acquisition Program, and Naval Surface Fire Support,
Washington, D. C.; Air Force

Munitions Requirements Weapons Division, Crystal City, Virginia; U. S.
Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii; U. S. Central Command, McDill Air Force
Base, Tampa, Florida; and U. S. Force Korea, Seoul, Korea. We

performed our review from December 1999 through November 2000 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I: Scope and
Methodology

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports Page 17 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions
Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2000.

Air Force Munitions Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector General,
Sept. 3, 1999. Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in
Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 105, July 22, 1999).

U. S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements,

Department of Defense Inspector General, May 10, 1999.

Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process,

Department of Defense Inspector General, Dec. 10, 1998. Weapons
Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed (GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 32,
Dec. 9, 1998). Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions, Department of
Defense Inspector General, Dec. 3, 1998. Army Quantitative Requirements for
Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 26, 1998.
Management Oversight of the Capabilities- Based Munitions Requirements
Process, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 22, 1998. Threat
Distributions for Requirements Planning at U. S. Central

Command and U. S. Forces Korea, Department of Defense Inspector General, May
20, 1998.

Army's and Marine Corps' Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I and II
Stinger Missiles, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 25, 1996. U.
S. Combat Air Power – Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction

Capabilities Could Save Billions, Department of Defense Inspector General,
May 13, 1996. Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti- Armor Weapon System
and

Associated Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 29,
1995. Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting
Office Reports

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General and General Accounting Office
Reports Page 18 GAO- 01- 18 Defense Logistics

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production,
and Development (GAO/ NSIAD- 95- 95, June 23, 1995). Acquisition Objectives
for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements for Shallow Water Oceanography,
Department of Defense Inspector General, May 15, 1995.

Army's Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for Anti- Armor
Systems and Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, March 29,
1995.

The Marine Corps' Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for
Anti- Armor Munitions for Ground Forces, Department of Defense Inspector
General, Oct. 24, 1994. The Navy's Process for Determining Quantitative
Requirements for

Anti- Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, Oct. 11,
1994. The Air Force's Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for

Anti- Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 17,
1994. Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti- Armor Munitions,
Department of Defense Inspector General, June 14, 1994.

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 19 GAO- 01- 18
Defense Logistics

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense Page 20 GAO- 01- 18
Defense Logistics

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment Page 21 GAO- 01- 18
Defense Logistics

Ronald Berteotti (214) 777- 5702 Patricia J. Nichol (214) 777- 5665

In addition to those named above, Patricia Sari- Spear made key
contributions to this report. Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgment GAO Contacts Acknowledgment (709458)

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