Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of
Aircraft (Briefing Report, 02/09/2001, GAO/GAO-01-163BR).
As the Department of Defense (DOD) enters the 21st century, the average
ages of its military weapon systems and equipment are increasing,
primarily because DOD has not routinely replaced equipment purchased
during the Cold War era. According to DOD officials, the aging of weapon
systems and equipment reduces readiness. Additionally, to keep pace with
the maintenance required for aging systems and equipment, the military
services testified that they have diverted funds from accounts
designated for modernization to accounts designated for operating and
support. DOD faces major challenges as it continues to implement its
current tactical aircraft modernization plans. The Navy and Air Force
will not be able to procure enough new tactical aircraft to reduce the
average age of tactical aircraft, and over the next 11 years, the
average age will continue to increase, especially in the Air Force. The
upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review provides an opportunity to assess
whether the issue of aging requires concerted attention.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-01-163BR
TITLE: Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Average Age of Aircraft
DATE: 02/09/2001
SUBJECT: Military procurement
Tactical air forces
Military aircraft
Equipment maintenance
Combat readiness
IDENTIFIER: DOD Future Years Defense Program
DOD Quadrennial Defense Review
A-10 Aircraft
AV-8B Aircraft
F-117 Aircraft
F-22 Aircraft
F-15 Aircraft
F-16 Aircraft
F/A-18C/D Aircraft
F/A-18E/F Aircraft
Joint Strike Fighter
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GAO-01-163BR
A
Report to the Secretary of Defense
February 2001 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average
Age of Aircraft GAO- 01- 163
Letter 3 Briefing Sections Briefing Section I: Tactical Aircraft Forces'
Investment Plans 8
Briefing Section II: Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age 32
Briefing Section III: Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging 46
Briefing Section IV: Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended 58 Briefing Section V: Conclusions and
Recommendations 66 Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 70
Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 72 Appendix III: GAO
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 75
Lett er
February 9, 2001 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense
Dear Mr. Secretary: As the Department of Defense (DOD) enters the 21st
century, the average ages of its military weapon systems and equipment are
increasing, primarily because DOD has not routinely replaced equipment
purchased during the Cold War era. According to Defense officials, the aging
of weapon systems and equipment reduces readiness. Additionally, to keep
pace with the maintenance required for aging systems and equipment, the
military services testified that they have diverted funds from accounts
designated for modernization to accounts designated for operating and
support. Concerns relating to aging systems and equipment extend to tactical
aircraft- which include those fixed- wing fighter and attack aircraft that
are
typically smaller in size, carry fewer weapons, and fly shorter unrefueled
distances than the larger bomber aircraft. Tactical aircraft have played key
roles in military actions in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo and are expected to
continue as an integral part of the future force structure. DOD has
recognized that these weapon systems have been aging as aircraft acquired in
the 1970s and 1980s are approaching the end of their service lives. The 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review, which established an overall investment strategy
for DOD, stated that among other things DOD should pursue a
focused modernization effort to replace aging systems and incorporate
cutting- edge technology into the force. Plans to modernize aging tactical
aircraft forces include procurement of over 3,700 new tactical aircraft
(F/ A- 18E/ Fs, F- 22s, and Joint Strike Fighters) and modification of
existing aircraft in the services' inventories. The new aircraft are
estimated to cost between $258 billion and $338 billion over 30 years ending
in 2026. A new
quadrennial review will soon be undertaken and is scheduled to be complete
in September 2001.
On November 14, 2000, we briefed staff from the Department on our analysis
of whether DOD's tactical aircraft modernization plans will permit the Navy
(including the Marine Corps) and Air Force to reduce the average
age of tactical aircraft. As part of this briefing, we also discussed
observations concerning (1) the consistency and reliability of information
used to determine the impact of aging on aircraft and (2) the extension of
the lives of certain aircraft. This report provides a copy of our briefing
and summarizes our key finding and observations. Based on your reported
interest in evaluating major weapon system acquisitions, and tactical
aircraft programs in particular, we believe this report will provide you
with useful information.
DOD's planned investment of $258 billion to $338 billion in new tactical
aircraft modernization is not likely to decrease the average age 1 of
tactical aircraft over the next 25 years. 2 In looking at individual service
procurement plans, our projections of average age show that at the midpoint
of the modernization plans in 2011, the average ages of both the
Navy and the Air Force tactical aircraft will likely increase. This increase
occurs in our projections because older aircraft are not expected to be
replaced by newer aircraft at a rate high enough to reduce average age. More
specifically, we project that in 2011, the average age of the Air Force's
tactical aircraft will grow from 13 to 21 years; for the Navy, it will
increase
from 10 to 11 years. By 2025, we project that the average age of Navy
aircraft will be about 10 years but that Air Force aircraft will have an
average age of 16 years. This is greater than in 1997, when the
modernization plans began. In our analysis of the modernization plans, we
observed that DOD currently does not have consistent and reliable
information to determine the impact of aircraft aging on readiness and
operating and support costs. Military leaders have testified they are
confident that aging equipment significantly
contributes to decreased readiness and increased operating and support costs
but that they were unable to clearly quantify the impact. The services
currently use standard DOD reliability and maintainability measurements that
can be influenced by factors other than aircraft age, making the 1 Aircraft
are designed to last for certain operating periods expressed in flying
hours. However, for overall force and replacement planning purposes, the
flying hours are translated into years of operation. Historically, DOD has
planned to retire aircraft after 20 years of operation. Assuming an even
distribution of aircraft by age, the average age goal for a force of
aircraft would then be 10 years, one- half the expected retirement age. We
were unable to identify current age goals, but the services had historical
average age goals for tactical aircraft. The Navy goal was 7.5 years based
on a 15- year aircraft life, while the Air Force was 11 years based on a 22-
year life. The Navy's goal is lower because the Navy's aircraft operate in a
more severe environment on aircraft carriers.
2 In projecting average ages, we assumed that new tactical aircraft would be
delivered according to the schedules in the services' modernization programs
as of December 1999. Any delays in these delivery schedules would result in
higher average ages for given periods of time.
measures less effective tools to predict and plan for the future effects of
age. Without good information or tools, Defense leaders may not be able to
convincingly support concerns relating to aging or to develop effective and
timely solutions to problems. The services are currently studying aging
aircraft and issues related to operations and support costs. The Navy is
focusing on specific problems like wiring and electronics. The Air Force is
assessing the overall management policies and structures needed to manage
aging issues.
We also observed that DOD and the services' approved financial plans for
2001 and future years do not include funding for structural modifications
that the services believe are essential for maintaining certain tactical
aircraft in the force. These modifications, estimated to cost about
$1, 344 million through fiscal year 2014, are necessary, according to the
Navy and the Air Force, to extend the useful lives of about 1,542 F/ A- 18C/
D and F- 16 aircraft. These modifications are essential for DOD to maintain
sufficient numbers of tactical aircraft to respond to the current defense
policy to fight in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Service
officials stated they plan to include funds for the structural modifications
in the fiscal year 2002 Future Years Defense Program that has not yet been
approved by DOD. Conclusions and
DOD faces a major challenge as it continues to implement its current
Recommendations for tactical aircraft modernization plans. The Navy and the
Air Force will not be able to procure enough new tactical aircraft to reduce
the average age of Executive Action
tactical aircraft, and over the next 11 years, the average age will continue
to increase, especially in the Air Force. The upcoming Quadrennial Defense
Review provides an opportunity to assess whether the issue of aging requires
concerted attention. Therefore, we recommend that if DOD considers reducing
the average age of tactical aircraft as a critical goal for their
modernization plans, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review should
consider alternatives to the current tactical aircraft modernization plans
to achieve this goal. Because the services are studying the relationships of
aging aircraft and operations and support costs, and DOD officials told us
extending the lives of F/ A- 18C/ D and F- 16s are being considered in
formulation of the fiscal
year 2002 budget, we are making no recommendations at this time regarding
these observations.
As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit
a written statement on actions taken on our recommendations to the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government
Reform not later than 60 days after the date of the report. A written
statement must also be submitted to the Senate and House Committees on
Appropriations with an agency's first request for appropriations made more
than 60 days after the date of the report.
Agency Comments and In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD
generally agreed with Our Evaluation
our recommendation that, if DOD considers reducing the average age of
tactical aircraft as a critical goal for modernization, the planned 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review consider alternatives to the current tactical
aircraft modernization plans to achieve this goal. DOD agreed that the
Quadrennial Defense Review is a good opportunity to review the aging of its
tactical aircraft. DOD commented, however, that tactical aircraft age is
only one of the many issues that will need to be analyzed during this
defense review. We understand that many issues need to be analyzed. Our
report recognizes the need to blend many factors, including age, in
developing an investment strategy to modernize the forces. Our emphasis in
this report on the critical importance of aging is largely derived from the
strong concerns expressed by DOD and military leaders about aging forces and
contentions that aging equipment is a significant problem contributing to
declining readiness and increasing operating and support costs. DOD provided
additional information on their plans to address certain specific aging
problems and development of tools to better define the impact of age. DOD's
comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.
We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the Senate and House
Subcommittees on Armed Services, Committees on Appropriations. We will also
send copies to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Secretary of the Navy,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested
parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 if you or your staff have any questions
concerning this report. GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are in
appendix III.
Sincerely yours, Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Bri Bri ef ng i ng ef Sect i Sect ons i on i I
Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans Tactical Aircraft Forces Are
Important to U. S. Military Strategy
Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) ? “No Fly Zone” enforcement in
Iraq
(Northern and Southern Watch) ? Additional Air Attacks against Iraq (Desert
Fox and Desert Thunder) ? North Atlantic Treaty Organization
operations in Kosovo (Allied Force)
Tactical aircraft forces have been and will continue to be an important part
of carrying out U. S. military strategy. They were used extensively in
military actions in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Kosovo. These forces will
continue as an integral part of our military strategy in the future as noted
in the Department of Defense (DOD) planning documents, including the 1997
Quadrennial Defense Review and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Vision 2020.
Total DOD Investment in Development and Procurement of Tactical Aircraft
Includes funds for all equipment related to tactical aircraft 35
Dollars in Billions (Constant 2001) Future Years
Defense Program for 30
2001- 2005 includes $82.2
25 billion.
20 15 10
5 0
1972 1973
1974 1975
1976 1977
1978 1979
1980 1981
1982 1983
1984 1985
1986 1987
1988 1989
1990 1991
1992 1993
1994 1995
1996 1997
1998 1999
2000 2001
2002 2003
2004 2005
Procurement RDT& E Total Investment
Source: GAO analysis of DOD's 2001 Future Years Defense Program.
The importance of tactical air forces in U. S. military strategy is
reflected in the significant DOD investment in development and procurement
for the Navy (including the Marine Corps) and the Air Force. From 1972
through 2005, DOD has invested or plans to invest funds to research,
develop, and acquire new tactical aircraft and to modify and upgrade
aircraft in the inventory. The Future Years Defense Program for 2001- 2005
shows that about $82.2 billion will be invested in tactical aircraft.
Modernization Planning Involves Blending of Many Factors Within
Affordability Goals
An investment strategy to modernize the forces should include many factors
such as national policy, military concepts, force structure, existing and
emerging threats, total ownership cost, human capital needs, the industrial
base, and equipment age. During the planning process, these factors should
be analyzed and brought together in a comprehensive plan with objectives for
the modernization, the specific plans to achieve the
objectives, and the resources required. This briefing report includes our
analysis of whether DOD's tactical aircraft modernization plans will permit
the Navy (including the Marine Corps) and the Air Force to reduce the
average age of tactical aircraft. As part of this report, we also make
observations on the consistency and reliability of information used to
determine the impact of aging on aircraft and the extension of the lives of
certain aircraft.
Quadrennial Defense Review Examined Tactical Aircraft Force Requirements
? 1997 Review
? Provided overall guidance and assessed requirements for 1997 through 2015.
? Based on defense policy to fight two major theater wars, the services
require
? 11 Navy Carrier Wings
? 4 Marine Corps Wings
? 20 Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings
According to DOD and service representatives, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review represents the most comprehensive investment strategy within DOD. The
1997 review identified a number of overall objectives for U. S. military
forces, including ? being able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous
major theater wars,
? maintaining a continuous overseas presence, ? having capabilities that
provide a decisive advantage over our adversaries,
? pursuing a focused modernization effort to replace aging systems and
incorporate cutting- edge technologies, ? taking prudent measures to reduce
the risks of producing the wrong
capabilities or producing a capability too early and having it become
obsolete by the time it is needed, and ? ensuring that programs are fiscally
executable.
Quadrennial Defense Review Examined Tactical Aircraft Force Requirements
(continued)
? Noted overall force was aging as 1970s and 1980s weapons approach end of
service lives.
? Concluded increased procurement was needed to ensure forces in later years
are as capable as current forces.
? Reaffirmed DOD decisions to procure the F- 22, F/ A18E/ F, and JSF.
? 2001 Review
? Scheduled to be complete September 2001.
During the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD recognized that its overall force
was gradually aging, as many weapon systems were approaching the end of
their useful lives. DOD concluded that procurement funding was too low to
sustain the forces. Also, DOD recognized that it had repeatedly disrupted
some modernization programs to provide additional funding for
current operations. To create a sound financial foundation for the
modernization programs, the Review states that DOD must halt this chronic
disruption to modernization programs by properly projecting and funding
operating and support activities. With respect to tactical aircraft, the
Review recommends continuing with DOD's procurement of the F- 22, F/ A- 18E/
F, and Joint Strike Fighter aircraft but reduces the quantities to a total
of 3,739 tactical aircraft.
In our June 1998 report ( Quadrennial Defense Review: Opportunities to
Improve the Next Review, June 25, 1998), we note that in its Review, DOD
examined some variations of the services' procurement plans but did not
include a thorough, mission- oriented review of the mix of capabilities the
United States will need to counter future threats. The Review did not always
provide a mission focus that examined trade- offs or facilitated a
fundamental reassessment of the modernization needs in light of emerging
threats and technological advances. Our report notes that DOD had difficulty
in obtaining a consensus to examine changes in the services' planned force
structure.
Aircraft Are Approaching Ages at Which Tactical Aircraft Have Been Retired
in Past
Current 1999 Expected Remaining Aircraft Average Age Years in the Inventory
F- 14 A/ B/ D 15 years old 4- 9 years F/ A- 18 A/ B 13 years old 16 years F-
15 A- D 18 years old 31 years for some models F- 16 C/ D 10 years old At
least 20 years A- 10 18 years old 31 years
Retired Average Age Aircraft at Retirement
A- 7D 20 years old A- 7E 16 years old F- 4D 24 years old F- 4E 20 years old
F- 4G 25 years old F- 111D 20 years old
Source: GAO calculations of DOD data.
Some aircraft in the inventory are approaching or are at the average ages of
other tactical aircraft that were retired in the past. Most aircraft models
shown were retired when they reached average ages ranging from 20 to
25 years. The Air Force force structure data showed certain F- 15s and A-
10s are planned to be in the operational inventory for at least an
additional 30 years, at which time their age will average close to 50 years.
Status of Legacy Systems (as of 1999) Aircraft
Average Age Inventory
Production (Years) Status Navy
F- 14 A/ B/ D 15
195 Completed F/ A- 18 A- D
9 776
Completed AV- 8B
8 127
Completed
Air Force
F- 15 A- D 18
522 Completed F- 15 E
9 204
Active F- 16 A- B
17 100
Completed F- 16 C- D
10 1,272
Active F- 117
8 52
Completed A- 10
18 368
Completed Source: Navy and Air Force data.
Of the existing older aircraft models (legacy systems), only the Air Force's
F- 16s and F- 15Es were still being produced in late 2000. The Air Force has
not identified a replacement aircraft for the F- 15E at this time, and
Congress added funds in the last two fiscal years to keep the F- 15E
production line open. The Air Force is buying additional F- 16s to augment
its force to counter enemy ground- based air defenses. Also, F- 16s are
being produced for sale to various foreign countries. The Air Force A- 10s,
F- 15C/ Ds, and F117s have been out of production for several years.
The Navy took delivery of the last F/ A- 18D in August 2000, making the F/
A- 18E/ F the only Navy tactical aircraft in production. The Navy F- 14s and
AV- 8Bs have been out of production for several years. The Navy plans to
retire the F- 14s from service in 2008, and the AV- 8Bs are being
remanufactured to make them like new aircraft.
Trends of Common Measures of Navy Maintenance and Mission Capability
Percent 90
Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour 90
Mission Capable Rates 80 Worse 80 Worse 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20
10 10 0 0 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Fiscal year
Fiscal year F/ A- 18C F- 14D AV- 8B
F/ A- 18C F- 14D AV- 8B Source: Naval Air Systems Command.
Maintenance indicators over the past several years support the services'
concerns about maintainability, availability, and readiness of aging
aircraft. The maintenance hours per flying hour for selected aging Navy
tactical aircraft indicate worsening trends. However, while mission- capable
rates fluctuate with age, there does not appear to be a sustained positive
or negative trend. Service officials attribute part of these trends to the
impact of aging. They caution, however, that it would be difficult to
isolate the
aging segment. Other factors not related to age also impact these
indicators. For instance, the higher than expected attrition of experienced
maintenance personnel from the services has caused the services to depend
more heavily on less experienced personnel to repair aircraft. These less
experienced personnel take longer to perform maintenance, thus increasing
the number of hours required to return an aircraft to flying status.
Trends of Common Measures of Air Force Maintenance and Mission Capability
Percent 90
Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour 90
Mission Capable Rates 80 Worse
80 Worse 70 70 60 60 50 50 40 40 30 30 20 20 10 10 0 0 1992 1993 1994 1995
1996 1997 1998 1999
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Fiscal year
Fiscal year F- 15C F- 15E F- 16C
F- 15C F- 15E F- 16C Source: Air Force Materiel Command.
The Air Force is experiencing trends worse than those in the Navy, as
tactical aircraft age. Maintenance and mission capable rates get worse as
the aircraft age. As with the Navy, other factors- such as higher than
expected attrition of experienced maintenance personnel- may also impact
these rates.
DOD Modernization Plans to Buy New Tactical Aircraft
Dollars in Billions (Constant 2000)
Aircraft Estimated
Acquisition Aircraft to (Service) Cost
Quantity Time Frame
Be Replaced FA- 18E/ F
$ 45-$ 47 548
1997- 2010 F- 14; (Navy)
F/ A- 18C/ D
F- 22
$60-$ 67 339
1999- 2011 F- 15A- D (Air Force)
JSF
$36-$ 50 480
2008- 2019 (Navy)
JSF
$32-$ 47 609
2006- 2023 F/ A- 18;
(Marines) AV- 8B
JSF
$85-$ 127 1,763
2005- 2026 F- 16;
(Air Force) A- 10
Total $258-$ 338
3,739 1997- 2026
Note: Costs estimated by Congressional Budget Office in March 1999.
The Navy (including the Marine Corps) and the Air Force plan to modernize by
replacing aging tactical aircraft. They plan to buy 3,739 new tactical
aircraft between 1997 and 2026 to replace aging systems in the inventory and
improve the capability of the forces. The new tactical aircraft include the
F/ A- 18E/ F, F- 22, and the Joint Strike Fighter. The Congressional Budget
Office estimated that the total acquisition costs
for these programs could be $258 billion to $338 billion (2000 constant
dollars). Currently identified tactical aircraft modernization plans do not
include replacements for the F- 15Es or the F- 117s, both of which had
average ages of 9 and 8 years, respectively, at the end of fiscal year 1999.
Substantial Appropriations Needed to Complete Modernization Program
? As of fiscal year 2001, 84 percent of the modernization program funds
remain to be appropriated. This is broken out as follows.
? 34 percent of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation program funds
remain to be appropriated.
? 94 percent of Procurement program funds remain to be appropriated.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and CBO data.
Substantial appropriations are still required to complete the tactical
aircraft modernization programs (FA- 18E/ F, F- 22, and Joint Strike
Fighter). Congress has appropriated most Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT& E) funds estimated to complete the modernization programs.
Only 34 percent remains to be appropriated. The Joint Strike
Fighter Program has the largest remaining funding requirements, as 80
percent of its RDT& E funds remain to be appropriated beyond fiscal year
2001. The F/ A- 18E/ F and F- 22 have 5 percent or less of their RDT& E
funds to be appropriated beyond fiscal year 2001. The bulk of the
procurement funds, about 94 percent, for these tactical aircraft
modernization programs remain to be appropriated. All three modernization
programs have significant funding requirements in the future. The F/ A- 18E/
F still requires 70 percent, the F- 22 88 percent, and the Joint Strike
Fighter 100 percent of estimated procurement funds to complete the
modernization programs.
Planned New Tactical Aircraft Will Take 30 Years to Acquire
200
Number of Aircraft Funded as
of fiscal year 2001
150 100
50 0
1997 FY98
1999 2000
2001 2002
2003 2004
2005 2006
2007 2008
2009 2010
2011 2012
2013 2014
2015 2016
2017 2018
2019 2020
2021 2022
2023 2024
2025 2026
F/ A- 18E/ F F- 22 JSF Source: Selected Acquisition Reports and service
financial plans.
The acquisition for the three new types of tactical aircraft, as currently
planned, will take 30 years (1997- 2026) to complete. The planned quantities
to be bought per year have slowly increased, from a low of 12 aircraft in
1997 to a peak of 194 aircraft per year in 2012. After 2018, the quantities
begin to taper off to the final buy of 11 aircraft in 2026.
Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will
Br ef ng i i Secti on I I Not Reduce Aircraft Age Historical Goals for
Tactical Aircraft Age and Retirement Goals Average Age Retirement Age
Navy 7. 5 years 15 years Air Force 11 years 22 years
Historically, the services have endeavored to maintain average age and
retirement age goals for their tactical aircraft. The Navy goals have been
to maintain an aircraft's average age at 7.5 years and to retire aircraft at
15 years. The Air Force goals have been to maintain an aircraft's average
age at 11 years and to retire aircraft at 22 years. The Navy attributes its
lower goals to an operating environment that is more severe than the Air
Force's. Carrier force operations, including catapult take- offs, arrested
landings, and a more corrosive sea environment, are more demanding on the
aircraft structure.
Inventory Reduced but Average Age Increased for Tactical Aircraft
Navy Tactical Aircraft Air Force Tactical Aircraft
43 % Inventory Reduction 4500
Number of Aircraft 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000
29 % Inventory Reduction 1500
1000
ld old
old old
o old
old
500
years years years years years years 9 9 10 11 9 13 0 1989 1994 1999 1989
1994 1999 Fiscal year Fiscal year
Source: GAO analysis of Navy and Air Force data.
The number of Navy and Air Force aircraft has decreased over the 10- year
period from 1989 to 1999, providing an opportunity to eliminate older
aircraft from the inventory. During 1989- 99 the Navy reduced its force size
by 29 percent and the Air Force by 43 percent. Despite these force
reductions, however, neither the Navy nor the Air Force met their average
age goals in 1999. The average age of Navy aircraft increased from 9 years
to 10 years, and the average age of Air Force aircraft increased from 11
years to 13 years.
Projected Average Age of Navy and Air Force Tactical Aircraft
26 Years
24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10
8 6 4
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Fiscal year
Air Force Navy Source: GAO analysis of Navy and Air Force data.
Even with implementation of DOD's modernization plans, the average age of
Navy and Air Force tactical aircraft will continue to increase for several
years. The trend from fiscal year 1999 to 2011 (the mid- point of DOD's
modernization plans) shows that Navy aircraft average age is likely to
increase through 2006 to 13 years and then slowly decrease to 11 years in
2011. The Air Force aircraft age, however, is likely to increase throughout
this entire period from 13 years in 1999 to 21 years in 2011. In making
these projections we assumed there would be no change in the tactical
aircraft delivery schedules shown in the services' December 1999 Selected
Acquisition Reports.
Navy Slows Aircraft Aging Through Modernization But Still Does Not Meet
Average Age Goals
Average Age 10 Years 1999
Average Age 11 Years 2011
1 Year Old F/ A- 18E/ F 16 Years Old
7 Years Old 5 Years Old F- 14A- D AV- 8B
F/ A- 18E/ F 1 Year Old
JSF F/ A- 18A- D AV- 8B F/ A- 18A- D
17 Years Old 9 Years Old
20 Years Old
44% Legacy Systems Still in Force
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
The average age for all Navy tactical aircraft in 1999 was 10 years. The
Navy's plans to acquire tactical aircraft will slow the growth in average
age, but the Navy will fall short of achieving its historical 7.5- year
average age
goal for its aircraft. In 1999, most of the Navy force was made up of legacy
systems, including F/ A- 18C/ Ds, AV- 8Bs and F- 14s.
We project that by 2011, the mid- point of the DOD modernization plans, the
Navy force will consist of 44 percent legacy aircraft and 56 percent new F/
A- 18E/ Fs and Joint Strike Fighters. The modernization plans will not
reduce the average age for the Navy's tactical aircraft; it will result in
an
increase in average age from 10 years to 11 years. The older aircraft
models, F/ A- 18C/ Ds and the AV- 8Bs, are likely to reach average ages from
17 to 20 years by 2011.
Navy Slightly Exceeds Average Age Goals Near Completion of Modernization
2025 Average Age 10 Years
1,178 Total Aircraft
16 Years Old F/ A- 18E/ F
JSF 9 Years Old
No Legacy Systems Remain in the Force
Source: GAO analysis of Navy data.
We project that near the completion of DOD's modernization plans in 2025,
the average age of Navy's tactical aircraft will be 10 years. Thus, the Navy
will not meet its historical goal of an average age of 7.5 years for its
tactical aircraft. By this time, the Navy plans to have retired all of the
legacy aircraft that made up the tactical aircraft inventory when the
modernization
program started in 1997. However, the average ages of the F/ A- 18E/ Fs and
Joint Strike Fighter will be 16 years and 9 years, respectively.
Air Force Modernization Significantly Increases Average Age of Tactical
Aircraft
Average Age 13 Average Age 21 1999
2011
8 Years Old 20 Years Old
1 Year Old F- 117
F- 117 JSF 18 Years Old
4 Years Old 30 Years Old
A- 10 F- 22
A- 10 18 Years Old
27 Years Old 10 Years Old
F- 15A- D F- 15C/ D
F- 16C/ D F- 15E
21 Years Old F- 15E
F- 16C/ D 9 Years Old
22 Years Old F- 16A/ B
17 Years Old
87% Legacy Systems Still in Force if F- 16 Fatigue Life is Extended
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
The average age for all Air Force tactical aircraft in 1999 was 13 years.
The current Air Force plans to acquire tactical aircraft will not reduce the
average age of its current inventory but instead will result in a
significant increase. In 1999, the Air Force inventory of tactical aircraft
consisted entirely of legacy systems, which include F- 15, F- 16, F- 117,
and A- 10 aircraft.
We project that in 2011, the mid- point in DOD's modernization plans, 87
percent of the Air Force tactical aircraft force will be legacy systems. The
average age of the total tactical force is expected to increase by 8 years,
from 13 years to an average age of 21 years. The newer F- 22s, which would
make up most of the remaining 13 percent of aircraft inventory in 2011,
would be, on average, 4 years old. In 2011, the remaining F- 15C/ D/ Es, F-
16C/ Ds, F- 117s, and A- 10s are likely to have average ages that range from
20 to 30 years.
Air Force Still Exceeds Average Age Goals Near Completion of Modernization
Average Age 16 Years 2025 2,421 Total Aircraft
43 Years Old 40 Years Old A- 10
F- 15 35 Years Old
F- 15E F- 16C/ D (5 aircraft)
26 Years Old F- 22 JSF
17 Years Old 7 Years Old
F- 117 34 Years Old
24% Legacy Systems Still in the Force
Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.
Near the completion of DOD's modernization plans in 2025, the average age of
the Air Force's tactical aircraft is expected to be 16 years, exceeding the
historical average age goal by 5 years. The Air Force estimates that by this
time, 24 percent of its tactical aircraft inventory will include aging
F- 15C/ D/ Es, F- 16C/ Ds, F- 117s, and A- 10s. The average age of these
legacy aircraft will range from 26 to 43 years old. In addition, the average
age of the F- 22s and the Joint Strike Fighter will be 17 years and 7 years,
respectively. Therefore, the average age of the Air Force's tactical
aircraft is likely to be higher in 2025 than when the modernization efforts
began in 1999.
Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable Information to Determine the
Impact
Bri ng ef i Sect on i II I
of Aircraft Aging Impacts of Aging Aircraft According to DOD
? Decreased reliability
? Increased maintenance
? Decreased readiness
? Lower availability of weapon systems for operations and training
? Increased operating and support costs
DOD has stated that as aircraft age, they tend to break more often, take
longer to inspect and maintain, and are less available for operations and
training. Aging aircraft cost more to operate and support and result in
reduced readiness. While DOD does not fully understand the precise timing
and impact of aging, they have generally characterized aging conditions as
follows:
? Wear and tear from routine and frequent use over time eventually cause
failure of the aircraft structure and components. ? Operations in harsh
environments over time cause corrosion that deteriorates aircraft structure
and components. (These first two factors increase the frequency of parts
failures and the time needed for inspections and maintenance.) ?
Modifications need to keep pace with the threat, as aging technology becomes
ineffective. ? Support for aging aircraft is difficult because manufacturing
sources for
spare parts become scarce as technology moves forward and parts become
unavailable.
Military Leaders Warn of Aging Equipment Problems
? Joint Chiefs of Staff testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on September 27, 2000:
? Chairman: As aircraft age, the services will continue to use modernization
funds for increased maintenance costs.
? Air Force Chief of Staff: The Air Force has never dealt with a force this
old and the average age is accelerating. It takes an inordinate amount of
time, work, and money to keep its aging force air worthy and ready.
? Navy Chief of Staff: The Navy is buying desperately needed aircraft but
not at the rate necessary to sustain the future force.
DOD leaders testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in
September 2000 on the widespread concerns of aging military equipment.
Testimony indicated aging is a problem that affects all military equipment
and not just aircraft. The common theme was that aging equipment is
significantly contributing to declining readiness and increasing operating
and support costs. These leaders stated that additional funds must be
allocated to keep older equipment at military readiness levels for current
operational needs and contingencies. The allocation of additional funds for
operations and support impact the ability to plan for sufficient funding to
modernize military equipment and further delay the purchases of new
equipment.
Services Highlight Aircraft Aging Issues
? Navy Inspector General April 2000 Report:
? Navy aircraft are older now than anytime in history.
? As aircraft grow older, component reliability decreases and depot
maintenance requirements increase.
? Reliability levels of aging aircraft do not meet predicted levels.
? U. S. Air Force Posture Statement 2000:
? Ages of Air Force aircraft are at unprecedented levels.
? Maintenance costs to keep the aging aircraft ready are increasing.
In April 2000, the Navy Inspector General reported on naval aviation
readiness and factors degrading readiness. The report concluded that aging
aircraft are facing obsolescence and declining reliability and are stressing
a support system that suffers from reduced staffing and maintenance
proficiency. Merely procuring additional spare parts will not solve the
aging problem. The Inspector General concluded that the Navy should invest
in logistics and engineering efforts to address reliability issues, noting
that commercial airlines spend 2 staff years per aircraft for these types of
efforts compared to the Navy's investment of 0.5 staff years per aircraft.
The U. S. Air Force Posture Statement 2000 concludes that four factors have
caused mission- capable rates of Air Force aircraft to drop 9.9 percent
since 1994. These factors were (1) greatly increased deployments since 1990,
(2) aging aircraft, (3) problems in funding spare parts through most of the
1990s, and (4) low retention of maintenance technicians. The Posture
Statement notes that the age of all Air Force aircraft is unprecedented,
with a current average age of 20 years. Under modernization plans, the
average
age will increase to 30 years by 2015. The Secretary of the Air Force
further noted that fatigue, corrosion, and parts obsolescence are driving up
the costs of maintaining older aircraft and reducing overall equipment
readiness. The Statement concludes that the Air Force must balance the cost
of maintaining weapon systems against the cost of replacing major subsystems
or the weapon system itself.
Studies Are Unclear About the Cost Impacts of Aging Aircraft
? Some studies indicate that as aircraft get older operating and support
costs increase but, Navy and Air Force studies differed on the rate of cost
increases and the types of support costs impacted by age.
? At least one other study indicates consistent and reliable data were not
available for long enough periods to demonstrate the impacts of age.
For a 1995 study, the Navy reviewed 1983- 95 data and concluded that age-
correlated increases in all operating and support costs averaged 2.5
percent. This included costs for organizational and intermediate- level
labor, aircraft overhauls, engine rework, depot- level repair items, and
other support. The study included 12 fixed- wing and rotor aircraft.
A 1997 report by the Institute for Defense Analysis stated that the effects
of age on operating and support costs were not visible in data from 1987 to
1995. It concluded that 20 to 30 years of cost data would be needed to
review the entire life cycle of a system, but consistent data could be found
only for a 9- year period, from1987 to1995. A 1999 Air Force study of data
from 1986 to 1996 concluded aircraft overhaul costs increased by about 3 to
7 percent a year as aircraft age. However, the report concluded that the
confidence level of the data in the study was not high enough to indicate
age- related cost growth for engine overhauls, software maintenance, and
depot- level repair items. The study
included nine different bomber, cargo, and fighter aircraft.
Future Impacts of Aging Are Not Predictable and Therefore Uncertain
A 1998 Rand Study on aging aircraft stated there are no established
scientific relationships between specific aging factors and future
maintenance workload and costs; one cannot predict all maintenance events
and add up associated costs.
A Rand report (Aging Aircraft: Initial Look at Implications for PDM and
Engine Support Cost Growth, Oct. 1998) stated that there are no effective
models to measure and estimate the cost impacts of aging factors such as
corrosion or engine fatigue from high temperatures. The report also stated
that historically based cost estimating relationships used to estimate
future costs may not be valid. Most do not include age as a variable, and if
they do include age, there is no historical experience for the extreme ages
aircraft will achieve today and in the future. By comparison, past aircraft
were
replaced at a relatively early age. The report also shows divergent views of
the future impacts of age. Optimists believed that current initiatives to
control age- related support costs would be successful. Pessimists
acknowledged the initiatives but believed they only mask recent demand and
workload and that future problems are possible, given the unprecedented ages
aircraft will reach. Rand has continued to study the impacts of aging on
aircraft at the direction of the Air Force, but as of December 11, 2000, it
had not yet released its next planned report.
Services Approach Continued Study of Aging Impacts Differently
The Navy and Air Force continue to study the impacts of age on operating and
support costs and readiness.
? The Navy is focusing on more specific aging problems, such as the impacts
of age on avionics and aircraft wiring.
? The Air Force is identifying policy needs, information needs, predictive
tools, needed skills, and other elements.
The Navy and the Air Force do not fully understand the impacts of aging on
their aircraft or on the costs to operate and support them, and they lack
consistent and reliable data and tools to predict these impacts. While the
Navy and the Air Force continue to study aging issues, each service's aging
aircraft integrated product team appears to be focused on different levels
of the problem. The Navy team is investigating aging issues at a more
specific and detailed level, trying to discern the impacts of aging on
aircraft wiring and avionics components. The Air Force team is trying to
develop an overall structure to manage aging issues. It has identified the
need for policies, management information, predictive tools, technical
skills, and other elements to successful manage aging aircraft issues. In
the end, both services appear to have goals to better identify the
relationships between aging systems, maintenance, and operating and support
costs and to better manage aging with better information and tools. However,
until the services achieve these goals, they continue to rely on standard
DOD reliability and maintainability metrics to show the impacts of aging
aircraft. These metrics, such as maintenance staff hours per flying
hour, can be influenced by factors other than age, and the services cannot
distinguish the precise contribution of aging. For example, the high
retirement rate of experienced maintenance personnel could impact this
measure because less experienced maintenance personnel take more time to
identify and fix problems. Therefore, not knowing the specific impacts of
aircraft age reduces the services' ability to cost- effectively resolve the
problems associated with aging.
Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and
Bri ng ef i Sect on i I V
F- 16 Aircraft May Need to be Extended Important Modifications to Extend
Aircraft Life Not Included in DOD Financial Plans
? DOD has identified modifications needed to extend the structural life of
the F/ A- 18C/ Ds and F- 16 aircraft.
? The Navy and Air Force did not include funds in the fiscal year 2001
budget for these modifications.
? According to the services, without extension of the structural life over
one- third of the tactical aircraft could become inoperable, resulting in a
lower force size than recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.
The Navy F/ A- 18C/ Ds and the Air Force F- 16s are experiencing structural
problems that will require modifications to keep them in the aircraft
inventory for operational use. Neither service included the necessary
funding in the Fiscal Year 2001 Future Years Defense Program to develop and
incorporate these modifications. If these aircraft are not modified to
extend their structural life, about one- third of the tactical aircraft
forces
could be inoperable, resulting in a lower force size than recommended in the
1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.
Unfunded Requirements for F/ A- 18C/ D Aircraft Life Extension
? The Navy expects F/ A- 18C/ Ds to be in the inventory through 2019, but
structural problems will not allow achievement of service life goals, based
on flying hours and carrier landings and takeoffs.
? Without service life extensions, the Navy will be 223 aircraft short of
requirements in 2014.
? Goals are to extend flying hours from 6,000 to 12,000 and carrier landings
and takeoffs from 2,000 to 2,700.
? The Navy estimated the modifications could cost as much as $878 million
for up to 355 aircraft.
Modifications to Navy and Marine Corps F/ A- 18C/ D aircraft are needed to
extend their service lives beyond their original design. The Navy designed a
modification intended to strengthen the structure to double the number of
flying hours for the aircraft and increase the number of takeoffs and
landings by 700. According to F/ A- 18C/ D program officials, the Navy will
experience a shortfall of 223 aircraft in 2014 if this modification,
estimated
to cost $878 million (then- year dollars), is not completed.
Unfunded Requirements for F- 16 Aircraft Life Extension
? The F- 16 was designed to fly 8,000 hours. Tests of the structure
simulated the planned use over its lifetime.
? F- 16s may develop structural problems by the time they operate 5,000
hours because they have been used in more severe conditions than planned.
? The Air Force estimates the cost of the life extension at about $466
million for F- 16s now in the inventory.
Without significant modifications, the F- 16 aircraft currently in the
inventory are expected to be able to fly only about 5,000 of the 8,000 hours
that they were designed to fly. According to F- 16 program officials, this
limitation is the result of greater stresses in flight because F- 16s have
been
used in more severe operating environments than planned when the aircraft
were designed and tested. To enable the F- 16s to fly 8,000 hours, the
program office has proposed a structural modification program that will
extend the F- 16's life to the original flying hour design. This program,
identified as Falcon Star, is expected to take place from 2004 through 2014
and include 1,187 aircraft. The Air Force estimates the modifications will
cost $16 million for development and $450 million (then- year dollars) to
buy and install modifications. The Air Force did not include funds in the
Fiscal Year 2001 Future Years Defense Program for the modifications.
Number of Air Force Tactical Aircraft Significantly Reduced Without F- 16
Life Extension
Inventory 2500 Correcting F- 16 Problem Not Correcting F- 16 Problem
F- 22 2000
1,110 Fewer F- 16s F- 22 F16C/ D
F16C/ D 1500
F16A/ B F16A/ B
JSF F- 117
JSF F- 117
1000 F- 15E
F- 15E 500
A/ OA- 10 A/ OA- 10
F- 15 F- 15
0 1999
2002 2005
2008 2011
2014 2017
2020 2023
2026 2029
1999 2002
2005 2008
2011 2014
2017 2020
2023 2026
2029 Fiscal year Fiscal year
Total aircraft required Source: Air Force Air Combat Command.
If the Air Force fails to incorporate the life- extension modifications into
the F- 16 aircraft, the size of the force will be substantially reduced by
2010. The figure shows the impact of not funding and incorporating the
modifications to extend the life of the F- 16 aircraft. The left side of the
chart shows the Air Force tactical aircraft inventories assuming the F- 16
modification program is completed, while the right side shows the inventory
if the modification program is not completed. The net result according to
the Air Force is that the tactical aircraft inventory would be lower by
about 1,110
F- 16 aircraft in 2010 if the modifications are not completed.
Br ef ng i i Secti on V
Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions
? Despite modernization plans estimated to cost $258 billion to $338
billion, the services have not planned to procure enough tactical aircraft
to reduce the average age of the force. Therefore, the services will have to
depend on aging aircraft to meet future force requirements.
? Over the next 11 years average age will continue to increase, especially
in the Air Force.
? The upcoming Quadrennial Defense Review is an opportunity to assess
whether the issue of aging is one requiring concerted attention.
Recommendations
? We recommend that if DOD considers reducing the average age of tactical
aircraft as a critical goal for their modernization plans, the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review should consider alternatives to the current
tactical aircraft modernization plans.
Appendi Appendi xes x I
Scope and Methodology To assess whether the Department of Defense's (DOD)
tactical aircraft modernization plans will permit the Air Force and the Navy
to reduce the average tactical aircraft age, we interviewed officials in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and headquarters offices of the Navy and
the Air Force. We reviewed the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to
determine plans for tactical aircraft and the defense forces in general and
interviewed officials in Naval Air Systems Command, Air Force Material
Command, and Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center to evaluate the
individual modernization programs for tactical aircraft. We obtained and
evaluated data on tactical aircraft program financial plans, budgets,
schedules, and modernization plans to determine the types of improvements
planned in the future. This included data defining programs
to develop new aircraft and improve existing aircraft. We also obtained and
analyzed the aggregate average age data for each tactical aircraft model
currently in the inventory. We also obtained current and planned inventory
levels for each aircraft model from 1999 through 2025 as well as the planned
inventory levels for new tactical aircraft that will enter the force. Using
current age data, inventory plans, and delivery schedules, we projected the
average age of each tactical aircraft model at points in time during the
modernization plans.
We also analyzed Navy and Air Force studies and held discussions with
individual aircraft program officials on readiness and operating and support
costs of aging aircraft. We discussed information and tools used by the
services to measure the impacts of aging on aircraft and the problems
associated with using the information and tools. We obtained readiness,
reliability, and maintainability data from service databases to analyze
trends relative to the age of tactical aircraft currently in the forces.
Also, we
met with Aging Aircraft Integrated Product Teams in the Navy and the Air
Force to discuss impacts of age on aircraft as well as their ongoing and
future efforts.
Finally, in addressing whether modifications needed to keep aircraft in
service have been included in the fiscal year 2001 Future Years Defense
Program, we obtained the fiscal year 2001 Future Years Defense Program and
the fiscal year 2001 budgets for the Navy and the Air Force tactical
aircraft programs. We also discussed the modification plans with the
appropriate service representatives in the program offices responsible for
managing the specific weapon systems. In reporting the total DOD investments
in tactical aircraft, we used the fiscal year 2001 Future Years Defense
Program, which is reported in
constant 2001 dollars. However, in reporting the individual tactical
aircraft program acquisition cost estimates, we used Congressional Budget
Office estimates that were in constant 2000 dollars. Modification costs for
specific aircraft types were based on service estimates in then- year
dollars. The types of dollars used are identified in the briefing sections
of the report. We performed our review from December 1999 through November
2000 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendi x II Comments From the Department of Defense
Now on p. 5.
Now on p. 4.
Appendi x II I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Robert D.
Murphy (937) 258- 7904 Acknowledgments In addition to the name above,
Michael J. Hazard, Gaines R. Hensley, and
Patricia W. Lentini made key contributions to this report. (707463) Lett er
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GAO United States General Accounting Office
Page 1 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Contents
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Page 3 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft United States General Accounting
Office
Washington, D. C. 20548 Page 3 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
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Briefing Section I
Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Briefing Section I Tactical Aircraft Forces' Investment Plans
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Page 32 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 33 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 34 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 35 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 36 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 37 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 38 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 39 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 40 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 41 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 42 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 43 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
Page 44 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section II Analysis Shows That Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce
Aircraft Age
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Page 46 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 47 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 48 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 49 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 50 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 51 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 52 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 53 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 54 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 55 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 56 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section III Observations- DOD Lacks Consistent and Reliable
Information to Determine the Impact of Aircraft Aging
Page 57 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Page 58 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 59 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 60 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 61 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 62 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 63 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 64 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section IV Observations- Useful Lives of the F/ A- 18 and F- 16
Aircraft May Need to be Extended
Page 65 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Page 66 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section V
Briefing Section V Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 67 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section V Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 68 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Briefing Section V Conclusions and Recommendations
Page 69 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
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Appendix I
Appendix I Scope and Methodology
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Appendix II
Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
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Appendix II Comments From the Department of Defense
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Page 75 GAO- 01- 163 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix III
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548- 0001
Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Correction Requested Presorted Standard
Postage & Fees Paid GAO Permit No. GI00
*** End of document. ***