-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-1171t						        

TITLE:     Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations

DATE:   09/25/2001 
				                                                                         
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GAO-01-1171t
     
Testimony Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and Its Subcommittee
on Oversight of Governmental Management, Restructuring and the District of
Columbia, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 30 p. m. EDT Tuesday

September 25, 2001 AVIATION SECURITY

Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security
Operations

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO- 01- 1171T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 1171T

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Committees: A safe and secure civil
aviation system is a critical component of the nation?s overall security,
physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a
myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a
system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred
or which of the weaknesses in the nation?s aviation security apparatus
contributed to the horrendous events of last week, it is clear that serious
weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can
be far more devastating than previously imagined.

We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have identified in
the safeguards to protect passengers and prevent unauthorized access to or
attacks on aircraft. Our testimony is based on our prior work and a review
that we have under way for the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, and includes assessments of security
concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry- on
baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current screening practices,
including practices in selected other countries.

In summary:  Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including
aircraft, have not

always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our special agents
used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to
secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is acting on the weaknesses we
identified and is implementing actions to more closely check the credentials
of law enforcement officers. The Department of Transportation?s Inspector
General has also documented numerous problems with airport access controls,
and in one series of tests, the Inspector General?s staff successfully
gained access to secure areas, including ramps and aircraft, 68 percent of
the time.  As we reported in June 2000, testing of screeners shows that
significant,

long- standing weaknesses- measured by the screeners? abilities to detect
threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry- on
luggage- continue to exist. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the
potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. At that time, FAA
characterized this level of performance as unsatisfactory. More recent
results have shown that as testing gets more realistic- that is, as tests

Page 2 GAO- 01- 1171T

more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a
checkpoint- screeners? performance declines significantly. A principal cause
of screener performance problems is the rapid turnover among screeners.
Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at most large airports, leaving
few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because of the low wages,
limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous nature of their work.
Additionally, too little attention has been given to factors such as the
sufficiency of the training given to screeners. FAA?s efforts to address
these problems have been slow. We recommended that FAA develop an integrated
plan to focus its efforts, set priorities, and measure progress in improving
screening. FAA is addressing these recommendations, but progress on one key
effort- the certification of screening companies- is still not complete
because the implementing regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly
2-ï¿½ years since FAA originally planned to implement the regulation. 
Weaknesses in the current system in which airlines are responsible for

screening passengers and controlling access to secure areas have raised
questions about whether alternative approaches should be considered. In our
ongoing work, we surveyed aviation stakeholders and aviation and terrorism
experts and have identified four options for assigning screening
responsibilities: continue with air carriers but with new requirements,
assign responsibility to airports, or shift responsibility to the federal
government, either through the creation of a new federal agency or the
creation of a federal corporation. In assessing alternatives, respondents
identified five important criteria: improving screening performance,
establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving
people efficiently, and minimizing legal and liability issues. The majority
of respondents believed that screening performance and accountability would
improve if screening were placed with the federal government. Many indicated
that assigning screening responsibility to the airports would not likely
improve screeners? performance and accountability. Still, some respondents
believed that a professional screening workforce could be developed in any
organizational context.

The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country looks at
aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers implemented new
controls that promise a greater sense of security. We support these actions.
Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our aviation security
system, more needs to be done. Aviation security has truly become a national
security issue, and as we will discuss today, responsibility for screening
may no longer appropriately rest with air carriers. It has been observed
that previous tragedies have resulted in congressional hearings, studies,
recommendations, and debates, but little

Page 3 GAO- 01- 1171T

long- term resolve to correct flaws in the system as the memory of the
crisis recedes. The future of aviation security hinges in large part on
overcoming this cycle of limited action that has too often characterized the
response to aviation security concerns.

Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism was
significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U. S. airliners was
discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the task of providing
security to the nation?s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we
must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made
totally secure. The enormous size of U. S. airspace alone defies easy
protection. Furthermore, given this country?s hundreds of airports,
thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly
limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system,
aviation security must be enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding airplanes
and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept
from breaching security checkpoints or gaining access to ramps and doorways
leading to aircraft. FAA has developed several mechanisms to prevent
criminal acts against aircraft, such as adopting technology to detect
explosives and establishing procedures to ensure that passengers are
positively identified before boarding a flight. Still, in recent years, we
and others have often demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to
plague the nation?s aviation security.

The current aviation security structure and its policies, requirements, and
practices have evolved since the early 1960s and were heavily influenced by
a series of high- profile aviation security incidents. Historically, the
federal government has maintained that providing security is the
responsibility of air carriers and airports as part of their cost of doing
business. Beginning in 1972, air carriers were required to provide screening
personnel, and airport operators were required to provide law enforcement
support. However, with the rise in air piracy and terrorist activities that
threatened not only commercial aviation but also national security,
discussions began to emerge as to who should have the responsibility for
providing security at our nation?s airports. With the events of the last
week, concerns have arisen again as to who should be responsible for
security and screening passengers at our nation?s airports. This issue has
evoked many discussions through the years and just as many options
concerning who should provide security at our nation?s Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 1171T

airports and how security should be handled. But as pointed out in a 1998
FAA study, there was no consensus among the various aviation- related
entities. 1

To identify options for assigning screening responsibilities, we surveyed
aviation stakeholders- security officials at the major air carriers and the
largest airports, large screening companies, and industry associations- and
aviation and terrorism experts. We asked our respondents to provide their
opinions about the current screening program, criteria they believe are
important in considering options, the advantages and disadvantages of each
option, and their comments on implementing a different screening approach.
It is important to understand that we gathered this information prior to
September 11, 2001, and some respondents? views may have changed.

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is
a critical component of aviation security. Existing access controls include
requirements intended to prevent unauthorized individuals from using forged,
stolen, or outdated identification or their familiarity with airport
procedures to gain access to secured passenger areas or to ramps and
doorways leading to aircraft. In May 2000, we reported that our special
agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two
airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. 2 At
these airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law enforcement
officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created from
commercially available software packages or downloaded from the Internet,
and were issued ?law enforcement? boarding passes. They were then waved
around the screening checkpoints without being screened. Our agents could
thus have carried weapons, explosives, chemical/ biological agents, or other
dangerous objects onto aircraft. In response to our findings, FAA now
requires that each airport?s law enforcement officers examine the badges and
credentials of any individual seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is
also working on a ?smart card? computer system that would verify law
enforcement officers? identity and authorization for bypassing passenger
screening. The Department of Transportation?s (DOT) Inspector General has
also

1 Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security Responsibilities
and Funding,

Dec. 1998. 2 Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/ T-
OSI- 00- 10, May 25, 2000). Weaknesses in Airport

Access Controls

Page 5 GAO- 01- 1171T

uncovered problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector General?s
staff tested the access controls at eight major airports in 1998 and 1999
and gained access to secure areas in 68 percent of the tests; they were able
to board aircraft 117 times. After the release of its report describing its
successes in breaching security, 3 the Inspector General conducted
additional testing between December 1999 and March 2000 and found that,
although improvements had been made, access to secure areas was still gained
more than 30 percent of the time.

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line of
defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the aviation
system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each day
for articles that could pose threats to the safety of an aircraft and those
aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for screening passengers and
their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas of an airport
or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees to conduct
screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security companies to do
the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening companies are
responsible for screening at some of the nation?s larger airports.

Concerns have long existed about screeners? ability to detect and prevent
dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were
discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and to have later been
found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the performance
of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially
dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. In
1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during FAA tests.
In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects during the same type of
test. Test data for the 1991 to 1999 period show that the declining trend in
detection rates continues. 4 Furthermore, the recent tests show that as
tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist
might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners? ability to detect
dangerous objects declines even further.

3 Airport Access Control (AV- 2000- 017, Nov. 18, 1999). 4 Information on
FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security information and
cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss the actual
detection rates for the 1991- 99 period. Inadequate Detection

of Dangerous Objects by Screeners

Page 6 GAO- 01- 1171T

As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to
identify dangerous objects. 5 Two conditions- rapid screener turnover and
inadequate attention to human factors- are believed to be important causes.
Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long- standing problem, having
been identified as a concern by FAA and by us in reports dating back to at
least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among screeners was about 100
percent a year at some airports, and according to our more recent work, the
turnover is considerably higher. 6 From May 1998 through April 1999,
screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the nation?s 19 largest airports;
5 of these airports reported turnover of 200 percent or more, and 1 reported
turnover of 416 percent. At one airport we visited, of the 993 screeners
trained at that airport over about a 1- year period, only 142, or 14
percent, were still employed at the end of that year. Such rapid turnover
can seriously limit the level of experience among screeners operating a
checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low
wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the daily stress of
the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the minimum wage. We
reported last year that some of the screening companies at 14 of the
nation?s 19 largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6. 00 an
hour or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the
minimum wage-$ 5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at airport
fastfood restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners receive. For
instance, at one airport we visited, screeners? wages started as low as
$6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport?s fast- food
restaurants was $7 an hour.

The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties require
repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare event when
a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has been given to
factors such as (1) improving individuals? aptitudes for effectively
performing screening duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job
and the distractions that reduce screeners? vigilance. As a result,
screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary

5 Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance

(GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000). 6 Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard
Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO- RCED- 87- 182, July 24, 1987).

Page 7 GAO- 01- 1171T

aptitudes, or sufficient knowledge to perform the work effectively, and who
then find the duties tedious and dull.

We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions to
improve screeners? performance. However, FAA did not have an integrated
management plan for these efforts that would identify and prioritize
checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be resolved, and
identify measures- and related milestone and funding information- for
addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA did not have adequate
goals by which to measure and report its progress in improving screeners?
performance.

FAA is implementing our recommendations to develop an integrated management
plan. However, two key actions to improving screeners? performance are still
not complete. These actions are the deployment of threat image projection
(TIP) systems- which place images of dangerous objects on the monitors of X-
ray machines to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance- and a
certification program to make screening companies accountable for the
training and performance of the screeners they employ. Threat image
projection systems are expected to keep screeners alert by periodically
imposing the image of a dangerous object on the X- ray screen. They also are
used to measure how well screeners perform in detecting these objects.
Additionally, the systems serve as a device to train screeners to become
more adept at identifying harder- to- spot objects. FAA is currently
deploying the threat image projections systems and expects to have them
deployed at all airports by 2003.

The screening company certification program, required by the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish performance, training,
and equipment standards that screening companies will have to meet to earn
and retain certification. However, FAA has still not issued its final
regulation establishing the certification program. This regulation is
particularly significant because it is to include requirements mandated by
the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 to increase screener training-
from 12 hours to 40 hours- as well as to expand background check
requirements. FAA had been expecting to issue the final regulation this
month, 2-ï¿½ years later than it originally planned. According to FAA, it
needed the additional time to develop performance standards based on
screener performance data.

Page 8 GAO- 01- 1171T

Concerned about the performance of screeners, the Subcommittee on Aviation,
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, asked us to examine
options for conducting screening and to outline some advantages and
disadvantages associated with these alternatives. This work is still
ongoing, but I will provide a perspective on the information we have
obtained to date.

Many aviation stakeholders agreed that a stable, highly trained, and
professional workforce is critical to improving screening performance. They
identified compensation and improved training as the highest priorities in
improving performance. Respondents also believed that the implementation of
performance standards, team and image building, awards for exemplary work,
better supervision, and certification of individual screeners would improve
performance. Some respondents believed that a professional workforce could
be developed in any organizational context and that changing the delegation
of screening responsibilities would increase the costs of screening.

We identified four principal alternative approaches to screening. Each
alternative could be structured and implemented in many different ways; for
instance, an entity might use its own employees to screen passengers, or it
might use an outside contractor to perform the job. For each alternative, we
assumed that FAA would continue to be responsible for regulating screening,
overseeing performance, and imposing penalties for poor performance. Table 1
outlines the four options.

Table 1: Description of Screening Alternatives Alternative Summary

Airlines with new certification rules Air carriers could continue to be
responsible for conducting screening. However, this alternative assumes that
FAA will impose new requirements on screening companies to ensure that
screeners are better trained and demonstrate proficiency in using screening
equipment. Airports Each airport management authority could be responsible
for its own screening.

Given the number and diversity of the nation?s airports, screening
operations might vary considerably throughout the country. Federal agency A
new DOT agency (with headquarters and field structure) could be created to

conduct the national screening program. It could be accountable to the
Congress through the annual appropriations and oversight processes. Federal
corporation A government corporation created solely to conduct passenger and
baggage

screening. Like other government corporations- such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority- it would be accountable to the Congress but would have more
autonomy than other agencies.

Source: GAO?s analysis of Booz- Allen and Hamilton, Independent Assessment
of Airport Security Screener Performance and Retention, Sept. 15, 2000.

Options for Assigning Screening Responsibility to Other Entities

Four Major Alternatives for Screening

Page 9 GAO- 01- 1171T

Shifting responsibility for screening would affect many stakeholders and
might demand many resources. Accordingly, a number of criteria must be
weighed before changing the status quo. We asked aviation stakeholders to
identify key criteria that should be used in assessing screening
alternatives. These criteria are to

 improve screening performance;  establish accountability for screening
performance;  ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines,
airports, FAA,

and screening companies;  efficiently move passengers to flights; and 
minimize legal and liability issues.

We asked airline and airport security officials to assess each option for
reassigning screening responsibility against the key criteria. Specifically,
we asked them to indicate whether an alternative would be better, the same,
or worse than the current situation with regard to each criterion. Table 2
summarizes their responses.

Table 2: Summary of Respondent?s Views of Alternatives to the Current
Program Options

Screener performance Accountability Stakeholder

cooperation Legal and liability Passengers moved efficiently

Airlines with new rules Better Better Same Same Same Airports Undecided
Undecided Undecided Undecided Undecided Federal agency Better Better
Undecided Undecided Undecided Federal corporation Better Better Undecided
Undecided Same

Note: The views expressed about the airlines? and airports? options are
based on the opinions of 17 major air carriers and airports we interviewed;
views about the federal agency and the federal corporation are based on the
opinions of 9 and 4 of these respondents, respectively. A consensus of
Better, Same, or Worse was determined by having about 60 percent agree on
the response.

At the time of our review, FAA was finalizing a certification rule that
would make a number of changes to the screening program, including requiring
FAA- certification of screening companies and the installation of TIP
systems on X- ray machines at screening checkpoints. Our respondents
believed that these actions would improve screeners? performance and
accountability. Some respondents approved of the proposed changes, since
they would result in FAA having a direct regulatory role vis- a- vis the
screening companies. Others indicated that the installation of TIP systems
nationwide could improve screeners? awareness and ability to detect
potentially threatening objects and result in better screener performance.
Respondents did not believe that this option would affect stakeholder
Criteria for Assessing

Screening Alternatives

Leaving Responsibility to Air Carriers With New Certification Rules

Page 10 GAO- 01- 1171T

cooperation, affect passenger movement through checkpoints, or pose any
additional legal issues.

No consensus existed among aviation stakeholders about how making airports
responsible for screening would affect any of the key criteria. Almost half
indicated that screeners? performance would not change if the airport
authority were to assume responsibility, particularly if the airport
authority were to contract out the screening operation. Some commented that
screening accountability would likely blur because of the substantial
differences among airports in management and governance. Many respondents
indicated that the airport option would produce the same or worse results
than the current situation in terms of accountability, legal/ liability
issues, cooperation among stakeholders, and passenger movement. Several
respondents noted that cooperation between air carriers and airports could
suffer because the airports might raise the cost of passenger screening and
slow down the flow of passengers through the screening checkpoint- to the
detriment of the air carriers? operations. Others indicated that the legal
issue of whether employees of a government- owned airport could conduct
searches of passengers might pose a significant barrier to this option.

Screening performance and accountability would improve if a new agency were
created in DOT to control screening operations, according to those we
interviewed. Some respondents viewed having one entity whose sole focus
would be security as advantageous and believed it would be fitting for the
federal government to take a more direct role in ensuring aviation security.
Respondents indicated that federal control could lead to better screener
performance because a federal entity most likely would offer better pay and
benefits, attract a more professional workforce, and reduce employee
turnover. There was no consensus among the respondents preferring this
option on how federal control might affect stakeholder cooperation,
passenger movement, or legal and liability issues.

For some of the same reasons mentioned above, respondents believed that
screening performance and accountability would improve under a government
corporation charged with screening. The majority of the respondents
preferred the government corporation to the DOT agency, because they viewed
it as more flexible and less bureaucratic than a federal agency. For
instance, the corporation would have more autonomy in funding and budgeting
requirements that typically govern the operations Assigning Screening

Responsibilities to Airports

Creating a New Federal Agency Within DOT

Creating a Federal Corporation

Page 11 GAO- 01- 1171T

of federal agencies. Respondents believed that the speed of passengers
through checkpoints was likely to remain unchanged. No consensus existed
among respondents preferring the government corporation option about how
federal control might affect stakeholder cooperation or legal and liability
issues.

We visited five countries- Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom- viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as having
effective screening operations to identify screening practices that differ
from those in the United States. 7 The responsibility for screening in most
of these countries is placed with the airport authority or with the
government, not with the air carriers as it is in the United States. In
Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the responsibility for screening
has been placed with the airports, which either hire screening companies to
conduct the screening operations or, as at some airports in the United
Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the
Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger screening and hires
a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are overseen by
a Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other countries with
international airports, 100 have placed screening responsibility with the
airports or the government; only 2 other countries- Canada and Bermuda-
place screening responsibility with air carriers.

We also identified differences between the United States and the five
countries in three other areas: screening operations, screeners?
qualifications, and screeners? pay and benefits. As we move to improve the
screening function in the United States, practices of these countries may
provide some useful insights.

First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are more
stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
routinely touch or ?pat down? passengers in response to metal detector
alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed passengers
through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to more
thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also have a greater police or
military presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for

7 See Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance

(GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000). Potential Lessons

About Screening Practices From Other Countries

Page 12 GAO- 01- 1171T

example, security forces- often armed with automatic weapons- patrol at or
near checkpoints. At Belgium?s main airport in Brussels, a constant police
presence is maintained at one of two glass- enclosed rooms directly behind
the checkpoints.

Second, screeners? qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to
the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France
requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. In the
Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been
residents of the country for 5 years. Training requirements for screeners
were also greater in four of the countries we visited than in the United
States. While FAA requires that screeners in this country have 12 hours of
classroom training before they can begin work, Belgium, Canada, France, and
the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours of
training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an
additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as X- ray machine
operations, that the screener will conduct.

Finally, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of
these countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive wages that
are at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries receive
wages that are viewed as being at the ?middle income? level in those
countries. In the Netherlands, for example, screeners received at least the
equivalent of about $7.50 per hour. This wage was about 30 percent higher
than the wages at fast- food restaurants in that country. In Belgium,
screeners received the equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay
higher, but the screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as health
care or vacations- in large part because these benefits are required under
the laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly lower
screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about 50
percent or lower in these countries.

Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices, and
because data on screeners? performance in each country were not available to
us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices on
improving screeners? performance. Nevertheless, there are indications that
for least one country, practices may help to improve screeners? performance.
This country conducted a screener- testing program jointly with FAA that
showed that its screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did
screeners in the United States.

Page 13 GAO- 01- 1171T

In view of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it is clear that we need
to thoroughly assess and improve aspects of our aviation security system,
including screening. Reassigning the screening functions may be one of the
key improvements needed; however, we all recognize that implementing an
alternative to the current approach will take time. Many of the stakeholders
we consulted expected that changes would be difficult and may require much
time and labor to avoid disruption of screening operations. Incremental
actions might be necessary, such as testing a new alternative at selected
sites while maintaining the current situation elsewhere.

In the meantime, DOT and FAA should continue with efforts under way to
improve screeners? performance. We also believe that in the immediate
future, additional actions should be considered. These actions could include
prioritizing outstanding recommendations that address security, developing a
strategic plan to address the recommendations, assigning specific executive
responsibility for carrying out this plan, and identifying the sources and
amounts of funding needed. A key action needed is to complete the
promulgation of the screening company certification regulation, which also
implements the requirements of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000,
enacted by the Congress last November. Furthermore, this committee and
others are considering various types of assistance for the airline industry.
Consideration of the role of air carriers in conducting passenger screening
could be examined as part of the ongoing effort to identify and structure
mechanisms to provide such assistance to help the carriers emerge from the
current crisis.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any
questions that you or Members of the Committees may have.

For more information, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-
2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Samer
W. Abbas, J. Michael Bollinger, Colin J. Fallon, Libby Halperin, Gail F.
Marnik, Belva M. Martin, John R. Schulze, and Daniel J. Semick. Contacts and

Acknowledgments

(540011)
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