Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security (20-SEP-01, GAO-01-1166T).			 
								 
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the	 
nation's security, physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions
of dollars and	myriad programs and policies have been devoted to
achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at this  
time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in the	 
nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the 
horrendous events on September 11, 2001, it is clear that serious
weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their  
impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined. As  
reported last year, GAO's review of the Federal Aviation	 
Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC)	 
computer systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical  
aspects of its own security requirements. Specifically, FAA had  
not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities were secure, that  
the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors  
who use these systems had undergone background checks. Controls  
for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not
always worked as intended. GAO's special agents used fictitious  
law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure  
areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk	 
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. Tests of screeners	 
revealed significant weaknesses in their ability to detect threat
objects on passengers or in their carry-on luggage. Screening	 
operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the  
United Kingdom--countries whose systems GAO has examined--differ 
from this country's in some significant ways. Their screening	 
operations require more extensive qualifications and training for
screeners; include higher pay and better benefits; and often	 
include different screening techniques, such as "pat-downs" of	 
some passengers.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-1166T					        
    ACCNO:   A01945						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe      
             Weaknesses in Aviation Security                                  
     DATE:   09/20/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Air traffic control systems			 
	     Airports						 
	     Computer security					 
	     Facility security					 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Law enforcement personnel				 
	     Safety standards					 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     FAA Air Traffic Control System			 
	     FAA Civil Aviation Security Program		 

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GAO-01-1166T
     
Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Transportation, Senate and House
Committees on Appropriations

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 00 p. m. EDT Thursday, September
20, 2001

AVIATION SECURITY Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation
Security

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO- 01- 1166T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees: A safe and
secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation?s overall
security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of
dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving
such a system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually
occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation?s aviation security
apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous events of last week, it is
clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that
their impact can be far more devastating than previously imagined.

We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have identified
throughout the nation?s aviation system. Our testimony is based on our prior
work and includes assessments of security concerns with (1) aviation-
related computer systems, (2) airport access controls, and (3) passenger and
carry- on baggage screening, including how the United States and selected
other countries differ in their screening practices. Our testimony will also
offer some observations about improving aviation security in these various
areas.

In summary:  As we reported last year, our reviews of the Federal Aviation

Administration?s (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer
systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own
security requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings
and facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and
that the contractors who access these systems had undergone background
checks. As a result, the ATC system was susceptible to intrusion and
malicious attacks. FAA is making some progress in addressing the 22
recommendations we made to improve computer security, but most have yet to
be completed.  Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including
aircraft, have not

always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our special agents
used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to
secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is acting on the weaknesses we
identified and is implementing improvements to more closely check the
credentials of law enforcement officers. The Department of Transportation?s
Inspector General has also documented numerous

Page 2 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

problems with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, the
Inspector General?s staff successfully gained access to secure areas 68
percent of the time.  As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners
revealed significant

weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on
passengers or contained in their carry- on luggage. In 1987, screeners
missed 20 percent of the potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its
tests. At that time, FAA characterized this level of performance as
unsatisfactory. More recent results have shown that as testing gets more
realistic- that is, as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might
attempt to penetrate a checkpoint- screeners? performance declines
significantly. A principal cause of screeners? performance problems is the
rapid turnover among screeners. Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at
most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners,
primarily because of the low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive,
monotonous nature of their work. Additionally, too little attention has been
given to factors such as the sufficiency of the training given to screeners.
FAA?s efforts to address these problems have been slow. We recommended that
FAA develop an integrated plan to focus its efforts, set priorities, and
measure progress in improving screening. FAA is addressing these
recommendations, but progress on one key effort- the certification of
screening companies- is still not complete because the implementing
regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2 ï¿½ years since FAA
originally planned to implement the regulation.  Screening operations in
Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and

the United Kingdom- countries whose systems we have examined- differ from
this country?s in some significant ways. Their screening operations require
more extensive qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay
and better benefits, and often include different screening techniques, such
as ?pat- downs? of some passengers. Another significant difference is that
most of these countries place responsibility for screening with airport
authorities or the government instead of air carriers. The countries we
visited had significantly lower screener turnover, and there is some
evidence they may have better screener performance; for example, one
country?s screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did U. S.
screeners in a 1998 joint screener testing program conducted with FAA.

The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country looks at
aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers implemented new
controls that promise a greater sense of security. We support these actions.
Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our aviation security
system, more needs to be done. Additional

Page 3 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

considerations for the immediate future could include prioritizing
outstanding recommendations that address security, developing a strategic
plan to address the recommendations, assigning specific executive
responsibility for carrying out this plan, and identifying the sources and
amounts of funding needed. In establishing priorities, a key action needed
is to complete the promulgation of the screening company certification
regulation, which also implements the requirements of the Airport Security
Improvement Act of 2000, enacted by the Congress last November. The Congress
also needs to reconsider whether airlines should continue to bear primary
responsibility for screening operations at the nation?s airports. Aviation
security has truly become a national security issue, and responsibility for
screening may no longer appropriately rest with air carriers. Consideration
of the role of air carriers in conducting passenger screening could be
examined as part of the ongoing effort to identify and structure mechanisms
to provide financial and other assistance to help the aviation industry
emerge from the current crisis.

It has been observed that previous tragedies have resulted in congressional
hearings, studies, recommendations, and debates, but little long- term
resolve to correct flaws in the system as the memory of the crisis recedes.
The future of aviation security hinges in large part on overcoming this
cycle of limited action that has too often characterized the response to
aviation security concerns.

Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism was
significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U. S. airliners was
discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the task of providing
security to the nation?s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we
must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made
totally secure. The enormous size of U. S. airspace alone defies easy
protection. Furthermore, given this country?s hundreds of airports,
thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly
limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system,
aviation security must be enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding airplanes
and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept
from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure airport
areas or to aircraft. Additionally, vigilance is required to prevent attacks
against the extensive computer networks that FAA uses to guide thousands of
flights safely through U. S. airspace. FAA has developed several mechanisms
to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such as adopting technology to
detect explosives and establishing procedures to ensure that passengers are
positively identified before boarding a flight. Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that
significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation?s aviation security.

Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation security
in recent years. One such problems is FAA?s computer- based air traffic
control system. The ATC system is an enormous, complex collection of
interrelated systems, including navigation, surveillance, weather, and
automated information processing and display systems that link hundreds of
ATC facilities and provide information to air traffic controllers and
pilots. Failure to adequately protect these systems could increase the risk
of regional or nationwide disruption of air traffic- or even collisions.

In five reports issued from 1998 through 2000, we pointed out numerous
weaknesses in FAA?s computer security. 1 FAA had not (1) completed
background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2) assessed and
accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3) performed appropriate
risk assessments to determine the vulnerability of the majority of its ATC
systems, (4) established a comprehensive security program, (5) developed
service continuity controls to ensure that critical operations continue
without undue interruption when unexpected events occur, and (6) fully
implemented an intrusion detection capability to detect and respond to
malicious intrusions. Some of these weaknesses could have led to serious
problems. For example, as part of its Year 2000 readiness efforts, FAA
allowed 36 mainland Chinese nationals who had not undergone required
background checks to review the computer source code for eight mission-
critical systems.

To date, we have made nearly 22 recommendations to improve FAA?s computer
security. FAA has worked to address these recommendations, but most of them
have yet to be completed. For example, it is making progress in obtaining
background checks on contractors and accrediting

1 Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety

(GAO/ AIMD- 98- 155, May 18, 1998), Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve
Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate and Review Software
(GAO/ AIMD- 00- 55, Dec. 23, 1999), Computer Security: FAA is Addressing
Personnel Weaknesses, But Further Action Is Required (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 169,
May 31, 2000), FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and
Other Continuing Weaknesses

(GAO/ AIMD- 00- 252, Aug. 16, 2000), and FAA Computer Security:
Recommendations to Address Continuing Weaknesses (GAO- 01- 171, Dec. 6,
2000). Potential for

Unauthorized Access to Aviation Computer Systems

Page 5 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

facilities and systems as secure. However, it will take time to complete
these efforts.

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is
another component of aviation security. Among the access controls in place
are requirements intended to prevent unauthorized individuals from using
forged, stolen, or outdated identification or their familiarity with airport
procedures to gain access to secured areas. In May 2000, we reported that
our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure
areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and
badges. 2 At these airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law
enforcement officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created
from commercially available software packages or downloaded from the
Internet, and were issued ?law enforcement? boarding passes. They were then
waved around the screening checkpoints without being screened. Our agents
could thus have carried weapons, explosives, chemical/ biological agents, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. In response to our findings, FAA now
requires that each airport?s law enforcement officers examine the badges and
credentials of any individual seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is
also working on a ?smart card? computer system that would verify law
enforcement officers? identity and authorization for bypassing passenger
screening.

The Department of Transportation?s Inspector General has also uncovered
problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector General?s staff
conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access controls at eight major
airports and succeeded in gaining access to secure areas in 68 percent of
the tests; they were able to board aircraft 117 times. After the release of
its report describing its successes in breaching security, 3 the Inspector
General conducted additional testing between December 1999 and March 2000
and found that, although improvements had been made, access to secure areas
was still gained more than 30 percent of the time.

2 Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/ T- OSI- 00- 10,
May 25, 2000). 3 Airport Access Control (AV- 2000- 017, Nov. 18, 1999).
Weaknesses in Airport

Access Controls

Page 6 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line of
defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the aviation
system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each day
for articles that could pose threats to the safety of an aircraft and those
aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for screening passengers and
their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas of an airport
or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees to conduct
screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security companies to do
the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening companies are
responsible for screening at some of the nation?s larger airports.

Concerns have long existed over screeners? ability to detect and prevent
dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were
discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been found
during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the performance of
screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially
dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. In
1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during FAA tests.
In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects during the same type of
test. Test data for the 1991 to 1999 period show that the declining trend in
detection rates continues. 4 Furthermore, the recent tests show that as
tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist
might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners? ability to detect
dangerous objects declines even further.

As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to
identify dangerous objects. 5 Two conditions- rapid screener turnover and
inadequate attention to human factors- are believed to be important causes.
Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long- standing problem, having
been identified as a concern by FAA and by us in reports dating back to at
least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among screeners was about 100
percent a year at some airports, and according to our more recent work, the
turnover is considerably higher. 6 From May

4 Information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security
information and cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss
the actual detection rates for the 1991- 99 period.

5 Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance

(GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000). 6 Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard
Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO- RCED- 87- 182, July 24, 1987). Inadequate Detection

of Dangerous Objects by Screeners

Page 7 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

1998 through April 1999, screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the
nation?s 19 largest airports; 5 of these airports reported turnover of 200
percent or more, and one reported turnover of 416 percent. At one airport we
visited, of the 993 screeners trained at that airport over about a 1- year
period, only 142, or 14 percent, were still employed at the end of that
year. Such rapid turnover can seriously limit the level of experience among
screeners operating a checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low
wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the daily stress of
the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the minimum wage. We
reported last year that some of the screening companies at 14 of the
nation?s 19 largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6. 00 an
hour or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the
thenminimum wage-$ 5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at
airport fast- food restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners
receive. For instance, at one airport we visited, screeners? wages started
as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport?s
fastfood restaurants was $7 an hour.

The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties require
repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare event when
a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has been given to
factors such as (1) improving individuals? aptitudes for effectively
performing screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job
and the distractions that reduce screeners? vigilance. As a result,
screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary
aptitudes, nor the adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work, and
who then find the duties tedious and dull.

We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions to
improve screeners? performance. However, FAA did not have an integrated
management plan for these efforts that would identify and prioritize
checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be resolved, and
identify measures- and related milestone and funding information- for
addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA did not have adequate
goals by which to measure and report its progress in improving screeners?
performance.

FAA is implementing our recommendations. However, two key actions to
improving screeners? performance are still not complete. These actions are
the deployment of threat image projection systems- which place images

Page 8 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

of dangerous objects on the monitors of X- ray machines to keep screeners
alert and monitor their performance- and a certification program to make
screening companies accountable for the training and performance of the
screeners they employ. Threat image projection systems are expected to keep
screeners alert by periodically imposing the image of a dangerous object on
the X- ray screen. They also are used to measure how well screeners perform
in detecting these objects. Additionally, the systems serve as a device to
train screeners to become more adept at identifying harder- to- spot
objects. FAA is currently deploying the threat image projections systems and
expects to have them deployed at all airports by 2003.

The screening company certification program, required by the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish performance, training,
and equipment standards that screening companies will have to meet to earn
and retain certification. However, FAA has still not issued its final
regulation establishing the certification program. This regulation is
particularly significant because it is to include requirements mandated by
the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 to increase screener training-
from 12 hours to 40 hours- as well as expand background check requirements.
FAA had been expecting to issue the final regulation this month, 2 ï¿½ years
later than it originally planned.

We visited five countries- Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom- viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as having
effective screening operations to identify screening practices that differ
from those in the United States. We found that some significant differences
exist in four areas: screening operations, screener qualifications, screener
pay and benefits, and institutional responsibility for screening.

First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are more
stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
routinely touch or ?pat down? passengers in response to metal detector
alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed passengers
through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to more
thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also have a greater police or
military presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for example,
security forces- often armed with automatic weapons- patrol at or near
checkpoints. At Belgium?s main airport in Brussels, a constant police
presence is maintained at one of two glass- enclosed rooms directly behind
the checkpoints. Differences in the

Screening Practices of Five Other Countries and the United States

Page 9 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Second, screeners? qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to
the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France
requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. In the
Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been
residents of the country for 5 years. Training requirements for screeners
were also greater in four of the countries we visited than in the United
States. While FAA requires that screeners in this country have 12 hours of
classroom training before they can begin work, Belgium, Canada, France, and
the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours of
training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an
additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as X- ray machine
operations, that the screener will conduct.

Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of these
countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive wages that are at
or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries receive wages
that are viewed as being at the ?middle income? level in those countries. In
the Netherlands, for example, screeners received at least the equivalent of
about $7.50 per hour. This wage was about 30 percent higher than the wages
at fast- food restaurants in that country. In Belgium, screeners received
the equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay higher, but the
screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as health care or
vacations- in large part because these benefits are required under the laws
of these countries. These countries also have significantly lower screener
turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about 50 percent or
lower in these countries.

Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these countries is
placed with the airport authority or with the government, not with the air
carriers as it is in the United States. In Belgium, France, and the United
Kingdom, the responsibility for screening has been placed with the airports,
which either hire screening companies to conduct the screening operations
or, as at some airports in the United Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the
checkpoints themselves. In the Netherlands, the government is responsible
for passenger screening and hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint
operations, which are overseen by a Dutch police force. We note that,
worldwide, of 102 other countries with international airports, 100 have
placed screening responsibility with the airports or the government; only 2
other countries- Canada and Bermuda- place screening responsibility with air
carriers.

Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices, and
because data on screeners? performance in each country were not

Page 10 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different
practices on improving screeners? performance. Nevertheless, there are
indications that for least one country, practices may help to improve
screeners? performance. This country conducted a screener testing program
jointly with FAA that showed that its screeners detected over twice as many
test objects as did screeners in the United States.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any
questions that you or Members of the Committee may have.

For more information, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-
2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Bonnie
Beckett, J. Michael Bollinger, Colin J. Fallon, John R. Schulze, and Daniel
J. Semick. Contacts and

Acknowledgments

Page 11 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access Security
Improvements (GAO- 01- 1069R, Aug. 31, 2001).

Aviation Security: Additional Controls Needed to Address Weaknesses in
Carriage of Weapons Regulations (GAO/ RCED- 00- 181, Sept. 29, 2000).

FAA Computer Security: Actions Needed to Address Critical Weaknesses That
Jeopardize Aviation Operations (GAO/ T- AIMD- 00- 330, Sept. 27, 2000).

FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain Due to Personnel and Other Continuing
Weaknesses (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 252, Aug. 16, 2000).

Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance (GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000).

Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further
Action Is Required (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 169, May 31, 2000).

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO- OSI- 00- 10, May
25, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat
Terrorism (GAO/ NSIAD- 00- 85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System (GAO/ T- RCED/ AIMD- 00- 142, Apr. 6, 2000).

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long- Standing Screener
Performance Problems (GAO/ T- RCED- 00- 125, Mar. 16, 2000).

Computer Security: FAA Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign
Nationals to Remediate and Review Software (GAO/ AIMD- 00- 55, Dec. 23,
1999).

FBI: Delivery of ATF Report on TWA Flight 800 Crash (GAO/ OSI- 99- 18R, Aug.
13, 1999).

Aviation Security: FAA?s Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for
Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (GAO/ RCED99- 53, Feb.
25, 1999). Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight
Safety (GAO/ AIMD- 98- 155, May 18, 1998).

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long- Term Attention Is Needed
(GAO/ T- RCED- 98- 190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/ RCED- 98- 102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (T- NSIAD98- 164,
Apr. 23, 1998).

Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
Identifying and Responding to Risks (GAO/ RCED- 98- 6, Feb. 27, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA?s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/ RCED- 97- 111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection
Devices (GAO/ RCED- 97- ll9R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Aviation Security: Posting Notices at Domestic Airports (GAO/ RCED- 9788R,
Mar. 25, 1997).

Aviation Safety and Security: Challenges to Implementing the Recommendations
of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (GAO/ T- RCED-
97- 90, Mar. 5, 1997).

Aviation Security: Technology?s Role in Addressing Vulnerabilities

(GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 262, Sept. 19, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/ TRCED/ NSIAD-
96- 251, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and
Narcotics (GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/ T- RCED/ NSIAD- 96- 237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Page 13 GAO- 01- 1166T Aviation Security

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 96- 76BR, Mar. 27, 1996).

Aviation Security: FAA Can Help Ensure that Airport?s Access Control Systems
are Cost Effective (GAO/ RCED- 95- 25, Mar. 1, 1995).

Aviation Security: Development of New Security Technology Has Not Met
Expectations (GAO/ RCED- 94- 142, May 19, 1994).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/ RCED- 94- 38, Jan. 27, 1994).

(540010)
*** End of document. ***