Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for
Assigning Screening Responsibilities (21-SEP-01, GAO-01-1165T).  
								 
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component  
of the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and	 
economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs
and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system.	 
Although it is not fully known at this time what actually	 
occurred or what all the weaknesses in the nation's aviation	 
security apparatus are that contributed to the horrendous	 
terrorist acts of Semptember 11, 2001, it is clear that serious  
weaknesses exist in the nation's aviation security system and	 
that their impact can be far more devastating than previously	 
imagined. There are security concerns with (1) airport access	 
controls, (2) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3)  
alternatives to current screening practices, including practices 
in selected other countries. Controls for limiting access to	 
secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as	 
intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law	 
enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas
at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking	 
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. In June 2000, testing of 
screeners showed that significant, long-standing		 
weaknesses--measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat
objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on	 
luggage--continue to exist. More recent results show that as	 
tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to  
penetrate a checkpoint--screeners' performance declines 	 
significantly. Weaknesses in screening and controlling access to 
secure are as have left questions concerning alternative	 
approaches. In assessing alternatives, respondents identified	 
five important criteria: improving screening performance,	 
establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation among 	 
stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and
liability issues.						 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-1165T					        
    ACCNO:   A01970						        
  TITLE:     Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and    
             Options for Assigning Screening Responsibilities                 
     DATE:   09/21/2001 
  SUBJECT:   Aircraft						 
	     Airports						 
	     Facility security					 
	     Transportation safety				 
	     Internal controls					 
	     Safety standards					 
	     FAA Civil Aviation Security Program		 

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GAO-01-1165T
     
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 10: 00 a. m. EDT Friday September
21, 2001

AVIATION SECURITY Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning
Screening Responsibilities

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO- 01- 1165T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 1165T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: A safe and secure civil
aviation system is a critical component of the nation?s overall security,
physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a
myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a
system. Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred
or which of the weaknesses in the nation?s aviation security apparatus
contributed to the horrendous events of last week, it is clear that serious
weaknesses exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can
be far more devastating than previously imagined.

We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have identified in
the safeguards to protect passengers and prevent unauthorized access to or
attacks on aircraft. Our testimony is based on our prior work and a review
that we have underway for this Subcommittee and includes assessments of
security concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry-
on baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current screening practices,
including practices in selected other countries.

In summary:  Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including
aircraft, have not

always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our special agents
used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to
secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and walking
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons, explosives, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is acting on the weaknesses we
identified and is implementing actions to more closely check the credentials
of law enforcement officers. The Department of Transportation?s Inspector
General has also documented numerous problems with airport access controls,
and in one series of tests, the Inspector General?s staff successfully
gained access to secure areas 68 percent of the time.  As we reported in
June 2000, testing of screeners shows that significant,

long- standing weaknesses- measured by the screeners? abilities to detect
threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry- on
luggage- continue to exist. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the
potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. At that time, FAA
characterized this level of performance as unsatisfactory. More recent
results have shown that as testing gets more realistic- that is, as tests
more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a

Page 2 GAO- 01- 1165T

checkpoint- screeners? performance declines significantly. A principal cause
of screeners? performance problems is the rapid turnover among screeners.
Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at most large airports, leaving
few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because of the low wages,
limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous nature of their work.
Additionally, too little attention has been given to factors such as the
sufficiency of the training given to screeners. FAA?s efforts to address
these problems have been slow. We recommended that FAA develop an integrated
plan to focus its efforts, set priorities, and measure progress in improving
screening. FAA is addressing these recommendations, but progress on one key
effort- the certification of screening companies- is still not complete
because the implementing regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2
ï¿½ years since FAA originally planned to implement the regulation. 
Weaknesses in the current system in which airlines are responsible for

screening passengers and controlling access to secure areas have raised
questions about whether alternative approaches should be considered. In work
that we have under way for the Subcommittee, we surveyed aviation
stakeholders and aviation and terrorism experts and have identified four
options for assigning screening responsibilities: continue with air carriers
but with new requirements, assign responsibility to airports, or shift
responsibility to the federal government, either through the creation of a
new federal agency or the creation of a federal corporation. In assessing
alternatives, respondents identified 5 important criteria: improving
screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation
among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and
liability issues. The majority of respondents believed that screening
performance and accountability would improve if screening were placed with
the federal government. Many indicated that assigning screening
responsibility to the airports would not likely improve screeners?
performance and accountability. Still, some respondents believed that a
professional screening workforce could be developed in any organizational
context.

The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country looks at
aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers implemented new
controls that promise a greater sense of security. We support these actions.
Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our aviation security
system, more needs to be done. Aviation security has truly become a national
security issue, and as we will discuss today, responsibility for screening
may no longer appropriately rest with air carriers. Mr. Chairman, it has
been observed that previous tragedies have resulted in congressional
hearings, studies, recommendations, and

Page 3 GAO- 01- 1165T

debates, but little long- term resolve to correct flaws in the system as the
memory of the crisis recedes. The future of aviation security hinges in
large part on overcoming this cycle of limited action that has too often
characterized the response to aviation security concerns.

Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism was
significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U. S. airliners was
discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the task of providing
security to the nation?s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we
must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made
totally secure. The enormous size of U. S. airspace alone defies easy
protection. Furthermore, given this country?s hundreds of airports,
thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly
limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system,
aviation security must be enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding airplanes
and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept
from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to aircraft. FAA has
developed several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such
as adopting technology to detect explosives and establishing procedures to
ensure that passengers are positively identified before boarding a flight.
Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated that
significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation?s aviation security.

The current aviation security structure, its policies, requirements, and
practices have evolved since the early 1960s and were heavily influenced by
a series of high profile aviation security incidents. Historically, the
federal government has maintained that providing security was the
responsibility of air carriers and airports as part of their cost of doing
business. Beginning in 1972, air carriers were required to provide screening
personnel and the airport operators to provide law enforcement support.
However, with the rise in air piracy and terrorist activities that not only
threatened commercial aviation but the national security of the United
States, discussions began to emerge as to who should have the responsibility
for providing security at our nations airports. With the events of the last
week, concerns have been raised again as to who should be responsible for
security and screening passengers at our nation?s airports. This issue has
evoked numerous discussions through the years and just as many options of
who and how security at our nation?s airports Background

Page 4 GAO- 01- 1165T

should be handled. But as pointed out in a 1998 FAA study, there had not
been a consensus among the various aviation- related entities. 1

To identify options for assigning screening responsibilities, we surveyed
aviation stakeholders- security officials at the major air carriers and the
largest airports, large screening companies, and industry associations- and
aviation and terrorism experts. We asked our respondents to provide their
opinions about the current screening program, criteria they believe are
important in considering options, the advantages and disadvantages of each
options, and their comments on implementing a different screening approach.
It is important to understand that we gathered this information prior to
September 11, 2001, and some respondents? views may have changed.

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is
a critical component of aviation security. Existing access controls include
requirements intended to prevent unauthorized individuals from using forged,
stolen, or outdated identification or their familiarity with airport
procedures to gain access to secured areas. In May 2000, we reported that
our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure
areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and
badges. 2 At these airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law
enforcement officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created
from commercially available software packages or downloaded from the
Internet, and were issued ?law enforcement? boarding passes. They were then
waved around the screening checkpoints without being screened. Our agents
could thus have carried weapons, explosives, chemical/ biological agents, or
other dangerous objects onto aircraft. In response to our findings, FAA now
requires that each airport?s law enforcement officers examine the badges and
credentials of any individual seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is
also working on a ?smart card? computer system that would verify law
enforcement officers? identity and authorization for bypassing passenger
screening.

The Department of Transportation?s Inspector General has also uncovered
problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector General?s staff

1 Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security Responsibilities
and Funding,

Dec. 1998. 2 Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/ T-
OSI- 00- 10, May 25, 2000). Weaknesses in Airport

Access Controls

Page 5 GAO- 01- 1165T

conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access controls at eight major
airports and succeeded in gaining access to secure areas in 68 percent of
the tests; they were able to board aircraft 117 times. After the release of
its report describing its successes in breaching security, 3 the Inspector
General conducted additional testing between December 1999 and March 2000
and found that, although improvements had been made, access to secure areas
was still gained more than 30 percent of the time.

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line of
defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the aviation
system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each day
for articles that could pose threats to the safety of an aircraft and those
aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for screening passengers and
their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas of an airport
or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees to conduct
screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security companies to do
the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening companies are
responsible for screening at some of the nation?s larger airports.

Concerns have long existed about screeners? ability to detect and prevent
dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were
discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been found
during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the performance of
screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect potentially
dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as passengers. In
1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during FAA tests.
In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects during the same type of
test. Test data for the 1991 to 1999 period show that the declining trend in
detection rates continues. 4 Furthermore, the recent tests show that as
tests become more realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist
might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint, screeners? ability to detect
dangerous objects declines even further.

3 Airport Access Control (AV- 2000- 017, Nov. 18, 1999). 4 Information on
FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security information and
cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss the actual
detection rates for the 1991- 99 period. Inadequate Detection

of Dangerous Objects by Screeners

Page 6 GAO- 01- 1165T

As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to
identify dangerous objects. 5 Two conditions- rapid screener turnover and
inadequate attention to human factors- are believed to be important causes.
Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long- standing problem, having
been identified as a concern by FAA and by us in reports dating back to at
least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among screeners was about 100
percent a year at some airports, and according to our more recent work, the
turnover is considerably higher. 6 From May 1998 through April 1999,
screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the nation?s 19 largest airports;
5 of these airports reported turnover of 200 percent or more, and one
reported turnover of 416 percent. At one airport we visited, of the 993
screeners trained at that airport over about a 1- year period, only 142, or
14 percent, were still employed at the end of that year. Such rapid turnover
can seriously limit the level of experience among screeners operating a
checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low
wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the daily stress of
the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the minimum wage. We
reported last year that some of the screening companies at 14 of the
nation?s 19 largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6. 00 an
hour or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the
minimum wage-$ 5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at airport
fastfood restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners receive. For
instance, at one airport we visited, screeners? wages started as low as
$6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport?s fast- food
restaurants was $7 an hour.

The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties require
repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare event when
a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has been given to
factors such as (1) improving individuals? aptitudes for effectively
performing screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job
and the distractions that reduce screeners? vigilance. As a result,
screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary

5 Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance

(GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000). 6 Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard
Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO- RCED- 87- 182, July 24, 1987).

Page 7 GAO- 01- 1165T

aptitudes, nor the adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work, and
who then find the duties tedious and dull.

We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions to
improve screeners? performance. However, FAA did not have an integrated
management plan for these efforts that would identify and prioritize
checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be resolved, and
identify measures- and related milestone and funding information- for
addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA did not have adequate
goals by which to measure and report its progress in improving screeners?
performance.

FAA is implementing our recommendations to develop an integrated management
plan. However, two key actions to improving screeners? performance are still
not complete. These actions are the deployment of threat image projection
(TIP) systems- which place images of dangerous objects on the monitors of X-
ray machines to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance- and a
certification program to make screening companies accountable for the
training and performance of the screeners they employ. Threat image
projection systems are expected to keep screeners alert by periodically
imposing the image of a dangerous object on the X- ray screen. They also are
used to measure how well screeners perform in detecting these objects.
Additionally, the systems serve as a device to train screeners to become
more adept at identifying harder- to- spot objects. FAA is currently
deploying the threat image projections systems and expects to have them
deployed at all airports by 2003.

The screening company certification program, required by the Federal
Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish performance, training,
and equipment standards that screening companies will have to meet to earn
and retain certification. However, FAA has still not issued its final
regulation establishing the certification program. This regulation is
particularly significant because it is to include requirements mandated by
the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 to increase screener training-
from 12 hours to 40 hours- as well as to expand background check
requirements. FAA had been expecting to issue the final regulation this
month, 2 ï¿½ years later than it originally planned. According to FAA, it
needed the additional time to develop performance standards based on
screener performance data.

Page 8 GAO- 01- 1165T

Because of the Subcommittee?s long- standing concerns about the performance
of screeners, you asked us to examine options for conducting screening and
to outline some advantages and disadvantages associated with these
alternatives.

Many aviation stakeholders agreed that a stable, highly trained, and
professional workforce is critical to improving screening performance. They
identified compensation and improved training as the highest priorities in
improving performance. Respondents also believed that the implementation of
performance standards, team and image building, awards for exemplary work,
better supervision, and certification of individual screeners would improve
performance. Some respondents believed that a professional workforce could
be developed in any organizational context, and that changing the delegation
of screening responsibilities would increase the costs of screening.

We identified four principal alternative approaches to screening. Each
alternative could be structured and implemented in many different ways; for
instance, an entity might use its own employees to screen passengers, or it
might use an outside contractor to perform the job. In each alternative, we
assumed that FAA would continue to be responsible for regulating screening,
overseeing performance, and imposing penalties for poor performance. Table 1
outlines the four options.

Table 1: Description of Screening Alternatives Alternative Summary

Airlines with new certification rules Air carriers could continue to be
responsible for conducting screening. However, this alternative assumes that
FAA will impose new requirements on screening companies to ensure that
screeners are better trained and demonstrate proficiency in using screening
equipment. Airports Each airport management authority could be responsible
for its own screening. Given the

number and diversity of the nation?s airports, screening operations might
vary considerably throughout the country.

Federal agency A new DOT agency (with headquarters and field structure)
could be created to conduct the national screening program. It could be
accountable to the Congress through the annual appropriations and oversight
processes.

Federal corporation A government corporation created solely to conduct
passenger and baggage screening. Like other government corporations- such as
the Tennessee Valley Authority- it would be accountable to the Congress but
would have more autonomy than other agencies.

Source: GAO?s analysis of Booze- Allen and Hamilton, Independent Assessment
of Airport Security Screener Performance and Retention, Sept. 15, 2000.

Options for Assigning Screening Responsibility to Other Entities

Four Major Alternatives for Screening

Page 9 GAO- 01- 1165T

Shifting responsibility for screening would be a step affecting many
stakeholders and might demand many resources. Accordingly, a number of
criteria must be weighed before changing the status quo. We asked aviation
stakeholders to identify key criteria that should be used in assessing
screening alternatives. These criteria are to

 improve screening performance;  establish accountability for screening
performance;  ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines,
airports, FAA,

and screening companies;  efficiently move passengers to flights; and 
minimize legal and liability issues.

We asked airline and airport security officials to assess each option for
reassigning screener responsibility against the key criteria. Specifically,
we asked them to indicate whether an alternative would be better, the same,
or worse than the current situation with regard to each criterion. Table 2
summarizes their responses.

Table 2: Summary of Respondent?s Views of Alternatives to the Current
Program Options

Screener performance Accountability Stakeholder

cooperation Legal and

liability Passengers moved efficiently

Airlines with new rules Better Better Same Same Same Airports Undecided
Undecided Undecided Undecided Undecided Federal agency Better Better
Undecided Undecided Undecided Federal corporation Better Better Undecided
Undecided Same

Note: The views expressed about the airlines and airports options are based
on the opinions of 17 major air carriers and airports we interviewed; views
about the federal agency and the federal corporation are based on the
opinions of 9 and 4 of these respondents, respectively. A consensus of
Better, Same, or Worse was determined by having about 60 percent agree on
the response.

At the time of our review, FAA was finalizing a certification rule that
would make a number of changes to the screening program, including requiring
FAA- certification of screening companies and the installation of TIP
systems on X- ray machines at screening checkpoints. Our respondents
believed that these actions would improve screeners? performance and
accountability. Some respondents approved of the proposed changes since they
would result in FAA having a direct regulatory role vis- a- vis the
screening companies. Others indicated that the installation of TIP systems
nationwide could improve screener awareness and ability to detect
potentially threatening objects and result in better screener performance.
Respondents did not believe that this option would affect stakeholder
Criteria for Assessing

Screening Alternatives

Leaving Responsibility to Air Carriers With New Certification Rules

Page 10 GAO- 01- 1165T

cooperation, affect passenger movement through checkpoints, or pose any
additional legal issues.

No consensus existed among aviation stakeholders about how airport control
of screening would affect any of the key criteria. Almost half indicated
that screener performance would not change if the airport authority were to
assume responsibility, particularly if the airport authority were to
contract out the screening operation. Some commented that screening
accountability would likely blur because of the substantial differences
among airport management and governance. Many respondents indicated that the
airport option would produce the same or worse results than the current
situation in terms of accountability, legal/ liability issues, cooperation
among stakeholders, and passenger movement. Several respondents noted that
cooperation between air carriers and airports could suffer because the
airports might raise the cost of passenger screening and slow down the flow
of passengers through the screening checkpoint- to the detriment of the air
carriers? operations. Others indicated that the legal issue of whether
employees of a government- owned airport could conduct searches of
passengers might pose a significant barrier to this option.

Screening performance and accountability would improve if a new agency were
created in DOT to control screening operations, according to those we
interviewed. Some respondents viewed having one entity whose sole focus
would be security would be advantageous and believed it fitting for the
federal government to take a more direct role in ensuring aviation security.
Respondents indicated that federal control could lead to better screener
performance because a federal entity most likely would offer better pay and
benefits, attract a more professional workforce, and reduce employee
turnover. There was no consensus among the respondents preferring this
option on how federal control might affect stakeholder cooperation,
passenger movement, or legal and liability issues.

For some of the same reasons mentioned above, respondents believed that
screening performance and accountability would improve under a government
corporation charged with screening. The majority of the respondents
preferred the government corporation to the DOT agency, because they viewed
it as more flexible and less bureaucratic than a federal agency. For
instance, the corporation would have more autonomy in funding and budgeting
requirements that typically govern the operations Assigning Screening

Responsibilities to Airports

Creating a New Federal Agency Within DOT

Creating a Federal Corporation

Page 11 GAO- 01- 1165T

of federal agencies. Respondents believed that the speed of passengers
through checkpoints was likely to remain unchanged. No consensus existed
among respondents preferring the government corporation option about how
federal control might affect stakeholder cooperation or legal and liability
issues.

We visited five countries- Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom- viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as having
effective screening operations to identify screening practices that differ
from those in the United States. 7 The responsibility for screening in most
of these countries is placed with the airport authority or with the
government, not with the air carriers as it is in the United States. In
Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the responsibility for screening
has been placed with the airports, which either hire screening companies to
conduct the screening operations or, as at some airports in the United
Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the
Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger screening and hires
a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are overseen by
a Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other countries with
international airports, 100 have placed screening responsibility with the
airports or the government; only 2 other countries- Canada and Bermuda-
place screening responsibility with air carriers.

We also identified differences between the U. S. and the five countries in
three other areas: screening operations, screener qualifications, and
screener pay and benefits. As we move to improve the screening function in
the United States, practices of these countries may provide some useful
insights.

First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are more
stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
routinely touch or ?pat down? passengers in response to metal detector
alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed passengers
through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to more
thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also have a greater police or
military presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for

7 See Aviation Security: Long- Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners?
Performance

(GAO/ RCED- 00- 75, June 28, 2000). Potential Lessons

About Screening Practices From Other Countries

Page 12 GAO- 01- 1165T

example, security forces- often armed with automatic weapons- patrol at or
near checkpoints. At Belgium?s main airport in Brussels, a constant police
presence is maintained at one of two glass- enclosed rooms directly behind
the checkpoints.

Second, screeners? qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to
the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France
requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. In the
Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been
residents of the country for 5 years. Training requirements for screeners
were also greater in four of the countries we visited than in the United
States. While FAA requires that screeners in this country have 12 hours of
classroom training before they can begin work, Belgium, Canada, France, and
the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours of
training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an
additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as X- ray machine
operations, that the screener will conduct.

Finally, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of
these countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive wages that
are at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries receive
wages that are viewed as being at the ?middle income? level in those
countries. In the Netherlands, for example, screeners received at least the
equivalent of about $7.50 per hour. This wage was about 30 percent higher
than the wages at fast- food restaurants in that country. In Belgium,
screeners received the equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay
higher, but the screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as health
care or vacations- in large part because these benefits are required under
the laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly lower
screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about 50
percent or lower in these countries.

Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices, and
because data on screeners? performance in each country were not available to
us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different practices on
improving screeners? performance. Nevertheless, there are indications that
for least one country, practices may help to improve screeners? performance.
This country conducted a screener- testing program jointly with FAA that
showed that its screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did
screeners in the United States.

Page 13 GAO- 01- 1165T

Mr. Chairman, we commend the Subcommittee for the foresight to begin the
debate on options for assigning the screening functions even before the
tragic events of last week. Those events have elevated the discussion;
however, we all recognize that an alternative to the current approach will
take time to implement. Many of the stakeholders we consulted expected that
changes would be difficult and may require much time and labor to avoid
disruption of screening operations. Incremental actions might be necessary,
such as testing a new alternative at selected sites while maintaining the
current situation elsewhere.

In the meantime, the Department of Transportation and the FAA should
continue with efforts under way to improve screener performance. We also
believe that in the immediate future, additional actions should be
considered. These actions could include prioritizing outstanding
recommendations that address security, developing a strategic plan to
address the recommendations, assigning specific executive responsibility for
carrying out this plan, and identifying the sources and amounts of funding
needed. A key action needed is to complete the promulgation of the screening
company certification regulation, which also implements the requirements of
the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, enacted by the Congress last
November. Furthermore, this committee and others are considering various
types of assistance for the airline industry. Consideration of the role of
air carriers in conducting passenger screening could be examined as part of
the ongoing effort to identify and structure mechanisms to provide such
assistance to help the carriers emerge from the current crisis.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to
answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

For more information, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-
2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included Samer
W. Abbas, J. Michael Bollinger, Colin J. Fallon, Libby Halperin, Gail F.
Marnik, Belva M. Martin, John R. Schulze, and Daniel J. Semick. Contacts and

Acknowledgments

(391006)
*** End of document. ***