-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-01-1122t						        

TITLE:     Space Shuttle Safety: Update on NASA's Progress in Revitalizing 
the Shuttle Workforce and Making Safety Upgrades

DATE:   09/06/2001 
				                                                                         
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GAO-01-1122t
     
Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U. S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO For Release on Delivery Expected at 2: 30 p. m. EDT Thursday September
6, 2001 SPACE SHUTTLE SAFETY

Update on NASA's Progress in Revitalizing the Shuttle Workforce and Making
Safety Upgrades

Statement of Allen Li, Director Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team

GAO- 01- 1122T

Page 1 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today
to discuss workforce and safety issues facing the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration?s (NASA) space shuttle program. As requested for this
hearing, we have updated the information we provided to this Subcommittee in
a March 2000 testimony and in an August 2000 report. 1 At the time, the
space shuttle program was at a critical juncture: its workforce had declined
significantly since 1995, its flight rate was to double over that of recent
years to support the assembly of the International Space Station, and costly
safety upgrades were planned to enhance the space shuttle?s safe operation
until at least 2012.

We reported that workforce reductions were jeopardizing NASA?s ability to
safely support the shuttle?s planned flight rate. For instance, many areas
critical to safety were not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers.
Recognizing the need to revitalize the shuttle?s workforce, NASA terminated
its downsizing plans for the shuttle program in December 1999 and initiated
efforts to hire new staff. Furthermore, we also reported that NASA faced a
number of programmatic and technical challenges in its efforts to develop
and begin equipping the shuttle fleet with a variety of safety and
supportability upgrades over the next 5 years. These included a demanding
schedule and undefined design and workforce requirements.

Today, I will discuss NASA?s current progress in addressing these workforce
and safety issues and the challenges still ahead. In brief, we found that
NASA is making progress in revitalizing the shuttle program?s workforce.
NASA?s current budget request projects an increase of more than 200 full-
time equivalent staff through fiscal year 2002. NASA has also focused more
attention on human capital management in its annual performance plan by
outlining an overall strategy to attract and retain a skilled workforce.
Even with these gains, however, there are still considerable challenges
ahead. For example, because many of the additional staff are new hires, they
will require considerable training, and they will need to be effectively
integrated into the shuttle program. Also, NASA still needs to fully staff
areas critical to shuttle safety; deal with critical losses due to
retirements in the coming years; and, most of all,

1 See Space Shuttle: Human Capital Challenges Require Management Attention

(GAO/ T- NSIAD- 00- 133, Mar. 22, 2000) and Space Shuttle: Human Capital and
Safety Upgrade Challenges Require Continued Attention (GAO/ NSIAD/ GGD- 00-
186, Aug. 15, 2000).

Page 2 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

sustain management attention to human capital reforms. NASA?s workforce
problems are not unique. Many agencies have also been contending with
serious human capital shortfalls. We recently added strategic human capital
management to our list of federal programs and operations identified as high
risk. Moreover, while NASA is making strides in revitalizing its workforce,
its ability to implement safety upgrades in a timely manner is uncertain.
NASA is still assessing the full package of its planned improvements, and
some projects have already encountered funding and scheduling problems.
Overcoming challenges related to the upgrades is critical since NASA will be
relying on the space shuttle longer than originally anticipated.

The space shuttle is the world?s first reusable space transportation system.
It consists of a reusable orbiter with three main engines, two partially
reusable solid rocket boosters, and an expendable external fuel tank. Since
it is the nation?s only launch system capable of carrying people to and from
space, the shuttle?s viability is important to NASA?s other space programs,
such as the International Space Station. NASA operates four orbiters in the
shuttle fleet.

Space systems are inherently risky because of the technology involved and
the complexity of their activities. For example, thousands of people perform
about 1.2 million separate procedures to prepare a shuttle for flight. NASA
has emphasized that the top priority for the shuttle program is safety.

The space shuttle?s workforce shrank from about 3,000 to about 1,800
fulltime equivalent employees from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year
1999. A major element of this workforce reduction was the transfer of
shuttle launch preparation and maintenance responsibilities from the
government and multiple contractors to a single private contractor. NASA
believed that consolidating shuttle operations under a single contract would
allow it to reduce the number of engineers, technicians, and inspectors
directly involved in the day- to- day oversight of shuttle processing.
However, the agency later concluded that these reductions caused shortages
of required personnel to perform in- house activities and maintain adequate
oversight of the contractor.

Since the shuttle?s first flight in 1981, the space shuttle program has
developed and incorporated many modifications to improve performance and
safety. These include a super lightweight external tank, cockpit display
enhancements, and main engine safety and reliability Background

Page 3 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

improvements. In 1994, NASA stopped approving additional upgrades, pending
the potential replacement of the shuttle with another reusable launch
vehicle.

NASA now believes that it will have to maintain the current shuttle fleet
until at least 2012, and possibly through 2020. Accordingly, it has
established a development office to identify and prioritize upgrades to
maintain and improve shuttle operational safety.

Last year, we reported that several internal studies showed that the shuttle
program?s workforce had been negatively affected by downsizing. 2 These
studies concluded that the existing workforce was stretched thin to the
point where many areas critical to shuttle safety- such as mechanical
engineering, computer systems, and software assurance engineering- were not
sufficiently staffed by qualified workers. (Appendix I identifies all of the
key areas that were facing staff shortages). Moreover, the workforce was
showing signs of overwork and fatigue. For example, indicators on forfeited
leave, absences from training courses, and stressrelated employee assistance
visits were all on the rise. Lastly, the program?s demographic shape had
changed dramatically. Throughout the Office of Space Flight, which includes
the shuttle program, there were more than twice as many workers over 60
years old than under 30 years old. This condition clearly jeopardized the
program?s ability to hand off leadership roles to the next generation.

According to NASA?s Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight,
the agency faced significant safety and mission success risks because of
workforce issues. This was reinforced by NASA?s Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, which concluded that workforce problems could potentially affect
flight safety as the shuttle launch rate increased.

NASA subsequently recognized the need to revitalize its workforce and began
taking actions toward this end. In October 1999, NASA?s Administrator
directed the agency?s highest- level managers to consider

2 Several workforce studies had been completed since 1996, including
Independent Assessment of the Shuttle Processing Directorate Engineering and
Management Processes, NASA Human Exploration and Development of Space
Independent Assessment Office, (Nov. 4, 1999); Annual Report for 1999,
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (Feb. 2000); and Report to Associate
Administrator, Office of Space Flight, Space Shuttle Independent Assessment
Team (Mar. 7, 2000). Progress and

Challenges in Revitalizing the Shuttle Workforce

Page 4 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

ways to reduce workplace stress. The Administrator later announced the
creation of a new office to increase the agency?s emphasis on health and
safety and included improved health monitoring as an objective in its fiscal
year 2001 performance plan. 3 Finally, in December 1999, NASA terminated its
downsizing plans for the shuttle program and initiated efforts to begin
hiring new staff.

Following the termination of its downsizing plans, NASA and the Office of
Management and Budget conducted an overall workforce review to examine
personnel needs, barriers to achieving proper staffing levels and skill
mixes, and potential reforms to help address the agency?s long- term
requirements. In performing this review, NASA used GAO?s human capital self-
assessment checklist. 4 The self- assessment framework provides a systematic
approach for identifying and addressing human capital issues and allows
agency managers to (1) quickly determine whether their approach to human
capital supports their vision of who they are and what they want to
accomplish and (2) identify those policies that are in particular need of
attention. The checklist follows a five- part framework that includes
strategic planning, organizational alignment, leadership, talent, and
performance culture.

NASA has taken a number of actions this year to regenerate its shuttle
program workforce. Significantly, NASA?s current budget request projects an
increase of more than 200 full- time equivalent staff 5 for the shuttle
program through fiscal year 2002- both new hires and staff transfers.
According to NASA, from the beginning of fiscal year 2000 through July 2001,
the agency had actually added 191 new hires and 33 transfers to the shuttle
program. These new staff are being assigned to areas critical to shuttle
safety- such as project engineering, aerospace vehicle design, avionics, and
software- according to NASA. As noted earlier, appendix I

3 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to
prepare annual performance plans. The purpose is to improve the efficiency
of all federal agencies, under the goals of improving management,
effectiveness, and public accountability; improving congressional decision-
making on where to commit the nation?s fiscal and human resources; and
improving citizens? confidence in the government?s performance.

4 See Human Capital: A Self- Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders (GAO/
OCG- 00- 14G, Sept. 2000). 5 Full- time equivalent is a measure of staff
hours equal to those of an employee who works 40 hours per week in 1 year.
Thus, a measure of 200 full- time equivalent staff does not necessarily
represent the actual number of new hires. Recent Actions Taken by

NASA

Page 5 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

provides a list of critical skills where NASA is addressing personnel
shortages.

NASA is also focusing more attention on human capital management in its
annual performance plan. The Government Performance and Results Act requires
a performance plan that describes how an agency?s goals and objectives are
to be achieved. These plans are to include a description of the (1)
operational processes, skills, and technology and (2) human, capital and
information resources required to meet those goals and objectives. On June
9, 2000, the President directed the heads of all federal executive branch
agencies to fully integrate human resources management into agency planning,
budget, and mission evaluation processes and to clearly state specific human
resources management goals and objectives in their strategic and annual
performance plans.

In its Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan, NASA describes plans to attract
and retain a skilled workforce. The specifics include the following:

 Developing an initiative to enhance NASA?s recruitment capabilities,
focusing on college graduates.

 Cultivating a continued pipeline of talent to meet future science, math,
and technology needs.

 Investing in technical training and career development.

 Supplementing the workforce with nonpermanent civil servants, where it
makes sense.

 Funding more university- level courses and providing training in other
core functional areas.

 Establishing a mentoring network for project managers. We will provide a
more detailed assessment of the agency?s progress in achieving its human
capital goals as part of our review of NASA?s Fiscal Year 2002 Performance
Plan requested by Senator Fred Thompson.

Alongside these initiatives, NASA is in the process of responding to a May
2001 directive from the Office of Management and Budget on workforce
planning and restructuring. 6 The directive requires executive agencies to
determine (1) what skills are vital to accomplishing their missions, (2) how
changes expected in the agency?s work will affect human resources, (3) how
skill imbalances are being addressed, (4) what challenges impede the

6 Workforce Planning and Restructuring, OMB Bulletin No. 01- 07 (May 8,
2001).

Page 6 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

agency?s ability to recruit and retain high- quality staff, and (5) what
barriers there are to restructuring the workforce. NASA officials told us
that they have already made these assessments. The next step is to develop
plans specific to the space flight centers that focus on recruitment,
retention, training, and succession and career development.

If effectively implemented, the actions that NASA has been taking to
strengthen the shuttle workforce should enable the agency to carry out its
mission more safely. But there are considerable challenges ahead. For
example, as noted by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in its most recent
annual report, NASA now has the difficult task of training new employees and
integrating them into organizations that are highly pressured by the
shuttle?s expanded flight rates associated with the International Space
Station. 7 As we stressed in our previous testimony, training alone may take
as long as 2 years, while workload demands are higher than ever.

The panel also emphasized that (1) stress levels among some employees are
still a matter of concern; (2) some critical areas, such as information
technology and electrical/ electronic engineering, are not yet fully
staffed; and (3) NASA is still contending with the retirements of senior
employees. Officials at Johnson Space Center also cited critical skill
shortages as a continuing problem. Furthermore, NASA headquarters officials
stated that the stress- related effects of the downsizing remain in the
workforce. Addressing these particular challenges, according to the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, will require immediate actions, such as
expanded training at the Centers, as well as a long- term workforce plan
that will focus on retention, recruitment, training, and succession and
career development needs.

The workforce problems we identified during our review are not unique to
NASA. As our January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series reports made
clear, serious federal human capital shortfalls are now eroding the ability
of many federal agencies- and threatening the ability of others- to

7 See Annual Report for 2000, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Remaining
Workforce

Challenges Human Capital Shortfalls- A Governmentwide Problem

Page 7 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

economically, efficiently, and effectively perform their missions. 8 As the
Comptroller General recently stated in testimony, the problem lies not with
federal employees themselves, but with the lack of effective leadership and
management, along with the lack of a strategic approach to marshaling,
managing, and maintaining the human capital needed for government to
discharge its responsibilities and deliver on its promises. 9 To highlight
the urgency of this governmentwide challenge, in January 2001, we added
strategic human capital management to our list of federal programs and
operations identified as high risk. 10

Our work has found human capital challenges across the federal government in
several key areas.

 First, high- performing organizations establish a clear set of
organizational intents- mission, vision, core values, goals and objectives,
and strategies- and then integrate their human capital strategies to support
these strategic and programmatic goals. However, under downsizing,
budgetary, and other pressures, agencies have not consistently taken a
strategic, results- oriented approach to human capital planning.

 Second, agencies do not have the sustained commitment from leaders and
managers needed to implement reforms. Achieving this can be difficult to
achieve in the face of cultural barriers to change and high levels of
turnover among management ranks.

 Third, agencies have difficulties replacing the loss of skilled and
experienced staff, and in some cases, filling certain mission- critical
occupations because of increasing competition in the labor market.

 Fourth, agencies lack a crucial ingredient found in successful
organizations: organizational cultures that promote high performance and
accountability.

8 See Performance and Accountability Series- Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: A Governmentwide Perspective (GAO- 01- 241, Jan. 2001). In
addition, see the accompanying 21 reports (numbered GAO- 01- 242 through
GAO- 01- 262) on specific agencies.

9 See Human Capital: Taking Steps to Meet Current and Emerging Human Capital
Challenges (GAO- 01- 965T, July 17, 2001). 10 See High- Risk Series: An
Update (GAO- 01- 263, Jan. 2001). In addition, see Human Capital: Meeting
the Governmentwide High- Risk Challenge (GAO- 01- 357T, Feb. 1, 2001).

Page 8 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

At this time last year, NASA planned to develop and begin equipping the
shuttle fleet with a variety of safety and supportability upgrades, at an
estimated cost of $2.2 billion. These upgrades would affect every aspect of
the shuttle system, including the orbiter, external tank, main engine, and
solid rocket booster.

Last year, we reported that NASA faced a number of programmatic and
technical challenges in making these upgrades.

 First, several upgrade projects had not been fully approved, creating
uncertainty within the program.

 Second, while NASA had begun to establish a dedicated shuttle safety
upgrade workforce, it had not fully determined its needs in this area.

 Third, the shuttle program was subject to considerable scheduling
pressure, which introduced the risk of unexpected cost increases, funding
problems, and/ or project delays. Specifically, the planned safety upgrade
program could require developing and integrating at least nine major
improvements in 5 years- possibly making it the most aggressive modification
effort ever undertaken by the shuttle program. At the same time, technical
requirements for the program were not yet fully defined, and upgrades were
planned to coincide with the peak assembly period of the International Space
Station.

Since then, NASA has made some progress but has only partially addressed the
challenges we identified last year. Specifically, NASA has started to define
and develop some specific shuttle upgrades. For example, requirements for
the cockpit avionics upgrade have been defined. Also, Phase I of the main
engine advanced health monitoring system is in development, and Friction
Stir Welding on the external tank is being implemented.

In addition, according to Shuttle Development Office officials, staffing for
the upgrade program is adequate. Since our last report, these officials told
us that the Johnson Space Center has added about 70 people to the upgrade
program, while the Marshall Space Flight Center has added another 50 to 60
people. We did not assess the quality or sufficiency of the added staff, but
according to the development office officials, the workforce?s skill level
has improved to the point where the program has a

?good? skill base. Nevertheless, NASA has not yet fully defined its planned
upgrades. The studies on particular projects, such as developing a crew
escape system, are not expected to be done for some time. Moreover, our
previous Progress and

Challenges in Making Shuttle Safety Upgrades

Page 9 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

concerns with the technical maturity and potential cost growth of particular
projects have proven to be warranted. For example, the implementation of the
electric auxiliary power unit has been delayed indefinitely because of
technical uncertainties and cost growth. Also, the estimated cost of Phase
II of the main engine advanced health monitoring system has almost doubled,
and NASA has canceled the proposed development of a Block III main engine
improvement because of technological, cost, and schedule uncertainties.

Compounding the challenges that NASA is facing in making its upgrades is the
uncertainty surrounding its shuttle program. NASA is attempting to develop
alternatives to the space shuttle, but it is not yet clear what these
alternatives will be. We recently testified before the Subcommittee on Space
and Aeronautics, House Committee on Science on the agency?s Space Launch
Initiative. This is a risk reduction effort aimed at enabling NASA and
industry to make a decision in the 2006 time frame on whether the full-
scale development of a reusable launch vehicle can be undertaken. 11
However, as illustrated by the difficulties NASA experienced with another
reusable launch vehicle demonstrator- the Lockheed Martin X- 33- an exact
time frame for the space shuttle?s replacement cannot be determined at this
time. Consequently, shuttle workforce and upgrade issues will need to be
considered without fully knowing how the program will evolve over the long
run.

In conclusion, NASA has made a start at addressing serious workforce
problems that could undermine space shuttle safety. It has also begun
undertaking the important task of making needed safety and supportability
upgrades. Nevertheless, the challenges ahead are significant- particularly
because NASA is operating in an environment of uncertainty and it is still
contending with the effects of its downsizing effort. As such, it will be
exceedingly important that NASA sustain its attention and commitment to
making space shuttle operations as safe as possible.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

11 See Space Transportation: Critical Areas NASA Needs to Address in
Managing Its Reusable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO- 01- 826T, June 20, 2001).

Page 10 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

For further contact regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li at
(202) 512- 4841. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony
included Jerry Herley, John Gilchrist, James Beard, Fred Felder, Vijay
Barnabas, and Cristina Chaplain. Contact and

Acknowledgement

Page 11 GAO- 01- 1122T Space Shuttle Safety

In December 1999, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
completed an internal workforce assessment focusing on the Office of Space
Flight, which includes the shuttle program. That assessment identified work
areas in which NASA was experiencing skill shortfalls. At our request, NASA
provided a listing of skill shortages in the shuttle program. The areas the
agency identified follow:

 Program/ project management/ project engineering

 Aerospace vehicle design and mission analysis

 Avionics

 Guidance, navigation, and control systems

 Materials analysis

 Mechanical engineering

 Thermal control

 Structural dynamics

 Vehicle dynamics

 Aircraft ground systems

 Human factors

 Environmental controls

 Robotic systems

 Computer systems

 Fluids (liquid propulsion systems)

 Information technology security

 Aerospace systems test engineering

 Software (applications and systems)

 Sensors and transducers

 Electrical engineering

 Software assurance engineering

 Flight assurance

 Quality engineering

 Reliability engineering

 Safety engineering

 Flight controls Appendix I: Space Shuttle Program Skill

Shortfall Areas

(120094)
*** End of document. ***