TITLE: B-400135; B-400135.2, Lockheed Martin MS2 Tactical Systems, August 8, 2008
BNUMBER: B-400135; B-400135.2
DATE: August 8, 2008
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B-400135; B-400135.2, Lockheed Martin MS2 Tactical Systems, August 8, 2008

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Lockheed Martin MS2 Tactical Systems

   File: B-400135; B-400135.2

   Date: August 8, 2008

   Marcia G. Madsen, Esq., Cameron S. Hamrick, Esq., David A. Dowd, Esq.,
   Roger D. Waldron, Esq., Luke Levasseur, Esq., Melissa L. Baker, Esq., and
   Sarah A. Sulkowski, Esq., Mayer Brown; and Bucky P. Mansuy, Esq., Lockheed
   Martin MS2 Tactical Systems, for the protester.

   John W. Chierichella, Esq., Anne B. Perry, Esq., Jonathan S. Aronie, Esq.,
   Keith R. Szeliga, Esq., Jesse J. Williams, Esq., and Daniel J. Marcinak,
   Esq., Sheppard Mullin, for Northrop Grumman, the intervenor.

   Bridget A. Jarvis, Esq., Christopher J. Biglin, Esq., Russell P. Spindler,
   Esq., Gregory Ircink, Esq., Stephanie Kroke, Esq., and Kristopher Fischer,
   Esq., Naval Air Systems Command, for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Agency reasonably determined, in procurement for unmanned maritime
   surveillance aircraft, that awardee had significant advantage over
   protester with respect to past performance where: protester's
   subcontractor, responsible for approximately 50 percent of contract
   effort, had recent past performance history of being unable to resolve
   staffing and resource issues, resulting in adverse cost and schedule
   performance on very relevant contracts for unmanned aircraft; record did
   not demonstrate that protester's subcontractor had implemented systemic
   improvement that resulted in improved performance; while operating
   division of the awardee also had performance problems on very relevant
   contracts for unmanned aircraft, many had been addressed through systemic
   improvement; and overall performance of awardee's team on most evaluated
   contract efforts was rated better than satisfactory, while the overall
   performance of protester's team on 11 of 26 contract efforts was only
   marginal.

   DECISION

   Lockheed Martin MS2 Tactical Systems (LM) protests the Naval Air Systems
   Command's (NAVAIR) award of a contract to Northrop Grumman (NG) under
   request for proposals (RFP) No. N00019-07-R-0001, for the Broad Area
   Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Unmanned Aircraft System(UAS). LM challenges
   the evaluation of proposals and resulting source selection.

   We deny the protest.

   The Navy generally expects that the BAMS UAS will provide a persistent
   maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data
   collection and dissemination capability to the fleet, with BAMS on station
   24 hours a day, 365 days a year for 20 years. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at
   47. The Statement of Objectives for BAMS (SOO) included in the RFP
   established the objective that each BAMS orbit (unit) provide (with no
   more than three aircraft aloft simultaneously) continuous surveillance
   capability for a minimum of 24 hours per day for 7 consecutive days, with
   an Effective Time on Station (ETOS) of no less than 80 percent, at a
   minimum mission range of 2,000 nautical miles (nm). BAMS SOO
   sections 1.0-3.1. Likewise, the Performance Based System Specification for
   BAMS (PBSS) included in the RFP required that the BAMS UAS "be capable of
   maintaining 80 percent (Threshold) and 95 percent (Objective) ETOS
   executed within a period of 168 continuous hours at a mission radius of
   2000 Nautical Mile (nm) from its operating base." PBSS sect. 3.1.1.

   At Initial Operational Capability (IOC), defined as one base unit with
   sufficient assets to operationally support one persistent ISR orbit, the
   BAMS UAS missions will include maritime surveillance, collection of enemy
   order of battle information, battle damage assessment, port surveillance,
   communication relay, and support of maritime interdiction, surface
   warfare, battlespace management, and targeting for maritime and littoral
   strike missions. (At full operational capability, the BAMS UAS will
   provide for up to five simultaneous orbits worldwide.) While the objective
   is to achieve IOC in fiscal year (FY) 2113 or earlier, the minimum
   threshold requirement is for an IOC in FY 2014. SOO sections 1.0-2.0.

   The solicitation provided for award of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for
   system development and demonstration (SDD), with cost-plus-award fee
   options for low rate initial production (LRIP 1), and for furnishing the
   BAMS UAS to Australia. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal
   represented the best value to the government based on four evaluation
   factors: (1) technical (including two subfactors of equal importance:
   design approach and program/schedule); (2) past performance;
   (3) experience; and (4) cost (including four subfactors: SDD/LRIP1 option
   contract cost, which was significantly more important than operations and
   support (O&S), which was more important than production, which was
   significantly more important than Australian option cost). The technical
   factor was more important than past performance or experience, which were
   of equal importance, while cost was least important. All factors other
   than cost, combined, were significantly more important than cost.

   Three offerors responded to the solicitation by the closing time on May 3,
   2007. LM proposed to design and fabricate the BAMS Mariner, a modified
   version of its proposed subcontractor General Atomics Aeronautical
   Systems' (GA-ASI) Predator B aircraft (flown by the U. S. Air Force), with
   such modifications as a 22-foot extension of the wingspan, [REDACTED]. The
   BAMS Mariner, with a gross takeoff weight of 12,528 pounds (approximately
   2,000 pounds greater than the existing model), was to be powered by a
   single engine with a turboprop propeller. Based upon an evaluated ingress
   speed of [REDACTED] knots and an egress speed of [REDACTED] knots, NAVAIR
   assessed that for a station approximately 2,000 miles from its operating
   base, each BAMS Mariner would be on station [REDACTED] hours, while the
   evaluated ETOS of a 4-aircraft orbit was 84.6 percent. NG proposed to
   design and fabricate the BAMS Global Hawk (RQ-4N), a modified version of
   its RQ-4B Global Hawk B (flown by the U.S. Air Force), with such
   modifications as [REDACTED]. The BAMS Global Hawk, with a gross takeoff
   weight of 32,250 pounds, was to be powered by a single turbofan (jet)
   engine. Based upon an evaluated ingress speed of [REDACTED] knots and an
   egress speed of [REDACTED] knots, each BAMS Global Hawk would be on
   station [REDACTED] hours, while the evaluated ETOS of the proposed
   3-aircraft orbit was 96.2 percent. Boeing proposed to design an unmanned
   version of the [REDACTED]. The Boeing [REDACTED], with a gross takeoff
   weight of [REDACTED] pounds, was to be powered by [REDACTED]. Based upon
   an evaluated ingress speed of [REDACTED] knots and an egress speed of
   [REDACTED] knots, each Boeing [REDACTED] would be on station [REDACTED]
   hours, while the evaluated ETOS of the proposed [REDACTED]-aircraft orbit
   was 92.8 percent.

   All three proposals were included in the competitive range. After
   conducting several rounds of written and oral discussions with the
   offerors, NAVAIR requested the submission of final proposal revisions
   (FPR). FPRs were evaluated as follows:

                             NG                 LM               Boeing       
   Technical               Highly             Highly             Highly       
   (Overall)           Satisfactory/      Satisfactory/      Satisfactory/    
                                                                              
                        Medium Risk        Medium Risk        Medium Risk     
   Design Approach      Outstanding/       Outstanding/       Outstanding/    
                                                                              
                          Low Risk           Low Risk           Low Risk      
   Program and         Satisfactory/      Satisfactory/      Satisfactory/    
   Schedule                                                                   
                        Medium Risk        Medium Risk        Medium Risk     
   Past Performance    Moderate Risk        High Risk           Low Risk      
   Experience          Very Low Risk      Very Low Risk         Low Risk      
   Cost                                                    
   SDD/LRIP 1          $1.946 Billion     $1.213 Billion      $[REDACTED]     
   O&S                $12.382 Billion    $12.495 Billion      $[REDACTED]     
   Production          $6.603 Billion     $2.064 Billion      $[REDACTED]     
   Australian Option    $240 Million       $112 Million       $[REDACTED]     

   Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) Proposal Analysis Report (PAR) at
   3.

   Although each proposal received the same adjectival ratings under the
   technical factor, NG's (as well as Boeing's) proposal was evaluated as
   having a strong advantage over LM's. Specifically, NG's proposal was
   evaluated by the SSAC as having a strong advantage over LM's under the
   design approach subfactor of the technical factor. In this regard, the
   solicitation provided that evaluation under the design approach subfactor
   would encompass the extent to which the proposed BAMS UAS will be able to
   meet the mandatory as well as the offeror-specific tailored requirements
   of the BAMS PBSS, with emphasis on ETOS, open systems architecture,
   mission performance, due regard, and growth potential in the areas of
   unmanned aircraft (UA) Space, Weight, and Power (SWaP). NG's proposed BAMS
   was evaluated as having a significant strength in the emphasis area of
   ETOS, offering a greater persistent ISR capability with an evaluated ETOS
   of 96.2 percent, significantly higher than LM's evaluated ETOS of
   84.6 percent. In addition, NG's proposal was evaluated as having a
   significant strength in the emphasis area of SWaP, including a
   significantly higher weight margin (ability to add weight without
   breaching the ETOS threshold requirements) of approximately
   [REDACTED] pounds, nearly [REDACTED] times greater than LM's margin of
   only approximately [REDACTED] pounds. Tr. at 122-49; Hearing Exhibit 102.
   NAVAIR noted that NG's superior SWaP future growth capability could be
   used to incorporate future capability increments without breaching the
   ETOS threshold requirements, and that the resulting significantly greater
   design margin would reduce the risk of unknown design challenges requiring
   increased SWaP, particularly weight. In contrast, LM's proposal was
   evaluated as having a significant weakness under the design approach
   subfactor for failure to provide a validated computer model of the
   performance of its proposed engine. The agency determined that NG's strong
   advantage under the design approach subfactor offset a slight advantage
   for LM under the program schedule subfactor, such that NG's proposal had a
   significant overall advantage over LM's under the technical factor. SSAC
   PAR at 3-7.

   In addition, the past performance of LM and GA-ASI (its principal
   subcontractor, which was proposed to perform approximately 50 percent of
   the work), was determined to represent a high risk, giving rise to
   substantial doubt that the LM/GA-ASI team could perform the proposed
   contract effort. In this regard, the SSAC noted reports of poor past
   performance on very relevant work, including prior GA-ASI contracts for
   Predator-related work, with practically no systemic improvement
   demonstrated. According to the evaluators, the customer feedback for
   GA-ASI's contracts was remarkably consistent across contracts, identifying
   difficulties in managing workload, problems with executing systems
   engineering and systems integration tasks, and problems with properly
   staffing a project. Further, the SSAC expressed concern that the
   additional resources required for the BAMS UAS program would further
   exacerbate the identified existing staffing and management shortcomings.
   Finally, the SSAC noted that LM itself had experienced difficulties in
   furnishing adequate staffing on its contract (the Po Sheng contract) to
   upgrade the command control system for Taiwanese F-16 fighter aircraft.
   Based on this record, the SSAC expressed concern that the LM team would
   encounter significant schedule delays and be required to make technical
   trade-offs in order to produce the Mariner. PAR at 7-10.

   In contrast, the NG division serving as the prime contractor/system
   integrator and performing approximately [REDACTED] percent of the NG
   contract effort (NG Integrated Systems, Eastern Region in Bethpage, New
   York) was evaluated as having satisfactory to very good past performance.
   NG Executive Summary at 1i-1. Although the performance of NG Integrated
   Systems, Western Region, Unmanned Systems Development Center in Rancho
   Bernardo, California--which (with its predecessor, Teledyne Ryan, see NG
   Past Performance Proposal at 3.4a-1) developed the Global Hawk and will
   perform approximately [REDACTED] percent of the contract effort--on very
   relevant Global Hawk-related work was viewed as a significant concern,
   with the potential to translate into risk for the BAMS effort, the SSAC
   noted that most past performance problems had been addressed through
   demonstrated systemic improvement. Consequently, the agency determined
   that only some doubt existed that NG would be able to successfully perform
   the required effort, thus warranting a moderate overall risk rating. PAR
   at 10; NG Executive Summary at 1i-1.

   The SSAC concluded that NG had a significant advantage over LM/GA-ASI with
   respect to past performance. According to the SSAC, while NG had
   implemented systemic improvements that were successful in improving
   performance for nearly all problems found on relevant contracts, nearly
   all LM/GA-ASI problems appeared to persist without implemented systemic
   improvement that resulted in improved performance. Moreover, the SSAC
   expressed particular concern that the poor past performance of the LM team
   was focused on GA-ASI, which was proposed to perform approximately 50
   percent of the BAMS work, leaving a critical gap in LM's capability to
   reliably perform the BAMS effort. The SSAC (with one dissenter) concluded
   that NG's proposal's strong advantage over LM's proposal under the
   technical factor (the most important evaluation factor), and NG's
   significant advantage under the past performance factor (the second most
   important factor), offset LM's significant advantage with respect to cost.
   PAR at 7-11, 13-16.

   The Source Selection Authority (SSA) concurred with the SSAC's
   recommendation that NG's proposal was most advantageous. According to the
   SSA,

     [LM's] past performance record identifies systemic problems at GA-ASI,
     which coupled with the lack of demonstrated systemic improvement,
     indicate that these problems will likely be repeated on the BAMS UAS
     program negatively impacting a significant portion of the work.
     Furthermore, while [NG's] advantage in Past Performance in itself
     justifies the [cost] premium, the technical advantage of providing a
     large design margin further increases [NG's] probability for success,
     mitigating some of the doubt associated with their Moderate Past
     Performance risk. . . . [NG's] design approach has significant Space,
     Weight and Power (SWaP) growth capability, which may be used to
     incorporate future increments without breaching the Effective Time on
     Station (ETOS) threshold requirement. This significant strength can also
     be used as a design margin which acts to reduce the risk of unknown
     design challenges requiring increased SWaP, particularly weight.
     Finally, it is important to note that [LM's] lower proposal evaluated
     costs do not include any costs associated with poor performance.
     Performance difficulties can result in a significant cost to the
     Government in terms of time (schedule slips), money (cost over-runs and
     internal Government manpower and resources), and technical capability
     for the warfighter.

   Source Selection Decision (SSD) at 2-3. Upon learning of the resulting
   award to NG, and after being debriefed, LM filed this protest with our
   Office.

   PAST PERFORMANCE

   Background

   LM principally challenges NAVAIR's evaluation of its own and NG's past
   performance. In this regard, the RFP provided that the government would

     evaluate the offeror's, and (if applicable), its principal
     subcontractors' and critical team members' demonstrated past performance
     in delivering quality products and in meeting technical, cost and
     schedule requirements on similar programs for SDD, Production, and
     Operations and Support. The currency and relevance of the information,
     source of the information, context of the data, and general trends in
     contractor's performance will be considered. Problems not addressed by
     the offeror will be considered to still exist. However, consideration
     for discounting problems may be given when those problems are addressed
     through demonstrated systemic improvement.

   RFP sect. M.II.B.

   In furtherance of the past performance evaluation, offerors were required
   to identify contracts "whose performance is within five years from the RFP
   release and contain efforts similar to those efforts, e.g., tasks,
   contract type, location, contract dollar value, etc., required by this
   solicitation." RFP sect. L.3.1. The information provided "should be
   related to similar programs in the same division, or cost centers in which
   the Offeror proposes to perform this effort," and correspond to the
   descriptions of the offeror's experience under the experience factor. Id.
   The experience section of the RFP, in turn, required that the experience
   "be relative to proposed roles and responsibilities of the
   Offeror/Subcontractor in this solicitation," and identified several tasks
   considered relevant, including "[p]erforming SDD tasks such as design,
   integration, fabrication, and test of a system similar in scope to the
   BAMS UAS," "[p]erforming logistics tasks for major military weapons
   systems similar in scope to the BAMS UAS," and "[p]roduction and
   manufacturing of a system similar in scope to the BAMS UAS." RFP sect.
   L.4.0.

   For each relevant contract, offerors were required to describe performance
   in meeting technical and quality requirements, meeting schedule
   requirements, controlling cost, and managing the contracted effort (e.g.,
   program management, cooperation with customer, subcontract management).
   RFP sect. L.3.4.2. In addition, and of particular importance here,
   offerors were required, "[f]or each past performance problem identified,
   [to] describe the status of the systemic improvement efforts and, where
   applicable, demonstrate the impact that the systemic improvement effort
   had on resolving the problem such that it would not reoccur." RFP
   sect. L.3.1. Further, in addition to "[i]dentify[ing] those systemic
   improvement actions taken to resolve past problems," offerors were
   required to "[p]rovide the records of such results and indicate where they
   are documented, preferably in Government record systems. Describe the
   techniques, elements, and tools used to correct problems on the contract
   and, if applicable, how these techniques, elements, and tools will be used
   during this program." RFP sect. L.3.4.3. Finally, offerors were cautioned
   that "[t]he Government does not assume the duty to search for data to cure
   the problems it finds in the information provided by the Offeror. The
   burden of providing thorough and complete past performance information
   remains with the Offeror." RFP sect. L.3.1.

   The record indicates that, in evaluating past performance, NAVAIR
   undertook an in-depth, detailed examination of the recent relevant past
   performance of each team. In this regard, the agency reviewed 30 contracts
   for the LM team, 19 of which (including 6 LM and 7 GA-ASI contracts) were
   determined to be either somewhat relevant or very relevant; received 23
   past performance questionnaires for the team; conducted 7 interviews; and
   reviewed 34 CPARS. The agency reviewed 27 contracts for the NG team, 24 of
   which (including 17 NG contracts) were determined to be either somewhat
   relevant or very relevant; received 40 past performance questionnaires for
   the team; conducted 13 interviews; and reviewed 45 CPARS. SSEB at 40.
   Based on the totality of the information available from the above
   information sources, NAVAIR determined that the performance of the LM team
   was exceptional on 1 contract effort, very good on 6, satisfactory on 8,
   and marginal on 11. (Some contracts were divided into separate
   delivery/task orders for purposes of these ratings When considered on a
   contract-by-contract basis, without division into separate task order(s)
   contract efforts, the LM team's performance was exceptional on
   one contract, very good on six, satisfactory on seven, and marginal on
   five. However, of particular significance to evaluation, of the five very
   relevant GA-ASI contracts for Predator-based aircraft, GA-ASI's
   performance was marginal on three contracts.) In contrast, NAVAIR
   determined that the overall performance of the NG team was exceptional on
   3 contract efforts, very good on 10, satisfactory on 9, and marginal on
   only 3 contract efforts. Source Selection Evaluation Board Report (SSEB)
   at 31-40.

   LM asserts that NAVAIR's evaluation of LM's, GA-ASI's, and NG's past
   performance was inconsistent with the solicitation and otherwise
   unreasonable in numerous respects.

   Where a solicitation requires the evaluation of offerors' past
   performance, we will examine an agency's evaluation only to ensure that it
   was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's evaluation criteria
   and procurement statutes and regulations; determining the relative merits
   of offerors' past performance information is primarily a matter within the
   contracting agency's discretion. The MIL Corp., B-297508, B-297508.2, Jan.
   26, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 34 at 10; Hanley Indus., Inc., B-295318, Feb. 2,
   2005, 2005 CPD para. 20 at 4. A protester's mere disagreement with the
   agency's judgment is not sufficient to establish that the agency acted
   unreasonably. Birdwell Bros. Painting & Refinishing, B-285035, July 5,
   2000, 2000 CPD para. 129 at 5. Here, we find the overall past performance
   evaluation to be reasonable. We discuss LM's most important challenges to
   the past performance evaluation below.

   Past Performance of LM Team

   Although the SSEB noted that inadequate staffing and a shortfall in
   technical skills had adversely impacted LM's ability to execute a somewhat
   relevant (the Po Sheng) SDD contract to upgrade the command control system
   for Taiwanese F-16 fighter aircraft, the panel generally acknowledged that
   LM had demonstrated "high quality technical performance" on five of
   six relevant contracts. SSEB at 52. In contrast, however, GA-ASI's
   contract performance was a matter of great concern to the agency.
   Specifically, while recognizing that GA-ASI had demonstrated a willingness
   and ability to respond on short notice to evolving Global War on Terror
   (GWOT) warfighter requirements, the SSEB found that GA-ASI's performance
   demonstrated: inadequate staffing, resulting in performance problems on
   SDD contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper (a second-generation, Predator B model)
   and the MQ-1C Extended Range/Multipurpose (ER/MP) UAS (a second-generation
   Predator model); unfavorable schedule performance on four of seven
   relevant GA-ASI contracts, including very relevant contracts for the MQ-9
   Reaper, UAS ground control stations, MQ-1C ER/MP, I-GNAT Extended Range
   UAS (a version of the Predator with some differences for the Army), and
   MQ-1 baseline Predator; poor performance in meeting technical quality
   requirements on three of seven GA-ASI contracts, including contracts for
   the MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1C ER/MP, and I-GNAT Extended Range UAS; and workload
   exceeded the firm's capacity on five of seven GA-ASI contracts, including
   contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper, UAS ground control stations, MQ-1C ER/MP,
   I-GNAT Extended Range UAS, and MQ-1/MQ-9 maintenance support. In summary,
   the SSEB found the overall performance of GA-ASI on its very relevant
   contracts for the MQ-9 Reaper (most delivery orders), UAS ground control
   stations, MQ-1C ER/MP, and I-GNAT Extended Range UAS to be marginal. SSEB
   at 36-38, 52-62.

   Based upon the above past performance problems, the SSEB determined that
   there was substantial doubt that LM would successfully perform the
   required effort, and that an overall high risk rating therefore was
   warranted. According to the SSEB:

     The Lockheed Martin team delivers a high quality, technical product and
     both Lockheed Martin and GA-ASI are motivated to meet the warfighter's
     requirements. Lockheed Martin, as the prime contractor however, will be
     substantially challenged to ensure that GA-ASI will remain on schedule.
     The proposal includes a prominent role for GA-ASI including aircraft
     design, UA manufacture, flight test, logistics, training support,
     communications subsystem and MCS aircraft control segment which
     represents approximately 50% of the proposed effort. There is,
     therefore, significant risk to the BAMS UAS program if GA-ASI's future
     performance trend reflects identified past performance difficulties in
     managing increasing workload, a possibility which the [Past Performance
     Evaluation Team] assesses as likely to occur.

     Lockheed Martin and GA-ASI have recent past performance histories of
     being unable to resolve staffing issues resulting in adverse cost and
     schedule performance. Furthermore, there are documented concerns
     regarding the amount of work that GA-ASI has taken on and the slow pace
     of implementing processes and process improvements that increased
     workloads and responsibilities require. Systemic improvement initiatives
     have been identified or are in work in several areas of concern;
     however, these efforts are not yet demonstrated to determine their
     effectiveness at lowering risk.

   SSEB at 62.

   LM disputes both the agency's evaluation of its performance under several
   of the individual contracts and the determination that there was little
   demonstrated systemic improvement.

   (1) MQ-9 Reaper/GCS

   GA-ASI's ongoing Air Force contract No. F33657-02-G-4035 included very
   relevant (according to both LM and NAVAIR) delivery orders for interim
   contract capability, SDD and production of the MQ-9 Reaper (again, a
   second-generation Predator B model), and for the pre-production and
   production of UAS ground control stations (GCS). NAVAIR received three
   Contractor Performance Assessment Reports (CPAR) for these contract
   efforts, the most recent completed on April 23, 2007 for the period from
   January 1 to December 31, 2006, with earlier CPARS for the periods October
   1, 2004 to December 31, 2005 and September 18, 2002 to September 30, 2004.
   (NAVAIR had unsuccessfully requested updated 2007 performance information
   on contract No. 4035. NAVAIR E-mail to Air Force Point of Contact as
   suggested by Air Force Program Manager (as listed in LM Past Performance
   Proposal at 3-6), Nov. 28, 2007; Tr. at 2183-84.)

   LM challenges the overall marginal rating for GA-ASI's performance under
   this contract on the basis that this overall rating was inconsistent with
   the category ratings in the latest 2006 Air Force CPAR of very good for
   technical, satisfactory for management, and marginal for schedule and cost
   control. However, while recognizing that GA-ASI "does an excellent job
   responding to quick reaction and rapidly evolving warfighter requirements
   in support of the Global War on Terror," the 2006 CPAR nevertheless
   expressed significant reservations as to GA-ASI's performance in several
   areas:

     Systems engineering was rated satisfactory overall but remains an area
     of concern for the program. The company has not been able to develop a
     sufficient systems engineering staff to keep pace with the numerous
     other contracted efforts.

     While satisfactory overall, [software engineering] is an area of concern
     for the program. Although the company continues to increase its software
     engineering staff, there continues to be limited software engineering
     resources to complete all contracted work. . . . The contractor needs to
     continue to increase their engineering staff in order to meet contracted
     commitments in parallel.

     Several projects under this [Basic Ordering Agreement] have suffered
     from schedule delays, to include the MQ-9 ICC and MQ-9 SDD efforts. The
     schedule variances for these efforts are -20% and -44.9% respectively as
     of Dec. 06. While [GA-ASI] has committed to expanding the workforce, the
     contractor has insufficient resources to execute the contracted work on
     schedule in several key areas. The resulting schedule delays directly
     impact the fielding of combat capability.

   CPAR, Contract No. 4035, 2006 Period. The 2004/2005 CPAR for contract No.
   4035 included similar criticisms of GA-ASI's performance, as well as
   marginal schedule and cost control ratings. Given the above continuing
   staffing and resources shortfalls, which resulted in "schedule delays
   directly impact[ing] the fielding of combat capability," CPAR, Contract
   No. 4035, 2006 Period, and the repeated marginal schedule and cost control
   ratings in the most recent CPARs, we find no basis to question NAVAIR's
   evaluation of GA-ASI's overall performance under contract No. 4035.

   LM further challenges NAVAIR's assessment that systemic improvement by
   GA-ASI on contract No. 4035 (as well as under other contracts) had not
   been demonstrated. In this regard, LM generally acknowledged in its
   December 4, 2007 discussions response with respect to a number of GA-ASI
   contracts (including the MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-1C ER/MP, and I-GNAT Extended
   Range UAS), that "the fundamental cause for GA-ASI Past Performance issues
   was availability of trained staff to meet the demand for our products and
   services"; that GA-ASI's workload had exceeded its capacity; that there
   had been "management task saturation"; and that there was a "valid CPAR
   comment" regarding (overly) "[c]entralized management structure." LM
   Evaluation Notice (EN) Response, Dec. 4, 2007, LM-PP-003, -008, -009,
   -010, 011. However, LM maintained then, id., and asserts in its protest,
   that GA-ASI has undertaken such systemic improvements as increasing
   engineering and trained staff, hiring mid-level and senior program
   managers, and restructuring the decision-making process. According to the
   protester, the evaluation failed to acknowledge these systemic
   improvements.

   The agency's evaluation in this area was reasonable. Although LM has
   suggested that the RFP did not require that there be documented results of
   any systemic improvements, and that merely hiring additional staff should
   be accepted as effective systemic improvement, as noted above, the RFP in
   fact required the offeror to "identify those systemic improvement actions
   taken to resolve past problems, . . . demonstrate the extent to which it
   will benefit the instant contract," and "[p]rovide the records of such
   results and indicate where they are documented, preferably in Government
   record systems." RFP L.3.4.3. Accordingly, in ascertaining whether there
   had been systemic improvement in correcting prior performance deficiencies
   and problems, the agency properly looked to see whether the record
   "demonstrate[d] the impact of the systemic improvement," including whether
   there were any results of the claimed systemic improvement measures "in a
   record or documentation to show that action resulted in a tangible
   improvement to that program," such that there was "independent
   verification [of] tangible improvement." Tr. at 778-80.

   Given the solicitation requirement that any improvements in contract
   performance be documented, the agency reasonably determined that overall
   systemic improvement by GA-ASI on contract No. 4035 had not been shown. In
   this regard, as noted above, notwithstanding the agency's November 2007
   request to the Air Force for updated contract performance information, an
   updated CPAR or other updated past information had not been furnished by
   the Air Force. Further, while LM furnished its own updated Earned Value
   Management System (EVMS) data on contract No. 4035 in a December 6, 2007
   discussions response, that data did not clearly establish that overall
   demonstrated systemic improvement on the contract had occurred. LM
   reported that the cumulative Schedule Performance Index (SPI) (ratio of
   work performed to the initial planned schedule, with an SPI of less than
   1.0 indicating that work is not being completed as planned and the program
   may be behind schedule if the incomplete work is on the critical path) on
   the three ground control system delivery orders as of October 2007 was
   only 76.6 percent, 88.8 percent, and 91.9 percent, all below the
   95-percent level at which performance began to be a matter of some concern
   to the agency. LM also reported that the cumulative Cost Performance Index
   (CPI) (ratio of work performed to actual costs for work performed, with a
   CPI of less than 1.0 being unfavorable because the work is being performed
   less efficiently than planned) on one of the orders likewise was below the
   95-percent level (93.1 percent). LM Response to EN LM-PP-015, Dec. 6,
   2007; Tr. at 1084-92; GAO Cost Assessment Guide, GAO-07-1134SP, at 226.[1]
   As for the four MQ-9 Reaper delivery orders, LM reported that one had been
   completed in December 2006 at a cumulative CPI of 92.4 percent, one of the
   remaining three orders was below the 95-percent CPI level in October 2007
   (at 91.3 percent), and the third order had been rebaselined in October
   2007 (and the index thus was reset to 1.0). LM also reported that one of
   the orders was below the 95-percent level for SPI in October 2007 (at 83.7
   percent), while a second had been rebaselined in October 2007 after having
   an SPI of 55.2 percent in June 2007. We conclude that the agency
   reasonably determined that there was no documentation of systemic
   improvement on contract No. 4035.

   (2) MQ-1C ER/MP

   Both NAVAIR and LM considered ongoing Army contract No. W58RGZ-05-C-0069,
   for the MQ-1C Extended Range/Multipurpose (ER/MP) UAS (a second-generation
   Predator model using the basic structure of the Predator aircraft with the
   Predator B avionics suite), to be very relevant to LM's proposed BAMS
   Predator-based Mariner UAS. LM Past Performance Proposal at 3-9, 3-51.
   NAVAIR received for this contract: four past performance questionnaire
   (PPQ) responses, including December 10, 2007 and April 2007 responses from
   the Army Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO), an April 2007 response from
   the Army Product Manager, and a February 26, 2007 response from the
   Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) Administrative Contracting
   Officer (ACO); and a number of LM discussion responses that referred to
   the contract (as well as a number of other contracts).

   LM challenges the overall marginal rating for GA-ASI's performance under
   this contract, primarily on the basis that this rating was inconsistent
   with the input from the DCMA ACO and LM's discussion responses.

   We find that the agency reasonably rated GA-ASI's performance under
   contract No. 0069 only marginal. In this regard, the most recent detailed
   information received by NAVAIR for this contract was the Army PCO's
   December 10, 2007 PPQ response in which he rated GA-ASI's performance as
   marginal for technical/quality performance, schedule, cost performance,
   and program management. According to the Army PCO, while the agency was
   "confident the company can and will deliver a quality aircraft system,"
   nevertheless, "as the program continues, and [GA-ASI] takes on additional
   contracts, we are concerned about [GA-ASI's] ability to successfully
   manage and deliver products to all customers on time and within cost."
   Army PCO PPQ Response, Contract No. 0069, Dec. 10, 2007. The Army PCO
   specifically reported the following performance problems on the MQ-1C
   ER/MP contract:

     [GA-ASI has not met contracted . . . delivery schedules.

     [GA-ASI] continues to struggle as the Systems Integrator.

     [GA-ASI] has resisted hiring adequate engineering and technical staff to
     address all of the tasks they are currently contracted to perform.

     The common theme within the delivery/schedule problems appears to relate
     back to the acceptance of contractual commitments which are physically
     beyond production capacity.

     A major contributor is [that GA-ASI's] senior management continues to
     obligate the company without fully reviewing and understanding the
     current workload and commitments.

     Management task saturation coupled with [GA-ASI's] highly centralized
     management structure both contribute towards the delays with the
     integration testing and coordination efforts . . . .

     The engineering staff appears to be technically [competent], but in most
     cases are not empowered at the appropriate levels to make the necessary
     decisions to push the task forward in a timely manner to maintain
     schedule.

     [GA-ASI] has made limited corrective actions and usually not without
     Government PMO insistence.

   Army PCO PPQ Response, Contract No. 0069, Dec. 10, 2007. Furthermore, the
   April 2007 PPQs completed for Contract No. 0069 by the Army PCO and the
   Army Product Manager appeared to indicate that GA-ASI's performance
   problems had been continuing for some time, with references to GA-ASI
   "continu[ing] to struggle in identifying and executing system engineering
   and system integration tasks required to facilitate final integration of
   the subsystems," and having "struggled in the area of staffing at adequate
   levels to properly resource the program schedule." Army PCO PPQ Response,
   Contract No. 0069, Apr. 2007; Army Product Manager PPQ Response Contract
   No. 0069, Apr. 2007.

   LM asserts that the overall marginal rating for GA-ASI's performance on
   contract No. 0069, for the MQ-1C ER/MP, did not reasonably account for the
   February 26, 2007 PPQ response completed by the DCMA which reported that
   GA-ASI's technical/quality and schedule performance was exceptional, its
   cost performance was very good, and its management performance was very
   good to exceptional.

   We find LM's position unpersuasive. As an initial matter, we agree with
   the agency that the DCMA ACO furnished little detail in support of his
   very favorable performance ratings, and that the detail that was furnished
   appears in some measure inconsistent with the high ratings. In this
   regard, for example, while the DCMA ACO rated GA-ASI's cost performance as
   very good and its schedule performance as exceptional, the DCMA ACO
   reported cumulative, unfavorable EVMS ratings of 0.84 for CPI and 0.91 for
   SPI as of January 2007. Although the DCMA ACO stated that
   government-directed changes were the cause of schedule and cost issues, he
   also acknowledged that $18 million of a predicted $37 million cost overrun
   was believed to be the result of "cost growth within the contract scope,"
   as distinct from "scope growth," and he referred to the fact that
   "[c]orrective actions are on-going," including continued hiring by GA-ASI,
   thus seemingly implying that there was some contractor responsibility for
   performance problems. Tr. at 1784-93. In any case, the DCMA ACO's response
   was furnished in February 2007, while the more detailed responses by the
   Army PCO and Army Product Manager represented more recent assessments
   based on the contract performance as of April and December 2007. We note
   in this regard that the PPQs completed in April 2007 by the Army PCO and
   Army Product Manager both rated GA-ASI's performance as marginal to
   satisfactory for technical/quality and schedule performance, and
   satisfactory for cost and management performance, thus suggesting both
   that GA-ASI's performance had deteriorated since the DCMA ACO's assessment
   in February and continued to deteriorate up to the time of the marginal
   performance reported by the Army PCO in December 2007. Army PCO PPQ
   Response, Contract No. 0069, Apr. 2007; Army Product Manager PPQ Response,
   Contract No. 0069, Apr. 2007. Moreover, to the extent that the differences
   in assessment of GA-ASI's performance represented a difference of opinion,
   as distinct from a mere change over time in the quality of performance, we
   consider it significant that it was the views of the Army PCO and Army
   Product Manager, rather than those of the DCMA ACO, that were broadly
   consistent with the reports in the Air Force CPARs on GA-ASI's performance
   on the MQ-9 Reaper/GCS delivery orders, that is, the reports of continuing
   GA-ASI staffing and resources shortfalls resulting in schedule delays. In
   summary, based on the recent, detailed information concerning GA-ASI's
   performance problems on contract No. 0069, which information was
   consistent with reports of staffing and resource shortfalls resulting in
   schedule delays on other contracts, NAVAIR reasonably rated GA-ASI's
   performance on this contract as no better than marginal.

   LM asserts that, in any case, NAVAIR failed to account for systemic
   improvement by GA-ASI, such as increased staffing. As noted above,
   however, the RFP required a showing of documented improvements in contract
   performance as a result of any claimed systemic improvement measures. RFP
   sect. L.3.4.3. While GA-ASI has apparently continued to increase its
   workforce, again, an increase in workforce by itself, without a documented
   improvement in contract performance, did not meet the solicitation
   standard for showing systemic improvement. Here, not only did the PPQ
   responses seem to suggest deteriorating performance on contract No. 0069
   through December 2007, but, in addition, recent EVMS data furnished by LM
   during discussions was not favorable. In this regard, in its December 6,
   2007 discussion response to EN LM-PP-015, LM indicated that the MQ-1C
   contract had been rebaselined after performance resulted in increasingly
   unfavorable EVMS numbers at the beginning of 2007--with a decline in the
   CPI from 83.8 percent in January to 80.3 percent in April and a similar
   SPI decline from 90.9 percent to 87.1 percent--but then, after the
   rebaselining was reflected in the EVMS data in September 2007 with fresh
   100-percent CPI and SPI ratings, the numbers again began to decline,
   falling to 98.4 percent and 98.2 percent, respectively, in October 2007.
   LM Response to EN LM-PP-015, Dec. 6, 2007. In these circumstances, we find
   that NAVAIR reasonably concluded that the information known to the agency
   did not support a finding of systemic improvement on contract No. 0069.

   (3) I-GNAT Extended Range UAS

   Both NAVAIR and LM considered Army contract No. DAAH01-03-C-0124, ending
   in December 2007, for the I-GNAT Extended Range (ER) UAS (an Army version
   of the Predator), to be very relevant to LM's proposed BAMS Predator-based
   Mariner UAS. LM Past Performance Proposal at 3-9, 3-70. NAVAIR received
   three PPQ responses for this contract: a May 31, 2007 response from the
   Army Deputy Product Director, Unmanned Aerial Systems Program Management
   Office; an April 18, 2007 response from the Army PCO (who was also the
   Program Manager (PM) for this program (according to LM, LM Past
   Performance Proposal at 3-7), and the PCO for the MQ-1C ER/MP contract);
   and an April 2007 "coordinated" response from the DCMA ACO (who also was
   the ACO for the MQ-1C ER/MP contract) and the DCMA Program Integrator,
   which was subsequently updated by the DCMA ACO on May 24, 2007. In
   addition, NAVAIR received several LM discussion responses that referred to
   the contract (among a number of other contracts).

   LM challenges the overall marginal rating for GA-ASI's performance under
   this contract, primarily on the basis that it fails to account for the
   DCMA input. In this regard, the record reflects what appears to be an
   irreconcilable difference between the Army and DCMA evaluations of
   GA-ASI's performance. On the one hand, the Army Deputy Product Manager and
   the Army PCO/PM agreed on marginal ratings for technical/quality,
   schedule, cost and management performance based on concerns that GA-ASI
   had "consistently failed to meet contractual delivery dates for the spares
   and Ground Data Terminals and [was] beginning to show moderate slippage on
   delivery dates for Air Vehicles and Ground Control Stations"; had
   demonstrated resistance to hiring adequate personnel; had overly
   centralized management structure that contributed to program delays; had
   difficulty in managing its subcontractors; and ultimately was "agreeing to
   contractual commitments which are beyond its production capacity." PPQ
   Response, Contract No. 0124, May 31, 2007, Army Deputy Product Director;
   PPQ Response, Contract No. 0124, Apr. 18, 2007, Army PCO/PM. On the other
   hand, the coordinated response from the DCMA ACO and DCMA Program
   Integrator offered the summary conclusion that there had been exceptional
   technical/quality, schedule, cost and management performance, with
   "generally" on-time performance or, as of May 2007, "on schedule" aircraft
   deliveries and "[n]o major slippage on the production schedule." PPQ
   Response, Contract No. 0124, Apr. 2007, DCMA ACO; E-mail from NAVAIR to
   DCMA ACO, May 24, 2008.

   We find that NAVAIR's evaluation of GA-ASI's performance on contract No.
   0124 was reasonable. Confronted with materially differing ratings from the
   Army and DCMA representatives as of May 2007, the agency unsuccessfully
   sought updates from both entities on November 28, 2007, E-mail to Army
   Deputy Product Manager, Army PCO/PM, and DCMA ACO, Nov. 28, 2007, and also
   raised the negative past performance information from the Army with LM in
   a series of ENs in October 2007. Of particular significance in this latter
   regard were LM's October 12 responses to EN LM-PP-009 and EN LM-PP-11, in
   which LM did not specifically refute the reports that GA-ASI had failed to
   meet a number of contractual delivery dates, but essentially maintained
   that it was simply "being responsive to the customer's aggressive
   requests" and that any performance difficulties were beyond its control.
   LM Response to EN LM-PP-009, Oct. 12, 2007. Given that the record before
   NAVAIR included negative performance appraisals from responsible officials
   of the Army, that is, the customer agency; the Army evaluations were
   consistent with those on several other Army and Air Force Predator-related
   contracts; the Army evaluations were more detailed than the general praise
   from the DCMA ACO; the DCMA ACO's use of such language as "generally"
   on-time or "[n]o major slippage" suggests that there were some schedule
   slippages, which would appear to be inconsistent with the DCMA ACO's
   exceptional ratings; and the fact that, when questioned by NAVAIR in this
   regard, LM did not refute the reports that GA-ASI had failed to meet a
   number of the contractual delivery dates, we find that NAVAIR reasonably
   rated GA-ASI's performance on this contract as marginal.[2]

   In summary, we find that LM's challenges to the evaluation of its team's
   past performance provide no basis for questioning the agency's
   determination that the LM team--in particular, GA-ASI--had a recent past
   performance history of being unable to resolve staffing and resource
   issues, which resulted in adverse cost and schedule performance. We
   further find no basis for questioning the agency's determination that,
   notwithstanding such systemic improvement measures as hiring additional
   staff, LM did not establish documented improvements in contract
   performance as a result of the systemic improvement measures; these
   efforts therefore did not furnish a basis for reducing the risk associated
   with the LM team's unfavorable past performance.

   Past Performance of NG

   As noted above, NG's performance was rated as marginal on only 3 of 20
   contract efforts, very good on 10 and exceptional on 3. The SSEB
   specifically found that the NG division serving as the prime
   contractor/system integrator (NG Integrated Systems, Eastern Region) had
   satisfactory to very good past performance, demonstrating "high quality
   technical performance" on each of seven relevant contracts and favorable
   or excellent cost control on six of those contracts. SSEB at 63.
   Furthermore, the SSEB found that the overall NG team demonstrated
   excellent program management on most relevant contracts.

   However, the performance of NG Integrated Systems, Western Region,
   Unmanned Systems Development Center, on very relevant Global Hawk-related
   work was viewed as a significant concern. In this regard, the SSEB
   determined that the NG team had demonstrated: (1) unfavorable cost
   performance on 5 of 19 contract efforts, including Western Region Air
   Force contract No. F33657-01-C-4600, for Engineering and Manufacturing
   Development of the Global Hawk (Global Hawk EMD), and Western Region Air
   Force contract No. F33657-03-C-4310, for Low Rate Initial Production of
   the Global Hawk (Global Hawk LRIP); (2) underestimation of software
   development and integration resulting in schedule delays and cost overruns
   on three SDD contracts, including the Global Hawk EMD contract; (3)
   unfavorable schedule performance on 5 of 15 contract efforts, including
   both the Global Hawk EMD and Global Hawk LRIP contracts; and (4) marginal
   ability to manage subcontractors on three contracts, including the Global
   Hawk EMD contract. As a result of the above performance problems, the
   overall performance of NG's Western Region on the Global Hawk EMD contract
   was rated as marginal. (NG's performance was rated as satisfactory on
   Global Hawk LRIP contract No. 4310, as well as on three other Global Hawk
   LRIP contracts.) SSEB at 63-77.

   Although NAVAIR recognized the potential for the NG Western Region
   performance problems on the Global Hawk EMD contract to translate into
   risk for NG's Global Hawk-based BAMS effort, the agency identified other
   considerations that mitigated this risk: NG's overall generally very
   good-to-exceptional technical/quality ratings; its flexible and responsive
   management as indicated in most performance reports; the favorable
   performance of NG Eastern Region, the proposed prime contractor/system
   integrator, in controlling cost; and demonstrated systemic improvement
   with respect to most prior performance problems. Regarding the evaluated
   demonstrated systemic improvement, the SSEB determined that: of the
   five contracts on which there had been unfavorable cost performance,
   systemic improvement had been demonstrated on one, and some systemic
   improvement had been demonstrated on three (including the Global Hawk
   EMD); of the three contracts on which there had been underestimation of
   software development and integration resulting in schedule delays and cost
   overruns, systemic improvement had been demonstrated on two; of the five
   contracts on which there had been unfavorable schedule performance,
   systemic improvement had been demonstrated on two (including the Global
   Hawk EMD), and some systemic improvement had been demonstrated on two
   (including the Global Hawk LRIP); and of the three contracts on which
   there had been marginal management of subcontractors, systemic improvement
   had been demonstrated on one and some systemic improvement had been
   demonstrated on another. Based on this evidence, the SSEB determined that
   only some doubt existed that NG would be able to successfully perform the
   BAMS effort, thus warranting a moderate overall risk rating (in contrast
   to the substantial doubt regarding successful performance and resulting
   high risk rating for LM's proposed contract effort). Id.

   LM asserts that NG's moderate risk rating did not adequately account for
   NG's performance problems, particularly on the Global Hawk EMD contract,
   and that the agency unreasonably credited NG with systemic improvements on
   a number of contracts, particularly the Global Hawk EMD and Global Hawk
   LRIP contracts. Based upon our review of the record, we find no basis for
   questioning the evaluation of NG's past performance.

   As indicated above, and as is otherwise amply demonstrated in the record,
   NAVAIR fully recognized the problems encountered by NG Western Region
   under the Global Hawk EMD contract, including those with respect to
   unfavorable cost performance, underestimation of software development and
   integration resulting in schedule delays and cost overruns, unfavorable
   schedule performance, and marginal ability to manage subcontractors, all
   resulting in an overall performance rating of marginal. SSEB at 67-76;
   Contract Performance Analysis Worksheet, Dec. 19, 2007. Furthermore,
   notwithstanding LM's claims to the contrary, this recognition included an
   understanding throughout the evaluation, and by the SSA, that there had
   been significant cost increases under the contract (15 percent or more
   above the baseline cost) such that notification to Congress was required
   in 2005. See 10 U.S.C. sect. 2433 (2008); Letter from Secretary of the Air
   Force to Congress, Apr. 13, 2005; Letter from Secretary of the Air Force
   to Congress, Dec. 29, 2005 (reporting cost breach "directly related" to
   breach previously reported in April 2005); Contract Performance Analysis
   Worksheet, Dec. 19, 2007, Cost; SSEB at 66-68; SSAC PAR at 10; Tr. at
   1322-39, 1889-90.

   LM asserts that NAVAIR unreasonably credited NG with systemic improvement
   with respect to most reported past performance problems. Again, however,
   the record supports the agency's conclusion. For example, the SSEB noted
   with respect to the prior unfavorable cost performance under the Global
   Hawk EMD contract, that NG had implemented a number of cost control
   measures, including a [REDACTED], designed to improve program oversight
   and management and maintain cost and schedule within two percent of the
   baseline. In this regard, the Air Force program director advised NAVAIR on
   November 16, 2007 that

     the program has put in place a new Acquisition Program Baseline and is
     executing to it. . . . The contractor and government have made
     management changes and have put in place strong mechanisms to control
     cost and schedule and to predict growth in either. Overall, the program
     has made significant changes and I believe that it is now healthy and on
     a path to success.

   E-mail From Program Director to NAVAIR, Nov. 16, 2007. In addition, NG
   responded to NAVAIR ENs by furnishing cumulative EVMS data for 2007 (after
   the prior cost breach and rebaseline), showing a CPI of 1.01 in January
   2007, decreasing to .99 in July and increasing to 1.00 in October 2007. NG
   Response to EN NG-PP-008, Nov. 30, 2007. However, since the Air Force
   program director had reported in a May 23, 2007 CPAR that NG continued to
   have cost and schedule control challenges in several areas, and given the
   interim decline in the CPI to .99 in July 2007, the SSEB determined that
   NG had demonstrated only some systemic improvement. Regarding the prior
   unfavorable schedule performance, the SSEB noted NG's implementation of
   such measures as the [REDACTED] designed to improve program oversight and
   management. In addition, the SSEB noted that, while the Air Force program
   director had reported in May 2007 that NG still faced schedule control
   problems in several areas, the program director had also confirmed that
   improvements had been made in overall scheduling approach and process.
   Since the EVMS data furnished by NG in November 2007 had indicated a
   cumulative SPI ranging between .99 in January 2007 and .98 in November
   2007, the SSEB determined that systemic improvement had been demonstrated
   in the schedule area.

   In contrast, with respect to the prior underestimation of software
   development and integration resulting in schedule delays and cost
   overruns, the SSEB noted that as recently as September 7, 2007, the Air
   Force had expressed concern to NG as to a 20-month delay in the Block 10
   software, which originally was scheduled for completion in January 2006,
   but instead was rescheduled for operational release in late September
   2007. The SSEB further noted that, while NG had implemented a number of
   systemic improvement measures in this area, the contractor had conceded
   that many of the initiatives were still in the early stages of
   development. Based on this information, the SSEB determined that systemic
   improvement had not been demonstrated in this area. The SSEB reached a
   similar conclusion with respect to the previous determination regarding
   NG's marginal ability to manage subcontractors. SSEB at 66-76; Declaration
   of Past Performance/Experience Team Lead, July 8, 2008.

   As is apparent from the above discussion, the SSEB undertook a detailed,
   reasoned approach to determining whether NG had demonstrated systemic
   improvement. LM has not shown the agency's methodology or conclusions to
   be unreasonable. While LM suggests that there was no cost data to
   demonstrate systemic improvement, and further asserts that the agency
   failed to consider the impact of the software problems on the overall
   schedule, we think that, given the favorable EVMS data for 2007--including
   a CPI of not less than .99 and an overall SPI of not less than .98 between
   January and October 2007--and the various systemic improvement measures
   undertaken by NG (including its [REDACTED], the agency reasonably
   determined that some systemic improvement had been demonstrated in the
   cost area and that systemic improvement had been demonstrated in the
   overall schedule.

   We conclude that the agency reasonably determined that only some doubt
   existed that NG would be able to successfully perform the required effort,
   thus warranting a moderate overall risk rating.

   TECHNICAL

   As noted above, NG's proposal was evaluated as having a strong advantage
   over LM's under the design approach subfactor of the technical factor
   based in part on the evaluation of NG's proposed BAMS UAS as having
   significant strengths in the emphasis areas of: ETOS, with NG offering a
   greater persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
   capability with its proposed UAS orbit evaluated as having an ETOS of 96.2
   percent, significantly higher than LM's evaluated ETOS of 84.6 percent;
   and SWaP, including NG's weight margin of [REDACTED] pounds, nearly
   [REDACTED] times greater than LM's margin of approximately [REDACTED]
   pounds. NAVAIR noted that NG's superior SWaP future growth capability
   could be used to incorporate future capability increments without
   breaching the ETOS threshold requirements, and that the resulting
   significantly greater design margin would reduce the risk of unknown
   design challenges that could require increased SWaP, particularly weight.
   NAVAIR concluded that NG's strong advantage under the design approach
   subfactor offset a slight advantage in favor of LM's proposal under the
   program schedule subfactor such that NG's proposal had a significant
   overall advantage over LM's under the technical factor. SSAC PAR at 3-7.

   LM raises several challenges to the evaluation under the technical factor.
   We find that none furnishes a basis for questioning the reasonableness of
   the agency's overall determination of NG's advantage under the factor. For
   example, LM asserts that the ETOS calculation for its proposed
   Predator-based solution understated the time on station because it was
   improperly based on an orbit of four aircraft, ignoring the fact that LM
   had updated its original approach to add a fifth aircraft in its December
   4 proposal revisions. However, the record supports the agency's
   interpretation of LM's revised proposal as continuing to propose a
   4-aircraft orbit for purposes of the ETOS calculation. Neither the origin
   of the revisions nor the resulting revised proposal supports LM's
   interpretation of a 5-aircraft orbit for purposes of the ETOS calculation.
   In this regard, LM advised NAVAIR in its December 4 proposal revision that
   "[a]s a result of Government comments and after rerunning the Government's
   model received as part of EN LMGA-C-0040, we have added an additional
   aircraft to our LRIP 1 cost and schedule. We will now produce 5 aircraft
   as part of LRIP 1." LM/GA Proposal Update, Response to the 28 November
   BAMS Face-to-Face Discussions, at 2-3. However, EN LMGA-C-0040 was a cost
   EN, not a technical EN, and the relevant section of the EN advised LM that
   the agency had concluded that its proposal of 33 aircraft would not be
   sufficient to sustain full operating capability for the required 20 years.
   Further, LM's submissions from before and after the December 4 revisions
   all referred to an orbit or input of four aircraft, including: LM's
   Technical Proposal Figure 2.1.4-6 "ETOS Calculator Inputs," responsive to
   the RFP requirement that offerors "[i]dentify all assumptions used in
   developing ETOS predictions" and complete an "ETOS Input Table," RFP
   L.2.1.4; the narrative in its Technical Proposal Section 2.1.4, "Effective
   Time on Station"; and the proposal's executive summary. LM Executive
   Summary at 3-4, 10, 22; LM Executive Summary Errata, Dec. 4, 2007; LM
   Technical Proposal sect. 2.1.4. Moreover, as noted by the agency, LM was
   informed during face-to-face discussions on November 28, 2007, that the
   agency was assuming that only 80 percent of the unmanned aircraft at a
   particular site would be able to fly for purposes of the ETOS
   calculation--"Number of UAs per site = ETOS results/80% availability."
   BAMS UAS Competition, LM Preliminary Discussions Evaluation Findings, Nov.
   28, 2007, at 54. Since application of the 80-percent availability factor
   would require five aircraft in order that four would be available to fly
   for purposes of the ETOS calculation, the agency reasonably found that
   LM's proposal of a fifth aircraft for LRIP was not intended to change the
   proposal of four aircraft for the ETOS calculation. Tr. at 46-49,
   62-65.[3] Thus, nothing in the circumstances of the December 4 revisions
   reasonably alerted the agency to an intention on LM's part to add a fifth
   aircraft for ETOS calculation purposes.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] While LM maintained that the EVMS data were invalid and not reliable,
   this only confirms the absence of any documentation of systemic
   improvement.

   [2] LM further asserts that, in evaluating the past performance of GA-ASI,
   NAVAIR failed to account for information in DCMA's Informal Preaward
   Survey on GA-ASI, the results of which were reported to NAVAIR on or about
   February 1, 2008. Although our Office has previously held that an agency
   may not ignore information obtained during a preaward survey that is
   relevant to a past performance evaluation, GTS Duratek, Inc., B-280511.2,
   B-280511.3, Oct. 19, 1998, 98-2 CPD para.130 at 15, or to the
   consideration of the awardee's capability to perform the work undertaken
   as part of the technical evaluation, Continental Maritime of San Diego,
   B-249858 et al., Feb. 11, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 230 at 7, the record here
   reflects that the views expressed in GA-ASI's survey were essentially
   taken into account in the evaluation. Specifically, with respect to past
   performance, the survey (which was completed in only 3 days) included (1)
   a general statement by the same DCMA Program Integrator whose views had
   been "coordinated" with those of the DCMA ACO on contract No. 0124 (for
   the I-GNAT ER) that GA-ASI had performed well on the various Predator
   contracts, and (2) a statement in the property management area of the
   survey, apparently by a different DCMA employee, that GA-ASI has grown
   rapidly and "has not been able to keep up [with] increasing need for
   adequate staffing." As noted by NAVAIR, however, both views had previously
   been accounted for in the past performance evaluation, and neither was
   supported by any new detailed information. NAVAIR Comments, July 28, 2008,
   at 12-13.

   [3] Consistent with the agency's assumed 80 percent availability factor,
   and NG's proposal of three aircraft for the ETOS calculation, NG's
   proposal was evaluated on the basis of four aircraft per site. (LM's
   proposal was evaluated on the basis of five aircraft per site, consistent
   with its evaluated proposal of four aircraft for the ETOS calculation.)
   Final Evaluation SSAC Briefing, Feb. 4, 2008, at 116.