TITLE: B-311313, Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc., June 10, 2008
BNUMBER: B-311313
DATE: June 10, 2008
****************************************************************
B-311313, Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc., June 10, 2008

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc.

   File: B-311313

   Date: June 10, 2008

   Kenneth B. Weckstein, Esq., and Michael D. Maloney, Esq., Brown Rudnick
   Berlack Israels LLP, for the protester.
   Michael A. Gordon, Esq., and Fran Baskin, Esq., Michael A. Gordon, PLLC,
   for Meridian Management Corporation, an intervenor.
   Mark S. Ledford, Esq., Social Security Administration, for the agency.
   Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protest is sustained where agency's evaluation of offerors' experience
   relied on factors not identified in the solicitation and on distinctions
   between offerors' experience that were not supported by the record.

   2. Protest is sustained where source selection decision was based on a
   flawed technical evaluation, and also considered an undisclosed evaluation
   criterion of transition risk in assuming that any non-incumbent contractor
   would likely cause mistakes in performance that would result in costs for
   the agency.

   DECISION

   Consolidated Engineering Services, Inc. (CES) protests the award of a
   contract to Meridian Management Corporation (MMC) under request for
   proposals (RFP) No. SSA-RFP-08-1004 by the Social Security Administration
   for facility management services. The protester contends that the agency's
   evaluation of the offerors' technical proposals was unreasonable, and that
   the selection decision was flawed.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP was issued on June 1, 2007, and sought proposals to provide
   facilities management services for the Harold Washington Social Security
   Center, also known as the Great Lakes Program Service Center (GLPSC), in
   Chicago, Illinois. Offerors were required to propose the following
   services: facilities management, operation and maintenance of building and
   mechanical equipment, elevator maintenance, utilities, custodial and
   related services, sustaining maintenance, security, protective signaling
   service, and uninterruptible power supply service maintenance. RFP sect.
   B. MMC is the incumbent contractor currently providing these services for
   the GLPSC.

   The RFP anticipated the award of a fixed-price contract, with a 1-year
   base performance period and nine 1-year option periods. The RFP stated
   that proposals would be evaluated on the basis of the following factors:
   experience, past performance, and price. RFP sect. H-1. The non-price
   factors were of equal importance and, combined, were "slightly more
   important than price." RFP amend. 1 sect. H-1. The RFP also stated that
   the agency would evaluate offerors' experience and past performance to
   develop a "confidence/performance risk" assessment for each proposal. The
   confidence/performance risk assessment was to be used, along with price,
   to conduct the selection decision. RFP sect. H-2.2.

   As relevant here, the RFP stated that the agency would evaluate offerors'
   proposals under the experience factor based on the following criteria:

     Experience is the opportunity to learn by doing. The Government will
     evaluate the extent to which an offeror possesses experience in work
     similar to the Government's requirements under this solicitation in
     terms of size, scope and complexity, to enable the offeror to:

     -identify performance uncertainties and risks;

     -identify potential performance problems and their symptoms;

     -identify, fashion and select prospective and appropriate solutions;

     -implement effective corrective actions;

     -develop and implement actions that improve efficiency and/or useful
     life expectancy of facilities and equipment; and

     -achieve the overall objectives of the contract.

   RFP sect. H-1(d)(1).

   The RFP further stated that proposals would be evaluated based on
   offerors' experience in the following "critical areas": custodial
   services, elevator maintenance, energy management, life safety systems
   maintenance, mechanical systems operation and maintenance, security
   services, utilities service management, and working productively with
   unions. Id. Offerors were advised that the agency would "evaluate the
   offeror's experience in providing relevant and similar services to other
   corporations or Government agencies . . . in terms of the size, scope and
   complexity of the operation," and that the evaluation "may also include
   information available from other sources both public and private." Id. The
   RFP stated that offerors' proposals would be assigned one of the following
   ratings under the experience factor: extremely similar, very similar,
   somewhat similar, slightly similar, or neither similar nor relevant "in
   terms of size, scope and complexity, to the Government's requirements
   under this solicitation." Id.

   For the confidence/performance risk assessment, the RFP stated that the
   agency would consider offerors' past performance and experience to create
   the composite assessment that "reflect[s] the Government's level of
   confidence that the offeror, if selected for award, would successfully
   perform the requirements of this contract." RFP sect. H-2.2. The RFP
   advised that offerors' proposals would be assigned one of the following
   ratings under the confidence/performance risk assessment:

     Full Confidence/No Risk -- Essentially no doubt/risk exists that the
     offeror will successfully perform the required effort.

     High Confidence/Little Risk -- Little doubt/risk exists that the offeror
     will successfully perform the required effort.

     Confidence/Some Risk -- Some doubt/risk exists that the offeror will
     successfully perform the required effort.

     Unknown Confidence/ Unknown Risk -- Where no relevant performance record
     was identified, confidence level/performance risk is unknown.

     Little Confidence/Substantial Risk -- Substantial doubt/risk exists that
     the offeror will successfully perform the required effort.

     No Confidence/Extreme Risk -- Extreme doubt/risk exists that the offeror
     will successfully perform the required effort.

   Id.

   The agency received proposals from six offerors by the closing date of
   July 11, 2007, including CES and MMC. A technical evaluation team (TET)
   evaluated each offeror's technical proposal and prepared a report to the
   contracting officer (CO), who also served as the source selection
   authority for the procurement. In testimony provided to our Office, the CO
   stated that she relied primarily on the TET's analysis for her
   understanding of the technical aspects of the offerors' proposals. Audio
   Disc (AD) at 1:11:06.[1]

   The agency established a competitive range of the most highly-rated
   proposals, consisting of CES, MMC, and a third offeror. Agency Report
   (AR), Tab 6, Competitive Range Determination, at 4-5. The agency then
   conducted discussions with each offeror in the competitive range, received
   revised proposals, and conducted new evaluations.

   The final ratings for each offerors' proposal were follows:

   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                            |        CES        |       MMC        |
   |----------------------------+-------------------+------------------|
   |Experience                  | Extremely Similar |Extremely Similar |
   |----------------------------+-------------------+------------------|
   |Past Performance[2]         |     Excellent     |    Excellent     |
   |----------------------------+-------------------+------------------|
   |Confidence/ Performance Risk| High Confidence/  | Full Confidence/ |
   |                            |                   |                  |
   |                            |    Little Risk    |     No Risk      |
   |----------------------------+-------------------+------------------|
   |Price                       |    $[deleted]     |   $46,368,279    |
   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+

   AR, Tab 18, Source Selection Decision (SSD), at 4, 6, 7.

   In the selection decision, the CO concluded that although CES's and MMC's
   proposals received similar ratings, MMC's proposal had several advantages
   that warranted selection for award. The selection decision first discussed
   each offeror's proposal, and the CO's basis for assigning ratings under
   each evaluation factor. Although CES and MMC received equal ratings under
   the experience and past performance evaluation factors, the CO concluded
   that MMC's proposal merited a confidence/performance risk rating of "full
   confidence/no risk," whereas CES merited a rating of "high
   confidence/little risk." AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 6-7.

   In comparing the offerors, the CO concluded that MMC was superior to CES
   under the past performance and experience evaluation factors. Under the
   past performance evaluation, the CO noted that both offerors were rated
   excellent, and that there were no performance problems reported for
   either. The CO concluded that "while both firms received equal past
   performance ratings, there is somewhat less past performance related risk
   associated with award to Meridian." Id.

   Under the experience evaluation, the CO noted that both offerors were
   rated as having experience "extremely similar" to the solicitation
   requirements. Nonetheless, the CO stated that the "extremely similar"
   ratings represented a range of possible merit for each offeror's
   experience, and that MMC's experience was superior to CES's experience.
   The CO first concluded that while CES had experience in managing all of
   the eight critical areas required under the solicitation, the company had
   performed them in a number of different multi-service contracts, "none of
   which required the performance and management of these functions at one
   site." Id. By comparison, the selection decision stated that "Meridian has
   experience performing all these functions on one contract (the GLPSC
   [incumbent contract])." Id. On this basis, the CO concluded that MMC's
   experience was more relevant that CES's experience.

   The CO then cited two examples to illustrate her view that MMC's
   experience was more relevant than CES's experience, explaining that while
   "Meridian and CES both appear to be excellent contractors with extensive
   experience . . . [t]he differences are in the details." Id. First, the CO
   concluded that MMC's experience in managing centrifugal chillers, a
   requirement under the mechanical systems operation and maintenance
   critical area, was more relevant than CES's experience because "CES has
   nine years of demonstrated experience operating and maintaining 300-ton
   York centrifugal chillers," whereas "Meridian has 10 years of demonstrated
   experience operating the three 533-ton York centrifugal chillers at the
   GLSPC." Id. Second, the CO concluded that MMC's experience in managing
   guard services, a requirement under the security services critical area,
   was more relevant than CES's experience. In this regard, the CO notes that
   MMC had provided guard services through its subcontractor under the
   incumbent contract, whereas CES had provided guard services through a
   subcontractor on a military base operations contract--experience the
   agency viewed as somewhat less relevant to the solicitation requirements.
   Id.

   In the final tradeoff between CES's and MMC's proposals, the CO stated
   that the selection decision would be based on the following consideration:
   "Given Meridian's clear superiority in experience, the question becomes is
   this superiority, and associated reduction in risk, worth the slightly
   over $[deleted] over 10 years that could be saved if [the contract were]
   awarded to CES." Id. The CO determined that the lower price of CES's
   proposal was not the better value to the government because CES did not
   have experience in performing all of the solicitation requirements under
   one contract, and that CES lacked familiarity with the GLPSC. Id. The CO
   also concluded that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that CES will make some
   mistakes during the learning phase at a new facility," and that "[s]uch a
   mistake (i.e., one that damages equipment, injures an employee, or causes
   a building closure) could easily cost the agency more than $[deleted]."
   Id.

   The agency selected MMC's proposal for award on February 20, 2008, and
   notified CES of that decision. CES requested a debriefing, which was
   provided on February 27. This protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   CES challenges the reasonableness of the agency's evaluation of the
   offerors' experience and the selection decision. The evaluation of an
   offeror's proposal, including experience, is a matter within the agency's
   discretion. IPlus, Inc., B-298020, B-298020.2, June 5, 2006, 2006 CPD
   para. 90 at 7, 13. Although we will not substitute our judgment for that
   of the agency, we will question the agency's conclusions where they are
   inconsistent with the solicitation criteria, undocumented, or not
   reasonably based. Sonetronics, Inc., B-289459.2, Mar. 18, 2002, 2002 CPD
   para. 48 at 3. On the other hand, a protester's mere disagreement with the
   agency's judgment in its determination of the relative merit of competing
   proposals does not establish that the evaluation was unreasonable. C.
   Lawrence Constr. Co., Inc., B-287066, Mar. 30, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 70 at
   4.

   Although the protester raises several allegations regarding the agency's
   evaluation of the offerors' proposals and assignment of adjectival
   ratings, our decision here primarily addresses the agency's direct
   comparison of the offerors' proposals.[3] As discussed below, we agree
   with the protester that the agency's comparison of the offerors' proposals
   and the selection decision were unreasonable.

   Comparison of Offerors' Experience

   The protester argues that the agency's evaluation of the offerors'
   experience was unreasonable and not supported by the record. As discussed
   above, the agency rated both offerors under the experience factor as
   having experience that is "extremely similar" to the requirements of the
   solicitation, the highest possible rating. The agency concluded, however,
   that MMC's experience was more relevant than CES's based on a general
   comparison of the relevance of the offerors' experience, and on two
   specific examples which the agency concluded illustrated differences
   between the offerors. We discuss first the agency's general evaluation of
   the offerors' relative experience, and then address the two specific
   examples. As discussed below, we conclude that the agency's evaluation of
   the offerors' relative experience was not reasonable.

     1. Overall Relevance of Experience

   The selection decision first emphasized that CES's experience was less
   relevant than MMC's because the protester had not performed all of the
   eight "critical areas" listed in the experience factor under one contract.
   The protester contends that the agency's reliance on this distinction was
   unreasonable. We agree.

   In the comparison of the overall experience records of CES and MMC, the CO
   explains twice that she found a significant distinction based on whether
   the offerors had performed all of the eight "critical areas" under one
   contract:

     Unlike CES, Meridian has experience performing all eight critical areas
     combined under one contract, [the incumbent] GLPSC combined facilities
     management contract. . . .

     However, while Meridian has experience performing all these functions
     under one contract (the [incumbent contract]), CES' experience is spread
     over a number of contracts, none of which required the performance and
     management of all of these functions at one site.

   AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 12.

   During the hearing, counsel for the agency asked the CO to explain "what
   the government was looking for in the overall solicitation." AD at
   1:57:45. The CO stated the agency was seeking to identify offerors that
   had "experience in providing all services under all the categories under
   one contract." Id. at 1:57:55. The CO further stated that in order to be
   considered equivalent in terms of experience to the incumbent, an offeror
   would need to have performed at least one contract involving every service
   sought under the solicitation. Id. at 2:02:45, 2:04:50.

   Agencies are required to evaluate proposals based solely on the factors
   identified in the solicitation, and must adequately document the bases for
   their evaluation conclusions. Intercon Assocs., Inc., B-298282,
   B-298282.2, Aug. 10, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 121 at 5. While agencies
   properly may apply evaluation considerations that are not expressly
   outlined in the RFP where those considerations are reasonably and
   logically encompassed within the stated evaluation criteria, there must be
   a clear nexus between the stated criteria and the unstated consideration.
   Global Analytic Info. Tech. Servs., Inc., B-298840.2, Feb. 6, 2007, 2007
   CPD para. 57 at 4.

   The solicitation stated that offerors experience would be evaluated as
   follows: "Experience will be evaluated in terms of the size, scope and
   complexity of the operation. Experience in the following [eight] critical
   areas, listed in alphabetical order, will be evaluated." RFP sect.
   H-1(d)(1). We agree with the agency that the solicitation anticipated
   award of a single contract, and that the ability to perform all of the
   services under a single contract is a basis for evaluation. We do not
   agree, however, that the CO's "one contract" criterion for evaluating the
   relevance of offerors' experience was a reasonable proxy for that
   evaluation. Instead, we think that the RFP does not support the agency's
   "one contract" interpretation for evaluating experience, and that the
   interpretation was not reasonably related to the stated evaluation
   criteria.

   The RFP does not state that the agency was seeking proposals from offerors
   who had performed all of the eight critical areas of experience under "one
   contract"; instead, the solicitation states that the agency will evaluate
   offerors' experience to determine whether their experience with the eight
   critical areas is similar to the requirements of the solicitation. The
   CO's "one contract" approach meant that the agency did not consider any
   offeror to have equivalent experience to the incumbent contractor unless
   the offeror had performed the exact same services required under the
   solicitation in the same manner as the incumbent, i.e., under one
   contract.

   In addition to being inconsistent with the RFP, the CO's interpretation
   appears to have unduly restricted competition by unreasonably disfavoring
   non-incumbent firms competing with the incumbent. Specifically, the
   agency's action prejudiced CES by precluding consideration of whether
   offerors' references demonstrated, individually or collectively,
   experience that was similar in size, scope or complexity to the
   solicitation requirements.[4] In this regard, the CO simply assumed,
   without meaningful analysis, that CES's collective experience, which the
   record shows clearly included multi-function contracts involving all of
   the services required under the solicitation, could not have been the
   equal to MMC's under the incumbent contract.[5] On this record, we
   conclude that the agency's evaluation was not reasonably consistent with
   the stated evaluation factors.

     2.                  Centrifugal Chillers

   In the first of the two specific examples of areas where the CO concluded
   that MMC's experience was more relevant than CES's, the selection decision
   states that MMC had more relevant experience managing centrifugal
   chillers. The selection decision states that the offerors' experience was
   distinguishable because CES has 9 years of experience with 300-ton York
   chillers, whereas MMC has 10 years of experience with "the three 533-ton
   York centrifugal chillers at the GLPSC." AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 12. The
   protester contends that the agency's distinctions between the offerors'
   experience here was unreasonable. We agree.

   During her testimony, the CO stated that although CES was given credit for
   having experience in centrifugal chiller maintenance, she distinguished
   between the experience of CES and MMC because she concluded that CES did
   not have experience with maintenance of the same type or models of
   chillers as those at the GLPSC. AD at 1:13:50. The CO stated that she
   believed that there are differences between various models of centrifugal
   chillers, and that CES's experience was less relevant than MMC's
   experience managing the 533-ton York centrifugal chillers at the GLPSC. AD
   at 1:16:24, 1:17:05. The CO stated, however, that she performed only a
   "cursory" review of the offerors' proposals, and "mostly relied on the
   technical evaluation team" for analysis of the technical merits of the
   proposals. AD at 1:11:06. Further, the CO stated that she does not
   understand what a centrifugal chiller is, but instead relied on the TEP
   for all of her understanding of the technical issues regarding chillers.
   AD at 1:35:05. Thus, the CO explained that any conclusions she made
   regarding differences between the experience of CES and MMC in maintaining
   centrifugal chillers was based on information she received from the TET.
   AD at 1:18:10.

   The TET report, however, does not discuss differences between the
   offerors' experience, and does not support the conclusions made by the CO
   in the selection decision.[6] The TET report stated that CES has
   "performed maintenance on Trane and York chilled water equipment which is
   very similar to the chilled water equipment at the [GLPSC]." AR, Tab 5,
   TET Report, at 20. The TET report does not identify which models of
   centrifugal chillers with which CES or MMC has experience, nor does the
   report draw any distinctions between the offerors' experience with
   centrifugal chillers or discuss why their experience is different.

   Additionally, the record shows that the CO did not have a clear
   understanding of which types of chillers CES had experience maintaining.
   The CO stated, for example, that her reference in the selection decision
   to CES's experience with York chillers was an error, because she believed
   that the CES proposal showed experience with Trane chillers. AD at
   1:13:40, 1:43:45. In fact, CES's proposal states that the company has
   experience maintaining "[deleted] chiller equipment . . . including
   [deleted] Trane, York[deleted]." AR, Tab 4, CES Proposal, Executive
   Summary, at 6. CES's proposal lists experience with [deleted] Trane
   centrifugal chillers, [deleted] York centrifugal chillers, [deleted] Trane
   CentraVac centrifugal chillers, [deleted] Trane CentraVac centrifugal
   chillers, and [deleted] Trane centrifugal chillers. Id. at 9-15.

   On this record, we conclude that the evaluation of the offerors' proposals
   regarding their experience with centrifugal chillers was not reasonable.
   As the CO acknowledges, she does not understand whether the experience
   each offeror had with the chillers was different in any meaningful way,
   and the report provided to her by the TET does not discuss or otherwise
   provide any basis to distinguish between the offerors' experience.
   Moreover, the selection decision's assessment of MCC's experience again
   appears to reflect an unsupported, and anti-competitive, preference for
   the incumbent.

     3. Security Services

   The CO also concluded that MMC's experience in managing security services
   was more relevant than CES's experience. The CO noted that both offerors
   proposed to meet the security requirements under the contract through
   subcontractors, and that each offeror had previously performed contracts
   where they had managed security services subcontractors. The CO concluded,
   however, the MMC's experience was more relevant because "Meridian and
   [its] proposed subcontract[or] have demonstrated experience providing
   Guard Services at the GLPSC for the last ten years." AR, Tab 18, SSD, at
   12. The protester contends that the CO's evaluation was unreasonable
   because both offerors had proposed to perform the security requirements
   through subcontractors with similar experience records. We disagree.

   The record shows that the CO rated the experience of both offerors'
   proposed subcontractors as extremely similar to the security requirements
   in the solicitation. AR, Tab 5, TET Report, at 6, 20. The CO, however,
   distinguished between the experience of the CES and MMC in their
   management of security subcontractors. AR, Tab 5, TET Report, at 6, 20;
   Tab 18, SSD, at 6, 12. In this regard, the CO determined that MMC had
   experience managing a subcontractor at the GLPSC on the incumbent
   contract, and therefore had extremely similar experience. AR, Tab 5, TET
   Report, at 6; Tab 18, SSD, at 12. In contrast, CES had experience managing
   a subcontractor at a military installation, which the CO concluded was
   "not entirely similar to managing armed guard services in a multi-story
   office building setting like that of the GLPSC." AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 6.
   Specifically, the CO concluded that CES had not adequately explained in
   its proposal why the requirements of the security subcontract it managed
   were similar to the requirements of the solicitation. AD
   at 1:48:35. Thus, in contrast with the unsupported preference for the
   incumbent's experience discussed above, we think the CO reasonably
   distinguished the nature of the protester's prior work from the work
   required under the solicitation. We therefore find no basis to sustain
   this protest ground.

   In sum, we conclude the agency's evaluation of the offerors' relative
   merits under the experience factor was flawed, and thus the agency's
   conclusion that MMC's experience was more relevant than CES's experience
   lacked a reasonable basis. We further conclude that CES was prejudiced by
   this flawed evaluation because the agency relied upon it in selecting
   MMC's higher-priced proposal for award, and sustain the protest on this
   basis. See McDonald Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at
   3; Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

   Source Selection Tradeoff Analysis

   The protester argues that the agency's selection decision was flawed for
   two reasons: (1) the tradeoff analysis relied on the flawed evaluation of
   the offerors' experience, and (2) the tradeoff analysis concluded that
   non-incumbent contractors generally pose risks in their transition to
   contract performance, and that those concerns warranted discounting CES's
   lower proposed price--notwithstanding the fact that the solicitation did
   not call for evaluation of offerors' approaches to transition. We agree
   with the protest on both issues.

   First, the tradeoff analysis concluded that MMC's experience was "clearly
   superior" to CES's experience, and that this difference required the CO to
   address whether MMC's higher-priced proposal merited selection as opposed
   to CES's lower-priced proposal. Because, as discussed above, the agency's
   underlying evaluation of the offerors' experience was unreasonable, we
   conclude that CES's was prejudiced by the agency's reliance on that
   evaluation in the selection decision.

   Next, the agency's tradeoff determination relied on assumptions concerning
   the risk posed by award of a contract to a non-incumbent offeror that were
   unreasonable and inconsistent with the solicitation. As explained above,
   the CO determined that although CES's proposed price was $[deleted] lower
   than MMC's, this difference was "more than offset[]" by MMC's lower
   performance risk based on that offeror's successful performance of the
   incumbent contract. AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 12. The CO also concluded that the
   $[deleted] price differential was not significant because of the
   possibility that a non-incumbent contractor, such as CES, could experience
   problems during contract transition that would eliminate the differential:
   "It is reasonable to assume that CES will make some mistakes during the
   learning phase at a new facility," and that "[s]uch a mistake (i.e., one
   that damages equipment, injures an employee, or causes a building closure)
   could easily cost the agency more than $[deleted]." Id.

   The CO acknowledged in her testimony that her concern regarding the
   transition risk was based on general assumptions regarding non-incumbents,
   rather than any aspect of CES's proposal. AD at 1:34:05. Specifically, the
   CO cited two factors for her assumptions regarding transition risk: (1)
   what the CO termed "general knowledge" concerning the difficulties that a
   non-incumbent might have in contract transition, and (2) the CO's
   experience with a contract in Birmingham, Alabama where a non-incumbent,
   lower-priced offeror was selected for contract award, but did not perform
   successfully. AD at 1:31:15, 2:05:30. We do not think that either of these
   rationales provides a reasonable basis to conclude that CES's proposal
   posed a $[deleted] transition risk. Neither factor relates to the risk
   posed by CES's proposal, and instead is based on a general assumption that
   a non-incumbent will likely experience costly problems during transition.

   Additionally, the solicitation did not require offerors to identify their
   approaches to contract transition in their proposals, nor did the agency
   state that it would take transition costs or risk into account in
   evaluating offerors' proposals.[7] We think that the agency's use of
   assumptions concerning transition risk here constituted an improper use of
   an undisclosed and anti-competitive evaluation criterion that was not
   related to any risk or price evaluation identified in the solicitation.
   See Global Analytic Info. Tech. Servs. Inc., supra. The undisclosed
   evaluation factor of transition risk and associated cost clearly
   prejudiced CES because it effectively negated the price advantage CES's
   proposal had as compared to MMC.

   On this record we conclude that the agency's selection decision was not
   reasonable, and that CES was prejudiced by the agency's reliance on the
   flawed evaluation of offerors' experience and the agency's unreasonable
   assumptions concerning transition risk. We therefore sustain the protest
   on these bases.

   RECOMMENDATION

   We recommend that the agency reevaluate the offerors' proposals,
   consistent with this decision. If the agency concludes that its needs
   require a consideration of transition risk, it should issue a revised
   solicitation and obtain new proposals from the offerors. At the conclusion
   of this process, we recommend that the agency make a new selection
   decision. If MMC is not found to offer the best value to the government,
   the agency should terminate MMC's contract for the convenience of the
   government.

   We also recommend that CES be reimbursed the costs of filing and pursuing
   this protest, including reasonable attorney fees. Bid Protest Regulations,
   4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1) (2008). CES should submit its certified claim
   for costs, detailing the time expended and cost incurred, directly to the
   contracting agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision. 4 C.F.R.
   sect. 21.8(f)(1).

   The protest is sustained.[8]

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] In developing the protest record, our Office conducted a recorded
   telephone hearing in which the CO testified. Since there is not a written
   transcript of this hearing, references in this decision to the hearing are
   to the time index on the audio disc.

   [2] Following the TET's evaluation of offerors' proposals, the CO
   determined that additional references for CES's and MMC's past performance
   should be consulted. AR, Tab 18, SSD, at 4-6. During this process, the
   agency revised the past performance evaluation ratings for MMC and CES
   from outstanding, the highest rating, to excellent, the next-highest
   rating. Id. Although CES contends that there were irregularities with the
   manner in which the ratings were revised, we have reviewed the record and
   find no basis to conclude that there was any error.

   [3] For example, CES contends that the agency's evaluation of MMC's
   proposal under the experience factor was improper because, the protester
   argues, the solicitation did not allow the agency to consider offerors'
   performance of contracts with the agency. In this regard, the solicitation
   stated that the agency would evaluate "the offeror's experience in
   providing relevant and similar services to other corporations or
   Government agencies." RFP sect. H-1(d)(1). CES contends that this language
   precluded the agency from considering offerors' experience in performing
   contracts for agency. We think this argument relies on an unreasonable
   interpretation of the solicitation, namely that the word "other" precludes
   the agency from considering the performance of any work that an offeror
   performed for the agency--such as the incumbent contract. We have reviewed
   all of the issues raised in CES's protest, and conclude that none has
   merit, aside from those we specifically address herein.

   [4] In this regard, the TET evaluation noted that two of the facilities
   listed in CES's experience references were "extremely similar in size,
   scope and complexity" to the GLPSC, and the other two were "larger and
   more complex" than the GLPSC. AR, Tab 5, TET Report, at 20.

   [5] The agency and the intervenor argue that our decision in Ashe Facility
   Servs., Inc.,
   B-292218.3, B-292218.4, Mar. 31, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 80, stands for the
   proposition that an agency may reasonably consider an offeror's experience
   in performing all of the requirements of a solicitation under a single
   contract. In Ashe, however, our Office concluded that an agency reasonably
   evaluated whether offerors had experience in performing "multifunction
   contracts," that is, "contracts that combined the functional areas under
   the RFP." Id. at 13-14. We concluded in Ashe that the agency had
   reasonably determined that the protester had experience in performing only
   one function of a four-function requirement, and therefore lacked
   multi-function experience. Id. at 5-6, 14. Here, in contrast, there is no
   dispute that CES has experience performing multifunction contracts
   involving all of the eight critical areas of experience. Instead, the
   agency's evaluation unreasonably determined that only offerors that had
   performed all of the solicitation requirements under a single contract
   would be rated as highly as the incumbent contractor.

   [6] In her testimony, the CO did not identify any documents other than the
   TET report upon which she based her conclusions regarding the offerors'
   experience with centrifugal chillers. AD at 1:37:45.

   [7] In her testimony, the CO acknowledged that the solicitation did not
   advise non-incumbent offerors that they would be evaluated on the basis of
   their ability to perform a transition from the incumbent contractor. AD at
   1:32:50.

   [8] During the course of this protest, the agency determined that,
   although the filing of this protest trigged the required suspension of
   contract performance under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), an
   override of that suspension was necessary. Specifically, the agency
   determined that "continued contract performance by Meridian Management
   Corporation (MMC), the awardee, will be in the best interest of the United
   States." Agency Override Determination, Mar. 3, 2008. Consistent with the
   requirement of CICA regarding the impact of an agency's decision to
   override the automatic stay of performance on "best interests" grounds,
   our recommendation is made "without regard to any cost or disruption from
   terminating, recompeting, or reawarding the contract." See 31 U.S.C. sect.
   3554(b)(2).