TITLE: B-311004; B-311004.2, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., March 28, 2008
BNUMBER: B-311004; B-311004.2
DATE: March 28, 2008
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B-311004; B-311004.2, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc., March 28, 2008

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.

   File: B-311004; B-311004.2

   Date: March 28, 2008

   John S. Pachter, Esq., Jonathan D. Shaffer, Esq., Mary Pat Gregory, Esq.,
   Le'Ontra B. Greenspan, Esq., and Kathryn T. Muldoon, Esq., Smith, Pachter,
   McWhorter, for the protester.

   Richard Sauber, Esq., Donald J. Russell, Esq., and Michael L. Waldman,
   Esq., Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber, for Northrop
   Grumman Corporation, the intervenor.

   Maj. Walter R. Dukes, Kim Sawicki, Esq., John J. Reynolds, Esq., and James
   F. Ford, Esq., Department of the Army, for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest against exclusion of protester's proposal from competitive range
   (leaving only one proposal in the range) in procurement for airborne radar
   is denied where agency reasonably determined that (1) protester's proposal
   failed to satisfy solicitation requirement to substantiate compliance with
   specifications and/or took exception to required levels of performance,
   and (2) some of the deficiencies resulted from fundamental limitations on
   performance of protester's proposed radar system, or otherwise would
   require a major rewrite to correct.

   DECISION

   General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA) protests the exclusion of
   its proposal from the competitive range under request for proposals (RFP)
   No. W15P7T-07-R-P406, issued by the U.S. Army Communication-Electronics
   Command (CECOM), for production of a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)/Ground
   Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) system. GA primarily asserts that the
   determination to exclude its proposal from the competitive range failed to
   reasonably account for the performance of its proposed SAR/GMTI system in
   the flight test conducted as part of the evaluation.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The SAR/GMTI system is a lightweight, high performance, all-weather,
   multi-function radar system intended for use both on the Extended
   Range/Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and the Future Combat
   Systems Class IV Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV). The SAR/GMTI system will
   provide a battlefield commander with increased situational awareness by
   imaging stationary targets with the Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and
   detecting (ascertaining location, direction and velocity of) moving
   targets with the Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), even in adverse
   weather and through battlefield obscurants (eg., smoke or dust).

   A prior contract for system development and demonstration (SDD) of the
   SAR/GMTI system, covering the design, fabrication, integration and test of
   six articles (later increased to eight funded articles), was awarded to GA
   on November 20, 2004. Although the original SDD schedule provided for
   delivery of the test units 18 months after award, there has been a
   significant delay in delivery. During two independent operational tests of
   the SDD conducted by the Army Technical and Evaluation Command, the GMTI
   mode of GA's system was found noncompliant with the test specifications.
   While a new schedule was established under which eight systems were to be
   accepted by March 2008, as of that time, only three systems had been
   accepted, and these only through a waiver of some specifications.
   Contracting Officer's Statement at 2; Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at
   I/177-I/190.[1]

   The solicitation here, issued on August 10, 2007, contemplated award of a
   contract for an initial production quantity of 10 to 15 systems compliant
   with the SAR/GMTI Performance Based Specification (PBS), dated August 2,
   2007, with four 1-year production options for up to 35 systems each, and
   two payload performance enhancement options. The solicitation divided the
   performance requirements for the SAR/GMTI as set forth in the PBS into
   three categories: Band A "[m}andatory critical system performance
   requirements that must be met"; Band B "[s]ystem performance capabilities
   with levels of performance that are Highly Desired"; and Band C "[s]ystem
   performance capabilities with levels of performance that are Desired." RFP
   sect. M.3.1.

   Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal was determined to be
   the most beneficial to the government ("best value") when evaluated under
   four factors: (1) technical, with sub-factors for technical solution,
   (which was slightly more important than) schedule/production capability,
   (which was significantly more important than) supportability; (2)
   performance risk; (3) price/cost; and (4) small business participation.
   Overall, the technical factor was significantly more important than
   performance risk, which was slightly more important than price/cost, which
   was significantly more important than small business participation. The
   non-price/cost factors combined were significantly more important than
   price/cost.

   Of significance here, the RFP provided that the evaluation under the
   technical factor would consider (1) adequacy of response, (2)
   understanding the requirement, (3) feasibility of approach, and (4) the
   results of a scheduled 2-3 day flight test to be performed as part of the
   proposal process. Regarding the required flight test, the solicitation
   generally provided as follows:

     d. Flight Test. The Flight Test will be used to aid in the assessment of
     the Offeror's ability to produce the system as proposed. The Flight Test
     will be evaluated to help to determine the level of confidence provided
     the Government with respect to the Offeror's methods and approach in
     successfully completing the proposed tasks and technical requirements
     within the proposed schedule. The Flight Test will be evaluated in
     accordance with the Flight Test Plan attached to the RFP. The extent to
     which the Offeror successfully demonstrates higher levels of performance
     capabilities during the Flight Test will be considered. As a minimum,
     the Offeror must successfully demonstrate the following four areas: SAR
     Modes: Spot and Strip; GMTI Mode; SAR Strip Resolution of 0.3m and 1.0m;
     and SAR Spot Resolution of 0.3m. Failure to successfully demonstrate any
     one of these areas will be deemed a deficiency and will result in a
     Technical Factor rating of Unacceptable. Offerors are cautioned that
     they will be provided only one flight test session. Accordingly,
     Offerors will not be afforded an opportunity to correct any deficiencies
     received in the Flight Test.

   (Emphasis in original.) RFP sect. M.3.1.

   By the September 24 closing date, CECOM had received offers from GA and
   Northrop Grumman Corporation (NG). Both GA and NG demonstrated SAR/GMTI
   systems during the required source selection flight tests in October 2007
   that were evaluated as demonstrating sufficient capability in the four
   required areas to pass the flight test. However, analysis of the source
   selection flight test data resulted in GA's SAR/GMTI system receiving only
   a moderate confidence rating with respect to meeting proposed SAR
   performance, and a low confidence rating with respect to meeting proposed
   GMTI performance.

   While GA's system passed the flight test, its proposal was rated
   unacceptable under the technical factor. In this regard, the source
   selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated GA's proposal as having nine
   deficiencies under the technical solution subfactor, including such
   deficiencies as: modifying and not proposing to meet 15 mandatory Band A
   critical system performance requirements in its proposed Product
   Specification for incorporation into the contract; omitting Band A "shall"
   requirements from its proposed statement of work; failing to substantiate
   claimed operational ranges; failing to substantiate GMTI performance
   parameters; and failing to substantiate mandatory Band A requirements for
   reliability through test data or analysis. In addition to the nine
   deficiencies, GA's proposal was evaluated as having 13 significant
   weaknesses and 32 weaknesses under the technical solution subfactor. The
   SSEB nevertheless rated GA's proposal as susceptible of being made
   acceptable under the technical solution subfactor on the basis that its
   system had passed the flight test. However, the source selection authority
   (SSA) determined that, given the evaluated major deficiencies in GA's
   proposal and the SSEB's conclusion that a major rewrite of the proposal
   would be required to make it acceptable, a rating of unacceptable under
   the technical solutions subfactor was consistent with the rating
   definitions in the source selection evaluation plan. Competitive Range
   Determination at 3-4; Tr. at I/294-I/305.[2]

   The SSEB also rated GA's proposal unacceptable under the
   schedule/production capability subfactor (on the basis of 8 deficiencies,
   12 significant weaknesses, and 4 weaknesses) and under the supportability
   subfactor (on the basis of 3 deficiencies and 5 weaknesses). In addition
   to its overall unacceptable rating under the technical factor, GA's
   proposal was rated as posing moderate performance risk and as being only
   susceptible of being made acceptable under the small business factor.

   In contrast, NG's proposal was rated as susceptible of being made
   acceptable under the technical factor on the basis of a susceptible rating
   under the technical solution subfactor, which was the result of a single
   evaluated deficiency (proposing in its Product Specification to modify a
   Band A requirement for operational slant range performance by adding a
   caveat regarding [REDACTED]). NG's proposal was rated acceptable under the
   schedule/production capability subfactor and good under the supportability
   subfactor. In addition, NG's proposal was rated as posing low performance
   risk and as outstanding under the small business factor.

   The SSA determined that, in light of the fact that GA's proposal was
   evaluated as unacceptable (with major deficiencies) under the technical
   factor, and would require a major rewrite to become acceptable, it was not
   one of the most highly rated proposals, and on that basis excluded it from
   the competitive range. This resulted in a competitive range consisting
   only of NG's proposal. Upon learning of its exclusion from the competitive
   range, and after being debriefed, GA filed this protest with our Office.

   GA challenges the determination to exclude its proposal from the
   competitive range primarily on the basis that the agency did not
   reasonably account for the performance of its SAR/GMTI system in the
   flight test or the information in GA's proposal. GA specifically denies
   that it took exception in its proposed Product Specification to the
   requirements of the solicitation PBS.

   We will review an agency's evaluation and exclusion of a proposal from the
   competitive range for reasonableness and consistency with the solicitation
   criteria and applicable statutes and regulations. Novavax, Inc., B-286167,
   B-286167.2, Dec. 4, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 202 at 13. Contracting agencies
   are not required to retain in the competitive range proposals that are not
   among the most highly rated or that the agency otherwise reasonably
   concludes have no realistic prospect of being selected for award. Federal
   Acquisition Regulation sect. 15.306(c)(1); D & J Enter., Inc., B-310442,
   Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 8 at 2.

   We have reviewed all of GA's challenges to the competitive range
   determination and find that they furnish no basis to question the
   exclusion of GA's proposal. We discuss GA's most significant arguments
   below.

   FLIGHT TEST

   In significant measure, GA's challenge to the exclusion of its proposal
   from the competitive range rests upon the assumption that there is an
   inconsistency between its exclusion and the fact that the performance GA
   demonstrated during the required flight test was sufficient to pass the
   test. Indeed, it appears from the record that GA's approach to this
   procurement seems to have been primarily focused on passing the flight
   test. In this regard, GA's director of radar programs for reconnaissance
   systems testified, in response to a question as to GA's "proposal
   approach, in terms of providing . . . basic radar parameters," as follows:

     Okay. When you read the solicitation . . . you must pass the flight
     test. This was about the flight test. Everything else was secondary to
     the flight test. . . .

   Tr. at II/366-II/367.

   As noted by the agency, however, the proposal requirements as established
   by the solicitation extended significantly beyond the requirement that the
   system demonstrated at the source selection flight test receive a passing
   grade. Thus, offerors were required to describe their proposed approach to
   meeting the PBS requirements in detail; the solicitation provided as
   follows:

     [t]he Offeror shall present the extent to which its proposed solution
     and capabilities/characteristics compare to the solicitation, SOO, and
     PBS. The Offeror shall address all PBS Band A requirements, shall
     discuss how they will meet all specified levels of performance therein,
     and describe their proposed solution in meeting these requirements. The
     Offeror shall address all PBS Band B and C requirements. Offerors are
     not required to meet the desired performance capabilities with levels of
     performance set forth in Bands B and C in their proposed solution;
     however, they must discuss each Band B and C capability and the levels
     of performance that their proposed solution will achieve.

   RFP sect. L.2.2.1.1.2. Furthermore, offerors were required not merely to
   describe in detail their proposed approach to all of the PBS requirements;
   they were also required to substantiate that the performance of their
   proposed system would meet the PBS requirements, at least insofar as they
   concerned the Band A requirements.[3] In this regard, the RFP provided as
   follows:

     The Offeror shall deliver sample imagery and describe existing analysis,
     test data, and/or empirical data that substantiate the SAR/GMTI
     performance, environmental qualification, and reliability claims for the
     proposed system. Independent military test data is preferred. Data
     submitted in accordance with this section, along with data collected
     during the flight test, will be used for proposal evaluation. Proposals
     must contain supporting rationale for any claimed capabilities. Detailed
     test result information may be included under Section 4, Supporting
     Documentation, and will not be included as part of the Technical Volume
     page count. If the Offeror lacks actual test or usage data regarding
     performance, environmental qualification or reliability claims the
     Offeror must specify and justify the level of risk associated with this
     lack of data. Additionally the Offeror shall address how other
     techniques (modeling, analysis, etc.) provide the Government with
     confidence to verify the Offeror's claims based upon the lack of test
     data.

   RFP sect. L.2.2.1.1.4.

   While, as noted by the protester, the solicitation provided for
   consideration of the flight test results as part of an offeror's
   substantiation of its claimed level of performance, the 2-3 day flight
   test provided for under the solicitation was intended to address only a
   limited subset of the overall required performance capabilities, and then
   only in a limited manner. Thus, offerors were required to demonstrate, at
   a minimum, only four capabilities--SAR Spot-mode images at 0.3 meters
   resolution, SAR Strip-mode images at 0.3 and 1.0 meter resolutions, and
   GMTI--of the many capabilities required under the PBS. RFP sect. M.3.1;
   SAR/GMTI Source Selection Test Flight Plan at 1. Indeed, had the flight
   test been intended to comprehensively demonstrate the full range of
   required performance, the record indicates that the flight test would have
   required several months rather than the 3 days of testing contemplated
   under the solicitation. Tr. at I/22-I/24, I/216-I/217, I/319, II/113.
   Moreover, a demonstrated SAR/GMTI system could pass the flight test even
   if the performance shown during the test fell short of the mandatory Band
   A minimum level of performance; all that was required was a demonstration
   of "some capability" with respect to each of the four capabilities
   required to be demonstrated during the test. Tr. at I/323-I/324. In these
   circumstances, given the limited scope of the flight test and the fact
   that passing the test did not establish compliance with all mandatory PBS
   requirements, we see no necessary inconsistency between passing the test
   and being evaluated as not substantiating compliance with the mandatory
   PBS performance requirements.

   FAILURE TO MEET MANDATORY BAND A REQUIREMENTS

   Our review of the record indicates that the agency reasonably determined
   that GA failed to substantiate its compliance with and/or took exception
   to the required levels of performance with respect to significant
   mandatory Band A requirements. We discuss several examples below.

   Probability of Detection

   The solicitation PBS established a mandatory Band A requirement for the
   likelihood that the GMTI mode would detect a specific moving target if
   that target was within the field of view of the radar. Specifically, the
   PBS provided for a minimum GMTI probability of detection (PD), stating
   that "[t]he radar-payload shall be capable of providing 85% PD (Band A);
   90% PD (Band C), at all range-extents, of a standard military target (as
   defined in paragraph 3.2)." PBS sect. 3.3.4.1, GMTI Probability of
   Detection (PD).

   GA indicated in its Product Specification that its system would exceed the
   Band A 85 percent PD requirement, stating that its "radar-payload shall be
   capable of providing 90% PD of a standard military target within the
   operational range/altitude envelopes." GA Product Specification
   sect. 3.3.4.1. However, the performance GA's GMTI mode demonstrated during
   the source selection flight test was inconsistent with its claim of a 90
   percent PD, with GA's GMTI mode averaging only a [REDACTED] percent PD.
   Tr. at I/322, II/169; Analysis Report for GA SAR/GMTI LRIP Source
   Selection Flight Test at 24. GA did include in its proposal a summary data
   table listing 7 prior SDD test flights, in 6 of which the tested system
   reportedly demonstrated a PD in excess of the Band A requirement here for
   an 85 percent PD. GA Technical Proposal at 36/37. However, the agency
   determined, and GA has not shown otherwise, that GA failed to furnish a
   sufficient description of the test flights and explanation showing how the
   claimed PDs were calculated; as a result, the test results could not serve
   as substantiation for GA's Product Specification PD. Indeed, GA's failure
   to show how the prior test flight PDs were calculated was considered
   especially significant by the agency since, on prior occasions, GA had
   claimed higher PDs than the agency's own calculations had indicated. TR at
   II/34-II/35, II/159-II/169.

   We conclude that the agency reasonably determined that GA's proposal
   failed to substantiate compliance with required Band A GMTI PD.

   GMTI Minimum Detectable Velocity/Velocity Ambiguity

   The record indicates that, in general, the difficulty in detecting a
   target with a GMTI system increases the slower the target is moving and
   the faster the air vehicle is moving. Tr. at I/95-I/100, I/325,
   II/40-II/41 II/172-II/173. In this regard, the solicitation PBS
   established a mandatory Band A requirement that the GMTI probability of
   detection requirements, which include a Band A 85 percent GMTI PD
   requirement, be met for targets with a radial velocity--a measurement of
   target velocity toward or away from the radar--of between 10 kilometers
   per hour (kph) (approximately 2.78 meters/second (m/s)) and 70 kph (19.4
   m/s). Tr. II/38-II/40, II/170. Further, the PBS required that measurement
   of the velocity of the target, and thus the report to the consumer of the
   radar intelligence, not be ambiguous or incorrect within the required
   range of target velocity. Specifically, the PBS provided as follows:

     The Payload shall be capable of meeting probability-of-detection
     requirements for targets moving at radial speeds between 10 kph and 70
     kph (Band A), 4 kph and 120 kph (Band C) at all look-angles, within the
     radar look angle envelope, measured relative to the AV's velocity
     vector. The detected speeds must also be unambiguous within the proposed
     range.

   PBS sect. 3.3.4.1.1, GMTI-Detectable Velocities.

   GA provided in its Product Specification as follows regarding this
   requirement:

     For AV [air vehicle] velocities of [REDACTED] kph, the payload shall be
     capable of meeting probability-of-detection requirements for targets
     moving at radial speeds between 10 kph and 70 kph at all look-angles,
     within the radar look angle envelope, measured relative to the AV's
     velocity vector. The detected speeds must also be unambiguous within the
     proposed range.

   GA Product Specification sect. 3.3.4.1.1.

   The agency determined that because GA's Product Specification on its face
   only obligated GA to meet the GMTI PD requirement for the required range
   of target velocity when the air vehicle was moving at the single velocity
   of [REDACTED] kph, GA had unacceptably qualified its obligation under the
   PBS to meet PD requirements for targets moving at radial speeds between 10
   kph and 70 kph. We find the agency's determination of noncompliance in
   this regard to be reasonable since GA has pointed to nothing in the PBS
   that limited the GMTI PD requirement to instances where the air vehicle
   was moving at a velocity of [REDACTED] kph. Tr. at I/97-II/100.[4]

   Furthermore, the agency determined that GA had failed to substantiate its
   performance over the entire required range of target velocity.
   Specifically, during the source selection test flight, the minimum
   detectable target velocity demonstrated by GA's GMTI mode was [REDACTED]
   m/s ([REDACTED] kph), significantly in excess of the mandatory minimum of
   approximately 2.78 m/s (10 kph). Analysis Report for GA SAR/GMTI LRIP
   Source Selection Flight Test at 24. Although in the course of this protest
   GA has explained that its failure during the source selection flight test
   to meet the lower end of the required target velocity range was simply the
   result of a radar setting by the GA radar operator, Tr. at II/335-II/338,
   GA has made no showing that this explanation was apparent from GA's
   proposal. In any case, we agree with the agency that GA's explanation is
   undermined by the fact that GA's technical proposal included a summary
   data table listing seven prior SDD test flights, all of which were shown
   as having a minimum detectable velocity of [REDACTED] m/s, and the fact
   that GA also included in its proposal two videos of SDD GMTI data
   collection that indicate a minimum detectable velocity of [REDACTED] m/s
   or greater. GA Technical Proposal at 36/37; Tr. at II/40-II/42,
   II/171-II/186; Agency Comments, Mar. 17, 2008, at 9. Moreover, the agency
   determined, and GA's director of radar programs for reconnaissance systems
   conceded in his testimony, that there was no description in its proposal
   of how it would meet the minimum detectable velocity requirement. Tr. at
   II/411.

   In these circumstances, where the difficulty in detecting a target with a
   GMTI system increases the slower the target is moving and the faster the
   air vehicle is moving; GA appeared to impose a significant limit (through
   a restriction on air vehicle speed) in its Product Specification on its
   obligation to meet the 85 percent PD requirement; and the data from both
   its source selection flight test and prior flight tests all indicated a
   minimum detectable velocity of no less than [REDACTED] m/s, we think the
   agency reasonably determined that GA's GMTI mode appeared to have a "hard
   limit" of [REDACTED] m/s, and thus was noncompliant with the mandatory
   Band A minimum detectable velocity of approximately 2.78 m/s (10 kph). Tr.
   at II/41; Analysis Report for GA SAR/GMTI LRIP Source Selection Flight
   Test at 25.

   Further, in addition to the apparent inability of GA's GMTI to meet the
   mandatory Band A requirements with respect to minimum detectable velocity,
   the agency observed that the performance of GA's GMTI mode during the
   source selection flight test failed to meet the Band A requirement that
   the detected speeds be unambiguous, that is, accurately reported, within
   the proposed range of target speeds. Specifically, while GA proposed to
   meet (in some limited circumstances) the mandatory Band A PBS requirement
   that the GMTI mode be capable of meeting PD requirements for targets
   moving at radial speeds between 10 kph (approximately 2.78 meters/second
   (m/s)) and 70 kph (19.4 m/s), the test reports indicate that the detected
   speeds were unambiguous only up to a maximum of approximately
   [REDACTED] kph ([REDACTED] m/s), and thus fell short of meeting the
   requirement that they be unambiguous up to 70 kph (19.4 m/s). PBS
   3.3.4.1.1, GMTI-Detectable Velocities; Analysis Report for GA SAR/GMTI
   LRIP Source Selection Flight Test at 30. Moreover, the agency determined,
   and GA has not shown otherwise, that GA's proposal did not explain how GA
   would address the ambiguity problem. Tr. at II/186. The results of the
   flight test indicated to the agency that there may also be a hard upper
   limit to the possible radar performance in this regard, perhaps related to
   the radar's [REDACTED]. Tr. at I/326-I/329, II/46-II/47. GA has not shown
   this conclusion was unreasonable, given the information available to the
   agency in its proposal.

   In summary, we find that the agency reasonably determined both that GA had
   failed to substantiate the compliance of its GMTI mode with the mandatory
   Band A minimum detectable velocity and velocity ambiguity requirements,
   and that the information in GA's proposal reasonably called into question
   whether it would in fact meet those requirements.

   Basic Radar Data

   Based on its review of GA's proposal, the agency determined that GA
   generally had failed to furnish basic radar design parameters, detailed
   hardware and software design configurations, details on radar modes, and
   test data, modeling and analysis sufficient to permit the agency to
   understand how GA's radar would perform over the range of expected actual
   operating conditions. The agency concluded that, in the absence of
   sufficient basic radar information, it could not adequately understand how
   GA's proposed system was likely to perform, and thus was unable to
   independently validate many of GA's claimed capabilities.

   GA maintains that there was no solicitation requirement that offerors
   furnish basic radar parameters. We disagree. The solicitation required
   offerors to "deliver sample imagery and describe existing analysis, test
   data, and/or empirical data that substantiate the SAR/GMTI performance,
   environmental qualification, and reliability claims for the proposed
   system." RFP sect. L.2.2.1.1.4. Further, where the offeror lacked "actual
   test or usage data" substantiating the performance of its system, it was
   required to "address how other techniques (modeling, analysis, etc.)
   provide the Government with confidence to verify the Offeror's claims."
   Id. Since GA lacked sufficient test data to substantiate its compliance
   with all of the mandatory Band A requirements, GA was required by these
   provisions to furnish modeling and analysis to substantiate its system's
   compliance with the PBS requirements. The agency found, and GA's director
   of radar programs for reconnaissance systems conceded in his testimony,
   that GA's proposal did not include detailed modeling or analysis of its
   system's performance. Tr. at II/384-II/385.

   GA nevertheless asserts that section four of its proposal (Supporting
   Documentation), included "all or most" of the basic radar information
   necessary to allow the agency to do an analysis of GA's system. GA
   Comments, Mar. 17, 2008, at 3. According to GA, a subject matter expert
   could "develop assumptions on the design"; "make an approximation of the
   antenna pattern assuming good design practices"; assume that GA used a
   particular one of the number of available weighting functions in order to
   reduce sidelobe signal levels; and otherwise make assumptions or derive
   information such that a subject matter expert "could establish a first
   order approximation of the predicted performance" of the GA system. GA
   Comments, Mar. 12, 2008, at 3-6.

   In fact, however, the agency's radar subject matter experts at the Georgia
   Tech Research Institute were unable to model the theoretical performance
   of GA's SAR/GMTI radar system due to the lack of basic radar design
   information in GA's proposal. Tr. at II/93-II/94. Given GA's concession
   that it's proposal did not include such details as the radio frequency and
   signal processing losses at each stage of the processing of the radar
   signals, GA Comments, Mar. 12, 2008, at 3; given the various assumptions
   GA agrees a subject matter expert would need to make in order to model
   system performance; and given the fact that, at best, GA claims only that
   "a first order approximation of the predicted performance" could be
   obtained, we find no basis to question either the determination by the
   Georgia Tech Research Institute radar subject matter experts that they
   could not adequately model the theoretical performance of GA's SAR/GMTI
   radar system, or the conclusions of the agency's own radar experts that
   there was insufficient basic radar information about GA's system to permit
   them to independently validate many of GA's claimed capabilities. In any
   case, it is an offeror's responsibility to submit a well-written proposal,
   with adequately detailed information, that clearly demonstrates compliance
   with the solicitation requirements and allows a meaningful review by the
   procuring agency. CACI Techs., Inc., B-296946, Oct. 27, 2005, 2005 CPD
   para. 198 at 5; Ace Info. Solutions, Inc., B-295450.2, Mar. 7, 2005, 2005
   CPD para. 75 at 8. Where, as here, an offer does not affirmatively
   demonstrate compliance with mandatory requirements, the offeror risks
   rejection of its proposal. HDL Research Lab, Inc., B-294959, Dec. 21,
   2004, 2005 CPD para. 8 at 5.

   We conclude that the Army reasonably determined that GA's proposal failed
   to substantiate compliance with, and/or took exception to the required
   levels of performance with respect to significant mandatory Band A
   requirements. Further, given the significant deficiencies in GA's
   proposal, and the reasonable determination on the part of the agency that
   some of these deficiencies resulted from fundamental limitations on the
   performance of GA's proposed system, or otherwise would require a major
   rewrite to correct, the agency reasonably excluded GA's proposal from the
   competitive range.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] Our Office conducted a hearing in this matter.

   [2] The source selection evaluation plan provided that an "unacceptable"
   rating was warranted where a proposal "contains a major error(s),
   omission(s) or deficiency(ies) that indicates a lack of understanding of
   the problems or an approach that cannot be expected to meet requirements
   or involves a very high risk; and none of these conditions can be
   corrected without a major rewrite or revision of the proposal." Source
   Selection Evaluation Plan for the SAR/GMTI Production Procurement at
   34-35.

   [3] The record indicates that the agency was of the view that an offeror
   was required under the solicitation to substantiate the level of
   performance proposed by the offeror, whether that level of performance
   simply met the mandatory Band A minimum requirements or exceeded those
   requirements. Tr. at I/115-I/116, II/224-II/226. However, whether or not
   an offeror's failure to substantiate a claimed level of performance in
   excess of the mandatory Band A minimum would under the solicitation itself
   warrant a deficiency, it is clear from the record, as discussed below,
   that GA's proposal in fact failed to substantiate its compliance with
   and/or took exception to a number of significant, mandatory Band A levels
   of performance.

   [4] In this regard, we note that the desired (but not mandatory) Band C
   requirement was that "[t]he radar-payload GMTI-Mode shall not exhibit
   degraded performance at AV ground speeds less than or equal to 67 m/s,"
   that is, at less than or equal to 241.2 kph. PBS sect. 3.6.2, Ground
   Speed. Thus, it is clear from the PBS that the agency anticipated that the
   air vehicle may be employed at speeds well in excess of [REDACTED] kph.