TITLE: B-310553, Comprehensive Health Services, Inc., December 27, 2007
BNUMBER: B-310553
DATE: December 27, 2007
****************************************************************
B-310553, Comprehensive Health Services, Inc., December 27, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Comprehensive Health Services, Inc.

   File: B-310553

   Date: December 27, 2007

   L. James D'Agostino, Esq., and Richard L. Moorhouse, Esq., Greenberg
   Traurig, LLP, for the protester.

   Agnes P. Dover, Esq., Todd R. Overman, Esq., and Andrew C. Ertley, Esq.,
   Hogan & Hartson LLP, for Logistic Health, Inc., an intervenor.

   MAJ Carla T. Peters, Department of the Army, for the agency.

   Paul E. Jordan, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Evaluation of protester's technical proposal was unobjectionable where,
   after discussions, agency reasonably determined that protester failed to
   correct identified weaknesses in technical approach; in particular,
   downgrading based on loss of proposed subcontractor after proposal
   submission was reasonable where loss of subcontractor reasonably was found
   to significantly impact protester's ability to provide certain health care
   specialists.

   2. Agency reasonably determined that awardee's loss of proposed
   subcontractor after proposal submission did not warrant downgrading
   proposal--despite assessing weakness and revising strength associated with
   subcontractor in initial evaluation--where agency reasonably concluded
   that loss of subcontractor was not significant in light of awardee's
   substantial other proposed resources.

   3. Agency provided meaningful discussions where, in response to failure of
   protester's initial proposal to address all statement of work
   requirements, it asked protester to describe and more fully explain
   identified processes, thereby leading protester into areas of its proposal
   that required amplification.

   4. Agency's evaluation of awardee's price as reasonable was
   unobjectionable where evaluation was based on comparison of prices
   received and comparison of individual line item prices to independent
   government cost estimates (IGCE) for low and high ranges of estimated
   costs, and awardee's price--though higher than average IGCE--was lower
   than high range IGCE.

   DECISION

   Comprehensive Health Services, Inc. (CHS) protests the award of a contract
   to Logistic Health, Inc. (LHI) under request for proposals (RFP)
   No. WX81XWH-07-R-0021, issued by the Department of the Army for health
   readiness support services to be furnished to all Department of Defense
   service components. CHS challenges the technical and price evaluations,
   the adequacy of discussions, and the price/technical tradeoff
   determination.

   We deny the protest.

   The RFP sought proposals to support the Reserve Health Readiness Program
   (RHRP), under which reserve military personnel are provided medical and
   dental support services. The RHRP follows a predecessor program known as
   the Federal Strategic Health Alliance (FEDS_HEAL). RHRP services include
   immunizations; physical examinations; periodic health assessments (PHA);
   post deployment health re-assessments (PDHRA); dental examinations,
   x-rays, and treatment; laboratory services; occupational health services;
   and other services as required. The RFP contemplated the award of an
   indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract for a 1-year base
   period, with 4 option years.

   Proposals were to be evaluated for "best value" on the basis of five
   factors (the first three of which included subfactors)--(1) technical
   approach--PHA; (2) technical approach--PDHRA; (3) corporate and management
   capabilities; (4) past performance; and (5) price. Factors 1 and 2 were of
   equal weight and were considered more important than factors 3 and 4,
   which were of equal weight. The non-price factors were rated on an
   adjectival basis (exceptional, good, acceptable, marginal, unacceptable,
   or, for past performance only, neutral ) and, combined, were significantly
   more important than price. Price was to be evaluated for completeness,
   reasonableness, and to ensure offerors understood the RFP's scope of work.

   Three offerors, including CHS and LHI, submitted proposals, which were
   evaluated by a source selection evaluation board (SSEB). After the initial
   evaluation, only CHS's and LHI's proposals were included in the
   competitive range, and discussions were conducted with both. Both CHS and
   LHI had a proposed subcontractor withdraw from their proposals after
   initial proposals were submitted. Each addressed this change in its final
   proposal revision (FPR), and the SSEB considered the changes in its final
   consensus evaluation, the ratings under which were as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                   |CHS              |LHI               |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Factor 1: Technical App. PHA       |Good             |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |General requirements               |Good             |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Individual medical readiness       |Good             |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Additional services                |Acceptable       |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Factor 2: Technical App. PDHRA     |Acceptable       |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Understanding requirements         |Acceptable       |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |General requirements               |Acceptable       |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Factor 3: Corporate/Management     |Acceptable       |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Program management                 |Acceptable       |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Quality control plan               |Good             |Exceptional       |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Transition plan                    |Acceptable       |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Past Performance                   |Acceptable       |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |          Overall Rating           |Acceptable       |Good              |
   |-----------------------------------+-----------------+------------------|
   |Price                              |$706,953,207     |$784,474,334      |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Based on the SSEB's evaluation report, the source selection advisory
   council (SSAC) recommended award to LHI as the best value based on its
   technically superior proposal. After reviewing and independently analyzing
   the various evaluation reports and the SSAC's award recommendation, the
   source selection authority (SSA) concluded that the benefits offered by
   LHI's proposal indeed outweighed its higher price. The agency thus made
   award to LHI. After a written debriefing, CHS filed this protest.^[1]

   TECHNICAL EVALUATION

   CHS's Proposal

   CHS asserts that the evaluation was flawed because the agency improperly
   failed to remove various weaknesses after CHS addressed them in its
   discussion responses. The protester maintains that eliminating these
   weaknesses would have increased its ratings under the affected factors
   from acceptable to good.

   In considering a protest of an agency's proposal evaluation, our review is
   confined to determining whether the evaluation was reasonable and
   consistent with the terms of the solicitation and applicable statutes and
   regulations. United Def. LP, B-286925.3 et al., Apr. 9, 2001, 2001 CPD
   para. 75 at 10-11.

   The evaluation here was unobjectionable. For example, under the subfactor
   understanding PDHRA requirements (under the technical approach--PDHRA
   factor), proposals were evaluated on the offeror's ability to deliver,
   schedule, and process all required PDHRA screenings. The PDHRA program is
   an outreach, assessment, and referral program, the purpose of which is to
   proactively identify health concerns that emerge over time following
   operational deployments, and include both physical and behavioral health
   needs. Performance Based Statement of Work (PBSOW) sect. 2.2.4. CHS's
   initial proposal received a strength under this subfactor based on its
   proposal of a network that included [deleted] behavioral health providers
   (BHP) with expertise in early identification of traumatic stress, post
   traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and traumatic brain injury. Agency
   Report (AR), Tab 13, at 23. However, after one of CHS's subcontractors
   withdrew from its teaming agreement, the protester's FPR stated that this
   network was reduced to [deleted] BHPs; based on this information, the SSEB
   eliminated the original strength and added a weakness under this subfactor
   to reflect the low number of BHPs. In assigning this weakness, the SSEB
   noted that CHS now lacked BHPs in [deleted] and had only [deleted] BHPs in
   three other states. AR, Tab 34, at 11. The agency considered this a
   significant weakness in that it reflected a reduced capability to perform
   PDHRAs, and this resulted in the lowering of CHS's rating from good to
   acceptable for this subfactor and factor. Id.

   CHS maintains that its proposal should not have been downgraded because
   its FPR advised the agency that the firm had engaged another
   subcontractor, as well as several professional staffing agencies, to
   handle staffing gaps in all locations. CHS FPR Cover Letter. However,
   notwithstanding these arrangements, the agency notes that CHS's failure to
   identify any coverage in [deleted] rendered its proposal noncompliant with
   the RFP's requirements. Contracting Officer's Statement at 7. The agency
   further notes that three of the four replacement agencies were already
   mentioned in CHS's initial proposal, and states that it found that the
   replacements introduced a new element of risk in the proposal. AR, Tab 35,
   at 4. In view of the significance of the change in CHS's BHP coverage,
   including the failure to provide coverage in [deleted], we think the
   agency reasonably could find that the changed coverage constituted a
   significant weakness in CHS's proposal.[2]

   As another example, the agency's evaluation of CHS's proposal under
   subfactor 3.1--program management--was unobjectionable. Under this
   subfactor, offerors' ability to organize, plan, report, prioritize,
   schedule work, and exercise project control was to be evaluated. RFP at
   96. Offerors were instructed to describe how they envisioned daily
   interaction and communication with the service components (SC) and
   contracting officer's representative. RFP sect. L.4.3.1. The scope of the
   PBSOW (RFP sect. C.1.1) included provision of health readiness support
   services to the SCs, including reserve and active components, and task 6
   (information technology) required contractor interfaces with the different
   SC databases (RFP sect. C.2.2.6.2). In the initial evaluation, the agency
   criticized CHS's proposal for being "highly Army-centric" based on its
   references to daily interfacing with Army Reserve and National Guard
   leadership, and the absence of any mention of how CHS would interface with
   the other SCs--Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps--covered by this
   procurement. Contracting Officer's Statement at 8; AR, Tab 13, at 25. The
   SSEB noted that there was no discussion of the Navy's primary deployment
   health website where PDHRAs are done for Navy and Marine personnel. AR,
   Tab 13, at 25. During discussions, the agency specifically asked CHS how
   its Army-centric approach applied to all SCs. Tab 19. In its response
   addressing the agency's concerns, CHS explained that it focused on the
   Army because of the number of Army-specific RFP requirements, and that it
   did not intend to be Army-centric. CHS FPR at I-19. In addition to
   referencing the scheduling and tracking systems to be used in support, CHS
   stated that it would work closely with each SC and referenced its
   replacement of an Army officer with an Air Force officer on its board of
   advisors, which already included a Navy representative. Id.; CHS FPR at
   III-5.

   CHS maintains that the agency should have concluded that the role its
   board members "would almost certainly play in ensuring that [its]
   performance . . . was fully responsive to all service agency
   requirements." CHS Comments at 11. However, the SSEB found that CHS's
   discussion response was too general in nature; it spoke to the firm's
   intent to be customer-centric without including sufficiently specific
   information demonstrating a familiarity with the other SCs and how it
   would work with them. We find that the agency's concerns that remained
   following discussions were consistent with the evaluation scheme, and CHS
   has not established that those concerns were unreasonable. In particular,
   the agency reasonably could find that simply including an Air Force
   officer on the board of advisors, without more specific information in its
   proposal addressing the agency's "Army-centric" concern, was not
   sufficient to overcome that concern. We conclude that the agency
   reasonably determined that this weakness remained after discussions, and
   reasonably considered it in evaluating CHS's proposal.

   As a final example, under factor 3--corporate and management
   capabilities--proposals were evaluated in part on offerors' proposed
   transition plan, including separate treatment of incoming and outgoing
   transitions. RFP sect. L.4.3.3. Among other requirements, proposals were
   to include a list of three recent healthcare-related transitions of
   similar size and scope, along with a brief description of the work
   performed, transition timeframe, and customer point of contact. Id. CHS's
   initial proposal identified three recent transitions, but the evaluators
   assessed a weakness because two of the three were not transitions from
   incumbent contractors but, rather, were situations where the firm had
   expanded its client base within the same group of services or services for
   the same customer agency. AR, Tab 13, at 26. In discussions, the agency
   asked CHS to provide descriptions of two transitions from another vendor
   to CHS for programs similar to RHRP's scope and size. AR, Tab 19, at 1.
   While CHS provided two additional transition examples, the agency found
   that one actually had been included in the original proposal and did not
   appear to reflect a transition from another vendor, and that the other was
   much smaller in scope and size than the effort here. AR, Tab 33, at 19-20.
   As a result, the SSEB left the weakness in place in its final evaluation.

   CHS asserts that the weakness was improperly assessed, but does not
   directly challenge the agency's evaluation of its transition examples.
   Instead, it argues that the agency improperly focused on transitions from
   other vendors and asserts that the agency overlooked or gave little credit
   for its thorough treatment of transitions in its FPR. This argument is
   without merit. CHS's transition plan was required to address incoming
   transitions, i.e. from another vendor to CHS, and its examples
   undisputedly fell short of establishing that experience for efforts of
   similar size and scope. This being the case, the agency reasonably
   assigned a weakness in this area. Moreover, with regard to the balance of
   CHS's transition plan, there is no indication that the agency ignored or
   gave too little weight to the firm's FPR. In this regard, the agency
   assigned the plan an acceptable rating overall under this subfactor, which
   included a strength for its transition team, and a finding that CHS's FPR
   corrected a weakness on key decision points and exit criteria. AR, Tab 33,
   at 19.

   LHI's Proposal

   CHS asserts that the evaluation of LHI's proposal unreasonably failed to
   take into account the impact of LHI's loss of a subcontractor. In this
   regard, CHS notes that the originally proposed subcontractor was
   responsible for some [deleted] PBSOW work allocation areas and accounted
   for approximately [deleted] health care providers (HCP). In the
   protester's view, LHI's proposal should have been downgraded based on its
   loss of this subcontractor.

   This argument is without merit. The record shows that the agency was fully
   aware of LHI's loss of the subcontractor in question and the resultant
   effect on LHI's proposed staffing, but found that the loss did not
   significantly impact the firm's initial rating. Contracting Officer's
   Statement at 11. In this regard, LHI's initial proposal was rated
   exceptional under the understanding the requirement subfactor under factor
   2 based on six evaluated strengths and no weaknesses or deficiencies. One
   of the strengths was assigned based on LHI's proposal of more than
   [deleted] HCPs, with [deleted] BHPs throughout all service areas, and
   [deleted] on-site PDHRA teams, all of which improved the scheduling of
   events, timely assessment of service members, and efficient use of
   resources. AR, Tab 13, at 14. In the final evaluation, the agency still
   considered these proposed resources to be a strength; although the loss of
   its subcontractor resulted in a reduction of [deleted] in the number of
   proposed HCPs, LHI still had more than [deleted] providers to cover
   requirements. See AR, Tab 33, at 6. Since the record shows that the
   remaining teams and providers that led the agency to assign this strength
   were unaffected, and the five other original strengths were unchanged, we
   find nothing unreasonable in the agency's determination that LHI's rating
   under this subfactor should not be lowered.

   Similarly, under the factor 1 subfactor PHA general requirements, LHI's
   proposal received an initial rating of good based on eight evaluated
   strengths and three weaknesses. AR, Tab 13, at 12. Following discussions,
   LHI was found to have corrected one weakness and partially corrected the
   other two. In the final evaluation, the agency noted the loss of the
   subcontractor and added a third weakness. The agency did not lower LHI's
   rating under the subfactor, however, because it determined that the loss
   of the subcontractor did not significantly impact the previous rating.
   Contracting Officer's Statement at 11. Further, the record shows that,
   although [deleted] work allocation areas under the PBSOW had been
   identified as the responsibility of the subcontractor, LHI had
   consistently identified [deleted] as responsible for all PBSOW areas, and
   two of its other proposed subcontractors as responsible for [deleted] of
   the areas as well. LHI Initial Proposal and FPR at 6. In view of LHI's and
   its other subcontractors' coverage of all work allocation areas and the
   remaining strengths and corrected weaknesses, the agency reasonably
   determined that LHI's rating under this subfactor should not be lowered.

   MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS

   CHS asserts that the agency failed to provide it with meaningful
   discussions regarding weaknesses under factor 1--technical approach PHA.
   It maintains that the agency's discussion questions regarding vaccines,
   cardiovascular screening, and phlebotomy services did not reasonably alert
   the firm to the specific issues of concern to the agency.

   When an agency engages in discussions with an offeror, the discussions
   must be meaningful, that is, must lead the offeror into the areas of its
   proposal that require correction or amplification. Hanford Envtl. Health
   Found., B-292858.2, B-292858.5, Apr. 7, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 164 at 8. An
   agency need not "spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and every item that
   must be revised or addressed to improve the submission. Arctic Slope World
   Servs., Inc., B-284481, B-284481.2, Apr. 27, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 75 at 9.

   The discussions here were meaningful. For example, the agency asked CHS to
   describe its processes for minimizing vaccine waste and cost. CHS states
   that it understood the agency's area of concern to be the treatment of
   expired vaccines, and asserts that the agency was required to clearly
   state that its concern was with recovery of unused vaccines. We disagree.
   The recovery of unused vaccines clearly is directly related to the
   agency's discussion question focusing on minimizing vaccine waste and
   cost. As another example, the PBSOW established requirements for
   cardiovascular screening based on various parameters, such as screening
   for all service members age 40 and above in the Army Reserve and National
   Guard (sect. C.2.2.2.4.5), and for Navy and Marine Reserve personnel,
   screening for males at age 35 and females at age 45 (sect. C.2.2.2.4.6).
   CHS's initial proposal only identified screening for service members
   [deleted], and the agency thus asked CHS to more fully explain its
   proposed program for cardiovascular screening. In its FPR, CHS failed to
   address the differing Navy and Marine requirements. In light of the
   specific identification of the differing requirements for cardiovascular
   screening among the different SCs in the RFP, and CHS's responsibility for
   addressing all PBSOW requirements in its proposal, the agency's discussion
   question was sufficient to draw the firm's attention to the area of its
   proposal needing amplification.

   PRICE EVALUATION

   CHS asserts that the agency failed to properly evaluate LHI's price for
   reasonableness. Specifically, CHS notes that more than 100 of LHI's
   individual medical procedure prices exceeded the agency's independent
   government cost estimates (IGCE), and that LHI's overall price exceeds the
   agency's average IGCE.

   Where, as here, a solicitation provides for award of a fixed-price
   contract--under which the government's liability is fixed and the
   contractor bears the risk and responsibility for the actual costs of
   performance--the agency need only evaluate an offeror's price for fairness
   and reasonableness. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
   sections 15.402(a), 15.404-1(a); SAMS El Segundo, LLC, B-291620.3, Feb.
   25, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 48 at 8. Agencies may use various price analysis
   techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price, including
   the comparison of proposed prices received in response to the solicitation
   and comparison with an IGCE. FAR sect. 15.404-1(b)(2)(i), (v). Agencies
   may rely upon adequate price competition alone to assess price
   reasonableness. MVM, Inc., B-290726 et al., Sept. 23, 2002, 2002 CPD
   para. 167 at 6. A price reasonableness determination is a matter of
   administrative discretion involving the exercise of business judgment by
   the contracting officer that we will question only where it is
   unreasonable. The Right One Co., B-290751.8, Dec. 9, 2002, 2002 CPD
   para. 214 at 5.

   The price reasonableness evaluation here, based on adequate price
   competition and a comparison of prices with the agency IGCEs, complied
   with the RFP's requirements and was unobjectionable. The RFP provided that
   price was to be evaluated for completeness and reasonableness and to
   ensure that the offeror understood the scope of work. RFP at 97. In
   evaluating offerors' prices, the agency compared each offeror's individual
   line item prices to those of the other offerors and to the agency's IGCEs,
   which represented both the low and high range of estimated costs for each
   medical and dental procedure.[3] LHI's initial overall price was
   approximately 19 percent higher than the average IGCE, and CHS's
   approximately 2 percent higher, and the agency found that both prices were
   reasonable based on adequate price competition and its conclusion that the
   prices were within a reasonable range of the average IGCE. AR, Tab 17, at
   3. In discussions, the agency requested both offerors to review their work
   scope and pricing for certain individual procedures whose prices were
   lower than the low range IGCE or higher than the high range IGCE. Both
   offerors changed some, but not all, identified prices, and also reduced
   their overall prices, resulting in LHI's price being 11.05 percent higher
   than the average IGCE, and CHS's 0.10 percent higher. AR, Tab 32,
   at 3-4, 8. The agency again found that there was adequate price
   competition, and that both offerors' overall prices were within a
   reasonable range of the average IGCE. While CHS asserts that LHI's price
   was too far above the average IGCE to be considered reasonable, as noted
   by the agency, LHI's price was lower than the agency's high range IGCE.
   Given this fact, we find no basis to object to the agency's price
   evaluation. CHS's disagreement with the agency's judgment does not make
   the evaluation unreasonable. Hughes Georgia, Inc., B-272526, Oct. 21,
   1996, 96-2 CPD para. 151 at 7.  [4]

   SOURCE SELECTION

   CHS asserts that the best value determination was flawed because there is
   no indication that the SSA considered and evaluated the significant price
   difference between the proposals in light of the closeness of their
   technical evaluation ratings--only one adjectival level apart. CHS
   maintains that such an analysis would result in a finding that its
   proposal represented the best value.

   Source selection officials have broad discretion in determining the manner
   and extent to which they will make use of the technical and price
   evaluation results; their judgments are governed only by the tests of
   rationality and consistency with the stated evaluation criteria. Chemical
   Demilitarization Assocs., B-277700, Nov. 13, 1997, 98-1 CPD para. 171 at
   6. Where, as here, the RFP allows for a price/technical tradeoff, the
   selection official retains discretion to select a higher-priced but
   technically higher-rated submission, if doing so is in the government's
   best interest and is consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation
   and source selection scheme. 4-D Neuroimaging, B-286155.2, B-286155.3,
   Oct. 10, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 183 at 10. The propriety of a tradeoff
   depends not on the mere difference in technical scores or ratings, but on
   the reasonableness of the source selection official's judgment concerning
   the significance of the difference. Digital Sys. Group, Inc., B-286931,
   B-286931.2, Mar. 7, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 50 at 7.

   The tradeoff here was reasonable. While the decision document did not list
   the specific differences between the proposals or the dollar amount of the
   price difference, it is clear from the record that the SSA considered them
   prior to making her decision. In this regard, the SSA's decision states
   that she reviewed the SSEB consensus report, the SSEB chairperson's
   report, and the SSAC's recommendation memorandum. AR, Tab 36. These
   reports identify the various strengths and weaknesses of the competing
   proposals and provide detailed information that goes well beyond the
   proposals' adjectival ratings. In this regard, the SSAC's recommendation
   includes a chart that details each offeror's different prices for the
   various line items and totals, as well as individual and total percentage
   differences between their prices and the average and high IGCEs. AR, Tab
   35, at 2. The technical differences in the proposals were further
   discussed in the SSAC's recommendation, which identified six specific
   areas where LHI's proposal exceeded CHS's in terms of crucial aspects of
   the RHRP. For example, the SSAC noted LHI's more than [deleted] standard
   operating procedures (SOP) directly applicable to the RHRP, as compared to
   CHS's failure to mention any existing relevant SOPs; LHI's possession of
   [deleted] of the 58 required vaccine distribution licenses, as compared to
   CHS's proposal's silence on the subject; and differences in the
   identification and depth of experience of the offerors' respective
   management teams. Id. at 3-4. The SSAC also specifically noted each
   offeror's loss of a subcontractor, but noted the limited impact this had
   on LHI's proposal (continued provision of some [deleted] HCPs, including
   [deleted] BHPs) compared to CHS's [deleted] medical HCPs and
   "dramatically" reduced number of BHPs. Id. at 4. The SSAC noted that any
   interruption in or degradation of services would have a "disastrous
   effect" on the ability of the reserve forces to manage medical readiness,
   assess deployability, and deploy medically qualified SMs in the required
   numbers. Id. at 3. The SSAC found greater risks associated with award to
   CHS, despite its lower price, based on the identified differences in the
   proposals, and concluded that LHI's superior proposal with minimal
   performance risks outweighed its price premium.

   After applying a "rational and independent analysis of the reports and
   memorandum documenting the evaluation of each Offeror's proposal," the SSA
   concluded that the SSAC's recommendation for an award to LHI was proper
   and in the best interests of the government. AR Tab 36. She specifically
   noted the 10.94 percent price premium associated with LHI's proposal, but
   concluded that "the benefits offered by LHI outweigh the additional cost
   of contract performance." Id. The SSA also noted LHI's demonstrated
   successful provision of required medical readiness services over the past
   6 years. Id. Even though the SSA did not repeat the specific advantages,
   disadvantages, and relative risks associated with the competing proposals,
   since she was fully briefed on all of those matters, including the
   specific technical and price differences between the proposals, and she
   considered the underlying evaluation and recommendation record, we find
   nothing unreasonable in the SSA's best value determination. FAR
   sect. 15.308 (SSA may use reports and analyses prepared by others and
   documentation need not quantify the tradeoffs that led to decision).

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] CHS challenges the agency's award on numerous bases. We have
   considered them all and find that they have no merit or did not prejudice
   the protester. This decision addresses CHS's most significant arguments.

   [2] CHS also asserts that the agency improperly double-counted its
   subcontractor loss by also considering it under factor 3--corporate and
   management capabilities. However, an agency properly may consider an
   element of a proposal under more than one evaluation criterion, so long as
   the element is reasonably related to all criteria under which it is
   considered. RAMCOR Servs. Group, Inc., B-276633.2 et al., Mar. 23, 1998,
   98-1 CPD para. 121 at 9. CHS's proposal originally was assigned a strength
   under the factor 3 program management subfactor because the subcontractor
   it proposed had worked with TRICARE and, the agency concluded, would bring
   knowledge of that resource's capability to meet service members' needs.
   AR, Tab 13, at 24. With the loss of that subcontractor, the agency
   eliminated the strength. Since the subcontractor was relevant to CHS's
   proposal under both factors, the agency properly considered the loss of
   the subcontractor under both factors.

   [3] The IGCEs were based on historical data, Champus Maximum Charge rates,
   the Medicare Economic Index, and future projections of utilization of RHRP
   services. AR, Tab 17 at 3.

   [4] In challenging the agency's reasonableness determination, CHS also
   points to the fact that LHI's FPR included some 113--out of 241
   total--procedure prices that were higher than the high range IGCEs for
   those individual procedures. However, the agency was fully aware of these
   high prices and ultimately decided that the fact that LHI's total price
   was within the range of the low and high IGCE, rather than the individual
   prices, was determinative. This was within the agency's discretion. In any
   event, the agency found that CHS also proposed a significant number--81 in
   its FPR--of individual procedure prices that exceeded the high range
   IGCEs. It thus does not appear that CHS was prejudiced by any flaw in the
   agency's evaluation. McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD
   para. 54 at 3 (GAO will not sustain a protest unless the protester
   demonstrates a reasonable possibility that it was prejudiced by the
   agency's actions); see Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577,
   1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).