TITLE: B-309964; B-309964.2, ITT Industries Space Systems, LLC, November 9, 2007
BNUMBER: B-309964; B-309964.2
DATE: November 9, 2007
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B-309964; B-309964.2, ITT Industries Space Systems, LLC, November 9, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: ITT Industries Space Systems, LLC

   File: B-309964; B-309964.2

   Date: November 9, 2007

   Kevin P. Connelly, Esq., Joseph J. Dyer, Esq., Grace Bateman, Esq., Jon B.
   Crocker, Esq., Heather L. Pitz, Esq., and Amanda B. Weiner, Esq., Seyfarth
   Shaw LLP, for the protester.

   Scott Arnold, Esq., Bradley Wine, Esq., Joseph Berger, Esq., Austin Fulk,
   Esq., and Justin A. Chiarodo, Esq., Dickstein Shapiro LLP, for Ball
   Aerospace & Technologies Corp., an intervenor.

   Vincent A. Salgado, Esq., James T. Mahoney, Esq., Daniel Hymer, Esq., and
   Laura M. Giza, Esq., National Aeronautics and Space Administration, for
   the agency.

   Edward Goldstein, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protest challenging evaluation of proposals and source selection
   decision is denied where record demonstrates that the evaluation was
   reasonable and consistent with the solicitation, and protester's arguments
   amount to mere disagreement with agency's conclusions.

   2. Agency's failure to address Defense Contract Audit Agency qualification
   of audit results regarding awardee's cost proposal due to awardee's
   noncompliance with cost accounting standards was not prejudicial where
   agency demonstrated that awardee's noncompliance would not result in any
   increased costs to the government.

   DECISION

   ITT Industries Space Systems, LLC protests the award of a contract to Ball
   Aerospace & Technologies Corp. (BATC) under request for proposals (RFP)
   No. NNG07177439R, issued by the National Aeronautics and Space
   Administration (NASA) for the operational land imager instrument for the
   Landsat Data Continuity Mission. ITT argues that NASA improperly evaluated
   its proposal as well as that of the awardee, failed to conduct meaningful
   discussions with ITT, and, as a consequence, the award decision was
   flawed.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM) is an Earth-observing satellite
   program. Under this program a series of Landsat satellites have been
   collecting images of the Earth's surface since 1972 for a variety of uses,
   including land use planning, agricultural monitoring, and natural
   resources management. On January 9, 2007 NASA issued the subject RFP for
   the procurement of the LDCM's next generation Operational Land Imager
   (OLI) instrument--"a multispectral, reflective-band, imaging sensor,"
   which is intended for flight aboard a separately procured LDCM satellite.
   Contracting Officer's (CO) Statement at 3.

   The solicitation contemplates the award of a cost-plus-award-fee contract
   with a base period of performance of 52 months for the OLI instrument
   (including delivery of the OLI instrument within 39 months of contract
   award and integration of the instrument in the separately procured
   satellite), an additional 5 years of post-orbit sustaining engineering,
   plus five 1-year options for additional sustaining engineering. The RFP
   provided for award to the offeror submitting the proposal which was
   determined to represent the best value to the government. In making the
   best value determination, the RFP established a trade-off process in which
   NASA would evaluate and consider proposals with respect to three factors:
   mission suitability, cost, and past performance. The mission suitability
   factor was more important than either the cost or past performance
   factors, both of which were of equal importance. Moreover, the RFP
   specified that the cost factor was "significantly less important than the
   combined importance of the Mission Suitability Factor and the Past
   Performance Factor." RFP at 00197.

   Section M.4 of the solicitation identified five subfactors within the
   mission suitability factor. According to this section of the RFP, each
   subfactor was assigned a maximum numerical point value with a combined
   maximum value of 1,000 points as follows:

   A. Instrument Design Concept                                400 points

   B. Instrument Testing and Calibration Planning              250 points

   C. Management, Systems Engineering, Performance Assurance   250 points

   D. Safety and Health                                        50 points

   E. Small Disadvantaged Business Participation Program       50 points

   RFP at 00203.

   Regarding cost, section M.5 of the solicitation provided that NASA would
   evaluate offerors' proposed costs for reasonableness and realism, and that
   upward or downward adjustments might be made as a result of the agency's
   cost realism assessment, to include adjustments to an offeror's proposed
   direct and indirect costs. An offeror's proposed fee would not be
   adjusted, however, and all proposed fee amounts would be included in
   NASA's assessment of an offeror's most probable cost. The RFP further
   provided for adjustments to an offeror's mission suitability score if NASA
   was required to adjust an offeror's proposed cost by 21 percent or more
   when determining the offeror's most probable cost.

   For the purposes of evaluating offerors' past performance, the
   solicitation instructed offerors to provide information concerning all
   relevant contracts and subcontracts that they and their major
   subcontractors were then currently performing or had completed within the
   past 5 years. RFP at 00194. The RFP indicated that NASA's past performance
   evaluation would be based upon a consideration of an offeror's performance
   and the degree of relevance of the past performance as reflected in
   information contained in the offeror's proposal, customer questionnaires,
   and other references that NASA might contact for additional information.
   NASA would assign an offeror a rating of excellent, very good, good, fair,
   poor, or neutral based upon an assessment of its performance. According to
   the RFP, NASA would consider, among other things, an offeror's performance
   record with respect to technical issues, schedule, cost, management, and
   mission success. In assessing the relevance of an offeror's performance
   history, NASA indicated that it would assess the "degree" to which a prior
   contract was similar to the requirements of the solicitation with respect
   to size, content, and complexity. RFP at 00205.

   On February 23, NASA received timely proposals from two offerors (ITT and
   BATC) in response to the solicitation. NASA then constituted a source
   evaluation board (SEB), which conducted an initial evaluation of the
   offerors' proposals with respect to the three evaluation factors (mission
   suitability, past performance, and cost) and found that both offerors'
   proposals contained "weaknesses" as well as "significant weaknesses." In
   letters dated April 19, NASA sent ITT and BATC written discussion
   questions identifying the weaknesses and significant weaknesses identified
   by the SEB in its initial evaluation. In addition, the discussion letters
   provided that NASA would hold face-to-face meetings with ITT and BATC
   regarding the information contained in the written discussion letters and
   further indicated that the offerors should be prepared to discuss the
   information set forth in those letters. AR, Tab 24, ITT Discussions
   Letter, at 04206.

   After individually meeting with NASA, ITT and BATC timely submitted their
   final proposal revisions. The SEB's evaluation of the ITT and BATC
   proposals under the three evaluation factors is summarized as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |Offeror|  Mission  |  Mission  |Proposed Cost| Recommended  |   Past    |
   |       |Suitability|Suitability| Plus Award  |  Cost Plus   |Performance|
   |       |  Points   |  Rating   |     Fee     | Award Fee[1] |           |
   |-------+-----------+-----------+-------------+--------------+-----------|
   |BATC   |    847    | Very Good |$127,873,686 | $142,083,921 |   Good    |
   |-------+-----------+-----------+-------------+--------------+-----------|
   |ITT    |    660    |   Good    |$174,012,643 | $167,568,734 |   Good    |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   AR, Tab 45, SEB Final Report, at 07907.

   In its evaluation of ITT's proposal under the mission suitability factor,
   the SEB determined that ITT's proposal contained 13 strengths and 8
   weaknesses, with no significant strengths, significant weaknesses or
   deficiencies. BATC's "very good" rating under this factor was based on the
   SEB's finding that its proposal contained 2 significant strengths, 13
   strengths and 1 weakness, with no significant weaknesses or deficiencies.
   AR, Tab 45, SEB Final Report, at 07940, 07925. The detailed breakdown of
   the scores under the five mission suitability subfactors was as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |   Mission Suitability   | Points  |       BATC       |       ITT       |
   |         Factor          |Available|                  |                 |
   |-------------------------+---------+------------------+-----------------|
   |        Subfactor        |   Pts   | Adj |Score|Points|Adj |Score|Points|
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Subfactor A -- Instrument|   400   |Excel| 95  | 380  |Good| 65  | 260  |
   |Design Concept           |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Subfactor B -- Instrument|   250   |Excel| 97  |242.5 |Good| 70  | 175  |
   |Testing and Calibration  |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |Planning                 |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Subfactor C -Management, |   250   |Good | 65  |162.5 |Good| 70  | 175  |
   |Systems Eng'g,           |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |Performance Assurance    |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Subfactor D -- Safety and|   50    |Good | 60  |  30  |Good| 60  |  30  |
   |Health Plan              |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Subfactor E -- Small     |   50    |Good | 64  |  32  |Fair| 40  |  20  |
   |Disadvantaged Business   |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |(SDB) Participation      |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |Program                  |         |     |     |      |    |     |      |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Cost Realism Adjust      |         |     |     |  0   |    |     |  0   |
   |-------------------------+---------+-----+-----+------+----+-----+------|
   |Total                    |  1000   |Very |     | 847  |Good|     | 660  |
   |                         |         |Good |     |      |    |     |      |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   AR, Tab 45, SEB Final Report, at 07924.

   After the SEB presented its findings to the source selection authority
   (SSA), the SSA concluded that BATC's technically superior proposal with
   its lower probable cost was more advantageous to the government than the
   proposal submitted by ITT and decided to make award to BATC. This protest
   followed.

   ITT's protest raises numerous arguments challenging the agency's
   evaluation of proposals and the content and scope of its discussions with
   ITT. With respect to the cost factor, ITT contends that NASA's cost
   realism evaluation was flawed and that NASA's discussions regarding its
   costs were misleading and not meaningful. With regard to the past
   performance factor, ITT asserts that NASA's evaluation was flawed and
   reflected unequal treatment, and that the SSA's consideration of the
   offerors' past performance was not based upon a reasonable consideration
   of the past performance record for either ITT or BATC. Regarding the
   mission suitability factor, ITT raises numerous specific challenges
   concerning NASA's evaluation of its proposal, asserts that discussions
   regarding its weaknesses in many instances were not meaningful, and that
   NASA's evaluation of ITT's proposal in several instances evidences unequal
   treatment when compared to its consideration of BATC's proposal. As a
   final matter, ITT contends that the above issues resulted in NASA making a
   flawed award decision. Although we do not here specifically address all of
   ITT's arguments about the evaluation of proposals and other agency
   actions, we have fully considered all of them and find that they afford no
   basis to sustain the protest of the selection decision here.

   DISCUSSION

   Cost Evaluation

   When an agency evaluates a proposal for the award of a cost-reimbursement
   contract, as in this case, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not
   dispositive because, regardless of the costs proposed, the government is
   bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs. Federal
   Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sections 15.305(a)(1); 15.404-1(d); Tidewater
   Constr. Corp., B-278360, Jan. 20, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 103 at 4.
   Consequently, the agency must perform a cost realism analysis to determine
   the extent to which an offeror's proposed costs are realistic for the work
   to be performed. FAR sect. 15.404-1(d)(1). An agency is not required to
   conduct an in-depth cost analysis, see FAR sect. 15.404-1(c), or to verify
   each and every item in assessing cost realism; rather, the evaluation
   requires the exercise of informed judgment by the contracting agency.
   Cascade Gen., Inc., B-283872, Jan. 18, 2000, 2000 CPD para. 14 at 8.
   Further, an agency's cost realism analysis need not achieve scientific
   certainty; rather, the methodology employed must be reasonably adequate
   and provide some measure of confidence that the costs proposed are
   reasonable and realistic in view of other cost information reasonably
   available to the agency as of the time of its evaluation. See SGT, Inc.,
   B-294722.4, July 28, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 151 at 7; Metro Mach. Corp.,
   B-295744; B-295744.2, Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 112 at 10-11. Because
   the contracting agency is in the best position to make this determination,
   we review an agency's judgment in this area only to see that the agency's
   cost realism evaluation was reasonably based and not arbitrary. Hanford
   Envtl. Health Found., B-292858.2, B-292858.5, Apr. 7, 2004, 2004 CPD para.
   164 at 8-9.

   In order to facilitate the agency's cost evaluation, offerors were
   required to submit proposed cost estimate information (i.e., hours by
   labor category, subcontract cost information, and other direct costs) for
   many of the work elements (and specific sub-elements) that were, in the
   agency's view, "fundamental" to the OLI requirement. These were referred
   to as the "Work Breakdown Structure" (WBS). In performing its cost
   evaluation, the SEB considered each offeror's proposed technical approach
   and proposed cost estimates, which it compared to NASA's own estimates for
   each WBS. Based on the SEB's understanding of the requirements and the
   offeror's unique technical approach, the SEB calculated "recommended" or
   "probable" values for hours and ODCs. Utilizing this information, in
   conjunction with labor rate information submitted by the offerors, which
   was reviewed by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and adjusted
   based on recommendations from DCAA, as well as the offeror's fee, NASA
   calculated recommended total costs for BATC and ITT. AR at 7, AR, Tabs 19,
   20, 21, 41, and 44. Specifically, NASA made an upward adjustment to BATC's
   total proposed estimated cost, increasing it from $127,873,686 to
   $142,083,921 and made a downward adjustment to ITT's total proposed
   estimated cost, decreasing it from $174,012,643 to $167,568,734.

   In challenging the agency's cost evaluation, ITT principally contends that
   NASA's conclusions regarding the estimated cost differential between the
   two offerors is not supported by the contemporaneous record. ITT asserts
   that there was no basis for NASA to conclude that ITT would incur
   substantially more labor hours for management since there was nothing to
   suggest that ITT's management approach was less efficient than that of
   BATC. In this vein, ITT faults NASA for not performing a "cross-check" to
   determine whether differences between offerors' hours for WBS cost
   elements were the result of differences in their technical approaches or
   of inconsistencies in the evaluation of offerors. None of these challenges
   provides a basis to sustain ITT's protest.

   Notwithstanding the protester's contentions to the contrary, the
   contemporaneous record clearly reflects NASA's detailed cost evaluation
   and specific identification of the areas where ITT's and BATC's cost
   elements differed based on their varying technical approaches. In the
   regard, NASA explains that ITT's $25 million higher adjusted cost as
   compared to BATC's was a consequence of several factors. AR, Tab 46, SEB
   Slide Presentation to SSA, at 08028. Notably, ITT's estimated fee pool was
   [DELETED] percent as compared to BATC's fee pool of [DELETED] percent.[2]
   Moreover, NASA determined that approximately $[DELETED] million of the
   difference was explained by three major factors. First, ITT proposed
   [DELETED] as compared to BATC. While this was ultimately judged to be a
   strength of ITT's proposal, it was more expensive. Second, ITT's OLI
   design was [DELETED] and therefore more expensive than BATC's OLI design.
   Third, ITT utilized [DELETED] than BATC proposed to perform the OLI work.
   AR at 11-12. By way of example, NASA notes that ITT's management team
   included a [DELETED], a position that BATC did not have. ITT also proposed
   [DELETED]. BATC, on the other hand, did not [DELETED] overseeing each of
   their major technical areas. In addition, BATC proposed to do [DELETED],
   resulting in greater staffing inefficiencies due to duplication of
   staffing for the subcontractor and prime. Id.

   While ITT contends that there is no basis for concluding that its
   management approach was "less efficient" and therefore would yield a
   substantially higher number of estimated management labor hours, ITT fails
   to address the specific examples of the differences in the management
   structure between the two proposals identified by NASA. Rather, ITT simply
   notes that there was a wide disparity between ITT's higher management
   hours and those of BATC, and concludes, based on this fact alone, that
   there is no rational basis for such a disparity.[3] The basis for the
   disparity, however, is a logical extension of the fact that ITT, in its
   initial proposal, set forth a management approach based on substantially
   more management hours than even the final upwardly adjusted hours for
   BATC.[4] In this regard, ITT does not point to any information in the
   offerors' proposals suggesting that the agency's calculation of management
   hours for either offeror was erroneous, that BATC's proposal represented
   understaffing, or that NASA had failed to properly calculate ITT's or
   BATC's management hours. ITT's challenges in this regard do not provide a
   basis for sustaining its protest.

   ITT further contends that NASA's cost realism evaluation was flawed
   because it failed to properly consider Defense Contract Audit Agency
   (DCAA) audit results identifying irregularities with BATC's compliance
   with cost accounting standards (CAS)--specifically, CAS 420--concerning,
   as relevant here, BATC's allocation of its costs for independent research
   and development. As a consequence, ITT contends that NASA's "most probable
   cost" estimate for BATC was not reasonably supported. Specifically, ITT
   highlights the fact that DCAA qualified its audit results for BATC based
   on the fact that BATC was "noncompliant" with CAS 420, which had been
   reported in prior audits, indicated that the cost impacts had not been
   determined, and stated that these issues "may have a significant effect on
   the final cost allocations for CAS covered Government contracts." AR, Tab
   50, DCAA Audit for BATC, 08221. In addition, DCAA explained that the
   Divisional Administrative Contracting Officer (DACO) of the Defense
   Contract Management Agency for BATC would separately negotiate the cost
   impact of the noncompliance. Id.

   The record shows that NASA further questioned DCAA on this issue, asking
   whether it could provide some indication of the magnitude of the cost
   impact. DCAA responded that it could not provide such an estimate, simply
   noting that the matter would be addressed by the DACO. NASA did not pursue
   the matter with BATC during discussions and did not make any adjustments
   to BATC's costs as result of the DCAA qualification.

   In a hearing held by our Office, however, the DACO for BATC, who is
   responsible for, among other things, cost allowability issues and
   interacting with DCAA regarding its contractor audit reports with respect
   to BATC's contracts, provided testimony regarding this issue. The DACO
   explained that BATC's noncompliance relates to a 2001 audit finding, which
   has not yet been resolved, that any cost impact would be limited to fiscal
   year 2000 incurred costs, and that any cost adjustment would be limited to
   a decrease in costs to the government--BATC's noncompliance would not
   result in increased costs to the government. Hearing Transcript (Hearing
   Tr.) at 173. Moreover, the DACO indicated that even if the noncompliance
   identified in the 2001 audit were a continuing issue, such that it
   implicated BATC's 2007 contracts (something which the DACO indicated has
   not been identified by DCAA), such noncompliance by BATC again would not
   result in any increased costs to the government, thus negating any concern
   that BATC's costs under the OLI contract would increase as a consequence
   of the outstanding CAS issue. Id. While ITT contends that the issue was
   raised by DCAA and that the DACO cannot speak for DCAA, the record
   reflects that DCAA expressly indicated that the matter would be addressed
   by the DACO and ITT has not explained why the DACO's testimony should be
   regarded as unreliable or otherwise unreasonable. As a consequence, on
   this record, ITT's challenge does not provide a basis for our Office to
   sustain its protest with regard to this issue.

   With respect to the cost evaluation, ITT further contends that NASA misled
   ITT during discussions into increasing its costs and argues that its
   discussions were not meaningful because NASA failed to inform ITT that its
   fee was "too high." ITT's Comments and Supplemental Protest at 33. These
   arguments are without merit. Both arguments stem from the erroneous
   premise that NASA found ITT's costs to be "unreasonably" high and its
   award fee "excessive." ITT's Comments and Supplemental Protest at 31, 34.
   While ITT's costs and fee were less competitive than those of BATC, there
   is simply nothing in the record to support ITT's assertions that NASA
   found them to be unreasonable or excessive based upon its understanding of
   ITT's proposal technical approach. An agency is not required to inform an
   offeror during discussions that its costs are not as competitive as those
   of another offeror. Yang Enters., Inc.; Santa Barbara Applied Research,
   Inc., B-294605.4 et al., Apr. 1, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 65 at 10.

   Regarding ITT's allegation that it was misled into increasing its costs,
   the record reflects that NASA's discussions addressed areas where it had
   concluded that ITT's proposal failed to account for costs based upon ITT's
   proposed technical approach and NASA's understanding of the requirements.
   For example, NASA noted that ITT failed to include labor hours to "support
   weekly telecoms," "working groups," and additional "mission-level
   reviews," and underestimated travel needs and labor support for various
   activities. AR, Tab 24, ITT Discussions Letter, at 04218-19. ITT suggests
   it was improper for NASA to lead ITT to further increase its labor hours
   and thereby its costs through the discussions process, since its labor
   hours and costs were higher than those estimated by NASA and those
   proposed by BATC. ITT's argument, however, fails to recognize that ITT's
   own changes in its final proposal affirmed that ITT believed NASA's
   concerns were justified. If ITT believed that it could perform the
   contract at the costs it initially proposed, it had the option to submit
   this information to the agency in response to the discussion questions. In
   addition, as noted above, NASA's cost realism evaluation was based upon
   ITT's proposed technical approach and the discussion questions were
   necessarily tailored to that approach. Thus, the fact that ITT's labor
   hours and costs were higher than those estimated by NASA or proposed by
   BATC is irrelevant to the propriety of NASA's discussion questions to ITT,
   which we believe reasonably addressed cost concerns related to ITT's
   technical approach. As a consequence, we see nothing objectionable in the
   agency's discussions.

   Past Performance

   In challenging NASA's past performance evaluation, ITT contends that it
   was unreasonable for ITT and BATC to have both been rated "good" under the
   past performance factor given ITT's superior past performance record as
   compared to that of BATC. In this regard, ITT asserts that NASA
   misevaluated its own past performance and failed to properly consider
   BATC's past performance record, that the evaluation reflected disparate
   treatment between ITT and BATC, and that the SSA did not have a reasonable
   understanding of the differences between the offerors' past performance
   information.

   Determining the relative merits of an offeror's past performance
   information is primarily a matter within the contracting agency's
   discretion and we will not substitute our judgment for reasonably based
   past performance ratings. United Paradyne Corp., B-297758, Mar. 10, 2006,
   2006 CPD para. 47 at 4. We will examine an agency's evaluation only to
   ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's
   evaluation criteria and procurement statutes and regulations. Clean
   Harbors Envtl. Servs., Inc., B-296176.2, Dec. 9, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 222
   at 3. A protester's mere disagreement with the agency's judgment does not
   establish that an evaluation was improper. Id.

   Here, as a general matter, the past performance record with respect to
   both ITT and BATC reflects laudatory comments and ratings, as well as
   instances where both offerors experienced serious problems. NASA made a
   judgment that each offeror's past performance warranted an overall rating
   of "good," and there is nothing in the record to indicate that NASA's
   considered judgments were outside the bounds of reasonable decisionmaking.
   In this regard, we have specifically reviewed all of the arguments raised
   by ITT and find none to be meritorious.

   For example, in challenging NASA's evaluation of its own past performance,
   ITT asserts that NASA inexplicably excluded one of its past performance
   contracts where it had received excellent past performance scores,
   specifically its work as a subcontractor for the design of the National
   Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System
   (NPOESS)-Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) Sensor. NASA
   explains, however, that ITT's involvement with the NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor
   contract was limited to that of a "'potential alternate source'" and
   thereby limited to the formulation phase of that contract (i.e.,
   preliminary design review). CO Supplemental Statement of Facts at 2. As
   such, the SEB concluded that the NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor contract was not
   sufficiently similar to the OLI project, which entails the design,
   development, fabrication and testing, and integration of the OLI for the
   LDCM; the SEB specifically informed the SSA that it did not consider
   contracts in the formulation phase, such as the NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor
   contract, to be relevant. AR, Tab 46, SEB Slide Presentation to SSA, at
   8004. While ITT contends that its work on the NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor contract
   which involved a "significant" and "complicated design process," was
   "clearly relevant," ITT's Supplemental Comments at 9, its arguments amount
   to little more than disagreement with the agency's judgment and do not
   provide a basis to sustain its protest.

   ITT further contends that by not considering the NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor
   contract, NASA's evaluation reflected unequal treatment since it did
   consider one of BATC's contracts (its Deep Impact Instrument contract with
   the University of Maryland) notwithstanding the fact that NASA had not
   received a past performance questionnaire regarding BATC's performance
   under that contract. ITT's argument in this regard does not logically flow
   from its premise since NASA disregarded ITT's NPOESS-VIIRS Sensor contract
   due to relevance concerns, not because it did not obtain a questionnaire
   regarding ITT's performance. In any event, the record reflects that while
   NASA did not obtain a questionnaire regarding BATC's performance of the
   Deep Impact contract, NASA did in fact obtain information concerning
   BATC's performance under that contract from the customer and specifically
   documented the information it received, see AR at 21 n.5; AR, Tab 34, BATC
   Past Performance Information, at 06827-28, thus establishing a basis for
   NASA's consideration of BATC's performance on the Deep Impact contract and
   its conclusion that BATC's performance on that contract was "very good"
   overall. AR, Tab 45, SEB Final Report, at 07966.

   In challenging NASA's past performance evaluation, ITT argues that NASA
   erroneously considered its performance as a subcontractor to provide the
   Cross-Track Infared Sounder (CrIS) Sensor in support of the NPOESS and
   that its rating is not supported by the record. NASA rated ITT's past
   performance under the CrIS contract as "good" for technical and "fair" for
   both schedule and price. ITT argues that its "fair" rating with respect to
   schedule was not justified based on the past performance questionnaire
   NASA received from the prime contractor regarding ITT's performance.
   Conceding the fact that its performance has been affected by what ITT
   characterizes as "a unique but significant vibration failure," ITT notes
   that the questionnaire reflected ratings of "very good" and "good" with
   respect to questions concerning schedule. ITT's Comments and Supplemental
   Protest at 11.

   NASA considered ITT's performance on the CrIS contract to be "highly
   relevant" since "the CrIS contract is most like the OLI contract in that
   it involves design, development, fabrication and testing of a complex
   earth observing instrument," and therefore "weighed very heavily in the
   past performance evaluation for ITT." CO Supplemental Statement of Facts
   at 4. In considering ITT's performance of the CrIS contract, the SEB
   obtained information beyond the prime contractor questionnaire. As
   explained in hearing testimony, the SEB obtained input from the project
   manager for the NPOESS Preparatory Project, a NASA employee, who had
   direct knowledge of the status of the subsidiary CrIS instrument project.
   Hearing Tr. at 16. This individual provided the SEB with a highly critical
   assessment of ITT's performance under the CrIS program, indicating that
   ITT was the primary cause of the noted vibration failure, which delayed
   the scheduled delivery of the CrIS instrument by more than 1 year, and
   stated that ITT's performance was "unsatisfactory."[5] Hearing Tr. at 18,
   20. Based on this record, we find nothing unreasonable with NASA's past
   performance ratings with respect to ITT's performance under the CrIS
   contract.

   Mission Suitability

   With respect to the mission suitability factor, ITT raises numerous
   specific challenges concerning NASA's evaluation of its proposal and
   asserts that discussions regarding many of its weaknesses were not
   meaningful, and that NASA's evaluation of ITT's proposal in several
   instances evidences unequal treatment when compared to its consideration
   of BATC's proposal.

   In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we will not reevaluate technical
   proposals, but instead will examine the agency's evaluation to ensure that
   it was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation's stated evaluation
   criteria. L-3 Communications Westwood Corp., B-295126, Jan. 19, 2005, 2005
   CPD para. 30 at 5. In negotiated procurements, whenever discussions are
   conducted by an agency, they are required to be meaningful, equitable, and
   not misleading. To satisfy the requirement for meaningful discussions, the
   agency need only lead an offeror into the areas of its proposal requiring
   amplification or revision; all-encompassing discussions are not required,
   nor is the agency obligated to "spoon-feed" an offeror as to each and
   every item that could be revised to improve its proposal. Metro Mach.
   Corp., B-295744, B-295744.2, Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 112 at 19. This
   is particularly true where, as here, one aspect of the evaluation is to
   test the offeror's technical understanding. See TRI-COR Indus.,
   B-259034.2, Mar. 14, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 143 at 5-6. We have considered
   all the issues raised by the protester concerning the mission suitability
   factor and find that they are without merit.

   ITT argues that several of the strengths it received should have instead
   been characterized as "significant" strengths, based upon the relative
   definition of the two adjectival ratings and the superlatives used by the
   SEB in describing the merits of the strengths contained in ITT's proposal,
   and as reflected by the description of the significant strengths ascribed
   to BATC's proposal. For example, ITT contends that it should have been
   assessed a "significant strength" as opposed to a "strength" under
   subfactor A, Instrument Design, of the mission suitability factor, for its
   proposed [DELETED] since the SEB found that the ITT had proposed "a very
   effective design to mitigate contamination risk." AR, Tab 45, SEB Final
   Report, at 07940. According to ITT, a finding the ITT proposed a "very
   effective" design properly falls within the definition of a "significant
   strength," which requires a finding that the proposal "greatly enhances
   the potential for successful performance, or contributes significantly
   toward meeting or exceeding the contract requirements," as opposed to a
   strength, which merely required a finding the proposal provides "a high
   level of confidence of meeting the requirement and to some extent clearly
   exceeds what is necessary to meet the requirement." Id. at 07918-19. We
   find ITT's entire line of argument in this area to essentially express
   ITT's disagreement with the agency's considered technical judgments
   regarding the specific elements of the offerors' proposals and we find
   nothing to suggest that the agency's judgments were unreasonable or
   inconsistent with the terms of the solicitation.

   ITT also argues that NASA unreasonably assigned its proposal a "weakness"
   for lacking adequate maturation plans for its [DELETED]. As it relates to
   this issue, the RFP provided as follows:

     Assess the technical maturity of the following instrument subsystems:
     the focal plane, focal plane electronics, mechanisms, calibration
     devices, structure, optics, and solid state recorder. Assess the
     technology readiness of all technologies below Technological Readiness
     level 6 (TRL-6) and provide detailed plans and schedules for their
     maturation.

   RFP at 00180.

   In its proposal, ITT maintained that all of its OLI design technologies
   met the TRL-6 standard. AR, Tab 9, ITT Initial Proposal, at 01628. The SEB
   had concerns as to whether ITT's [DELETED] and in discussions with ITT,
   NASA expressly indicated that "the proposed technology readiness levels of
   the [DELETED] are not adequately substantiated." AR, Tab 24, ITT
   Discussions Letter, at 04215. In its final proposal revision, ITT
   attempted to address NASA's concerns in this regard by providing
   additional information to confirm that these items were in fact TRL-6
   compliant. NASA, however, found the additional information provided by ITT
   to be inadequate and therefore assessed ITT with a weakness because,
   having failed to establish TRL-6 maturity for these items, ITT did not
   provide the detailed plans and schedules for the maturation of these items
   as required by the RFP.

   ITT, in its comments on the agency report, argues that it had proposed
   significant cost and fee margins to accommodate "any efforts" to mature
   these items. ITT's Comments and Supplemental Protest at 52. Addressing
   this argument, NASA explained that providing cost and fee margins is not
   the equivalent of providing maturation plans, and that ITT did not provide
   any discussion of the "efforts" that ITT would employ to mature these
   items. ITT then chides the agency for failing to recognize that ITT was
   not required to provide detailed plans and schedules for maturation of
   these items since it had established that the items were TRL-6 compliant.
   ITT, however, misses the point. ITT never addresses NASA's specific
   explanations of why it did not consider the items to be TRL-6 compliant,
   and because NASA found them to be at a level of maturity below TRL-6, ITT
   was required under the RFP to provide detailed maturation plans. Based on
   this record, there is nothing to suggest that NASA's evaluation of ITT's
   proposal in this regard was unreasonable.[6]

   In challenging its discussions, ITT maintains that they were inadequate,
   and in many instances misleading, with regard to the specific weaknesses
   identified by the agency. For example, ITT contends that NASA failed to
   conduct adequate discussions with respect to ITT's proposed "calibration
   of radiometric sources."[7] As it relates to this issue, the RFP indicated
   that NASA would evaluate the procedures by which an offeror would maintain
   traceability of their radiometric calibration with regard to spectral
   radiance standards maintained by the National Institutes of Standards and
   Technology (NIST) for the United States, and how the radiance calibration
   transfer to orbit will be verified. Hearing Tr. at 109-110; RFP at 00200.

   NASA informed ITT that its [DELETED]. AR, Tab 24, ITT Discussions Letter,
   at 04220. The record reflects that ITT revised its proposal in response to
   NASA's concerns, however, the SEB found that the additional information
   provided by ITT was not sufficient to address its underlying concern and
   the weakness therefore remained. In challenging the reasonableness of
   NASA's discussions, ITT argues that it was not informed of NASA's true
   concerns regarding this weakness, as reflected by the SEB's
   characterization of the weakness in its final report. The record shows
   that the final report reflected NASA's concerns with issues which were
   first introduced in ITT's final proposal revision and therefore could not
   have been raised in NASA's previously held discussions with ITT; nor was
   NASA required, as ITT suggests, to reopen discussions in order to provide
   ITT with an opportunity to address NASA's concerns regarding the newly
   introduced information. Ideamatics, Inc., supra.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The recommended cost reflected NASA's adjustments to the offeror's
   proposed cost based upon its cost realism evaluation.

   [2] The fee pool values represent NASA's adjusted values for both ITT and
   BATC. AR, Tab 46, SEB Slide Presentation to SSA, at 08028.

   [3] In its initial proposal, ITT proposed [DELETED] hours with respect to
   the "Management" WBS, while BATC proposed [DELETED] hours. NASA estimated
   that, based on ITT's approach, that number should be increased by
   [DELETED] for a total of [DELETED] hours, to account for items such as
   [DELETED] and estimated that the number of hours for BATC should be
   increased by [DELETED] for a total of [DELETED] hours. NASA raised these
   issues with ITT and BATC during discussions. AR, Tab 24, ITT Discussions
   Letter, at 04218-19; AR, Tab 25, BATC Discussions Letter, at 04262-63. In
   its final proposal, ITT proposed [DELETED] hours based on the discussion
   items. NASA, however, made a downward adjustment of [DELETED] with respect
   to ITT's final proposal. AR, Tab 41, Cost Analysis Tables, at 07104-05.
   BATC, on the other hand included only [DELETED] hours in its final
   proposal, and based on its assessment of BATC's approach, NASA made an
   upward adjustment of [DELETED] hours for a total of [DELETED] hours under
   the "Management" WBS. AR, Tab 46, SEB Slide Presentation to SSA, at
   08026-27.

   [4] As previously noted, see fn. 3, ITT initially proposed [DELETED] hours
   under the "Management" WBS, while BATC's final upwardly adjusted hours
   under this WBS were only [DELETED]. AR, Tab 41, Cost Analysis Tables, at
   07104-05.

   [5] The project manager's testimony in this regard was consistent with
   contemporaneous evaluator notes reflecting that ITT's performance on the
   CrIS contract had been rated as "unsatisfactory" due to the noted
   vibration failure, which had negatively affected both schedule and cost.
   AR, Tab 35, ITT Past Performance Information, at 06912.

   [6] While ITT also argues that NASA's discussions regarding this issue
   were inadequate, the record clearly reflects that NASA specifically
   informed ITT of its concerns with the maturation levels of its [DELETED]
   where it indicated that they were "not adequately substantiated." AR, Tab
   24, ITT Discussions Letter, at 04215. To the extent ITT chose to establish
   that these items were TRL-6 compliant and NASA ultimately concluded that
   ITT's efforts in this regard were inadequate, NASA was not obligated to
   re-open discussions with ITT to afford ITT yet a further opportunity to
   address this issue, or to provide ITT with an opportunity to provide
   maturation plans and schedules for these items. Ideamatics, Inc.,
   B-297791.2, May 26, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 87 at 3 n.5. ITT further argued
   that NASA's discussions and evaluation of BATC's proposal demonstrate
   unequal treatment of ITT and BATC. The record, however, reflects that ITT
   and BATC proposed different approaches [DELETED]. Based on this record, we
   see nothing unequal about the agency's discussions or evaluation.

   [7] As NASA explained in hearing testimony, radiometric calibration in the
   context of the OLI procurement refers to the process of relating the OLI
   instrument output to a physical quantity, specifically spectral radiance.
   Radiometric calibration sources are the devices by which that calibration
   is determined for the OLI instrument prior to launch. Hearing Tr. at 108.