TITLE: B-309955, Nautical Engineering, Inc., November 7, 2007
BNUMBER: B-309955
DATE: November 7, 2007
************************************************************
B‑309955, Nautical Engineering, Inc., November 7, 2007
Decision
Matter of: Nautical Engineering, Inc.
File: B-309955
Date: November 7, 2007
Jacob B. Pankowski, Esq., John J. Field, Esq., and Marisa Miller, Esq.,
Nixon Peabody, LLP, for the protester.
John J. Ralston, Esq., U.S. Coast Guard, for the agency.
Jonathan L. Kang, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Protest challenging consolidation of requirements previously provided
under separate small contracts as improper bundling under the Small
Business Act is denied where agency reasonably demonstrates that
measurably substantial benefits to the government justify the
consolidation.
2. Protest challenging consolidation of requirements as a violation of the
Competition in Contracting Act is denied where agency demonstrates that
the consolidation is reasonable.
DECISION
Nautical Engineering, Inc. (NEI) protests the terms of request for
proposals (RFP) No. HSCG85-07-R-6253PM, issued by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Coast Guard, for maintenance and repair of
Coast Guard cutters based in Alameda, California. NEI contends that the
RFP violates the Small Business Act by improperly bundling two types of
maintenance and repair services that were previously provided under
separate smaller contracts. The protester also contends that the
consolidation of these services violates the Competition in Contracting
Act of 1984 (CICA).
We deny the protest.
BACKGROUND
The U.S. Coast Guard Maintenance and Logistics Command Pacific (MLCPAC) is
the organization responsible for maintenance and logistics support for all
Coast Guard missions throughout the Pacific Area. The solicitation seeks
proposals to provide maintenance and repair services for three 378-foot
Coast Guard high endurance cutters based in Alameda, California. This
class of ship is generally referred to by the hull classification initials
WHEC.[1] The WHEC cutters require periodic maintenance and repair services
in two forms: (1) "dry dock" services, wherein the ship is removed from
the water at a certified contractor facility, and (2) dockside services,
wherein work is performed on the ship while it remains in the water. The
cutters receive maintenance and repair service during scheduled
"availabilities" during which they are removed from operational service.
Each cutter is normally scheduled for one dry dock availability every 4
years and one dockside availability every 3 years, in addition to any
needed unplanned or emergency repairs. The agency currently obtains
services for each WHEC cutter individually, with separate contracts for
dry dock and dockside availabilities.
In November 2004, the Coast Guard began a review to attempt to identify
benefits that could be achieved by transitioning from the agency current
model of awarding individual contracts for each service for each ship, to
what is known as a "phased maintenance model," i.e. multi-year, multi-ship
contracts that involve the contractor in both the long-term planning and
performance of maintenance and repair services. Contracting Officer's (CO)
Statement para. 12. Among these anticipated benefits are the reduction of
costs from leveraging a large volume of work, learning curve efficiencies
from repeat work on the cutters (as opposed to the current model, where
contractors may not work on the same ship), better management of costs
resulting from advanced planning, and decreased length of maintenance
availabilities, which results in an increase in the ships' operational
time. Agency Report (AR), Tab 27, Add. to WHEC Cutter Acquisition Plan
(Bundling Analysis), 4-6.
To implement its review, the Coast Guard proposed to use this phased
maintenance approach for its WHEC cutters based in Alameda. As relevant
here, the new phased maintenance approach included consolidating all
maintenance and repair work, including the dry dock and dockside work,
into a single contract. The agency's requirements for maintenance and
repair were also subject to a geographic restriction: under Coast Guard
regulations all work on the WHEC cutters based in Alameda must be
performed within 75 miles of Alameda. AR, Tab 32, Coast Guard Pacific Area
Instruction 3100.1E.
Because the new approach involves consolidation of the dry dock and
dockside services, some of which had been provided by small businesses
such as NEI, the Coast Guard undertook an analysis of the potential impact
on competition of its phased maintenance approach. The agency's analysis
addressed whether the solicitation constitutes "bundling" under the Small
Business Act. As discussed in detail below, the Small Business Act
prohibits agencies from bundling two or more procurement requirements for
goods or services that were previously provided under separate smaller
contracts into a single solicitation that is likely to be unsuitable for
award to a small business. 15 U.S.C. sect. 632(o)(2), see also Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 2.101. An exception to the prohibition
on bundling exists when agencies can demonstrate that the government would
receive "measurably substantial benefits" from the bundling valued at 10
percent of the estimated contract or order value (including options), if
the contract is $86 million or less (or valued at 5 percent of the
estimated contract value if the contract is for more than $86 million). 15
U.S.C. sect. 644(e)(2)(c); FAR sect. 7.107(b). The Coast Guard estimated
the value of this contract at $11.4 million, and thus decided it would
need to show a benefit of at least ten percent, or at least $1.14 million,
to justify bundling this work. AR, Tab 34, Acquisition Plan, at 3.
The Coast Guard also conducted market research in February-March 2005 to
identify potential offerors for a contract that combines the two services.
As relevant here, the agency identified two potential offerors for dry
dock services in the Alameda area: Bay Ship and Yacht, a small business,
and San Francisco Dry-Dock, a large business. AR, Tab 15, Contractor
Survey Responses. The agency concluded that it was not likely to receive
two or more proposals from responsible small businesses for the
consolidated services, and therefore there was no basis to set aside the
procurement. AR, Tab 16, Small Business Review Form.
The Coast Guard initiated discussions with the Small Business
Administration (SBA) regarding the determination not to set aside the
procurement for small businesses, and regarding whether the consolidation
of the dry dock and dockside services constituted an impermissible
bundling. Although the Coast Guard initially took the position that the
solicitation did not constitute bundling because the procurement was for a
new requirement, it nonetheless prepared a justification for bundling on
the basis that the consolidation of the dry dock and dockside services
would provide measurably substantial benefits to the government.
The Coast Guard's bundling analysis relied primarily on data prepared by
the Department of the Navy to justify bundling maintenance and repair work
for its DDG 51 class destroyers. Id.; AR, Tab 22, Navy Small Business
Justification. The Navy's justification addressed the consolidation of
maintenance and repair services for destroyers at Norfolk, VA and Mayport
Basin, FL, and relied on earlier data from similar consolidations that
took place at the San Diego and Puget Sound repair centers. The Navy data
showed that the consolidation of services through use of a single
contractor as a lead integrator for all services required for all ships,
instead of multiple contractors for each ship, lead to cost savings based
on increased flexibility with maintenance operations, advanced planning
and scheduling, leveraging of costs over larger work volumes, and learning
curve efficiencies gained on repetitive tasks. Id. at 17.
The Coast Guard's bundling analysis concluded that the agency could also
capture the benefits experienced by the Navy in consolidating its
maintenance and repair operations. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis, at 7.
Specifically, the agency's analysis relied on two key findings in the
Navy's justification for its destroyer maintenance and repair procurement.
First, the Navy identified a potential cost savings equal to 5.29 percent
of the estimated cost of its destroyer maintenance and repair contract
that could be achieved through use of the phased maintenance approach. AR,
Tab 22, Navy Small Business Justification, at 5-6, 17. Second, the Navy
estimated a component of the 5.29 percent cost savings was derived from a
decrease in the length of maintenance availabilities from 11 to 9
weeks--an estimated 18 percent reduction. The Navy's analysis concluded
that this reduction would lead to reduced maintenance costs because of
fewer days during which maintenance and repair costs are incurred. Id. at
16-17. The Coast Guard analysis applied the estimated 18 percent reduction
in maintenance time in a different manner, however, reasoning that the
reduced duration of a maintenance availability would translate into
increased operational time for the WHEC cutters.[2] AR, Tab 27, Bundling
Analysis,
at 7.
In calculating the benefit of the increased operational time, the Coast
Guard's analysis relied on Commandant Instruction (COMDTIST) 7310.1I,
which sets forth standard rates for assets such as cutters to be used in
reimbursement agreements with other agencies. The COMDTIST stated that the
"reimbursable" rate for a WHEC cutter is $7,437 per hour, or $178,488 per
day. AR, Tab 27, COMDTIST 7310.1I,
encl. 1. The analysis also noted that the Coast Guard published a separate
rate for "variable and foreseeable costs" for these cutters of $1,641 per
hour, or $39,384 per day. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis, at 4; Coast Guard
Variable Rate FY 06 Cost Tables, encl. 1. The variable costs consist of
expenses not incurred during a maintenance availability such as fuel or
other consumables. CO Statement para. 48; AR, Tab 27, Coast Guard Variable
Rate FY 06 Cost Tables, encl. 1.
Using these two rates, the Coast Guard calculated the benefit to the
government of increased operational time. Based on the Navy's data, the
Coast Guard assumed that the 333 days of maintenance and repair currently
scheduled for the WHEC cutters could be reduced under the proposed
contract by 18 percent, or 60 days--translating into 60 more days of
operation for the cutters. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis, at 4. At the
reimbursable rate, the benefit to the government from the increased use of
the cutters would be $10.7 million; at the variable rate, the benefit
would be $2.3 million. Id. The Coast Guard's bundling analysis
acknowledged a potential margin of error in adopting the Navy's approach,
but concluded that regardless of the rate used, the proposed bundling
would provide the statutorily-required "measurably substantial
benefits."[3] Id.
The SBA procurement center representative (PCR) assigned to review the
small business plan and bundling analysis agreed with the Coast Guard's
justification for its procurement approach. Although the PCR stated that
the SBA believed that the proposed procurement constituted bundling, the
SBA nonetheless agreed that the bundling was properly justified, and that
there was no basis to set aside the procurement for small businesses. In
this regard, the SBA stated:
SBA concurs with your proposed full and open procurement, subject to no
new countervailing information surfacing resulting from your actions
seeking industry reaction. The justification for changing MLCPAC's
procurement approach appears adequate by FAR 7.107 standards. A small
business set-aside does not appear viable.
AR, Tab 26, SBA Letter, Dec. 7, 2005, at 3.
On November 23, 2005, the Coast Guard issued a "sources sought notice,"
which advised potential offerors that the agency intended to issue a
contract for a single maintenance integrator to perform services,
including dry dock and dockside, on all WHEC cutters based in Alameda. AR,
Tab 25, Sources Sought Notice. The agency requested that potential sources
submit comments by December 8, 2005. Eventually, the agency received two
comments from potential offerors in response to the notice. Puglia
Engineering expressed concern that the consolidation of the dry dock and
dockside work, combined with the geographic limits, might reduce
competition; Tecnico Corp. requested an opportunity to address the issue
but then did not provide further comments. AR, Tab 37, Email from Puglia
to CO, Feb. 16, 2007, Tab 38, Email from Tecnico to CO, Feb. 16, 2007.
On February 14, 2007, the Coast Guard issued a pre-solicitation notice for
a "phased maintenance" contract for the three WHEC cutters. On May 24,
2007, the Coast Guard issued the RFP, which anticipated award of a
fixed-price, indefinite-quantity/indefinite-delivery (ID/IQ) contract for
planning, dry dock and dockside maintenance and repair of the three
cutters. The RFP anticipated the award of a contract with a base period of
1 year, followed by four 1-year options. The RFP requires the successful
offeror to establish and maintain mentoring or partnership agreements with
at least two small business firms, and to subcontract not less than 25
percent of all repairs ordered annually to small businesses, with not less
than
20 percent of the work given to the small business partners, and not less
than
5 percent to the HUBZone business partners. RFP at 23.
NEI filed an agency-level protest on July 17, arguing that the
solicitation improperly bundled the requirements. AR, Tab 40, NEI
Agency-Level Protest. On August 2, NEI filed a protest with our Office; in
light of this protest, the Coast Guard dismissed the agency-level protest.
DISCUSSION
NEI argues that the solicitation improperly bundles the dry dock and
dockside maintenance and repair requirements in violation of the Small
Business Act, and that the agency justification for the bundling is
unreasonable. The protester also argues that the consolidation of these
two requirements violates the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), 41
U.S.C. sect. 253a(a) (2000), which prohibits unnecessary consolidation of
an agency's requirements. The protester contends that as a result of the
consolidation, small business offerors such as NEI who can provide
dockside services but who do not have dry dock facilities will be excluded
from competing for the contract. For the reasons discussed below, we
conclude that both of the protester's arguments lack merit.[4]
A. Bundling in Violation of the Small Business Act
The Small Business Act, as amended, states that, "to the maximum extent
practicable," each agency shall "avoid unnecessary and unjustified
bundling of contract requirements that precludes small business
participation in procurements as prime contractors." 15 U.S.C. sect.
631(j)(3) (2000). To implement this restriction, the Small Business Act
defines bundling as:
consolidating 2 or more procurement requirements for goods or services
previously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts into a
solicitation of offers for a single contract that is likely to be
unsuitable for award to a small-business concern due to--
(A) the diversity, size, or specialized nature of the elements of the
performance specified;
(B) the aggregate dollar value of the anticipated award;
(C) the geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites; or
(D) any combination of the factors described in subparagraphs (A), (B),
and (C).
15 U.S.C. sect. 632(o)(2); see also FAR sect. 2.101.
The Small Business Act's statutory prohibition against bundling
requirements is not absolute, however, as an agency may determine that
consolidation of requirements is "necessary and justified if, as compared
to the benefits that would be derived from contracting to meet those
requirements if not consolidated, the Federal Government would derive from
the consolidation measurably substantial benefits, including any
combination of benefits that, in combination, are measurably substantial."
15 U.S.C. sect. 644(e)(2)(B). The FAR states that these benefits may be
identified as follows:
Measurably substantial benefits may include, individually or in any
combination or aggregate, cost savings or price reduction, quality
improvements that will save time or improve or enhance performance or
efficiency, reduction in acquisition cycle times, better terms and
conditions, and any other benefits. The agency must quantify the
identified benefits and explain how their impact would be measurably
substantial. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the
agency may determine bundling to be necessary and justified if, as
compared to the benefits that it would derive from contracting to meet
those requirements if not bundled, it would derive measurably
substantial benefits equvalent to--ten percent of the estimated contract
or order value (including options) if the value is $86 million or less.
FAR sect. 7.107(b).
The agency argues that, as a threshold matter, the consolidation of the
dry dock and dockside services does not constitute bundling for two
reasons: (1) the solicitation represents a new requirement not subject to
the bundling rules because of the addition of planning services to the
consolidated requirements, and (2) the agency's market research shows that
at least one small business offeror has a dry dock, and therefore the
procurement is suitable for award to "a small business." With regard to
the latter argument, the agency contends that the Small Business Act
should be interpreted to mean that if a single small business offeror is
capable of performing the consolidated requirements, the solicitation is,
by definition, not "unsuitable for award to a small-business concern." The
protester argues that the agency is incorrect with regard to both
arguments.[5]
We need not resolve whether the Coast Guard is correct as to the
interpretation of the term "a small business concern" because we conclude
that the Coast Guard reasonably decided that the government will receive
measurably substantial benefits that justify bundling of the requirements
in any event.
1. Measurably Substantial Benefits
NEI argues that the Coast Guard's bundling analysis is flawed in several
respects. The protester first argues that the Coast Guard's reliance on
the Navy's bundling justification is not reasonable because the Coast
Guard did not adequately explain why it can expect the same efficiencies
for the WHEC cutters the Navy claimed for its destroyers. The protester
further argues that the Coast Guard unreasonably assumes that it will
experience the same level of savings as the Navy, and thus the assumption
of a similar 5.29 percent savings is not reasonable.
Our review of the Coast Guard analysis shows that the agency does not
directly compare the details of its maintenance and repair operations to
the Navy's operations. Instead, the analysis focuses on the benefits of
adopting the phased maintenance model to address inefficiencies in the
current practice of making single-contract awards. See AR, Tab 27,
Bundling Analysis, at 3-4. Based on our review, we think the Coast Guard's
approach of identifying similar problems and adopting similar solutions to
those identified and adopted by the Navy, was reasonable. Furthermore, the
Coast Guard's analysis did not assume, as the protester argues, that the
same precise savings will result. Rather, the analysis relied on the
combination of the projected cost savings as well as other benefits,
discussed below, to conclude that the overall benefit to the government
would exceed 10 percent of the value of the contract. See id. at 4. On
this record, we believe that the Coast Guard's reliance on the Navy data
was reasonable.[6]
Next, NEI argues that the Coast Guard's use of the Navy's data resulted in
a double counting of "savings" by relying on both the 5.29 percent cost
savings and the 18 percent reduction in the length of maintenance
availabilities. The protester correctly notes that the Navy's
justification relied on the 18 percent reduction in the length of
maintenance availabilities as a contributing factor to the overall 5.29
percent cost savings, and argues that it would not be appropriate to
conclude that a transition by the Coast Guard to the phased maintenance
model would result in both a 5.29 percent cost savings plus an additional
18 percent cost savings. The Coast Guard's justification did not, however,
rely on the Navy's data in this way. Instead, as discussed below, while
the 18 percent reduction in maintenance time was a component of the 5.29
percent cost savings for the Navy, it was also separately relied upon by
the Coast Guard as a basis to conclude that the WHEC cutters would be
available for more operational time.
The Navy's bundling justification for the destroyers did not attempt to
quantify the benefit to the government from having additional operational
time for the ships as a result of the decreased length of maintenance
availabilities. Instead, the 18 percent savings in the Navy's analysis
represented costs saved by avoiding 2 weeks of maintenance costs; these
savings were thus a component of the overall 5.29 percent savings
anticipated by the Navy. See AR, Tab 22, Navy Small Business
Justification,
at 17.
The Coast Guard, however, chose to use the Navy's data to quantify an
additional benefit to the government from the increased operational time
for the WHEC cutters. The Coast Guard's analysis notes that although the
Navy was "reluctant to quantify the benefits of returning a ship to
operational status sooner," the agency believed that "the benefits to
[the] Coast Guard of increasing the available operational time for WHEC's
can be quantified." CO Statement para. 46. In this regard, the intention
of the new acquisition strategy was based on the "central goal of reducing
the period of time for performance of maintenance tasks," and thereby
increasing "the number of days that the WHEC's are available to perform
national defense and homeland security missions." Id. Thus, this benefit,
although quantified, was not a calculation of "cost savings." Put
differently, the Coast Guard's justification relied on two different
benefits to the government: decreased maintenance and repair costs
(quantified as a savings of 5.29 percent), and increased time that the
WHEC cutters will be performing their duties (18 percent more time).
The Coast Guard's identification of two benefits is consistent with the
FAR, which states that measurably substantial benefits "may include,
individually or in any combination or aggregate, cost savings or price
reduction, quality improvements that will save time or improve or enhance
performance or efficiency, reduction in acquisition cycle times, better
terms and conditions, and any other benefits." FAR sect. 7.107(b). NEI's
argument thus incorrectly characterizes the Coast Guard's identification
of benefits as a double-counting of "anticipated savings." Protester's
Comments on AR at 22. The two benefits identified by the Coast Guard are,
however, distinct, and each is an appropriate measure under the FAR. We
find no basis on this record to challenge the reasonableness of the Coast
Guard's determination.
Finally, NEI argues that the agency inappropriately relied on the
"reimbursable" rate of $178,488 per day to quantify the benefit to the
government from increased operational time of the WHEC cutters. COMDIST
7310.1I states that the components of the reimbursable rate "should not be
used to calculate reimbursement for [the Federal Emergency Management
Agency] and foreseeable costs related to contracting actions," because the
rate contains "both fixed and variable components." AR, Tab 27, COMDIST
7310.1I, at 2. Instead, the COMDIST states that "[r]ates for these
purposes shall be promulgated separately." Id. As noted in the facts
above, the agency did separately promulgate rates for "variable and
foreseeable costs" for the cutters of $39,384 per day. See AR, Tab 27,
Coast Guard Variable Rate FY 06 Cost Tables, encl. 1.
The Coast Guard's bundling analysis calculated the benefit to the
government of increased operational time for the cutters based on the full
reimbursable rate of $178,488 per day. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis at 4.
However, the analysis also noted that using the lower variable rate still
results in measurably substantial benefits to the government that
justifies bundling. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis,
at 3. Thus, the analysis concludes, that even the rate of $39,384 per day
yields a benefit to the government of $2,363,040--approximately 20 percent
of the estimated contract value.
Although the protester only challenges the agency's reliance on the
$178,488 per day rate, rather than the $39,384 rate, we think that neither
of these rates on their own is a reasonable measure of the benefit to the
government for 1 day of use of a WHEC cutter. In this regard, the variable
rate represents costs that the government will avoid during a maintenance
availability, such as fuel. See CO Statement para. 48; AR, Tab 27, Coast
Guard Variable Rate FY 06 Cost Tables, encl. 1. Thus, the variable rate of
$39,384 per day represents costs avoided, rather than the increased
benefit to the government from an additional day of operation for a
cutter.
During the course of this protest, the CO conceded a better calculation of
the benefit to the government is achieved by subtracting the variable rate
from the full reimbursable rate. CO Statement para. 48. Thus, in the CO's
view, the benefit to the government of an increased day of use for a
cutter is $178,488 per day, less the variable costs of $39,384. Id. We
think that this approach appears reasonable because it captures the
quantifiable benefit to the government from the operation of ship, less
the costs of operation. Further, this approach is consistent with COMDIST
7310.1I, which states that the reimbursable rate should not be used to
calculate foreseeable costs relating to contracting actions because of its
inclusion of both fixed and variable costs. AR, Tab 27, COMDIST 7310.1I,
at 2. This calculation of a benefit to the government falls between the
two calculations cited in the Coast Guard's bundling analysis, but in any
event well exceeds 10 percent of the value of the contract. Id.
In sum, we conclude that even if the consolidation of the dry dock and
dockside requirements constituted bundling under the Small Business Act,
the Coast Guard reasonably justified any such bundling by identifying
measurably substantial benefits to the government from the consolidation.
Even allowing for some margin of error in adopting the Navy's estimates,
the record supports the Coast Guard's determination that the consolidation
of the requirements will result in measurably substantial benefits to the
government equal to at least 10 percent of the anticipated contract
value.[7]
2. Procedural Issues with Bundling Justification and Approval
NEI also alleges that the agency's bundling justification contained
several procedural errors. First, the protester argues that the agency
failed to advise the SBA of negative responses from small business
offerors, and that this failure voided the SBA's approval of the proposed
bundling. As quoted above, the SBA's letter approving the Coast Guard's
procurement approach stated that the SBA concurred with the bundling
analysis "subject to no new countervailing information surfacing resulting
from your actions seeking industry reaction." AR, Tab 26, SBA Letter,
Dec. 7, 2005, at 3.
NEI argues that at least two potential small business offerors expressed a
negative reaction to the Coast Guard's proposed procurement approach. As
discussed above, Puglia expressed concern that the consolidation of the
dry dock and dockside work, combined with the geographic limits, might
reduce competition; Tecnico also expressed a desire to comment on the
procurement, but did not submit substantive comments. AR, Tab 37, Email
from Puglia to CO, Feb. 16, 2007, Tab 38, Email from Tecnico to CO, Feb.
16, 2007. NEI contends that receipt of these comments obligated the Coast
Guard to seek a new approval from the SBA.
A review of the context of the comments leads us to conclude that these
comments do not provide any new information regarding the bundling
analysis. The Coast Guard's bundling analysis and the SBA's approval, both
noted that the consolidation of the services could preclude small business
offerors without a dry dock in the Alameda area from submitting proposals
as prime contractors. AR, Tab 27, Bundling Analysis, at 8; Tab 26, SBA
Letter, Dec. 7, 2005, at 2-3. Thus, the substance of the comments by
Puglia and Tecnico do not raise any concerns regarding the assumptions or
analyses in the Coast Guard's bundling justification, or provide new
information for the SBA to consider. On this record, we do not believe
that the Coast Guard's failure to provide this information to the SBA
provides a basis to sustain the protest.
Next, NEI argues that the Coast Guard was required to obtain approval for
its bundling justification from the DHS deputy secretary.[8] The Coast
Guard Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization Specialist (SADBUS)
assigned to the procurement recommended that approval for the bundling
should be obtained from the DHS Deputy Secretary, in accordance with FAR
sect. 7.107(c) and Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM) sect.
3007-107(b). AR, Tab 28, E-mail from SADBUS to CO, Feb. 6, 2006. In this
regard, FAR sect. 7.107(c)(1) states that a civilian agency must obtain
approval at the deputy secretary level for any proposed bundling where
"[t]he expected benefits do not meet the thresholds in paragraphs (b)(1)
and (b)(2) of this section but are critical to the agency's mission
success." The CO disagreed with the SADBUS's recommendation because the
relevant regulations require such approval only where the bundling is not
justified by the requisite savings identified in FAR sect. 7.107(b). AR,
Tab 31, CO Memorandum, Feb. 16, 2006. We agree with the CO's conclusion
that, because the Coast Guard's analysis reasonably determined that any
bundling would result in measurably substantial benefits to the government
in excess of 10 percent of the anticipated contract value, referral to the
DHS Deputy Secretary for approval was not required.
Finally, NEI argues that the Coast Guard failed to provide adequate notice
to small businesses of the agency's intention to bundle the maintenance
and repair requirements. Agencies contemplating issuance of a solicitation
containing bundling must provide at least 30 days notice to affected
incumbent small business concerns before release of the solicitation. FAR
sect. 10.001(c). The Coast Guard argues that potential offerors, including
NEI, were placed on notice of the agency's intention to consolidate the
requirements by the sources sought and pre-solicitation notices. We agree.
The sources sought notice, issued on November 23, 2005, stated that the
agency intended to issue a solicitation for a phased maintenance contract
in support of the WHEC cutters. AR, Tab 25, Sources Sought Notice. The
notice advised potential offerors that the agency anticipated that the
solicitation will create a "complete paradigm shift" by replacing the
agency's current "single ship contracting program in favor of [a]
multi-ship, multi-option" type of contract, and that successful offerors
would "need to either possess their own USCG certified dry dock facility
or have access to a USCG certified dry dock facility in the Bay Area." Id.
at 1-2. The pre-solicitation notice, issued on Feb. 14, 2007, also
provided this information. AR, Tab 36, Pre-Solicitation Notice. These two
notices were issued well in advance of the solicitation on May 24, 2007.
On this record, we believe that the agency met its obligation to inform
offerors of its intended procurement approach.[9]
B. Bundling in Violation of CICA
NEI argues that even if the Coast Guard's approach of consolidating the
maintenance and repair services does not violate the Small Business Act's
prohibitions on bundling, the solicitation violates CICA's prohibition on
improperly consolidating requirements. CICA generally requires that
solicitations permit full and open competition and contain restrictive
provisions and conditions only to the extent "necessary to satisfy the
needs of the executive agency." 41 U.S.C. sect. 253a(a)(2)(B). Since
bundled or consolidated procurements may combine separate, multiple
requirements into one contract, they have the potential for restricting
competition by excluding firms that can furnish only a portion of the
requirement. Aalco Forwarding, Inc., et al., B-277241.12, B-277241.13,
Dec. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 175 at 6. In interpreting CICA, we have
looked to see whether an agency has a reasonable basis for its contention
that bundling is required, and we have sustained protests only where no
reasonable basis is demonstrated. Phoenix Scientific Corp., B-286817, Feb.
22, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 24 at 10.
Here, the agency concluded that the combination of the dockside and
shipside maintenance and repair work will result in measurably substantial
benefits to the government. As discussed above, we conclude that these
benefits, including maintenance and repair cost savings and increased
operational time for the WHEC cutters based on reduced duration of
maintenance availabilities, justified bundling under the Small Business
Act. In our view, these benefits also provide a reasonable basis to
justify the consolidation of the two requirements for purposes of CICA.
See Teximara, Inc., B-293221.2, July 9, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 151 at 8-9.
The protest is denied.[10]
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel
------------------------
[1] The three WHEC cutters are the Boutwell, Morenthau, and Sherman. A
fourth cutter, the Munro, was initially part of the agency's intended
procurement, but was deleted from the procurement prior to the issuance of
the solicitation due to its assignment to a different home port.
[2] As discussed below, and noted by the protester, the Navy chose not to
attempt to quantify the value of increased operational time gained from
reduced maintenance and repair time. AR, Tab 22, Navy Small Business
Justification, at 17.
[3] In addition to the two categories of substantial benefits discussed
above, the Coast Guard's analysis also concluded that the agency would
benefit from increased "quality and effectiveness" in ship repair. AR, Tab
27, Bundling Analysis, at 4. The agency did not attempt to quantify this
benefit.
[4] Our Office provided the SBA an opportunity to submit comments on the
protest and the Coast Guard's agency report. The SBA advised our Office
that it did not wish to submit comments.
[5] In particular, the protester contends that the agency's interpretation
of the phrase "a small business concern" could lead to the conclusion
that, for example, a consolidation of requirements that precludes 99 out
of 100 small business offerors from submitting proposals is not bundling
in violation of the Small Business Act.
[6] The protester also argues that the Coast Guard's reliance on the data
cited in the Navy's justification was unreasonable because the record does
not indicate whether the SBA approved the Navy's bundling justification
for its destroyer maintenance and repair solicitation. We believe that
this argument is unavailing: the Coast Guard's bundling analysis relied
upon the underlying data cited in the Navy's justification, and not
whether the SBA actually approved the Navy's use of that data in its own
justification. In any event, as relevant here, the SBA approved the Coast
Guard's bundling justification for this procurement.
[7] Although the protester did not address the role of the WHEC cutter
Munroe in the Coast Guard's bundling analysis, we note that the agency's
justification assumes that this ship would be part of the procurement. The
Munro accounted for one of the eight scheduled maintenance availabilities,
but was subsequently removed from the procurement based on its change of
home ports. CO Statement para. 26; AR, Tab 34, Acquisition Plan, at 3.
Although the agency's bundling analysis was not redone after the deletion
of the Munro, the record shows that this change would not have affected
the Coast Guard's conclusion that the phased maintenance approach would
result in measurably substantial benefits to the government in excess of
10 percent of the anticipated contract value.
[8] NEI also contends that certain internal Coast Guard forms approving
the procurement, including small business plan, did not have the proper
signatures. The balance of the record shows that the small business plan
and justifications were adequately documented by the CO, and that the SBA
agreed with the Coast Guard's proposed procurement. To the extent any
individual form lacked a signature, we view this as a procedural defect
that was not prejudicial to NEI. See Military Agency Servs. Pty., Ltd.,
B-290414 et. al., Aug. 1, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 130, at 8. In this regard,
our Office will not sustain a protest absent a showing of competitive
prejudice, that is, unless the protester demonstrates that, but for the
agency's actions, it would have a substantial chance of receiving award.
McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3; see
Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
[9] Even if we were to conclude that the pre-solicitation notice did not
meet the agency's requirement to provide the 30-day notice to potentially
affected small business firms, the protester has not demonstrated any
potential prejudice here. McDonald-Bradley, supra; see Statistica, Inc.,
supra. In this regard, NEI was able to file a timely protest challenging
the terms of the solicitation.
[10] In pursuing this protest, NEI has raised various collateral issues.
For example, as an alternative to its primary grounds of protest, the
protester argues that even if the bundling was justified, the RFP should
have been set aside for small businesses. NEI contends that the agency's
market research shows that at least two small business offerors exist who
could meet the agency's requirements: (1) Bay Ship & Yacht, which
possesses a dry dock, and (2) NEI, which can perform the dockside work.
NEI Comments on AR at 27, n.13. NEI misstates, however, the so-called
"rule of two," which requires an agency to set aside procurements over
$100,000 when it has a reasonable expectation of receiving proposals from
at least two responsible small business offerors and that award will be
made at fair market prices. FAR sect. 19.502-2(b). The set-aside
requirement clearly does not apply here because there was no reasonable
expectation that two or more responsible small businesses offerors would
submit responsible proposals in response to the solicitation, i.e.
proposals for both the dry dock and dockside work. We have reviewed all of
the protester's arguments, and conclude that none provides a basis for
sustaining the protest.