TITLE:  Legal Principles Applicable to Selection of Federal Advisory Committee Members, B-303767, October 18, 2004
BNUMBER:  B-303767
DATE:  October 18, 2004
**********************************************************************
   B-303767

   October 18, 2004

   The Honorable Brian Baird
House of Representatives

   Subject: Legal Principles Applicable to Selection of Federal Advisory
Committee Members

   Dear Mr. Baird:

   This letter is in response to your September 1, 2004 request regarding a
follow-up question on our report, Federal Advisory Committees: Additional
Guidance Could Help Agencies Better Ensure Independence and Balance
(GAO-04-328, April 2004), issued to you and Representative Johnson.  Among
other things, our report made recommendations designed to better ensure
that federal agencies comply with independence and balance requirements
when appointing advisory committee members.  We did not make any judgments
about whether conflicts of interest existed on any particular committee or
whether any particular committee was properly balanced.

   In connection with this report, you asked us whether federal agencies may
inquire about and consider an individual's political affiliation in
selecting members for their advisory committees.  There are a number of
provisions in federal personnel law that prohibit agencies from
discriminating against employees or applicants for employment on the basis
of political affiliation.  As discussed in part I below, whether these
provisions apply to a particular advisory committee candidate turns on the
candidate's federal employment status (or what the candidate's status
would be if selected)*specifically, whether the candidate is or would be a
regular federal employee, a "special government employee" (SGE), or a
non-employee.  In addition to applicable personnel law provisions, as
discussed in part II below, there are other statutory restrictions on
agency use of political affiliation in the selection of members for
certain specifically designated advisory committees.  Determining whether
a violation of either the personnel laws or the committee-specific
statutory restrictions has occurred would require a thorough and nuanced
examination of the particular facts and circumstances on a case-by-case
basis. 

   You did not ask us to analyze, nor did we analyze, these issues with
regard to the facts surrounding selection of members for any particular
advisory committee.  Instead, our analysis was designed solely to identify
general legal principles that may apply to the selection of advisory
committee members.  Accordingly, this opinion should not be construed as
expressing a view about the activities of any particular agency or
committee.

   Analysis

   I.  Federal Personnel Laws Applicable to the Selection of Certain Types of
Advisory
       Committee Members

   A number of statutes prohibit the federal government from discriminating
based on political affiliation.  Some of these prohibit
political-affiliation discrimination when selecting individuals for
employment in specific positions.[1]  In addition to these job-specific
prohibitions, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No.
95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, one of the principal personnel laws, prohibits
discrimination based on political affiliation in certain circumstances, by
designating actions as "prohibited personnel practices."  As with all CSRA
provisions, however, these provisions apply only to persons who are
federal employees.[2]  Before discussing how these prohibited personnel
practice provisions may apply in the context of federal advisory
committees, therefore, it is helpful to understand the different federal
employment statuses of advisory committee members.

   As discussed in our report, federal advisory committee members generally
are either "representative members" or SGE members.[3]  Representative
members are "invited to appear at a department or agency in a
representative capacity" and are not federal employees.[4]  Their
selection is therefore not subject to federal personnel or employment
laws, including the CSRA.  SGEs, by contrast, "serv[e] on a government
advisory committeeA .A .A .A in an independent capacity, rather than
presenting the views of a particular organizationA .A .A .A [and] must be
formally appointed" to federal service.[5]  According to officials at the
General Services Administration (which has primary responsibility for
overseeing the establishment of advisory committees), SGEs are appointed
as "excepted service" employees, rather than competitive service
employees.[6]  As federal employees, SGEs are covered by the CSRA. 
Regular federal employees also are occasionally named to federal advisory
committees, and they, too, would be covered by the CSRA.  According to
officials at the Office of Personnel Management, regular federal employees
in the competitive service would ordinarily maintain their competitive
service status while serving on a committee.[7]

   When selecting SGE or regular federal employee advisory committee members,
the two principal CSRA prohibited personnel practices potentially relevant
to consideration of political affiliation are 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(1)(E)
and 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(10).  These are discussed below.

   A.A A A A  Section 2302(b)(1)(E)

   Section 2302(b)(1)(E) prohibits federal officials who are taking or
recommending personnel actions "from discriminat[ing] for or against any .
. . employee or applicant for  employment . . . on the basis of . . .
political affiliation, as prohibited under any [other] law, rule, or
regulation."  Because candidates for SGE or regular federal employee
committee positions (but not representative positions) would be considered
"employee[s] or applicant[s] for employment," and officials selecting them
would be considered to be taking a personnel action, this provision could
apply to prohibit consideration of political affiliation as a
discriminating factor in selecting SGE or regular employee committee
members.[8] 

   In practice, however, SA 2302(b)(1)(E) is likely to have only limited
application to the selection of advisory committee members.  Section
2302(b)(1)(E) alone does not make it a prohibited personnel practice to
discriminate based on political affiliation.  Rather, a selecting official
must have violated some otherA "law, rule, or regulation" barring
political affiliation discrimination; that violation, in turn, would
constitute a prohibited personnel practice.  See, e.g., Mitchell v. Espy,
845 F. Supp. 1474, 1492 (D. Kan. 1994) (SA 2302(b)(1)(E) reflects general
principle prohibiting discrimination based on political affiliation but
principle "cannot be considered in the absence of a law, rule, or
regulation alleged to have been violated.").  Several "other" laws and
regulations do prohibit political affiliation discrimination, but, to the
best of our knowledge,[9] these principally apply to: (a) competitive
service positions;[10] or (b)A positions on committees for which Congress
has specifically prohibited the consideration of political affiliation
(discussed in part II below).[11]  Thus, in the context of selecting
advisory committee members, SA 2302(b)(1)(E) prohibits agencies from
considering political affiliation in a discriminatory manner when
evaluating regular federal employees for any advisory committee or when
evaluating regular federal employees or SGEs for one of the statutorily
designated committees.[12]  It does not prohibit such inquiry of
individuals being considered for a representative member position because,
as noted, representative members are not federal employees covered by the
CSRA.  Moreover, even when SA 2302(b)(1)(E) applies, proving that a
particular advisory committee selection decision reflected discrimination
on the basis of political affiliation would require specific factual
evidence that the appointment decision depended on the candidate's
political affiliation, which likely would present significant evidentiary
challenges.[13]

   B.A A A A A  Section 2302(b)(10)

   The second CSRA prohibited personnel practice provision that on its face
might apply to the selection of advisory committee members is 5 U.S.C.
SA 2302(b)(10).  Whether this provision alone would prohibit agencies from
considering political affiliation, however, has not been squarely
addressed either by the courts or the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).[14]  Furthermore, as discussed below, even if the provision
applies, there likely would be practical difficulties of proof in
demonstrating a violation of SA 2302(b)(10) in a particular case.

   Under SA 2302(b)(10), it is a prohibited personnel practice for federal
officials with personnel decisonmaking authority to discriminate for or
against any applicant for employment on the basis of conduct that does not
adversely affect either the employee's job performance or the performance
of others.  The legislative history of this provision indicates that
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination against activities that have
no bearing on job performance.  The Conference Report stated:

   The conferees intend that only conduct of the employee or applicant that
is related to the duties to be assigned to an employee or applicant or the
employee's or applicant's performance or the performance of others may be
taken into consideration in determining that employee's suitability or
fitness. 

   H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, at 131 (1978).  The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, in looking to the CSRA's Findings and
Statement of Purposes, has stated that SA 2302(b)(10) "provides extensive
protection from discrimination of all types, where that discrimination is
unrelated to on-the-job conduct and performance."  Garrow v. Gramm, 856
F.2d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing CSRA SA 3, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1112). 

   In some circumstances, agencies deem political affiliation to be a
relevant job qualification for advisory committee membership because by
law, such committees must be balanced. [15]  In those cases, a potential
member's political affiliation could be relevant to committee job
performance, and thus inquiry about it might not be a violation of
SA 2302(b)(10).  In other circumstances, however, political affiliation
may be irrelevant to committee job performance, in which case
consideration of a potential member's political affiliation in a
discriminatory manner might be a prohibited personnel practice under
SA 2302(b)(10).  Even where inquiry into political affiliation is
prohibited, however, proving that selection in a specific case was based
on this prohibited factor, rather than on some other factor, likely would
present evidentiary challenges.  It would require establishing factual
evidence that the appointment decision specifically hinged on the
candidate's political affiliation,[16] which is likely to be a difficult
burden.[17]

   C.  Merit Systems Principles

   Even if asking a potential SGE or regular federal employee advisory
committee member about their political affiliation is not a prohibited
personnel practice under the CSRA, it would, in many cases, be contrary to
the CSRA's "merit system principles."  The CSRA declares that federal
personnel management "should be implemented consistent with the . . .
merit system principles," one of which is that "[a]ll employees and
applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in
all aspects of personnel management without regard to political
affiliationA .A .A . and with proper regard for their privacy and
constitutional rights."  5 U.S.C. SA 2301(b)(2)(emphasis added).  The MSPB
has found this merit system principle "in effect, make[s] political
discrimination in federal employment contrary to federal personnel
policy."  Acting Special Counsel v. Sullivan, 6 M.S.P.B. 442, 444 (1981). 

   Yet both the courts and the MSPB have ruled that these merit systems
principles are advisory only, providing guidance to, but not imposing
requirements on, federal agencies.[18]  The principles therefore do not
"provide [an] independent basis for action by either the agency or an
employee," Middleton v. Dep't of Justice, 23 M.S.P.R. 223, 227 n.6 (1984).

   II.  Additional Statutes Applicable to the Selection of Members of
Specific

   Advisory Committees

   In addition to the general personnel law restrictions described above,
there are a number of federal advisory committees for which consideration
of political affiliation in member selection is specifically prohibited by
statute, irrespective of the federal employment status of the candidate
(non-employee, SGE, or regular federal employee) or the type of advisory
committee position being filled.  If these statutory prohibitions are
violated, the violation also could form the basis, for regular federal
employee or SGE committee members, of a prohibited personnel practice
under 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(1)(E), as discussed in part I above. 

   Some of these statutes prohibit political affiliation consideration by
specific committee name.  Members of the Commercial Fishing Industry
Vessel Safety Advisory Committee, for example, must be selected without
regard to political affiliation.  See 46 U.S.C. SA 4508(b)(2).  See also,
e.g., 19 U.S.C. SA 2155(b)(1) (requiring the establishment of an advisory
committee for trade policy and negotiations and stating that appointments
shall be made without regard to political affiliation). 

   Congress also has prohibited agencies from using political affiliation in
selecting members for advisory committees established under three
health-related statutes: the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. SSA 201
et seq., the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. SSA 2689 et seq., and the
Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and
Rehabilitation Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. SSA 4541 et seq.  All such
appointments "shall be made without  regard to political affiliation." 
See 42 U.S.C. SA 217a-1, codifying section 1001 of the Health Research and
Health Services Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 401.
Thus, for example, political affiliation may not be a factor in naming
members to committees established under the Public Health Service Act, a
universe which includes a number of Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) advisory committees.[19]  Among these committees are the
National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse,[20] the Food and Drug
Administration's Advisory Committee on Reproductive Health Drugs,[21] and
the National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research, [22] as well as
four of the committees we reviewed in our report.[23]  Again, we did not
analyze the facts and circumstances regarding selection of members for
these committees or any other particular committee.

Conclusion

   Agencies are prohibited under the federal personnel laws from
discriminating on the basis of political affiliation when considering
regular federal employees in the competitive service for membership on
advisory committees.  Such discrimination is deemed to be a prohibited
personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(1)(E).  Federal advisory
committee members generally are representative or SGE members, however,
rather than regular federal employees, and SA 2302(b)(1)(E) generally
allows agencies to ask about and consider political affiliation when
selecting representative or SGE members.  Under a second prohibited
personnel practice provision, 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(10), agencies may be
barred in particular facts and circumstances from discriminating on the
basis of political affiliation when selecting regular federal employees or
SGEs for committees.  Finally, although Congress has enacted merit system
principles prohibiting consideration of political affiliation in all
aspects of federal employee personnel management, the courts and the MSPB
have uniformly ruled that these principles are not legally enforceable
prohibitions. 

   In addition to these personnel law restrictions, and irrespective of the
federal employment status of the candidate, Congress has prohibited
consideration of political affiliation for a number of specifically
designated advisory committees.  When selecting members for those
designated committees, inquiring about or considering political
affiliation would violate the committee-specific restrictions.  In
addition, where the candidate for a designated committee happens to be a
federal employee, inquiring about or considering political affiliation
could also constitute a prohibited personnel practice under the personnel
laws.

   Whether a violation of any of the foregoing prohibitions has occurred in a
particular instance would depend on a fact-specific investigation and
analysis on a case-by-case basis.  Our analysis was designed solely to
identify relevant legal principles, however; we did not conduct an
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the selection by
any particular agency of the members of any particular advisory committee.

   Please contact Susan D. Sawtelle, Associate General Counsel, at (202)
512-6417, Karen Keegan, Assistant General Counsel, at (202) 512-8240, or
Amy Webbink, Senior Attorney, at (202) 512-4764, if you have any questions
concerning this opinion.

   Sincerely yours,

   Anthony H. Gamboa
General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. SA 72a(a) (professional staff members for Senate
committees "shall be appointedA .A .A .A without regard to political
affiliation."); 2 U.S.C. SA 130-2(c)(1) (Director of Interparliamentary
Affairs of House of Representatives "shall be appointedA .A .A .A without
regard to political affiliation."); 2 U.S.C. SA 601(a)(2) (Director of
Congressional Budget Office "shall be appointedA .A .A .A without regard
to political affiliation."); 5 U.S.C. app. 3 SA 3(a) (agency Inspectors
General "shall be appointedA .A .A .A without regard to political
affiliation."); 10 U.S.C. SA 139(a)(1) (Department of Defense Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation "shall be appointed without regard to
political affiliation."); 16 U.S.C. SA 554a (forest inspectors, fire
patrol, and certain other Department of Agriculture employees "are to be
hereafter appointedA .A .A .A without regard for their political
affiliations.").

   [2] If these CSRA prohibitions apply, they provide "the exclusive
procedure for challenging federal personnel decisions."  Petrini v.
Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1990). 

   [3] See also Office of Government Ethics, Memorandum 82X22, Members of
Federal Advisory Committees and the Conflict-of-Interest Statutes, at 3-4
(July 9, 1982).

   [4] Id.

   [5] Id.

   [6] Letter from Raymond J. McKenna, General Counsel, General Services
Administration, to Susan D. Sawtelle, Associate General Counsel, GAO (Sep.
15, 2004). 

   [7] Letter from Mark A. Robbins, General Counsel, Office of Personnel
Management, to Susan D. Sawtelle, Associate General Counsel, GAO (Sep. 17,
2004) (OPM Letter).

   [8]  Taking, or failing to take, a personnel action is not necessary to
find a prohibited personnel practice, but any discrimination found must be
related to the authority to "take, recommend, or approve a personnel
action" to be covered by SA 2302(b)(1)(E).  See Special Counsel v.
Russell, 28 M.S.P.R. 162, 168-69 (1985).  Under the CSRA, appointment of
an applicant for a covered position is a personnel action.  5 U.S.C.
SA 2302(a)(2)(A)(i).  With some exceptions, competitive service and
excepted service positions are considered covered positions.  5 U.S.C.
SA 2302(a)(2)(B). 

   [9] It is possible that an agency may have a manual or some other guidance
of which we are not aware that could qualify as a "law, rule, or
regulation" prohibiting political affiliation discrimination.

   [10] Under 5 C.F.R. SA 300.103(c), for example, "[a]n employment practice 
shall not discriminate on the basis of . . . partisan political
affiliation, or other nonmerit factor," but this applies only to
employment practices for the competitive service. See also 5 C.F.R.
SA 300.101 (purpose of the regulations is to establish principles to
govern employment practices that "affect the recruitment, measurement,
ranking and selection of individuals for initial appointment and
competitive promotion in the competitive service").  Similarly, inquiries
into and consideration of political affiliation are prohibited by 5 C.F.R.
SA 4.2, but again, only for positions in the competitive service.  See
also 5 C.F.R. SA 720.901(a) ("In determining the merit and fitness of a
person for competitive appointment or appointment by noncompetitive action
to a position in the competitive service, an appointing officer shall not
discriminate on the basis of the person's political affiliations, except
when required by statuteA .A .A .A .").

   [11] The First Amendment has also been cited as a "law" the violation of
which could form the basis of a SA 2302(b)(1)(E) violation.  See Feit v.
Ward, 886 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1989).  Similarly, SA 2302(b)(10), discussed
in part B below, could be another such "law."  These interpretations could
apply to both SGE and regular federal employee committee members.  See
footnotes 15-17 below and corresponding text.

   [12] The same agency conduct that would constitute discrimination on the
basis of political affiliation prohibited by a law, rule, or regulation
under SA 2302(b)(1)(E) likely also would violate 5 U.S.C. SA 2302(b)(12). 
Section 2302(b)(12), establishing another prohibited personnel practice,
prohibits personnel actions that violate any law, rule, or regulation
implementing or directly concerning the CSRA's "merit system principles." 
As discussed in part C below, one of these merit system principles is that
"[a]ll employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and
equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard
to political affiliationA .A .A . and with proper regard for their privacy
and constitutional rights."  5 U.S.C. SA 2301(b)(2) (emphasis added).

   [13] The MSPB, an independent quasi-judicial agency established to protect
federal merit systems against partisan political and other prohibited
personnel practices, has found that while inquiries concerning political
affiliation may be cited as evidence of discrimination, such inquiries are
only prohibited if they are actually shown to be "discriminatory in
purpose or inherently coercive in the context in which they were made" and
that "unlawful intent is not lightly to be inferred."  Acting Special
Counsel v. Sullivan, 6 M.S.P.B. 442, 458, 461 (1981).  See also Buckler v.
Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, 73 M.S.P.R. 476, 497 (1997)
("[A]n appellant may establish a prima facie case of prohibited
discrimination by introducing preponderant evidence to show that he is a
member of a protected group, he was similarly situated to an individual
who was not a member of the protected group, and he was treated more
harshly or disparately than the individual who was not a member of his
protected group.").

   [14] The MSPB has heard at least two cases involving violations of both
sections 2302(b)(1)(E) and 2302(b)(10).  However, neither decision
addressed whether SA 2302(b)(10) alone would prohibit
political-affiliation discrimination.  See Special Counsel v. Dept. of
Commerce, 23 M.S.P.R. 561 (1984); Acting Special Counsel v. Sullivan, 6
M.S.P.B. 442 (1981).

   [15] As discussed in our report, the Federal Advisory Committee Act
requires that committee memberships be "fairly balanced in terms of the
points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the
advisory committee."  5 U.S.C. app. 2, SA 5(b)(2).   The political
affiliation of members of particular committees has been deemed relevant
in achieving such balance.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. SA 303 note (certain
Federal Communications Commission advisory committee must be "fairly
balanced in terms of political affiliation"); United States Coast Guard,
Commandant Instruction 5420.37, Attach. 3 at 1 and 3 (Sep. 23, 1993)
(political affiliation information sought for purposes of balance).  See
also OPM Letter, above (achieving requisite committee member balance may
be difficult in some circumstances without considering political
affiliation or philosophical positions).

   [16] See footnote 13 above.

   [17] If it can be demonstrated that an agency established party
affiliation as a factor for federal employee committee membership but that
political affiliation is not, in fact, relevant to job performance,
arguably this also might implicate the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court
has stated that "the ultimate inquiry . . . is whether the [government]
hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." 
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).  While Branti addressed the
discharge of public employees, the Supreme Court has also afforded First
Amendment protections to hiring decisions based on party affiliation.  See
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).  On the other
hand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has questioned, in
dicta, whether patronage hiring for temporary positions would be afforded
the same First Amendment protections.  Vickery v. Jones, 100 F.3d 1334,
1339-40 (7th Cir. 1996).  Thus, it is not altogether clear what First
Amendment protections would be afforded to potential advisory committee
members who have temporary duties. 

   [18] See, e.g., Lien v. Metzler, 152 F.3d 948 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("The merit
systems principles set forth in section 2301 are only intended to furnish
guidance to federal agencies."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 966 (1998); Neal
v. Dep't of Human Health and Serv., 46 M.S.P.R. 26, 28 (1990) ("The merit
systems principles are intended to furnish guidance to Federal
agenciesA .A .A .A ."); Parton v. FCC, 7 M.S.P.B. 236, 239 (1981) ("[T]he
Merit Systems Principles are not self-executing in that they cannot be the
basis of an action unless they are implemented by a law, rule, or
regulation, but according to the legislators' statement of purposes in
enacting them, the Principles are *expressly stated to furnish guidance to
Federal agencies in carrying out their responsibilities in administering
the public business.'").  In concluding that the merit principles are only
advisory, the courts and the MSPB have relied in part on the fact that the
statute says federal personnel management "should be"*not "shall be" or
"must be"*consistent with the merit systems principles.  CSRA's
legislative history is consistent with this interpretation. See H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 95-1717, at 3 (1978) (merit system principles are "expressly
stated to furnish guidance to Federal agencies in carrying out their
responsibilities in administering the public business").

   [19] As noted in our report, HHS entities sponsor 26 percent of all
federal advisory committees and 36 percent of all scientific and technical
advisory committees.

   [20] See Charter for the National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse (citing
42 U.S.C. SA 284a, section 406 of the Public Health Service Act).  Some
individuals being considered for membership on this council have alleged
that they were asked whether they voted for President Bush.  See, e.g.,
Barton Reppert, Politics in the Lab Hits U.S. Scientific Integrity,
Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 2004,  at 11;  Aaron Zitner, Advisors
Put Under a Microscope, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 23, 2003, at A1;  Union of
Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policy Making (July
2004)(Union of Concerned Scientists) at 28.  As noted above, we did not
analyze the facts and circumstances surrounding the selection of these or
any other advisory committee members.

   [21] See Charter for the Advisory Committee on Reproductive Health Drugs
(citing 42 U.S.C. SSA 217a, 241, 242, 242a, 262, and 264, sections 222,
301-303, 351, and 361 of the Public Health Service Act).

   [22] See Charter for the National Advisory Council for Human Genome
Research (citing 42 U.S.C. SA 284a, section 406 of the Public Health
Service Act).  Some individuals nominated to serve on this council have
alleged that they were asked "leading political questions" that they
believed were a "political litmus test."  See, e.g., Maggie Fox, U.S.
Science Policy Swayed by Politics, Says Group, Reuters, July 9, 2004.  See
also Union of Concerned Scientists, above, at 26-28 (stating that two
individuals reported being asked questions about their political views
during their appointment process).  Again, we did not analyze the facts
and circumstances surrounding the selection of these or any other advisory
committee members.

   [23] The four committees we reviewed in our report which are covered by
this limitation are: (1) the National Human Research Protections Advisory
Committee, see Charter for the National Human Research Protections
Advisory Committee (citing 42 U.S.C., SA 217a, section 222 of Public
Health Service Act); (2) the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's
Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention, see Charter for
the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention (citing 42
U.S.C. SA 217a, section 222 of Public Health Service Act); (3) the
Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods, see
Charter for the Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological
Methods (citing 42 U.S.C. SA 285l, section 463A of Public Health Service
Act); and (4) FDA's Food Advisory Committee, see Charter for the Food
Advisory Committee (citing, among other things, 42 U.S.C. SSA 217a, 241,
242, 242a, 262, and 264, sections 222, 301-303, 351, and 361 of the Public
Health Service Act).