TITLE: B-299978; B-299978.3; B-299978.4, AlliedBarton Security Services LLC, October 9, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299978; B-299978.3; B-299978.4
DATE: October 9, 2007
*************************************************************************************
B-299978; B-299978.3; B-299978.4, AlliedBarton Security Services LLC, October 9, 2007
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Decision
Matter of: AlliedBarton Security Services LLC
File: B-299978; B-299978.3; B-299978.4
Date: October 9, 2007
Daniel B. Abrahams, Esq., and Michael D. Maloney, Esq., Epstein, Becker &
Green, P.C.; and W. Jay DeVecchio, Esq., David A. Churchill, Esq., Kevin
C. Dwyer, Esq., and Daniel E. Chudd, Esq., Jenner & Block LLP, for the
protester.
Wendy S. Tien, Esq., Shapiro Sher Guinot & Sandler, for Knight Protective
Services, Inc., an intervenor.
Audrey H. Liebross, Esq., Federal Emergency Management Agency, for the
agency.
Louis A. Chiarella, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Protest challenging agency's eligibility determination under the
authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. sect. 5150, is denied where the agency
reasonably concluded that the protester was not a firm residing or doing
business primarily in the designated set-aside location.
2. Protester is not an interested party for purposes of challenging the
successful vendor's eligibility for receipt of a task order where the
record shows that, even if the protest were sustained on this ground, an
intervening vendor would be next in line for selection.
DECISION
AlliedBarton Security Services LLC protests the issuance of a task order
to Knight Protective Services, Inc. pursuant to request for quotations
(RFQ) No. HSFEHQ-07-Q-0053, issued by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), Department of Homeland Security, for armed guard services
for FEMA housing sites in the Baton Rouge, Louisiana area. AlliedBarton
argues that the agency's determination, pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sect.
5121 et seq. (2000) (the Stafford Act), that it was not a firm residing or
primarily doing business in the state of Louisiana, and therefore was
ineligible for receipt of a task order under the RFQ, was unreasonable.
The protester also claims that FEMA's Stafford Act determination regarding
Knight was improper.
We deny the protest.
BACKGROUND
The RFQ, issued on April 12, 2007, to holders of General Services
Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts for guard
services, contemplated the issuance of a time-and-materials type task
order with fixed unit prices and quantities specified by the agency for a
base period of 2 months together with ten 6-month options. The
solicitation included a statement of work (SOW), instructions to vendors
on the submission of quotations, and evaluation factors for award. The RFQ
established four technical evaluation factors, in descending order of
importance--technical approach, management plan, personnel, and past
performance--as well as price. The technical factors, when combined, were
significantly more important than price. The agency would select the
vendor whose quotation represented the overall best value to the agency,
all factors considered. RFQ amend. 3, Instructions to Vendors, at 11-13.
Additionally, under the authority of the Stafford Act, the RFQ set aside
the procurement for firms residing or doing business primarily in the
state of Louisiana. Id. at 1-2.
Eight vendors, including AlliedBarton and Knight, submitted quotations by
the May 17 closing date. The agency then conducted technical, price, and
Stafford Act eligibility evaluations of vendors' quotations. The agency's
final evaluation ratings of the quotations submitted by AlliedBarton and
Knight were as follows:
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|Factor | AlliedBarton | Knight |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Technical Approach | Exceptional | Satisfactory |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Management Plan | Exceptional | Very Good |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Personnel | Very Good | Very Good |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Past Performance | Very Good | Very Good |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Overall | Exceptional | Very Good |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Stafford Act Eligible | No | Yes |
|--------------------------+------------------+-----------------|
|Price | $156,430,339 | $156,657,383 |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+
Agency Report (AR), Tab 9, Consensus Report, at 10-11; Tab 10, Consensus
Technical Report, at 4-29. The agency subsequently determined that
Knight's quotation, which was lowest-priced among the most highly
technically-rated, eligible vendors, represented the best value to the
agency.[1] Id., Tab 11, Source Selection Decision, at 1. These protests
followed.
DISCUSSION
AlliedBarton's protest raises numerous issues regarding the agency's
evaluation of both its and Knight's quotations. Of foremost importance,
AlliedBarton protests that FEMA improperly determined that, for purposes
of the Stafford Act, it was not a business residing in the state of
Louisiana. The protester also challenges the agency's determination that
Knight was a firm residing or doing business primarily in Louisiana, and
argues that FEMA's evaluation of vendors's eligibility reflects unequal
treatment. Lastly, AlliedBarton argues that FEMA engaged in improper
discussions by permitting Knight to submit additional evidence to
establish that it was a firm residing in Louisiana after the deadline for
submission of quotations. For the reasons set forth below, we find no
basis upon which to sustain the protest.[2]
AlliedBarton's Stafford Act Eligibility
AlliedBarton first protests that the agency improperly determined that it
was not eligible for selection here under the Stafford Act. The protester
argues that FEMA's determination that it was not a firm residing or doing
business primarily in the State of Louisiana was unreasonable, disparate,
and lacked adequate documentation. While AlliedBarton does not contend
that it primarily does business in Louisiana, the protester contends that
it is a firm residing in Louisiana for purposes of the Stafford Act.
Pursuant to the authority of section 307 of the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C.
sect. 5150, amended by the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-295, sect. 694, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006), and the SAFE Port
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, sect. 611, 120 Stat. 1943 (2006), agencies may
provide a preference to or set aside disaster relief recovery contracts to
individuals or firms either residing or doing business primarily in the
designated location. In its entirety, the Stafford Act provision at issue
here states:
Use of Local Firms and Individuals
(a) Contracts or Agreements With Private Entities-
(1) In General -- In the expenditure of Federal funds for debris
clearance, distribution of supplies, reconstruction, and other major
disaster or emergency assistance activities which may be carried out by
contract or agreement with private organizations, firms, or individuals,
preferences shall be given, to the extent feasible and practicable, to
those organizations, firms, and individuals residing or doing business
primarily in the area affected by such major disaster or emergency.
* * * * *
(3) Specific Geographic Area -- In carrying out this section, a contract
or agreement may be set aside for award based on a specific geographic
area.[3]
42 U.S.C. sect. 5150.
Accordingly, the RFQ here was limited to firms residing or primarily doing
business in Louisiana, and incorporated Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR) clause 52.226-3, "Disaster or Emergency Area Representation." RFQ
amend. 3, at 63. Further, the solicitation provided vendors with
additional "guidance on what constitutes a firm residing or primarily
doing business in the State of Louisiana."[4] Id., Instructions to
Vendors, at 1-2. The RFQ also stated that "[i]f these factors establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that the firm in question resides or
primarily does business in the State of Louisiana, then said firm shall be
categorized as such." Id. at 2.
AlliedBarton's quotation included the required volume addressing its
Stafford Act eligibility. The protester's quotation set forth in detail
its ties to Louisiana, in a format consistent with the RFQ's quotation
preparation guidance factors, and included copies of its certificate of
incorporation and various Louisiana state licenses.[5] AR, Tab 6,
AlliedBarton's Quotation, vol. III, Stafford Act Evidence.
The agency subsequently determined that AlliedBarton was neither residing
nor primarily doing business in Louisiana. AR, Tab 9, Consensus Report, at
11. As expressed in a statement filed with FEMA's report to our Office,
the contracting officer considered relevant that AlliedBarton was
incorporated in Delaware, had its corporate headquarters in Pennsylvania,
and identified Arlington, Virginia as the location of its primary point of
contact for government business. Contracting Officer's Statement, Aug. 1,
2007, at 1. The contracting officer also stated as follows:
I balanced the factors in Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.226-3 to
determine whether the company resides in or primarily does business in
Louisiana. Favoring a decision that the company resides in or primarily
does business in Louisiana is the fact that it has been working in
Louisiana for 20 years and has had a Louisiana office since November 2002,
before Hurricane Katrina struck. On the other hand, its teaming agreement
with a local company did not provide sufficient assurance that the local
company would provide 50% of the cost of the guard workforce. Furthermore,
AlliedBarton indicated that its local office employs 200 individuals, but
it did not state anywhere that the individuals employed at the local
office are themselves local. Finally, AlliedBarton's 2006 Louisiana gross
revenues account for only about one percent of its total gross revenues.
Id. at 1-2. The contracting officer concluded that, in her opinion,
AlliedBarton had not satisfied the burden of demonstrating that it either
resided or did business primarily in Louisiana. Id. at 2.
AlliedBarton does not dispute the contracting officer's finding that only
one percent of its total gross revenues comes from Louisiana; rather,
AlliedBarton contends that this fact is irrelevant to a determination of
whether it resides there. Protest at 2 n.2. The protester also does not
dispute the contracting officer's findings that its teaming agreement did
not provide assurance that the local company would provide 50 percent of
the cost, or that AlliedBarton's quotation failed to indicate that the
200 individuals employed by its local office were themselves local. See
Comments, Aug. 8, 2007, at 19. Rather, AlliedBarton alleges that these
were merely post-hoc rationalizations by the agency to which our Office
should not give any weight. The protester also argues that FEMA's Stafford
Act eligibility determination was inadequately documented, unreasonable,
disparate, and failed to consider much of the specific evidence that the
vendor submitted establishing its residency within Louisiana. We disagree.
Where, as here, an agency issues an RFQ to FSS contractors under FAR
Subpart 8.4 and conducts a competition (see FAR sect. 8.405-2), we will
review the record to ensure that the agency's evaluation is reasonable and
consistent with the terms of the solicitation. See GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship,
B-298102, B-298102.3, June 14, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 96 at 6; RVJ Int'l,
Inc., B-292161, B-292161.2, July 2, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 124 at 5. In
reviewing an agency's evaluation of quotations, our Office will not
reevaluate quotations, but instead will examine the record to determine
whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and in accord with the stated
evaluation criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.
Sumaria Sys., Inc., B-299517,
B-299517.2, June 8, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 122 at 7.
In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we do not limit our review to
contemporaneous evidence, but consider all the information provided,
including the parties' arguments, explanations, and any hearing testimony.
Remington Arms Co., Inc., B-297374,
B-297374.2, Jan. 12, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 32 at 10. While we generally
give little weight to reevaluations and judgments prepared in the heat of
the adversarial process, Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2,
B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15, post-protest
explanations that provide a detailed rationale for contemporaneous
conclusions simply fill in previously unrecorded details, and will
generally be considered in our review of the rationality of selection
decisions, so long as those explanations are credible and consistent with
the contemporaneous record. NWT, Inc.; PharmChem Labs., Inc., B-280988,
B-280988.2, Dec. 17, 1998,
98-2 CPD para. 158 at 16. While the record documenting the agency's
eligibility determination lacks details, nonetheless, based on the entire
record in this case, we conclude that FEMA did undertake a Stafford Act
eligibility determination of vendors, including AlliedBarton, prior to its
award decision. Moreover, the contracting officer's statement here does
not involve after-the-fact, subjective judgments; rather, we view the
post-protest documentation here as merely a memorialization of a
contemporaneous analysis.[6]
Further, as explained in detail below, our review of the record indicates
that FEMA's evaluation of AlliedBarton's quotation and resulting
determination that the vendor was not a firm residing (or doing business
primarily) in Louisiana for purposes of the Stafford Act was reasonable
and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. The record reflects
that the contracting officer properly considered the information which
AlliedBarton submitted as well as other relevant information. Although we
do not specifically address all of the protester's arguments about the
evaluation of its quotation, we have fully considered all of them and find
that they afford no basis to question the agency's Stafford Act
eligibility determination.
As a preliminary matter, we note that both the relevant FAR clause and the
additional solicitation guidance provided to vendors regarding what
constitutes residing or primarily doing business in Louisiana set forth
non-exclusive lists of factors to be considered as part of the agency's
determination. Thus, it was not improper for the agency to consider
information beyond that which the RFQ required vendors to submit. Further,
the FAR clause does not express which factors are considered relevant to
the "residing" prong, and which are relevant to the "doing business
primarily" prong, of a Stafford Act eligibility determination. The FAR
clause also does not state how the factors are to be weighed, or preclude
giving different weightings to different factors. Accordingly, our review
focuses on whether the agency's determination was reasonable and
consistent with the stated evaluation criteria, all factors considered.
We find that FEMA's determination regarding AlliedBarton's Stafford Act
eligibility was a reasonable one. As set forth above, the contracting
officer properly considered where the vendor was incorporated, where it
had its corporate headquarters, and the location of the company's
government business primary point of contact, all of which were outside
Louisiana. The contracting officer also considered information contained
within the vendor's quotation favoring a decision that the company resided
in Louisiana, as well as information to the contrary.[7] The contracting
officer then balanced the factors set forth in FAR clause 52.226-3 and
concluded that AlliedBarton had not satisfied the burden of demonstrating
that it either resided or did business primarily in Louisiana. Once an
agency has given meaningful consideration to all relevant information, a
protest challenging an agency's evaluation of such information will not be
sustained unless the agency's judgments were unreasonable or contrary to
the stated evaluation criteria. See Kay & Assocs., Inc., B-291269, Dec.
11, 2002, 2003 CPD para. 12 at 4; see also Alion Sci. & Tech. Corp.,
B-297022.4, B-297022.5, Sept. 26, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 146 at 8. We find
the protester's challenge to the agency's evaluation here amounts to mere
disagreement with the agency's judgment and thus does not establish that
the evaluation was unreasonable. JAVIS Automation & Eng'g, Inc.,
B-293235.6, Apr. 29, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 95 at 5.
AlliedBarton also asserts that the agency's Stafford Act determination was
improper because the agency believed that a business concern could not
reside in numerous places simultaneously. The protester essentially argues
that the contracting officer focused too heavily, if not exclusively, on
AlliedBarton's state of incorporation. While the protester does not
dispute that it is incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in
Pennsylvania, it argues that if, under the Stafford Act, "residing" was to
mean only where a company was incorporated or had its principal place of
business, then Congress, or the FAR, would have reflected that view.
Comments, Aug. 8, 2007, at 10-11. The protester's argument is not
supported by the record.
The record indicates that FEMA did not interpret the term "residing" to
mean only where a firm was incorporated or headquartered; rather, the
contracting officer reasonably considered all relevant information,
including, but not limited to, where AlliedBarton was incorporated and
headquartered as part of her determination.
AlliedBarton also argues that FEMA's Stafford Act eligibility
determinations regarding itself and Knight reflect unequal treatment. The
protester offers a side-by-side comparison of the Stafford Act evidence
regarding itself and Knight under each of the FAR clause 52.226-3 criteria
to support its assertion that the agency's treatment of vendors was
unequal. AlliedBarton argues that, under many of the factors, the evidence
it submitted to demonstrate its Stafford Act eligibility was superior to
the evidence regarding Knight's eligibility. Comments, Aug. 8, 2007,
at 12-15.
In our view, AlliedBarton's argument here is mistakenly premised upon an
improper "apples and oranges" comparison of the vendors' quotations. When
performing its Stafford Act evaluation of Knight, the agency determined
that the awardee was eligible based on the "doing business primarily"
prong. AR, July 29, 2007, at 7; GAO Conference Call with Parties, Sept.
19, 2007. By contrast, the agency's Stafford Act eligibility determination
of AlliedBarton turns on the "residing" prong (the protester admits that
it does not do business primarily in Louisiana). Accordingly, the
protester's side-by-side comparison of which vendor has a greater overall
connection to the state of Louisiana is not meaningful or relevant to the
agency's determination whether the protester resides in the designated
location.
AlliedBarton also argues that there is no documentation in the record
establishing that the agency considered much of its Stafford Act evidence,
including its list of customers in various Louisiana cities, its local
offices, the fact that AlliedBarton had been licensed in Louisiana since
1983, the firm's relationships with local vendors and subcontractors, and
other information submitted by AlliedBarton which, the firm asserts,
establishes that AlliedBarton resides in Louisiana. AlliedBarton argues
that even the contracting officer's post-protest statement fails to
indicate that FEMA considered all the evidence presented by AlliedBarton
on this matter. AlliedBarton argues that, in light of the agency's alleged
failure to consider all relevant information, the conclusion that the firm
did not reside in Louisiana was unreasonable. Comments at 29-32. We
disagree.
The record does not support AlliedBarton's assertion that FEMA ignored
specific evidence submitted by the vendor and favoring a determination
that the firm was residing in Louisiana. Instead, the record reflects that
the agency reviewed the evidence submitted by AlliedBarton and balanced
the factors set forth in FAR clause 52.226-3 when determining the firm's
Stafford Act eligibility. There is simply no requirement that the agency
restate each favorable aspect of the vendor's quotation, or the complete
list of evaluation criteria set forth in the applicable FAR clause, as
part of its determination. See SAMS El Segundo, LLC, B-291620, B-291620.2,
Feb. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 44 at 18; Jacobs COGEMA, LLC, B-290125.2,
B-290125.3, Dec. 18, 2002, 2003 CPD para. 16 at 22.
Other Protest Issues
AlliedBarton also protests that the agency improperly permitted Knight to
submit additional evidence after the deadline for submission of quotations
to establish that it was Stafford Act eligible. Specifically, the
protester refers to a June 26 email showing that FEMA asked Knight to
provide the agency with a list of locations in Louisiana where Knight was
then providing guard services. AlliedBarton argues that the agency's
actions here constituted improper discussions since FEMA failed to afford
the protester a similar opportunity to provide additional evidence to
establish that it also resides in Louisiana.[8] Protest, Aug. 24, 2007, at
4-7.
After making its award determination on June 19, the contracting officer
decided to reassign guard sites in the New Orleans-area to the Baton
Rouge-area contractor, Knight.[9] As part of this action, the contracting
officer requested that Knight provide FEMA with a list of parishes in
Louisiana in which the firm was currently working. Agency Report, Aug. 31,
2007, at 1-2. There is no simply evidence that FEMA used or intended to
use information provided by Knight after the selection decision was made
to augment its pre-selection Stafford Act eligibility determination as the
protester contends: the agency's eligibility determination regarding
Knight does not mention or rely on the information provided by Knight in
the email here.[10] See Contracting Officer's Statement, Aug. 1, 2007, at
2-3. In sum, there is no support in the record for the protester's
assertion that FEMA's post-selection contact with Knight was for anything
other than contract administration purposes. In these circumstances, there
is no basis to conclude that the agency improperly conducted discussions
with only one vendor.
Lastly, AlliedBarton protests that the agency improperly determined that
Knight qualified as a firm residing or doing business primarily in
Louisiana. We find that AlliedBarton is not an interested party to raise
this issue. In order for a protest to be considered by our Office, a
protester must be an interested party, which means that it must have a
direct economic interest in the resolution of a protest issue. Bid Protest
Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sections 21.0(a)(1), 21.1(a) (2007); Cattlemen's
Meat Co., B-296616, Aug. 30, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 167 at 2 n.1. A
protester is an interested party to challenge the evaluation of the
awardee's quotation where there is a reasonable possibility that the
protester's quotation would be in line for selection if its protest were
sustained. Joint Mgmt. & Tech. Servs., B-294229, B-294229.2, Sept. 22,
2004, 2004 CPD para. 208 at 9; Ridoc Enter., Inc., B-292962.4, July 6,
2004, 2004 CPD para. 169 at 9. Here, AlliedBarton is ineligible for
selection because, as discussed above, the agency reasonably found it not
to be a firm residing or doing business primarily in the RFQ's designated
set-aside area. Given that there are other eligible vendors that would be
in line for selection even if AlliedBarton's challenge to FEMA's
evaluation of Knight's Stafford Act eligibility were sustained, we
consider AlliedBarton's interest to be too
remote to qualify it as an interested party to pursue this issue. See
Ridoc Enter., Inc., supra.
The protest is denied.
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel
------------------------
[1] The agency determined that, in addition to Knight, five other vendors
had also submitted technically acceptable quotations and were Stafford Act
eligible. AR, Tab 9, Consensus Report, at 11.
[2] After development of the record in these protests, the GAO attorney
conducted an outcome prediction alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
conference (for a description of GAO's outcome prediction ADR process, see
Alaska Structures, Inc.--Costs, B-298575.4, Jan. 22, 2007, 2007 CPD para.
15 at 4 n.4). He advised the parties that AlliedBarton's protest appeared
to be without merit insofar as the record showed that FEMA's evaluation of
the protester's Stafford Act eligibility was reasonable and consistent
with the stated evaluation criteria, the record did not establish that the
agency had engaged in improper discussions with Knight, and that
AlliedBarton was not an interested party to pursue its remaining basis of
protest. The protester subsequently informed our Office that it did not
intend to withdraw its protest based on this ADR session, but would rather
have a written decision on the merits of its case.
[3] For a description of the process by which the federal government
provides federal assistance generally under the Stafford Act, see AshBritt
Inc., B-297889, B-297889.2, Mar. 20, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 48 at 3-4.
[4] The RFQ's guidance on what constitutes a firm residing or primarily
doing business in the state of Louisiana consisted of a non-exclusive list
of factors to be considered by the agency that essentially restated the
criteria set forth in FAR clause 52.226-3. For example, the list included
location of the firm's permanent office, existing state licenses, and
record of past work in the designated area.
[5] AlliedBarton's quotation represented that the firm, among other
things, had both permanent primary and satellite offices located in
Louisiana, held a Louisiana state security license and was originally
licensed in Louisiana in 1983, had continued to provide security services
in Louisiana since 1983, had 200 permanent employees who worked in and
mostly resided in Louisiana, had relationships with various vendors
supporting its business, and was a member of various organization with
local chapters in Louisiana. AR, Tab 6, AlliedBarton's Quotation, vol.
III, Stafford Act Evidence, at 2-5.
[6] While we think it is unobjectionable here to consider the post-protest
documentation offered by the agency to fill in the previously unrecorded
details, the better practice clearly would have been to memorialize the
details contemporaneously rather than after a protest was filed.
[7] The protester does not dispute the validity of the information on
which the contracting officer relied here supporting the determination
that the firm was not residing in the state of Louisiana.
[8] Although FAR Part 15 procedures do not directly apply to FSS buys, our
Office looks to Part 15 as guidance when, as here, an agency treats vendor
responses as if it were conducting a negotiated procurement. See TDS,
Inc., B-292674, Nov. 12, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 204 at 6 n.3. When an agency
conducts discussions with one vendor, it must conduct discussions with all
vendors in a manner that is equitable and fair. Id. at 6.
[9] The agency subsequently decided not to reassign security guard
services between the New Orleans area and Baton Rouge area contractors as
originally planned. FEMA Email to Parties, Sept. 28, 2007.
[10] Moreover, FEMA's Stafford Act eligibility determination of Knight was
based on whether the firm was doing business primarily in Louisiana--a
determination for which the number of job locations was not relevant.