TITLE: B-299873, General Dynamics Information Technology, September 19, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299873
DATE: September 19, 2007
*********************************************************************
B-299873, General Dynamics Information Technology, September 19, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: General Dynamics Information Technology

   File: B-299873

   Date: September 19, 2007

   Scott M. McCaleb, Esq., William A. Roberts, III, Esq., Eric W. Leonard,
   Esq.,

   Nicole J. Owren-Wiest, Esq., William J. Grimaldi, Esq., and Jon W. Burd,
   Esq., Wiley Rein, LLP, for the protester.

   Mark D. Colley, Esq., Ronald A. Schechter, Esq., Cameron W. Fogle, Esq.,
   Stuart W. Turner, Esq., and Dominique Castro, Esq., Arnold & Porter, LLP,
   for Raytheon Technical Services Company, an intervenor.

   Sharon H. Sachs, Esq., Harlan F. Gottlieb, Esq., and Duncan R. Butts,
   Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.

   Scott H. Riback, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest that agency misevaluated cost proposals is sustained where agency
   failed to use higher of numerous inconsistent proposed rates in
   calculating awardee's proposed total evaluated price, as expressly
   provided by solicitation, such that source selection decision was based on
   consideration of materially understated differential between protester's
   and awardee's evaluated prices.

   DECISION

   General Dynamics Information Technology (GDIT) protests the award of a
   contract to Raytheon Technical Services Company (RTSC) under request for
   proposals (RFP) No. N61339-06-R-0019, issued by the Department of the Navy
   for warfighter field operations customer support services. GDIT maintains
   that the agency misevaluated proposals and made an unreasonable source
   selection decision.

   We sustain the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The Navy conducted this acquisition on behalf of the Department of the
   Army to acquire lifecycle contractor support services (LCSS) comprised of
   maintenance, supply support, software maintenance, engineering services,
   instructional services and miscellaneous training support services at over
   500 Army and non-Army training installations worldwide. This procurement
   will consolidate three contracts, one for support of the agency's live
   training (LT) operations, one for support of its virtual training (VT)
   operations, and one for support of its constructive training (CT)
   operations. RTSC previously performed services in support of the LT
   operations, GDIT previously performed services in support of the CT
   operations, and Computer Sciences Corporation, a subcontractor to RTSC
   under the current solicitation, previously performed services in support
   of the VT operations.

   The RFP contemplated the award of a fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/
   indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract, with time-and-materials (T&M)
   provisions, to perform the services for a base period of 18 months (6
   months phase-in and 12 months full performance), with eight 1-year option
   periods and a final 6-month option period. RFP sect. B.1.[1]

   Award was to be made to the firm submitting the proposal deemed to offer
   the "best value" to the government considering the following evaluation
   factors: technical, price, past performance, and experience. The technical
   factor (with subfactors for management and support, functional support
   requirements, and specialized support requirements) was more important
   than price, and price was more important than past performance and
   experience; the non-price factors combined were more important than price.
   RFP sect. M-2. Technical proposals were to be rated outstanding, highly
   satisfactory, satisfactory, marginal or unsatisfactory, and were to
   receive proposal risk ratings of low, medium or high. RFP sect. M-4. The
   past performance and experience evaluations would be reflected in
   performance risk ratings of very low, low, moderate, high, very high, or
   unknown. Id.

   For pricing purposes, the RFP included six tables (B.1 through B.6) that
   were to be completed by the offerors. The B.1 table was to include prices
   for performance of various fixed-price requirements, largely on the basis
   of lump-sum pricing on a monthly basis for the entire period of
   performance (the B.1 table also was to include pricing for phase-in
   activities). The B.2 table was to include fully burdened hourly labor
   rates for various specified labor categories at specified locations; this
   table included estimated quantities for the various labor categories that,
   when multiplied by the hourly rates, yielded aggregated prices for T&M
   work included in the B.2 table. The B.3 table was to include lump-sum
   fixed prices for performance of various training events; the lump-sum
   prices were to be multiplied by specified numbers of events to yield total
   pricing for this aspect of the requirement. The B.4 table was to include
   fully-burdened hourly labor rates for all 10 lots for all labor categories
   at all potential performance locations. The B.5 and B.6 tables were to
   include fixed prices for various training events at specified locations
   for all 10 lots.

   The prices included in the B.1, B.2 and B.3 tables were to be added
   together to arrive at the offerors' total evaluated prices. RFP sect. M-3.
   The B.4, B.5 and B.6 tables were not to be used for price evaluation
   purposes, but would be incorporated into the successful offeror's contract
   for purposes of pricing future work orders. Id. Offerors were advised that
   the agency would review the price proposals to determine whether they were
   complete, reasonable, and consistent with the offeror's technical
   approach, and reflected a clear understanding of the requirements. Id.
   Offerors were cautioned that inconsistency between their price and
   technical proposals, unbalanced pricing, or other pricing anomalies could
   be assessed as either increasing proposal risk under the technical
   evaluation, or as a price area concern regarding increased risk of
   additional government costs during contract execution. Id. Of particular
   significance here, offerors were further advised that their B.2 table
   would be compared to their B.4 table to ensure consistency between the
   two, and that their B.3 table would be compared to their B.5 and B.6
   tables to ensure consistency; in the event of a discrepancy between the
   tables, the higher of the proposed prices would be used for evaluation
   purposes. Id.

   The agency received initial proposals from GDIT and RTSC and, following
   the initial evaluation, included both in the competitive range. The agency
   then engaged in discussions and obtained final proposal revisions (FPR)
   from the two offerors. After evaluating the FPRs, the agency assigned the
   following ratings to the proposals:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                       |          GDIT          |         RTSC          |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |       Technical       |Satisfactory/Medium Risk|Highly Satisfactory/Low|
   |                       |                        |         Risk          |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |Management and Support |Satisfactory/Medium Risk| Outstanding/Low Risk  |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |  Functional Support   | Satisfactory/Low Risk  | Satisfactory/Low Risk |
   |     Requirements      |                        |                       |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |  Specialized Support  | Satisfactory/Low Risk  | Satisfactory/Low Risk |
   |     Requirements      |                        |                       |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   | Total Evaluated Price |     $2.919 Billion     |    $3.047 Billion     |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |   Past Performance    |     Very Low Risk      |     Very Low Risk     |
   |-----------------------+------------------------+-----------------------|
   |      Experience       |     Very Low Risk      |     Very Low Risk     |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Agency Report (AR) exh. 83, at 3. The agency prepared detailed narrative
   materials that explained the basis for the assigned ratings.[2] These
   evaluation results were presented to the SSA who, after deliberation,
   identified RTSC's proposal as representing the best value. AR exh. 85.
   Among other things, the SSA determined that various technical strengths in
   RTSC's proposal, together with the avoidance of various weaknesses
   identified in GDIT's proposal, were worth the $128 million (4.4 percent)
   price premium associated with RTSC's proposal. AR exh. 85, at 4. The SSA
   further specifically found that he would select the RTSC proposal for
   award even though the price premium could increase to 12 percent at the
   contract ceiling price of $[deleted] billion. Id. After being advised of
   the agency's source selection decision and receiving a debriefing, GDIT
   filed this protest.

   GDIT challenges the agency's evaluation of proposals under the technical
   evaluation criterion--maintaining that the agency both misevaluated its
   proposal in several respects, and engaged in disparate treatment in its
   evaluation of the two proposals--and the evaluation of RTSC's proposal
   under the price and past performance criteria. As discussed in detail
   below, we have considered all of GDITs arguments and find that there were
   material errors in the agency's price evaluation that render the source
   selection decision unreasonable.

   INCONSISTENCIES IN RTSC PRICE PROPOSAL

   GDIT maintains that there were a number of inconsistencies in RTSC's price
   proposal, with the labor rates included in the B.4 table being higher than
   the rates included in the B.2 table. The protester identifies two areas
   where these inconsistencies appear. First, RTSC's FPR eliminated a
   [deleted] percent escalation rate that it previously had applied to its
   direct labor rates for its [deleted] employees. Although the firm
   submitted a revised B.2 table with its FPR that reflected the elimination
   of this [deleted] percent escalation rate, it did not submit a revised B.4
   table. Second, the protester has identified some 40 additional labor
   categories where RTSC's rates in its B.4 table are higher than the rates
   included in the firm's B.2 table. According to the protester, the agency's
   failure to include the higher of these inconsistent prices in RTSC's
   evaluated price--as expressly provided for in the RFP--resulted in an
   understatement of RTSC's total evaluated price of approximately $97
   million.

   The agency responds that, with respect to the [deleted] labor rates, it
   reasonably relied on language appearing in the May 7 cover letter
   accompanying RTSC's FPR to conclude that the firm had reduced its pricing
   in both the B.2 and B.4 tables, notwithstanding any apparent
   inconsistencies between the prices in tables B.2 and B.4. This letter
   provided, in pertinent part: "Our proposed burdened labor rates for the
   categories and locations attached to this letter are hereby updated
   accordingly for both Section B.2 and B.4. These rates represent a total
   reduction of $[deleted] in our evaluated B.2 price." AR exh. 75, Cover
   Letter. The agency maintains that this language was sufficient to obligate
   RTSC to provide rates without the [deleted] percent escalation. The agency
   maintains, moreover, that, even if this language was inadequate to
   obligate RTSC, this is a minor clerical error that can be corrected after
   award.

   With respect to the other 40 inconsistent labor rates, the agency states
   that it relied on similar language appearing in the firm's proposal
   providing that: "Raytheon assures that the rates proposed in Section B.2
   `T&M Evaluation Worksheets' are consistent with B.4 `Loaded Labor Rates
   Matrix,'" and further providing that "[e]ach site referenced in the B.2
   tables has been mapped into the corresponding B.4 Appendix B Locations on
   the tabs of the B.4 workbooks." AR exh. 60, Volume 5_Book 2_CP_rev2.doc,
   at 76. The agency asserts that this was sufficient to indicate that RTSC
   intended to be bound by the lower rates appearing in the B.2 table.

   We find that the agency improperly failed to include an additional $97
   million (consistent with GDIT's calculation) in RTSC's evaluated price.
   The RFP was unequivocal regarding how the agency was to evaluate proposals
   in the event of an inconsistency between the B.2 and B.4 tables:

     Section B.2 `Time and Materials Evaluation Worksheets' will be evaluated
     to ensure that the rates proposed are consistent with the B.4 `Loaded
     Labor Rates Matrix' . . . . Inconsistencies between B.2 and B.4 rates,
     or between B.3 and B.5/B.6 FFP, will result in the Government using the
     higher of the inconsistent rates/prices for the Total Evaluated Price.

   RFP at M-3. It is undisputed that RTSC's B.2 table included revised prices
   that were inconsistent with the higher prices in its B.4 table. Under the
   above-quoted language, in this situation, the agency was to include the
   higher prices in the evaluation. The agency, in relying upon the
   information in RTSC's cover letter, disregarded this express RFP provision
   in arriving at RTSC's total evaluated price. The agency's reliance on the
   language in the May 7 cover letter, in lieu of the approach plainly set
   forth in the RFP, was misplaced. Not only was such reliance inconsistent
   with the plain language of the RFP but, in any case, the cover letter
   language rendered RTSC's proposal, at best, ambiguous. In this regard,
   although RTSC purported to revise both its B.2 and B.4 tables by the terms
   of the cover letter, as noted, it submitted only a revised B.2 table and
   stated that its proposed change "represents a total reduction of
   $[deleted] in our evaluated B.2 price." AR exh. 75. Other portions of
   RTSC's proposal--including its B.4 table--remained unchanged by the May 7
   revision, including the narrative replacement pages to its proposal that
   RTSC had previously submitted in connection with its earlier offer of the
   [deleted] percent escalation for its [deleted] employees. AR exh. 42d,
   Vol. 5, book 2 change pages, at 157-57f. Thus, RTSC's B.4 table and
   narrative proposal continued to offer the [deleted] percent annual
   escalation to its [deleted] employees' compensation, notwithstanding the
   language of its cover letter. [3]

   Agencies are required to evaluate proposals in a manner consistent with
   the solicitation. Clean Harbors Env't Servs., Inc., B-296176.2, Dec. 9,
   2005, 2005 CPD para. 222 at 3. The RFP here expressly provided that the
   agency would evaluate inconsistent pricing in a very specific manner, and
   the agency failed to evaluate RTSC's proposal consistent with the RFP
   ground rules.

   PREJUDICE

   Prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest.
   McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 54 at 3;
   Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
   determination as to prejudice in this case turns on the magnitude of the
   evaluated differential between GDIT's and RTSC's total evaluated prices,
   as well as the differential between their prices at the contract ceiling.
   We have reviewed the agency's calculations in this regard and, for the
   reasons discussed below, conclude that the $97 million omission from
   RTSC's total evaluated price affected not only the total evaluated price
   calculation, but led the SSA also to consider a materially understated
   price differential at the contract ceiling.

   The agency's misevaluation resulted in a $97 million understatement of the
   price premium associated with award to RTSC, as reflected in the agency's
   calculation of total evaluated price; the record shows that, rather than
   the $128 million dollar premium calculated and relied upon by the agency,
   the correct amount of the price premium is $225 million. Protester's
   Comments, exh. 17. This translates into a 7.7 percent total evaluated
   price premium rather than the 4.4 percent premium on which the SSA's
   source selection decision, in part, was based.

   The second aspect of the price evaluation--the offerors' pricing at the
   contract ceiling--also was directly impacted, since the additional $97
   million also should have been factored into that calculation. GDIT takes
   the position, that, because of the $97 million error in the agency's
   calculation of RTSC's total evaluated price, the agency's calculation of
   the price differential at the ceiling is significantly understated--it
   claims that the correct price differential at the ceiling is between 17
   and 18 percent, that is, approximately 50 percent greater than the12
   percent differential the SSA considered--and that the SSA therefore relied
   on materially inaccurate information in making his source selection
   decision. In response, the agency asserts that, whether or not it
   erroneously failed to include the $97 million in its calculation of RTSC's
   total evaluated price, GDIT was not prejudiced by this error because the
   SSA was aware that the price differential at the contract ceiling amount
   was larger from a percentage standpoint than the difference in the total
   evaluated prices, with or without the $97 million error. Specifically, the
   agency asserts that the difference between the offerors' total evaluated
   prices was either 4.4 or 7.7 percent, depending upon whether the
   $97 million is included, but that the SSA was advised that the price
   difference at the ceiling amount was 12 percent. The agency concludes that
   this shows that Raytheon's proposal would have been selected even had the
   differential between the offerors' total evaluated prices been 7.7
   percent, as alleged by GDIT.

   As noted, the agency's award decision was based on its calculating the
   offerors' total evaluated prices by multiplying the various hourly rates
   included in their B.2 tables by the number of hours specified for each
   labor category, for each year of the 10-year contract period; it added
   this sum to the total prices calculated using the B.1 and B.3 tables.
   Thereafter, the agency calculated the firms' prices at the ceiling. It did
   this by isolating the offerors' prices for the T&M work and calculating a
   total weighted average hourly rate for each firm.[4] The agency then
   calculated a projected B.2 price based on multiplying each offeror's total
   weighted average hourly rate by the number of hours specified in the B.2
   table, plus [deleted] percent additional hours, to arrive at a projected
   price for "100 percent" of the requirement.[5] The agency calculated that
   GDIT's projected B.2 price was $[deleted] billion, and that RTSC's was
   $[deleted] billion. AR exh. 78, WFA & WTA Price & Hours History
   051507.xls, at 2. The agency then escalated the projected B.2 prices by 20
   percent per year over the 10-year life of the contract, and then added
   back the fixed prices calculated using the B.1 and B.3 tables. On the
   basis of these calculations, the agency arrived at a projected price of
   $[deleted] billion for GDIT and $[deleted] billion for RTSC. The agency
   therefore concluded that GDIT enjoyed a price advantage over RTSC of
   $[deleted] billion--approximately 12 percent--at the contract ceiling. AR
   exh. 78, WFA & WTA Price & Hours History 051507.xls, at 3.

   The agency's calculation of the offerors' prices at the ceiling included
   two errors. First, as a result of the approximately $97 million omission
   from RTSC's total evaluated price, the total weighted average hourly rate
   ($[deleted]) used to calculate RTSC's projected price was incorrect;
   although the agency has not calculated a revised rate for RTSC in response
   to the protest, the protester has submitted a figure of $[deleted] that
   has not been disputed by the parties. [6] Protester's Comments, exh. 40;
   Protester's Supplemental Comments, exh. 89. Second, as the agency
   concedes, its escalation calculation was performed inaccurately, with the
   result that the prices were escalated by more than the intended 20 percent
   per year. Supplemental Agency Report (SAR) at 75-77.

   The agency prepared a revised calculation of projected prices at the
   ceiling in connection with the protest. SAR attach. 16. This calculation
   shows the offerors' prices calculated, by lot, four different ways: first,
   using the labor hours included in the B.2 table; second, using the labor
   hours included in the B.2 table, escalated by 20 percent per year; third,
   using [deleted] percent more labor hours; and, finally, using the original
   number of hours in table B.2, increased by [deleted] percent, and
   escalated by 20 percent per year. The results of this calculation of
   prices at the ceiling show a total projected price for GDIT of $[deleted],
   and a total projected price for RTSC of $[deleted], for a difference of
   $[deleted], or 10.24 percent, in GDIT's favor. SAR attach. 16.

   This revised calculation also is erroneous. While it corrects the agency's
   earlier error in calculating the 20 percent escalation factor, it still is
   based on the annual weighted average hourly rates included in RTSC's
   original B.2 table, without correction for the $97 million understatement
   in RTSC's proposed prices. When the agency's calculations are performed
   using corrected annual weighted average hourly rates, the results show
   that GDIT's projected price would be $[deleted], and that RTSC's projected
   price would be $[deleted], for a difference of $[deleted], or 17.77
   percent, in GDIT's favor.[7]

   GDIT's own calculation of the price differential at the contract ceiling
   support the results of the revised agency calculation, as corrected above.
   For RTSC, the final calculated price is $[deleted] billion (that is, the
   contract ceiling price), and for GDIT, $[deleted], for a difference of
   $[deleted], or 17.34 percent, that is, a differential similar to that
   resulting from our calculation discussed above. Protester's Comments, exh.
   40.

   The agency maintains that GDIT's calculation is inaccurate because it is
   based on the invalid assumption that the agency will actually purchase a
   volume sufficient to reach the contract ceiling. However, the agency--not
   the protester--chose to use, and rely upon, pricing at the contract
   ceiling in making the source selection. AR exh. 85, at 4; SAR attach. 1,
   at 1, attach. 2. The protester's calculation does nothing more than show
   the price differential between the offerors, scaled to the contract's
   ceiling price, which is precisely the information the SSA believed he was
   being provided at the time he made the award decision. The agency further
   argues that this calculation shows nothing more than the "unremarkable
   truth" that the more T&M work performed under the contract, the greater
   the price differential between GDIT and RTSC. SAR at 77-79. This is
   incorrect. In the above calculations, while the dollar amount of the
   differential varies with the quantity of hours, the percentage
   differential--the number on which the SSA relied--remains the same
   regardless of the number of hours used.[8]

   Thus, we conclude that, in addition to increasing the differential in
   total evaluated price from 4.4 to 7.7 percent, the $97 million omission
   carried over to the calculation of prices at the ceiling. Had the agency
   correctly calculated these prices, GDIT's price advantage would have been
   between 17.34 and 18.05 percent, that is, approximately 50 percent higher
   than the 12 percent advantage considered by the agency and relied on by
   the SSA in the selection decision.

   These errors were prejudicial to GDIT. As noted, the record shows that the
   agency made a cost/technical tradeoff between the proposals, finding that
   the price premium associated with the RTSC proposal was worth the
   perceived technical superiority of that offer. The underlying basis for
   that conclusion, however, was a price premium that was incorrectly
   calculated; as discussed, the SSA thought that the price premium
   associated with the RTSC proposal was 4.4 percent of total evaluated price
   and 12 percent of the firms' prices at the contract ceiling amount. Had
   the SSA been aware of the actual cost premium associated with award to
   RTSC (7.7 percent of total evaluated price and 17.34 to 18.05 percent of
   the contract ceiling amount), he may well have made a different source
   selection decision. McDonald-Bradley, supra.; Statistica, Inc. v.
   Christopher, supra. Under these circumstances, the agency's source
   selection decision was unreasonable, and we therefore sustain GDIT's
   protest on this ground.

   THE AGENCY'S T&M ESTIMATE AND ESCALATION

   GDIT also challenges the agency's methodology in evaluating the offerors'
   prices. The agency selected a sample comprised of 25 installations (out of
   the 166 installations serviced by the predecessor contracts), which it
   determined included a representative sample of all of the potential labor
   categories at all types of installations; according to the agency, this
   revised T&M estimate accounted for approximately 70 percent of all fiscal
   year 2006 (FY06) T&M hours. SAR Attach. 13. The agency contends that the
   T&M estimate it used in preparing the revised B.2 table reflects its best
   estimate of the prospective T&M requirement. The agency also notes that,
   although it did prepare the estimate using only 70 percent of the FY06 T&M
   hours, with no escalation, it also prepared an extrapolated calculation of
   the offerors' prices at the contract ceiling amount (discussed above), and
   used that calculation as another reference point to support its source
   selection decision.

   GDIT argues that the revised B.2 table actually includes only
   approximately 60 percent--not 70 percent--of the FY06 T&M hours.
   Protester's Comments at 19-20; exhs. 34, 36 and 37. GDIT further argues
   that, whether the agency's estimate constitutes 60 or 70 percent of the
   FY06 T&M hours, it fails to accurately reflect the magnitude of its price
   advantage, because it does not use 100 percent of the FY06 T&M hours, and
   because it does not account for escalation.

   Agencies are required by statute to consider the cost or price to the
   government of entering into a contract. 10 U.S.C. sect. 2305(a)(3)(A)(ii)
   (2000). In the context of ID/IQ contracting, this often is difficult
   because of uncertainty regarding what ultimately will be procured.
   Agencies have developed a variety of methods or strategies to address this
   difficulty, including the use of estimates for the various quantities of
   labor categories to be purchased under the contract, see Creative Info.
   Tech., Inc., B-293073.10, Mar. 16, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 110 at 3, sample
   tasks, FC Bus. Sys., Inc., B-278730, Mar. 6, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 9 at
   3-5, hypothetical or notional plans that are representative of what
   requirements are anticipated during contract performance, Aalco
   Forwarding, Inc., et al., B-277241.15, Mar. 11, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 87 at
   11, and hypothetical pricing scenarios reflecting various cost or price
   eventualities. PWC Logistics Servs., Inc., B-299820, B-299820.3, Aug. 14,
   2007, 2007 CPD para. __ at 11-15. Underlying each of these methods is the
   central objective of evaluating the relative cost of competing proposals
   in order to provide the agency's source selection authority a meaningful
   understanding of the cost or price implications of making award to one or
   another concern. It is axiomatic that the agency's price evaluation method
   must produce results that are not misleading. Aalco Forwarding, Inc.
   supra. at 11.

   The agency's methodology was unobjectionable. As noted, the agency
   employed a combination of techniques to evaluate proposed prices. First,
   the agency prepared a labor hours estimate based on FY06 historical data.
   Although that estimate represented fewer than the historical total number
   of hours purchased by the agency--60 percent, according to the
   protester--the agency asserts that the estimate was valid based on its
   representative nature. Second, after arriving at its total evaluated price
   calculations, the agency prepared an extrapolated price calculation for
   each concern based on a projection of the firms' prices at the contract
   ceiling, as discussed above. There is no basis for us to conclude that the
   agency's methodology--obtaining proposals based on a representative
   sample, and then extrapolating total prices based on the information
   received--was unreasonable. Rather, the agency's approach appears to be
   similar to those we have endorsed in prior decisions. See, e.g., Aalco
   Forwarding, Inc., supra.; PWC Logistics Servs., Inc., supra.

   RECOMMENDATION

   We recommend that the agency reopen the acquisition, obtain revised
   proposals (in particular, due to the ambiguity in RTSC's proposal), and
   evaluate them in a manner that is consistent with the terms of the RFP and
   this decision.[9] If, at the conclusion of the reevaluation, the agency
   determines that GDIT is properly in line for award, we further recommend
   that the agency terminate RTSC's contract, and make award to GDIT, if
   otherwise proper. Finally, we recommend that GDIT be reimbursed the costs
   of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
   4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1) (2007). The protester should submit its
   certified claim for these costs, detailing the time spent and the costs
   incurred, directly to the agency within 60 days of receiving our decision.
   4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(f)(1).

   The protest is sustained.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The RFP includes several pricing schedules (discussed below); each
   contemplates performance in lots designated lot 0 through lot IX. RFP
   section B.1 is a pricing schedule for a portion of the fixed-price
   requirement.

   [2] The agency report contains reports from the source selection
   evaluation board (SSEB), AR exh. 81, and the source selection advisory
   committee (SSAC), AR exh. 83. The agency report also contains a briefing
   that was presented by the SSEB to the SSAC, AR exh. 82, as well as a
   briefing presented by the SSAC to the source selection authority (SSA). AR
   exh. 84.

   [3] We point out as well that, during the course of the protest, RTSC did
   not affirm the agency's interpretation of its proposal. Further, the
   record shows that the agency actually incorporated RTSC's April 23, 2007
   B.4 table (which included all of the higher labor rates) into the
   resulting contract. Agency Letter, July 19, 2007, at 8.

   [4] For both offerors, the annual weighted average hourly rates varied
   throughout the life of the contract. For RTSC, the agency calculated a
   total weighted average hourly rate of $[deleted], and for GDIT a total
   weighted average hourly rate of $[deleted]. E.g. AR exh. 78, at 155.

   [5] The record shows that the B.2 table included 4,137,361 hours per year,
   or 41,373,610 hours for the entire period of performance. In performing
   its projected price calculations, the agency included an additional
   [deleted] hours per year, for a total of [deleted] hours per year, or
   [deleted] hours over the life of the contract. AR exh. 78, WFA & WTA Price
   & Hours History 051507.xls, at 2.

   [6] We obtained the corrected total and annual average weighted hourly
   rates for RTSC from data presented in GDIT's supplemental comments, since
   the agency has not proffered any evidence as to what the RTSC rates would
   be had it accounted for the $97 million error. That data shows that the
   corrected RTSC total weighted average hourly rate should have been
   $[deleted], and that the corrected annual weighted average hourly rates
   should have been as follows: [deleted]. GDIT's Supplemental Comments, exh.
   89. As noted, neither the agency nor RTSC challenges the accuracy of these
   corrected rates.

   [7] We point out that, other errors aside, when the agency's original
   calculation is performed using the correct total weighted average hourly
   rate of $[deleted], GDIT's and RTSC's prices at the ceiling would be
   $[deleted] billion and $[deleted] billion, respectively, for a total
   evaluated difference of $[deleted] billion, or 18.05 percent, in favor of
   GDIT.

   [8] The record shows that the calculations actually yield results within a
   narrow range--between 17.34 and 18.05 percent--which is the result of the
   differing approaches to performing the calculations. For example, some of
   the calculations used a total weighted average hourly rate, while others
   used specific, annual weighted average hourly rates.

   [9] Given our recommendation that the agency obtain and evaluate revised
   proposals, GDIT's arguments relating to the agency's technical and past
   performance evaluations, as well as several of its minor price related
   evaluation assertions, are academic. We thus need not address them.