TITLE: B-299818; B-299818.2; B-299818.3; B-299818.4, Systems Research and Applications Corporation; Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., September 6, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299818; B-299818.2; B-299818.3; B-299818.4
DATE: September 6, 2007
************************************************************************************************************************************
B-299818; B-299818.2; B-299818.3; B-299818.4, Systems Research and Applications Corporation; Booz Allen Hamilton, INc., September 6, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Systems Research and Applications Corporation; Booz Allen
   Hamilton, Inc.

   File: B-299818; B-299818.2; B-299818.3; B-299818.4

   Date: September 6, 2007

   David P. Metzger, Esq., Kara L. Daniels, Esq., Caitlin K. Cloonan, Esq.,
   and Stuart W. Turner, Esq., Arnold & Porter LLP, for Systems Research and
   Applications Corporation; and Paul F. Khoury, Esq., William J. Grimaldi,
   Esq., and John R. Prairie, Esq., Wiley Rein LLP, for Booz Allen Hamilton,
   Inc., the protesters.

   Robert J. Symon, Esq., Douglas L. Patin, Esq., Jeremy Becker-Welts, Esq.,
   and Steven A. Pozefsky, Esq., Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP, for Jacobs
   Technology, the intervenor.

   Brent Curtis, Esq., Sean M. Hannaway, Esq., and Bernice A. Pasternak,
   Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.

   Guy R. Pietrovito, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1.      Admission of a consultant to a GAO protective order was
   appropriate, over the objection that the consultant once held a position
   with the protester and that the consultant's daughter was currently
   employed by the protester, where the record shows that the consultant had
   no continuing interest in the protester and the consultant's daughter held
   a relatively low-level position with the protester in a division that was
   unrelated to the work to be performed under the protested contract.

   2.      Protest is sustained in a negotiated procurement for award on a
   "best value" basis, which provided for evaluation of the degree to which
   offerors' proposals met or exceeded requirements, where the agency failed
   to qualitatively assess the merits of the offerors' differing approaches.

   DECISION

   Systems Research and Applications Corporation (SRA) and Booz Allen
   Hamilton, Inc. (BAH) protest the award of a contract to Jacobs Technology
   under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8721-06-R-0001, issued by the
   Department of the Air Force for engineering and technology acquisition
   support services (ETASS) for the agency's Electronic Systems Center (ESC).
   The protesters challenge the agency's evaluation of proposals, conduct of
   discussions, and source selection decision.[1]

   We sustain the protests because the record does not show that the agency
   qualitatively assessed the differences in the offerors' proposals, as
   required by the RFP.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP provides for the award of an indefinite-delivery,
   indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract for a base-year with 2 option years,
   under which the agency will award fixed-price, labor-hour, or
   cost-plus-award-fee task orders for advisory and assistance services
   supporting the ESC. Specifically, offerors were informed that the contract
   objectives

     are to provide disciplined systems/specialty engineering and technical
     support, using established government, contractor and tailored industry
     processes that encompass the practices and requirements of the ESC
     Engineering Directorate . . . Capability Maturity Model Integration
     (CMMI) framework.

   RFP, Statement of Objectives (SOO) sect. 2.1. Historically, ESC's
   engineering and technical support has been provided by government and
   federally funded research and development center personnel and contractor
   personnel working under the Information Technology Services Program (ITSP)
   II task orders.[2] Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 2.

   The RFP SOO identified 13 ESC support objectives, including the provision
   of

     system/program engineering, technical support and technical training,
     for the acquisition, integration, sustainment, continued evolution,
     deployment/fielding and installation, operations and field support of
     ESC Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence,
     Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR), Business and Enterprise Resource
     Planning (ERP) systems and information systems.

   RFP, SOO sect. 2.1.a. The RFP also identified three functional support
   objectives, including

   [p]rovid[ing] engineering and technical support to ESC [Engineering
   Directorate] in achieving its goals for CMMI process proficiency at the
   program level up through the wing level, to include but not limited to,
   engineering expertise in support of the planning, development and
   implementation of a robust engineering function at ESC.

   Id., sect. 2.2.a.

   The RFP provided for award on a "best value" basis, and stated the
   following evaluation factors and subfactors:

   Mission Capability Factor
                      Subfactor 1: Technical Approach                         
                      Subfactor 2: Transition Planning                        
                      Subfactor 3: Personnel                                  
                      Subfactor 4: Management Practices                       
   Proposal Risk Factor
                      Subfactor 1: Technical Approach                         
                      Subfactor 2: Transition Planning                        
                      Subfactor 3: Personnel                                  
                      Subfactor 4: Management Practices                       
   Past Performance Factor
   Cost/Price Factor  

   RFP sect. M.2.1. The mission capability, proposal risk, and past
   performance factors were stated to be of equal weight, and to be each,
   individually, more important than the cost/price factor. The subfactors
   within the mission capability and proposal risk factors were stated to be
   of equal importance. Id.

   Offerors were informed that proposals would be evaluated under the mission
   capability factor using the color and adjectival ratings identified in the
   Air Force's Mandatory Procedure (MP) 5315.3,[3] and that proposal risk
   would be assessed using the risk ratings identified in that document. RFP
   sect. M.3.1. In addition, the RFP described, for each management
   capability and proposal risk subfactor, the areas upon which the agency's
   evaluation would focus.

   For example, for the transition planning subfactors, the RFP provided that
   the agency would evaluate the offerors' approaches to transitioning from
   the current advisory and assistance services support to the ETASS services
   with an emphasis on evaluating:

    A. The degree to which the offeror has proposed a comprehensive,
       detailed, effective plan to provide ETASS services while ensuring
       mission requirements are satisfied.
    B. The degree to which the offeror demonstrates the capability to have
       available the resources needed to efficiently and effectively support
       the objectives at IDIQ/[task order] start.

   RFP sect. M.3.1.2. Similarly, for the technical approach subfactors,
   offerors were informed that the agency would, among other things, evaluate
   the "degree to which the offeror presents a clear understanding and an
   innovative approach to fulfill all the objectives outlined in the ETASS
   IDIQ SOO" and the "soundness and efficiency of the offeror's tailoring of
   their standardized approach to fulfill all the objectives of the
   individual ETASS task orders." Id. sect. M.3.1.1. For the personnel
   subfactors, offerors were informed that the agency would evaluate, among
   other things, the "degree to which" the offerors proposed "a sound,
   realistic and standardized approach for obtaining/training/retaining
   qualified personnel to perform contract objectives" and the degree to
   which the offerors "present[] a clear understanding and ability to support
   ESC with reach back, potential surge situations and/or draw downs." Id.
   sect. M.3.1.3. For the management practices subfactors, the RFP provided
   for an evaluation of the soundness of the offerors' "overall team
   management, business practices and organizational structure," as well as
   the extent to which the offerors had or would have potential
   organizational conflicts of interest (OCI). Id. sect. M.3.1.4.

   The RFP provided for an evaluation of the offerors' relevant experience
   performed during the 5 years prior to the issuance date of the
   solicitation. Offerors were informed that the agency, in assessing the
   firms' past performance, would assign relevance ratings of either highly
   relevant, relevant, somewhat relevant, or not relevant, and quality
   ratings of exceptional, very good, satisfactory, marginal, or
   unsatisfactory.[4] Based upon its relevance and quality ratings, the
   agency would assign a confidence rating of high confidence, significant
   confidence, satisfactory confidence, unknown confidence, little
   confidence, or no confidence. Id. sect. M.3.2.

   The RFP provided for the evaluation of the sum of the offerors' proposed
   prices for seven ETASS task orders, which were identified in the
   solicitation.[5] Id. sect. M.3.3.2. Offerors were further informed that
   their proposals would be evaluated at the "Most Probable Cost (MPC)" as
   determined by the "Cost/Price Realism Assessment (CPRA)," which the RFP
   stated would be calculated as follows:

    A. Labor Hour (LH): Labor Hour [contract line item] prices for the seven
       initial task orders will be evaluated at the MPC/CPRA for the Basic
       and two (2) Option years.
    B. Cost Reimbursable (CR): The Cost Reimbursable effort will be evaluated
       at the amounts provided by the Government in the RFP.
    C. All rates on the IDIQ B-Table will be examined for reasonableness and
       realism.[6]

   Id. sect. M.3.3.2. The RFP further stated that the agency would evaluate
   the extent to which offerors' proposed prices indicated a clear
   understanding of the RFP's objectives and reflected a sound approach to
   satisfying those objectives, and further warned offerors that prices that
   were assessed as unrealistically low or high without explanation would be
   considered under the proposal risk subfactor as indicating a lack of
   understanding of the technical objectives. Id. sect. M.3.3.4.

   Offerors were informed that they must satisfy all of the solicitation's
   objectives, terms and conditions, and that failure to do so could result
   in the offer being removed from consideration for award. Id. sect. M.4.
   One of the RFP's terms was the requirement that the contractor

     conform to the stated ESC overall goals of 35% Small Business
     Opportunities, which will include at a minimum 7.5% Small Disadvantaged
     Business (SDB), 3.75% Service Disabled Veteran Owned Business (SDVOSB),
     3.75% Women-Owned Small Business (WOSB), and 0.1% Historically
     Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZONE) with the initial proposal, as well
     as, ensuring that the goals are maintained during execution. The
     socio-economic goals will be evaluated at the aggregate total of the
     dollars obligated on the task orders. If applicable, the resulting
     subcontracting plan will become an attachment to the contract.

   Id. sect. ESC-H115, Socioeconomic Goals.

   Detailed instructions were provided for the preparation of proposals and
   for oral presentations. Specifically, the RFP provided that offerors would
   address the mission capability and proposal risk subfactors only in an
   oral presentation, which would include consideration of up to 223 slides
   that were to be submitted with the offeror's proposal.[7] Id. sect.
   L.2.1.5.3. The instructions also informed offerors of the information,
   data, and explanations that the offerors should provide in response to
   each evaluation factor and subfactor. For example, with respect to the
   technical approach subfactors, the RFP provided that the offerors should
   describe their approach "that encompasses the practices and requirements
   of the ESC/[Engineering Directorate] tailored CMMI framework, and how they
   would be used to satisfy" the SOO. Id. sect. L.4.2.2.1(a)(1). With respect
   to the transition planning subfactors, offerors were to address their
   plans to fulfill the SOO "while transitioning from current [advisory and
   assistance services] contractor support to the new ETASS paradigm of
   systems engineering and technical services and capabilities."
   Id. sect. L.4.2.2.2(a).

   Offerors were also requested to provide their "basis for estimates" (BOE)
   for each task order that described the "basis, rationale, metrics and
   estimating methodology and historical database used to derive the proposed
   labor hours," and that identified an hourly estimate by labor category by
   year for each task order. The BOE also required offerors to "include a
   comparison of the proposed hours to historical experiences on
   similar/analogous projects and rationale for the proposed labor-skill
   mix." Id. sect. L.6.3.2.

   The Air Force received proposals from five offerors, including SRA, BAH,
   and Jacobs, by the due date for receipt of proposals. The agency's source
   selection evaluation team (SSET) received oral presentations (which
   included a period of questions and answers) from the offerors with respect
   to the mission capability and proposal risk subfactors. The evaluators
   individually reviewed and rated the offerors' proposals, and then met as a
   team to discuss their individual ratings and to agree to consensus ratings
   for the offerors' proposals under each subfactor. See Hearing Transcript
   (Tr.) at 32-33, 199-202, 215, 235-38, 260-63; Supplemental Contracting
   Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 14. Discussions were conducted, and
   revised proposals received from the five offerors. The protesters' and
   awardee's final proposals were evaluated by the SSET as follows:

                          Jacobs              SRA                 BAH         
   1. Mission        
   Capability        
   Technical         Green/Acceptable  Green/Acceptable    Green/Acceptable   
   Approach                                               
   Transition        Green/Acceptable  Green/Acceptable    Green/Acceptable   
   Personnel         Green/Acceptable  Green/Acceptable    Green/Acceptable   
   Management        Blue/Exceptional  Green/Acceptable    Green/Acceptable   
   Practices                                              
   2. Proposal Risk  
   Technical               Low                Low                 Low         
   Approach                                               
   Transition              Low                Low                 Low         
   Personnel               Low                Low                 Low         
   Management              Low                Low                 Low         
   Practices                                              
   3. Past           High Confidence      Significant         Significant     
   Performance[8]                         Confidence          Confidence      
   4. Price          $260.0 million       $[Deleted]          $[Deleted]      
   (Proposed)                                             

   AR, Tab 30, SSET Decision Briefing to Source Selection Authority (SSA), at
   111, 119; Tab 31, Proposal Analysis Report (PAR), at 32-52, 59.

   As detailed below, the green/acceptable/low risk ratings assessed for the
   protesters' and awardee's proposals under most of the subfactors of the
   mission capability factor and proposal risk factor reflected the SSET's
   judgment that, although the firms proposed differing approaches, their
   proposals were merely acceptable, meeting requirements, and presented low
   proposal risk.

   For example, under the technical approach subfactors of the mission
   capability and proposal risk factors, the SSET found that the protesters
   and awardee demonstrated a clear understanding of the ESC SOO, proposed
   adequate approaches to controlling systems engineering processes, and
   tailored their respective approaches for each task order. In short, the
   evaluators found that all of the offerors presented proposals that,
   although they proposed a "different path" to systems engineering
   improvement, would improve the ESC systems engineering processes. AR, Tab
   31, PAR, at 36-37.

   Under the transition planning subfactors, the SSET noted that the
   offerors' approaches differed in part based on whether the offeror team
   consisted of personnel or subcontractors with ESC program experience
   through the performance of ITSP II task orders (BAH and SRA), or whether
   the offeror team did not currently have personnel or subcontractors with
   more than a broad familiarity with ESC programs (Jacobs). See, e.g., id.
   at 41. In this regard, the evaluators assessed as a weakness in Jacobs's
   proposal under the proposal risk transition planning subfactor that the
   firm did not demonstrate current knowledge of ESC programs, which
   introduced "risk that mission requirements will not be satisfied during
   transition," and it could take "considerable time and manpower for the
   Government to bring the contractor `up to speed' on program status,
   current challenges, risk, program requirements, etc."[9] Id. at 40. The
   SSET nevertheless concluded that all of the firms' proposals satisfied the
   agency's requirements and assigned the firms' proposals green/acceptable
   with low risk ratings under these subfactors.

   The offerors' green/acceptable with low risk ratings under the personnel
   subfactors reflected the SSET's judgment that all of the firms had
   proposed a realistic plan for obtaining, training, and retaining qualified
   personnel to satisfy the contract requirements. Id. at 45.

   Unlike the other management capability/proposal risk subfactors, the SSET
   found that Jacobs's proposal merited a higher rating under the management
   practices subfactors than did SRA's and BAH's. Specifically, the SSET
   found that

     Jacobs's proposal for Management Practices is EXCEPTIONAL (Blue), and
     exceeded the requirements, and is significantly better than all the
     other Offerors['] proposals. Jacobs's "seamless teaming arrangements"
     (single set of B[-]tables/rates,[10] common processes/tools used by the
     prime and subs) provides the best overall team management, business
     practices, and organizational structure to properly and effectively
     administer ETASS. Jacobs had no administrative burden to the Government
     or negative performance effects on the contract related to [OCI]
     mitigation. All the rest of the Offerors' proposals were rated
     ACCEPTABLE (Green). They all had policies and procedures that their
     teams would use, software tools (scheduling, cost, portal, . . etc.) to
     aid in managing them, and the potential burden and negative impacts to
     contract performance related to OCI mitigation were considered minor and
     appropriately addressed in each Offeror's mitigation plan.

   Id. at 51.

   Jacobs's superior past performance factor assessment reflected the
   agency's performance confidence assessment group's (PCAG) judgment that,
   although all of the offerors' performance records established their
   ability to satisfy the ETASS requirements, "Jacobs distinguished itself
   from the others and received a High Confidence rating based on its record
   that showed exceptional performance on Highly Relevant contracts." The
   PCAG noted that SRA and BAH had a record of exceptional or very good
   performance, but did not have the "same level of Highly Relevant work as
   Jacobs." Id. at 52.

   The offerors' proposed prices were evaluated by the CPRA team that
   assessed the realism of the offerors' proposed labor hours for their
   respective technical approaches and by a cost team that assessed the
   realism of the firms' proposed fixed labor rates.[11]

   The evaluation results were presented to the SSA in a number of briefings
   at various stages in the procurement, beginning with the initial consensus
   evaluation and continuing through the competitive range determination and
   final consensus evaluation. See AR, Tab 26, Initial Proposal Briefing to
   SSA; Tab 28, Competitive Range Briefing to SSA; Tab 30, SSET Decision
   Briefing to SSA. The SSA concluded that Jacobs's proposal reflected the
   best value to the government. With respect to SRA's proposal, the SSA
   concluded that Jacobs's higher ratings under the management practices
   subfactor of the mission suitability factor and the past performance
   factor outweighed SRA's lower proposed price. With respect to BAH's
   proposal, the SSA noted that BAH's proposal, which had a higher evaluated
   price than Jacobs's, presented no advantages over Jacobs's proposal. AR,
   Tab 33, Source Selection Decision, at 9-10. Award was made to Jacobs, and
   these protests followed.

   ADMISSION TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

   Protective orders were issued in connection with these protests in
   accordance with our Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.4 (2007),
   which allow the limited release of confidential or source selection
   sensitive information to counsel and consultants admitted under the
   protective orders.

   The Air Force and Jacobs objected to the admission of a consultant--a
   university professor--who was retained by BAH's counsel to assist in the
   representation of that protester under the direction and control of that
   attorney. Specifically, they objected that the consultant had substantial
   involvement in the business affairs of BAH during the course of his career
   as a BAH officer and stockholder for nearly twenty years (concluding in
   May 2004) and that his daughter was currently employed at BAH. The
   parties, however, did not challenge the veracity of the consultant's
   representations or BAH's need for his assistance or assert that the
   consultant was involved in competitive decision-making.

   In response, BAH stated that the consultant was a retired BAH partner, who
   no longer held any position with and had no financial interest in BAH,
   given that he had divested himself of all BAH stock in 2005. In addition,
   the consultant's daughter, who had only recently graduated with a
   bachelor's degree, held a relatively low-level position (well below the
   management level) with BAH and worked in a division that would have no
   involvement with the ETASS contract work.

   In considering the propriety of granting or denying an applicant admission
   to a protective order, we review each application in order to determine
   whether the applicant is involved in competitive decision-making and
   whether there is otherwise an unacceptable risk of inadvertent disclosure
   of protected information should the applicant be granted access to
   protected material. See Robbins-Gioia, Inc., B-274318 et al., Dec. 4,
   1996, 96-2 CPD para. 222 at 9-10, citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. United
   States, 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed.Cir. 1984); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
   B-295694.2, B-295694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 51 at 7-8. With
   respect to the applications of consultants to a protective order, we
   consider and balance a variety of factors, including our Office's desire
   for assistance in resolving the specific issues of the protest, the
   protester's need for consultants to pursue its protest adequately, the
   nature and sensitivity of the material sought to be protected, and whether
   there is opposition to an applicant expressing legitimate concerns that
   the admission of the applicant would pose an unacceptable risk of
   inadvertent disclosure. See EER Sys. Corp., B-256383 et al., June 7, 1994,
   94-1 CPD para. 354 at 9, citing Mastushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
   United States, 929 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

   We admitted the consultant to the protective order based upon our finding
   that his admission did not pose more than a minimal risk of inadvertent
   disclosure. Specifically, we concluded that, although it is true that the
   consultant held, at one time, a position with BAH that would appear to
   have precluded his admission under a GAO protective order, the consultant
   left that position several years ago and had no continuing financial
   interest in the protester, having divested himself of all BAH stock. There
   was no indication from the consultant's application or from anything
   presented by the parties that his future activities, given his full-time
   position as a university professor, would pose more than a minimal risk of
   inadvertent disclosure. With respect to the consultant's daughter, we
   recognized that she was an employee of the protester, but found that this
   did not automatically require the denial of his application for admission.
   Given his daughter's relatively low-level position with the protester in a
   division unrelated to the work to be performed under the ETASS contract,
   we found that this also did not demonstrate an unacceptable risk of
   inadvertent disclosure of protected information.

   DISCUSSION

   The protesters challenge the agency's evaluation of the protesters' and
   awardee's technical proposals. They contend that the agency failed to
   adequately document its evaluation and did not otherwise reasonably
   evaluate the proposals in accordance with the solicitation's evaluation
   scheme.

   Lack of Documentation

   In determining whether a particular evaluation conclusion is rational, we
   examine the record to determine whether the judgment was reasonable and in
   accord with the evaluation criteria listed in the solicitation. Abt
   Assocs., Inc., B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 223 at 4. Such
   judgments are by their nature often subjective; nevertheless, the exercise
   of these judgments in the evaluation of proposals must be reasonable and
   must bear a rational relationship to the announced criteria upon which
   competing offers are to be selected. Hydraudyne Sys. and Eng'g B.V.,
   B-241236; B-241236.2, Jan. 30, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 88 at 4.

   In order for us to review an agency's evaluation judgment, an agency must
   have adequate documentation to support its judgment. Southwest Marine,
   Inc.; American Sys. Eng'g Corp., B-265865.3, B-265865.4, Jan. 23, 1996,
   96-1 CPD para. 56 at 10. In this regard, the Federal Acquisition
   Regulation (FAR) requires that agencies sufficiently document their
   judgments, including documenting the relative strengths, deficiencies,
   significant weakness, and risks supporting their proposal evaluations. See
   FAR sections 4.801(b), 15.305(a), 15.308; Century Envtl. Hygiene, Inc.,
   B-279378, June 5, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 164 at 4. While an agency is not
   required to retain every document or worksheet generated during its
   evaluation of proposals, the agency's evaluation must be sufficiently
   documented to allow review of the merits of a protest. See KMS Fusion,
   Inc., B-242529, May 8, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 447 at 7; see also e-LYNXX
   Corp., B-292761, Dec. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 219 at 8 (it is a
   fundamental principle of government accountability, even when using
   simplified acquisition procedures, that an agency be able to produce a
   sufficient record to allow for a meaningful review where its procurement
   actions are challenged). Where an agency fails to document or retain
   evaluation materials, it bears the risk that there may not be adequate
   supporting rationale in the record for us to conclude that the agency had
   a reasonable basis for the source selection decision. Southwest Marine,
   Inc.; American Sys. Eng'g Corp., supra.

   In determining the rationality of an agency's evaluation and award
   decision, we do not limit our review to contemporaneous evidence, but
   consider all the information provided, including the parties' arguments,
   explanations, and hearing testimony. Northwest MEP Servs., Inc.,
   B-285963.5 et al., Jan. 5, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 28 at 7. While we consider
   the entire record, including the parties' later explanations and
   arguments, we accord greater weight to contemporaneous evaluation and
   source selection material than to arguments and documentation prepared in
   response to protest contentions. Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support,
   B-277263.2, B-277263.3, Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15.

   Here, the contemporaneous evaluation documents in the record were not
   sufficient to allow us to review the reasonableness of the SSET's
   judgments without further explanation.[12] For example, although the SSET
   members each individually evaluated the firms' technical proposals, see
   Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 8, the vast majority of
   the evaluator worksheets[13] in the record were not completed and contain
   only the notation "N/C," which indicated that the evaluator had "no
   comment."[14] See Tr. at 423. There were some worksheets that were
   completed by individual evaluators that identified and detailed strengths
   for proposals that were not accepted by the SSET in its consensus
   judgment. However, the only contemporaneous documentation of the SSET's
   judgment concerning its failure to accept these evaluator strengths were
   such general comments as the "Group did not capture as a strength." E.g.,
   AR, Tab 12, SRA Initial Mission Capability Worksheet for Technical
   Approach, at 17; Tr. at 210-11.

   Other consensus evaluation documents in the record, such as the PAR and
   SSA briefing slides, and the source selection decision, describe the basic
   elements of each offeror's proposal under each of the evaluation factors
   and subfactors, but do not discuss, to any meaningful degree, the
   differences between the proposals. That is, although the PAR describes
   each offeror's basic approach for each mission capability/proposal risk
   subfactor, there is no qualitative assessment of the merits of the
   offerors' respective approaches for the bulk of the subfactors. Thus, for
   most of the evaluation subfactors, the firms' proposals all were assessed
   as being green/acceptable with low risk (the one exception is the
   management practices subfactor, for which, as noted above, Jacobs's
   proposal received a blue/exceptional with low risk rating) and, to the
   extent that strengths or weaknesses were identified, these strengths and
   weaknesses apparently did not affect the acceptable ratings the firms
   received for these factors. In addition, these consensus documents and the
   source selection decision do not explain why strengths and weaknesses that
   were initially identified by various SSET members were ultimately
   determined not to be strengths or weaknesses.

   Because the contemporaneous record was not sufficiently documented to
   allow us to review the reasonableness of the agency's evaluation judgments
   in light of the protesters' contentions, we conducted a hearing to elicit
   testimony from a number of the SSET evaluators and from the SSA. Although
   the hearing testimony provided additional explanation of the agency's
   evaluation judgments, the testimony, as detailed below, failed to
   establish the reasonableness of the agency's evaluation. Rather, the
   record establishes that the SSET failed to qualitatively assess the merits
   of SRA's, BAH's, and Jacobs's technical proposals under the bulk of the
   mission capability/proposal risk subfactors, even where the evaluators
   recognized that the firms proposed differing approaches. Instead, the
   SSET's evaluation concluded for the most part that the firms' proposals
   would merely satisfy the agency's requirements, and in many cases and
   without explanation, did not credit, documented strengths found by
   individual evaluators. This evaluation methodology was apparently driven,
   in part, by the way that the SSET applied a definition of "strength" [15]
   that discounted the relative merits of the offerors' varying
   approaches.[16] This, we find, was inconsistent with the RFP's evaluation
   scheme that, as noted above, provided for assessing the "degree to which"
   the offerors' proposals met or exceeded the agency's requirements under
   each of the mission capability/proposal risk subfactors. Moreover, as
   further detailed below, the record indicates that there may have been
   material factual errors in the evaluation as presented to the SSA.

   Transition Planning Subfactors Evaluation

   The protesters' and intervenor's proposals were all evaluated as
   green/acceptable with low proposal risk under the transition planning
   subfactors, despite the fact that the SSET assessed Jacobs's "lack of
   current program knowledge" as a weakness under the proposal risk
   transition planning subfactor. In this regard, although SRA and BAH had
   staff and team members with considerable experience with ESC, Jacobs and
   its subcontractors did not. The record shows that, initially, the SSET
   assigned a moderate risk to this weakness because the evaluators found
   that "[c]onsiderable Government time and manpower will be needed to bring
   the contractor `up to speed.'" See AR, Tab 26, SSET Initial Proposal
   Briefing to SSA, at 106. At that time, the SSET identified as "risk
   mitigators" Jacobs's proposed [Deleted][17] and use of its ISO-certified
   process[18] to capture critical personnel to acquire program knowledge,
   but these mitigators did not cause the SSET to assess Jacobs's proposal as
   low risk under this subfactor. Id. Although not recorded as a risk
   mitigator, Jacobs also stressed in its oral presentation the firm's
   "proven ability to transition large enterprise contracts," and listed its
   "major transition experience." See AR, Tab 18, Jacobs Transition Planning
   Oral Presentation Slides, at 98-99, 125, 128.

   The Air Force raised its risk concerns with Jacobs in discussions, and
   Jacobs reiterated its past experience in "effectively execut[ing] 12 large
   enterprise contracts like ETASS without having had any incumbent work" and
   offered, as a revised [Deleted]. See AR, Tab 21, Jacobs's Response to
   EN-004, at 1-2. Following discussions, the SSET reduced Jacobs's risk
   rating from moderate to low, primarily referencing that firm's
   "successful" experience in transitioning "over a dozen large organizations
   of the scale of ESC (personnel >700)." See AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 41; see Tr.
   at 564, 626-27.

   The record does not reasonably show why Jacobs's risk rating was reduced
   to low under the transition planning subfactor based upon that firm's
   discussions responses that primarily reiterated information already
   provided to the agency in Jacobs's initial proposal.[19] The record also
   indicates that the SSET's risk assessment was based upon a material
   factual error, given that Jacobs's proposal identifies, as major
   transition experience, only two contracts of similar scale to the ETASS
   contract (that is, more than 700 personnel transitioned); the remainder of
   the contracts identified provided for transitioning many fewer
   personnel.[20] See AR, Tab 18, Jacobs's Transition Planning Oral
   Presentation Slides, at 98-99. Thus, the statements in the PAR and Source
   Selection Decision that "Jacobs has applied its transition processes to
   successful transitions in over a dozen large organizations of the scale of
   ESC (personnel >700)" appear to be factually inaccurate. See AR, Tab 31,
   PAR, at 40-41; Tab 33, Source Selection Decision, at 4. Moreover, as the
   protesters note, the record does not show that the evaluators considered
   the relevance of Jacobs's past transition experience in terms of whether
   it involved similar transition plans or techniques. See, e.g., Tr.
   at 654-55. In this regard, the PCAG found that the two contracts that were
   of similar scale to the ETASS contract (that is, more than 700 personnel
   transitioned) were only "somewhat relevant" and "not relevant,"
   respectively. See AR, Tab 40, Jacobs's Past Performance Spreadsheet.

   Furthermore, the SSET's final evaluation found, with regard to Jacobs's
   transition planning, that considerable government time and manpower could
   be needed to bring the contractor "up to speed," even after application of
   the identified risk mitigators. AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 40. Nevertheless, the
   SSET's final evaluation found Jacobs's proposal to be low risk under the
   proposal risk transition planning subfactor. Id. at 41. This appears to be
   inconsistent with the definition of "low" risk contained in MP5315.3 sect.
   5.5.2, incorporated into the RFP, which defined low proposal risk as
   reflecting a proposal that had "little potential to cause disruption of
   schedule, increased cost or degradation of performance. Normal contractor
   effort and normal government monitoring will likely be able to overcome
   any difficulties."

   In sum, the record does not demonstrate the reasonableness of Jacobs's
   green/low risk rating under the transition planning subfactors.

   The record also indicates that the agency did not reasonably assess the
   "degree to which" the offerors, in their transition planning, had
   "proposed a comprehensive, detailed, effective plan" and "demonstrate[d]
   the capability to have available resources needed to efficiently and
   effectively support the [ETASS] objectives," as required by the RFP's
   evaluation criteria. See RFP sect. M.3.1.2(A), (B). Both SRA and BAH
   proposed current staff and teams that had significantly more ESC
   experience than did Jacobs, and this difference was at the core of the
   SSET's concern that Jacobs's lacked current program knowledge, which
   Jacobs proposed to acquire through substantial hiring of personnel working
   on the ITSP II task orders.[21]

   Besides the protesters' inherent incumbent-based advantages under these
   subfactors, the record shows that apparent proposal strengths were
   identified for both SRA's and BAH's proposals by individual evaluators
   with regard to the transition planning subfactors based on these firms'
   proposed detailed and comprehensive transition plans, but these strengths
   were not adopted by the SSET for reasons that were not reasonably
   explained.

   Specifically, one evaluator noted, as a strength in SRA's proposal, that
   the firm had presented a comprehensive, detailed and effective transition
   plan that, among other things, "[Deleted]." Also, the evaluator cited
   SRA's use of its [Deleted] software tool to assist in transition. Further,
   the evaluator noted that "the SRA Team will incorporate a transition
   launch initiative that will ensure a seamless transition of people,
   practices, and projects, and ensure no disruption." AR, Tab 12, SRA
   Initial Mission Capability Evaluation Worksheets for the Transition
   Planning Subfactor, at 5-6. In its consensus judgment, however, the SSET
   did not agree that this was a strength that should be reported, but
   determined that it should instead be treated as a risk mitigator, although
   SRA's proposal risk for this subfactor was already assessed as low with no
   weaknesses identified. Id.; Tr. at 646-47 (the SSET decided that SRA's
   approach did not satisfy the agency's definition of strength).

   With respect to the evaluation of BAH's proposal under the mission
   capability transition planning subfactor, one evaluator noted as a
   strength that BAH proposed a "transition strategy that allows for a
   superior retention rate of critical experience and corporate knowledge
   through strategic teaming," and that this would ensure a "smoother,
   faster, and more efficient transition period" and result in "overall
   positive effects on program risk, schedule, and cost." AR, BAH Protest,
   Tab 12, BAH Initial Mission Capability Evaluation Worksheets for the
   Transition Planning Subfactor, at 13. As with the strength identified for
   SRA's proposal under this subfactor, the SSET decided, but did not
   document, that this was not a strength.

   We recognize that it is not unusual for individual evaluator ratings to
   differ from one another, or to differ from the consensus ratings
   eventually assigned. See Cube-All Star Servs. Joint Venture, B-291903,
   Apr. 30, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 145 at 11 n.21. The overriding concern for
   our purposes is not whether the final ratings are consistent with earlier,
   individual ratings, but whether they reasonably reflect the relative
   merits of the proposals. Brisk Waterproofing Co., Inc., B-276247, May 27,
   1997, 97-1 CPD para. 195 at 2 n.1. Here, the consensus evaluation record
   does not document the differences in the firms' proposals or explain why
   seemingly warranted strengths identified by the evaluators were not
   adopted by the SSET. This lack of documentation was caused in part by the
   fact that the SSET recorded its consensus deliberations for each subfactor
   on "white boards," "capturing the positive and negative aspects" of
   proposals on those boards, but the boards were erased after the SSET had
   reached a consensus judgment. See Tr. at 236, 420-25.

   As noted above, ultimately the proposals of SRA, BAH, and Jacobs all
   received the same green/acceptable with low risk rating under the
   transition planning subfactor. Although the SSA was informed of the
   weakness identified in Jacobs's proposal with respect to its lack of
   current program knowledge as it related to transition planning, the record
   does not establish that the agency considered the differences in the
   firms' proposals for transition planning. [22] That is, based on the
   record, SRA's and BAH's proposals appeared to provide superior approaches
   to transition planning to that offered by Jacobs, but the SSET ultimately
   concluded, applying its narrow interpretation of what it considered a
   strength, that all of the firms' proposals merely met the agency's
   requirements. See, e.g., Tr. at 618 (BAH's "superior retention of critical
   experience and corporate knowledge" was "one means of meeting the
   requirements" and "[i]t was a very good approach, but it was an approach.
   It met the requirement"); see also Tr. at 665-66 ("If I had gradations of
   risk, yes [BAH's and SRA's proposals] had lower risk" under the transition
   planning subfactor because those firms would "have to do less hiring of
   folks with the knowledge of the ESC program"). Absent from the record is
   any meaningful explanation from the agency or intervenor as to why the
   firms' differing transition approaches (which were admittedly based
   largely upon differing amounts of incumbent staff and program knowledge)
   should not have been considered under these evaluation subfactors.

   Based on this record, we find the agency did not reasonably evaluate the
   offerors' proposals under these subfactors.

   Technical Approach Subfactors Evaluation

   As with the transition planning subfactors, the protesters' and
   intervenor's proposals were all evaluated to be green/acceptable with low
   proposal risk under the technical approach subfactors. Here too, the
   evaluators noted differences in the relative merits of the firms'
   respective proposals under these subfactors, but apparent strengths
   identified by the evaluators in SRA's and BAH's proposals were not fully
   "captured" by the SSET in its consensus evaluation. As with the transition
   planning subfactors, the record shows that the evaluators recognized that
   there were differing technical approaches, see AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 36-37,
   but there is no evidence that the SSET did more than find all of the
   various approaches satisfied the agency's requirements.

   With respect to SRA, among the strengths initially noted by individual
   evaluators in the firm's proposal under these subfactors, was SRA's
   proposal of its [Deleted] software tool:

     Convenient and accessible web-based forum for capturing knowledge, best
     practices, and standard/tailored technical processes for use across the
     ESC community. [Deleted] will host the tailored ESC CMMI-based process
     asset library (PAL) and be the portal for all ESC personnel to access
     process related information and best practices. . . . The [Deleted]
     knowledge will be kept at ESC at the end of the ETASS contract.
     [Deleted] provides an enhanced capability to access current, applicable
     information and guidance as a single authoritative source for use by the
     ESC community.

   See AR, Tab 12, SRA Initial Mission Capability Worksheets for Technical
   Approach, at 17. The SSET concluded, however, that this was not a proposal
   strength apparently because all of the offerors proposed some form of
   software tool that was similar to SRA's [Deleted] software. See Tr. at 140
   ("we could have given everybody a strength or nobody a strength"); see
   also Tr. at 141-42, 250. This strength was not presented to the SSA.

   The agency has provided no cogent explanation as to why this aspect of
   SRA's approach was not a strength that should have been presented to the
   SSA for his consideration. Even accepting the agency's contention that
   other offerors proposed similar software tools, we would have expected, as
   contemplated by the evaluation methodology, some assessment of the merits
   of those firms' proposed software tools. This was not done here.
   Furthermore, we note that there is no similar strength for, or even a
   description of, software tools noted in any of the evaluators' worksheets
   for Jacobs or BAH.

   With respect to BAH's proposal, one evaluator noted a number of strengths
   in that firm's proposal under the mission capability technical approach
   subfactor, including BAH's offer of "over 40 state-of-the-art Lab
   Facilities which provide significant innovations and additional
   capabilities that may be leveraged by ESC Organizations in support of our
   engineering/technical services objectives"; its "facilitat[ation of]
   senior-level access [to] help build bridges for ESC across the stakeholder
   community resulting in the improved coordination, communication and
   interoperability with other C4I programs"; and its "demonstrat[ion of its]
   clear and detailed understanding of the ETASS objectives by the
   delineation of [its] understanding of the requirement, the inputs required
   for the objective, the personnel/skills required, the process steps, the
   tools/techniques and output/products." AR, BAH Protest, Tab 12, BAH
   Initial Mission Capability Worksheet for Technical Approach, at 1-2.
   Assessed as a strength under this subfactor by another evaluator was BAH's
   proposal of Wing Technical leads at the "IDIQ Enterprise, that are not
   directly chargeable to the Gov't," which "is a strength because it
   provides resources to significantly enhance mission integration
   horizontally and vertically, promoting overall ESC objectives for
   integration." Id. at 4. Although three of these apparent strengths were
   identified by the SSET in its consensus judgment, the assessment that BAH
   had demonstrated a clear and detailed understanding of the ETASS
   objectives was not because the SSET ultimately concluded that this merely
   satisfied its requirement.

   Given that the RFP informed offerors that the agency would evaluate the
   "degree to which the offeror presents a clear understanding and an
   innovative approach to fulfill all the objectives outlined in the ETASS
   IDIQ SOO" under these subfactors, RFP sect. M.3.1.1., we find no support
   in the record for the SSET's conclusion that BAH's demonstration of its
   clear and detailed understanding of the ETASS objectives should not have
   been reported as a strength or considered in the agency's assessment of
   the merits of the firms' proposals. Rather, although the evaluators found
   that BAH proposed a "clear understanding of the [ETASS] objectives" and
   strong approach to satisfying them, the record does not explain why the
   SSET found that BAH's approach would merely satisfy the agency's
   requirements. See Tr. at 287-88.

   Further, the Air Force has failed to persuasively rebut BAH's contention
   that Jacobs did not similarly demonstrate a clear understanding and
   approach to fulfilling all of the ETASS objectives. Specifically, BAH
   contends that Jacobs's technical approach proposal presented a generic,
   standard systems engineering methodology that did not specifically address
   how the firm would satisfy the ETASS objectives. See BAH Comments at 13;
   BAH Post-Hearing Comments at 11. Although the agency and intervenor
   vehemently disagree with BAH's assertion, the record shows that the agency
   recognized that there were differences in BAH's and Jacobs's approaches,
   see AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 36, but did not consider as required by the RFP
   the degree to which they demonstrated an understanding and approach to
   satisfying the ETASS objectives.

   We also find troubling a January 30, 2007 memorandum for record, which
   indicates that a material misstatement of fact may have been made to the
   SSA. This document, which was prepared by the contracting officer,
   memorializes certain discussions between the SSET and the SSA. With
   respect to the SSET's rating of BAH's technical approach, the SSA asked
   what it would take for BAH to get a blue/exceptional rating.

     Specifically he wanted to know if the labs presented are connected back
     to ESC and would that be a good thing. A member of the SSET stated that
     the labs are connected back to ESC (the [Global Information Grid]), labs
     currently have work with [the Defense Information Systems Agency] and
     [the Space and Naval Warfare Systems], and they could be of benefit to
     ESC. [The SSET Chair] stated that their technical approach did not rise
     to a blue. He stated that if they could have connected to all 13 SOO
     requirements instead of the 3 or if they could have provided more
     examples, it could have become a blue.

   AR, Tab 50, Memorandum for Record, Jan. 30, 2007, at 1. In contrast to
   this statement, as pointed out by BAH, the firm's proposal was found by
   the agency to have described a detailed approach that satisfied all of the
   13 SOO objectives. BAH Post-Hearing Comments at 18-19; see AR, Tab 31,
   PAR, at 7.

   Testimony elicited at the hearing from an agency witness explained that
   the statement "that if they could have connected to all 13 SOO
   requirements instead of the 3 or they could have provided more examples,
   it could have become a blue" did not refer to BAH's proposal but to
   another offeror's proposal. Tr. at 451-52. Although counsel disagree
   whether this error reflects an inaccurate account by the contracting
   officer of the statements made to the SSA or whether the document
   accurately recounts a misstatement of fact to the SSA, beyond the document
   itself there is no evidence that would allow us to determine what the SSA
   was actually told. That is, the witness, who testified that the statement
   in the memorandum was in error, was not present at the briefing recorded
   in the memorandum, see Tr. at 309-10, and the SSA did not recall the
   discussion recorded in the memorandum. Tr. at 352, 355. No other
   testimony, statements or evidence have been provided, such as from the
   contracting officer or SSET chair, to otherwise explain this document.
   Accordingly, we conclude that the SSA may have been provided with
   inaccurate information that reasonably could have affected his judgment as
   to the relative merits of the firms' proposals.

   Personnel Subfactors Evaluation

   As with the transition planning and technical approach subfactors, the
   protesters' and intervenor's proposals were all evaluated as
   green/acceptable with low proposal risk under the personnel subfactors.
   SRA complains that the agency failed to assess in any meaningful way the
   differences in the firms' proposals under these subfactors, particularly
   with respect to the firms' ability to provide personnel with C4ISR
   knowledge and experience.

   As indicated above, the RFP provided that for the mission
   capability/proposal risk personnel subfactors the agency would evaluate,
   among other things, the degree to which the firms proposed sound,
   realistic, and standardized approaches to obtaining, training, and
   retaining qualified personnel. RFP sect. M.3.1.3(A). In this regard, the
   RFP required that the contractor provide personnel with "knowledge of, and
   experience with, [C4ISR] both airborne and ground, and information systems
   for the Air Force and Department of Defense components." Id., SOO, sect.
   3.1.a.

   Here too, the record simply does not evidence that reasonable
   consideration of the "degree" to which the offerors' proposed approaches
   would satisfy the contract objectives, including providing personnel with
   C4ISR knowledge and experience. In this regard, the hearing testimony
   merely confirmed that, although the SSET was aware that there were
   differences in the firms' approaches under these subfactors, see Tr. at
   713, the SSET determined that all of the offerors' approaches satisfied
   the "government's minimum requirements and offered acceptable approaches
   for bringing people on." Tr. at 764. In this regard, the SSET did not
   discuss or consider whether the relative level of C4ISR experience could
   be a discriminator between Jacobs's and SRA's proposal under these
   subfactors or, in that regard, whether SRA would have any proposal
   advantage because of the SRA team's large incumbent staff with C4ISR
   experience.[23] See Tr. at 746, 759.

   The Air Force argues that "corporate C4ISR experience" is not a contract
   requirement or source selection criterion. Air Force Post-Hearing Comments
   at 41. This argument misses the point. SRA's protest contention is not
   that it has more corporate C4ISR experience than does Jacobs, but that the
   RFP provided for a qualitative assessment of the offerors' approaches to
   providing qualified personnel, including personnel with C4ISR knowledge
   and experience. The record does not show that such an assessment was done,
   as called for by the RFP's evaluation scheme.

   Management Practices Subfactors Evaluation

   In contrast to its evaluation of SRA's, BAH's, and Jacobs's proposals
   under the other mission capability and proposal risk subfactors, the SSET
   assessed Jacobs's proposal as superior to SRA's and BAH's under the
   management practices subfactors, because Jacobs proposed "the best overall
   team management, business practices, and organizational structure to
   properly and effectively administer ETASS" and "Jacobs had no
   administrative burden to the Government or negative performance effects on
   the contract related to [OCI] mitigation." AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 51. With
   respect to OCIs, the agency concluded that both SRA's and BAH's proposals
   reflected potential OCI concerns, which the offerors adequately mitigated.
   Id.

   The protesters object that the Jacobs's exceptional/low risk ratings under
   these subfactors were the result of an unequal evaluation, which focused
   on the fact that Jacobs posed no OCI concerns.[24] In this regard, the
   protesters complain that the agency failed to reasonably evaluate the
   differentiating features of their team management structures.

   There is little documentation in the record with respect to the SSET's
   evaluation of the soundness of the firms' approaches for overall team
   management, business practices, and organizational structure. Although the
   PAR generally described each firm's proposed structures and practices, and
   assessed as a proposal strength Jacobs's "seamless teaming" approach,
   there is no analysis of the merits of the other proposals' varying
   approaches.

   For example, one evaluator noted that SRA proposed the use of CMMI Level 3
   processes to perform the contract and that the firm had demonstrated
   "soundness in configuration management, process planning, metrics
   planning, and execution and control." See AR, Tab 12, SRA Initial Mission
   Capability Worksheet for Management Practices, at 18. Although the PAR
   reported SRA's proposed use of CMMI Level 3 policies and processes in a
   general description of SRA's proposal under this subfactor, there is no
   analysis of the merits of SRA's approach. In this regard, the agency's
   witness, who was offered to testify regarding the management practices
   subfactors, was unable to provide any cogent testimony as to the
   differences in SRA's management structure and approach and Jacobs's
   proposed "seamless team" management structure.[25] See, e.g., Tr. at
   809-12.

   While on this record we do not believe that the Air Force lacked a
   reasonable basis for finding Jacobs's proposal exceptional/low risk under
   the management practices subfactors, here too the record evidences that
   the agency did not consider the relative merits of Jacobs's proposal
   vis-`a-vis the protesters' proposals.

   Mission Capability and Proposal Risk Subfactors Evaluation Conclusion

   Where, as here, the RFP states a best value evaluation plan--as opposed to
   selection of the lowest priced, technically acceptable offer--evaluation
   of proposals is not limited to determining whether a proposal is merely
   technically acceptable; rather, proposals should be further differentiated
   to distinguish their relative quality under each stated evaluation factor
   by considering the degree to which technically acceptable proposals exceed
   the stated minimum requirements or will better satisfy the agency's needs.
   See The MIL Corp., B-294836, Dec. 30, 2004, 2005 CPD para. 29 at 8;
   Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc.; Meridian Mgmt. Corp., B-281287.5 et
   al., June 21, 1999, 2001 CPD para. 3 at 8. In fact, we have long stated
   that evaluation ratings should be merely guides for intelligent
   decision-making, see Citywide Managing Servs. of Port Washington, Inc.,
   B-281287.12, B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001 CPD para. 6 at 11, and that
   therefore evaluators and SSAs should reasonably consider the underlying
   bases for ratings, including the advantages and disadvantages associated
   with the specific content of competing proposals, in a manner that is fair
   and equitable and consistent with the terms of the solicitation. See MD
   Helicopters, Inc.; AgustaWestland, Inc., B-298502 et al., Oct. 23, 2006,
   2006 CPD para. 164 at 15. Indeed, as indicated above, the FAR requires
   that agencies sufficiently document their judgments, including documenting
   the relative strengths, deficiencies, significant weakness, and risks
   supporting their proposal evaluations. See FAR sections 4.801(b),
   15.305(a), 15.308; Century Envtl. Hygiene, Inc., supra, at 4.

   Here, given the nearly complete absence in the record of any assessment of
   the firms' different approaches under the mission capability and proposal
   risk subfactors (as noted above, the SSET did assess Jacobs's proposed
   "seamless team" approach and lack of OCIs as proposal strengths,
   justifying a blue/excellent rating with low risk under the management
   practices subfactors), we find that the SSET failed to evaluate the firms'
   proposals under these subfactors consistent with the RFP, which we find
   prevented the SSA from meaningfully weighing the relative merits of the
   offerors' proposals. In this regard, the SSA indicated in his testimony
   that it was his practice in making selection decisions to look beyond the
   color/adjectival ratings in weighing the offerors' proposals, see Tr.
   at 323-25, and the contemporaneous record evidences that the SSA attempted
   to look beyond the adjectival ratings here to ascertain the relative
   quality of the firms' technical proposals. See, AR, Tab 50, Memorandum for
   Record, Jan. 30, 2007. However, we do not find that the SSA was provided
   with a reasonable opportunity to do so here, given the SSET's failure to
   qualitatively assess the merits of the offerors' proposals, as required by
   the RFP.[26] See Tr. at 330-39.

   Accordingly, since the record evidences that the agency did not evaluate
   the proposals under the mission capability and proposal risk subfactors in
   a way that reasonably distinguished their relative merits in accordance
   with the RFP's evaluation scheme, we sustain the protests.

   Past Performance Factor Evaluation

   The protesters also object to the evaluation of the firms' past
   performance by the agency's PCAG. Both SRA and BAH complain that the
   agency treated the firms unequally with respect to the relevance of their
   own and their subcontractors' respective past performance, and contend
   that they should have received higher confidence ratings than Jacobs based
   upon their more specific experience supporting the ESC.

   We find from our review of the record no basis to object to the Air
   Force's past performance evaluation. Rather, the contemporaneous
   documents, along with the agency's explanations during the protest,
   demonstrate a careful consideration of the relevance and quality of the
   offerors' past performance. Although the protesters disagree with the
   agency's assessed past performance confidence ratings, as illustrated by
   the following examples, we find no basis to conclude that the agency's
   judgment in this regard was unreasonable. See TPL, Inc., B-297136.10,
   B-297136.11, June 29, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 104 at 10.

   For example, SRA contends that the PCAG "double-counted" Jacobs's past
   performance to determine that Jacobs had exceptional performance on three
   highly relevant contracts: the Technical and Engineering Acquisition
   Support contract, the Engineering Support Services (ESS) II contract, and
   the ESS contract.[27] SRA complains, however, that the agency credited
   Jacobs for both the ESS II and ESS contracts based upon a single past
   performance questionnaire that was for only the ESS II contract. SRA
   Comments and Supplemental Protest at 64.

   The Air Force responds that, although the PCAG did rely upon a single past
   performance questionnaire from the contracting officer for both contracts,
   the questionnaire identified that it was for both the ESS II and ESS
   contracts. See AR, Tab 42, Jacobs Past Performance Questionnaires, at
   122-33. From our review of that document, we agree with the agency that
   the questionnaire is not ambiguous, as suggested by SRA, but identifies
   both contracts by contract numbers, contract types (one is a
   cost-plus-award-fee contract and other is a cost-plus-fixed-fee), and
   contract values. In addition to the questionnaire, the PCAG considered,
   with respect to the older ESS II contract, information from the Contractor
   Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) and an additional
   questionnaire from a program manager. We conclude that the agency did not
   improperly "double-count" Jacobs's past performance under these two
   contracts.

   As another example, BAH complains that it should have received a higher
   confidence rating because several of the contracts (that is, the Program
   Management Team Omnibus (PMTO) contract with the Department of the Navy
   and the Technical, Engineering, Fabrication, and Operational Support
   Services (TEFOS) with the Department of the Army's
   Communications-Electronics Command) that it identified for past
   performance were multi-center engineering contracts involving C4ISR, which
   BAH asserts should have been evaluated as highly relevant, and not merely
   relevant.[28] Similarly, BAH complains that its subcontractor's ITSP II
   work should have been rated better than merely relevant, because it is the
   same work as will be performed under the ETASS contract.

   The agency responds that, although the PMTO contract supports a C4ISR
   activity, the primary focus of the PMTO contract is non-technical, program
   management work, and not the type of engineering and technical support
   contemplated in ETASS. The agency also explains that it reviewed BAH's
   proposal's description of the PMTO contract, but also obtained information
   from the CPARS and from Navy web-sites for this contract. With respect to
   the TEFOS contract, the Air Force states that this contract, which
   supports a C4ISR activity similar to ESC, was not of the same magnitude or
   complexity as the ETASS work. Contracting Officer's Statement (BAH
   Protest) at 35. With respect to the ITSP II work, the agency recognized
   that it was the same type of work that would be performed under the ETASS
   contract, but each of the ITSP II task orders focused on a single program
   and was of a smaller magnitude than the ETASS requirement. Id. at 35-36.
   Although BAH disagrees with the agency's past performance evaluation
   concerning the relevance of these contracts, it has failed to show that
   the agency's judgment was unreasonable.

   Overall, based on our review, we find the agency's past performance
   evaluation to be reasonable.

   Cost/Price Evaluation

   SRA protests that the agency failed to conduct a reasonable cost realism
   evaluation of Jacobs's proposal. Specifically, SRA argues that Jacobs's
   proposed labor rates are unrealistically low and should have been upwardly
   adjusted. SRA Comments and Supplemental Protest at 5.

   We first disagree with the protester that the RFP provided for a cost
   realism evaluation that would result in probable cost adjustments of the
   offerors' fixed labor rates.[29] Rather, we find that the RFP, read as
   whole, provided for a price realism analysis and informed offerors that
   unrealistically low "costs" might be considered with respect to the
   offeror's understanding of the technical objectives. RFP sect. M.3.3.4.

   Although realism of cost or price is not ordinarily considered in the
   evaluation of proposals for a fixed-price contract, an agency may provide
   for the use of a price realism analysis in a solicitation for the award of
   a fixed-price contract for such purposes as measuring an offeror's
   understanding of the solicitation's requirements and assessing the risk
   inherent in an offeror's proposal. Consolidated Eng'g Servs., Inc.,
   B-279565.5, Mar. 19, 1999, 99-1 CPD para. 76 at 10. The nature and extent
   of such a price realism analysis ultimately are matters within the sound
   exercise of the agency's discretion, and our review of such an evaluation
   is limited to determining whether it was reasonable and consistent with
   the solicitation's evaluation criteria. Citywide Managing Servs. of Port
   Washington, Inc., supra, at 4-5. Although a price realism analysis, if
   conducted, may affect the technical evaluation, it cannot properly lead to
   adjustment of the firms' fixed prices. FAR sect. 15.404-1(d)(3); Verestar
   Gov't Servs. Group, B-291854, B-291854.2, Apr. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 68
   at 6 n.3.

   Here, the record shows that the agency's cost team reasonably assessed the
   realism of Jacobs's proposed fixed labor rates by comparing those rates to
   rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment
   Statistics wages estimates, from the FSS professional engineering services
   schedule, and from the ITSP II program. The cost team also computed an
   average fully loaded labor rate and an average direct loaded labor rate
   for each offeror and compared those rates. See AR, Tab 30, SSET Decision
   Briefing to SSA, at 122-23. The cost team found that Jacobs's fully loaded
   labor rates were [Deleted], and were, in this regard, [Deleted]. However,
   the cost team also found that [Deleted]. Supplemental Contracting
   Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 6-7.

   With respect to the realism of the firms' proposed labor hours and mixes,
   the CPRA team found that the protesters' and awardee's initially proposed
   labor hours and mixes, considering the firms' BOEs, were realistic based
   upon each firm's proposed technical approach to performing each task
   order. The record shows that the Jacobs's revised proposal was evaluated
   by the agency, which determined that the proposed labor hours and labor
   rates were reasonable and realistic. See AR, Tab 32, Price Competition
   Memorandum, at 6-8. While SRA believes that the agency failed to evaluate
   the realism of the offerors' proposed labor hours and labor hour mix in
   their revised price proposals, SRA does not identify what aspects of
   Jacobs's labor mix were assertedly unrealistic. Accordingly, we find no
   basis in the record to object to the agency's analysis of this aspect of
   Jacobs's proposal.

   Small Business Subcontracting Plan

   SRA and BAH also complain that Jacobs's proposal is unacceptable because
   it does not satisfy the RFP's mandatory small business subcontracting plan
   requirements. Specifically, they assert that Jacobs's proposal [Deleted],
   although the RFP required offerors to satisfy a goal of having 0.1 percent
   HUBZone participation.

   The agency responds that the RFP did not provide an evaluation factor for
   small business subcontracting and participation. Contracting Officer's
   Statement (SRA Protest) at 53. Rather, the agency argues that the only
   solicitation requirement was for offerors to propose acceptable small
   business subcontracting plans. See SRA Legal Memorandum at 38. Here,
   Jacobs's proposed plan promised to [Deleted] the solicitation's goal for
   HUBZone subcontractors. AR, Tab 18, Jacobs Small Business Subcontracting
   Plan, at 4-2. This plan was found acceptable by the Small Business
   Administration (SBA) procurement center representative and the contracting
   officer. Id.; AR, Tab 36, SBA Letter to the Air Force, Nov. 22, 2006. We
   deny SRA's and BAH's protest in this regard.

   Misleading Discussions

   SRA and BAH also protest that the agency conducted misleading discussions
   with the protesters with respect to Task Order No. 7, supporting the Air
   Force's 554^th Electronic Systems Wing (ELSW) and 643^rd Electronic
   Systems Squadron, which caused SRA and BAH to substantially [Deleted]
   their proposed prices for this work, and allowed Jacobs to substantially
   [Deleted] its proposed prices.

   The agency responds that the offerors' initial proposals evidenced a lack
   of common understanding with respect to this task order, given that the
   firms' proposals "significantly varied and varied substantially from what
   the government estimated would be necessary to perform" this work.[30]
   Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 11; AR, Tab 26, SSET
   Initial Proposal Briefing to SSA, at 127. Accordingly, the agency issued
   two solicitation amendments, the first of which replaced the task order
   SOO for Task Order No. 7 with a new task order SOO (that removed support
   for the 643^rd Electronic Systems Squadron), and the second of which
   provided "budget constraint" information. Thereafter, as part of
   discussions, the Air Force issued a common EN to all offerors that stated

     The Government is clarifying the requirements of ETASS support to the
     554^th [ELSW] with a revised [SOO], issued via [RFP] Amendment 0005. The
     support required in the SOO was modified to specify the required support
     within available budget constraints. As a result, the Government will
     not be issuing ENs based on previously proposed support to the 554^th
     ELSW.

     In your response to this EN specifically address 1) what support you
     propose given the constrained funding available (see constrained budget
     information provided in the 554^th ELSW SOO), 2) identify any necessary
     support that may not be provided due to the constrained funding, and 3)
     identify the risks and your proposed mitigation plan associated with
     your proposed support given the constrained funding.

   See, e.g., AR, EN-10 to Jacobs.

   We find no basis to object to the agency's conduct of discussions here.
   The record shows that the agency believed that none of the offerors had
   proposed acceptable approaches to task order No. 7, see AR, Tab 26,
   Initial Proposal Briefing to SSA, at 127-28, and the agency concluded that
   its requirements had not been adequately communicated to the offerors.
   Accordingly, the agency amended the SOO for task order No. 7 to better
   communicate its needs (as well as to remove support for the
   643^rd Electronic Systems Squadron) and to inform offerors of budget
   constraints in performing this work. Although SRA and BAH apparently
   believe that this required them to increase their prices (and suggest the
   EN was intended to benefit Jacobs), this common EN merely clarified the
   agency's requirements and provided the offerors with funding information.
   Read reasonably, the EN allowed offerors an opportunity to address how
   they would meet the agency's requirements, and, if such support would
   exceed the agency's constrained budget, what support could not be provided
   and the offerors' mitigation plans for addressing this.

   Violation of Post-Employment Restrictions

   BAH also protests that Jacobs proposed, as its [Deleted] for this
   contract, an individual who retired in October 2006 from the Air Force as
   a senior government official. BAH contends that this individual
   participated in BAH's discussion responses with the Air Force and
   "suggests" that he may have violated 18 U.S.C. sect. 207(c) (2000), which
   prohibits certain former senior government official from knowingly, "with
   the intent to influence," communicating with or appearing before any
   officer or employee of the department or agency in which that person
   served, for a period of 1 year after that individual's termination of
   service.

   Whether or not this individual violated the post-employment restrictions
   of 18 U.S.C. sect. 207(c) is not within the purview of our Bid Protest
   Regulations. The provision at 18 U.S.C. sect. 207(c) is a criminal
   statute, the interpretation and enforcement of which are primarily matters
   for the procuring agency and the Department of Justice. Accordingly, this
   allegation is dismissed.[31] See The Earth Tech. Corp., B-230980, Aug. 4,
   1988, 88-2 CPD para. 113 at 8.

   The protests are sustained.

   We recommend that the Air Force perform a new evaluation consistent with
   this decision, reopen discussions, if necessary, and make a new source
   selection decision. If a firm other than Jacobs is selected for award, the
   agency should terminate Jacobs's contract. We also recommend that the
   agency reimburse the protesters for their reasonable costs of filing and
   pursuing the protests. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(d)(1).
   The protesters' certified claims for costs, detailing time expended and
   costs incurred, must be submitted directly to the agency within 60 days of
   receiving this decision. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(f)(1).

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] Although the protests were consolidated, the Air Force provided
   separate reports in response to the protests filed by SRA and BAH. For the
   most part, the reports are identical with respect to the documents
   provided and how they were identified in the reports (i.e., tab numbers).
   In this decision, we refer to the agency report submitted in response to
   the SRA protest, except where it is necessary to cite to differing
   documents in the agency report submitted in response to BAH's protest.

   [2] ITSP II consists of blanket purchase agreements issued under the
   General Services Administration Federal Supply Schedule (FSS), under which
   task orders were issued for advisory and assistance services support for
   ESC. Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 2.

   [3] A "blue/exceptional" rating reflected a proposal that

     [e]xceeds specified minimum performance or capability requirements in a
     way beneficial to the government; proposal must have one or more
     strengths and no deficiencies to receive a blue.

   A "green/acceptable" rating reflected a proposal that

     [m]eets specified minimum performance or capability requirements
     delineated in the [RFP]; proposal rated green must have no deficiencies
     but may have one or more strengths.

   MP5315.3 sect. 5.5.1.

   [4] "Highly relevant" was defined by the RFP as "[p]ast/present
   performance effort involve[ing] essentially the same magnitude of effort
   and complexities this solicitation requires." "Relevant" was defined as
   "[p]ast/present performance effort involve[ing] much of the magnitude of
   effort and complexities this solicitation requires." RFP sect. M.3.2.3.

   [5] These initial task orders were to support seven different ESC units.
   Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA Protest) at 4.

   [6] The B-Tables requested the offerors' loaded labor rates for each of
   the seven task orders. RFP attach. 2, B-Tables.

   [7] The RFP also established time limits for each offeror's oral
   presentation. RFP sect. L.2.1.5.1.

   [8] The RFP identified high confidence rating as being better than
   significant confidence. RFP sect. M.3.2.5.

   [9] Jacobs's initial proposal was assessed as moderate risk under the
   proposal risk transition planning subfactor because of Jacobs's "lack of
   current program knowledge" that would require "[g]overnment time and
   manpower." See AR, Tab 26, SSET Initial Proposal Briefing to SSA, at 106.

   [10] The Air Force states that the reference to the single set of
   B-table/rates was, although a true statement, not a basis for the
   exceptional/low risk rating under the mission capability management
   practices subfactor. Rather, it was Jacobs's offer of [Deleted] that
   contributed to the exceptional rating. See Contracting Officer's Statement
   (SRA Protest) at 32.

   [11] The CPRA team consisted of some SSET team members and some of the
   cost team members. AR, Tab 31, PAR, at 84-85.

   [12] Jacobs disagrees that the record was insufficiently documented,
   citing our decision in G&N, L.L.C., B-285118 et al., July 19, 2000, 2002
   CPD para. 3, and arguing that there was no requirement that the agency
   provide narrative discussions of its evaluation conclusions. The
   sufficiency of an agency's subjective evaluation judgments is necessarily
   something which must be decided on a case-by-case basis. In G&N, we found
   sufficient the agency's evaluation documentation that did not include
   narrative evaluations (even though the solicitation indicated that the
   evaluators would prepare narrative evaluations). In that case, however,
   unlike the situation presented here, the evaluation documentation
   contained sufficient detail and was adequately supplemented by the
   agency's explanations of its evaluation. Id. at 6-8.

   [13] The worksheets for the mission capability subfactors provide a space
   for an evaluator to describe "what is offered"; to indicate whether the
   proposal met, exceeded, or failed to meet specified performance capability
   requirements; to identify strengths, uncertainties, and deficiencies; to
   identify the color rating assigned; and to indicate whether an evaluation
   notice was required. See, e.g., AR, Tab 12, SRA Initial Mission Capability
   Evaluation Worksheets for the Technical Approach Subfactor, at 1.
   Similarly, the worksheets for the proposal risk subfactors provided a
   space for an evaluator to describe "what is offered"; to indicate whether
   the proposal risk was high, moderate, or low; to identify strengths,
   uncertainties, and deficiencies; and to indicate whether an evaluation
   notice (EN) was required. See, e.g., AR, Tab 12, SRA Initial Proposal Risk
   Evaluation Worksheets for the Technical Approach Subfactor, at 2.

   [14] One of the Air Force's evaluators testified:

     If it was just green, low, there was nothing to document. It met the
     requirement. It met the definition. So we did the evaluation sheet for
     no comment for the completion of the record so at least there was
     something there that said we considered that, we had no comments, there
     were not strengths or weaknesses but here's my evaluation sheet. That's
     what the "NC" on it. Trying to fulfill that requirement, that's why we
     did those sheets, to ensure that there was a documented record.

   Tr. at 423. Other hearing testimony indicated that the individual
   evaluator worksheets for each of the mission capability subfactors began
   with a "default" rating of green/acceptable with low risk rating. See Tr.
   at 800-02.

   [15] Strength was defined by the agency to be:

     A significant, outstanding, or exceptional aspect of an offeror's
     proposal that has merit and exceeds the specified performance or
     capability requirements in a way that is advantageous to the Government,
     and either will be included in the contract or is inherent in the
     offeror's process.

   AR, Tab 30, SSET Decision Briefing to the SSA, at 9. Our concern relates
   not to the definition itself, but rather to the way it was applied during
   the evaluation.

   [16] Although not completely clear, hearing testimony indicated that, as
   interpreted by the SSET, superior and/or beneficial features of an
   offeror's proposal could not be considered strengths because they would
   either not be captured in the contract document or were considered "part
   of [the offeror's] inherent business process." See, e.g., Tr. at 430-31,
   446. The discounting of the offerors' apparent strengths because they were
   part of the offerors' "inherent business process" appears to be
   inconsistent with the agency's definition of strength, which provided that
   "significant, outstanding, or exceptional aspect[s] of a proposal" that
   are "inherent in the offeror's process" should be regarded as strengths.
   See AR, Tab 30, SSET Decision Briefing to the SSA, at 9.

   [17] Jacob's initial proposal described the firm's [Deleted]. AR, Tab 18,
   Jacobs Transition Planning Oral Presentation Slides, at 118.

   [18] "ISO" refers to a family of standards for quality management systems,
   established by the International Organization for Standardization, a
   non-governmental organization. The word ISO is derived from the Greek word
   "isos," meaning "equal." See www.iso.org.

   [19] We recognize that Jacobs revised its proposed [Deleted] in response
   to discussions, but the record indicates that this was not a significant
   factor in the agency's revised risk assessment. See AR, 33, Source
   Selection Decision, at 4; see also Contracting Officer's Statement (SRA
   Protest) at 19 (the "primary reasons for Jacobs' low risk in the
   transition [planning] subfactor were its ISO-certified transition process,
   and its proven track record of performance in transitions of similar and
   larger sizes").

   [20] In its EN response, Jacobs identified only one contract having a
   scale similar to the ETASS contract and only two contracts that it
   transitioned. AR, Tab 21, Jacobs Response to EN-004, at 1-2.

   [21] Much argument has been provided regarding the extent to which the
   ITSP II work is similar or dissimilar to the work to be performed under
   the ETASS contract. The fact remains that, although the ETASS contract
   will have a broader scope of work than did the ITSP II task orders, see
   Tr. at 16, the evaluators treated work under the ITSP II as essentially
   "incumbent" work. See, e.g., Tr. at 549-50, 552-53, 642-44. In this
   regard, Jacobs's [Deleted], which the Air Force viewed as a risk
   mitigator, is predicated upon Jacobs's obtaining program knowledge from
   personnel working under the ITSP II task orders. See AR, Tab 18, Jacobs's
   Transition Planning Oral Presentation Slides, at 96 ("Jacobs recognizes
   the contributions the current ITSP II workforce has made to ESC. We value
   the skills and knowledge inherent in the incumbent employees and will give
   priority for employment on the new ETASS contract should we be chosen for
   the award.")

   [22] In his hearing testimony, the SSA appeared to remember that there
   were differences in the firms' approaches to transition planning, but he
   could not recall with any specificity those approaches or whether or not
   there were any advantages offered by SRA's and BAH's approaches. The SSA's
   testimony established that he had little present recollection of this
   procurement, which we find understandable given the passage of time and
   his involvement in many other source selections since the time of his
   selection decision here. See, e.g., Tr. at 346, 356.

   [23] SRA states that one member of its team is "Dynamics Research
   Corporation (`DRC'), which is the incumbent ESC C4ISR planning
   subcontractor," and "DRC will `provide Communications Engineers,
   Integration Engineers, Logistics Specialists, IA, and Test Engineers.'"
   SRA Comments and Supplemental Protest at 23-24.

   [24] The protesters contend that Jacobs's lack of potential OCIs was the
   SSET's overriding focus in determining that superiority of Jacobs's
   proposal under this factor. Although the SSA testified that Jacobs's lack
   of potential OCIs was not the basis of the selection of that firm's
   proposal for award, see Tr. at 361, other hearing testimony lends support
   to the protesters' views. See, e.g., Tr. at 207. However, potential OCI
   issues are only one part of what was to be evaluated under these
   subfactors.

   [25] In the hearing, SRA's counsel directed the evaluator to SRA's oral
   presentation slides, where SRA stated that it would flow-down established
   CMMI Level 3 policies and procedures to subcontractors and have a "fully
   integrated, badgeless approach." See AR, Tab 11, SRA Management Practices
   Oral Presentation Slides, at 103. The evaluator testified that "[i]t's not
   clear what established SRA CMMI policies and procedures are flowing down.
   And also, we [presumably the SSET] did not know what a badgeless approach
   was." Tr. at 810. To the extent the SSET had questions about what SRA was
   proposing, SRA was not asked to explain its management practices approach
   either during the question and answer portion of the oral presentation or
   through discussions. Tr. at 811.

   [26] This is particularly problematic given the SSA's judgment that this
   was a very close competition. See Tr. at 386.

   [27] The ESS contract followed the ESS II contract. AR, Tab 30, SSET
   Decision Briefing to the SSA, at 354.

   [28] The PCAG assigned quality ratings of excellent and very good,
   respectively, to BAH's performance under those contracts. AR, Tab 30, SSET
   Decision Briefing to SSA, at 209.

   [29] Although the ETASS contract will provide for the award of cost
   reimbursement task orders, the RFP did not request that offerors submit
   proposed costs for these task orders or provide that such costs would be
   evaluated for cost realism, and stated that the "Cost Reimbursable effort
   will be evaluated at the amount provided by the Government in the RFP."
   RFP sect. M.3.3.2.

   [30] Four offerors, including SRA and BAH, proposed [Deleted] hours than
   the government estimate for the Task Order No. 7 work, while Jacobs
   proposed [Deleted] hours than the government estimate. See AR, Tab 26,
   SSET Initial Proposal Briefing to SSA, at 124.

   [31] BAH does not contend that this individual had access to information
   that could have provided Jacobs with an unfair competitive advantage.