TITLE: B-299477, Phoenix Management, Inc., May 16, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299477
DATE: May 16, 2007
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B-299477, Phoenix Management, Inc., May 16, 2007
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective Order.
No party requested redactions; we are therefore releasing the decision in
its entirety.
Decision
Matter of: Phoenix Management, Inc.
File: B-299477
Date: May 16, 2007
Johnathan M. Bailey, Esq., and Theodore M. Bailey, Esq., Bailey & Bailey,
P.C., for the protester.
Lt. Col. Frank A. March, Maj. Gregory A. Moritz, Maj. P. Daniel DiPaola,
Capt. John J. Pritchard, Capt. Robert B. Nelson, Capt. Charlene T.
Storino, and Raymond M. Saunders, Esq., Department of the Army, for the
agency.
Paul N. Wengert, Esq., and Ralph O. White, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest is denied where the agency reasonably found the protester's
proposal did not adequately explain protester's approach to utilizing
staff to ensure that multiple tasks of performance work statement would be
performed according to stated standards (without disrupting the
performance of other tasks), and where the agency had provided comments
during discussions that reasonably alerted the protester to that concern,
but the revised proposal failed to alleviate the agency's concern.
DECISION
Phoenix Management, Inc. (PMI) protests the decision of the Department of
the Army, pursuant to Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76, to
accept the agency tender for performance by the government's most
efficient organization (MEO) to perform in-house the requirements for
airfield support services at Fort Rucker, Alabama, rather than to award a
contract for these services, under request for proposals (RFP)
No. W911SO-06-R-0011. PMI argues that, but for the agency's unreasonable
evaluation, its lower priced proposal would have been viewed as
acceptable, and it would have received the award.
We deny the protest.
BACKGROUND
The Army issued the RFP on July 20, 2006, seeking firm fixed-price
proposals, and an agency tender, for performance of airfield support
services for a 10-month base period (preceded by a 60-day phase-in
period), followed by four 1-year option periods. The performance work
statement (PWS) described services in three main areas--flight
operations,[1] motor vehicle operations,[2] and airfield support[3]--to be
performed at five sites: Cairns Army Airfield, Hanchey Army Heliport, Lowe
Army Heliport, Shell Army Heliport, and Knox Army Heliport. RFP amend. 4,
Revised Performance Work Statement (PWS), at C-5-1.
The RFP specified that proposals would be evaluated under three evaluation
factors: mission capability, past performance, and price. The mission
capability factor was divided into two subfactors of equal importance: (1)
management and organization; and (2) technical approach. The RFP further
explained these were "critical subfactors," and therefore a rating of
marginal or unacceptable in either subfactor would "automatically carry
forward to the [f]actor rating." RFP amend. 7, at 2. The RFP then provided
that the mission capability and past performance factors were of equal
importance in determining technical acceptability, and that award would be
made to the offeror submitting the lowest-priced technically acceptable
offer. Id.
With respect to the mission capability portion of proposals, the RFP
instructed offerors to be "specific, detailed, and complete to clearly and
fully demonstrate that the offeror has a thorough understanding of the
requirements," and required that proposals
address how tasks in each functional area (except Quality Control
[addressed elsewhere]) of the PWS will be accomplished by addressing how
you will be organized and staffed along with specifically describing how
work will be scheduled (including use of any automated systems or
workloading procedures), proposed work processes and outputs, process
interfaces, innovations, assumptions of support, and cross-utilization
training and plans. . . .
RFP amend. 6, at 6.
The RFP explained that under the management and organization subfactor the
agency would "focus on organization, personnel qualifications for labor
categories, qualifications for key personnel, labor hours, and
demonstrated understanding of personnel requirements." RFP amend. 7, at 2.
Additionally, the RFP indicated that under the technical approach
subfactor the agency would scrutinize the proposal "to determine the
offeror's understanding of the technical requirements and assess the
offeror's ability and methodology to meet the minimum requirements." Id.
The Army received initial proposals from PMI and two other offerors, as
well as an agency tender. After evaluating the offers, the Army determined
that even though PMI's proposal was considered unacceptable under both
subfactors (and thus under the mission capability factor itself), the
agency would nonetheless conduct discussions with PMI. During these
discussions, PMI was advised that its proposal was evaluated as
unacceptable, and was provided with extensive comments about its approach.
With respect to PMI's proposed staffing, the Army specifically advised
that
Staffing levels are far too thin to provide adequate coverage of all
required tasks. Although the proposal states the intention of utilizing
the part-time employees to back fill areas as needed, no clear
explanation of how these employees will be activated or how they are
guaranteed to be available at the same rate and time as the demand is
presented. Please explain[.]
The Army also provided the following comment on PMI's organizational
structure:
No clear description exists on who will be trained and performing
specific required functions. The offeror proposes that both Flight
Operations and Motor Vehicle Operation personnel will provide VIP
support as needed, but does not clearly define how/who/what personnel
are cross trained to perform these functions, how or when are they
trained and in what areas. Please explain.
AR, Tab 10, Discussions Letter, at 3-4.
In addition, the evaluation of the flight operations technical approach
led the Army to comment that "the proposal does not accurately describe
how this and all other Motor Vehicle Operations and Airfield Support
functions can and/or will be accomplished at the proposed manning level."
The Army further commented that PMI did not seem to have a clear
understanding of all requirements in the PWS, and noted, in particular,
that PMI proposed to appoint both a Primary and an Alternate Publications
Officer from the pool of Air Traffic Assistants. This apparent
double-tasking led the Army to note that PMI had not clearly explained
"how operations will continue to be supported with two individuals while
this person is picking up, delivering and distributing publications to
respective areas. Please explain." Id. at 4.
Finally, with respect to motor vehicle operators, the agency again asked
PMI to explain how it would accomplish the PWS tasks with the proposed
staffing, and advised that the proposal did not provide details on "how
all required [motor vehicle operations] functions as stated in the PWS
will/can be accomplished at existing manning level." The Army also asked
PMI to explain how it would accomplish regular pilot shuttle service tasks
on the occasions when it must also simultaneously retrieve an aircraft
crew from a remote site. Id. at 4-5.
Generally, PMI's responses to these questions advised that the company was
increasing staffing, and directed the Army to review PMI's revised total
full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing level and revised organizational
chart. The responses also advised that "[u]pon review, we expect the
Government will find the newly proposed numbers will meet all of the
requirements and expectations within the PWS while affording superb
customer service and eliminating all risk to the Government." AR, Tab 6.a,
PMI Negotiation Questions & Responses, at 2; see also id. at 8, 9, and 10.
After receiving and evaluating revised proposals, the Army concluded that
PMI's revised proposal was still unacceptable. Although the Army found
certain aspects of PMI's proposal had been improved, and acknowledged that
PMI had added staff and revised its organizational chart, the agency also
concluded that PMI had not sufficiently explained its approach for
performing the PWS, as required by the RFP, and as specifically requested
during discussions. For example, the Army evaluators noted that, despite
the increased staff levels, "the proposed placement of personnel, lack of
detail and methodology for accomplishing required tasks at proposed
staffing levels, and the lack of clarification on the provided
Organizational Chart, leaves a remaining high level of risk." AR, Tab 11,
Source Selection Evaluation Board Results for PMI, at 1.
The Army evaluators also observed that PMI's proposed placement of Air
Traffic Assistants (ATAs) and Motor Vehicle Operators (MVOs)--coupled with
concerns about the proposal's lack of description about how all these
functions could be accomplished at all airfields over the required
operational times--"provides no assurance that all required functions will
be accomplished, thus incurring a high level of risk." Id. Specifically,
the evaluators noted that "the revised proposal for ATAs and MVOs provides
absolute minimum manning (one layer deep for MVOs) . . . without a
detailed description as to how all functions could be accomplished at all
times, in all locations, and by whom." Id. at 1-2.
Given the Army's conclusion that PMI's revised proposal remained
technically unacceptable, the agency eliminated PMI from the competition,
and ultimately selected the MEO to perform these services. The Army
provided PMI with a debriefing, and this protest followed.
DISCUSSION
PMI argues that its revised proposal should not have been found
technically unacceptable; and specifically, that the staffing increases
added after discussions were adequate to perform the PWS tasks. In
addition, PMI contends that the Army's explanation for concluding that
PMI's approach was unacceptable is vague and unfounded.
In response, the Army explains that PMI's decision to increase its
staffing in its revised proposal simply did not resolve the concerns
identified in discussions about how PMI would accomplish the tasks in the
PWS. Legal Memorandum at 16-20. To better understand the Army's rationale
for its conclusion, as well as PMI's views, our Office convened a hearing.
During the hearing, the chair of the source selection evaluation board
provided specific examples of how an offeror's failure to ensure that
appropriate staff was available to handle multiple tasks simultaneously
could impair the operation of the airfields. In addition, the Army witness
highlighted areas in PMI's proposal where there was no detail to explain
how PMI would accomplish all the required tasks. In contrast, PMI
officials could not point to specific provisions in the revised proposal
that addressed the Army's concerns. Rather, PMI witnesses offered
explanations that had not been included in the revised proposal, and
indicated that the 1-page organizational chart should have been sufficient
to persuade Army evaluators that PMI could accomplish all PWS tasks with
its staffing.
In our view, the hearing confirmed the concerns raised by agency
evaluators that the revised proposal did not explain PMI's management
approach in narrative form. The hearing also confirmed that, in the
absence of narrative explanations, PMI's approach could only be inferred
from revisions to an organizational chart, which set forth numerical
staffing levels in terms of full-time equivalents and full- and part-time
employees. Hearing Transcript at 109-111, 124-26, 129-34, and 143-45.
In its post-hearing comments, PMI argues that the complexity and
fluctuation of workflow described by the Army's evaluator during the
hearing was not captured by the PWS. Specifically, PMI contends that the
workload tables in the PWS, which consisted of 13 pages tallying the
monthly incidence of each PWS task at each of the five sites over a year,
implied that PWS tasks were evenly distributed within daily operational
periods.
We think PMI's contentions about its interpretation of the PWS are not
supported by the record. The PWS here focused on providing rapid-response
service and support at five separate sites to student and instructor
pilots, transient aircraft and crews, and other aviators not affiliated
with the pilot training mission--a focus that is inherently inconsistent
with the regular, steady process that PMI contends was conveyed in the
RFP. Moreover, this interpretation of the PWS was not supported by the
hearing testimony of PMI's own managers, including one of whom had several
years of work experience on airfields at Fort Rucker. E.g., Hearing
Transcript at 106, 108-111, 123-24, and 138-44.
Offerors bear the responsibility to submit an adequately written proposal
with sufficient detail to demonstrate an understanding of, and ability to
meet, solicitation requirements; proposals that fail to make this showing
may properly be found unacceptable. See, e.g., Aerostat Servs. P'ship,
B-244939.2, Jan. 15, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 71 at 6 (agency reasonably found
protester's proposal unacceptable where proposal failed to adequately
explain how staff needed continually for particular duties would also
perform unrelated tasks that would necessarily divert their attention,
time, and energy away from ongoing core duties). Based on our review of
the record, including the detailed hearing testimony, we conclude that the
Army evaluators reasonably found that several aspects of PMI's management
approach did not go beyond depicting staffing in numerical form for
particular days and hours, which left the evaluators without a clear
explanation of how PMI's plan would address the tasks identified in the
PWS, and unsure about whether PMI's staffing was sufficient.[4]
The protest is denied.
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel
------------------------
[1] This section of the PWS required offerors to have two air traffic
assistants on duty at each airfield at all times during specified hours to
handle in-person and radio communications with instructors and students,
in addition to other tasks. RFP amend. 4, Revised PWS, at C-5-1.
[2] This section of the PWS included transporting students and instructors
to aircraft, picking up students and instructors who land off-base (such
as for mechanical or emergency weather conditions), and transporting
distinguished visitors (VIPs). RFP amend. 4, Revised PWS, at C-5-8.
[3] This section of the PWS primarily involved buildings and grounds
maintenance, but also included many airfield-specific tasks, such as
regular runway checks to remove debris (known as FOD for "Foreign Object
Debris"), and inspection and repair of aircraft tie-downs. RFP amend. 4,
Revised PWS, at C-5-10.
[4] We also find no merit in PMI's argument that the discussions questions
failed to advise the company of the Army's concerns. In our view, the
record confirms that in each case, the Army reasonably directed PMI to the
aspects of its initial proposal that caused concern. PMI's decision to
respond by relying primarily on staffing increases--with no meaningful
narrative description of its management approach to accomplishing the
tasks--reasonably became the focus of the Army's evaluation of the revised
proposal, and led the evaluators to rate it as unacceptable.