TITLE: B-299145; B-299145.2; B-299145.3, Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Owego, February 26, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299145; B-299145.2; B-299145.3
DATE: February 26, 2007
*******************************************************************************************************************************
B-299145; B-299145.2; B-299145.3, Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Owego, February 26, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems
   Integration-Owego

   File: B-299145; B-299145.2; B-299145.3

   Date: February 26, 2007

   John W. Chierichella, Esq., Jonathan S. Aronie, Esq., Anne B. Perry, Esq.,
   Keith R. Szeliga, Esq., and Jesse J. Williams, Esq., Sheppard Mullin, for
   Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Marcia Madsen, Esq., David F. Dowd, Esq.,
   Michael E. Lackey, Jr., Esq., William L. Olsen, Esq., and Luke Levasseur,
   Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, and Bucky P. Mansuy, Esq., Lockheed Martin
   Corporation, for Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Owego, the
   protesters.

   Paul F. Khoury, Esq., Scott M. McCaleb, Esq., William J. Colwell, Esq.,
   Nicole Owren-Wiest, Esq., Kevin Plummer, Esq., and Rand L. Allen, Esq.,
   Wiley Rein LLP, and Mark W. Reardon, The Boeing Company, for The Boeing
   Company, the intervenor.

   Michael O'Farrell, Esq., and Bridget E. Lyons, Esq., Department of the Air
   Force, for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest is sustained where (1) solicitation for combat search and rescue
   aircraft provided that cost/price would be calculated on the basis of Most
   Probable Life Cycle Cost, including both contract and operations and
   support (O&S) costs, (2) solicitation requested detailed information
   quantifying required maintenance for proposed aircraft, and (3) agency
   nevertheless normalized cost of maintenance when calculating O&S costs,
   thereby ignoring potentially lower cost of asserted low maintenance
   helicopters; once offerors are informed of criteria against which
   proposals will be evaluated and award made, agency must adhere to those
   criteria.

   DECISION

   Sikorsky Aircraft Company and Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Owego
   (LMSI) protest the Department of the Air Force's award of a contract to
   The Boeing Company, under request for proposals (RFP) No.
   FA8629-06-R-2350, for the Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle
   (CSAR-X). Sikorsky and LMSI challenge the evaluation of proposals and
   resulting source selection.

   We sustain the protests.

   The HH-60 helicopter currently serves as the agency's combat search and
   rescue aircraft, used to recover downed aircrew and isolated personnel.
   However, as indicated in the contemporaneous record, and confirmed at the
   hearing our Office conducted in this matter, the Air Force has determined
   that its aging fleet of HH-60s has several shortfalls, including:
   insufficient combat radius; a cabin and payload that are too small;
   inadequate survivability, including inadequate defensive systems and
   armament; inadequate adverse weather capability; inadequate battlespace
   awareness; and, as an aircraft nearing the end of its service life,
   difficulties in maintaining the aircraft and inadequate availability.
   Source Selection Decision (SSD) at 2; RFP sect. L 1.1; CSAR-X Final
   Evaluation Brief, Oct. 21, 2006, at 11; Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 15-16,
   208-09, 240-49. The solicitation, issued on October 5, 2005, provided for
   the acquisition of a non-developmental item, medium lift, vertical
   take-off and landing aircraft that, with minimal development, could
   achieve a combat ready CSAR-X Block 0 aircraft Initial Operational
   Capability (IOC) by Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 and replace the HH-60 aircraft.
   The contemplated effort included the development and demonstration (on a
   cost-plus-award-fee-with-incentive-fee basis) of the initial Block 0
   aircraft, fixed-price production lots for a total of 141 aircraft,
   associated trainers, spares and support, and the cost-plus-award-fee
   development and demonstration of the ultimate, fully capable CSAR X Block
   10 aircraft.

   Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented the "best
   value" based on consideration of four evaluation factors: (1) mission
   capability, including (in descending order of importance) subfactors for
   Block 0 aircraft performance, system architecture and software, systems
   engineering, product support, management/schedule and Block 10 aircraft
   performance; (2) proposal risk, assessed at the subfactor level, and
   focusing on weaknesses associated with an offeror's proposed approach and
   the resulting potential for disruption of schedule, increased cost,
   degradation of performance, the need for increased government oversight,
   and the likelihood of unsuccessful contract performance; (3) past
   performance; and (4) cost/price. Of particular importance here, the
   solicitation provided that, for evaluation purposes, cost/price would be
   calculated on the basis of the Most Probable Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC) for
   the aircraft, comprised of the cost/price of: (1) system development and
   demonstration (SDD); (2) the award fee; (3) production; (4) operations and
   support (O&S); (5) other government costs; and (6) proposal risk
   adjustments, based on a quantification in terms of schedule and cost of
   the impact of the technical, programmatic and schedule risk of the
   offeror's proposed approach. Mission capability, proposal risk and past
   performance were of equal importance and, when combined, were
   "significantly more important than" cost/price. RFP sect. M 8.

   Boeing, Sikorsky and LMSI submitted initial proposals by the November 5,
   2005 closing time. Boeing proposed the twin-rotor HH-47 helicopter, an
   updated version of the MH-47G helicopter, part of a family of helicopters
   that have been in production and flying for over 40 years. LMSI proposed
   the single-rotor US101 helicopter, a version of the EH-101, military
   versions of which are in military service with the United Kingdom.
   Sikorsky proposed the single-rotor S-92 helicopter, currently in
   commercial use to ferry personnel to and from off-shore oil platforms and
   used by the United Kingdom, Canada and several other governments for
   maritime search and rescue.

   All three proposals were included in the competitive range. After
   conducting several rounds of written and oral discussions--including
   several face-to-face "debriefings" during which offerors were advised of
   the agency's current evaluation of their technical proposals and past
   performance--and after a flight evaluation to assess the current
   capability of the offerors' baseline aircraft, the Air Force requested
   final proposal revisions (FPR) by September 18, 2006. The Air Force
   evaluated the FPRs as follows:

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                     |       LMSI        |      Sikorsky      |       Boeing       |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Mission Capability/  |                   |                    |                    |
|                     |                   |                    |                    |
|Proposal Risk        |                   |                    |                    |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Block 0 Performance  |  Acceptable/High  |   Acceptable/Low   |  Exceptional/Low   |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Architecture/Software|    Acceptable/    |Acceptable/Moderate |Acceptable/Moderate |
|                     |     Moderate      |                    |                    |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Systems Engineering  |Acceptable/Moderate|Acceptable/Moderate |Acceptable/Moderate |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Product Support      |  Exceptional/Low  |  Exceptional/Low   |   Acceptable/Low   |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Management/Schedule  |Acceptable/Moderate|Exceptional/Moderate|Exceptional/Moderate|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Block 10 Performance |Acceptable/Moderate|Acceptable/Moderate |Exceptional/Moderate|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Past Performance     | Little Confidence |Satisfactory        |Satisfactory        |
|                     |                   |Confidence          |Confidence          |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Price/Cost           |        ($ million)|         ($ million)|         ($ million)|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|SDD Proposed         |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|SDD Adjustment       |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Production Proposed  |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Production Adjusted  |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|OGC                  |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Subtotal             |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|O&S                  |         [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|          [REDACTED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|MPLCC                |          $35,853.7|           $38,531.8|           $38,891.5|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Based on the evaluation results, the source selection authority (SSA)
   determined that Boeing's proposal represented the best value. As an
   initial matter, according to the SSD, because cost/price "was so close
   between the offerors" and was significantly less important than the other
   evaluation factors combined, "Cost/Price ratings did not provide a great
   deal of weight" in the SSA's source selection decision; rather, "Mission
   Capability/Proposal Risk Subfactors and Past Performance became the basis
   for discriminating between the offerors." SSD at 6. In this regard, the
   SSA noted that LMSI's proposal had received a high risk rating under the
   Block 0 performance subfactor due to [REDACTED]. According to the SSA,
   since "[REDACTED]," he "saw no reason to take on that HIGH level of risk."
   Id. In addition, the SSA noted that LMSI had received a little confidence
   rating for past performance due to unsatisfactory performance under its
   current contract for the VH-71 Presidential helicopter, which was
   evaluated as highly relevant to this procurement. According to the SSA,
   LMSI had "show[n under that contract] that it could not reliably meet
   important schedule requirements and had difficulty in systems engineering
   flow-downs to their subcontractors." Id. at 7. The SSA, noting the
   "stronger proposals offered by Boeing and Sikorsky," concluded that the
   "modest" MPLCC savings associated with LMSI's proposal were outweighed by
   LMSI's high risk rating under the Block 0 performance subfactor and little
   confidence past performance rating. Id. at 6-7.

   The SSA also determined that Boeing's proposal was more advantageous than
   Sikorsky's lower cost proposal. In this regard, while acknowledging
   Sikorsky's advantage under the product support subfactor, where it was
   rated exceptional while Boeing's was rated only acceptable, the SSA
   emphasized that Boeing's was the only proposal that received an excellent
   rating under the Block 0 performance subfactor, having received
   significantly more strengths (including strengths for mission load and
   occupant protection) than Sikorsky's proposal. The SSA also noted Boeing's
   advantage under the Block 10 performance subfactor (the least important
   subfactor), where Boeing's proposal was rated exceptional and Sikorsky's
   only acceptable. The SSA concluded that Boeing's greater mission
   capability strengths outweighed Sikorsky's "slightly lower" MPLCC. Id. at
   10.

   Upon learning of the resulting award to Boeing (on November 9, 2006), and
   after being debriefed, Sikorsky and LMSI filed these protests with our
   Office. In their protests, Sikorsky and LMSI challenge the agency's
   evaluation of proposals.

   In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, it is not
   our role to reevaluate proposals. Rather, our Office examines the record
   to determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and in accord
   with the RFP criteria and applicable procurement statutes and regulations.
   See Rolf Jensen & Assocs., Inc., B-289475.2, B-289475.3, July 1, 2002,
   2002 CPD para. 110 at 5. In this regard, an agency may not announce in the
   solicitation that it will use one evaluation plan and then follow another;
   once offerors are informed of the criteria against which their proposals
   will be evaluated and the source selection decision made, the agency must
   adhere to those criteria or inform all offerors of significant changes.
   Remington Arms Co., Inc., B-297374, B-297374.2, Jan. 12, 2006, 2006 CPD
   para. 32 at 15. Here, based upon our review of the record, including a
   hearing conducted by our Office, we find that the Air Force's evaluation
   of O&S costs was inconsistent with the RFP.

   As noted above, the solicitation provided that, for evaluation purposes,
   cost/price would be calculated on the basis of the MPLCC for the CSAR-X
   aircraft, including (among other costs) O&S costs. In this regard, the
   solicitation included RFP attachment 13, "O&S Data Form," the "primary
   purpose" of which was to "capture all relevant CSAR-X Operating and
   Support (O&S) costs"; offerors were required to complete the attachment
   with estimates of specified O&S costs for their proposed aircraft through
   FY 2029, when the last of the new CSAR-X aircraft were to become fully
   operational. The agency then extended all O&S costs from FY 2029 to
   generate a complete life cycle for each aircraft, resulting in an overall
   CSAR-X life cycle through FY 2039. Contracting Officer's Statement
   (Sikorsky) at 22; CSAR-X O&S Cost FPR Evaluation at 3.

   Attachment 13 listed the following O&S cost categories: (1) Unit Mission
   Personnel, including active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force reserve
   personnel; (2) Unit Level Consumption, including Fuel, Consumables, Repair
   Costs (Repair Material, Repair Labor and Replenishment Spares), and
   Training Munitions; (3) Depot Maintenance; (4) Contractor Support,
   including Training System and Other Contractor Costs (Material and Labor);
   (5) Sustaining Support, including Support Equipment, Sustaining
   Engineering and Software Maintenance; and (6) Indirect Support, including
   active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force reserve personnel. Offerors
   were required to estimate the O&S costs of their proposed aircraft in
   these categories through FY 2029, with the exception that attachment 13
   stated as follows: "Unit Mission Personnel, Training Munitions, and
   Indirect Support will be calculated by the government team. Leave blank."

   In addition, offerors were required to comply with, and furnish
   "sufficient detail for effective evaluation and for substantiating the
   validity of stated claims" with respect to, various requirements in the
   CSAR-X System Requirements Document (SRD) quantifying the amount of
   maintenance the proposed aircraft would need during their service life.
   RFP sect. L 2.0. For example, offerors were required to submit the
   maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMH/FH) their aircraft required; the
   CSAR-X SRD established as a threshold, or minimum, requirement that the
   CSAR-X aircraft not require more than 20 MMH/FH and, as an objective, that
   it not require more than 10 MMH/FH. SRD sect. 3.1.4.2.4. Other examples
   include requirements for offerors to specify: (1) mean time to repair
   their aircraft, with the SRD specifying a threshold requirement of no more
   than 1.5 hours and an objective of 0.5 hours, SRD sect. 3.1.4.2.1; (2)
   time required for Mid Term Scheduled Inspections, with a threshold
   requirement of 20 manhours and an objective of 10 manhours, SRD sect.
   3.1.5.3.2; (3) time to repair a failed system after a sortie, with a
   threshold requirement of completion within 12 hours 80 percent of the time
   and an objective of completion within 12 hours 90 percent of the time, SRD
   sect. 3.1.4.2.1; and (4) time to complete any required long-term scheduled
   inspections and repair, with a threshold requirement of completion using
   no more than 960 manhours and an objective of completion using no more
   than 480 manhours, SRD sect. 3.1.5.3.3.

   The Air Force calculated the O&S cost of Boeing's proposal as $[REDACTED]
   billion in "Then Year" (TY) (inflated) dollars, Sikorsky's as $[REDACTED]
   billion, and LMSI's as $[REDACTED] billion. In calculating these O&S cost
   estimates, the Air Force used the same costs for Unit Mission Personnel,
   Training Munitions, MER Contractors and Indirect Support for each offeror.
   The government-generated personnel-based costs for Unit Mission Personnel
   ($9.611 billion) and Indirect Support ($3.609 billion) accounted for most
   of the calculated O&S cost totals for each offeror--approximately
   [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] percent, respectively, of LMSI's evaluated O&S
   cost; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] percent of Sikorsky's O&S cost, and
   [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] percent of Boeing's O&S cost.[1]

   Sikorsky and LMSI assert that the agency's calculation of O&S costs using
   the same estimated cost for Unit Mission Personnel and Indirect Support
   for all proposals, irrespective of the aircraft offered, unreasonably
   failed to account for the reduced maintenance required by their generally
   newer design, smaller helicopters. They claim that this was inconsistent
   with the RFP's requirement for detailed information regarding O&S costs
   generally, and maintenance costs specifically. The protesters read this
   information requirement, together with the MPLCC evaluation approach, as
   indicating that the O&S cost evaluation would take into account the
   helicopter offered.

   We agree with the protesters. It is true that the solicitation provided
   that "Unit Mission Personnel . . . and Indirect Support will be calculated
   by the government team," Attach. 13, and similar language in a different
   context could mean that the agency would use normalized, i.e.,"plug,"
   numbers for all offerors. Here, however, the RFP also stated the agency's
   intention to "capture all relevant CSAR-X Operating and Support (O&S)
   costs," id., and requested the submission of various measures and
   information intended to quantify the amount of maintenance the proposed
   aircraft would need during their service life. The solicitation further
   indicated through its inclusion in the SRD of threshold requirements and
   objectives with respect to various maintenance measures (such as MMH/FH),
   that it valued aircraft that require less maintenance. In the face of
   these solicitation provisions, we think the statement that the government
   would calculate the Unit Mission Personnel and Indirect Support costs
   reasonably could only be interpreted as indicating that the agency would
   perform those calculations taking into account the unique aspects of the
   proposed aircraft (including maintenance requirements) as identified in
   the required information. Only in this way would the agency's evaluation
   "capture all relevant CSAR-X Operating and Support (O&S) costs," as it
   announced was its intent.

   We further agree that the agency's methodology for calculating O&S costs
   did not reasonably account for each offeror's unique technical approach,
   including very different proposed helicopters, and thus was inconsistent
   with the stated evaluation scheme. In this regard, the Air Force based the
   evaluated cost for Unit Mission Personnel--that is, the primarily
   base-level active duty, Air National Guard and Air Force reserve personnel
   in the contemplated 13 CSAR-X squadrons--and for MER Contractors on the
   staffing set forth in the Air Force's MER for the Replacement Personal
   Recovery Vehicle (CSAX), March 30, 2006 version, issued by the Air Force
   Special Operations Command (the warfighting command previously responsible
   for the combat search and rescue mission). The MER specifies that the
   maximum total staffing requirement "under the current concept of
   operations," including both government and contractor personnel, will be
   6,232 manyears (or 5,539 manyears excluding contractors and certain
   technicians), more than half of which were listed under the maintenance
   function. MER at 2, 16; Tr. at 37-42, 378-81, 1181-82; Agency Comments,
   Feb. 3, 2007, at 17-18. In addition, the agency derived the evaluated cost
   for Indirect Support, which included such indirect costs as training and
   change of station, based on the stafffing specified in the MER. Tr. at
   1133-34. As indicated in the MER itself, and as conceded by agency
   witnesses in hearing testimony, the MER reflected the staffing and
   maintenance concepts only for the current HH-60 helicopter. MER at 12-14;
   Tr. 38, 377-78, 1182.[2]

   The Air Force maintains that it was reasonable to base its O&S cost
   analysis on the MER staffing because the MER represented the official
   agency staffing for the contemplated CSAR-X squadrons. However, the fact
   that the MER may have been considered the official staffing level is
   irrelevant here. The question is not whether the MER could be used in the
   agency's analysis; rather, the question is whether the agency reasonably
   could rely on the MER to the exclusion of the information provided by
   offerors regarding the characteristics of their particular aircraft,
   especially since the MER is based on the current helicopter, not those
   proposed, and may bear only a limited relationship to the ultimate future
   maintenance staffing needs for the replacement helicopter. The fact that
   the MER represented the agency's current official staffing level does not
   override what we have found was the evaluation approach reasonably
   indicated by the RFP--that the maintenance characteristics of the proposed
   helicopters would be considered in the O&S cost evaluation.

   Reliance on the MER is all the more problematic given that the current
   HH-60, which is nearing the end of its service life, has "very high"
   maintenance requirements, requiring "upward around" 25-30 MMH/FH.
   Tr. at 681. In contrast, as discussed above, the CSAR-X SRD established as
   a minimum that the CSAR-X aircraft shall not require more than 20 MMH/FH,
   and stated as an objective that the aircraft should not require more than
   10 MMH/FH. SRD sect. 3.1.4.2.4. Consistent with the SRD, all three
   offerors estimated significantly lower MMH/FH for their proposed
   helicopters than is required for the current HH-60. Boeing's proposal,
   generally referring to extensive flying experience for the H-47 family of
   aircraft during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom,
   and specifically relying for part of its calculation upon experience with
   the MH-47E helicopter, generally referred to an estimated MMH/FH for the
   CSAR-X of [REDACTED] hours. (We note that the specific calculations
   supporting this number actually indicated an estimated MMH/FH of
   [REDACTED] hours.) Boeing Mission Capability Proposal, 1(d) Product
   Support, sect. 4.2, at 46, 50-51, 62-63. LMSI, noting that its current
   EH-101 platforms had accumulated over [REDACTED] flight hours, and had
   specifically demonstrated an MMH/FH of below [REDACTED] hours during
   combat operations in Iraq, estimated the MMH/FH for its proposed CSAR-X as
   [REDACTED] hours. LMSI FPR Executive Summary; LMSI FPR Mission Capability
   Proposal, 1(d) Product Support, sect. 1.4, at 18-19, 27-30, 50-52.
   Sikorsky, noting that its aircraft had achieved sustained
   [REDACTED] percent availability, flying [REDACTED] hours a day, during
   commercial offshore oil operations in harsh environments, and citing an
   "[i]ndependent analysis" by an aircraft consulting firm specializing in
   calculating aircraft operating costs, estimated the MMH/FH of its proposed
   CSAR-X aircraft as fewer than [REDACTED] hours. Sikorsky FPR Executive
   Summary; Sikorsky Mission Capability Proposal, 1(d) Product Support, June
   2006, sect. 3.1.1, at 42-43, 52; see Tr. at 651.

   Further, it is clear that the MER will change to reflect the
   characteristics, including unique maintenance requirements, of the
   selected CSAR-X helicopter. Not only does the MER itself acknowledge that
   it is a "living document" but, in fact, there already have been three
   editions of the MER during the course of this procurement, including the
   March 30, 2006 edition used by the evaluators and two subsequent editions
   (July 17, 2006 and August 30, 2006) that were not used in the evaluation.
   MER at 2; Tr. at 1088. Both the SSA and the contracting officer
   anticipated that the MER would be changed after award to reflect the
   characteristics and requirements of the selected CSAR-X helicopter. Tr. at
   97, 384-85, 388-89, 392-93. Although the SSA testified that the MER would
   be updated only after the agency has 2-3 years of operational experience
   with the new CSAR-X aircraft, Tr. at 216-17, 385, we note that the
   agency's June 2005 Capability Development Document for Combat Search and
   Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X)/Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV), June
   16, 2005, prepared prior to the current litigation, stated simply that the
   "initial Manpower Estimate Report . . . will be updated following source
   selection." Capability Development Document at 61. In any case, even
   accepting the SSA's chronology, the MER could be changed as early as 2014,
   that is, 2 years after the scheduled initial operational capability in
   2012. Since the Air Force purported to evaluate O&S costs through FY 2039,
   we see no basis in the record for its evaluation to ignore the most likely
   maintenance requirements for the new CSAR-X for nearly all of its
   operational life and to rely instead on a maintenance approach (as
   reflected in the March 2006 MER) based on the current high maintenance
   aircraft.

   The agency asserts that consideration in the O&S cost evaluation of the
   offerors' predicted MMH/FH would have been inappropriate. In this regard,
   the agency argues that only the offerors' contractually binding
   commitments, as set forth in each offeror's proposed Weapon System
   Specification (WSS)--which was to be incorporated into the offeror's
   contract, RFP sect. L-2--were meaningful, and notes that [REDACTED].

   We find the agency's position unpersuasive. First, again, whether or not
   the agency believed considering the characteristics of the offerors'
   proposed aircraft was inappropriate, the fact is that, as already
   discussed, the RFP indicated that those characteristics would be
   considered. Further, we note that the agency's current reliance on the WSS
   numbers represents a departure from its approach during the O&S cost
   evaluation; the WSS numbers simply were not used in the O&S cost
   evaluation. Testimony from agency witnesses indicates that the offerors'
   WSS numbers were irrelevant to the O&S cost calculations, such that if one
   offeror had included an MMH/FH of 19 hours in its WSS and another had
   included an MMH/FH of 1 hour, the difference would not have affected the
   evaluated O&S costs. Tr. at 594-99.[3]

   The agency also questions the protesters' MMH/FH predictions, focusing in
   particular on [REDACTED] estimate that its proposed aircraft would have an
   MMH/FH of fewer than [REDACTED] hours. (As noted above, [REDACTED]
   predicted an MMH/FH of [REDACTED] hours.) Specifically, the agency claims
   that neither Sikorsky's nor LMSI's proposals included sufficient data to
   support their claimed MMH/FH numbers. Again, the contemporaneous record
   does not support the agency's position. While the agency now focuses on
   the reliability of the offerors' predictions, and one of the evaluators
   testified that he questioned during the evaluation whether [REDACTED]
   could achieve its predicted MMH/FH, it is clear from the hearing testimony
   that the agency did not calculate a probable MMH/FH for the aircraft, but
   instead simply determined that each proposed aircraft could achieve the
   SRD objective. Tr. at 42-46, 77, 99-101, 654-57, 660-61, 979. Thus, to the
   extent that the agency now questions Sikorsky's and LMSI's predictions
   that their aircraft would require significantly less maintenance than
   would Boeing's aircraft, see Agency Comments, Feb. 3, 2007, at 25 n.2, the
   agency's position is based on an analysis performed in the course of the
   protest. We give little weight to analyses performed in the heat of
   litigation. Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft Support, B-277263.2, B-277263.3,
   Sept. 29, 1997, 97-2 CPD para. 91 at 15 (GAO accords little weight to
   agency efforts to defend, in the face of a bid protest, a prior source
   selection through the submission of new analyses, because such
   reevaluations and redeterminations prepared in the heat of the adversarial
   process may not represent the fair and considered judgment of the agency);
   see, e.g., Advanced Sys. Dev., Inc., B-298411, B-298411.2, Sept. 19, 2006,
   2006 CPD para. 137 at 18; Remington Arms Co., Inc., supra, at 12.

   We recognize that the Air Force now appears to be of the view that "trying
   to base the Air Force's projected manpower costs on anything other than
   what is known, i.e., the MER . . . would amount to nothing more than rank
   speculation." Agency Comments, Feb. 3, 2007, at 25. We are not questioning
   the agency's position in this regard. Our decision here is simply that the
   agency may not announce in the solicitation that it will use one
   evaluation plan and then follow another. Remington Arms Co., Inc., supra,
   at 15. Here, the agency advised offerors that it would evaluate O&S costs,
   including "captur[ing] all relevant CSAR-X Operating and Support (O&S)
   costs," RFP attachment 13, and further indicated through its inclusion in
   the SRD of threshold requirements and objectives with respect to various
   maintenance measures (such as MMH/FH), that it valued aircraft that
   require less maintenance. Given this solicitation advice, the agency could
   not ignore the differences between the proposed aircraft with respect to
   required maintenance.

   We therefore sustain the protests on the basis that the Air Force, by
   ignoring differences among the proposed aircraft that could have a
   material impact on likely O&S costs, departed from its stated evaluation
   approach. Further, the evaluation of O&S costs based on each offeror's
   proposed helicopter could have resulted in lower evaluated total costs for
   both of the protesters, which could have resulted in a different source
   selection.

   RECOMMENDATION

   We recommend that the Air Force amend the solicitation to clarify its
   intent with respect to the evaluation of O&S costs, reopen discussions
   with offerors consistent with our conclusions above, and then request
   revised proposals. If the evaluation of revised proposals results in a
   determination that Boeing's proposal no longer represents the best value
   to the government, the agency should terminate its contract. We also
   recommended that Sikorsky and LMSI be reimbursed the costs of filing and
   pursuing their protests, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 4 C.F.R.
   sect. 21.8(2)(1). In accordance with 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.8(f)(1), the
   protesters' certified claims for such costs, detailing the time expended
   and costs incurred, must be submitted directly to the agency within 60
   days after receipt of this decision.

   The protests are sustained.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The agency calculated the cost for MER Contractors, the staffing for
   which was listed in the MER, as $591.4 million, which was added to each
   offeror's MPLCC.

   [2] The Air Force maintains that LMSI's and Sikorsky's protests of the
   agency's approach to using the MER in the calculation of O&S costs are
   untimely. In this regard, our Bid Protest Regulations provide that
   protests of alleged solicitation improprieties must be filed prior to the
   next closing time for receipt of proposals, and other protests shall be
   filed not later than 10 days after the basis for protest is known or
   should have been known. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.2(a) (2006). According to the
   agency, RFP attachment 13--which provided that "Unit Mission Personnel,
   Training Munitions, and Indirect Support will be calculated by the
   government team"--in conjunction with the fact that during the course of
   the procurement it presented a slide stating that the "Manpower Estimate
   Report (MER) [dated] Mar 06 will be used for Unit Mission Personnel,"
   placed offerors on notice of the agency's intended evaluation approach. We
   disagree. While offerors were on notice that the agency intended to use
   the MER in evaluating O&S costs, this did not reasonably advise them that
   the agency would ignore the actual proposed aircraft and technical
   approaches when calculating most of the O&S costs, and that the agency
   thereby was abandoning its stated approach of "captur[ing] all relevant
   CSAR-X Operating and Support (O&S) costs." RFP attach. 13.

   At the pre-hearing conference conducted by our Office, the agency for the
   first time also asserted that the cost team lead had advised Sikorsky (but
   not LMSI) during a February debriefing that the same manpower levels (with
   no consideration of the proposed aircraft's reliability) would be used in
   calculating the O&S cost associated with each offeror's proposal. However,
   the agency did not identify the Sikorsky employee allegedly provided the
   information, and all six Sikorsky executives who attended the debriefing
   (which was actually conducted in March and not February) have submitted
   sworn declarations stating that, while Sikorsky was advised that the MER
   would be used in the calculating O&S costs, it was not advised that the
   MER would be used in lieu of consideration of the significant
   characteristics of the proposed aircraft. Sikorsky Comments, Jan. 19,
   2007, attach. We consider it significant, moreover, that this claim was
   raised only after the agency had submitted an initial agency report,
   supplemental report, and rebuttal without any reference to the alleged
   agency statement. Considering that we resolve doubts regarding timeliness
   in favor of protesters, Fort Mojave/Hummel, a Joint Venture, B-296961,
   Oct. 18, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 181 at 6 n.7, we find that the protesters'
   challenges to the agency's calculation of O&S costs are timely.

   [3] This testimony is consistent with the fact that the contemporaneous
   evaluation documentation gives no indication that the O&S calculations
   took into account such differences in the maintenance-related measures
   included in offerors' WSSs as: [REDACTED]. CSAR-X Final Evaluation Brief,
   Oct. 21, 2006, at 64-66, 96-98.