TITLE: B-299145.4, Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems, March 29, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299145.4
DATE: March 29, 2007
******************************************************************************
B-299145.4, Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems, March 29, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Sikorsky Aircraft Company; Lockheed Martin Systems
   Integration-Owego--Request for Reconsideration

   File: B-299145.4

   Date: March 29, 2007

   John W. Chierichella, Esq., Jonathan S. Aronie, Esq., Keith R. Szeliga,
   Esq., and Jesse J. Williams, Esq., Sheppard Mullin, for Sikorsky Aircraft
   Company; Marcia Madsen, Esq., David F. Dowd, Esq., Michael E. Lackey, Jr.,
   Esq., William L. Olsen, Esq., and Luke Levasseur, Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe
   & Maw, and Bucky P. Mansuy, Esq., Lockheed Martin Corporation, for
   Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Oswego, the protesters.

   Paul F. Khoury, Esq., Scott M. McCaleb, Esq., William J. Colwell, Esq.,
   Nicole Owren-Wiest, Esq., Kevin Plummer, Esq., and Rand L. Allen, Esq.,
   Wiley Rein LLP, and Mark W. Reardon, Esq., The Boeing Company, for The
   Boeing Company, the intervenor.

   Michael O*Farrell, Esq., and Bridget E. Lyons, Esq., Department of the Air
   Force, for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Agency reasonably determined that protester*s recent, seriously deficient
   performance on a highly relevant contract for a similar aircraft warranted
   a past performance rating of little confidence, notwithstanding that
   protester also had very good performance on another highly relevant
   contract.

   DECISION

   The Department of the Air Force requests reconsideration of our decision,
   Sikorsky Aircraft Co.; Lockheed Martin Sys. Integration-Owego, B-299145 et
   al., Feb. 26, 2007, 2007 CPD para. ___, asking that we decide issues that
   were not addressed in that decision. In our decision, we sustained the
   protests of Sikorsky Aircraft Company and Lockheed Martin Systems
   Integration-Owego (LMSI) against the Air Force*s award of a contract to
   The Boeing Company under request for proposals (RFP) No. FA8629-06-R-2350,
   for the Combat Search and Rescue Replacement Vehicle (CSAR-X).

   We sustained the protests on the basis that the Air Force*s evaluation of
   operations and support (O&S) costs was inconsistent with the approach set
   forth in the solicitation. [1] We recommended that the Air Force amend the
   solicitation to clarify its intent with respect to the evaluation of O&S
   costs, reopen discussions with offerors consistent with our decision, and
   then request revised proposals. The protesters had raised numerous
   additional challenges to the evaluation of proposals, but we viewed them
   as academic, and therefore did not address them. However, the Air Force
   has requested that we address the additional issues in order to
   *facilitate an expeditious and comprehensive approach for completing the
   CSAR-X source selection.* Air Force Letter to GAO, Mar. 12, 2007.
   Essentially, the agency desires to implement corrective action that will
   correct any deficiencies identified by GAO in the procurement. In these
   circumstances, given the agency*s urgent and important need for a new
   combat search and rescue aircraft, our Office will address the additional
   arguments.

   We have reviewed all of the additional arguments raised by Sikorsky and
   LMSI and we found that none furnished an additional basis for sustaining
   the protests. We discuss two of the more significant arguments below.

   BACKGROUND

   As discussed in our decision, the solicitation provided for the
   acquisition of a non-developmental item, medium lift, vertical take-off
   and landing aircraft that, with minimal development, could achieve a
   combat ready CSAR-X Block 0 aircraft Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
   by Fiscal Year 2012 and replace the HH-60 aircraft, the agency*s current
   combat search and rescue aircraft and an aircraft with several significant
   shortfalls. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal represented
   the *best value* based on consideration of four evaluation factors:
   (1) mission capability, including (in descending order of importance)
   subfactors for Block 0 aircraft performance, system architecture and
   software, systems engineering, product support, management/schedule and
   Block 10 aircraft performance; (2) proposal risk; (3) past performance;
   and (4) cost/price. The solicitation further provided that, for evaluation
   purposes, cost/price would be calculated on the basis of the Most Probable
   Life Cycle Cost (MPLCC) for the aircraft, which was comprised not only of
   the cost/price of system development and demonstration and of production,
   but also of O&S costs and other life cycle costs.

   After conducting several rounds of written and oral discussions--including
   several face-to-face *debriefings* during which offerors were advised of
   the agency*s current evaluation of their technical proposals and past
   performance--and after a flight evaluation to assess the current
   capability of the offerors* baseline aircraft, the Air Force requested
   final proposal revisions (FPR) by September 18, 2006. The Air Force
   evaluated the FPRs as follows:

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                     |       LMSI        |      Sikorsky      |       Boeing       |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Mission Capability/  |                   |                    |                    |
|                     |                   |                    |                    |
|Proposal Risk        |                   |                    |                    |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Block 0 Performance  |  Acceptable/High  |   Acceptable/Low   |  Exceptional/Low   |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Architecture/Software|    Acceptable/    |Acceptable/Moderate |Acceptable/Moderate |
|                     |     Moderate      |                    |                    |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Systems Engineering  |Acceptable/Moderate|Acceptable/Moderate |Acceptable/Moderate |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Product Support      |  Exceptional/Low  |  Exceptional/Low   |   Acceptable/Low   |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Management/Schedule  |Acceptable/Moderate|Exceptional/Moderate|Exceptional/Moderate|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Block 10 Performance |Acceptable/Moderate|Acceptable/Moderate |Exceptional/Moderate|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Past Performance     | Little Confidence |Satisfactory        |Satisfactory        |
|                     |                   |Confidence          |Confidence          |
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Price/Cost           |        ($ million)|         ($ million)|         ($ million)|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|SDD Proposed         |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|SDD Adjustment       |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Production Proposed  |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Production Adjusted  |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|OGC                  |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|Subtotal             |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|O&S                  |          [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|           [DELETED]|
|---------------------+-------------------+--------------------+--------------------|
|MPLCC                |          $35,853.7|           $38,531.8|           $38,891.5|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Based on the evaluation results, the source selection authority (SSA)
   determined that Boeing*s proposal represented the *best value.* In this
   regard, the SSA noted that LMSI*s proposal had received a high risk rating
   under the Block 0 performance subfactor due to [DELETED]. According to the
   SSA, since *[DELETED],* he *saw no reason to take on that HIGH level of
   risk.* Source Selection Decision (SSD) at 6. In addition, the SSA noted
   that LMSI had received a little confidence rating for past performance due
   to unsatisfactory performance under its current contract for the VH-71
   Presidential helicopter, which was evaluated as the most highly relevant
   to this procurement. According to the SSA, LMSI had *show[n under that
   contract] that it could not reliably meet important schedule requirements
   and had difficulty in systems engineering flow-downs to their
   subcontractors.* Id. at 7. The SSA, noting the *stronger proposals offered
   by Boeing and Sikorsky,* concluded that the *modest* MPLCC savings
   associated with LMSI*s proposal were outweighed by LMSI*s high risk rating
   under the Block 0 performance subfactor and little confidence past
   performance rating. Id. at 6-7.

   The SSA also determined that Boeing*s proposal was more advantageous than
   Sikorsky*s lower cost proposal. In this regard, the SSA emphasized that
   Boeing*s was the only proposal that received an excellent rating under the
   Block 0 performance subfactor, having received significantly more
   strengths (including strengths for mission load and occupant protection)
   than Sikorsky*s proposal. The SSA also noted Boeing*s advantage under the
   Block 10 performance subfactor (the least important subfactor), where
   Boeing*s proposal was rated exceptional and Sikorsky*s only acceptable.
   The SSA concluded that Boeing*s greater mission capability strengths
   outweighed Sikorsky*s *slightly lower* MPLCC. Id. at 10.

   LMSI*s PAST PERFORMANCE

   As indicated above, LMSI received a past performance rating of little
   confidence (indicating that a substantial doubt existed that the offeror
   would successfully perform the required effort) due to unsatisfactory
   performance under its current contract to design, develop and field the
   VH-71 Presidential helicopter, a contract evaluated as highly relevant to
   this procurement. See RFP sect. M 12.1. The SSA noted that LMSI had shown
   under the VH-71 contract that it *could not reliably meet important
   schedule requirements and had difficulty in systems engineering flow-downs
   to their subcontractors,* SSD at 7, and cited LMSI*s poor performance as
   one of the principal bases for his determination that, notwithstanding its
   lower evaluated cost/price, LMSI*s proposal nevertheless did not represent
   the best value.

   LMSI challenges the past performance evaluation primarily on the bases
   that (1) it was misled by the agency during discussions as to the agency*s
   view of its past performance, and (2) the agency overemphasized its
   performance under the VH-71 contract.

   Opportunity to Respond During Discussions

   As an initial matter, it is clear from the record that the Air Force
   reasonably communicated to LMSI its concerns with respect to its
   performance under the VH-71 contract. In this regard, the solicitation
   provided for evaluation of *an offeror*s relevant present and recent past
   performance, focusing on and targeting performance which is relevant to
   the Mission Capability subfactor and Cost/Price factors.* RFP sect. M
   12.2. Relevance was to be based on factors such as whether performance
   involved *the same or similar hardware, technology, and manufacturing
   processes,* similar effort by the same division, or *[s]ystems integration
   similar to the complexity of the CSAR-X Program.* RFP sect. M 12.2. The
   RFP provided that, during discussions, offerors would *be given the
   opportunity to comment on . . . adverse performance information, except
   adverse information where they have previously been given an opportunity
   to respond (e.g. CPARS information).* RFP sect. M 6.

   LMSI listed in its proposal as one of five relevant LMSI contracts its
   contract with the Department of the Navy for the VH-71 Presidential
   Helicopter, stating that *[o]ur VH-71 contract is highly relevant to all
   CSAR-X Mission Capability Sub-Factors . . . as it requires complex
   system/subsystem integration and shares the common foundation of the EH101
   medium lift helicopter.* LMSI Past Performance Proposal at 16. LMSI noted
   that AgustaWestland, which had been part of its VH-71 team, was also
   proposed as a part of its team here; AgustaWestland builds the EH101
   helicopter that was the basis for both programs. Id. at 3, 16.

   Both the VH-71 administrative contracting officer (ACO) and the VH-71
   program office completed initial past performance questionnaires for the
   Air Force. Both questionnaires were critical of LMSI*s performance on the
   VH-71 contract.

   On December 22, 2005, the Air Force issued an evaluation notice (EN)
   advising LMSI that it had received a past performance questionnaire from
   the VH-71 program office that identified three shortcomings in LMSI*s
   performance on that contract: (1) an inability to accurately articulate
   and flow down to subcontractors [DELETED]; (2) [DELETED]; and (3)
   [DELETED]. EN LM-PP-2.

   In its January 9, 2006 response to the EN, LMSI acknowledged that there
   had been [DELETED] on the VH-71 contract. LMSI explained that there had
   been [DELETED]. LMSI Response to EN LM-PP-2 at 1-2. LMSI further
   responded, however, that [DELETED]. Id.

   LMSI does not deny that, as is evident from the facts recited above, the
   Air Force advised the firm of the agency*s concerns with its performance
   on the VH-71 contract. Rather, LMSI asserts that it thereafter was misled
   by the Air Force into believing that the agency was satisfied with its
   response to the agency*s evaluation notice and, as a result, was deprived
   of a meaningful opportunity to further respond to the perceived VH-71
   performance problems. Specifically, LMSI notes that, in the agency*s
   subsequent interim (pre-FPR) evaluation briefings in March, July, and
   September, LMSI was advised that its proposal had received a satisfactory
   confidence rating for past performance.

   It is clear from the record, however, that not only should LMSI have been
   on notice that the agency*s concerns with its VH-71 performance had not
   been fully resolved by LMSI*s explanation, but that, in any case, LMSI had
   a further opportunity to respond to the adverse past performance
   information that furnished the basis for the protester*s final past
   performance rating of little confidence. In this regard, in each of the
   three pre-FPR briefings, the Air Force noted that there had been *VH-71
   difficulties.* LMSI CSAR-X Initial Evaluation Briefing at 43; LMSI CSAR-X
   Interim Evaluation Brief at 58; LMSI CSAR-X Final Proposal Revision Brief
   at 55. In addition, in the March briefing, the agency noted that LMSI*s
   [DELETED] and, in the July and September briefings, referred to its
   *[c]oncerns with [LMSI*s] VH-71 contract performance.* LMSI CSAR-X Initial
   Evaluation Briefing at 43; LMSI CSAR-X Interim Evaluation Brief at 55;
   LMSI CSAR-X Final Proposal Revision Brief at 52.

   Moreover, the SSA noted in his source selection decision (as had the
   agency evaluators in their recommendation to the SSA) that LMSI*s final
   past performance rating of little confidence was based on a negative
   October 5 Contractor Performance Assessment Report (CPAR) for the VH-71
   contract which, although it was first furnished to the Air Force by the
   Navy on October 12 (after the September 18 closing date for receipt of
   FPRs), had been previously furnished to LMSI for comment on or about July
   10, and commented on by LMSI on October 2. SSD at 7; CSAR-X Final
   Evaluation Brief, Oct. 21, 2006, at 114, 116-17. As discussed in more
   detail below, the Navy CPAR rated LMSI*s VH-71 performance [DELETED].
   Given the Air Force*s continuing expressions of concern over LMSI*s VH-71
   performance, and the very unfavorable Navy CPAR that was furnished to LMSI
   in July, LMSI clearly was on notice of the need to further account for its
   VH-71 performance. We note, moreover, that LMSI in fact included an
   explanation of its VH-71 performance in its response to the CPAR--the
   agency considered this response in its final evaluation--and that LMSI
   could have provided an explanation in its FPR response as well, had it
   chosen to do so. We thus find no basis for concluding that LMSI was
   deprived of an opportunity to respond to the adverse past performance
   information on which the little confidence evaluation rating was based.

   Little Confidence Rating

   Turning to the evaluation itself, we find no basis for questioning the
   weight the Air Force accorded the VH-71 contract in assigning LMSI a
   little confidence rating for past performance. The evaluation of an
   offeror*s past performance, including the determination of the relevance
   and scope of an offeror's performance history, is a matter of agency
   discretion that we will not question unless shown to be unreasonable,
   undocumented, or inconsistent with the solicitation criteria or applicable
   statutes or regulations. Family Entm*t Servs., Inc., d/b/a/ IMC,
   B-291997.4, June 10, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 128 at 5.

   As discussed, the Air Force considered the VH-71 contract to be the most
   *highly relevant* contract for LMSI, because the VH-71 helicopter was
   based on the same helicopter (EH101) as LMSI*s proposed CSAR-X helicopter,
   and the VH-71 contract effort involved a similar teaming arrangement with
   AgustaWestland. Tr. at 288, 430-32; CSAR-X Proposal Analysis Report (PAR)
   sect. 3.1.2.2; CSAR-X Final Evaluation Brief at 116. In its proposal, LMSI
   rated its contract with the United Kingdom*s Ministry of Defense for the
   Merlin Mk 1 helicopter (which, likewise, was based on the EH101
   helicopter) more relevant than the VH-71 contract, but it also described
   the VH-71 contract as *highly relevant to all CSAR-X Mission Capability
   Sub-Factors . . . as it requires complex system/subsystem integration and
   shares the common foundation of the EH101 medium lift helicopter.* LMSI
   Past Performance Proposal at 16. Given the similarities of the VH-71
   contract to the current effort and LMSI*s own characterization of the
   contract, whether or not it was the most relevant prior contract, the
   VH-71 contract clearly was highly relevant, and properly was accorded
   substantial weight in the evaluation.

   We see nothing unreasonable in the agency*s concluding that LMSI*s recent,
   seriously deficient performance on a highly relevant contract for a
   similar aircraft warranted a finding of little confidence, notwithstanding
   that LMSI also had very good performance on another highly relevant
   contract. In this regard, as noted above, the official Navy CPAR
   documenting LMSI*s performance on the VH-71 contract described seriously
   deficient performance, including [DELETED]. The Navy*s CPAR attributed
   LMSI*s poor performance to such factors as [DELETED]. In this latter
   regard, according to the Navy, LMSI*s [DELETED]. Navy CPAR, LMSI VH-71
   Contract, Oct. 5, 2006. Further, while the VH-71 program manager expected
   that [DELETED] would improve, the CPAR indicated that [DELETED]. Id. We
   conclude that the agency*s evaluation of LMSI*s past performance was
   reasonable.

   DEPLOYABILITY

   LMSI and Sikorsky question the agency*s evaluation of the deployability of
   Boeing*s proposed aircraft, the HH-47 helicopter. In this regard, the RFP
   provided for evaluation of an offeror*s deployability strategy under the
   product support subfactor of the mission capability evaluation factor. RFP
   sect. M 10.4. The CSAR-X System Requirements Document (SRD) specifically
   required that the proposed aircraft be capable of being configured,
   prepared, and ready for loading aboard either a C-17 or C-5 cargo aircraft
   in no more than 3 hours, with an objective of no more than 2 hours, and
   that, following off-loading at the destination, the aircraft *be
   reconfigured and flight ready* within a maximum of 3 hours, with an
   objective of no more than 2 hours. SRD sect. 3.4.2.1.

   Offerors were required to demonstrate their deployability strategy both in
   their proposals and as part of a required flight demonstration. In this
   regard, the RFP provided that *[i]n order to assist the government in
   assessing proposal risk, each offeror is required to participate in a
   CSAR-X flight evaluation of the aircraft they intend to use as the
   non-developmental baseline aircraft for the CSAR-X program.* RFP sect. L
   3.2.7. The RFP further described the required flight demonstration as
   follows:

   The purpose of the flight evaluation effort is to assess the current
   capability of the offeror*s baseline aircraft. The Government understands
   that the aircraft provided for the CSAR-X Flight Evaluation may have to be
   modified through the [system development and demonstration] contract to
   meet all SRD Block 0 and/or Block 10 requirements. Accordingly, the flight
   evaluation will be used to support a Government assessment of the
   offeror*s proposal risk.

   RFP, attach. 14, sect. 1.0. Regarding deployability, the RFP provided that
   a government team would evaluate the aircraft build-up (as well as
   aircraft teardown), stating that the *[t]imed build-up procedures begin
   when the word *GO* is given and *STOP* when the CSAR-X is flight ready
   status (maintenance sign off of aircraft log book).* Id., at Table A14-4,
   Task 4.

   Unlike the single rotor Sikorsky baseline S-92 and LMSI baseline EH101
   helicopters, the Boeing baseline MH-47G helicopter has two rotors, and in
   order to load it into a cargo aircraft, it is necessary to remove the
   rotor blades, its transmission packages, and the aft and forward pylons on
   which the rotors are mounted. Boeing Product Support Proposal sections
   1.6.1, 1.6.2. Boeing*s baseline aircraft, [DELETED], demonstrated a
   teardown time of less than the specified 2-hour objective time. However,
   during Boeing*s December 6, 2005 flight demonstration, Boeing*s baseline
   MH-47G helicopter was determined flight-ready 2 hours 58 minutes after
   build-up began, just short of the maximum of 3 hours allowed in the SRD.
   In contrast, the LMSI and Sikorsky baseline aircraft demonstrated a
   build-up time of [DELETED]. Agency evaluators described the demonstrated
   build-up of Boeing*s helicopter as follows: *Marginal. Threshold time with
   two exceptions; [DELETED] not installed but required for flight.
   Additionally, multiple follow-up maintenance requirements including:
   [DELETED].* CSAR-X Flight Demonstration--Boeing at 24; CSAR-X Flight
   Demonstration--LMSI; CSAR-X Flight Demonstration--Sikorsky; Contracting
   Officer*s Statement--Dec. 26, 2006, at 5. [2] Boeing*s proposed aircraft
   ultimately was found not deficient in this area.

   The protesters assert that the evaluation of Boeing*s proposed CSAR-X
   aircraft as compliant with the SRD depolyability requirements was
   unreasonable. As noted by the agency, however, the solicitation did not
   provide for a pass/fail flight demonstration that would be conclusive as
   to whether the proposed CSAR-X met the SRD requirements. Rather, according
   to the RFP, the *purpose of the flight evaluation effort is to assess the
   current capability of the offeror*s baseline aircraft,* *to support a
   Government assessment of the offeror*s proposal risk,* with the
   *understand[ing] that the aircraft provided for the CSAR-X Flight
   Evaluation may have to be modified through the [system development and
   demonstration] contract to meet all SRD Block 0 and/or Block 10
   requirements.* RFP, attach. 14, sect. 1.0.

   Given this evaluation scheme, the relevant question is whether the Air
   Force reasonably concluded that the results of Boeing*s flight
   demonstration, considered together with Boeing*s proposed modifications to
   the baseline aircraft and other aspects of its technical approach,
   warranted a finding that the aircraft was reasonably likely, ultimately,
   to comply with this deployability requirement. In this regard, the Air
   Force noted that Boeing proposed to incorporate into its helicopter a
   number of additional time-saving measures not installed on the
   demonstrated helicopter, including a [DELETED]. Tr. at 748-68, 775-79,
   815, 860-66, 929-36; Boeing Mission Capability Proposal, 1(d) Product
   Support sect. 4.6.3; Boeing System Architecture Volume sect. 2.1.10;
   Boeing Cost/Price Proposal at 50; Boeing Statement of Work
   sect. 1.1.1.2.1.[3] The agency determined that these additional
   time-saving measures, when combined with increased training and
   familiarity with the aircraft, would enable Boeing*s CSAR-X aircraft to
   meet the SRD 3-hour build-up requirement. The agency*s determination, on
   its face, does not appear unreasonable, and the protesters have not shown
   otherwise.

   Having reviewed each of the other additional grounds of protest raised by
   Sikorsky and LMSI, we likewise find that there is no additional basis for
   sustaining the protests.

   Gary L. Kepplinger

   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] In addition, we noted that, while Boeing*s proposal generally referred
   to [DELETED] estimated maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMH/FH) for
   its proposed aircraft, and Boeing was given credit in the technical
   evaluation for meeting the specification objective of no more than 10
   manhours, in fact, the specific calculations in Boeing*s proposal
   supporting the claimed [DELETED] manhours actually indicated an estimated
   MMH/FH of [DELETED] hours. Boeing Mission Capability Proposal, 1(d)
   Product Support, sect. 4.2, at 46, 50-51, 62-63. We expect that the agency
   will resolve this discrepancy during the reopened discussions.

   [2] The record indicates that the start and stop of the build-up
   demonstration was determined for each of the offerors by their maintenance
   crew chief, not by the government observer team. Hearing Transcript (Tr.)
   at 729-31, 735-37, 760, 825-27. While affording an offeror the discretion
   to determine the stopping time could call into question the objectivity of
   a demonstration, the exceptions noted in the evaluators* report on the
   Boeing demonstration here indicate that the evaluators nevertheless
   exercised independent judgment to the extent that they could detect any
   obvious impediments to flight readiness. Since all offerors were afforded
   similar discretion, and the protesters have failed to demonstrate that the
   evaluation results did not accurately represent the general capabilities
   of Boeing*s aircraft in this regard, the procedures followed do not
   furnish a basis for objecting to the evaluation of Boeing*s deployability
   approach.

   [3] Contrary to the protesters* suggestions, the record indicates that the
   proposed Boeing HH-47 aircraft will include [DELETED]. Boeing Cost/Price
   Proposal at 50; Boeing Statement of Work sect. 1.1.1.2.1; Tr. at 801, 815.
   ([DELETED]. Tr. at 751.)