TITLE: B-299088; B-299088.2, Alutiiq Global Solutions, February 6, 2007
BNUMBER: B-299088; B-299088.2
DATE: February 6, 2007
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B-299088; B-299088.2, Alutiiq Global Solutions, February 6, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Alutiiq Global Solutions

   File: B-299088; B-299088.2

   Date: February 6, 2007

   John S. Pachter, Esq., Jonathan D. Shaffer, Esq., Stephen D. Knight, Esq.,
   Stephanie D. Capps, Esq., and Mary Pat Gregory, Esq., Smith Pachter
   McWhorter PLC, for the protester.

   Andrew P. Hallowell, Esq., and Frank C. Gulin, Esq., Pargament &
   Hallowell, PLLC, for TW & Company, Inc.; David B. Dempsey, Esq., Kristen
   E. Ittig., Esq., and David J. Craig, Esq., Holland & Knight LLP, for
   Chenega Security & Protection Services, LLC; Stuart B. Nibley, Esq.,
   Michael J. Askew, Esq., and Emily A. Jones, Esq., Thelen Reid Brown
   Raysman & Steiner LLP, for Doyon Security Services, LLC, intervenors.

   Capt. Sean M. Connolly and Peter D. DiPaola, Esq., Department of Army, for
   the agency.

   Louis A. Chiarella, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the
   General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   1. Protest is denied where there is no evidence that the contracting
   officer ignored relevant information in making affirmative determinations
   of responsibility regarding the awardees.

   2. Protest allegation challenging agency's evaluation of protester's
   proposal is denied where the alleged evaluation error did not result in
   competitive prejudice to protester.

   3. Protester is not an interested party to challenge evaluation of
   awardee's proposal where record shows that another firm, not the
   protester, would be in line for award if protester's challenge were
   sustained, and protester does not challenge evaluation of the other firm's
   proposal.

   DECISION

   Alutiiq Global Solutions protests the award of contracts to TW & Company,
   Inc., Chenega Security & Protection Services, LLC (Chenega SPS), and Doyon
   Security Services, LLC under request for proposals (RFP) No.
   W911SO-06-R-0019, issued by the Army Northern Region Contracting Center,
   Department of the Army, for security guard services. Alutiiq argues that
   the agency's evaluation of offerors' proposals and source selection
   decision were improper.

   We deny the protest.

   BACKGROUND

   The RFP, issued on July 21, 2006, as a section 8(a) set-aside,[1]
   contemplated the award of up to three
   indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts for a base year with
   four 1-year options to provide security guard services in accordance with
   the solicitation's performance work statement (PWS) at various Army
   installations within three defined geographic regions--Northeast, West,
   and Pacific Coast. The RFP established six evaluation factors: mission
   capability; personnel; experience; past performance; small business
   participation; and price.[2] The solicitation informed offerors that the
   first four evaluation factors were of equal importance, and were more
   important than the small business participation and price evaluation
   factors. Additionally, all nonprice evaluation factors, when combined,
   were significantly more important than price. RFP at 109. Contract award
   for each geographic region was to be made to the responsible offeror whose
   proposal was determined to be most advantageous to the government based on
   consideration of all evaluation factors. Id.

   Fifteen offerors, including Alutiiq, TW, Chenega SPS, and Doyon, submitted
   proposals for one or more geographic regions by the August 11 closing
   date. Alutiiq, TW, and Chenega SPS proposed for all three regions, while
   Doyon proposed only for the Pacific Coast region.[3]

   An agency source selection evaluation board (SSEB) evaluated offerors'
   technical proposals using the adjectival rating system set forth in the
   RFP. On August 25, the SSEB provided the source selection authority (SSA)
   with its evaluation ratings of offerors' technical proposals, Agency
   Report (AR), Tab 11, SSEB Technical Evaluation Report, and the SSA also
   received a separate evaluation of offerors' prices. Id., Tab 12, Price
   Evaluation Report. The technical and price evaluation ratings of offerors'
   proposals for each geographic region were as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Offerors (Northeast Region)[4] |  Overall Technical   |     Price      |
   |--------------------------------+----------------------+----------------|
   | TW                             |      Very Good       |  $79,343,586   |
   |--------------------------------+----------------------+----------------|
   | [Offeror A]                    |      Very Good       |  $83,518,100   |
   |--------------------------------+----------------------+----------------|
   | Chenega SPS                    |      Very Good       |  $86,571,900   |
   |--------------------------------+----------------------+----------------|
   | Alutiiq                        |      Very Good       |  $92,204,328   |
   |--------------------------------+----------------------+----------------|
   | [Offeror B]                    |      Very Good       |  $99,560,147   |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   | Offerors (West Region)[5] |   Overall Technical   |       Price        |
   |---------------------------+-----------------------+--------------------|
   | Chenega SPS               |       Very Good       |    $51,074,036     |
   |---------------------------+-----------------------+--------------------|
   | TW                        |       Very Good       |    $55,279,842     |
   |---------------------------+-----------------------+--------------------|
   | Offeror B]                |       Very Good       |    $58,918,566     |
   |---------------------------+-----------------------+--------------------|
   | [Offeror A]               |       Very Good       |    $60,778,048     |
   |---------------------------+-----------------------+--------------------|
   | Alutiiq                   |       Very Good       |    $61,951,644     |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |      Offerors (Pacific  Coast      | Overall Technical  |    Price     |
   |             Region)[6]             |                    |              |
   |------------------------------------+--------------------+--------------|
   | Doyon                              |     Very Good      | $66,750,156  |
   |------------------------------------+--------------------+--------------|
   | Chenega SPS                        |     Very Good      | $67,682,445  |
   |------------------------------------+--------------------+--------------|
   | TW                                 |     Very Good      | $70,076,335  |
   |------------------------------------+--------------------+--------------|
   | Alutiiq                            |     Very Good      | $80,311,929  |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Id., Tab 13, SSA Briefing, at 10-12.

   The technical evaluation ratings of Alutiiq's proposal and its proposed
   prices compared to those of the three awardees is as follows:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |       Factor        |  Alutiiq   |    TW     |Chenega SPS |   Doyon    |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Mission Capability   | Very Good  | Very Good | Very Good  | Very Good  |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Personnel            | Very Good  | Very Good | Very Good  | Very Good  |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Past Experience      | Very Good  | Very Good | Very Good  | Very Good  |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Past Performance     | Very Good  | Very Good | Very Good  | Very Good  |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Small Business       |Satisfactory| Very Good |Satisfactory|Satisfactory|
   |Participation        |            |           |            |            |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Overall              | Very Good  | Very Good | Very Good  | Very Good  |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Price (Northeast)    |$92,204,328 |$79,343,586|$86,571,900 |    N/A     |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Price (West)         |$61,951,644 |$55,279,842|$51,074,036 |    N/A     |
   |---------------------+------------+-----------+------------+------------|
   |Price (Pacific Coast)|$80,311,929 |$70,076,335|$67,682,445 |$66,750,156 |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   Id., Tab 14, Source Selection Decision, at 3.

   Both Doyon and another offeror, Santa Fe Protective Services, identified
   Coastal International Security (CIS) as their subcontractor for various
   aspects of the security guard services. Id., Tab 8, Doyon's Proposal, Vol.
   I, Technical Proposal, Executive Summary, at 1; Tab 11, SSEB Technical
   Evaluation Report, at 24. Doyon and Santa Fe did not, however, propose on
   the same geographic regions: Doyon proposed for only the Pacific Coast
   region, while Santa Fe proposed for only the Northeast and West regions.
   Id., Tab 14, Source Selection Decision, at 3.

   Prior to the agency's award determination, the contracting officer
   recognized that the Doyon and Santa Fe technical proposals were nearly
   identical to each other, and that both offerors had identified CIS as
   their primary subcontractor.[7] As a result, the contracting officer made
   the following inquiry of both offerors:

     In regards to the above solicitation, the Federal Acquisition Regulation
     (FAR) requires that I make a responsibility determination. In reviewing
     the proposals, I note that your proposal is virtually identical to the
     proposal of [Doyon, or Santa Fe]. . . . In order to alleviate this
     concern, please address this issue and explain your relationship with
     [Doyon, or Santa Fe] and Coastal International Security.

   Id., Tab 25, Contracting Officer's Memorandum for Record, Oct. 18, 2006.

   In its reply, Doyon informed the contracting officer that while it had
   entered into a Department of Defense (DOD) Mentor-Protege Program[8]
   relationship with CIS, and had relied on CIS to jointly draft Doyon's
   technical proposal, Doyon had no relationship with Santa Fe and had not
   been privy to Santa Fe's pricing. Id., Tab 26, Letter from Doyon to
   Contracting Officer, Oct. 16, 2006. Similarly, Santa Fe informed the
   contracting officer that while it had shared operational information with
   CIS, and had relied on CIS for proposal preparation, Santa Fe had neither
   business nor personal relationships with Doyon and never saw Doyon's
   proposal. Id., Tab 27, Letter from Santa Fe to Contracting Officer, Oct.
   17, 2006. Based on the responses received, the contracting officer
   concluded that CIS's participation in the proposals of both Doyon and
   Santa Fe was not improper. Id., Tab 25, Contracting Officer's Memorandum
   for Record, Oct. 18, 2006.

   TW's proposal identified Chenega Integrated Systems, LLC (Chenega IS) as
   its primary subcontractor. Id., Tab 6, TW's Proposal, Vol. II, Technical
   Proposal, at 5. Chenega IS is a different business entity than offeror
   Chenega SPS, although both firms share a common corporate parent, Chenega
   Corporation.[9] After the protest was filed, the contracting officer
   sought clarification from offerors TW and Chenega SPS regarding their
   relationship with Chenega IS. Contracting Officer's Statement, Dec. 12,
   2006. Chenega SPS's president informed the contracting officer that there
   were "absolutely no discussions with TW and/or [Chenega IS] on pricing or
   the composition of the technical proposal" for the solicitation here.[10]
   Id., attach. 1, Email from Chenega SPS to Contracting Officer, Dec. 11,
   2006, at 2. TW also informed the contracting officer that it had had no
   contacts with Chenega SPS (which it viewed as a competitor to itself and
   partner Chenega IS), including no interaction regarding the pricing of its
   proposal here. Id., attach. 2, Letter from TW to Contracting Officer, Dec.
   12, 2006, at 4.

   On October 23, the agency awarded contracts to TW, Chenega SPS, and Doyon
   for the Northeast, West, and Pacific Coast regions, respectively. This
   protest followed.

   DISCUSSION

   Alutiiq alleges that the contracting officer's responsibility
   determinations regarding Chenega, Doyon, and TW were flawed insofar as the
   contracting officer failed to properly consider substantial evidence of
   price collusion among the awardees.[11] Alutiiq also protests that the
   agency's evaluation of Doyon's proposal under the past performance and
   experience factors was unreasonable, and that the agency's evaluation of
   Alutiiq's proposal under the small business participation factor was
   improper.[12] Alutiiq contends that had the agency properly evaluated
   offerors' proposals, it would have awarded all three contracts to Alutiiq.

   Responsibility Determination Issue

   Alutiiq first challenges the contracting officer's responsibility
   determinations regarding Doyon, TW, and Chenega SPS. Specifically, the
   protester contends that, in order to be considered a responsible
   contractor, an offeror is required to propose prices independently and
   without sharing price information with other competitors. Alutiiq argues
   that TW and Chenega SPS could not have priced their proposals
   independently of each other, as TW had proposed Chenega IS as its primary
   subcontractor. Likewise, the protester argues that Doyon and Santa Fe
   could not have priced their proposals independently as both proposed CIS
   as their subcontractor. Alutiiq argues that in light of the fact that the
   offerors must have shared price information, the contracting officer's
   responsibility determination was flawed for lack of investigating whether
   any price collusion occurred. Protest, Nov. 30, 2006, at 7-9.

   GAO will not consider protests challenging affirmative determinations of
   responsibility except under limited, specified circumstances--where it is
   alleged that definitive responsibility criteria in the solicitation were
   not met or evidence is identified that raises serious concerns that, in
   reaching a particular responsibility determination, the contracting
   officer unreasonably failed to consider available relevant information or
   otherwise violated statute or regulation. Bid Protest Regulations, 4
   C.F.R. sect. 21.5(c) (2006); American Printing House for the Blind, Inc.,
   B-298011, May 15, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 83 at 5-6; Government Contracts
   Consultants, B-294335, Sept. 22, 2004, 2004 CPD para. 202 at 2. This
   includes protests where, for example, the protest includes specific
   evidence that the contracting officer may have ignored information that,
   by its nature, would be expected to have a strong bearing on whether the
   awardee should be found responsible. Universal Marine & Indus. Servs.,
   Inc., B-292964, Dec. 23, 2003, 2004 CPD para. 7 at 2; Verestar Gov't
   Servs. Group, B-291854, B-291854.2, Apr. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 68 at 4.
   Here, Alutiiq has not alleged that definitive responsibility criteria were
   not met and, as detailed below, its only evidence that the contracting
   officer failed to consider available relevant evidence in determining the
   awardees responsible is the speculation that TW, Chenega SPS, and Doyon
   did not price their proposals independently. This is not, in our view, a
   proffer of evidence sufficient to raise serious concerns that the
   contracting officer ignored relevant information in making her
   responsibility determinations.

   The record indicates that the contracting officer inquired into Doyon's
   and Santa Fe's reliance on CIS and gave reasonable consideration to the
   information the protester contends she failed to review. See Triple H
   Servs., B-298248, B-298248.2, Aug. 1, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 115 at 3.
   Likewise, with respect to Chenega SPS and TW, the contracting officer
   reasonably considered the information the protester contends she failed to
   review; accordingly, there simply is no evidence showing that the
   contracting officer ignored the information on which the protester bases
   its challenge to the affirmative determinations of responsibility.

   Moreover, the facts relied on by the protester here--that Doyon and Santa
   Fe had a common subcontractor, and that Chenega SPS and Chenega IS (TW's
   subcontractor) have common corporate ownership--do not constitute
   information that would be expected to have a strong bearing on whether the
   awardees should be found responsible, as required to trigger our review
   under 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(c). Universal Marine & Indus. Servs., Inc.,
   supra; Verestar Gov't Servs. Group, supra. In this regard, the requirement
   that competing concerns prepare their offers independently and without
   consultation with each other does not preclude competitors from proposing
   common subcontractors. McCombs Fleet Servs., B-278330, Jan. 16, 1998, 98-1
   CPD para. 24 at 4; Ross Aviation, Inc., B-236952, Jan. 22, 1990, 90-1 CPD
   para. 83 at 2-3. Alutiiq has presented no evidence, beyond its mere
   speculation, that Doyon's and Santa Fe's reliance on CIS for various
   technical aspects of their proposals must have also resulted in the
   offerors exchanging price information, and we will not assume that this
   was the case.[13] Ross Aviation, Inc., supra, at 3. Similarly, with
   respect to Chenega SPS and TW, it is important to note that there are two
   different Chenegas involved here--Chenega SPS, which was an offeror, and
   Chenega IS, which TW proposed as its subcontractor--that are "sister
   subsidiaries" of the same parent corporation, Chenega Corporation. The
   fact that two offerors, or an offeror and a second offeror's
   subcontractor, have common corporate ownership is not by itself sufficient
   to establish that the offerors failed to price their proposals
   independently, and where, as here, a protester presents no other evidence,
   beyond mere speculation, showing that competitors did not arrive at their
   prices independently, we will not assume otherwise. See McCombs Fleet
   Servs., supra, at 4.

   Other Evaluation Issues

   Alutiiq also protests that the Army improperly evaluated its proposal
   under the small business participation factor. Specifically, the protester
   contends that the agency's evaluation noted that Alutiiq had proposed to
   meet the small business participation goals set forth in the RFP. Alutiiq
   contends that since its proposal was of high quality and met all
   requirements, it should have received a rating of very good rather than
   satisfactory under this factor. Protest, Oct. 31, 2006, at 7. We find that
   the protester has failed to demonstrate any prejudice here.

   Our Office will not sustain a protest unless the protester demonstrates a
   reasonable possibility of prejudice, that is, unless the protester
   demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would have had a
   substantial chance of receiving the award. Parmatic Filter Corp.,
   B-285288.3, B-285288.4, Mar. 30, 2001, 2001 CPD para. 71 at 11; see also
   Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, 102 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
   Here, even if Alutiiq's proposal were assigned a higher rating of very
   good under the small business participation factor, this rating, when
   combined with the ratings it received on the remaining nonprice evaluation
   factors, would not have changed the overall very good rating assigned
   Alutiiq's technical proposal. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
   Alutiiq was not prejudiced, even assuming that the agency's evaluation of
   the protester's proposal under the small business participation factor was
   flawed.

   Lastly, Alutiiq protests the agency's evaluation of Doyon's proposal with
   regard to the past performance and experience factors. The protester
   contends that Doyon's proposal indicates a lack of relevant prime
   contractor security guard experience at military installations. Alutiiq
   also contends that Doyon's primary subcontractor, CIS, has had significant
   past performance problems on its prior security guard service contracts.
   By failing to take this information into account, the protester argues,
   the agency's rating of Doyon's proposal as very good for both past
   performance and experience was unreasonable. Protest, Oct. 31, 2006, at
   5-6. We find that Alutiiq is not an interested party to protest the
   evaluation of, and award to, Doyon because it would not be next in line
   for award of the Pacific Coast region contract if the award to Doyon were
   set aside.

   In order for a protest to be considered by our Office, a protester must be
   an interested party, which means that it must have a direct economic
   interest in the resolution of a protest issue. 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.0(a);
   Cattlemen's Meat Co., B-296616, Aug. 30, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 167 at 2
   n.1. A protester is an interested party to challenge the evaluation of the
   awardee's proposal where there is a reasonable possibility that the
   protester's proposal would be in line for award if the protest were
   sustained. Joint Mgmt. & Tech. Servs., B-294229, B-294229.2, Sept. 22,
   2004, 2004 CPD para. 208 at 9; Ridoc Enter., Inc., B-292962.4, July 6,
   2004, 2004 CPD para. 169 at 9.

   The record here clearly reflects that the SSA considered the proposals of
   Doyon, Chenega SPS, TW, and Alutiiq to be technically equal (i.e., no
   proposal contained any meaningful advantage that was not otherwise
   balanced by, encompassed in, or provided for in the other offerors'
   proposals).[14] AR, Tab 14, Source Selection Decision, at 18-23. Moreover,
   as set forth above, the proposals of Chenega SPS and TW were both
   lower-priced than that of Alutiiq for the Pacific Coast region. Where, as
   here, there are intervening offerors that would be in line for award ahead
   of Alutiiq if its challenge to the award to Doyon were sustained, we
   consider Alutiiq's interest to be too remote to qualify it as in
   interested party. See Ridoc Enter., Inc., supra.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. sect. 637(a) (2000),
   authorizes the Small Business Administration (SBA) to enter into contracts
   with government agencies and to arrange for performance through
   subcontracts with socially and economically disadvantaged small business
   concerns. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 19.800(a). Department
   of Defense agencies have been delegated authority to enter into 8(a)
   contracts on behalf of the SBA. Department of Defense FAR Supplement
   (DFARS) sect. 219.800(a).

   [2] The RFP established evaluation subfactors with regard to the mission
   capability, personnel, and past performance factors. The solicitation also
   set forth the Army's planned evaluation rating scheme. Specifically, the
   RFP stated that proposals would be rated under all factors, subfactors,
   and overall, using an adjectival rating system (i.e., very good,
   satisfactory, marginal, unacceptable, or neutral with regard to past
   performance), and provided definitions for each adjectival rating. RFP at
   109-11.

   [3] In instances where an offeror proposed for more than one geographic
   region, the RFP required the offeror to submit one technical proposal (all
   geographic regions utilized the same PWS) and a separate price proposal
   for each region. RFP at 101.

   [4] Six additional offerors submitted proposals for the Northeast region.
   All received overall technical ratings of no higher than satisfactory, and
   all were higher-priced than TW. Id., Tab 13, SSA Briefing, at 10.

   [5] Six additional offerors submitted proposals for the West region. All
   received overall technical ratings of no higher than satisfactory, and all
   were higher-priced than Chenega SPS. Id., Tab 13, SSA Briefing, at 11.

   [6] Eight additional offerors submitted proposals for the Pacific Coast
   region. All received overall technical ratings of no higher than
   satisfactory, and all but one were higher-priced than Doyon. Id., Tab 13,
   SSA Briefing, at 12.

   [7] The contracting officer found that Doyon's and Santa Fe's price
   proposals were not the same, however, as the offerors had proposed on
   different regions. AR, Tab 25, Contracting Officer's Memorandum for
   Record, Oct. 18, 2006.

   [8] The DOD Mentor-Protege Program provides incentives for DOD contractors
   to assist protege firms in enhancing their capabilities and to increase
   participation of such firms in government and commercial contracts. DFARS
   sect. 219.7100.

   [9] By contrast, Chenega SPS identified Wackenhut Services Inc., and not
   Chenega IS or Chenega Corporation, as its primary subcontractor. AR, Tab
   7, Chenega SPS's Proposal, Vol. I, Technical Proposal, at 10.

   [10] Chenega SPS's president also stated that he was the sole approver of
   the technical and price proposals submitted by the firm, and that neither
   he nor his staff ever discussed any content or strategy with TW or Chenega
   IS employees. Id., attach. 1, Email from Chenega SPS to Contracting
   Officer, Dec. 11, 2006, at 2.

   [11] Alutiiq also protested that TW, Chenega SPS, and Doyon were
   ineligible for award because they had violated FAR sect. 52.203-2,
   Certificate of Independent Price Determination, Protest, Nov. 20, 2006, at
   5; this basis of protest was later withdrawn. Protester's Response to
   Agency Dismissal Request, Nov. 30, 2006, at 1.

   [12] Alutiiq also originally protested that: 1) the agency's evaluation of
   TW's and Chenega SPS's past performance and experience was improper; 2)
   the agency failed to properly evaluate all awardees' proposals under the
   mission capability and personnel evaluation factors; 3) the agency failed
   to properly evaluate Alutiiq's proposal under a personnel subfactor; 4)
   the agency failed to conduct a proper best value determinations as part of
   its source selection decisions; and 5) the agency's evaluation of Doyon's
   proposal was improper because Doyon was unable to comply with FAR
   sect. 52.219.14, Limitations on Subcontracting. We previously dismissed
   these protest issues as lacking adequate detail and factually and legally
   insufficient. GAO Facsimile to Parties, Nov. 14, 2006.

   [13] While it is true that CIS knew the prices at which it had offered to
   perform work for Doyon and Santa Fe (and that in each instance CIS's price
   would become a significant part of that offeror's cost), there is no
   evidence that CIS knew that Doyon or Santa Fe would utilize that precise
   price, without any mark-up or mark-down, in their proposals. There is also
   no evidence that CIS knew of Doyon's or Santa Fe's prices, or that Doyon
   or Santa Fe communicated with the other regarding the prices that each
   offeror intended to propose.

   [14] The SSA also determined that the proposal of the lowest-priced,
   lower-technically- rated offeror, did not represent the best value to the
   government. AR, Tab 14, Source Selection Decision, at 23-24.