TITLE: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, January 12, 2007
BNUMBER: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3
DATE: January 12, 2007
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B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, January 12, 2007
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Decision
Matter of: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation
File: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3
Date: January 12, 2007
Richard A. Sauber, Esq., Deneen J. Melander, Esq., Steven A. Alerding,
Esq., Seth W. Greene, Esq., and Joseph J. LoBue, Esq., Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for the protester.
Marcia G. Madsen, Esq., David F. Dowd, Esq., Michael E. Lackey, Esq.,
David B. Robbins, Esq., and William L. Olsen, Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
Maw, for Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors--Syracuse, the
intervenor.
Brian Toland, Esq., John J. Reynolds, Esq., Howard J. Bookman, Esq., and
Johanna E. Crawford, Esq.,Department of the Army, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest that agency failed to adequately account in the evaluation and
best value determination for protester's offer of an enhancement (greater
coverage) to required target acquisition counter fire radar is denied
where the agency assigned a significant strength to protester's proposal
on account of the proposed enhancement, but also assigned a significant
strength to the awardee's proposal on account of the fact that its
proposed radar was based on an actual prototype radar, and thus was more
likely than the protester's unbuilt design to meet the solicitation's
stringent delivery schedule; having reasonably determined that the
protester's proposal was not superior to the awardee's proposal with
respect to technical approach, the agency reasonably concluded that the
awardee's advantages with respect to supportability and a lower cost/price
warranted finding that the proposal represented the best value.
DECISION
Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (NG) protests the U.S. Army
Communications-Electronics Command's (CECOM) award of a contract to
Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors--Syracuse (LM), under request
for proposals (RFP) No. W15P7T-06-R-T001, for the Enhanced AN/TPQ-36
(EQ-36) Target Acquisition Counter Fire Radar System. NG asserts that LM's
proposal failed to satisfy a mandatory solicitation requirement and
otherwise challenges the evaluation of proposals.
We deny the protest.
Target acquisition counter fire radar detects and analyzes incoming enemy
mortar shells, rockets, and artillery (cannon) shells so as to locate
enemy firing points and thereby enable friendly forces to target the
firing points. As stated in the Statement of Objectives (SOO) included in
the solicitation, the EQ-36 procurement is in response to
a requirement for quickly replacing the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8 radar
system, which has the operational capability to locate hostile mortar,
artillery, and rocket fire that are a pervasive threat throughout the
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
theaters of operation, with a system with improved capabilities.
SOO sect. 1. According to the SOO, the EQ-36 system "shall provide
increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, including 360
degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased ranges." Id.
sect. 1. Further, the EQ-36 "improves the current system's capability to
operate in clutter and less than desired detection range and accuracy,"
addressing "a critical OIF/OEF warfighting deficiency to locate threat
mortar, artillery and rocket systems in a clutter environment." Id. sect.
1.1.[1]
In addition, the SOO noted that, not only did the current target
acquisition counter fire radar systems have "limited radar system
performance, [but] this near obsolescent equipment is expensive to support
and adversely effects sustainment and maintainability costs." SOO sect.
1.1. Therefore, according to the SOO, "[s]chedule is a critical aspect of
the EQ-36 program due to the urgent nature of the requirement," and
"[g]iven the need to quickly field a system to meet ongoing requirements,
technically mature solutions shall be procured to meet existing and
emerging needs." SOO sections 1.4, 3.6. Toward this end, the solicitation
provided for an "evolutionary acquisition program that allows rapid
fielding of incremental EQ-36 requirements." SOO sect. 1.2. The SOO
described a three-increment approach to the acquisition, with the "minimum
requirements for Increment 1 and Increment 2 . . . delineated in the
Government EQ-36 PBS [Performance Based Specification]." Id. sect. 1.4.
The PBS provided in this regard that:
Performance capability required by this document is defined in terms of
Increment 1 (I1) requirements and Increment 2 (I2) requirements as well
as Increment 3 (I3) future growth capabilities. Increment 1 requirements
and any Offeror proposed Increment 2 requirements must be met by the
EQ-36 System in its proposed baseline, and shall be used in determining
system compliance during test. This will be known as the Offeror's
"proposed baseline." Any remaining Increment 2 requirements are
mandatory requirements that must be offered as part of an evaluated
option. The effort associated with Increment 2 must be completed within
forty-eight (48) months of option exercise . . . . Increment 3 efforts
represent future growth capabilities and are not mandatory.
PBS sect. 1.
The solicitation contemplated the award of a predominantly
cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for five baseline EQ-36 systems, the
first two which are to be delivered not later than 30 months after award,
with options for Increment 2 upgrades, 12 production systems (on a
fixed-price-incentive basis), a radar test environment simulator, and
training devices. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal
represented the "best value" based upon consideration of four evaluation
factors: (1) technical, including subfactors for technical approach,
supportability and management, with technical approach more important than
supportability, which was slightly more important than management;
(2) performance risk, including subfactors for past performance and system
engineering; (3) cost/price; and (4) small business participation plan.
The non-cost/price factors, when combined, were significantly more
important than the cost/price factor.
CECOM received three proposals in response to the RFP, two of which--NG's
and LM's--were included in the competitive range. After conducting several
rounds of written and oral discussions, CECOM requested the submission of
final proposal revisions (FPR).
Based on its evaluation of the FPRs, CECOM determined that LM's proposal
was technically superior to NG's. Both NG's and LM's proposals received
overall good ratings under the technical factor, and both were rated good
under technical approach (the most important technical subfactor), with
each receiving numerous strengths and five significant strengths. However,
LM's proposal was rated good and NG's proposal only acceptable under
supportability (the next most important subfactor). LM's proposal was
determined to be "clearly superior" to NG's in this area, with significant
strengths for a design that reduces the logistics footprint and improves
supportability, and for an [REDACTED]. Source Selection Decision (SSD) at
3. NG's proposal received no significant strengths under the
supportability subfactor. In addition, while both proposals were rated as
acceptable under the management subfactor, LM's proposal received two
strengths under this subfactor while NG's received none. Hearing
Transcript (Tr.) at 463. (Both proposals were rated low risk under the
past performance and systems engineering subfactors of the performance
risk evaluation factor, and acceptable for small business participation.)
In addition, LM's evaluated cost/price ($[REDACTED] million) was
approximately [REDACTED] percent lower than NG's ($[REDACTED] million).
The source selection authority (SSA) therefore determined that, based upon
its technical superiority and lower cost/price, LM's proposal represented
the best overall value to the government.
Upon learning of the resulting award to LM, and after being debriefed, NG
filed this protest with our Office challenging the evaluation of
proposals. We have considered all of NG's arguments and find that they
furnish no basis upon which to question the determination that LM's
proposal was the best value under terms of the solicitation. We discuss
the more significant arguments below.
TECHNICAL APPROACH
Requirement for 360 Degree Coverage
NG primarily asserts that LM's proposal failed to meet a solicitation
requirement that offerors' EQ-36 baseline have the capability to locate
hostile weapons--including cannon, rockets and mortars--over a 360 degree
arc from the radar. In this regard, LM's baseline and Increment 2 option
included 360 degree coverage only for mortars, and not for cannon or
rockets. NG concludes that LM's proposal should have been rejected as
technically unacceptable. CECOM disputes NG's interpretation of the
solicitation, maintaining that it only required 360 degree coverage for
mortars, and not cannon and rockets; it concludes that it therefore
properly found LM's proposal acceptable.
In reviewing a procuring agency's evaluation of an offeror's technical
proposal, we will not question an agency's evaluation judgments absent
evidence that those judgments were unreasonable or contrary to the stated
evaluation criteria or applicable procurement statutes or regulations. M &
M Ret. Enters., LLC, B-297282, Dec. 15, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 224 at 3.
Further, in considering the meaning of a solicitation provision, we will
read it in the context of the solicitation and in a reasonable manner.
Burns and Roe Servs. Corp., B-251969.4, Mar. 1, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 160
at 7. We will not adopt a restrictive interpretation of a solicitation
provision where it is not clear from the solicitation that such a
restrictive interpretation was intended by the agency. M & M Ret. Enters.,
supra; International Data Prods., Commax Techs., Inc., B-275480.2 et al.,
Apr. 3, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 179 at 4.
Here, we find that only the agency's interpretation of the solicitation
requirements is reasonable, and thus have no basis to question the
determination that LM's proposal met the requirement at issue here and was
acceptable.
The record indicates that the antenna array in the current generation of
target acquisition counter fire radars does not rotate and thus can only
provide approximately 90 degree coverage; in order to cover more sectors,
it is necessary to deploy more radars. While rapidly mechanically rotating
the antenna array would open up the potential for 360 degree coverage,
realizing that potential would require overcoming a number of challenges,
including a time interval during each rotation when the rotating antenna
array does not have a particular target in sight. The record indicates
that achieving useful coverage--that is, the ability of the radar to
detect, classify and track inbound enemy projectiles and then accurately
calculate the firing point--is more difficult for cannon shells and
rockets than for mortar shells, because (depending upon the projectile)
artillery shells and rockets have greater velocity, potentially more
distant firing points, flatter trajectories (for rockets), and/or smaller
radar cross-sections. Tr. at 20-29, 548, 557-61.
In support of its interpretation that the solicitation required 360 degree
coverage for the more challenging cannon and rockets, as well as for
mortars, NG points first to the history of the procurement. In this
regard, at the Industry Day conference held by the agency on November 29,
2005 (5 months before issuance of the solicitation), CECOM advised
attendees that "360 Degree Coverage is a Must to Fight the Current and
Future Enemy"; with respect to artillery, CECOM's presentation
specifically called for the "EQ-36 Baseline Requirements Phase II" to
include the "Best Capable" 360 degree coverage for artillery. Presentation
of Product Manager for Radars, Enhanced Q-36 Radars Industry Conference
(Presentation), Nov. 29, 2005, slides 9, 19. NG also notes that, on the
day CECOM issued the final RFP, in response to a question with respect to
the draft RFP concerning the preferred mode of operation, CECOM stated
that "[t]he preferred mode of operation is 360 degrees for the mission
period, 100% of the time." Question No. 1. As for the final RFP itself, NG
focuses primarily on language in the SOO stating that the EQ-36 system
"shall provide increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8,
including 360 degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased
ranges." SOO sect. 1. The protester asserts that these indications from
the agency made it clear that the 360 degree requirement applied to cannon
and rockets, as well as mortars.
Even assuming that NG reasonably interpreted the above language as setting
forth an explicit requirement for 360 degree coverage for cannon and
rockets in addition to mortars, NG's interpretation failed to take into
account the terms of the actual RFP. In this regard, as noted by the
agency, the November 2005 presolicitation presentation specifically
cautioned that the "Formal RFP will be the Controlling Document in the
Event There is a Conflict or Ambiguity." Presentation, Slide 4. The SOO in
the final RFP clearly and unambiguously referenced the Performance Based
Specification (PBS) as the document defining the performance requirements
under the contemplated contract and, thus, the requirements with which
offerors had to agree to comply, providing that "[t]he EQ-36 System is to
be an enhancement of the aging target acquisition counter fire radar
system AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, improving operational and physical functionality as
defined in the [PBS]," and that "[t]he EQ-36 System shall perform as
described in the [PBS]." SOO sections 1.1, 1.4.
The PBS, read as a whole, does not require 360 degree coverage for cannon
and rockets in order to be eligible for award. Section 3.3.4 of the PBS,
entitled "Single Weapon Location Performance, 360 Degree Sector," defined
the required 360 degree capability for each of the procurement increments
in terms of the required range, probability of location, and accuracy with
respect to the enumerated weapons. That section provided generally as
follows:
Increment 1: The EQ-36 System shall implement a 360 degree weapon
location mode with minimum performance criteria.
Increment 2: In its 360 degree mode, the EQ-36 System shall meet the
following performance requirements against mortar, cannon and rocket
weapons in Table 2.
PBS sect. 3.3.4. The specific range requirements in the 360 degree mode
were set forth in Table 2 as follows:
3.3.4.1 Range
When operating in a 360 degree sector mode, the EQ-36 System shall
locate mortar, cannon and rocket targets at the ranges listed in Table
2 below.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Weapon | Location Range (km) |
|-------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
| Type | Subtype | Increment 1* | Increment 2 | Increment 3 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
|Mortar | Light (60mm) | | 3 -- 10 | 3 -- 12 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
| |Medium (81mm) | 5* | 3 -- 12 | 3 -- 14 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
| |Heavy (120mm) | | 3 -- 15 | 3 -- 18 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
|Cannon |Light (105mm) | | | 5 -- 25 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
| |Medium (155mm)| | | 5 -- 32 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
| | Heavy (8in) | | | 5 -- 32 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
|Rocket |Light (107mm) | | | 8 -- 32 |
|----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
| |Heavy (122mm) | | | 15 -- 40 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+
* As a minimum the Government will fire a single range with various aspect
angles to validate 360 degree performance in Increment 1
Table 2 360 Degree Range
It is significant, we think, that the table includes no range requirements
for cannon and rockets in Increment 1 or Increment 2; rather, the only
range requirements for cannon and rockets were in the boxes for Increment
3, that is, the increment whose "efforts represent future growth
capabilities and are not mandatory." PBS sect. 1. The obvious inference to
be drawn from the absence of any Increment 1 or Increment 2 range
requirements for cannon or rockets, when there were Increment 1 and
Increment 2 range requirements for only mortars and Increment 3 ranges for
cannon and rockets, is that there were no Increment 1 or Increment 2
requirements for 360 degree coverage for cannon or rockets. This
interpretation is further strengthened by the language in the PBS
regarding the 360 degree coverage probability of location requirements,
which were described as follows:
3.3.4.2 Probability of Location (PL)<
Increment 1: The EQ-36 System shall have at least an 85 percent PL for
each mortar firing point over the full 360 degree search sector.
Increment 2: The EQ-36 System shall have at least an 85 percent PL for
each mortar firing point over the full 360 degree search sector.
Increment 3: If proposed the EQ-36 System shall have at least a
90 percent PL for each mortar, cannon and rocket firing point over the
full 360 degree search sector.
PBS sect. 3.3.4.2. As with the PBS range requirements, the absence of any
Increment 1 or Increment 2 probability of location requirements for cannon
or rockets, when there were Increment 1 and Increment 2 probability of
location requirements for only mortars and Increment 3 probability of
location standards for cannon and rockets, again indicates that there were
no Increment 1 or Increment 2 requirements for 360 degree coverage for
cannon or rockets.[2]
This interpretation is strengthened further still by the contrast between
the 360 degree range table in the final RFP and the table in the draft
versions of the RFP. Specifically, the table in the January 13, 2006 draft
RFP included the reference "TBD" (to be determined) or "TBD per contractor
proposal" in the Increment 1 and 2 boxes for cannon and rockets, and the
February 13, February 21, and April 6 draft RFPs contained the reference
"Per Contractor Proposal" in those boxes. PBS sect. 3.3.4.1, Draft RFP. In
our view, the replacement of the requirement contained in the PBS in the
draft RFPs, for the contractor to insert a value for the range at which
its radar would detect cannon and rockets in the 360 degree mode, with an
empty box in the actual RFP could only reasonably be understood as
indicating that whatever requirement may have existed in this regard in
the draft RFPs had been eliminated.
Indeed, as noted by the agency, a fair reading of the contemporaneous
record suggests that NG in fact understood that there were no Increment 1
or Increment 2 requirements for 360 degree coverage for cannon or rockets.
In this regard, for example, an Item for Negotiation (IFN) issued by the
agency with respect to NG's proposal to provide 360 degree coverage for
cannon and rockets, requested NG to "[p]rovide justification that the
EQ-36 system will meet the [Probability of Location] and Accuracy
requirements for cannon and rockets in 360 degree mode over the ranges
proposed in the Offeror's PS [Performance Specification] Table 5
360 Degree Range." NG responded, in part, that "[t]he cannon and rocket
LFTM [Live Fire Test Matrix] cases demonstrate the ability for the
360-degree mode to have significant residual capacity against cannon and
rockets beyond the Army mortar-only requirements." NG Response to IFN No.
TTC2-0005.[3] Likewise, in presenting its proposed 360 degree approach in
its FPR, NG acknowledged that "performance against cannons and rockets is
not required until Increment 3 in the 360-o mode," and further provided
that "[a]lthough the Increment 2 requirements include only the mortar
firings, the analysis [in NG Table 2.3.4-5] also included the cannon
minimum range firings." NG Technical Approach, sections 2.3.4.2, 2.3.4.4.
It is clear from these exchanges with the Army that NG understood that
there was no Increment 1 or Increment 2 requirement for 360 degree
coverage for cannon and rockets. The integrity of the protest process does
not permit a protester to espouse one interpretation of a solicitation
during the procurement, and then argue during a protest that the
interpretation is unreasonable. BST Sys., Inc., B-298761, B-298761.2, Dec.
1, 2006, 2006 CPD para. ___ at 6; AAI Eng'g Support, Inc., B-257857, Nov.
16, 1994, 95-1 CPD para. 2 at 3-4.
Relative Evaluation
NG asserts that, even if CECOM was not required to reject LM's proposal
based on the 360 degree requirement, it should have given NG's proposal a
higher rating than LM's under the technical approach subfactor for
offering 360 degree coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline and
other proposed enhancements.
As noted above, both proposals were rated as good under the technical
approach subfactor; both proposals received 5 significant strengths and
numerous strengths (23 for NG and 19 for LM). In this regard, NG's
proposal received significant strengths for offering: (1) 360 degree
coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline; (2) [REDACTED];
(3) [REDACTED]; (4) [REDACTED]; and (5) a fully-active (solid state)
phased array radar, thereby enhancing reliability and maintainability and
offering good power efficiency. EQ-36 Source Selection Final Evaluation
Results Presentation to the SSA, at 16-24; Assist Characteristic Report
for EQ-36, NG.
Likewise, LM's proposal received five significant strengths on account of
offering: (1) to base its EQ-36 radar on an actual, operational
protototype target acquisition counter fire radar, the Multi-Mission
Radar, Advanced Technology Objective (MMR-ATO), developed under contract
to the Army and tested at the government's Yuma Proving Ground, rather
than on parts of different types of radars as did NG; (2) [REDACTED]; (3)
lower emplacement and displacement times, including [REDACTED] minutes to
emplace the radar (versus [REDACTED] minutes for NG) and [REDACTED]
minutes to displace the radar (versus [REDACTED] minutes for NG), thereby
increasing the ability to keep pace with battlefield movements and
increasing the survivability of the crew; (4) [REDACTED]; and (5) as with
NG, a fully-active (solid state) phased array radar, thereby enhancing
reliability and maintainability and offering good power efficiency. EQ-36
Source Selection Final Evaluation Results Presentation to the SSA, at
16-24; Assist Characteristic Report for EQ-36, LM.
NG primarily asserts that CECOM gave insufficient weight to its offer of
360 degree coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline. According to
the protester, its proposal should have been rated as superior to LM's
under the technical approach subfactor.
The evaluation was reasonable. The statement of evaluation criteria in
section M of the solicitation furnished only a general listing of the
specific subfactors under the technical evaluation factor, describing them
simply as the "Technical Approach Sub-factor," "Supportability
Sub-factor," and "Management Sub-factor." RFP sect. M-4. However, section
M also generally provided that in evaluating proposals under each
technical subfactor, the agency would consider the feasibility of the
proposed approach, including "[t]he extent to which successful performance
is contingent upon proven devices and techniques that do not require
significant Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) and re-design." Id. Section M
further cautioned that while the government "values greater technical
capability early in the design," "any proposed additional capability (i.e.
addressing Increment 2 requirements and/or Increment 3 future growth
capabilities within the Increment 1 baseline) will be assessed for its
associated risks along with successful delivery of Increment 1
requirements, which remains the Government's priority." Id. Similarly, as
noted above, while the SOO provided that the EQ-36 system "shall provide
increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, including 360
degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased ranges," SOO
sect. 1, the SOO cautioned that "schedule is a critical aspect of the
EQ-36 program due to the urgent nature of the requirement," and "[g]iven
the need to quickly field a system to meet ongoing requirements,
technically mature solutions shall be procured to meet existing and
emerging needs." SOO sections 1.4, 3.6.
The record indicates that, while NG had proposed to include 360 degree
coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline, NG's proposed solution
was determined by the agency to be a "paper design" not yet built, in
which parts of different types of radar, including [REDACTED], and for
which there was only simulated and analytical data, with (unlike for LM)
no empirical data derived from operation of the proposed system. Tr. at
79, 170-71, 323, 341, 379, 451, 581, 758-59. Although NG's proposed 360
degree approach ultimately was rated as low to moderate risk after the
agency gave it the "benefit of the doubt" based upon NG having furnished a
"good paper," the subject matter experts from Georgia Tech Research
Institute who were advising the agency concluded that NG's approach in
fact entailed moderate risk, while the subfactor chairman for technical
approach viewed the risk associated with NG's proposal as closer to
moderate risk. Tr. at 616-18, 626. In particular, according to the agency,
the challenge of locating all types of weapons coupled with the limited
detection opportunities in the 360 degree mode will require robust
detection, tracking, identification and ballistic modeling algorithms;
NG's proposed approach therefore was determined to have a higher
probability of issues arising during the test phase, which could require
modification of the algorithms and further testing, thereby potentially
placing in jeopardy NG's ability to meet to required 30-month schedule for
delivering the initial baseline EQ-36 systems. In other words, NG's
proposal to address all threats posed a higher risk to schedule. Tr. at
342-43, 619; Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) Chairman, Nov. 17,
2006, at 8-9.
In contrast, as discussed above, LM based its EQ-36 radar on an actual,
operational protototype target acquisition counter fire radar, the
MMR-ATO, developed under contract with the Army, and which has
demonstrated 90 degree and 360 degree counter fire target acquisition
during testing at the government's Yuma Proving Ground. Indeed, as noted
by LM during discussions, not only was there extensive simulation of the
MMR-ATO's performance against cannons and rockets in 360 degree mode, but
in addition, LM had undertaken "very limited field testing against
cannons" at Yuma Proving Ground using the MMR-ATO which showed that the
"system does provide some level of performance against some cannon and
rocket trajectories." LM Technical Approch Proposal at 1-3; LM Response to
IFN No. TTB1-0137; LM Performance Risk Proposal at 57-60; Assist
Characteristic Report for EQ-36, LM, at 21; SSEB Chairman, Nov. 17, 2006,
at 7; Tr. at 78-79, 169-70, 323, 357-60. According to the SSA, the fact
that LM was basing its proposed system on an existing, operational
protototype target acquisition counter fire radar was "a tremendous risk
mitigator" which gave the agency "confidence that this was a mature design
and able to easily meet our schedule." Tr. at 451. The SSA accordingly
viewed LM's approach in this regard to be "a tremendous significant
strength." Id.
Given the stated emphasis in the solicitation on obtaining "technically
mature solutions" and the "priority" placed upon successfully meeting a
shortened schedule so as to "quickly field a system" to meet the agency's
"urgent" requirement, we find no basis for questioning the agency's
ultimate determination under the technical approach subfactor that
proposing to include in an unbuilt design 360 degree coverage for cannon
and rockets did not thereby render the proposal superior to a proposal
based upon an actual, operational prototype target acquisition counter
fire radar which had undergone testing at a government facility.
Nor has NG shown that other elements of its proposed solution represented
a sufficient enhancement or otherwise were deserving of such additional
credit, as to require the agency to find its proposal superior to LM's
under the technical approach subfactor. For example, NG asserts that its
proposal should have received a significant strength based on its approach
to the requirement in section 3.16.1 of the PBS, entitled "Anti-Radiation
Missile (ARM) Survivability," that the EQ-36 radar "be able to react to
and protect against an ARM attack." In this regard, an ARM missile attacks
radar by using its guidance system to hone in on radio frequency (RF)
emissions by the radar. LM proposed to meet this requirement by ceasing
emissions when notified that an ARM launch is imminent or in progress. LM
Response to IFN No. TTB1-0057. LM's approach of turning off the radar was
determined by the agency to be acceptable on the basis that it would end
further RF transmissions that the ARM could use to locate the radar. Tr.
at 351.[4] In contrast, NG proposed to [REDACTED] in order to continue
operation in a degraded mode while reducing radar signature. NG Response
to IFN No. TTC1-0082; SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 11-12.[5]
Although the NG solution offered the possibility of continuing to operate
the radar while at the same time [REDACTED], the agency was concerned
that, by continuing to radiate RF energy, the radar would be vulnerable to
detection by the ARM and the ARM's honing in on the radar's emission. The
agency's concern in this regard was increased by the fact that, under the
NG solution the radar [REDACTED], with the possibility that [REDACTED],
the ARM would be able to hone in on the radar. Indeed, a consultant
retained by NG in this matter conceded in his testimony that there might
be times when the mission of counter fire was not critical, and the "smart
decision" would be to turn off the radar. Tr. at 675. Furthermore, under
NG's approach there would be a [REDACTED]. The agency concluded that in
these circumstances, given the risk to the radar and the [REDACTED] under
NG's proposed solution, that solution did not warrant assignment of a
strength. Tr. at 51-60; 351-54; SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 12; Agency
Post-Hearing Comments, Dec. 21, 2006, at 11. Although NG challenges that
conclusion, asserting that the risk to the radar is less than the agency
believes, the protester has not shown that the agency's concerns were
unreasonable, and it has furnished no basis for our Office to question the
agency's determination not to award NG a strength in this regard. In
conclusion, having considered NG's various challenges to the evaluation
under the technical approach subfactor, we find no basis to question the
agency's rating of both proposals as good under this subfactor.
SUPPORTABILITY
NG challenges the evaluation of proposals under the supportability factor.
In this regard, NG's proposal was rated as only acceptable under the
supportability factor, having received no significant strengths and two
strengths, including: (1) a strength for furnishing [REDACTED]; and (2) a
strength for proposing to invest in technology (using Office of Naval
Research and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funding) in order
to reduce life cycle costs (LCC) and the manning footprint. In contrast,
LM's proposal was rated as good under the supportability factor, with two
significant strengths and two strengths, including: (1) a significant
strength for design elements that reduced the logistics footprint and
improved supportability, including [REDACTED] specific design improvements
to the MMR-ATO radar upon which LM's system was based, and a system
configuration that [REDACTED]; (2) a significant strength for proposing
[REDACTED]; (3) a strength for proposing [REDACTED]; and (4) a strength
for proposing to achieve significant savings by [REDACTED].
NG asserts that the agency failed to credit a number of elements of its
proposed approach with significantly reducing the logistics footprint of
the radar system. Included among its arguments is the claim that the
supportability evaluators unreasonably failed to consider information from
other parts of NG's proposal. Specifically, noting that the supportability
evaluators were alerted to the significance of the LM system configuration
by a technical approach evaluator, NG asserts that the supportability
evaluators acted unfairly in limiting their review of NG's proposal to the
supportability volume of NG's proposal, thereby failing to take into
account relevant information regarding the design of NG's system found in
the technical approach volume. In any case, NG asserts, references to the
assertedly relevant design features were also found in its supportability
volume.
We have considered NG's several specific challenges to the supportability
evaluation and find that they furnish no basis for questioning the overall
determination that LM's proposal was more advantageous than NG's under the
supportability subfactor. For example, NG asserts that it did not receive
sufficient evaluation credit for its proposed mean time between failure
(MTBF). In this regard, section 3.19 of the PBS, "Reliability," required
the EQ-36 system to have a minimum MTBF of 185 hours in Increment 1 and
330 hours in Increment 2. NG, which included calculations in its proposal
indicating that its design would ultimately have an MTBF of
[REDACTED] hours, received a strength (with a low to moderate risk rating)
under the technical approach subfactor for agreeing in its performance
specification to an MTBF of [REDACTED] hours in its Increment 1 baseline.
LM, which estimated that its system has an MTBF of [REDACTED] hours, but
described a process by which the MTBF would be significantly improved to
above [REDACTED] hours, also received a strength under the technical
approach subfactor for agreeing in its performance specification to an
MTBF of [REDACTED] hours in its Increment 1 baseline.
NG asserts that its proposal should have received a significant strength
under the supportability subfactor because the increased reliability
represented by the calculated MTBF of [REDACTED] hours for its design
would contribute to reducing the logistics footprint for the radar system.
Although the agency maintains that MTBF was to be evaluated only under the
technical approach subfactor, and in fact the most extensive discussion of
reliability for both offerors is to be found in the technical approach
volumes of their proposals, LM Technical Approach Volume at 129-38,
165-66, NG Technical Approach Volume at 2-90 to 2-92; NG Response to
Technical Approach IFN No. TTC1-0002, we believe that the agency's
position fails to account for the fact that the instructions to offerors
in section L of the solicitation directed that reliability be discussed
both in the technical approach volume and in the supportability volume of
their proposals. RFP sect. L-18. (Again, the evaluation criteria in
section M of the solicitation provided little guidance in this regard.)
Moreover, we note that, in the evaluation, the agency acknowledged that
increased MTBF "would positively impact Supportability and Operational
Availability." Assist Characteristic Report for EQ-36, NG, at 27. However,
to the extent that NG's proposal may have been entitled to a strength for
its MTBF under the supportability subfactor as well as under the technical
approach subfactor, the protester has not shown that LM would not also be
entitled to a strength under the supportability factor for agreeing to a
[REDACTED] MTBF requirement. Moreover, we find reasonable the position of
the SSEB that the fact that NG committed itself in its performance
specification to an MTBF of only [REDACTED] hours indicated a lack of
confidence in the [REDACTED] hours it predicted for its design, and that
there thus was no basis for assigning NG's proposal a significant strength
in this regard. SSEB Chairman, Nov. 17, 2006, at 12.
As a further example, we find unpersuasive NG's claim that it was entitled
to more evaluation credit under the supportability subfactor because its
estimate of the LCC of its design ($[REDACTED]) was lower than LM's
($[REDACTED]). NG Supportability Volume at 8-10; LM Supportability Volume
at 60. The SSEB technical supportability chairman testified that, not only
were the estimates uncertain given the developmental status of the
proposed systems but that, in any case, the great majority of the
difference in estimated LCC for the systems resulted from LM's having used
a higher estimate of the cost of the service personnel who would be
operating and maintaining the systems, a matter that was in the control of
the government and was not contractor-driven. Tr. at 208-14. NG has not
shown these calculations to be in error, and we thus have no basis for
questioning the evaluation in this area. We conclude that there is no
basis to question the agency's determination that LM's proposal was
superior to NG's under the supportability subfactor.
Given that the record supports the agency's determination that LM's
proposal was technically superior to NG's, and since LM's evaluated
cost/price was lower than NG's, the agency reasonably determined that LM's
proposal represented the best value to the government.
The protest is denied.
Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel
------------------------
[1] The EQ-36 is also intended to replace the AN/TPQ-37 target acquisition
counter fire radar. Contracting Officer's Statement, Nov. 17, 2006, at 2.
[2] In contrast to the above PBS provisions with respect to range and
probability of location, which specifically identified the weapons for
which coverage was to be provided, the PBS accuracy requirements referred
only to levels of accuracy with respect to "the locations computed." PBS
sect. 3.3.4.3.
[3] The PBS included the Live Fire Test Matrix as an appendix. The matrix
provided test parameters (describing each shot) to be used in evaluating
radar performance against various mortars, cannon and rockets in both the
90 degree and 360 degree modes; in the 360 degree mode, the matrix
provided test parameters both for mortars and, apparently in the event
that an offeror proposed coverage beyond the PBS requirements, also for
cannon and rockets. RFP, app. A, Live Fire Test Matrix--360 Degree
Sectors.
[4] LM included with its IFN response an estimate of the probability of
survival for the radar (assuming typical ARM characteristics) depending
upon the distance from the radar the ARM is when the radar ceases RF
emissions. LM Response to IFN No. TTB1-0057. LM's estimate indicated that
the probability of the radar surviving was [REDACTED]. LM Response to IFN
No. TTB1-0057.
[5] LM advised the agency that its radar offered a future growth
capability to add [REDACTED]. See SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 12.