TITLE: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, January 12, 2007
BNUMBER: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3
DATE: January 12, 2007
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B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3, Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, January 12, 2007

   DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
   The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
   Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.

   Decision

   Matter of: Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation

   File: B-298954; B-298954.2; B-298954.3

   Date: January 12, 2007

   Richard A. Sauber, Esq., Deneen J. Melander, Esq., Steven A. Alerding,
   Esq., Seth W. Greene, Esq., and Joseph J. LoBue, Esq., Fried, Frank,
   Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for the protester.

   Marcia G. Madsen, Esq., David F. Dowd, Esq., Michael E. Lackey, Esq.,
   David B. Robbins, Esq., and William L. Olsen, Esq., Mayer, Brown, Rowe &
   Maw, for Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors--Syracuse, the
   intervenor.

   Brian Toland, Esq., John J. Reynolds, Esq., Howard J. Bookman, Esq., and
   Johanna E. Crawford, Esq.,Department of the Army, for the agency.

   David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
   Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

   DIGEST

   Protest that agency failed to adequately account in the evaluation and
   best value determination for protester's offer of an enhancement (greater
   coverage) to required target acquisition counter fire radar is denied
   where the agency assigned a significant strength to protester's proposal
   on account of the proposed enhancement, but also assigned a significant
   strength to the awardee's proposal on account of the fact that its
   proposed radar was based on an actual prototype radar, and thus was more
   likely than the protester's unbuilt design to meet the solicitation's
   stringent delivery schedule; having reasonably determined that the
   protester's proposal was not superior to the awardee's proposal with
   respect to technical approach, the agency reasonably concluded that the
   awardee's advantages with respect to supportability and a lower cost/price
   warranted finding that the proposal represented the best value.

   DECISION

   Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (NG) protests the U.S. Army
   Communications-Electronics Command's (CECOM) award of a contract to
   Lockheed Martin Maritime Systems & Sensors--Syracuse (LM), under request
   for proposals (RFP) No. W15P7T-06-R-T001, for the Enhanced AN/TPQ-36
   (EQ-36) Target Acquisition Counter Fire Radar System. NG asserts that LM's
   proposal failed to satisfy a mandatory solicitation requirement and
   otherwise challenges the evaluation of proposals.

   We deny the protest.

   Target acquisition counter fire radar detects and analyzes incoming enemy
   mortar shells, rockets, and artillery (cannon) shells so as to locate
   enemy firing points and thereby enable friendly forces to target the
   firing points. As stated in the Statement of Objectives (SOO) included in
   the solicitation, the EQ-36 procurement is in response to

     a requirement for quickly replacing the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8 radar
     system, which has the operational capability to locate hostile mortar,
     artillery, and rocket fire that are a pervasive threat throughout the
     Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
     theaters of operation, with a system with improved capabilities.

   SOO sect. 1. According to the SOO, the EQ-36 system "shall provide
   increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, including 360
   degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased ranges." Id.
   sect. 1. Further, the EQ-36 "improves the current system's capability to
   operate in clutter and less than desired detection range and accuracy,"
   addressing "a critical OIF/OEF warfighting deficiency to locate threat
   mortar, artillery and rocket systems in a clutter environment." Id. sect.
   1.1.[1]

   In addition, the SOO noted that, not only did the current target
   acquisition counter fire radar systems have "limited radar system
   performance, [but] this near obsolescent equipment is expensive to support
   and adversely effects sustainment and maintainability costs." SOO sect.
   1.1. Therefore, according to the SOO, "[s]chedule is a critical aspect of
   the EQ-36 program due to the urgent nature of the requirement," and
   "[g]iven the need to quickly field a system to meet ongoing requirements,
   technically mature solutions shall be procured to meet existing and
   emerging needs." SOO sections 1.4, 3.6. Toward this end, the solicitation
   provided for an "evolutionary acquisition program that allows rapid
   fielding of incremental EQ-36 requirements." SOO sect. 1.2. The SOO
   described a three-increment approach to the acquisition, with the "minimum
   requirements for Increment 1 and Increment 2 . . . delineated in the
   Government EQ-36 PBS [Performance Based Specification]." Id. sect. 1.4.
   The PBS provided in this regard that:

     Performance capability required by this document is defined in terms of
     Increment 1 (I1) requirements and Increment 2 (I2) requirements as well
     as Increment 3 (I3) future growth capabilities. Increment 1 requirements
     and any Offeror proposed Increment 2 requirements must be met by the
     EQ-36 System in its proposed baseline, and shall be used in determining
     system compliance during test. This will be known as the Offeror's
     "proposed baseline." Any remaining Increment 2 requirements are
     mandatory requirements that must be offered as part of an evaluated
     option. The effort associated with Increment 2 must be completed within
     forty-eight (48) months of option exercise . . . . Increment 3 efforts
     represent future growth capabilities and are not mandatory.

   PBS sect. 1.

   The solicitation contemplated the award of a predominantly
   cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for five baseline EQ-36 systems, the
   first two which are to be delivered not later than 30 months after award,
   with options for Increment 2 upgrades, 12 production systems (on a
   fixed-price-incentive basis), a radar test environment simulator, and
   training devices. Award was to be made to the offeror whose proposal
   represented the "best value" based upon consideration of four evaluation
   factors: (1) technical, including subfactors for technical approach,
   supportability and management, with technical approach more important than
   supportability, which was slightly more important than management;
   (2) performance risk, including subfactors for past performance and system
   engineering; (3) cost/price; and (4) small business participation plan.
   The non-cost/price factors, when combined, were significantly more
   important than the cost/price factor.

   CECOM received three proposals in response to the RFP, two of which--NG's
   and LM's--were included in the competitive range. After conducting several
   rounds of written and oral discussions, CECOM requested the submission of
   final proposal revisions (FPR).

   Based on its evaluation of the FPRs, CECOM determined that LM's proposal
   was technically superior to NG's. Both NG's and LM's proposals received
   overall good ratings under the technical factor, and both were rated good
   under technical approach (the most important technical subfactor), with
   each receiving numerous strengths and five significant strengths. However,
   LM's proposal was rated good and NG's proposal only acceptable under
   supportability (the next most important subfactor). LM's proposal was
   determined to be "clearly superior" to NG's in this area, with significant
   strengths for a design that reduces the logistics footprint and improves
   supportability, and for an [REDACTED]. Source Selection Decision (SSD) at
   3. NG's proposal received no significant strengths under the
   supportability subfactor. In addition, while both proposals were rated as
   acceptable under the management subfactor, LM's proposal received two
   strengths under this subfactor while NG's received none. Hearing
   Transcript (Tr.) at 463. (Both proposals were rated low risk under the
   past performance and systems engineering subfactors of the performance
   risk evaluation factor, and acceptable for small business participation.)
   In addition, LM's evaluated cost/price ($[REDACTED] million) was
   approximately [REDACTED] percent lower than NG's ($[REDACTED] million).
   The source selection authority (SSA) therefore determined that, based upon
   its technical superiority and lower cost/price, LM's proposal represented
   the best overall value to the government.

   Upon learning of the resulting award to LM, and after being debriefed, NG
   filed this protest with our Office challenging the evaluation of
   proposals. We have considered all of NG's arguments and find that they
   furnish no basis upon which to question the determination that LM's
   proposal was the best value under terms of the solicitation. We discuss
   the more significant arguments below.

   TECHNICAL APPROACH

   Requirement for 360 Degree Coverage

   NG primarily asserts that LM's proposal failed to meet a solicitation
   requirement that offerors' EQ-36 baseline have the capability to locate
   hostile weapons--including cannon, rockets and mortars--over a 360 degree
   arc from the radar. In this regard, LM's baseline and Increment 2 option
   included 360 degree coverage only for mortars, and not for cannon or
   rockets. NG concludes that LM's proposal should have been rejected as
   technically unacceptable. CECOM disputes NG's interpretation of the
   solicitation, maintaining that it only required 360 degree coverage for
   mortars, and not cannon and rockets; it concludes that it therefore
   properly found LM's proposal acceptable.

   In reviewing a procuring agency's evaluation of an offeror's technical
   proposal, we will not question an agency's evaluation judgments absent
   evidence that those judgments were unreasonable or contrary to the stated
   evaluation criteria or applicable procurement statutes or regulations. M &
   M Ret. Enters., LLC, B-297282, Dec. 15, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 224 at 3.
   Further, in considering the meaning of a solicitation provision, we will
   read it in the context of the solicitation and in a reasonable manner.
   Burns and Roe Servs. Corp., B-251969.4, Mar. 1, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 160
   at 7. We will not adopt a restrictive interpretation of a solicitation
   provision where it is not clear from the solicitation that such a
   restrictive interpretation was intended by the agency. M & M Ret. Enters.,
   supra; International Data Prods., Commax Techs., Inc., B-275480.2 et al.,
   Apr. 3, 1997, 97-1 CPD para. 179 at 4.

   Here, we find that only the agency's interpretation of the solicitation
   requirements is reasonable, and thus have no basis to question the
   determination that LM's proposal met the requirement at issue here and was
   acceptable.

   The record indicates that the antenna array in the current generation of
   target acquisition counter fire radars does not rotate and thus can only
   provide approximately 90 degree coverage; in order to cover more sectors,
   it is necessary to deploy more radars. While rapidly mechanically rotating
   the antenna array would open up the potential for 360 degree coverage,
   realizing that potential would require overcoming a number of challenges,
   including a time interval during each rotation when the rotating antenna
   array does not have a particular target in sight. The record indicates
   that achieving useful coverage--that is, the ability of the radar to
   detect, classify and track inbound enemy projectiles and then accurately
   calculate the firing point--is more difficult for cannon shells and
   rockets than for mortar shells, because (depending upon the projectile)
   artillery shells and rockets have greater velocity, potentially more
   distant firing points, flatter trajectories (for rockets), and/or smaller
   radar cross-sections. Tr. at 20-29, 548, 557-61.

   In support of its interpretation that the solicitation required 360 degree
   coverage for the more challenging cannon and rockets, as well as for
   mortars, NG points first to the history of the procurement. In this
   regard, at the Industry Day conference held by the agency on November 29,
   2005 (5 months before issuance of the solicitation), CECOM advised
   attendees that "360 Degree Coverage is a Must to Fight the Current and
   Future Enemy"; with respect to artillery, CECOM's presentation
   specifically called for the "EQ-36 Baseline Requirements Phase II" to
   include the "Best Capable" 360 degree coverage for artillery. Presentation
   of Product Manager for Radars, Enhanced Q-36 Radars Industry Conference
   (Presentation), Nov. 29, 2005, slides 9, 19. NG also notes that, on the
   day CECOM issued the final RFP, in response to a question with respect to
   the draft RFP concerning the preferred mode of operation, CECOM stated
   that "[t]he preferred mode of operation is 360 degrees for the mission
   period, 100% of the time." Question No. 1. As for the final RFP itself, NG
   focuses primarily on language in the SOO stating that the EQ-36 system
   "shall provide increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8,
   including 360 degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased
   ranges." SOO sect. 1. The protester asserts that these indications from
   the agency made it clear that the 360 degree requirement applied to cannon
   and rockets, as well as mortars.

   Even assuming that NG reasonably interpreted the above language as setting
   forth an explicit requirement for 360 degree coverage for cannon and
   rockets in addition to mortars, NG's interpretation failed to take into
   account the terms of the actual RFP. In this regard, as noted by the
   agency, the November 2005 presolicitation presentation specifically
   cautioned that the "Formal RFP will be the Controlling Document in the
   Event There is a Conflict or Ambiguity." Presentation, Slide 4. The SOO in
   the final RFP clearly and unambiguously referenced the Performance Based
   Specification (PBS) as the document defining the performance requirements
   under the contemplated contract and, thus, the requirements with which
   offerors had to agree to comply, providing that "[t]he EQ-36 System is to
   be an enhancement of the aging target acquisition counter fire radar
   system AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, improving operational and physical functionality as
   defined in the [PBS]," and that "[t]he EQ-36 System shall perform as
   described in the [PBS]." SOO sections 1.1, 1.4.

   The PBS, read as a whole, does not require 360 degree coverage for cannon
   and rockets in order to be eligible for award. Section 3.3.4 of the PBS,
   entitled "Single Weapon Location Performance, 360 Degree Sector," defined
   the required 360 degree capability for each of the procurement increments
   in terms of the required range, probability of location, and accuracy with
   respect to the enumerated weapons. That section provided generally as
   follows:

     Increment 1: The EQ-36 System shall implement a 360 degree weapon
     location mode with minimum performance criteria.

     Increment 2: In its 360 degree mode, the EQ-36 System shall meet the
     following performance requirements against mortar, cannon and rocket
     weapons in Table 2.

   PBS sect. 3.3.4. The specific range requirements in the 360 degree mode
   were set forth in Table 2 as follows:

       3.3.4.1 Range

       When operating in a 360 degree sector mode, the EQ-36 System shall
       locate mortar, cannon and rocket targets at the ranges listed in Table
       2 below.

   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |         Weapon          |             Location  Range (km)             |
   |-------------------------+----------------------------------------------|
   |   Type   |   Subtype    |  Increment 1*  | Increment 2  | Increment 3  |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |Mortar    | Light (60mm) |                |   3 -- 10    |   3 -- 12    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |          |Medium (81mm) |       5*       |   3 -- 12    |   3 -- 14    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |          |Heavy (120mm) |                |   3 -- 15    |   3 -- 18    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |Cannon    |Light (105mm) |                |              |   5 -- 25    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |          |Medium (155mm)|                |              |   5 -- 32    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |          | Heavy (8in)  |                |              |   5 -- 32    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |Rocket    |Light (107mm) |                |              |   8 -- 32    |
   |----------+--------------+----------------+--------------+--------------|
   |          |Heavy (122mm) |                |              |   15 -- 40   |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

   * As a minimum the Government will fire a single range with various aspect
   angles to validate 360 degree performance in Increment 1
                            Table 2 360 Degree Range

   It is significant, we think, that the table includes no range requirements
   for cannon and rockets in Increment 1 or Increment 2; rather, the only
   range requirements for cannon and rockets were in the boxes for Increment
   3, that is, the increment whose "efforts represent future growth
   capabilities and are not mandatory." PBS sect. 1. The obvious inference to
   be drawn from the absence of any Increment 1 or Increment 2 range
   requirements for cannon or rockets, when there were Increment 1 and
   Increment 2 range requirements for only mortars and Increment 3 ranges for
   cannon and rockets, is that there were no Increment 1 or Increment 2
   requirements for 360 degree coverage for cannon or rockets. This
   interpretation is further strengthened by the language in the PBS
   regarding the 360 degree coverage probability of location requirements,
   which were described as follows:

     3.3.4.2 Probability of Location (PL)<

     Increment 1: The EQ-36 System shall have at least an 85 percent PL for
     each mortar firing point over the full 360 degree search sector.

     Increment 2: The EQ-36 System shall have at least an 85 percent PL for
     each mortar firing point over the full 360 degree search sector.

     Increment 3: If proposed the EQ-36 System shall have at least a
     90 percent PL for each mortar, cannon and rocket firing point over the
     full 360 degree search sector.

   PBS sect. 3.3.4.2. As with the PBS range requirements, the absence of any
   Increment 1 or Increment 2 probability of location requirements for cannon
   or rockets, when there were Increment 1 and Increment 2 probability of
   location requirements for only mortars and Increment 3 probability of
   location standards for cannon and rockets, again indicates that there were
   no Increment 1 or Increment 2 requirements for 360 degree coverage for
   cannon or rockets.[2]

   This interpretation is strengthened further still by the contrast between
   the 360 degree range table in the final RFP and the table in the draft
   versions of the RFP. Specifically, the table in the January 13, 2006 draft
   RFP included the reference "TBD" (to be determined) or "TBD per contractor
   proposal" in the Increment 1 and 2 boxes for cannon and rockets, and the
   February 13, February 21, and April 6 draft RFPs contained the reference
   "Per Contractor Proposal" in those boxes. PBS sect. 3.3.4.1, Draft RFP. In
   our view, the replacement of the requirement contained in the PBS in the
   draft RFPs, for the contractor to insert a value for the range at which
   its radar would detect cannon and rockets in the 360 degree mode, with an
   empty box in the actual RFP could only reasonably be understood as
   indicating that whatever requirement may have existed in this regard in
   the draft RFPs had been eliminated.

   Indeed, as noted by the agency, a fair reading of the contemporaneous
   record suggests that NG in fact understood that there were no Increment 1
   or Increment 2 requirements for 360 degree coverage for cannon or rockets.
   In this regard, for example, an Item for Negotiation (IFN) issued by the
   agency with respect to NG's proposal to provide 360 degree coverage for
   cannon and rockets, requested NG to "[p]rovide justification that the
   EQ-36 system will meet the [Probability of Location] and Accuracy
   requirements for cannon and rockets in 360 degree mode over the ranges
   proposed in the Offeror's PS [Performance Specification] Table 5
   360 Degree Range." NG responded, in part, that "[t]he cannon and rocket
   LFTM [Live Fire Test Matrix] cases demonstrate the ability for the
   360-degree mode to have significant residual capacity against cannon and
   rockets beyond the Army mortar-only requirements." NG Response to IFN No.
   TTC2-0005.[3] Likewise, in presenting its proposed 360 degree approach in
   its FPR, NG acknowledged that "performance against cannons and rockets is
   not required until Increment 3 in the 360-o mode," and further provided
   that "[a]lthough the Increment 2 requirements include only the mortar
   firings, the analysis [in NG Table 2.3.4-5] also included the cannon
   minimum range firings." NG Technical Approach, sections 2.3.4.2, 2.3.4.4.
   It is clear from these exchanges with the Army that NG understood that
   there was no Increment 1 or Increment 2 requirement for 360 degree
   coverage for cannon and rockets. The integrity of the protest process does
   not permit a protester to espouse one interpretation of a solicitation
   during the procurement, and then argue during a protest that the
   interpretation is unreasonable. BST Sys., Inc., B-298761, B-298761.2, Dec.
   1, 2006, 2006 CPD para. ___ at 6; AAI Eng'g Support, Inc., B-257857, Nov.
   16, 1994, 95-1 CPD para. 2 at 3-4.

   Relative Evaluation

   NG asserts that, even if CECOM was not required to reject LM's proposal
   based on the 360 degree requirement, it should have given NG's proposal a
   higher rating than LM's under the technical approach subfactor for
   offering 360 degree coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline and
   other proposed enhancements.

   As noted above, both proposals were rated as good under the technical
   approach subfactor; both proposals received 5 significant strengths and
   numerous strengths (23 for NG and 19 for LM). In this regard, NG's
   proposal received significant strengths for offering: (1) 360 degree
   coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline; (2) [REDACTED];
   (3) [REDACTED]; (4) [REDACTED]; and (5) a fully-active (solid state)
   phased array radar, thereby enhancing reliability and maintainability and
   offering good power efficiency. EQ-36 Source Selection Final Evaluation
   Results Presentation to the SSA, at 16-24; Assist Characteristic Report
   for EQ-36, NG.

   Likewise, LM's proposal received five significant strengths on account of
   offering: (1) to base its EQ-36 radar on an actual, operational
   protototype target acquisition counter fire radar, the Multi-Mission
   Radar, Advanced Technology Objective (MMR-ATO), developed under contract
   to the Army and tested at the government's Yuma Proving Ground, rather
   than on parts of different types of radars as did NG; (2) [REDACTED]; (3)
   lower emplacement and displacement times, including [REDACTED] minutes to
   emplace the radar (versus [REDACTED] minutes for NG) and [REDACTED]
   minutes to displace the radar (versus [REDACTED] minutes for NG), thereby
   increasing the ability to keep pace with battlefield movements and
   increasing the survivability of the crew; (4) [REDACTED]; and (5) as with
   NG, a fully-active (solid state) phased array radar, thereby enhancing
   reliability and maintainability and offering good power efficiency. EQ-36
   Source Selection Final Evaluation Results Presentation to the SSA, at
   16-24; Assist Characteristic Report for EQ-36, LM.

   NG primarily asserts that CECOM gave insufficient weight to its offer of
   360 degree coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline. According to
   the protester, its proposal should have been rated as superior to LM's
   under the technical approach subfactor.

   The evaluation was reasonable. The statement of evaluation criteria in
   section M of the solicitation furnished only a general listing of the
   specific subfactors under the technical evaluation factor, describing them
   simply as the "Technical Approach Sub-factor," "Supportability
   Sub-factor," and "Management Sub-factor." RFP sect. M-4. However, section
   M also generally provided that in evaluating proposals under each
   technical subfactor, the agency would consider the feasibility of the
   proposed approach, including "[t]he extent to which successful performance
   is contingent upon proven devices and techniques that do not require
   significant Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) and re-design." Id. Section M
   further cautioned that while the government "values greater technical
   capability early in the design," "any proposed additional capability (i.e.
   addressing Increment 2 requirements and/or Increment 3 future growth
   capabilities within the Increment 1 baseline) will be assessed for its
   associated risks along with successful delivery of Increment 1
   requirements, which remains the Government's priority." Id. Similarly, as
   noted above, while the SOO provided that the EQ-36 system "shall provide
   increased capability over the existing AN/TPQ-36(V) 8, including 360
   degree azimuth coverage against all threats at increased ranges," SOO
   sect. 1, the SOO cautioned that "schedule is a critical aspect of the
   EQ-36 program due to the urgent nature of the requirement," and "[g]iven
   the need to quickly field a system to meet ongoing requirements,
   technically mature solutions shall be procured to meet existing and
   emerging needs." SOO sections 1.4, 3.6.

   The record indicates that, while NG had proposed to include 360 degree
   coverage for cannon and rockets in its baseline, NG's proposed solution
   was determined by the agency to be a "paper design" not yet built, in
   which parts of different types of radar, including [REDACTED], and for
   which there was only simulated and analytical data, with (unlike for LM)
   no empirical data derived from operation of the proposed system. Tr. at
   79, 170-71, 323, 341, 379, 451, 581, 758-59. Although NG's proposed 360
   degree approach ultimately was rated as low to moderate risk after the
   agency gave it the "benefit of the doubt" based upon NG having furnished a
   "good paper," the subject matter experts from Georgia Tech Research
   Institute who were advising the agency concluded that NG's approach in
   fact entailed moderate risk, while the subfactor chairman for technical
   approach viewed the risk associated with NG's proposal as closer to
   moderate risk. Tr. at 616-18, 626. In particular, according to the agency,
   the challenge of locating all types of weapons coupled with the limited
   detection opportunities in the 360 degree mode will require robust
   detection, tracking, identification and ballistic modeling algorithms;
   NG's proposed approach therefore was determined to have a higher
   probability of issues arising during the test phase, which could require
   modification of the algorithms and further testing, thereby potentially
   placing in jeopardy NG's ability to meet to required 30-month schedule for
   delivering the initial baseline EQ-36 systems. In other words, NG's
   proposal to address all threats posed a higher risk to schedule. Tr. at
   342-43, 619; Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) Chairman, Nov. 17,
   2006, at 8-9.

   In contrast, as discussed above, LM based its EQ-36 radar on an actual,
   operational protototype target acquisition counter fire radar, the
   MMR-ATO, developed under contract with the Army, and which has
   demonstrated 90 degree and 360 degree counter fire target acquisition
   during testing at the government's Yuma Proving Ground. Indeed, as noted
   by LM during discussions, not only was there extensive simulation of the
   MMR-ATO's performance against cannons and rockets in 360 degree mode, but
   in addition, LM had undertaken "very limited field testing against
   cannons" at Yuma Proving Ground using the MMR-ATO which showed that the
   "system does provide some level of performance against some cannon and
   rocket trajectories." LM Technical Approch Proposal at 1-3; LM Response to
   IFN No. TTB1-0137; LM Performance Risk Proposal at 57-60; Assist
   Characteristic Report for EQ-36, LM, at 21; SSEB Chairman, Nov. 17, 2006,
   at 7; Tr. at 78-79, 169-70, 323, 357-60. According to the SSA, the fact
   that LM was basing its proposed system on an existing, operational
   protototype target acquisition counter fire radar was "a tremendous risk
   mitigator" which gave the agency "confidence that this was a mature design
   and able to easily meet our schedule." Tr. at 451. The SSA accordingly
   viewed LM's approach in this regard to be "a tremendous significant
   strength." Id.

   Given the stated emphasis in the solicitation on obtaining "technically
   mature solutions" and the "priority" placed upon successfully meeting a
   shortened schedule so as to "quickly field a system" to meet the agency's
   "urgent" requirement, we find no basis for questioning the agency's
   ultimate determination under the technical approach subfactor that
   proposing to include in an unbuilt design 360 degree coverage for cannon
   and rockets did not thereby render the proposal superior to a proposal
   based upon an actual, operational prototype target acquisition counter
   fire radar which had undergone testing at a government facility.

   Nor has NG shown that other elements of its proposed solution represented
   a sufficient enhancement or otherwise were deserving of such additional
   credit, as to require the agency to find its proposal superior to LM's
   under the technical approach subfactor. For example, NG asserts that its
   proposal should have received a significant strength based on its approach
   to the requirement in section 3.16.1 of the PBS, entitled "Anti-Radiation
   Missile (ARM) Survivability," that the EQ-36 radar "be able to react to
   and protect against an ARM attack." In this regard, an ARM missile attacks
   radar by using its guidance system to hone in on radio frequency (RF)
   emissions by the radar. LM proposed to meet this requirement by ceasing
   emissions when notified that an ARM launch is imminent or in progress. LM
   Response to IFN No. TTB1-0057. LM's approach of turning off the radar was
   determined by the agency to be acceptable on the basis that it would end
   further RF transmissions that the ARM could use to locate the radar. Tr.
   at 351.[4] In contrast, NG proposed to [REDACTED] in order to continue
   operation in a degraded mode while reducing radar signature. NG Response
   to IFN No. TTC1-0082; SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 11-12.[5]

   Although the NG solution offered the possibility of continuing to operate
   the radar while at the same time [REDACTED], the agency was concerned
   that, by continuing to radiate RF energy, the radar would be vulnerable to
   detection by the ARM and the ARM's honing in on the radar's emission. The
   agency's concern in this regard was increased by the fact that, under the
   NG solution the radar [REDACTED], with the possibility that [REDACTED],
   the ARM would be able to hone in on the radar. Indeed, a consultant
   retained by NG in this matter conceded in his testimony that there might
   be times when the mission of counter fire was not critical, and the "smart
   decision" would be to turn off the radar. Tr. at 675. Furthermore, under
   NG's approach there would be a [REDACTED]. The agency concluded that in
   these circumstances, given the risk to the radar and the [REDACTED] under
   NG's proposed solution, that solution did not warrant assignment of a
   strength. Tr. at 51-60; 351-54; SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 12; Agency
   Post-Hearing Comments, Dec. 21, 2006, at 11. Although NG challenges that
   conclusion, asserting that the risk to the radar is less than the agency
   believes, the protester has not shown that the agency's concerns were
   unreasonable, and it has furnished no basis for our Office to question the
   agency's determination not to award NG a strength in this regard. In
   conclusion, having considered NG's various challenges to the evaluation
   under the technical approach subfactor, we find no basis to question the
   agency's rating of both proposals as good under this subfactor.

   SUPPORTABILITY

   NG challenges the evaluation of proposals under the supportability factor.
   In this regard, NG's proposal was rated as only acceptable under the
   supportability factor, having received no significant strengths and two
   strengths, including: (1) a strength for furnishing [REDACTED]; and (2) a
   strength for proposing to invest in technology (using Office of Naval
   Research and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency funding) in order
   to reduce life cycle costs (LCC) and the manning footprint. In contrast,
   LM's proposal was rated as good under the supportability factor, with two
   significant strengths and two strengths, including: (1) a significant
   strength for design elements that reduced the logistics footprint and
   improved supportability, including [REDACTED] specific design improvements
   to the MMR-ATO radar upon which LM's system was based, and a system
   configuration that [REDACTED]; (2) a significant strength for proposing
   [REDACTED]; (3) a strength for proposing [REDACTED]; and (4) a strength
   for proposing to achieve significant savings by [REDACTED].

   NG asserts that the agency failed to credit a number of elements of its
   proposed approach with significantly reducing the logistics footprint of
   the radar system. Included among its arguments is the claim that the
   supportability evaluators unreasonably failed to consider information from
   other parts of NG's proposal. Specifically, noting that the supportability
   evaluators were alerted to the significance of the LM system configuration
   by a technical approach evaluator, NG asserts that the supportability
   evaluators acted unfairly in limiting their review of NG's proposal to the
   supportability volume of NG's proposal, thereby failing to take into
   account relevant information regarding the design of NG's system found in
   the technical approach volume. In any case, NG asserts, references to the
   assertedly relevant design features were also found in its supportability
   volume.

   We have considered NG's several specific challenges to the supportability
   evaluation and find that they furnish no basis for questioning the overall
   determination that LM's proposal was more advantageous than NG's under the
   supportability subfactor. For example, NG asserts that it did not receive
   sufficient evaluation credit for its proposed mean time between failure
   (MTBF). In this regard, section 3.19 of the PBS, "Reliability," required
   the EQ-36 system to have a minimum MTBF of 185 hours in Increment 1 and
   330 hours in Increment 2. NG, which included calculations in its proposal
   indicating that its design would ultimately have an MTBF of
   [REDACTED] hours, received a strength (with a low to moderate risk rating)
   under the technical approach subfactor for agreeing in its performance
   specification to an MTBF of [REDACTED] hours in its Increment 1 baseline.
   LM, which estimated that its system has an MTBF of [REDACTED] hours, but
   described a process by which the MTBF would be significantly improved to
   above [REDACTED] hours, also received a strength under the technical
   approach subfactor for agreeing in its performance specification to an
   MTBF of [REDACTED] hours in its Increment 1 baseline.

   NG asserts that its proposal should have received a significant strength
   under the supportability subfactor because the increased reliability
   represented by the calculated MTBF of [REDACTED] hours for its design
   would contribute to reducing the logistics footprint for the radar system.
   Although the agency maintains that MTBF was to be evaluated only under the
   technical approach subfactor, and in fact the most extensive discussion of
   reliability for both offerors is to be found in the technical approach
   volumes of their proposals, LM Technical Approach Volume at 129-38,
   165-66, NG Technical Approach Volume at 2-90 to 2-92; NG Response to
   Technical Approach IFN No. TTC1-0002, we believe that the agency's
   position fails to account for the fact that the instructions to offerors
   in section L of the solicitation directed that reliability be discussed
   both in the technical approach volume and in the supportability volume of
   their proposals. RFP sect. L-18. (Again, the evaluation criteria in
   section M of the solicitation provided little guidance in this regard.)
   Moreover, we note that, in the evaluation, the agency acknowledged that
   increased MTBF "would positively impact Supportability and Operational
   Availability." Assist Characteristic Report for EQ-36, NG, at 27. However,
   to the extent that NG's proposal may have been entitled to a strength for
   its MTBF under the supportability subfactor as well as under the technical
   approach subfactor, the protester has not shown that LM would not also be
   entitled to a strength under the supportability factor for agreeing to a
   [REDACTED] MTBF requirement. Moreover, we find reasonable the position of
   the SSEB that the fact that NG committed itself in its performance
   specification to an MTBF of only [REDACTED] hours indicated a lack of
   confidence in the [REDACTED] hours it predicted for its design, and that
   there thus was no basis for assigning NG's proposal a significant strength
   in this regard. SSEB Chairman, Nov. 17, 2006, at 12.

   As a further example, we find unpersuasive NG's claim that it was entitled
   to more evaluation credit under the supportability subfactor because its
   estimate of the LCC of its design ($[REDACTED]) was lower than LM's
   ($[REDACTED]). NG Supportability Volume at 8-10; LM Supportability Volume
   at 60. The SSEB technical supportability chairman testified that, not only
   were the estimates uncertain given the developmental status of the
   proposed systems but that, in any case, the great majority of the
   difference in estimated LCC for the systems resulted from LM's having used
   a higher estimate of the cost of the service personnel who would be
   operating and maintaining the systems, a matter that was in the control of
   the government and was not contractor-driven. Tr. at 208-14. NG has not
   shown these calculations to be in error, and we thus have no basis for
   questioning the evaluation in this area. We conclude that there is no
   basis to question the agency's determination that LM's proposal was
   superior to NG's under the supportability subfactor.

   Given that the record supports the agency's determination that LM's
   proposal was technically superior to NG's, and since LM's evaluated
   cost/price was lower than NG's, the agency reasonably determined that LM's
   proposal represented the best value to the government.

   The protest is denied.

   Gary L. Kepplinger
   General Counsel

   ------------------------

   [1] The EQ-36 is also intended to replace the AN/TPQ-37 target acquisition
   counter fire radar. Contracting Officer's Statement, Nov. 17, 2006, at 2.

   [2] In contrast to the above PBS provisions with respect to range and
   probability of location, which specifically identified the weapons for
   which coverage was to be provided, the PBS accuracy requirements referred
   only to levels of accuracy with respect to "the locations computed." PBS
   sect. 3.3.4.3.

   [3] The PBS included the Live Fire Test Matrix as an appendix. The matrix
   provided test parameters (describing each shot) to be used in evaluating
   radar performance against various mortars, cannon and rockets in both the
   90 degree and 360 degree modes; in the 360 degree mode, the matrix
   provided test parameters both for mortars and, apparently in the event
   that an offeror proposed coverage beyond the PBS requirements, also for
   cannon and rockets. RFP, app. A, Live Fire Test Matrix--360 Degree
   Sectors.

   [4] LM included with its IFN response an estimate of the probability of
   survival for the radar (assuming typical ARM characteristics) depending
   upon the distance from the radar the ARM is when the radar ceases RF
   emissions. LM Response to IFN No. TTB1-0057. LM's estimate indicated that
   the probability of the radar surviving was [REDACTED]. LM Response to IFN
   No. TTB1-0057.

   [5] LM advised the agency that its radar offered a future growth
   capability to add [REDACTED]. See SSEB Chairman, Dec. 6, 2006, at 12.